

ACHTERGRONDEN

AFBRAAK

JOEGOSLAVIË

1-D

Sagittarius

Van: "CDSM" <csm_b@btopenworld.com>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:>
Verzonden: zondag 26 januari 2003 23:04
Onderwerp: BBC SERIES 'THE FALL OF MILOSEVIC' - A MOCKERY OF

Dear All,

I've attached a review of the BBC documentary 'The Fall of Milosevic' which ran for three weeks and finished last weekend. It is being published in the next edition of 'Lalkar' (end of Feb) which is a left-wing paper. Please feel free to alter/add to it and use it as you see fit.

If there are any glaring errors then please let me know.

Regards Ian Johnson

BBC SERIES 'THE FALL OF MILOSEVIC' – A MOCKERY OF HISTORY

On November 5th 1990, the U.S. House and Senate passed Foreign Operations Appropriation Law 101-513 calling for the cut-off of aid and credits to Yugoslavia, knowing full well the destabilising effect that this would have, since conducting trade without credits is virtually impossible in the modern world. At this time there was no civil war, no republic had seceded and the United States was not engaged in any public dispute with Yugoslavia.

In 1992 the United States sent a group of 100 Nato personnel to Bosnia where they established a military headquarters at Kiseljak, a short distance from Sarajevo. A Nato diplomat described this operation to 'Intelligence Digest' in the following terms: "This is a very cautious first step, and we are definitely not making much noise about it. But it could be the start of something bigger. You could argue that Nato now has a foot in the door. Whether we manage to open the door is not sure, but we have made a start." (Nato in the Balkans IAC 1998).

Alongside these developments, Germany, anxious to extend its sphere of influence in the region, encouraged Croatia to join Slovenia in declaring for independence, itself an unconstitutional move, and duly furnished the renegade republic with financial and military aid.

In Bosnia a negotiated agreement for a unified state was reached between the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb leaders. This agreement of all three parties was sabotaged by Washington who advised the Bosnian Muslim regime of Izetbegovic that it would get U.S. backing in any drive it undertook to dominate the entire state.

The initial plans of both the United States and Germany were to forge a new Balkan order, one based on the market organisation of economies. Thus, under the guise of 'fostering democracy', the way was being opened for the recolonisation of the Balkans.

The planned reorganisation was for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be brought under the German sphere of influence, whereby Germany acquired access to the sea on the Adriatic and in the event that the Serbs could be overwhelmed, access to the new Rhine-Danube canal, a route which links the North Sea and the Black Sea. The southern part of Yugoslavia was to fall into the American sphere of influence. Macedonia was to be the centrepiece of this American region. This sphere would also include Albania, and, if the Sanjak and Kosovo could be stripped away from Serbia, those areas would also be included. These initial plans can be found in the National Security Directive. 'U.S. Policy Towards Yugoslavia', issued by the White House Washington D.C.

Consequently, in 1991-92, Yugoslavia, a socialist federation of six republics and two autonomous regions, which had existed in peace since 1945 when partisan forces defeated the German Nazis and their Croatian Ustashe allies in World War II, disintegrated into civil war.

Any honest analysis of the history of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the rise and fall of its leading participants, that does not take into account the above developments, is not a representation of the history of the Balkans but is in fact a mockery of that history.

The recently screened BBC documentary, 'The Fall of Milosevic' falls into the latter category. Accepted as 'the final truth' by parts of the media, it is instead a not so subtle propaganda attempt to once again justify the unjustifiable, namely, the deliberate and premeditated destruction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the major powers Germany and the USA.

For the United States, Yugoslavia was significant not just for its own position on the map, but also for the areas to which it allows access, the Black Sea – Caspian Sea and the territories of the former Soviet Union with its immense oil and gas resources and the potential of unlimited cheap labour.

WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS

The advisor on this particular BBC version of history, was James Rubin, US Special Envoy, advisor to Madeleine Albright, and now U.S. State Department Public Relations Head, and therefore an interested party whose objectivity should immediately come under suspicion.

It was James Rubin who in May 1999 greeted the indictment issued by the Hague Prosecutor Louise Arbour against Slobodan Milosevic for 'war crimes' as "justifying Nato's bombing policy."

During the 1990s Rubin married Christiane Amanpour, CNN's main reporter on the Kosovo war. CNN is owned by Time-Warner Corporation, who not only have exclusive rights to broadcast, or prevent the broadcasting of, the trial of Mr Milosevic, but who also contribute substantial funds to the Hague Tribunal.

In June 2001 upon the kidnapping of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague, Amanpour met Richard Holbrooke, US representative and another major contributor to the BBC documentary. They congratulated each other on a joint success. (CNN Live at Daybreak June 29th 2001). Holbrooke was to be a crucial player in the Balkans conflict, as shall be demonstrated below.

ETHNIC CLEANSING.

Germany was the first country to recognise the newly seceded Croatia, its former WW11 ally, and oversaw the resurrection of the Ustashe movement. The Ustashe had operated the Jasenovac concentration camp and slaughtered thousands of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. The president of this new Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, wrote, "Genocide is a natural phenomenon in keeping with human social mythological divine nature. It is not only allowed but even recommended."

This was the man the Serbs faced in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1995, where, alongside their Muslim allies, they refused to leave what had been their homeland for three hundred years, and fought against 'Operation Storm' the latest Croat plan to ethnically cleanse the region. Before launching this assault Tudjman sought the approval of the USA. It was Richard Holbrooke who visited Zagreb two days before Croatia launched 'Operation Storm' in August 1995, giving US approval to the imminent operation.

As Croatian troops launched their assault on the population of the Krajina, United States aircraft destroyed Serbian radar and anti-aircraft defences, thus allowing Croatian planes the freedom to carry out extensive attacks on unprotected towns and positions. Seventy-three percent of homes were destroyed and in a matter of days two hundred thousand Serbs were ethnically cleansed. Tudjman commented, "It's as if they have never lived here. They didn't even have time to take with them their filthy money or their filthy underwear."

Perhaps we can now begin to realise why this 'final truth' documentary, featuring as one of its major contributors the very same Richard Holbrooke, made no mention of this US approved act of ethnic cleansing.

However Holbrooke did use the opportunity given him by the BBC to reiterate the story of how he came to be photographed with armed KLA members prior to Nato's onslaught. "It was a fact finding mission. We wanted to find out about these people, we didn't know them." This is not true. Whatever Holbrooke's mission was, it was not to find out about the KLA, the US knew exactly who and what the KLA were. The American media had carried reports about them from the early eighties. Here is an example: "The Albanian nationalists have a two point platform,... 'first to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania'" New York Times July 12th 1982.

EVIDENCE.

The 270-minute BBC documentary contained voice-overs, which claimed, in heartfelt tones of near sincerity, "The dictator Slobodan Milosevic is finally being brought to trial." and "Milosevic had driven whole communities from their homeland" and "The wars he provoked launched the term 'ethnic cleansing' and tore Yugoslavia apart."

Hence two things are immediately asserted. One, he is a dictator, and two, he has committed war crimes. Slobodan Milosevic is a dictator only if you ignore the facts that he has won three elections, all internationally recognised as legitimate at the time,

and that Yugoslavia operated as a parliamentary democracy. For instance the decision to put Yugoslavia on a war footing in 1999 prior to Nato's bombing campaign was a parliamentary decision, as was the acceptance of the 'peace agreement.' on 10th June 1999. In contrast to this, the 'democrat' Tony Blair, took the UK into the war without any reference to parliament whatsoever.

In regard to any war crimes may I suggest that if the programme makers have any evidence at all, other than hearsay and propaganda, then they should hot-foot it over to The Hague Tribunal immediately and present this evidence to the trial prosecutors and save that Court from further embarrassment and the time consuming tasks of having to torture witnesses in order to force them to present false testimony against Mr Milosevic, as in the recent case of former head of Yugoslav State Security Mr Radomir Markovic.

Of course the documentary makers, as the Hague Tribunal itself, have no evidence. What they have and what was presented in this series is propaganda.

PROPAGANDA.

At the outset of the break-up of the sovereign state of Yugoslavia, the Washington based public relations firm, Ruder and Finn Global Public Affairs, was handed the task of demonising the Serbs and their leadership.

They did their job exceptionally well and managed to turn the truth onto its head. It was the Serbs who were now incredibly decreed as being guilty of systematic ethnic cleansing, a policy that no one more than the Serbs had suffered from. Indeed the aim of Serbia was the preservation of the Yugoslav federation, not its disintegration, thus opposing the very essence of ethnic cleansing.

James Harff, director of Ruder Finn, when boasting of his propaganda achievements to French TV2, stated, "Speed is vital, it is the first assertion that really counts. All future denials are entirely ineffective." Ruder Finn uses several hundred journalists, politicians, representatives of humanitarian

associations and academics to create public opinion. When asked of his proudest public relation endeavours Harff responded, "To have managed to put Jewish opinion on our side. Tens of thousands of Jews perished in Croatian camps yet we succeeded masterfully."

Edward S. Herman in his article, 'Propaganda System Number One: From Diem and Arbenz to Milosevic', comments: "Once an enemy is demonised – from Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Jacob Guzman Arbenz in Guatemala in the early 1950s to Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s and up to today – the media display a form of hysteria that helps mobilise the public in support of whatever forms of violence the government wishes to carry out. They become a virtual propaganda arm of the government, joining with it in the common fight against 'another Hitler'. Under these conditions remarkable structures of disinformation can be built, institutionalised, and remain parts of historic memory even in the face of ex post confutations, which are kept out of sight."

The BBC is an integral part of disseminating such disinformation.

FUNDING.

When recounting the events of 5th October 2000 and the coup that brought the Western backed forces to power in Yugoslavia, the BBC faced a dilemma. The opposition leaders contributing to the series wanted to boast about the finance they received from the United States, yet the series had hitherto made no mention of such blatant outside interference in the electoral affairs of a sovereign state.

They got around this problem by creating the impression that receiving funding from the U.S. was the most natural thing in the world to do, given the fact they were facing such a ruthless enemy.

Serbian politicians Messrs. Covic, Ilic, Zivkovic, Svilanovic, Korac and Djindjic, have two things in common.

All appeared as contributors in the documentary and all were backed and funded by the United States of America in the struggle to impose a free market economy on Yugoslavia. Zoran Djindjic, current prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party, is a man who fled Serbia during the Nato bombardment and continued during and after the bombing to meet with Madeleine Albright and US Special Balkans Envoy Richard Gelbard. Djindjic is the 'money man' and when he opens his mouth it is Albright who is speaking. Not surprisingly it was Djindjic who led the call for complete Yugoslav submission to the United States and initiated the moves to break up the Yugoslav Federation and remove the name Yugoslavia from the map.

Darling of many left-wing groups and portrayed as the man who led a section of mineworkers out on strike against the government is Velimir Ilic. However Ilic is an army deserter who refused to cooperate with the Yugoslav Army during the resistance to Nato's bombing. He boasted to the New York Times of his role in the coup and outlined the organisation behind it, thus giving the lie to the media presentation of the events of 5th October as 'spontaneous'.

The full extent of the US funding was, for obvious reasons, not disclosed in the BBC series. However let us rectify that 'oversight' by noting the following:

Most of the funding was channelled through the US government agency, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Founded in 1983, the NED took over functions that were once the responsibility of the CIA. Unlike the CIA however the NED receives open congressional appropriations, as opposed to the previously covert funding, and thus their activities are openly documented. For instance NED programme operator Paul McCarthy revealed in his testimony to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that the NED, in 1998, was responsible in Yugoslavia for the

newspapers Nasa Borba, Vreme and Danas, the TV station Negotin, the news agency BETA and the Belgrade station Radio B-92.

Significantly, in August 1999, the NED increased their funding to the Serbian 'youth' organisation Otpor, essentially recruiting the most reactionary layers from the ranks of the unemployed. The fruits of this strategy are outlined in the NED's own literature. "Otpor's activists played a crucial role in the street demonstrations that followed the elections and led to Milosevic's ultimate downfall on October 5th." And further: "Otpor's first major campaign was a nation-wide effort to pressure the regime to arrest Slobodan Milosevic." That Otpor were following a strategy laid down by Washington was emphasised when Richard Holbrooke admitted to the New York Times of 8th April 2001, "The arrest of Mr Milosevic resulted from American pressure."

It is worth noting that included among the directors on the board of the National Endowment for Democracy are Wesley Clark – former Supreme Commander of Nato, Richard Holbrooke – former Assistant Secretary of State and Francis Fukuyama – author of the anti-communist diatribe, 'The End of History.'

SUICIDE.

The BBC documentary deemed it fitting to repeat the lie that upon his arrest Mr Milosevic was suicidal. The documentary used Zarko Korac to give this story some credence. The suicide myth originated in the New York Times of 2nd April 2001 and the relevant part of the article reads: 'Zarko Korac, a Serbian deputy prime minister, said this morning that Mr Milosevic had waved his own gun during the discussion and had threatened to kill himself and his wife, Mirjana Markovic, and his daughter, Marija. Mr Korac said Mr Milosevic 'was in bad shape' but had finally agreed to surrender to save lives.'

Two things to note about Mr Korac and his version of events. First Zarko Korac has been appearing regularly on Western TV for the last ten years as an 'expert on Yugoslav psychology' and is very much the American's man. Second, Korac was not even present at the discussions he was describing. Banislav Ivkovic of the SPS, who was present, explains why this suicide story was put out: "In fact, Mr Milosevic was quite calm, which is amazing given the threat to himself, his family and his supporters. Why is Mr Korac, *who was not present*, telling these lies about Mr Milosevic's actions and mood? We fear this is an effort to create public opinion that views Mr Milosevic as suicidal. Then, in the likely eventuality that the DOS-controlled, or should we say the US controlled Serbian judiciary cannot break Mr Milosevic, thus making it impossible to stage a proper show trial, the regime will assassinate him in jail and say he committed suicide." Reporter Jared Israel who talked at length with Milosevic just days before the former president's arrest shares this view. Israel comments: "The US Establishment has continued to finance and train KLA terrorists while they committed the vilest crimes in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia. The US supported the KLA while it drove 90% of non-Albanians from Kosovo. The US Establishment intentionally bombed civilian trains, homes, and Serbian Television, during the 1999 aggression against Yugoslavia. For such people, morality is not an issue. Murder is a practical affair: will it help us or hurt us?"

TODAY.

With the BBC's portrayed heroes now in power, what benefits have befallen the general population today? The documentary stopped short of addressing this, and with good reason: "Kosovo remains a lawless society, completely intolerant of ethnic minorities and one of the most dangerous places on earth." (James Bisset, former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia – Ottawa Citizen June 22nd 2002).

" The drug barons of Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia have become the new economic elite, often linked to important Western commercial interests. The income from trafficking in drugs and arms was then recycled into other illegal activities like networks of prostitution."

" With the new government, the prices of bread, meat and electricity have exploded. But the miners from Kolubara who helped turn out Milosevic are currently being accused of 'blackmail' by prime minister Djindjic – whose popularity has dropped to 8%. During this time Kosovo, used to justify the Nato bombardment of Yugoslavia, has lived under the terror of mafias and has seen all nationalities ethnically cleansed despite, or because of, the presence of 40,000 Nato troops." (Michel Collon Two years later-Where is Yugoslavia. November 2002).

"The highest unemployment rates in all of Europe are in Bosnia 60%, and Kosovo 57%" (Associated Press October 8th 2002).

" In Kosovo the United States have built the largest military installation outside of America, 'Camp Bondsteel' It was built by Brown & Roots Services, a subsidiary of the US petroleum services firm Halliburton. The Head of Halliburton is Dick Cheney current vice-president of the U.S. Brown & Root is now the number one employer in Kosovo." (Balkans-infos June 2002).

" At least 800,000 Serbian workers-must be laid off." (Arvo Cudda World Bank representative. Tanjug. January 24th. 2002).

In addition to the above prime minister Djindjic has announced the closure of Serbia's four largest banks. They are to be handed over to foreign control. Djindjic is also following the demand made by the World Bank that all public services be privatised and state-run industries sold at auction, effectively handing control of the Serbian economy over to foreign interests.

In August 2002 Momir Gavrilovic of the Serbian Security Services visited president Kostunica and handed over information which tied the Western backed Djindjic to the mafia. The evidence was precise and damning. Momir Gavrilovic was found murdered before August had ended. No one has been charged.

The whole premise of the BBC series is that it is asking viewers to believe that both the United States and Britain would send their forces thousands of miles for the sole purpose of 'protecting' a particular ethnic group, with no other interests involved. Such an altruistic outlook would be touching if it was not so obscene.

"Slobodan Milosevic may not be a revolutionary in the mould of Fidel Castro or Che Guevara. But in Washington's eyes he committed the same sin as the protesters in Seattle and Prague. He said no to the 'new world order' and the International Monetary Fund. His government refused to accept IMF-dictated 'economic restructuring'. It refused to sell off all state owned industry and let Wall Street bankers run the country's economy. For that reason – and that alone- Yugoslavia was the target of eight years of war and economic sanctions by the US and Nato and a non-stop campaign of lies by the biggest propaganda machine in history, the US corporate news media." (Ramsey Clark. Former American Attorney General. October 12th 2000).

Ian Johnson January 2003.

Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <despot@www.dough.org>
 Aan: "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
 Verzonden: dinsdag 28 januari 2003 23:00
 Onderwerp: Fw: New Book about Nato's Lies in

----- Original Message -----

From: stichting obj <stichtingobj@home.nl>
 To: Despotovic, Ruza <despot@wish.net>
 Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 9:22 PM
 Subject: Fw: New Book about Nato's Lies in Yugoslavia

>

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: "Jürgen Elsässer" <J.Elsasser@t-online.de>
 > To: <juergen-elsaesser@gmx.de>
 > Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 7:40 PM
 > Subject: New Book about Nato's Lies in Yugoslavia

>

>

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>>

>>

>> Chers Amis de la Yugoslavie,

>>

>> je suis heureux de vous annoncer que mon livre est finalement traduit en
 >> français (les éditions serbes et italiennes sont en vente déjà depuis
 >> quelques mois):

>>

>> LA RFA DANS LA GUERRE AU KOSOVO

>> Chronique d'une Manipulation

>> 260 p., 22 ?

>> (Traduction de Pauline Massy et Edouard Recezeg)

>>

>> Vous pouvez commander un livre chez L'Harmattan, je pense que c'est
 > gratuit

>> pour journalists:

>> L'Harmattan, 5-7 rue de l'Ecole-Polytechnique, F-75005 Paris, France

>> Tel. 01-40467922 (service de presse)

>>

>> En mars, une présentation de livre est prévu à Paris. J'espère de vous
 > voir

>> ...

>>

>> Amicalement,

>> Juergen Elsaesser

>>

>>

>> Nouveaux textes en: www.juergen-elsaesser.de

>>

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 > Checked by AVG anti-virus system (<http://www.grisoft.com>).
 > Version: 6.0.445 / Virus Database: 250 - Release Date: 21-1-2003
 >

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jurisprudence of the European Commission and the European Court with respect to extraterritorial acts of by states.

It is a basic tenet of the Convention that states are bound to secure the rights of

"all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, not only when that authority is exercised within their own territory but also when it is exercised abroad." (Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77, Dec. Adm. Comm., 13 DR 85 at para. 19 (1978))

And in Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, Dec. Adm. Comm., 18 YB 82 at 120 (1975) it is considered that the

"authorised agents of the State, including.. armed forces, not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad but bring any other persons or property "within the jurisdiction" of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property. In so far as, by their acts or omissions, they affect such persons or property, the responsibility of the State is engaged."

NOTA BENE : 'by their acts or omissions'.

So even when there exist a certain measure of what is called 'actual authority' of State number one over some citizens of State number two, these subjects abroad can claim to be 'within the jurisdiction' of State one, in so far as they are affected by the acts or omissions of state one.

When this is even applicable on persons into the territory of another State, then it is certainly also valid for persons within the territory of the State itself.
Like Mr. Milosevic, being on Dutch territory.

It is abundantly clear that the person of Mr. Milosevic is affected repeatedly and profoundly by the 'acts and omissions' of the State of the Netherlands.

For instance the act of hosting this so-called tribunal.
Or the omission to host this tribunal by agreement, but without stipulating an adequate protection of human rights by this tribunal.

Or the act of complicity in the illegal kidnapping and abduction of Mr. Milosevic to the Hague.

Or the omission of failure to provide any legal instrument or provision to Mr. Milosevic in order to counteract the human rights violation he has to suffer by the tribunal.

And so on.

Consequently it is beyond any ^{ak n.} reasonable doubt that, with regard to the circumstances of ~~my client~~, there still exists a situation that, in general, the Dutch jurisdiction is unimpeded.

Nico Steijnen

From: Mick Collins <cirqueminime@club-internet.fr>
To: Krsljanin Vladimir <vlada@sps.org.yu>
Cc: Christopher Black <bar@idirect.com>; Louis Dalmás <lodalmas@wanadoo.fr>; Jared Israël <jaredi@aol.com>; Nico van holst en steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: zaterdag 9 februari 2002 23:00
Subject: FW: "Milosevic, Prisoner of Conscience" - from New Statesman

Vlada, I received this from Michael Parenti, a prominent American writer, public speaker and teacher from the Left. His book about Yugoslavia, To Kill A Nation, is excellent and shows a real dedication to telling the truth about your country and your people. I have been sending him all the material on the case and he has asked to have his name included on the Committee. I think he's a valuable addition. See you Monday in A-dam.
Mick

De : Michael Parenti <mp@michaelparenti.org>
Date : Sat, 09 Feb 2002 14:16:00 -0800
À : Mick Collins <cirqueminime@club-internet.fr>
Objet : Re: FW: "Milosevic, Prisoner of Conscience" - from New Statesman

Mick add my name to both the letters you sent to me. I don't know how to do it being technologically challenged.

van holst en steijnen

From: Despotovic, Ruza <despot@wish.net>
To: Globalreflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>; Hans Hupkes <hans.hupkes@tomaatnet.nl>; Nico & Neeltje Steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: vrijdag 28 december 2001 15:10
Subject: Fw: [www.ANTIC.org] NATO in the Balkans

----- Original Message -----

From: Miroslav Antic <miroslav@antic.org>
 To: 'YUGO' <Yugoland@yahooogroups.com>; 'BALKAN' <BalkanNews@yahooogroups.com>; 'News' <news@siem.net>; 'SNN' <news@antic.org>
 Cc: <sorabia@yahooogroups.com>; NSP <STOP-NSP@topica.com>; <K-P-J@yahooogroups.com>; <sin@antic.org>; 'YUEMB - Ottawa' <webmaster@yuemb.ca>; <diplomat@yuemb.ca>; <yuambaus@ins.at>; 'YU-UN' <yugoslavia@un.int>; 'yuamb-NL' <yuambanl@bart.nl>; 'ARCHIVE' <archive@jab.org>; 'SIM' <sim@antic.org>; 'SIM Egroups' <SrpskaInformativnaMreza@egroups.com>
 Sent: Friday, December 28, 2001 11:08 PM
 Subject: [www.ANTIC.org] NATO in the Balkans

>
 >
 > This book is scheduled to go to the printers in two weeks. However,
 > the IAC still needs to raise some more money to cover the printing
 > costs. Please send what you can.
 > Thank you

> *****

> International Action Center
 > 39 West 14th St., #206,
 > New York, NY, 10011

> Dear Friend,

> We are writing to inform you of an exciting,
 > new book soon to be published by the
 > International Action Center.

> This book is a follow-up to the extremely powerful
 > and informative "NATO in the Balkans."

> The brand-new book tells the truth about U.S.
 > and NATO strategy in the Balkans. And it exposes
 > the reality and scope of the war crimes committed
 > by the U.S. and NATO during and after their war
 > against Yugoslavia.

> The new work contains writings by over 30 of the
 > courageous
 > and articulate voices who opposed U.S./NATO
 > war crimes during and after the bombing of
 > Yugoslavia.

> In its 360 pages, the book details the media campaign
 > that hid the brutal destruction of Yugoslavia in the NATO
 > war. Twenty pages of photographs show the real
 > damage to civilians and infrastructure.

> There is also a historical record of the many Tribunals organized by
 > activists throughout the United States and Europe which found NATO
 > guilty of war crimes. The war crimes are listed and explained in great
 > detail in this book.

> "Hidden Agenda: US/NATO Takeover of Yugoslavia"
 > is a tool
 > for students and activists to use to understand and
 > explain the real story about the U.S./NATO war and

- > occupation. It is the only historical record in English documenting
- > NATO's illegal war in Yugoslavia. its contents must be known worldwide.
- > And the truth about the reality of NATO occupation must be told.
- >
- > This critically needed book will be published in
- > English and Greek by February 2002. A Serbian
- > edition will be available soon afterwards.
- >
- > The International Action Center has undertaken the
- > task of not only publishing this significant book but
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- >
- > You can help in this important endeavor. You can
- > help the International Action Center publish and
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- >
- > Funds are urgently needed to publish, promote,
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- >
- > Sara Flounders
- > Brian Becker
- > Heather Cottin

van holst en steijnen

From: CDSM <cdsm_b@btoopenworld.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Sent: woensdag 15 mei 2002 12:40
Subject: "Greater NATO" Flies to the Aid of "Greater Albania"

Hawks and Eagles: "Greater NATO" Flies to the Aid of "Greater Albania"

(A generally very good and well presented piece that however relies too heavily on theories of powerful ethnic lobby groups in the US and vested interests of various individuals and corporations while concentrating too little on the geo-political global interests of the US empire itself which relies on 25 year plans and chooses carefully who and what pressure groups to use to influence politicians and sell soap to the public. - PD)

Covert Action

By Diana Johnstone

On March 24, NATO launched its first full-scale aggressive war against a sovereign state. It was certainly not meant to be the last. NATO, it was repeatedly stated, had to prove its "resolve." The action was meant to be exemplary, a model for future NATO actions elsewhere and a warning to the world.

Yugoslavia had neither attacked nor threatened any other country. NATO acted illegally, without any mandate from the United Nations Security Council. By flouting the basic principles that underlie the fragile structure of international legality, the Clinton administration and NATO chose "might is right" as the law of the new millennium.

This appalling adventure, presented by servile media and ignorant politicians as a "humanitarian" necessity, set off precisely the "humanitarian catastrophe" its apologists claimed it was meant to prevent. Countless thousands of frightened ethnic Albanian civilians fled over rough terrain into neighboring countries. They were fleeing from the NATO bombing and Serb reprisals, in proportions it was not possible to measure. Both NATO and its armed Albanian allies in the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK or KLA) needed to persuade the world that "Milosevic" (the semi-fictional personification of evil on the one hand, and Serbia on the other) was carrying out "genocide" in Kosovo. The "genocide" story was necessary to justify both the bombing and the next phase of the NATO-KLA scenario, the invasion of Serbia to "liberate" Kosovo.

After a week of bombing, this much could be said with certainty: NATO leaders had lied so blatantly about things that could be checked, that there was no reason to believe anything they say about things that could not.

Among the many lies in the current torrent, one lie played a key role in the justifying of the NATO bombing, the "no alternative" lie: Since Milosevic refused peace negotiations, we had no choice but to bomb.⁽¹⁾

The "no alternative" lie incorporated several falsehoods in one.

Milosevic had not refused peace negotiations. For months, the Serbian government had been offering to negotiate, while the ethnic Albanian leaders refused. The Serb side had presented quite comprehensive and reasonable proposals for extensive self-government in Kosovo.

For years, but especially during recent months, both the Serbian government and non-governmental groups have made compromise proposals for Kosovo, all including autonomy, democracy and extensive cultural rights, while the nationalist leaders have insisted on only one demand: secession.

The "Rambouillet peace agreement" was in reality an ultimatum to Yugoslavia to accept a NATO protectorate on its soil. It was designed by State Department official Christopher Hill to satisfy KLA leaders, and was "agreed" upon only by those two parties and the European Union representative, not by the entire Contact Group (including Russia) which was theoretically sponsoring it. No sovereign state in the world could accept such an ultimatum.

Top U.S. officials openly coaxed reluctant Albanians into signing the agreement by telling them that their signatures were needed in order to justify NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia. The "peace agreement" was thus in reality a war agreement.

The War Agreement of Rambouillet

The conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs is a very old one, which can be traced back over three centuries. It is older than the Israeli-Palestinian or Northern Ireland conflicts, not to mention countless other ethnic conflicts in the world. The "peace process" in such cases is expected to be long and delicate. Only in Kosovo, governments and media suddenly decided that the conflict had to be settled in two weeks, at Rambouillet, on terms laid down by the

United States.

Why the hurry? Because the United States was keen to lock in NATO's new mission as global intervention machine with a show of force prior to the 50th anniversary of NATO summit in April.⁽²⁾ NATO had carefully planned the operations six months in advance. Peace negotiations "broke down" just when NATO was all set to go.

For many months, the Serbian government had offered to negotiate. High-level government teams went repeatedly to the provincial capital, Pristina, to hold talks with Ibrahim Rugova and other non-violent ethnic Albanian leaders. On one pretext or another, the Albanians refused to negotiate. It is probable that two factors weighed heavily in their refusal: fear of going against the rising armed rebel movement, the "Kosovo Liberation Army," (UCK/KLA), hostile to any compromise and ready to assassinate "traitors" who dealt with the Serbs; and expectations that strong U.S. pressure on Yugoslavia would bring them more than negotiations with Belgrade.

At Rambouillet, the older generation of nationalist leaders such as Rugova never had the slightest opportunity to enter negotiations with the multi-ethnic official Serbian delegation, which included members of the various ethnic communities in Kosovo. They were flanked and overshadowed in the ethnic Albanian delegation by KLA outlaws, who by then were assured of United States support. Rambouillet was a charade staged by the United States in order to provide a pretext for a NATO demonstration of force on the eve of the Alliance's fiftieth anniversary.

A genuine negotiation would have at least paid attention to the extensive 10-page proposal of the Serbian government side, calling for, notably:

- Equality of all citizens and guaranteed human rights.
- Facilitated return of all citizens to their homes.
- Safe unhindered access of all international and national or non-governmental humanitarian organizations to the population for purposes of aid.
- General amnesty for all political crimes related to conflict in Kosovo except for persons properly convicted of crimes against humanity and international law.
- Widest possible media freedoms.
- Preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national community.
- The commune (county) as basic unit of local self-government.
- An Assembly of 130 members, 95 elected directly by citizens through proportional representation and 35 elected by national communities of Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romani (Gypsies), Egyptians, and Gorani (mountain Serbs of southwestern Kosovo, converted to Islam), five members each.
- Election by the Assembly of a President and 6 vice presidents, at least one from each national community, for a four-year term.
- Responsibility of the Assembly for: budget and taxes; educational arrangements, with respect for the authorities of national communities and communes; electing judges; establishing a framework for local self-government; protecting the environment where intercommunal issues are involved; adopting regulations governing medical institutions, urban planning, agriculture, elections, property ownership, as well as economic, scientific, technological and social development, among other things.
- The right of citizens to choose whether to be tried in a Kosovo court or in a court of the Republic of Serbia, and the right to request that members of the panel hearing their case be chosen from their own national community.
- Voluntary establishment of courts of national communities to settle disputes among members of a national community who accept separate national community rules.

This last point is clearly designed for the Albanian community which, particularly in rural areas of Kosovo as in neighboring northern Albania, has never fully accepted any governmental law and prefers to be guided by the archaic traditional "Qanun" based on family honor and clan loyalty. Other measures, such as the provision for election to the Assembly, reflect fear of oppression by the Albanian majority of non-Albanians in Kosovo.

No doubt this proposal is inadequate. But in any normal negotiation, it would have at least been acknowledged as a basis for discussion. This did not occur. As for the Albanian side, it was interested in only one thing: secession from Serbia and total independence, if not today, then certainly in three years' time.

The stubbornness of the Albanian delegation surprised Madeleine Albright. Perhaps the U.S. sponsors of the KLA hadn't realized that the purpose of the armed rebellion was to seize power in any future "independent Kosovo," and did not fully trust the United States to give it to them under the ambiguous terms of Rambouillet. For that purpose, war is a better method than any peace agreement, even one specially designed to detach Kosovo from Serbia. The KLA finally agreed to sign the Christopher Hill document once it was clear that Belgrade could not possibly agree to it, and that the KLA would thus get the war it wanted, complete with air cover.

It was evident that Belgrade could not accept the U.S.-drafted two-part Rambouillet ultimatum, not only because it was a thinly veiled plan to detach Kosovo from Serbia, but also because it contained provisions even worse than loss of that historic province, provisions no country in the world could possibly accept. This has been clearly analyzed by Jan Oberg, director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden.⁽³⁾ The Rambouillet ultimatum came in two parts, civilian and military. In the civilian part, three aspects stand out as obviously unacceptable.

- Kosovo would in effect be independent of Serbia, but Serbia would not be independent of Kosovo. Kosovo

would be able to influence Yugoslavia as a whole by sending its representatives to both Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments, governments, and courts, whereas Yugoslavia would be barred from influencing Kosovo's internal affairs. This is precisely the aspect of the 1974 version of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia that made major economic reforms impossible in Serbia in the 1980s and led to virtually unanimous Serbian demands for a return to pre-1974 terms of Kosovo's autonomy.(4) The Albanian veto made Serbia ungovernable.

- "Self-governing" Kosovo would actually be run by a NATO imperial proconsul, with the title of Chief of the OSCE/EU Implementation Mission, or CIM. The CIM, who would effectively be chosen by the United States, would have the authority to issue binding directives on all important matters, hire and fire officials and security personnel, and overrule election results. During the three-week period between Rambouillet I and Rambouillet II, while the Clinton administration and ex-Senator Robert Dole were scrambling to cajole the Albanians into signing up for NATO bombing, the "High Representative" in Bosnia, model for the CIM, demonstrated his powers by dismissing the democratically elected President of the Serbian entity.(5)
- Economically, the Rambouillet ultimatum would continue to drain economic resources from Serbia to Kosovo. In Tito's Yugoslavia, Kosovo was the main recipient of development aid from the Federation. Nevertheless, due in part to population growth (by far the highest birthrate in Europe,(6) as well as clandestine immigration from Albania), per capita income in Kosovo remained the lowest in Yugoslavia. The Rambouillet ultimatum demanded that Yugoslavia give Kosovo an "equitable" share of benefits from international transactions, without indicating what might be Serbia's share of state or social property there. Since Kosovo would have its own "constitution," overruling the Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions, making it a "free market economy," it is to be expected that formerly Serbian resources would flow rapidly into the hands of the rich Albanian mafia as well as any interested buyers from the NATO countries. The agreement did not even mention suspending economic sanctions against Serbia, much less any economic aid or help to the 650,000 refugees in Serbia. But substantial economic aid was promised to Kosovo.

The only operational remnant of the formal Yugoslav "sovereignty" supposedly retained by this proposal would be the obligation for Serbia to keep paying for Kosovo.

Dr. Oberg points out that the civilian side of the "agreement" lacked any reference to confidence building, reconciliation, peace or human rights education—measures vitally needed to enable the ethnic communities to live together. In short, there was nothing to suggest any serious effort to prevent "ethnic cleansing" of the Serb minority by the triumphant Albanian majority.

Still, the Serbian negotiating team at Rambouillet was ready to consider seriously this extremely unjust arrangement. The real sticking point was the military side of the ultimatum. This amounted to nothing less than unconditional surrender of Kosovo to NATO.

- Kosovo would be occupied by a NATO force called "KFOR" headed by a Commander, COMKFOR, who would "have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect KFOR" or to order cessation of any activity he judges to be a "potential threat." Judging from experience in Bosnia, that could include forcibly shutting down media that differ with NATO doctrine.
- No ceiling is set on COMKFOR forces.
- The government had to disarm, but disarmament of the armed rebels, considered dangerous terrorists by the Serbs, was left up in the air. Yugoslav defenses within Kosovo would be withdrawn except for 1,500 border guards supported by up to 1,000 logistics personnel placed in predetermined barracks. On the other hand, the "Other Forces," apparently meaning the KLA (never mentioned by name), would be called on to "publicly commit themselves to demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR." This meant that the Yugoslavs had no way of knowing to what extent or how the KLA might ever be disarmed.
- COMKFOR would have full control of airspace over Kosovo as well as 25 kilometers into Serbia and Montenegro along the borders with Kosovo.
- NATO would not be liable for any damages to local property, would be immune from all local jurisdiction or legal process, and would be ensured free and unrestricted access through all of Yugoslavia. This amounts to a license to invade other parts of Yugoslavia.

"The military provisions," said Dr. Oberg, "have nothing to do with peacekeeping." The more appropriate term, he suggested on March 18, the day the Albanians signed, would be "peace-prevention."

Dr. Oberg observed that among all the leading media, commentators, scholars, and diplomats condemning the Yugoslav side for refusing to sign, none was examining what the accords contained. Having studied earlier versions of Christopher Hill's text and the final February 23 version, Dr. Oberg came to the conclusion that "this document has been adapted to be acceptable to the Albanian delegates to such an extent that the Yugoslav side—ready to accept the political parts at an earlier stage—now find the changed document unacceptable both in terms of political and military aspects."

Why this change? "Because the worst case for the international community would be Yugoslavia saying yes and the Albanians saying no," concluded Oberg.

So the Serbs were given an offer they could not accept.

Although KLA leaders were not enthusiastic about this agreement either, the United States apparently obtained

their consent by promising a privileged role for the rebel gunmen as military partners of the United States.

Eliminating the Alternative

It is preposterous to suggest that there was no alternative to unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia to CIM and COMKFOR. It would have taken time to work them out, and bringing the intransigent KLA into the negotiations made matters vastly more difficult. But that intransigence was largely the result of their certitude that they ultimately commanded full United States and NATO support.

During the time needed for a peace process, the presence of truly neutral peacemakers could have played a constructive and indispensable role.

Last October 12, Richard Holbrooke got Belgrade to allow 2,000 "verifiers" to enter Kosovo to monitor compliance of the Yugoslav side only with a cease-fire the KLA had never been obliged to keep. This was already an extreme oddity: a one-sided cease-fire, in which the legal police of a country agrees not to pursue armed groups which, whether called "liberation army" or "terrorists," had been murdering citizens for well over a year and showed no inclination to stop.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was chosen to organize this Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). In Western Europe, since the demise of the 1980s peace movement, objections to the qualitative and geographical expansion of NATO have tended to take refuge in proposals to strengthen the OSCE which, unlike NATO, involves Russia and indeed all European countries except, since 1992, Yugoslavia.

Early suspicions in some pro-OSCE circles, confirmed by later events, suggested that this assignment was used largely to discredit the OSCE as a viable "alternative" to NATO. Although the champions of OSCE had seen it as less U.S.-dominated, the U.S. put one of its own "dirty war" specialists, William Walker, in charge of the KVM. The "verifier" force never approached 2,000, and it was widely assumed that many of the verifiers were agents of various NATO intelligence services, in particular U.S. military or civilian intelligence. Walker's "diplomatic" experience in assisting the Contra guerrillas to mount a spoiling war against Sandinista Nicaragua was good background for cooperation with the KLA, the only "liberation" movement in the world (so far) which enthusiastically calls for NATO bombing of the territory it is out to conquer. In mid-January, Walker himself broke the fragile peace his force had been sent to solidify by endorsing the KLA version of the extremely controversial events in the village of Racak. Walker's hasty and unquestioning condemnation of a "Serbian massacre" which many believe (and on the basis of solid evidence) was a propaganda set-up, arranging battlefield dead to give the appearance of an execution, discredited the KVM as a neutral observer.

Some of the resulting dissension within the OSCE has come into public view. In particular, the German vice-president of the OSCE, Christian Democratic Bundestag member Willy Wimmer, called the KVM a "fairly hopeless mission" because some people "apparently did not at all want it to succeed." Who? "For instance the UCK. For instance those who are behind the UCK and pull the strings." Wimmer said that the international OSCE observers had unambiguously agreed that the Yugoslav side had kept to the October cease-fire agreement, while the UCK had "systematically evaded it" and engaged in provocations.⁽⁷⁾

Asked by Deutschlandradio Berlin whether he considered the NATO military assault a mistake, Wimmer answered: "I personally consider it a very big mistake. And I am in agreement with the OSCE parliamentary assembly, which with a majority of nearly 90% has repeatedly stated that military engagements can be undertaken only with a mandate from the United Nations Security Council." However, the interests of the United States and Britain were "diametrically opposed to us."

From "Greater Albania" to Greater NATO

The war against Yugoslavia has been sold to the public as a humanitarian necessity, when in reality it is a political project. For the Albanian leaders, the purpose was always clear: Albanian rule over Kosovo, not "human rights" and certainly not "peace."

Veton Surroi, publisher of the leading Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, financially supported by the Soros Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy, is often mentioned as the West's dark horse to be President of "independent" ethnic Albanian Kosovo. He was a member of the Albanian delegation that signed the Rambouillet war agreement with the U.S. and the EU. He told the New York Times a week later that when he signed, he "also accepted that there would be consequences for the people of Kosovo, that if the Serbian side did not agree to the pact, it would have to be imposed by force—even at risk to the civilian population." He continued: "...these kinds of political arrangements require war, both as the driving force and as the action that seals them."

Surroi also recognized the political interest of NATO: "The inhabitants of southeastern Europe will have to face the fact that NATO has created a security umbrella over them...."

In reality, the whole thrust of U.S. policy has been toward a violent conflict in Yugoslavia that would shatter Serbia, the last bastion of old-fashioned independence in the Balkans, and bring NATO in as occupier and arbiter. The United States did not want to bring Yugoslavia into NATO, but NATO into Yugoslavia.

To most people, it seems incredible that the apparently blundering Clinton administration could have hatched and carried out such a Machiavellian plot. And no doubt it didn't. The monstrous policy seems, from what one can discern, to have grown more or less by chance out of a strange encounter between two very different interest groups: Balkan revanchist lobbies, both Croatian and Albanian, on the one hand, and a circle of strategic policy planners looking for the means to transform NATO from a West European defense alliance focused on containing the Soviet Union into the military arm of U.S. global hegemony, able to act anywhere in the world without regard to national sovereignty, the United Nations or international law.

The Albanian Lobby

First came the lobbies. Already in the 1980s, when Albanians were actually running Kosovo, and the mainstream press was reporting that Albanians were harassing Serbs in order to establish "an ethnically clean Albanian republic" before merging with Albania to form "a greater Albania,"⁽⁸⁾ the Albanian lobby in the United States was working to reverse the image. The center of this lobby was New York Republican Congressman Joseph DioGuardi, of Italian-Albanian background.

On June 18, 1986, Representative DioGuardi and Senator Bob Dole introduced Concurrent Resolution 150, "Expressing Concern over the Condition of Ethnic Albanians Living in Yugoslavia." This was an early significant victory for the Albanian lobby. Of course, neither Dole nor, probably, any other congressman had the slightest idea of conditions in Kosovo, if they could tell where it was, but it's a rare politician who isn't ready to "express concern" over the condition of an ethnic minority that has an active lobby operating in Washington. This sort of resolution can then be used as documentary proof of whatever it alleges.

The reward was not long in coming. In May 1987, Dole and DioGuardi attended an Albanian-American fund-raiser in New York City that raised \$1.2 million for Dole's campaign and \$50,000 for DioGuardi's.⁽⁹⁾ Even so, DioGuardi lost his seat, whereupon he formed the Albanian-American Civic League to pursue lobbying for the Albanian cause.

Cuba has long been the most striking illustration of how a relatively small ethnic lobby—that of the counter-revolutionary Cuban exiles in Florida—could have a long-term negative influence on U.S. foreign policy. The Balkans provide a second, even more surprising, example.

Ethnic lobbies offer mediocre politicians two precious assets. The most obvious is money in the form of campaign contributions. The other is the semblance of an idealistic cause: Championing some obscure "oppressed people" seeking American support for its "righteous cause" can provide a glow of international vision to mediocre provincial politicians with not a glimmer of understanding of the outside world.

The ethnic lobbies are not partisan. Republicans and Democrats are eligible to support their causes. For the 1996 elections, the Democrats "established nine steering committees to concentrate on Albanians, Arabs, Croats, Greeks, Irish, Hungarians, Italians, Lithuanians and Poles.... An energetic 31-year-old Albanian American, Ilir Zherka, was put in charge of the drive, which was called Ethnic Outreach," The European reported.⁽¹⁰⁾

Once upon a time ethnic lobbies were concerned with the social welfare and advancement of their constituents. To some extent, that may still be the case, but since America became top superpower, the focus has shifted to bringing that power in on the side of exile groups with an agenda. The Clinton administration, Zherka told The European, "has concentrated on trying to solve age-old problems in Ireland, Bosnia, and the Middle East. In addition, Clinton has worked on expanding NATO, and the Poles, Hungarian, and Baltic citizens appreciate his efforts. He has also supported Ukrainian independence."

Here is where the agendas of exile groups and the post-Cold War problem of finding a new "mission" for NATO have dovetailed dangerously. With the collapse of the communist "enemy," a small number of very special interests have rushed in to fill the foreign policy void.

"Minority groups have leverage because their support can mean the difference between a candidate winning or losing an entire state," according to William Kimberling of the Federal Election Commission.⁽¹¹⁾ Smaller ethnic groups can be more effective than big ones because they are more compact. "One of the problems of American politics is that the two biggest groups, Blacks and Hispanics, are the least organized and don't vote." The lesson he drew is that "if you vote together, candidates will pay attention."

The leading role of the Albanian lobby in the Clinton campaign's "Ethnic Outreach" program is striking, as is the absence of any Serbian lobby. One can assume that this is not because there are no Americans of Serbian origin in the United States, but because Serbian-Americans have not, in recent decades, been united by an activist revanchist agenda. Serbs identified totally with the victorious Allied side in both world wars; many considered themselves Yugoslavs first and foremost, and if they opposed Tito, the changes they hoped to see in Yugoslavia were political and democratic, not a reshaping of the Balkans with help from the U.S. Superpower.

In contrast, right-wing Croatian exile groups in particular nursed dreams of restoring the fascist Ustashe "Independent Croatian State," which had existed only during World War II thanks to the occupation and dismantling of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy. In 1993, it was reported that "Croatia has built up the most effective lobbying and public relations network on Capitol Hill since the days when the Israeli and Greek lobbies were at their

peak." (12) Croatian lobbying efforts, congressional investigators were quoted as saying, "could well exceed \$50 million."

Culturally, there is little in common between Croats and Albanians. But extreme Croatian and Albanian exiles nursing the hope of restoring the Greater Croatia and the Greater Albania that had existed only thanks to the Axis Powers during World War II shared something very important: a common enemy. That common enemy was multinational Yugoslavia, which deprived them of their ethnically defined independent states. Politically, it was more effective to define that enemy as the Serbs, the people who had played the leading historic role in creating multinational Yugoslavia. Denouncing the Serbs as communist oppressors was the formula for winning support from American politicians. Serbian-Americans were without a well-funded revanchist agenda, and politically divided: no clout.

A key role in the joining of the anti-Serb forces was reportedly played by a young aide of Senator Dole, Mira Radievolvic Baratta. Within the "small circle of those who monitor U.S. policy toward the Balkans," *The Weekly Standard* reported in 1995, "her influence and her expertise are widely recognized." Richard Perle, an informal Dole adviser who worked on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims at the Dayton peace talks, says that "other than Richard Holbrooke, Baratta has been the most influential individual in shaping U.S. policy." (13) Baratta began working for Dole in June 1989 and in May 1995 received the "Award for Excellence in Politics" from the National Federation of Croatian Americans. In a bastion of ignorance, Baratta easily became the congressional expert on the Balkans. Baratta has "as good an understanding of the Balkans as anyone on Capitol Hill," *The Weekly Standard* reported admiringly, adding that "she is probably the only congressional staffer monitoring ex-Yugoslavia who speaks and reads both Croatian and Serbian"—a statement which itself indicates the prevailing ignorance, since Croatian and Serbian are the same language.

Baratta clearly understood the importance of concentrating on the villain—the Serbs—as a better way to influence policy than to try to sell Congress on the Croats. She also advocated the Albanian cause and was publicly credited with getting the Senate to adopt a resolution calling for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.

Even after leaving politics, Dole continues his support of the Albanian cause. "In articles and TV appearances, Dole has glorified the KLA and vilified the Serbs," *Investor's Business Daily* reported. (14)

Matthew Rees predicted that Baratta would succeed in "climbing the foreign-policy establishment's greasy pole. Dole advisers such as Perle, Wolfowitz, and Jeane Kirkpatrick are among Baratta's biggest boosters." (15)

By a not so strange coincidence, Baratta's fans include the most hawkish veterans of the Reagan administration. "Many former Reagan officials—U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle, and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger—have publicly endorsed sending NATO ground troops to Kosovo." (16) Caspar Weinberger, whose name is synonymous with the big California-based transnational infrastructure-construction company, Bechtel, is described as "the most hawkish on the Balkans." Bechtel, incidentally, has already been selected to build Croatia's new coastal highway. The ravaged Balkans should supply plenty of infrastructure construction opportunities—not least the future oil pipeline to bring Caspian Sea oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in line with the Clinton administration's great concern to divert the oil away from Russia or Iran.

The Eagles and the Hawks

Albania—in the Albanian language, Shqipëria, the land of the eagles—is by far the poorest, least developed country in Europe. After the fall of its uniquely repressive communist regime, Albanians came into world view trying desperately to flee their poor country toward Italy. During Enver Hoxha's dictatorship, that exit had been closed tight from within. The easiest exit route for Albanians in that period had been across the mountains of northern Albania into Kosovo, where local authorities—often ethnic Albanian kinfolk—let them settle. Compared to Albania, Kosovo was the land of milk and honey, even if it was the poorest part of Yugoslavia. With a Yugoslav passport, travel was easy. From Kosovo, enterprising Albanians went out to make their fortunes in Germany or Switzerland. Thanks in part to their very tight clan structure, Kosovo Albanians have notoriously taken control of the heroin smuggling routes through the Balkans from Turkey to Switzerland and Germany. After the fall of communism, rich Kosovo Albanians have tended to treat Albania itself as a colony for exploitation and a base for various illegal operations. Considering the potential dominance by Kosovo Albanians in a "Greater Albania," the prospect does not delight all people in Albania itself, in particular in the south, where the Tosk dialect is spoken, in contrast to northern Albania and Kosovo where the Gheg dialect prevails.

If, as has been widely reported, the KLA is the armed branch of the ethnic Albanian mafia, it would not be the first time that the CIA has ended up working hand in hand with drug dealers.

The alliance of the Hawks and the Eagles solidified around the dangerous project of "Greater Albania," sold by lobbies and public relations campaigns to American politicians and public opinion as a "human rights" rather than a nationalist cause. This project filled a foreign policy vacuum. Veterans of the Cold War policy elite were groping around for new "threats" and a new mission for NATO and the U.S. military-industrial complex. As for the American left, or what remained of it after the end of the Cold War, it largely stopped thinking seriously about international problems of war and peace. The "single issue" approach made paradoxical connections invisible. Reduced to sentimental humanitarianism, the liberal left has become easily manipulated by public relations campaigns framed in terms of human rights and victims. A contemporary version of the old "white man's burden" or mission civilisatrice has emerged to be exploited by the designers of NATO's new global mission.

Thus by championing a supposedly "oppressed people," NATO could prove in the Balkans its ability to act as a "humanitarian" police force anywhere in the world. Bombing Iraq and Serbia simultaneously, it could prove its "two wars at once" capacity (and use up its stock of cruise missiles before Y2K renders them obsolete). If it worked, NATO would have a formula that could be put into operation in other trouble spots, notably what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls the "Eurasian Balkans," a vast area of mixed ethnic composition interestingly located around the Caspian Sea and all those oil reserves.⁽¹⁷⁾ The idea is to find an "oppressed minority," promise support to its fiercest warriors, preferably drug dealers who can afford to buy their own weapons, and when all hell breaks loose, one moves in to "avoid humanitarian catastrophe." Yugoslavia is a test case.

Supposing U.S. mastery of airspace and television time, this mixed propaganda-missile mechanism should meet the needs of those who perceive that eternal U.S. economic supremacy needs a military arm. "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist—McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15," is how Thomas L. Friedman summed it up. ⁽¹⁸⁾ This is the imperative behind the rush to assert NATO's "right to intervene" all over the world.

Thus, observed columnist Jim Hoagland, "the Kosovo war is about the global future, not the European past." ⁽¹⁹⁾

The American people not being considered mature enough for such Realpolitik, it has been necessary to feed them children's fairy tales about the Big Bad Milosevic eating babies for breakfast, with Slick Willy and Slick Tony reincarnating FDR and Churchill to stop "the new Hitler." The future of the Albanians and the Serbs is only one of the stakes in the Kosovo war of 1999. Another is the capacity of the American people to tell reality from fiction.

Footnotes

1. Acceptance of this lie was prepared by previous lies relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Kosovo itself, lies too numerous to refute in a single article, all leading to the fallacious conclusion that Milosevic was conducting "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians in Kosovo. In fact, the Serbian police and military were engaged in, at worst, a classic counterinsurgency operation.

2. See: Jim Hoagland, "Beyond the Rambouillet Effort Looms the NATO Anniversary," *Washington Post/International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 15, 1999: "The talks at Rambouillet are negotiations within a negotiation. The diplomats work against a second deadline beyond the competing March offensives in Kosovo: In late April the leaders of 19 members of NATO will gather in Washington to celebrate the alliance's 50th anniversary and unveil a new 'strategic concept' of its missions and responsibilities.... The road to a Washington summit that reflects glory on the good and great of the Atlantic community now passes through the police stations and city hall of the pitiable Kosovar capital of Pristina." William Pfaff, "Washington's New Vision for NATO Could Be Divisive," *Los Angeles Times* Syndicate/*International Herald Tribune*, Dec. 12, 1998: "The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement on Kosovo in October was accurately described by Richard Holbrooke as an unprecedented event. NATO had intervened in an internal conflict inside a sovereign non-NATO state.... Washington sees this as a precedent for a new NATO that would deal with a variety of existing and future problems inside and outside Europe." Roger Cohen, "Europeans Contest U.S. NATO Vision," *New York Times Service/International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 28, 1998: "At the root of the differences lies the American conviction that NATO should now be seen as an 'alliance of interests' as much as one dedicated to the defense of a specific territory, and that those interests may in some instances push NATO into far-flung activities...." Etc.

3. Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Vegagatan 25, S 224 57 Lund, Sweden; tff@transnational.org; <http://www.transnational.org>. Oberg has been on over thirty missions to Kosovo as head of TFPFR's Conflict-Mitigation Team to the Balkans and Georgia.

4. The endlessly repeated statement that "the dictator Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy" is false. The Serbian Parliament voted to change the constitution to reduce Kosovo's autonomy to more normal federal standards as had prevailed earlier, not to abolish it. While technically legal, the change was not managed with the necessary political consideration for Albanian sensibilities. It provoked a revolt that led the Albanian population to reject the very considerable democratic rights it still possessed as part of a general boycott of Serbian institutions.

5. On the same day, he announced that the town of Brcko, which provides the only link between the two parts of the Serb entity, had been taken from its present Serb government and established as a third separate unit within Bosnia-Herzegovina. This decision was rendered by "arbitration": in reality a single U.S. official, Robert Owen. This decision reducing the Serbian entity is in violation of the basis of the Dayton Accords, which ensured the Bosnian Serbs 49% of the territory. These are only the latest in a series of one-man lessons in democracy by NATO dictators in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6. In the 1970s, the average fertility rate for Yugoslavia was 2.3 as a whole, but 5.4 in Kosovo. About 2.1 renews a population. Catherine Samary, *Le Marché contre l'autogestion*, La Brèche, 1988, p. 181.

7. *Junge Welt*, Mar. 26, 1999, interview with Willy Wimmer by Kirsten Lemke of Deutschlandradio Berlin, "War der NATO-Angriff ein Fehler?"

8. "Serbs...have...been harassed by Albanians and have packed up and left the region. The [Albanian] nationalists

have a two-point platform, ...first to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then to merge with Albania to form a greater Albania." David Binder, "Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, July 12, 1982.

9. From a Jan. 1, 1988 interview, cited by SIRIUS, Benjamin C. Works, Feb. 28, 1999, archive.
10. Ian Mather, "Ethnic Europeans lend Clinton a hand," *The European*, Nov. 7, 1996.
11. Ibid.
12. Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Mar. 31, 1993.
13. Matthew Rees, "Bosnia's Mira Image," *The Weekly Standard* (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 25, 1995.
14. Brian Mitchell, "The GOP's Tangled Foreign Policy," *Investor's Business Daily*, Mar. 4, 1999.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), especially the maps at pp. 124 and 146.
18. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Manifesto for the Fast World," *New York Times Magazine*, Mar. 28, 1999.
19. *Washington Post/International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 29, 1999.

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From: Despotovic, Ruza <ruzad@ggzba.nl>
To: Nico Steijnen (E-mail) <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: maandag 30 juli 2001 06:07
Subject: FW: de groene A

> —Oorspronkelijk bericht—

> Van: Despotovic, Ruza
 > Verzonden: donderdag 12 juli 2001 9:01
 > Aan: 'despot@wish.net'
 > Onderwerp: de groene A

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>
 > De Groene Amsterdammer van 27-1-2001
 > Navo-propaganda

>
 > De eerste studies naar de Kosovo-oorlog suggereren dat de media en
 > het publiek zich, net als tijdens de Golfoorlog, weer te gemakkelijk van
 > leugen naar leugen hebben laten meeslepen.

>
 > Door Jaap van Ginneken

>
 > Op het moment dat een «moreel rechtvaardige» oorlog als de
 > Navo-interventie in Kosovo in volle gang is, en ook «onze jongens» daarbij
 > gevaar lopen, staan de media en het publiek vaak niet open voor «de
 > achterkant van het gelijk». De grijstinten vervagen, het beeld wordt
 > vereenvoudigd tot zuiver wit en zuiver zwart, we hebben een «waas van
 > bloed» voor onze ogen. Het eigen morele gelijk wordt dramatisch en
 > emotioneel uitvergroot tot «surplus nobility», het morele ongelijk van de
 > anderen wordt uitvergroot tot «surplus evil» - volgens mechanismen die ik
 > eerder detailleerde in het boek De schepping van de wereld in het nieuws.
 > Wij vertegenwoordigen daarbij onveranderlijk «de internationale
 > gemeenschap» en voeren een «humanitaire interventie» uit waarbij een
 > «vredesmacht» een onderdrukt volk gaat «bevrijden». Wij hebben geen
 > vooringenomenheden en belangen. De vijand is daarentegen niets minder dan
 > een nieuwe Hitler die zich onveranderlijk van nazi-methoden en
 > concentratiekampen bedient - hij heeft ook geen legitieme andere
 > preoccupaties.
 > Het is vaak verstandig even te wachten totdat die opwinding weer wat
 > is weggeëbd, alvorens op zoek te gaan naar de nuances. Nu democratische
 > verkiezingen zowel in Kosovo als in Servië gematigden aan de regering
 > hebben gebracht, is het misschien tijd om nog eens terug te kijken en
 > enkele lessen te trekken. En ons met name af te vragen of we in tijden
 > van crisis wel zo goed en veelzijdig worden geïnformeerd dat we zinvol
 > kunnen besluiten bepaalde initiatieven te ondersteunen of niet. Of is het
 > misschien toch zo dat de media en de publieke opinie zich in voorkomende
 > gevallen betrekkelijk gemakkelijk op sleeptouw laten nemen, steeds
 > opnieuw? Want nadat de propaganda in de Golfoorlog eindelijk afdoende was
 > ontleed, ging het in Kosovo in iets andere omstandigheden weer ongeveer
 > hetzelfde. Er waren weliswaar zo'n 2.700 journalisten rond Kosovo
 > (tegenover bijvoorbeeld slechts vijfhonderd op het hoogtepunt/dieptepunt
 > van de Vietnamoorlog), maar het blijft de vraag of we daardoor ook
 > veelzijdig werden geïnformeerd.
 > Het heeft meer dan een jaar geduurd voordat het eerste substantiële
 > boek over dit onderwerp verscheen. Het is een bundel onder redactie van de
 > Britse medialektor Philip Hammond uit Londen en de Amerikaanse emeritus
 > hoogleraar Edward Herman uit Philadelphia. Daarnaast is de nieuwste editie

- > van het standaardwerk van de Britse journalist Philip Knightley over
- > oorlogsverslaggeving en propaganda ook weer uitgebreid met een hoofdstukje
- > over Kosovo. Er zullen ongetwijfeld nog andere studies volgen. En de
- > balans is tot zover niet erg opwekkend.
- > Het is waar dat het boek van Hammond en Herman nog wat sporen draagt
- > van de anti-oorlogspolemieken van destijds door een kleine pacifistische
- > minderheid. Sommige kleinere hoofdstukken zijn sterk opiniërend van aard,
- > en minder geannoteerd. Dat geldt bijvoorbeeld voor het voorwoord van de
- > Britse toneelschrijver Harold Pinter, voor enkele oudere commentaren van
- > de Britse journalist John Pilger, en voor een (tweede) hoofdstuk van de in
- > Parijs woonachtige Amerikaanse publiciste Diana Johnstone - over de
- > dubbelzinnige rol van de Franse «nouveaux philosophes». Die
- > schotschriften hadden wat mij betreft niet (meer) gehoeven, en doen het
- > boek eerder schade dan goed.
- > Maar zelfs als je dat er van afrekt, blijft er nog meer dan genoeg
- > stof tot nadenken over. Vooral de academische auteurs slagen er over het
- > algemeen in de mediaverslaggeving van destijds en de Navo-propaganda op
- > wezenlijke punten overtuigend ter discussie te stellen. Dergelijke boeken
- > zouden daarom eigenlijk verplichte stof moeten zijn voor aankomende
- > journalisten en studenten communicatiewetenschap. Maar nergens in de
- > westerse wereld bestaan academische instituties die systematisch studie
- > maken van propaganda - en al helemaal niet van die aan onze eigen kant.
- > Daardoor blijft de kennis fragmentarisch en laten redacteurs zich telkens
- > opnieuw in de luren leggen.
- >
- > Seth Ackerman en Jim Naureckas van de Amerikaanse watchdog-groep
- > Fair (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) plaatsen om te beginnen
- > vraagtekens bij een van de belangrijkste frames of interpretatiekaders van
- > de crisis - namelijk dat het allemaal begonnen zou zijn met de reis van
- > Milosovic naar Kosovo in 1989, en het arbitrair opschorten van de
- > autonomie van de regio. Die visie werd vlak voor de confrontatie uitgevent
- > door de toenmalige Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Albright en
- > daarna kritiekloos overgenomen door het overgrote deel van de media. Zij
- > gaat volgens de auteurs voorbij aan het feit dat de maatregel juist een
- > reactie was op separatistische agitatie in de regio gedurende de jaren
- > zeventig en tachtig, die uitliep op steeds terugkerende gewelddadigheden
- > tegen de Servische minderheid aldaar. Vanaf de rellen van 1981 in Pristina
- > had dit in de loop van de tijd tot een groot aantal doden en gewonden
- > geleid.
- > De belaste term «etnische zuivering» is volgens deze auteurs ook
- > niet afkomstig van de Serviërs maar juist van de Kosovaarse Albanezen. Ze
- > keken er bijvoorbeeld de Nexis' «news database» op na, en vonden dat een
- > eerste verwijzing naar het begrip in de New York Times in 1982 sloeg op
- > het Kosovaars-Albanese streven, net als een half dozijn verwijzingen in
- > daaropvolgende jaren. Nog in 1987 schreef de New York Times: «Etnische
- > Albanezen in de [plaatselijke] regering hebben openbare fondsen en
- > reglementen gemanipuleerd om land over te nemen dat aan Serviërs
- > toebehoorde.» Het artikel sprak over systematische aanvallen op kerken,
- > het vergiften van bronnen, het doodsteken van jongens en het verkrachten
- > van meisjes. Later was dat opeens allemaal weer vergeten.
- > Iets dergelijks gold volgens de auteurs voor het opblazen van de
- > burgeroorlog vanaf begin 1998 - een jaar vóór de crisis. Het aantal doden
- > liep volgens het onafhankelijke Swedish International Peace Research
- > Institute Sipri snel op, maar was desondanks niet hoger dan in een
- > gemiddelde grote stad in de Verenigde Staten (of op één dag van politiek
- > geweld in de rest van de wereld).
- > In de Amerikaanse en westerse media werd ondertussen nauwelijks
- > aandacht besteed aan het optreden en de excessen van het Kosovo
- > Bevrijdingsfront, maar alleen aan de Servische tegenoffensieven die
- > daardoor volledig op zichzelf staande intimidatiecampagnes leken te zijn.
- > Overigens werd het Bevrijdingsfront toen nog door de Amerikaanse
- > afgevaardigde Robert Gelbard omschreven als een «terroristische
- > organisatie» en openlijk in verband gebracht met wapen- en drugsmokkel.
- > Niemand in het Westen was nog voor het losweken van Kosovo en het
- > mogelijke ontstaan van een «Groter Albanië». Pas later bedacht men dat er
- > toch onvermijdelijk een militaire confrontatie met Servië zou moeten
- > komen.
- > Er werd een grens overschreden met «de slachting» van Raçak, zo
- > betogen de samenstellers van het boek, Hammond en Herman zelf. De ware
- > achtergronden daarvan waren overigens goeddeels buiten beeld gebleven. Op
- > 10 januari had het Bevrijdingsfront daar een politiepost aangevallen en
- > een politieman gedood. Op 15 januari voerden Servische troepen een

- > tegenoffensief uit in de omgeving, waarbij in de bossen hevig werd gevochten. Daarna trokken zij zich terug en nam het Bevrijdingsfront weer bezit van het dorp. De volgende dag toonde het Bevrijdingsfront tientallen > lijken in burgerkleding aan waarnemers en journalisten: het kennelijke > bewijs van een standrechtelijke executie of massamoord.
- > Wat nauwelijks uit de media naar voren kwam, was dat OVSE-waarnemers > en AP-journalisten de «politioele actie» van de Serviërs de dag daarvoor > hadden begeleid en gefilmd. Sceptici opperden dat het Bevrijdingsfront > selectief jongere en oudere gesneuvelden uit het gevechtsgebied had > verzameld en bij elkaar gelegd. Forensisch onderzoek van onder meer Finse > deskundigen zou volgens de auteurs later hebben aangetoond dat ze > goeddeels bij gevechten waren omgekomen. Maar het Amerikaanse hoofd van de > waarnemers Wil liam Walker stelde onmiddellijk met zekerheid dat het > overduidelijk een massaexecutie was geweest. (Dezelfde diplomaat had > eerder overigens als Amerikaans ambassadeur in El Salvador de moord van > rechtse militairen op zes jezuïeten vergoelijkt als een «management > control problem»: «Dergelijke dingen gebeuren nu eenmaal in tijden van > grote emoties en woede.»)
- >
- > Dezelfde auteurs en Peter Gowan, lector politicologie uit Londen, > geven ook een vernietigende analyse van de welbewuste Amerikaanse > manipulatie van de massamedia en de publieke opinie bij de stukgelopen > onderhandelingen van Rambouillet. De Servische kant was wel degelijk > bereid om een politieke regeling te aanvaarden over een herstel van > interne autonomie voor Kosovo. Juist het Bevrijdingsfront lag tot vlak > voor het eind dwars, en ging pas overstag toen het onderhands kreeg > gegarandeerd dat men de onderhandelingen met een loefje zou laten > stuklopen. Een hoge Amerikaanse functionaris zou op dat moment cryptisch > tegenover journalisten hebben verklaard: «We hebben de stok expres te hoog > gelegd... Ze hebben wat bombardementen nodig.»
- > Op het allerlaatste moment werd namelijk door de Amerikanen (buiten > de bemiddelende Russen om) in «aanslag B» bij de ontwerpvereenkomst > een clause geïntroduceerd waarvan men wist dat die voor de tegenpartij > volledig onaanvaardbaar zou zijn: namelijk dat er niet alleen > tienduizenden Navo-troepen in Kosovo zouden worden gestationeerd, maar dat > die zich ook vrijelijk en straffeloos door heel Servië zouden mogen > bewegen. Dat kwam de facto neer op het aanvaarden van een buitenlandse > bezettingsmacht. Kissinger noemde dat een «deal-breaker». Maar de meeste > media hadden niets in de gaten, en het bestaan van die beslissende > clause werd maandenlang over het hoofd gezien en zelfs glashard ontkend.
- > Op dat moment waren er al veertien maanden voorbereidingen aan de > gang voor een mogelijke bombardements campagne die de aanhoudende > Servische koppigheid moest breken. In de 78 dagen tussen 24 maart en 10 > juni werden uiteindelijk 37.000 bombardementsvluchten uitgevoerd, gemid > deld vijfhonderd per dag; voor het merendeel door de VS en vanaf zeer > grote hoogte. Aanvankelijk beperkte men zich daarbij tot militaire doelen.
- > Er zouden 93 tanks zijn vernietigd, 153 pantservoertuigen en 400 stuks > artillerie - zo zei de Navo. Maar achteraf bleek dat pure bluf: Paul > Beaver van het bekende vakblad Jane's Defense Weekly constateerde later > dat ter plaatse slechts dertien tanks waren vernietigd en dat de rest > intact was.
- > Volgens een vertrouwelijke Britse studie die in handen van de BBC > kwam, miste (net als eerder in de Golf) zestig procent van de zogenoemde > «slimme bommen» hun oorspronkelijke doel en zelfs 98 procent van de gewone > «domme bommen». Omgekeerd haalden de Serviërs al in de eerste dagen van de > oorlog een ultramoderne Stealth-bommenwerper neer en meesmuilden > triomfantelijk: «Sorry, we wisten niet dat hij onzichtbaar was.» (De Navo > vluchtte daarbij van leugen naar leugen. Eerst dat het niet waar kon zijn, > vervolgens dat het een ongelukje was geweest, toen dat men eerst de > bemanning had willen redden - maar dat bleek allang gebeurd).
- > Deze gegevens ontkrachten de kern van de cruciale Navo-mythe van de > «precisie-oorlog», waarbij de eigen kant geen enkel risico loopt maar een > gigantische overmacht in vuurkracht en computers inzet om militaire doelen > van de tegenstander met «chirurgische nauwkeurigheid» buiten bedrijf te > stellen. Door deze «precisie-oorlog» zou er ook niet of nauwelijks > «nevenschade» aan civiele doelen in de omgeving zijn, en evenmin veel > burgerdoden. Die mythe werd weliswaar opnieuw door de media geloofd en > naar de publieke opinie uitgedragen, maar de realiteit was volgens de > auteurs een heel andere. De weerstand van het Servische leger werd in deze > eerste fase nauwelijks gebroken en het Servische volk werd eerder méér dan > minder eensgezind.
- > Zelfs de internationale kritiek nam toe, naar aanleiding van enkele

- > grote missers, waarover eveneens glashard werd gelogen. De eerste was op 12 april, toen een passagierstrein op een brug onder vuur werd genomen.
- > Aanvankelijk beweerde het Navo-hoofdkwartier dat de trein te snel had gereden om de aanval nog te kunnen stoppen. Men toonde zelfs een videotape van de loop der gebeurtenissen. Pas veel later kwam uit dat die videotape drie keer te snel was afgespeeld, wat de indruk van onvermijdelijkheid versterkte. Daarna hield men zelfs nog even vol dat dit een onbedoeld technisch probleempje was geweest. Maar dat was zelfs voor de meest lichtgelovige commentatoren wat al te doorzichtig.
- > Een tweede voorbeeld van een misser vond plaats op 13 mei, toen het dorp Korisa werd aangevallen, waarbij tachtig Kosovaars-Albanese burgers omkwamen. Aanvankelijk ontkende de Navo dit, en stelde zelfs dat de Serviërs het hadden gedaan. Later betoogde men dat er militaire concentraties waren geweest en dat de burgers welbewust als «menselijk schild» waren gebruikt. Wederom pas veel later bleek dat men de opeenhoping van tractoren en aanhangwagens van vluchtelingen ook hier vanaf grote hoogte waarschijnlijk ten onrechte voor tanks en pantserwagens had aangezien.
- > De «nevenschade» onder burgers liep overigens nog verder op toen men besloot dat de zuiver militaire aanpak niet werkte en dat daarom de hele Servische infrastructuur geleidelijk moest worden vernietigd: elektriciteitscentrales, raffinaderijen, fabrieken, bruggen. Niet alleen legde dat de Donau internationaal lam en veroorzaakte het een reus achtige milieuvervuiling, er werden ook steeds meer woonhuizen, scholen, ziekenhuizen en kunstschaten geraakt.
- > Westerse verslaggevers in Belgrado en elders die daarover berichtten, werden er steevast van beschuldigd zich te laten misbruiken door de vijand. Ondertussen werd er ook gelogen over de aanvallen op de Chinese ambassade en de Servische televisie - propaganda waarover ik recent in het boekje Verborgene verleiders heb geschreven.
- > De dagelijkse persconferenties van de Navo in Brussel voorzagen de media al die tijd van een doorlopende stroom propaganda die werd gebracht als objectieve informatie. Knightley gaat in op de mise-en-scene van de autoriteiten daarbij. Enerzijds doordat «de deskundigen» vaak op een verhoogd podium werden geplaatst, met een grote groep journalisten beneden; anderzijds doordat zij vaak de «back up» hadden van een groot filmscherm, waarop bommen werpvideo's konden worden getoond. Natuurlijk waren deze steeds zorgvuldig geselecteerd en van een voorinterpretatie voorzien. Maar de gewekte illusie was dat je met eigen ogen «de feiten» kon waarnemen.
- >
- > Toen de eerste militaire fase van de bombardementen weinig effect bleek te hebben gehad en een tweede civiele fase werd ingezet, met een snel toenemend aantal burgerslachtoffers en controverses als gevolg, ontstond alsnog timide kritiek. Er vond daarop een grote reorganisatie van de public relations plaats. Vanuit Washington en Londen werden inderhaast teams van de beste «spin doctors» ter wereld ingevlogen, waaronder Tony Blairs imagoadviseur Campbell, die achter de schermen het heft in handen namen.
- > Ondertussen waren veel grote westerse media de facto «gelijgeschakeld». De media-analisten van het voornoemde Fair maakten bijvoorbeeld een analyse van het bronnengebruik van CNN - bij dergelijke gelegenheden het invloedrijkste medium ter wereld en inmiddels ook eigendom van het machtigste mediabedrijf ter wereld, Time Warner.
- > Officiële Anglo-Amerikaanse woordvoerders bleken daarbij driemaal zo vaak aan het woord te komen als Servische en negen keer zo veel tijd te krijgen. Maar vooral: de eersten konden vrijelijk onbewezen beweringen en beschuldigingen doen, terwijl die van de laatsten voortdurend in twijfel werden getrokken. Van de (meer geloofwaardige) vijftien belangrijkste westerse critici van de oorlog werden er daarentegen niet meer dan drie in totaal aan het woord gelaten, in slechts 0,7 procent van de gevallen.
- > De bekende Britse journalist John Pilger vertelt dat hij zijn kritische commentaren opeens bij geen enkele grote krant meer kwijt kon en dat BBC-uitzendingen tot vier keer toe werden afgelast. Toen hij uiteindelijk toch een kritisch commentaar geplaatst kreeg in The Guardian over de omschreven gang van zaken in Rambouillet, volgde een frontale aanval van de diplomatieke redacteur. Die beschuldigde hem er zelfs van de omstreden clausules in het ontwerpverdrag zelf verzonnen te hebben. De redacteur bleek later ongelijk te hebben en het ontwerpverdrag zelf nooit volledig te hebben gezien.
- > Dit en andere voorbeelden plaatsen opnieuw ernstige vraagtekens bij het functioneren van elementair «hoor en wederhoor» in tijden van gewapend

- conflict. Onze beeldvorming van tien jaar oorlog wordt sterk door al deze vooringenomenheden gekleurd. Het verklaarde doel van de westerse bemoeienissen was «etnische zuiveringen» te voorkomen, maar het eindresultaat is dat ex-Joegoslavië door onze plaatselijke bondgenoten in een half dozijn etnisch zuivere gebieden is opgedeeld - ook in Bosnië en Kosovo.
- > Het verklaarde doel van de militaire interventie in Kosovo was te voorkomen dat de Albanezen daar door de Serviërs zouden worden geïntimideerd en verjaagd, maar men kon van tevoren weten dat dit juist het onmiddellijke gevolg - en daarmee ook de rechtvaardiging achteraf - zou zijn.
 - > Daarmee begon ook het gegoochel met cijfers. Nadat de Albanezen Kosovo massaal begonnen te ontvluchten, zei de Amerikaanse minister van Defensie Cohen op 16 mei tegen de Amerikaanse omroep CBS: «We hebben nu gezien dat er honderdduizend mannen in de militaire leeftijd ontbreken. Zij zijn mogelijk vermoord.» De Britse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Cook verklaarde later dat er zeker meer dan tienduizend mensen waren vermoord in tenminste honderd massaslachtingen. In de eerste vijf maanden na terugkeer van de vrede werden echter 2108 lijken in massagraven gevonden, een aantal dat kan oplopen tot meer dan vierduizend. Een enorm massagraf in een mijn waarvan eerder zeer emotioneel melding was gemaakt, bleek echter niet te bestaan.
 - > De massagraven en de lijken zijn erg genoeg, en het zou altijd nog erger kunnen worden, maar het is niet wat ons eerder is verteld. Bovendien is het vooralsnog onduidelijk in hoeverre die doden slachtoffer waren van oorlogshandelingen van de beide partijen, dan wel van moord of van massaexecutie.
 - >
 - >
 - > De auteur is politiek psycholoog en communicatie-wetenschapper.
 - > P. Hammond & E.S. Herman (eds.), Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis. Uitg. Pluto
 - > P. Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker. Uitg. Prion
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van holst en steijnen

From: CDSM <cdsm_b@btopenworld.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Sent: dinsdag 26 maart 2002 11:41
Subject: Praise for Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War.

Praise for Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War.

"Should be seen by all those concerned about the Yugoslav situation"
 - Lord Peter Carrington, former British Foreign Minister and European Community Envoy

"An absolutely brilliant film, which I hope reaches a wide mass audience. I was one of the very few journalists to be in Kosovo while the bombardment was going on. "Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War" presents tragic events as I observed them on the ground, in contrast to most of the television reporting at the time. It is one thing to write about these events. It is another to have the visual evidence before you."

- Eve-Ann Prentice, London Times reporter and author of "One Woman's War"

"Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War" is a brilliant, gripping and even shocking film. It challenges the view that the NATO powers were only innocent onlookers at the disintegration of Yugoslavia, who belatedly entered its wars for "humanitarian" reasons. The film makes the case that Germany and Austria at first, and then the United States as major intervener, encouraged the breakup, took sides and armed their favored parties.

The film utilizes a remarkable array of well-qualified journalists, specialists in the Balkans, political insiders, and uses them effectively to examine the motivations of the key players and to expose the false claims on which the war-makers built their case for war. As the film shows that the mainstream media played a key role in disseminating propaganda and helping mobilize for war, their willingness to allow this film to enter into the national debate on the Balkan wars will be a good test of their integrity—and of the effectiveness of U.S. democracy."

- Edward S. Herman (co-author, with Noam Chomsky, of *Manufacturing Consent*, and co-editor, with Philip Hammond of *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*)

"A riveting documentary â??truly accomplishedâ?? It argues quite persuasively that Western intelligence agencies armed separatists, while also secretly taking sides in ethnic skirmishes - while claiming to be working toward peace. The numerous strategic missteps by the West, and the endless political doublespeak are carefully detailed; the tragedy of the situation seems to multiply before your very eyes as the film clearly proves that so much of the bloodshed could have easily been prevented."

- Ernest Hardy, LA Weekly

"For anyone who wishes to understand how the US and NATO became entangled in the Balkans, "Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War" is an invaluable guide. We learn how leaders of both political parties in the US became captives of public relations firms and ethnic lobbies producing policies that have made the Balkans increasingly dangerous and unstable and placing our military forces in harms way for the foreseeable future."

- Paul Alexander and John Batchelor WABC Radio New York

"A superb account of misguided intervention. "Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War" brings together important witnesses to events, both military and diplomatic, who leave no doubt that our elected leaders carried out an interventionist policy that was reckless, counterproductive and in violation of international law."

- Ret. Major General Paul Vallely US Army

"A first rate documentary"

- George Szamuely, New York Press

"Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War" not only exposes the media coverage of the wars as scarcely better than interventionist agitprop, it also documents the damage done to everyone in the former Yugoslavia by the determination of Germany and America to present violent solutions as the only effective option and then to impose their will on the rest of the international community."

- Dr Michael Stenton, historian, author of 'Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe: British Political Warfare 1939-43'

"I was appalled to learn that so much of what I thought I knew about the

conflict in the Balkans was at odds with facts carefully documented in "Yugoslavia, The Avoidable War." An essential part of the picture missing from press accounts is provided by Mr. Bogdanich and Mr. Lettmayer."
- Gary Null, WBAI, Pacifica Radio

"Quite apart from being a splendidly produced and gripping film, it teaches us lessons that go far beyond Yugoslavia. It explores the problems of modern mass democracy, which needs to be solved on the ground, not in the air, with a proper understanding of the peoples concerned."
- John Coleman, Editor New European

Winner Best Social Documentary
- New York International Independent Film and Video Festival

"...of special interest to Canadians, since we joined the war because the U.S. wanted a united front, not because we had a clue what was going on, or why."
- Toronto Sun

"...features interviews that list like a Who's Who of World Politics."
- Raindance Film Festival

For more information and to order a copy of the documentary, please go to: www.avoidablewar.com <<http://www.avoidablewar.com>>

Leidschendam, 16.4.-2000

Geachte Heer Steijnen

Hierbij stuur ik u uit

P.M. Callois: "Le Sang du pétrole; Bosnie; Essai de
Géopolitique", L'Ag de l'Homme, Lausanne,
ISBN 2-8251-0740-7

blz 26 : over het leven van Milošević

blz 88,89 : "Manifest" van Tadić

blz 164-169: Srebrenica, Vukovar

blz 183-185 over generaal Mladic en het verraad van Frankrijk.

blz 193. Vukovar

eind van eerste aflevering

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marche vers l'instable système confédéral, le maréchal-président chercha une solution politique, économique et sociale au cas particulier yougoslave. Puis, dépassant le cadre trop précaire de la nation, il s'efforça de l'élargir à certains de ses voisins, dans le même temps qu'animant le mouvement des non-alignés, il s'assurait ainsi un tremplin d'où rivaliser avec les grandes puissances. En Irak, champion d'un panarabisme nouvelle manière, socialiste, laïque, ouvert aux techniques des Occidentaux sinon à leur éthique, Saddam Hussein s'en remit à la modernisation accélérée de son pays et à la puissance des armes pour relever le flambeau brandi par Nasser et diriger les affaires du monde arabe. Deux grands desseins qui auraient été réalisés par des voies très différentes : politique en Yougoslavie, violente à l'intérieur, usage de la force à l'extérieur, en Irak. Un point commun cependant, la collusion du Parti et de l'Etat.

L'homme fort. Il en fallait en Yougoslavie et en Irak. Rassembler en une nation des ethnies et des confessions plus ou moins hostiles l'une à l'autre exige que le pouvoir soit exercé avec passion, sans défaillance et, parfois, sans scrupules. C'est ainsi que naquirent et se perpétuèrent les empires et qu'aujourd'hui résistent à la désagrégation les fédérations — aussi longtemps du moins qu'elles ont à leur tête l'homme fort, fédérateur. Sans le maréchal Tito en Yougoslavie, le général Kassem et les présidents Al Bakr et Saddam Hussein en Irak, ces deux Etats n'auraient pas résisté longtemps à la discorde des peuples qui les constituent et aux pressions et aux menaces exercées de l'extérieur. Tito comme Saddam Hussein ont accédé au pouvoir par les voies les plus périlleuses, les plus inhumaines. La guerre des partisans, les tueries sadiques des Oustachis, les brutalités de la Wehrmacht, les inévitables vengeances qu'elles provoquèrent, sans parler des rivalités internes et du jeu des factions, endurcirent encore un homme prédisposé à surmonter de telles épreuves. En Irak, l'instabilité gouvernementale permanente, la misère ambiante, les complots et les coups d'Etat, les massacres des opposants, la vie à chaque instant disputée à la mort, l'obligation de tuer pour ne pas l'être, est une dure école préparant à l'impitoyable. Aujourd'hui, la dislocation de la Yougoslavie a révélé l'homme fort de la jeune République Fédérale de Yougoslavie. On l'a vu précédemment, M. Milošević a été comparé à M. Saddam Hussein. D'après ce que l'on sait des conditions d'existence du président yougoslave, ce serait plutôt de Robespierre que l'on pourrait le rapprocher. Cependant, un seul point commun avec le maître de Bagdad : une enfance, une adolescence, un début d'existence tragiques. Rejeté par son beau-père, méprisé, battu, contraint de vivre à l'étable, le jeune Saddam aborda la vie dans des conditions misérables. Autour de Milošević, le deuil. Celui de son père : prêtre défroqué, névrosé, il sombra dans la folie et mit fin à ses jours ; celui de sa mère qui a choisi la pendaison, celui de son oncle, militaire, qui également se suicida tandis que Mme Milošević pleure sa mère, assassinée par les occupants après avoir été torturée pour qu'elle dénonce le réseau de partisans au sein duquel elle combattait l'occupant. Comment porter un jugement sur des hommes si profondément marqués par le malheur ?

Pour des raisons d'éthique et parce qu'elles les situent à l'opposé des valeurs qu'elles défendent — et auxquelles elles sacrifient — les démocraties occidentales rejettent ces personnages hors du commun que leur nature, et aussi les circonstances, ont transformé en tyran pour les uns, en bourreau des peuples pour les autres. A des degrés divers dans l'aversion, l'Occident condamne le maître de Bagdad et celui de Belgrade. Selon leur habitude, les médias ont surenchéri sur la réprobation officielle si bien que, pris à leur propre piège, les gouvernements champions de l'ordre moral sont à la fois tenus de négocier avec ces dictateurs et, afin de satisfaire leurs opinions publiques, de les menacer de leurs foudres. De surcroît, vis-à-vis de la jeune Yougoslavie ou de l'Irak hussénien, les démocraties occidentales s'interrogent. Ces dirigeants autoritaires qu'elles abhorrent et à la destitution desquels elles s'activent ne sont pas sans mérites dans la mesure où ils maintiennent d'indispensables équilibres régionaux. L'Irak de Saddam Hussein peut conjurer le péril intégriste et la Serbie de Milošević l'islamisation d'une large portion des Balkans. Et voici les deux hommes, si différents l'un de l'autre, présentant un même intérêt pour la communauté internationale.

Tous deux, également, sont en butte aux oppositions internes que suscite leur autoritarisme... et qu'encouragent les adversaires de l'extérieur. Ceux-ci fustigent le mépris des droits de l'homme, l'oppression des populations, la brutalité des méthodes de gouvernement. Mais ces critiques une fois formulées, dans le désaveu, chacun obéit à des intérêts particuliers : les uns redoutent l'extension des conflits armés dans les Balkans, voire en Europe centrale et l'ampleur des migrations humaines, d'autres craignent l'intervention de l'intégrisme et l'installation d'une forte tête de pont musulmane sur le continent. Au Moyen-Orient, les ambitions affichées par Saddam Hussein, les efforts déployés pour maîtriser les armements les plus évolués et les plus efficaces, mobilisèrent contre Bagdad la quasi-totalité des pays arabes aux côtés des Occidentaux, à la fois redresseurs de torts soucieux de contrôler le prix du baril de pétrole et d'interdire l'accès au club atomique.

Dans les deux pays, les turbulences internes ont des origines qui ne sont pas toujours comparables mais qui aboutissent au même résultat : la guerre civile. En Irak, le gouvernement doit faire face à la révolte permanente des Kurdes, occasionnelle des Assyriens, à la querelle séculaire des Kurdes et des Turcomans, des Sunnites et des Chiites, à l'agitation des partis politiques, aux conjurations des chefs militaires, aux complots des politiques, aux manifestations hostiles des Chiites de la « cinquième colonne iranienne », enfin aux disputes et aux convoitises familiales. En Yougoslavie, outre l'opposition des nombreux partis politiques et les interpellations des intellectuels, le gouvernement de Belgrade doit compter avec la vieille rivalité entre Serbes et Croates, les revendications albanaises, les aspirations musulmanes à l'indépendance, la querelle millénaire des églises catholique et orthodoxe, les nostalgiques de l'ordre ancien et les partisans de la démocratie intégrale, gigantesque maelström de clameurs et de fureurs que seule une poigne de fer peut maîtriser.

rapprochement entre orthodoxes et catholiques prouve que les musulmans sont visés en tant que tels »⁴.

A ces supputations et à ces accusations, les Serbes rétorquaient en rappelant le manifeste rédigé par Izetbegović, en 1970 : « instaurer l'Islam sur tous les plans, aussi bien chez les individus que dans la société et cela par un retour à la foi islamique et la création d'une entité musulmane du Maroc à l'Indonésie ». Comment faire coexister cette société islamique au sein d'une communauté chrétienne, fût-elle tolérante et penchant vers la laïcité ? Le comportement des fondamentalistes, en Iran, Egypte, Algérie et les actions terroristes qu'on leur prête ne laissent pas d'inquiéter la communauté internationale.

La *Déclaration islamique* de l'actuel président bosniaque est un document d'importance majeure⁵. Il s'agit à la fois d'un constat sur l'état du monde musulman (en 1970), d'une théologie positive de l'Islam et d'une justification de sa future et inéluctable puissance. Au moment où écrivait Izetbegović, la situation des populations musulmanes lui apparaissait à juste titre insupportable (et elle n'est guère différente aujourd'hui). « ... Nous sommes asservis : à un moment, en 1919, il n'existait aucun pays musulman indépendant. Nous sommes illettrés : au moment de son indépendance, le Pakistan comptait 75 % d'analphabètes, 85 % en Afghanistan, 70 % en Indonésie, 80 % en Algérie, 90 % au Nigéria... il n'y avait pas d'illettrés aux X^e et XI^e siècles en Espagne islamique... Nous sommes pauvres, nous sommes divisés... les richesses ont été progressivement accumulées entre les mains d'un nombre restreint... C'est cet état que certains ont appelé avec raison « la nuit de l'Islam »... Chaque ascension des peuples islamiques... a commencé avec l'affirmation du Coran... (Mais) la fidélité envers le Livre n'a pas cessé (si) elle a perdu son caractère actif et conservé son caractère irrationnel et mystique. Sous l'influence constante du formalisme théologique, le Coran a été de moins en moins lu et de plus en plus appris (récité) tandis que les commandements concernant la lutte, la droiture, le sacrifice personnel et matériel, amers et désagréables pour notre inertie, se sont dissous et ont disparu dans le ronronnement d'un texte appris par cœur... On répète un millier de fois une de ses phrases pour ne pas être obligé une seule fois de l'appliquer. On a créé une connaissance étendue et minutieuse sur la manière de prononcer le Coran, pour fuir la question : comment l'appliquer dans la vie. A la fin on a transformé le Coran en un simple son, dépourvu de sens ou de contenu compréhensible. (Là est) toute la réalité du monde musulman avec cet écart entre les paroles et les actes ; avec sa débauche, sa saleté, son injustice et sa lâcheté, avec ses mosquées monumentales mais vides, avec ses turbans grands et blancs, sans idéal ni courage, avec l'hypocrite phrase islamique et la pose religieuse, avec cette foi sans foi... »

Illustrant le messianisme rédempteur d'Izetbegović, cette longue citation est indispensable à la compréhension du problème posé aux Slaves du Sud par la dislocation de la fédération yougoslave. La présence de 44 % de Musulmans en Bosnie-Herzégovine — cohabitant avec 31 % de Serbes et 17 % de Croates — est devenue la principale cause des hostilités à l'intérieur et des discordes à

l'extérieur de l'ex-Yougoslavie.

« A travers Mahomet et le Coran », poursuivait Izetbegović, « l'Islam s'est tourné vers l'homme vrai, le monde extérieur, la nature, pour devenir un enseignement sur l'homme et la vie entière... L'Islam est devenu un ordre. L'Islam n'est pas seulement une religion... Le fait que (le Coran) contienne le principe même de l'ordre islamique comme l'unité de la croyance et de la politique, mène à (des) conclusions importantes dont la signification principale et pratique est immense : ... la première et la plus importante de ces conclusions est sans doute celle sur l'impossibilité du lien entre l'Islam et d'autres systèmes non islamiques. Il n'y a pas de paix ni de coexistence entre la religion islamique et les institutions sociales et politiques non islamiques... L'Islam exclut clairement le droit et la possibilité de la mise en œuvre d'une idéologie étrangère à son territoire. Il n'y a donc pas de principe de gouvernement laïque et l'Etat doit être l'expression et le soutien de concepts moraux de la religion ».

Quelle que soit l'élévation morale de certains passages de cette apologie de l'Islam, il est compréhensible que les populations serbes (et croates) de la Bosnie s'en émeuvent. Tant qu'une forte autorité imposait la paix entre les communautés, le respect des ethnies et des croyances était assuré. Depuis l'accès à l'indépendance et la neutralisation du pouvoir fédéral, la revendication islamiste ne laisse pas d'inquiéter les non-musulmans. Et la question se pose de la viabilité d'un Etat islamique au centre des Balkans occidentaux, légiférant bien que minoritaire, sur 56 % de chrétiens, Serbes orthodoxes et Croates catholiques. La propagation de l'intégrisme accompagnant l'émigration turque et maghrébine sur le sol de l'Europe dépasse le seul problème bosniaque. En travaillant à l'éclatement de la fédération yougoslave, l'Allemagne aurait-elle involontairement — préparé un vaste bouleversement politique et social dans l'ensemble des Balkans ? Comment se comportera la Turquie dans une vingtaine d'années lorsqu'elle rassemblera quelque 80 millions d'habitants à l'étroit sur leur plateau anatolien ?

Aujourd'hui, de pareilles perspectives ne sont pas publiquement évoquées. L'on se contente d'assister quasi indifférents à la destruction de l'ordre établi à la fin des deux guerres mondiales, c'est-à-dire des défaites de l'Allemagne.

Si bien qu'entre l'émotion parfois manifestée par les populations témoins du drame yougoslave et la réserve de leurs dirigeants, la différence a été notable. Les premières, « mises en condition » par les images du conflit, réclamaient des interventions armées que les seconds redoutaient à deux titres : l'engagement dans une guerre meurtrière et le sentiment que tous les torts ne sont peut-être pas du côté de Belgrade.

Un nationalisme réveillé : celui des Croates

Comme les musulmans bosniaques et, nous le verrons, comme les Serbes, les Croates se réfèrent avec fierté à leur très lointain passé. Leurs terres consti-

citoyen américain, en rendant compte d'un court séjour à Belgrade accompagné de deux Canadiens membres d'une association de Serbes vivant au Canada. Aux Etats-Unis, écrit R. Thomas, tous les faits et toutes les thèses qui pourraient être favorables aux Serbes sont passés sous silence. En revanche, afin de justifier le bombardement des positions serbes, les images antiserbes les plus provocantes sont largement diffusées tandis que celles qui plaideraient pour eux demeurent en archives. Ayant appris que des civils avaient été massacrés dans un village, journalistes et cameramen américains se précipitèrent sur les lieux. Mais lorsqu'ils découvrirent que les victimes étaient serbes, ils firent demi-tour. Un journal américain eut le front de reproduire la photographie d'une femme serbe qui avait été violée — clairement identifiée par le journal canadien — en changeant la légende et en présentant la malheureuse comme étant Musulmane. A Milwaukee et Minneapolis, les télévisions locales diffusèrent les images des corps carbonisés de plusieurs familles musulmanes en se gardant de mentionner que des soldats croates avaient commis ces crimes car, aussitôt après, étaient projetées des vues montrant des Serbes en action près de Srebrenica afin de faire croire qu'ils étaient également responsables du meurtre des Musulmans.

La télévision n'utilise pas toujours de procédés aussi sournois. Il arrive à ses producteurs d'être simplement des ignorants. C'est ainsi que la compagnie SKG News accompagna les images des obsèques de Serbes d'un commentaire assurant qu'il s'agissait de Musulmans — victimes des Serbes — alors que chaque cercueil portait la croix orthodoxe. La chaîne de télévision s'excusa. Mais la première impression est celle qui compte et personne ne prête attention aux démentis, comme le sait si bien M. James Harff.

A l'Ouest, le comportement des Croates, au cours de 1991 et du premier semestre de 1992, fut ignoré : destruction d'une centaine d'églises orthodoxes ; la cathédrale de Pakrac saccagée ; le palais épiscopal incendié ; des dizaines de villages serbes rasés par l'artillerie, l'incendie, le bulldozer ; l'« épuration ethnique » de plus de 150 agglomérations et villages dans la seule Slavonie occidentale ; la fuite vers la mère-patrie de près d'un demi-million de Serbes terrifiés par la férocité des nouveaux Oustachis, le massacre de Kupres où des paysans furent décapités, les membres arrachés, les orbites vidées, les quelque 200 Serbes jetés dans des fosses, la tuerie de Bradina, sur la route de Mostar à Sarajevo, le 25 mai 1992... Selon des témoignages serbes, donc sujets à controverse, « ...les habitants qui ne réussirent pas à fuir à temps furent déportés ou mitraillés, liquidés à coups de grenades, égorgés, arrosés d'essence et brûlés vifs... En d'autres endroits, des témoins disent avoir vu des victimes aux yeux arrachés, aux oreilles coupées, des corps empalés et même des cadavres de petits enfants jetés à la rivière après avoir été rôtis... » (environs de Gračanica, près de Doboj). Un recul d'un demi-siècle, une barbarie semblable à celle dont les Oustachis se rendirent coupables, une monstrueuse démonstration de la pérennité du Mal.

Barbarie ? Voyez le siège de Vukovar. Alors que la majorité des habitants

de la cité étaient des Serbes, le maréchal-président Tito l'attribua à la future République de Croatie. Vukovar est au nord de la voie stratégique Belgrade-Zagreb et, surtout, isole la Serbie proprement dite des Serbes majoritaires dans la région de Banja Luka et de Knin (Krajina). Le Plan Owen-Vance séparait les deux « Serbie » en donnant aux Croates la province n° 3 (les Croates y étaient majoritaires au nord, minoritaires au sud où l'emportaient numériquement, Serbes et Musulmans), Vukovar se trouvant à proximité de la limite entre les deux provinces numérotées respectivement 3 (aux Croates) et 4 (aux Serbes). Les combats commencèrent en août 1991, le siège de la ville dura près de quatre mois (elle tomba aux mains des Serbes le 28 novembre 1991), Zagreb annonça que ses forces armées avaient détruit 600 chars et tué 8 000 Serbes. Pour Belgrade, ce fut la garde nationale croate qui commença les hostilités alors que les Croates accusent l'armée fédérale yougoslave. En raison de l'ardeur et de la durée des combats, les médias assimilèrent Vukovar à Stalingrad. Mais à Stalingrad, les combattants furent loin d'égaliser la sauvagerie qui régna à Vukovar à l'instigation de Dobroslav Paraga, chef d'un parti extrémiste croate. Sur la tragédie de Vukovar et « l'héroïque résistance de ses volontaires », le rédacteur en chef de la revue britannique *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, M. Gregory Copley, porte des appréciations bien différentes de celles diffusées par la presse et la télévision¹⁰ : « ...du 1^{er} juin au 23 novembre 1991 (les Croates) s'attachèrent à exterminer celles des familles serbes qui n'avaient pas fui. Ce sont ces raisons qui ont conduit l'armée yougoslave à combattre dans Vukovar. Au moins mille Serbes, la plupart des femmes, vieillards, enfants, furent tués, égorgés au couteau, à coups de hache ou matraqués à mort, dans deux centres : l'un la fabrique de chaussures de Borovo, l'autre le Club d'aviron de Vukovar. Beaucoup de corps furent jetés dans le Danube, laissés flotter vers Belgrade... Une journaliste croate en visite à Vukovar durant les combats, non familière avec les armes à feu, demanda à un jeune tireur d'armer un pistolet pour elle afin qu'elle puisse ressentir ce que cela faisait de tuer un Serbe. Elle tira sans distinction sur une vieille femme serbe gardée par un Croate... »

Daniel S. Schiffer¹¹ est allé à Vukovar dès sa libération. Voici son témoignage : « l'indicible spectacle dont je fus, un jour, le témoin horrifié, stupéfait et comme pétrifié, s'apparentait en mon esprit à une énorme hallucination, à une vision que la seule raison ne peut même concevoir tant elle dépasse en sa monstruosité, en sa perversité, tout entendement... c'était peu après la chute de Vukovar... corps carbonisés le long des rivières, cadavres écorchés, puis crucifiés à la porte des maisons : têtes coupées dans les sillons des champs ; cœurs extirpés, yeux arrachés et dents éparpillées ça et là ; dépouilles mutilées tels des animaux offerts en sacrifice ; mères éventrées et enfants égorgés, paysans pendus au centre des basses-cours, tel du gibier ; chiens et chats empalés aux murs des jardins ; vaches et chevaux brûlés vifs dans les étables, une grimace de douleur encore visible sur leur gueule tordue... C'est à ce même genre de scénario que furent confrontés les observateurs des Nations Unies lorsqu'ils

entrèrent, consternés, dans la petite ville de Vitez, théâtre d'une impitoyable bataille où les milices croates avaient massacré la population musulmane »¹². *Bew*

Avec Elie Wiesel, à la demande de Dobrica Cosić, alors président de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, Daniel S. Schiffer procéda à une enquête sur les crimes de guerre perpétrés en Bosnie. Après avoir visité le camp de prisonniers (musulmans) de Manjača (le 28 novembre 1992), Schiffer obtint — sans difficulté — du Dr Radovan Karadžić, président de la République serbe de Bosnie, un téléfax libérant tous ses prisonniers. Et le 18 décembre, Manjača disparut de la liste des camps de détention. En revanche, « malgré leurs promesses, écrit Schiffer, je sus par la voix même de la Croix-Rouge, que ni les autorités croates, ni les autorités musulmanes n'avaient relâché un seul des détenus serbes, contrevenant... ainsi aux accords signés à Genève entre les trois parties... Moins d'une semaine plus tard, je fus informé par le général Ratko Mladić, commandant des forces armées serbo-bosniaques, que près d'un millier de prisonniers musulmans que j'avais fait libérer de Manjača avaient été contraints par les chefs croates du camp de réfugiés de Karlovac, de retourner au front... » La seule tragédie de Vukovar suffirait à susciter une haine tenace entre Serbes et Croates. Mais elle fut précédée et suivie de beaucoup d'autres. La revue britannique citée précédemment raconte également les tueries de Gospić (mi-octobre 1991), Glina (décembre 1991), Kupres (avril 1992). « ...Même à Zagreb où, officiellement, il n'y a pas eu de combats, plus de 100 Serbes furent tués dans la seule année 1991, et les églises orthodoxes endommagées ou détruites »¹³. *→ B2, 2V*

Le monde n'a pratiquement rien su de ces massacres et de ces destructions. Il fallait accabler les Serbes d'opprobre et dissimuler les forfaits des Croates derrière les exactions commises par les Serbes, le plus souvent en riposte aux persécutions dont leurs populations de Croatie et de Bosnie étaient les victimes. *Defense and Foreign Affairs* a constaté que, « pratiquement, tous les envois de films de nouvelles et de photographies qui sortent des zones de conflit passent par la capitale croate ou par les canaux contrôlés par les Musulmans bosniaques. On a déconseillé aux responsables des médias occidentaux d'accepter la « propagande » de ce qui est décrit comme être « les abominables autorités néocommunistes » de Belgrade... Les télévisions occidentales, y compris l'Eurovision, ont constamment refusé d'accepter quoi que ce soit émanant de Belgrade. Il faut souligner que le seul satellite utilisable par la Yougoslavie, avant que l'Etat ne soit prématurément disloqué, relevait de Zagreb, c'est pourquoi la Croatie fut capable de manipuler les diffusions des images télévisées ». A cette forme de distorsion de la vérité, il faut ajouter les desseins politiques à moyen et long terme de l'Allemagne et des Etats-Unis, auxquels il a été fait allusion. *→ A2, 6V*

Le bombardement de Srebrenica fournit une nouvelle occasion de vilipender les Serbes de Bosnie. Toujours agressifs, ils n'auraient pas hésité à prendre pour cibles les malheureuses populations musulmanes de la ville, faisant encore des centaines de victimes. La vérité est autre. C'est encore un Britannique,

→ 20.11.91
I.R. Thornton, interprète auprès des Casques bleus d'outre-Manche servant en Bosnie, qui la dévoile. Révolté par la campagne des médias, il écrivit à *Time* qui reproduisit¹⁴ sa lettre : « ...vous avez oublié de vous poser la question de savoir ce que sont devenus les Serbes qui formaient 30 % de la population de Srebrenica. Dès le début du conflit, ils furent chassés de leurs habitations avec les bagages qu'ils purent emporter et comme ils se sauvaient, les Musulmans tirèrent sauvagement sur les hommes, les femmes et les enfants en fuite. Ce sont des Musulmans eux-mêmes qui le dirent aux soldats britanniques lorsque ceux-ci pénétrèrent dans Srebrenica... Au début de l'année, les Musulmans de Bosnie lancèrent une offensive en Bosnie orientale, bombardant les villages serbes bosniaques, violant les femmes et massacrant le bétail... un soldat britannique qui a vu les corps de trois enfants croates à la gorge tranchée par les Musulmans peut-il admettre que ces Musulmans soient dotés d'armes plus puissantes et plus efficaces ? »

En mars 1991, le ministre de la Défense de la République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie avait entrepris, en accord avec ses collègues des Républiques formant la Yougoslavie, de désarmer toutes les formations paramilitaires. Prêts à la sécession, les Slovènes et les Croates refusèrent. A la même époque, la Croatie s'armait clandestinement recevant des armes de Hongrie et d'Autriche. Le trafic fut découvert à Virovitica, mais la grande presse préféra l'ignorer. Pourtant, il était évident qu'en ayant promulgué sa nouvelle Constitution, le 22 décembre 1990, la Croatie se préparait à l'indépendance et l'événement était d'importance. Depuis le début de cette même année 1990, les cadres civils et militaires serbes stationnés en Croatie avaient été destitués sans que personne, à l'extérieur de la Yougoslavie, ne se soucie de ces indices non équivoques de sécession. Il n'avait davantage pas été tenu compte du droit croate sur lequel repose la nouvelle Constitution de 1990. Il ne peut être celui d'un Etat pluriethnique et pluriconfessionnel : au pouvoir, le parti de la Communauté Démocratique de Croatie (HDZ) entend que la Croatie future soit une République « ethniquement purifiée ». A l'avenir, tous ses citoyens devront être croates et catholiques, les Serbes vivant en Croatie perdant toute existence politique et devenant une minorité tolérée, avant leur totale extinction. En Croatie, les Serbes n'ont plus le droit d'utiliser leur langue et leur alphabet cyrillique, ils sont chassés des postes de responsabilité et par toutes sortes d'exactions, poussés au dehors, lorsqu'ils ne seront pas persécutés, emprisonnés, mis à mort. S'efforçant de minimiser les effets du terrible règne des Oustachis, Franjo Tudjman avait affirmé que l'Etat tel que le concevait Ante Pavelić ne résultait pas de la guerre, mais qu'il était l'expression des aspirations légitimes du peuple croate. On conçoit que le passé resurgissant, les Serbes de Croatie n'aient envisagé que deux issues : par dizaines de milliers les uns cherchèrent refuge en Serbie même tandis que d'autres s'organisaient pour défendre sur place leur existence et leurs biens. Le sort de ces centaines de milliers de Serbes n'ayant le choix qu'entre la « valise et le cercueil » n'a suscité aucun mouvement d'opinion en Occident.

13) *166*
→ 20.11.91
In *Time* wird geen enkel Kroatisch incident, noch katholieke verk. aangevallen.

Le retour au pays, à l'invitation de Zagreb, des acteurs encore vivants de l'oustachisme — auxquels une filière vaticane avait permis de chercher refuge en Amérique latine — le drapeau à damiers rouges et blancs que brandissaient les brigades pro-allemandes, à nouveau emblème national ; à Zagreb, la place des « victimes du fascisme » débaptisée pour devenir celle des « Souverains croates » ; la réhabilitation du cardinal Stepinac, qui s'accommoda du régime oustachi ; les licenciements arbitraires « justifiés » par la nationalité ; l'obligation faite aux citoyens de déclarer leur allégeance au nouvel Etat ; les manifestations de nationalisme ; le dynamitage des maisons serbes, en particulier sur la côte dalmate ; les parades militaires et aussi les atteintes aux possessions des Serbes, leur mise en surveillance par la publication de listes de suspects, tous ces événements, suivis par le contrôle des médias, les manifestations de l'omnipotence du parti au pouvoir, rappelaient de tristes souvenirs. Ils furent dissimulés au reste du monde.

La proclamation de la République Serbe de Bosnie fut sévèrement critiquée, celle des Croates de Bosnie, la Herceg-Bosna n'a été mentionnée que lorsque l'armée croate s'est retournée contre ses anciens alliés musulmans. Le dirigeant serbe Radovan Karadžić a été traité de criminel de guerre et le chef croate Mate Boban d'homme d'Etat. Alors que les Fédéraux s'étaient retirés de Bosnie, laissant aux Serbes qui y vivaient la mission d'organiser leur défense, ce sont des unités de l'armée de Zagreb, initialement stationnées en territoire croate, qui disputèrent aux musulmans les zones où les Croates sont majoritaires, notamment au nord où, en 1992, étaient déjà déployées une douzaine de brigades légères avec chars et artillerie et, au sud, entre Livno et Trebinje, quelque 15 brigades occupaient un territoire officiellement bosniaque, mais en fait surtout peuplé de Croates. Il a bien fallu évoquer le siège de Mostar et les atrocités commises de part et d'autre dans la zone des combats, la guerre croato-musulmane ne pouvant plus être passée sous silence.

Les hostilités entre Croates et Musulmans bosniaques commencèrent le 15 avril 1993. Interprétant le Plan Owen-Vance à sa manière, Zagreb entendait « purifier ethniquement » les provinces qui devaient revenir aux populations croates de Bosnie-Herzégovine en les vidant de leurs habitants musulmans. Il est ignoble de croire qu'un jour les Croates trahiraient leurs amis musulmans, affirmait quelques mois plus tôt un « intellectuel » français, en quête de notoriété à Sarajevo. Aussi peu perspicace qu'il était affirmatif dans sa condamnation des Serbes, l'ultimatum des Croates aux Bosniaques l'incita, au moins provisoirement, à manifester moins d'assurance. Médisance et même calomnie n'en avaient pas moins accompli leur œuvre.

« C'est un véritable récit d'horreur qu'a livré un officiel des Nations Unies... Selon lui, alors que les affrontements continuent dans plusieurs villes de Bosnie centrale, notamment à Konjic, Zenica, Busovača et Mostar, des familles entières ont été exécutées à coups de feu, tirées à bout portant à Vitez. Des médecins qui avaient emprunté une route proche de cette ville, où Croates et Musulmans sont à égalité, auraient été froidement exécutés d'une balle dans la

tête... au moins 250 morts rien qu'à Vitez, 300 blessés et des milliers de personnes déplacées... »¹⁵. L'attaque de Mostar par les forces croates commença le 9 mai et les observateurs de l'ONU assistèrent sans pouvoir intervenir à l'expulsion, sous escorte, d'un certain nombre d'habitants de la cité, les hommes étant séparés des femmes et des enfants et dirigés vers des camps de concentration. « Selon un représentant du Haut Commandement aux Réfugiés, les Croates massacrent, violent en incendient les maisons pour chasser les Musulmans des villages autour de Vitez et Kiseljak, vers le sud-est, cependant que les Musulmans terrorisent les Croates pour les chasser des environs de Zenica. L'objectif de chaque communauté est de purifier « ethniquement » les zones devant leur être attribuées selon le Plan Owen-Vance »¹⁶. « Purification à la croate », avait titré *Le Monde*, en évoquant le massacre de Vitez. La guerre croato-musulmane produisit, aux Etats-Unis, un résultat inattendu : « ...Il est temps de bombarder les Serbes », déclara le sénateur Dennis DeConcini¹⁷. Certes, l'urgence était grande de s'en prendre aux Serbes, d'autant que trois semaines après la publication de la recommandation du sénateur, force était de reconnaître qu'à la suite du bombardement et de la destruction de la cité historique de Travnik par les Musulmans, quelque 5 500 civils croates et un millier de combattants de la Herceg-Bosnie étaient fort heureux de pouvoir trouver refuge auprès des forces serbes afin d'échapper au sort que leur réservaient les Musulmans d'Izetbegović. En septembre, à nouveau, près de 3 000 Croates des environs de Vareš, au nord de Sarajevo, iront se placer sous la protection des milices serbes du général Mladić. Il est vrai que, dans son rapport à l'ONU, l'ancien Premier ministre polonais, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, peu enclin à l'indulgence vis-à-vis des Serbes orthodoxes, n'avait guère fardé la vérité quant aux atrocités croato-musulmanes. Après des mois de silence, l'ampleur de la purification ethnique croate excédait toute possibilité de dissimulation. « Selon le témoignage des enquêteurs, les forces croates du HVO lancent une attaque (du village d'Ahnići) le 16 mai, à 5h30 du matin, sur cette localité qui ne présente aucun caractère stratégique. Les tirs de mortier interdisent toute fuite aux Musulmans. Ceux qui essaient néanmoins de partir vers le sud, une vingtaine de personnes, sont abattus par les Croates. Il n'y aura aucun survivant... les 180 maisons musulmanes sont détruites à coups de grenades ou incendiées. Les habitants qui tentent de s'enfuir des maisons en flammes sont abattus à bout portant. Les enquêteurs trouvent 89 cadavres de Musulmans, pour la plupart des personnes âgées, des femmes, des enfants. Les maisons croates sont intactes et leurs habitants se confinent dans un mutisme total... A Mostar, 1 500 à 2 000 personnes, des Musulmans pour la majorité, mais aussi quelques familles serbes, sont détenues dans d'horribles conditions... » Ce rapport s'en prend brièvement aussi aux violations commises par les Musulmans : « ...dans le village de Miletici, cinq jeunes hommes croates ont été soit torturés en public, soit exécutés... »¹⁸. MM. Tudjman et Izetbegović, tenus par l'intelligentsia occidentale pour de grands humanistes luttant contre l'impérialisme serbe, auraient-ils été incapables de commander leurs propres troupes ? Ou bien cher-

des milliers de Musulmans telles que les ont rapportées quelque 700 survivants : « ...Quatre jours sans manger et sans eau, nous buvions notre urine, battus à coups de matraques, de fils électriques... dix tués à coups de barres à mines, trois autres par balles... » Alain Finkielkraut posait la question : « Comment peut-on être Croate ? ». Les Croates lui donnent la réponse.

²¹ *Nous accusons*. Birmingham : Lazarica Press, 1992.

²² Les Serbes ne s'opposaient pas à la sécession de la Croatie. Ils exigeaient seulement que soient préservés intégralement les droits civiques de la minorité serbe qui y vivait.

²³ L'Acte final de la Conférence d'Helsinki (1^{er} août 1975) dispose que les changements de frontières doivent être effectués conformément au droit international, par des moyens pacifiques et par accord entre les parties.

²⁴ P. Grèzes, *Journal de Géopolitique inspirée*, 1993, p. 27.

²⁵ *Foreign Policy* n° 93. Hiver 93-94. *Date Line Yugoslavia : The Partisan Press*, pp. 153-173.

²⁶ *Peacekeeper. The Road to Sarajevo*. Vancouver/Toronto. Douglas & McIntyre, 1993, p. 194.

²⁷ MacKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

²⁸ MacKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

²⁹ Volume XX, n° 12, 31 décembre 1992, p. 6.

³⁰ *New York International Herald Tribune* du 14 janvier 1994, p. 2.

³¹ *Le Monde* du 1^{er} janvier 1994, p. 6.

³² « Une nouvelle trahison des clercs ». *Le Quotidien*, 14 janvier 1994, p. 14.

³³ « Mur, où est ta victoire ? », 22 décembre 1993, p. 8.

CHAPITRE V

TRISTE CHRONIQUE D'UNE GUERRE IMPOSÉE I

S'il est vrai que la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens, il est vrai également que la paix, c'est-à-dire la politique, est la continuation de la guerre par d'autres moyens.

Maréchal Boris M. CHAPOCHNIKOV

« Mon grand-père n'a pas connu son père, mon père pas davantage le sien et, moi j'ignore le visage du mien : il a été assassiné alors que j'avais deux ans ». Tous assassinés ? Non, il y a un mort au combat, mais le général Ratko Mladić, commandant les Serbes de Bosnie, assimile la guerre à un assassinat collectif. Il la déteste. « Je la fais parce que je veux que les miens vivent ; qu'ils connaissent la paix et l'indépendance... la liberté, être souverains chez eux... respectés... sans que personne ose, à nouveau, les menacer... La misère, la souffrance, la mort, ces mots résument l'histoire des Serbes : occupation ottomane, guerres entre occupants, entre Slaves, et même entre nous, tel est notre passé et notre présent. Nous sommes las d'avoir été — et d'être encore — exterminés. Nous n'avons pas voulu le démembrement de la Yougoslavie. Il nous contraint à rassembler sur un même espace territorial les deux millions des nôtres dispersés maintenant en terre étrangère — où ils sont minoritaires, considérés comme des citoyens de seconde catégorie... Nous sommes accusés de tous les crimes sans faire la part de ceux commis contre nous. Je suis désigné à la vindicte publique... parce que mes hommes et moi luttons — sur une terre qui fut nôtre — pour l'unité de la nation serbe. Allemands, Américains, Britanniques, Français, Espagnols, d'autres encore, n'ont pas de leçons à nous donner, qui agrandirent leur nation à l'épée et au canon... Nous ne demandons rien qui ne soit nôtre, et depuis des siècles ».

C'était le 19 juin 1993. Ne pouvant, faute d'en avoir le temps, me rendre à Pale, le général Mladić m'avait rejoint près de Belgrade, dans une maison amie. Comme tous les Serbes, il s'interrogeait sur l'étrange comportement de la France,

mais au début de notre entretien, il se garda d'y faire allusion, préférant exposer les raisons de son combat et le justifier. L'homme impressionne à la fois par sa stature et l'ardeur qu'il met à convaincre. Ses yeux bleus portent le regard au loin, au-delà de l'interlocuteur, lisant sa mission sur le mur de l'infini. Le pas est lourd, appuyé sur le sol à défendre. On dirait de sa main large et chaude qu'elle a été davantage musclée par la bêche ou le hoyau que par la mitrailleuse ou le bâton de commandement. C'est un paysan que j'ai en face de moi, adossé à ses champs, à sa maison, à ses biens, à ceux de tous ses compatriotes. Un Chouan ? Comme les Chouans, il lutte pour le maintien du royaume, en l'occurrence la République socialiste Fédérative de Yougoslavie. Yougoslave, il se résigne à une Serbie qui rassemblerait tous les Serbes sous les mêmes lois.

Trois heures de route pour rencontrer un visiteur n'ayant ni responsabilités, ni audience, me paraît une démarche surprenante de la part d'un Commandant en chef en guerre. Je l'en remercie vivement et lui expose les raisons de ma présence en Serbie : essayer de comprendre les causes du drame yougoslave, comparer la réalité aux dires d'une propagande antiserbe intense et efficace, vanter les avantages d'une réaction militaire mesurée, moins inhumaine, et aussi d'une contre-propagande jusqu'à maintenant par trop négligée par le gouvernement de Belgrade.

Le voile noir et aussi les graffiti sur le monument à la France « aimons la France comme elle nous a aimés » témoignent à la fois du désappointement et de la tristesse des Serbes abandonnés dans l'épreuve par un pays qu'ils croyaient proche. J'essaie d'expliquer nos atermoiements et notre ralliement à la stratégie antiserbe de l'Allemagne. S'étant engagé à fond dans l'aventure européenne, et par ses erreurs de gestion, dépendant économiquement de son puissant voisin d'outre-Rhin, Paris n'est pas entièrement libre de conduire une politique étrangère conforme à l'intérêt national. D'ailleurs l'objectif officiel — par la ratification du traité de Maastricht — était de se fonder dans un système fédéral qui sera obligatoirement dirigé par sa composante la plus puissante, c'est-à-dire l'Allemagne, l'Etat-Nation français s'estompe et avec lui une politique et une stratégie indépendantes. Bonn voulant le démembrement de la Yougoslavie, il a fallu que Paris suive. Il faut également compter avec la coupure des générations et l'ignorance généralisée de l'Histoire. Le souvenir de la vieille alliance franco-serbe a été effacé par la création de la Yougoslavie, par le titisme et son gouvernement, apparemment plus proche de l'Est que de l'Ouest. Alors qu'en dépit de ces profondes mutations politiques et sociales, les Serbes demeuraient assurés de l'attachement de la France, celle-ci s'était détournée des Balkans aux nations (Roumanie, Bulgarie) longtemps soumises au principe — soviétique — de la souveraineté limitée. Toutefois, malgré les pressions exercées par Bonn et par Washington, il faut reconnaître que Paris et Londres se sont toujours efforcés de freiner les ardeurs belliqueuses allemandes et américaines. Il est encore des Français qui n'ont pas oublié les sacrifices consentis par le peuple serbe à la cause des Alliés en guerre contre l'Allemagne de Guillaume et celle de Hitler.

La conversation s'orienta ensuite vers la guerre et les techniques de combat. Mladić redoutait l'intervention américaine et le recours aux missiles de croisière contre lesquels il n'est guère d'autre défense que la mobilité quasi permanente. Les forces dont dispose le général Mladić s'y prêtent, mais l'infrastructure économique et l'habitat sont bien évidemment vulnérables à ces engins. L'aviation se révélerait peu efficace d'autant que, si elle était engagée, les Serbes s'estiment en mesure de lui infliger des pertes suffisantes pour que les démocraties renoncent et composent. Ou en viennent à traiter la Serbie comme elles sont intervenues en Irak, rejetant, par leurs bombardements massifs, ce pays plusieurs décennies en arrière. Mais la CEI laisserait-elle faire ? Et aussi la France et la Grande-Bretagne ? En revanche, le terrain, les couverts, le combat de partisans, l'intrépidité des soldats serbes défendant leur terre, devraient être assez dissuasifs pour que les « Occidentaux » renoncent à lutter au sol. Mieux que leurs politiques, les chefs militaires des forces de l'ONU déployées en Bosnie le savent et aussi les deux médiateurs. Mais les gouvernements auront-ils la sagesse d'écouter leurs « techniciens » ? Mladić me rappela qu'au prix de près d'un million de victimes — des divisions SS croates et musulmanes — les résistants yougoslaves, serbes dans leur grande majorité, ont retenu une quinzaine de divisions allemandes dont le Führer aurait eu un urgent emploi sur le front russe. Et que le fait mérite quelques manifestations de reconnaissance, même près d'un demi-siècle plus tard.

Deux aides de camp, en civil, prenaient des notes et répondaient aux nombreux appels téléphoniques. Tard dans la nuit, l'un d'eux mit fin à notre entretien : un millier de soldats et cinq mille réfugiés croates demandaient protection aux Serbes afin de ne pas tomber aux mains des Musulmans qui, dans la région de Travnik, tentaient d'investir les positions des premiers et les villages des seconds. « ...Il faut que j'aille organiser en toute hâte un convoi d'autocars pour évacuer ces civils croates et aussi que je fasse ouvrir aux militaires la route de leur retour en territoire moins inhospitalier », me dit Mladić en ajustant son ceinturon tandis qu'à l'extérieur, dans un grand bruit de coups de freins et de crissements de pneus, s'organisait le convoi qui allait foncer à tombeau ouvert vers le quartier général de Mladić, à Han Pijesak. Avec une satisfaction visible, le général serbe venait de démontrer — bien fortuitement — le rôle d'arbitre et même de sauveur qu'en la circonstance les Croates lui attribuent. « On va sauver ces gens », me dit-il alors qu'il descendait quatre à quatre les marches du perron, « c'est mieux que de leur tirer dessus ». « ...A bientôt, Pierre le Serbe » me cria-t-il, le visage radieux, en s'engouffrant dans sa voiture.

Cet homme a été décrié, affecté d'une tare : en effet, il est nationaliste¹ et, aux endroits les plus exposés, il combat pour la survie de son pays. La veille, le président Ćosić, alors tout récemment destitué, m'avait fait part de ses angoisses : l'animosité de l'Allemagne bientôt puissance régnante en Europe, celle des Etats-Unis soucieux de ménager l'Islam et son pétrole, l'abandon des alliés traditionnels, une Serbie aux populations dispersées, coincée entre les germa-

de défense antiaérienne, dont les engins soviétiques provenant de l'ex-RDA formaient le principal armement. Les Croates n'avaient pas d'aviation de combat : quelques Antonov An 2, des petits Cessna 182, 3 Mig 21 dont deux seulement utilisables, des avions agricoles transformés en bombardiers et dont les pilotes largueraient des projectiles de fabrication artisanale, une douzaine d'hélicoptères russes provenant d'Allemagne de l'Est.

Après la chute de Vukovar (19 novembre 1991), l'armée fédérale aurait pu s'emparer d'Osijek, voire de Zagreb. Le chef d'état-major fédéral (général Kadijević) aurait refusé de prolonger l'offensive, satisfait sans doute d'avoir réussi à occuper en Croatie les territoires peuplés de Serbes.

Entre Serbes et Croates, les premiers incidents graves eurent lieu en août 1990, à Knin, et en avril 1991, plus d'un mois avant l'ouverture des hostilités en Slovénie. La possession du parc national de Plitvice, opposa policiers serbes et croates. Parce que ce centre de tourisme international se trouve sur le territoire de sa commune, la municipalité de Titova Korenica décida qu'il appartenait à la Krajina (dont la population, en majorité serbe, avait proclamé l'indépendance en mars 1990). Ayant tenté de récupérer ce territoire, des unités de la police croate y furent accueillies à coups de Kalachnikov ; il y eut un mort et une dizaine de blessés. Le mois suivant, un affrontement entre Serbes et Croates se termina par une fusillade — le massacre dit de Borovo-Selo — qui fit une vingtaine de morts ; les nationalistes tchetniks serbes étaient accusés d'avoir monté cette opération à la veille du remplacement du Serbe Borislav Jović par le Croate Stipe Mesić à la tête du gouvernement fédéral. Mesić s'était déclaré partisan de la transformation de la fédération yougoslave en une communauté d'Etats indépendants. L'armée fédérale fut alors mise en état d'alerte afin de prévenir les conflits entre nationalités et, s'ils éclataient, de s'interposer entre les belligérants. Cependant, se voyant en péril, par milliers, les Serbes quittaient la Croatie. La guerre civile menaçait. A la fin du mois de juin, un commando serbe attaquait un poste de police croate à Glina : quatre tués, une quinzaine de blessés.

La communauté internationale s'inquiéta. Rencontrant les représentants des Douze, M. James Baker, alors Secrétaire d'Etat, admit que, pour le moment, la question de l'indépendance des Républiques en mal de sécession ne se posait pas. Belgrade prit cette déclaration pour un encouragement : il lui revenait de maintenir l'unité de la Yougoslavie. Passant à Paris, Ante Marković, Premier ministre fédéral, venait de rencontrer M. Mitterrand : « ...vous pouvez compter sur la France pour vous aider à poursuivre les réformes entreprises et (assurer) le maintien de la stabilité du pays, dans le respect des minorités », lui dit le Président français, ajoutant : « ...nous souhaitons le succès de votre œuvre et nous vous y aiderons. Nous ne sommes pas indifférents à ce qui se passe dans cette région d'Europe. Nous ferons tout notre possible pour contribuer à votre réussite ». La France prenait ainsi position pour une fédération yougoslave « aménagée », les droits des minorités y étant respectés... mais également ses frontières « extérieures » et intérieures. De même, à Bruxelles, le 23 juin 1991,

la CEE demanda à la Slovénie et à la Croatie de ne pas déclarer leur indépendance, prévenant les deux gouvernements qu'ils ne seraient pas diplomatiquement reconnus. Le mois suivant, jouant les Ponce Pilate, le président Bush fit savoir que les événements de Yougoslavie concernaient les Européens... ce n'était pas le rôle des Etats-Unis de prendre parti. Aussi Belgrade était-il assuré de la neutralité américaine comme du soutien de la CEE. A l'exception de l'Allemagne, M. Kohl demandant l'arrêt de toute aide au gouvernement de Belgrade s'il usait de la force⁷.

Au début du mois de juillet, le front des hostilités se déplaça de Slovénie en Croatie, cette fois avec la participation active de l'armée fédérale. Voulant — apparemment — séparer des partisans serbes et croates s'affrontant à Tenja, en Croatie du nord-est, les Fédéraux ouvrirent le feu et il y eut des dizaines de morts. Osijek, commandant une région où les Serbes étaient majoritaires, fut attaqué au mortier et au canon. En Slayonie, après deux mois de combats, l'on comptait des centaines de victimes des deux nationalités. Leurs combattants luttèrent dans une zone à demi-serbe, à demi-croate, mais reliant la Serbie à la province de Croatie où les Serbes l'emportaient par le nombre, entre Vukovar au sud et Osijek au nord, à Borovo et Trpinja. Peuplé de Serbes, le faubourg industriel de Vukovar (Borovo-Naselje), attaqué par les milices croates, fut incendié et sa population chassée. Plus de 6 000 réfugiés serbes cherchèrent asile en Voïvodine.

En juillet, à nouveau, les fusillades de Glina firent les titres des journaux. Les maquisards serbes, Banja Luka assurant leur soutien, se battaient à 60 km de Zagreb : 180 tués. Bien que les observateurs britanniques laissèrent entendre que, cette fois, les Fédéraux avaient pris parti pour les Serbes en canonnant Dalj et Erdut tenus par les Croates, ceux-ci reconnaissaient que l'armée yougoslave s'efforçait de protéger les habitants de la région. Recherchant l'apaisement, la CEE dépêcha alors à Belgrade l'ambassadeur des Pays-Bas à Paris, M. Henry Wynaendts⁸. Cherchant à étendre à la crise serbo-croate les dispositions arrêtées à Brioni à la suite des événements de Slovénie, les trois « conciliateurs », Hans van den Broek, Jacques Poos et Joao de Deus Pinheiro se rendirent pour la quatrième fois à Belgrade. Mais, à l'époque, le président Milošević ne pouvait admettre que des militaires se joignent aux observateurs de la CEE et qu'ainsi soit légitimée une ingérence étrangère en uniformes. La démarche se solda par un échec. D'ailleurs, à Londres, les Etats membres de l'UEO ne purent s'entendre, Londres refusant l'envoi en Yougoslavie de Casques bleus, Moscou, pour sa part, y étant évidemment opposé et mettant même en garde les Occidentaux contre une intervention dans les Balkans. Contraints à l'inaction, les cessez-le-feu successifs n'étant pas observés, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des Douze décidèrent de s'en remettre à l'ONU. De son côté, à la mi-août, Milošević essaya de modifier les institutions fédérales pour qu'elles deviennent acceptables à Ljubljana et à Zagreb. Il proposa de rencontrer les dirigeants des trois Républiques qui n'avaient pas encore proclamé leur indépendance pour s'entendre sur une nouvelle fédération. Mais Radovan Karadžić

- ⁴ Dušan T. Bataković, *Kosovo, la Spirale de la Haine*. L'Age d'Homme, 1993, p. 77.
- ⁵ Les désertions furent nombreuses : celles des Slovènes membres de l'Armée fédérale, mais également d'autres nationalités admettant difficilement de mener un combat alors considéré comme fratricide.
- ⁶ Une centaine de chars d'assaut, des pièces d'artillerie lourde. M. Milan Vego, *Londres : Jane's Intelligence Review*, Mai 1993, p. 203.
- ⁷ En Serbie, on parle d'un IV^e Reich et le *International Herald Tribune* du 9 juillet 1991 écrit qu'on y croit que l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis préparent le génocide des Serbes dans un Centre d'opération spécial situé à Vienne.
- ⁸ Henry Wynaendts, *L'Engrenage*. Paris : Denoël, 1993.
- ⁹ Ce sont les articles 316 et 317 de la Constitution yougoslave qui furent utilisés le 30 octobre 1991 pour transférer les prérogatives du Parlement, le « danger de guerre imminent » étant manifeste et ce « danger de guerre imminent » d'après les articles 316 et 317 permettant à la présidence de la République socialiste fédérative yougoslave de gouverner par décrets-lois.
- ¹⁰ Il devait s'en confier à Lord Carrington : « Alija Izetbegović m'avait alerté : « Je dois demander l'indépendance de la Bosnie, disait-il. Si je ne le fais pas, j'aurai la gorge tranchée. Mais je dois vous dire qu'une telle démarche aboutira à la guerre civile. » » (*Le Figaro*, 13 juillet 1993.)
- ¹¹ *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Juin 1993, p. 243.
- ¹² Chacune avec 60 observateurs, la France et l'Italie étaient représentées en Yougoslavie aux côtés d'environ 350 autres envoyés des Nations Unies : Hollandais, Britanniques, Canadiens, Irlandais, Portugais, Polonais, Tchèques.
- ¹³ Entretien avec M. Jovanović. *Le Monde*, 15 janvier 1992, p. 5.
- ¹⁴ Le 21 février, à l'unanimité de ses membres, le Conseil de Sécurité décida l'envoi en Croatie de 14 000 Casques bleus (maintien de la paix, interposition, protection des missions humanitaires).
- ¹⁵ Divisions musulmanes SS « Kama » et « Handschar » et division de montagne albanaise « Skanderbeg ».
- ¹⁶ « Bosnia Urges Bush to Send Air Strikes Against Serbs ». *IHT*, p. 1.
- ¹⁷ La croisade arabe. *Le Point*, 15 août 1992, p. 22 et 15 septembre 1992, p. 19.
- ¹⁸ Si la presse américaine faisait souvent allusion au « bourbier » vietnamien, les militaires français comparaient l'aérodrome de Sarajevo à la « cuvette de Dien Bien Phu » et la guerre de Bosnie à celle du Liban.
- ¹⁹ Eric Laurent : « Chez Milošević ». *Le Figaro*, 20 juillet 1992, p. 4.
- ²⁰ En effet, l'auteur de ces lignes déteint des cassettes vidéo dont les images sont terriblement accusatrices et dont aucune télévision n'accepta de diffuser seulement quelques fragments.
- ²¹ *L'Express* du 28 janvier 1993 recensait 21 camps contrôlés par les Serbes, 6 par les Croates et 6 par les Musulmans, mais reconnaissait que les Serbes avaient démantelé trois de leurs camps : Omarska, Manjača et Trnopolje. (Les chiffres fournis par la Croix-Rouge et les enquêteurs de la CSCE diffèrent très peu de ceux fournis par *L'Express*)
- ²² « Nous accusons ». Birmingham : Lazarica, Mars 1992, p. 26.
- ²³ « Nous sommes horrifiés par l'épuration ethnique ». *Gazette de Lausanne, Journal de Genève*, 30 octobre 1992, p. 2.
- ²⁴ Anne Warburton ajoutait : « ...il y a eu une rumeur selon laquelle les Serbes violaient des enfants... nous n'avons pas plus de preuves que certaines femmes aient été gardées prisonnières jusqu'à ce qu'elles ne puissent plus se faire avorter ».
- ²⁵ *Le Figaro*, 14 août 1992, p. 5.
- ²⁶ « La Bosnie, le plus grand scandale du Méditerranisme ». *Le Quotidien*, 20 novembre 1992.
- ²⁷ Entretien avec le général MacKenzie. *Times*, 17 août 1992, p. 21.
- ²⁸ « General Sees Need for 400 000 Troops in Bosnia ». *International Herald Tribune*, 12 août 1993, p. 6. En France, incurables bellicistes, les Socialistes réclameront un engagement plus ferme de la France (M. Emmanuelli). Le président de la Commission de la Défense nationale à l'Assemblée nationale se prononça pour une intervention aérienne active chargée pour frapper

en direction de Belgrade, lieu où se trouve le gouvernement en place. « ...La France prendra part à une action contre l'aviation serbe » (M. R. Dumas à France 2). Une fois de plus, la France était à la remorque des Etats-Unis. Le Parti Républicain réclamait de George Bush qu'il interviennent militairement.

- ²⁹ *Le Monde*, 22 novembre 1992, p. 5.
- ³⁰ Entretien du président de la République avec un journaliste de *Sud-Ouest*, le 13 août 1992.
- ³¹ M. Roland Dumas réclamait qu'on libérât « les camps par la force ». A Davos, lieu de rencontre du Forum mondial de l'Economie, Manfred Womer, Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, demandait que l'Occident appuie les négociations par la menace d'opérations de guerre et, à Paris, M. Fabius traitait d'« ordures » les dirigeants serbes.
- ³² Claude-Marie Vadrot, « Izetbegović désorienté ». *Journal du Dimanche*, 10 janvier 1993, p. 4.
- ³³ Londres et Paris réagirent : l'*Ark Royal* de la Royal Navy et le *Clémenceau*, avec une escorte de ravitailleurs et de bâtiments de « couverture », furent envoyés en Adriatique y rejoindre les navires américains *Kennedy* et *Guam*.
- ³⁴ 25 morts et 94 blessés dans la seule journée du mercredi 27 janvier.
- ³⁵ « Contorsions européennes ». *Le Monde*, 31 janvier 1993, p. 3.
- ³⁶ La nuit suivante, c'est Zepa qui fut ravitaillée par air, une partie au moins des conteneurs parachutés fut trouvée par les habitants de l'enclave.
- ³⁷ Les Bosniaques ayant lancé une offensive pour dégager les enclaves musulmanes assiégées, les milices serbes changèrent d'attitude, refoulant les convois de blessés venant de Konjević-Polje.
- ³⁸ « In a Muslim Town, Serbs Pay a Heavy Price for Staying ». *International Herald Tribune*, 10 mars 1993, p. 2.
- ³⁹ En échange, les familles serbes désireuses de quitter Tuzla seront évacuées par un convoi de l'ONU et se rendront aussi, en toute sécurité, en zone contrôlée par les Serbes, par exemple, à Zvornik. Cette évacuation sera différée, les Musulmans souhaitant garder les Serbes en otages. Résultat : les Serbes bloquèrent un second convoi de ravitaillement destiné à Srebrenica.
- ⁴⁰ « Bosnie : l'Armée serbe campe sur une ligne dure ». *Le Figaro*, 22 janvier 1993, p. 4.
- ⁴¹ Toutefois, le général Mladić précisa que les Musulmans de Srebrenica devaient remettre leurs armes aux représentants de l'ONU et qu'ensuite, ils seraient libres de demeurer chez eux. Mais le gouvernement de la République serbe de Bosnie ne pouvait admettre sur son territoire des formations musulmanes armées.
- ⁴² Près de 30 % des équipages qui mettent en œuvre les 18 AWACS de l'OTAN étaient allemands.
- ⁴³ Ne confiait-il pas à un journaliste que « ...les condamnations parfois unilatérales de la Serbie par la communauté internationale blessent l'âme serbe ».
- ⁴⁴ Les Bosniaques fixaient à 2 500 le nombre de leurs militaires tués à Sarajevo et aux alentours, à 11 000, en comptant les civils, le total des morts et à 50 000 blessés, le tiers d'entre eux très gravement.
- ⁴⁵ Le président bosniaque Alija Izetbegović accepta que la « poche » de Srebrenica soit évacuée par toute la population musulmane, « ...nous n'avons pas le choix entre l'évacuation et un camp de concentration pour 50 000 personnes ».
- ⁴⁶ B. Naudet, « La Peur de Mounira ». *Le Monde*, 22 avril 1993, p. 3.
- ⁴⁷ Entrée en application le 26 avril 1993. Elle prévoyait le blocage du transit de toute marchandise (sauf médicaments et produits alimentaires), que ce soit à travers le Danube ou les axes routiers, le gel des avoirs à l'étranger de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, la saisie des matériels yougoslaves se trouvant à l'étranger...
- ⁴⁸ « The Serbs, Too, Have Security Worries ». *International Herald Tribune*, 3 mai 1993, p. 4.
- ⁴⁹ « Nous ne tenons pas ce référendum pour valable » affirmèrent les Douze faisant bon marché de la volonté populaire lorsqu'elle ne correspondait pas à leur politique.
- ⁵⁰ Ambassadeur de France. « La paix pour la Bosnie ». *Le Figaro*, 16 juin 1993, p. 2.
- ⁵¹ « Maastricht ou Sarajevo ? » *Le Monde*, 17 juin 1993, p. 1.

Milosevic's Speech

Kosovo Field, June 28, 1989

With Introduction and Historical Note by Jared Israel

(Mr. Israel's text was written April 1999)

Introduction

It is impossible for a society to engage in genocide unless the population is won to hate the target group. This has to be done in a systematic way. That is, political leaders must support hate in deeds but also in words.

We are told that this happened in Serbia. We are told that Slobodan Milosevic and other Serbian leaders indoctrinated the Serbian people to hate non-Serbs, especially ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province. We are told that Milosevic launched this racist campaign in a speech at Kosovo Field in 1989.

This charge made against Milosevic, that he preaches racial or ethnic hate, is significant because it supports the charge made against the Serbian people, that they were won to hatred and therefore practice genocide. Because many Americans and West Europeans these charges they are disposed to believe there must be some truth to the avalanche of pro-war propaganda demonizing the Serbs.

So. It is important to know exactly what Milosevic said in his speech at Kosovo Field. Yet nowhere do any of those who attack Milosevic's speech quote his words. Why not?

Greg Elich, a researcher, unearthed a U.S. government transcript of the Kosovo Field speech. Please read it and ask: is it a hateful diatribe, reminiscent of Hitler? Or is it something quite different, something really quite different indeed?

* * * * *

[Speech by Slobodan Milosevic, delivered to an estimated 1 million people at the central celebration marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, held at Gazimestan on 28 June, 1989. Compiled by the National Technical Information Service of the US Department of Commerce.]

Speech 28 June 1989 Slobodan Milosevic

By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos [Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.

Serbian Character -- Liberational

Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions will be constantly sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of

the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.

Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.

Unity Will Make Prosperity Possible

Disunity among Serb officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia. Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo and no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.

Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in doing so. This is why the optimism that is now present in Serbia to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, also because it is based on freedom, which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities aimed at furthering social and personal life.

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.

Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic.

Dramatic National Divisions

After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.

The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.

For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity

against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts. At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.

Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well [medjusobno ravnopravni]. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail.

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, 6 centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion, they could allow themselves to be disunited and to have hatred and treason because they lived in smaller, weakly interlinked worlds. Now, as people on this planet, they cannot conquer even their own planet if they are not united, let alone other planets, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.

Therefore, words devoted to unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason.

In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and in bringing about the fate which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries.

Even if it were not so, from a historical point of view, it remains certain that the people regarded disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future.

Unity brings Back Dignity

This year, the Serbian people became aware of the necessity of their mutual harmony as the indispensable condition for their present life and further development.

I am convinced that this awareness of harmony and unity will make it possible for Serbia not only to function as a state but to function as a successful state. Therefore I think that it makes sense to say this here in Kosovo, where that disunity once upon a time tragically pushed back Serbia for centuries and endangered it, and where renewed unity may advance it and may return dignity to it. Such an awareness about mutual relations constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, for its fate is in the joined hands of all its peoples. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing.

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavor to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country,

this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!

Long live Serbia!

Long live Yugoslavia!

Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!

van holst en steijnen

From: Paul Davidson <p.davidson@btinternet.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Sent: maandag 22 april 2002 13:43
Subject: GUARDIAN: US used Islamists to arm Croatia

US used Islamists to arm Croatia - (TWO ARTICLES)

Official Dutch report says that Pentagon broke UN embargo

Richard Norton-Taylor
 Monday April 22, 2002
 The Guardian

US intelligence agencies secretly broke a UN arms embargo during the 1991-1995 war in Croatia by channelling arms through Islamist jihad groups that Washington is now hunting down across Europe and Asia, according to evidence from the Netherlands.

The evidence surfaced in a hitherto unnoticed section of the official Dutch report into the 1995 Srebrenica massacre that led to the fall of the Dutch government and the resignation last week of its army chief.

The Dutch report reveals how the Pentagon formed a secret alliance with Islamist groups in an Iran-Contra-style operation.

US, Turkish and Iranian intelligence groups worked with the Islamists in what the Dutch report calls the "Croatian pipeline". Arms bought by Iran and Turkey and financed by Saudi Arabia were flown into Croatia initially by the official Iranian airline, Iran Air, and later in a fleet of black C-130 Hercules aircraft.

The report says that mojahedin fighters were also flown in, and that the US was "very closely involved" in the operation which was in flagrant breach of the embargo. British secret services obtained documents proving that Iran also arranged deliveries of arms directly to Bosnia, it says.

The operation was promoted by the Pentagon, rather than the CIA, which was cautious about using Islamist groups as a conduit for arms, and about breaching the embargo. When the CIA tried to place its own people on the ground in Bosnia, the agents were threatened by the mojahedin fighters and the Iranians who were training them.

The UN relied on American intelligence to monitor the embargo, a dependency which allowed Washington to manipulate it at will.

Last month, the US seized a number of Muslims in Bosnia whom it claimed had links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network. They were arrested in defiance of the Bosnian courts.

The contents of the section of the Dutch report entitled Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995, are revealed in an article in today's Guardian by Richard Aldrich, professor of politics at the university of Nottingham and a leading expert on intelligence operations.

He also reveals that the secret services of Ukraine, Greece and Israel were busy arming the Bosnian Serbs. Mossad, Israel's secret service, was particularly active, concluding a substantial arms deal with the Bosnian Serbs at Pale in return for the safe passage of the Jewish population of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, Prof Aldrich says.

"Subsequently, the remaining population who could not escape was perplexed to find that unexploded mortar bombs landing in Sarajevo sometimes had markings in Hebrew," he writes.

Both the UN and the Dutch government distanced themselves from the secret services, depriving them of a crucial tool during the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

The operation also raises the increasingly urgent issue of how to monitor intelligence agencies, Prof Aldrich says.

"While oversight and accountability is developing on a national basis, this is not remotely matched by international cooperation [between the agencies]."

America used Islamists to arm the Bosnian Muslims

The Srebrenica report reveals the Pentagon's role in a dirty war

Richard J Aldrich
Monday April 22, 2002
The Guardian

The official Dutch inquiry into the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, released last week, contains one of the most sensational reports on western intelligence ever published. Officials have been staggered by its findings and the Dutch government has resigned. One of its many volumes is devoted to clandestine activities during the Bosnian war of the early 1990s. For five years, Professor Cees Wiebes of Amsterdam University has had unrestricted access to Dutch intelligence files and has stalked the corridors of secret service headquarters in western capitals, as well as in Bosnia, asking questions.

His findings are set out in "Intelligence and the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995". It includes remarkable material on covert operations, signals interception, human agents and double-crossing by dozens of agencies in one of dirtiest wars of the new world disorder. Now we have the full story of the secret alliance between the Pentagon and radical Islamist groups from the Middle East designed to assist the Bosnian Muslims - some of the same groups that the Pentagon is now fighting in "the war against terrorism". Pentagon operations in Bosnia have delivered their own "blowback".

In the 1980s Washington's secret services had assisted Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. Then, in 1990, the US fought him in the Gulf. In both Afghanistan and the Gulf, the Pentagon had incurred debts to Islamist groups and their Middle Eastern sponsors. By 1993 these groups, many supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia, were anxious to help Bosnian Muslims fighting in the former Yugoslavia and called in their debts with the Americans. Bill Clinton and the Pentagon were keen to be seen as creditworthy and repaid in the form of an Iran-Contra style operation - in flagrant violation of the UN security council arms embargo against all combatants in the former Yugoslavia.

The result was a vast secret conduit of weapons smuggling through Croatia. This was arranged by the clandestine agencies of the US, Turkey and Iran, together with a range of radical Islamist groups, including Afghan mujahedin and the pro-Iranian Hizbullah. Wiebes reveals that the British intelligence services obtained documents early on in the Bosnian war proving that Iran was making direct deliveries.

Arms purchased by Iran and Turkey with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia made their way by night from the Middle East. Initially aircraft from Iran Air were used, but as the volume increased they were joined by a mysterious fleet of black C-130 Hercules aircraft. The report stresses that the US was "very closely involved" in the airlift. Mujahedin fighters were also flown in, but they were reserved as shock troops for especially hazardous operations.

Light weapons are the familiar currency of secret services seeking to influence such conflicts. The volume of weapons flown into Croatia was enormous, partly because of a steep Croatian "transit tax". Croatian forces creamed off between 20% and 50% of the arms. The report stresses that this entire trade was clearly illicit. The Croats themselves also obtained massive quantities of illegal weapons from Germany, Belgium and Argentina - again in contravention of the UN arms embargo. The German secret services were fully aware of the trade.

Rather than the CIA, the Pentagon's own secret service was the hidden force behind these operations. The UN protection force, UNPROFOR, was dependent on its troop-contributing nations for intelligence, and above all on the sophisticated monitoring capabilities of the US to police the arms embargo. This gave the Pentagon the ability to manipulate the embargo at will: ensuring that American Awacs aircraft covered crucial areas and were able to turn a blind eye to the frequent nighttime comings and goings at Tuzla.

Weapons flown in during the spring of 1995 were to turn up only a fortnight later in the besieged and demilitarised enclave at Srebrenica. When these shipments were noticed, Americans pressured UNPROFOR to rewrite reports, and when Norwegian officials protested about the flights, they were reportedly threatened into silence.

Both the CIA and British SIS had a more sophisticated perspective on the conflict than the Pentagon, insisting that no side had clean hands and arguing for caution. James Woolsey, director of the CIA until May 1995, had

increasingly found himself out of step with the Clinton White House over his reluctance to develop close relations with the Islamists. The sentiments were reciprocated. In the spring of 1995, when the CIA sent its first head of station to Sarajevo to liaise with Bosnia's security authorities, the Bosnians tipped off Iranian intelligence. The CIA learned that the Iranians had targeted him for liquidation and quickly withdrew him.

Iranian and Afghan veterans' training camps had also been identified in Bosnia. Later, in the Dayton Accords of November 1995, the stipulation appeared that all foreign forces be withdrawn. This was a deliberate attempt to cleanse Bosnia of Iranian-run training camps. The CIA's main opponents in Bosnia were now the mujahedin fighters and their Iranian trainers - whom the Pentagon had been helping to supply months earlier.

Meanwhile, the secret services of Ukraine, Greece and Israel were busy arming the Bosnian Serbs. Mossad was especially active and concluded a deal with the Bosnian Serbs at Pale involving a substantial supply of artillery shells and mortar bombs. In return they secured safe passage for the Jewish population out of the besieged town of Sarajevo. Subsequently, the remaining population was perplexed to find that unexploded mortar bombs landing in Sarajevo sometimes had Hebrew markings.

The broader lessons of the intelligence report on Srebrenica are clear. Those who were able to deploy intelligence power, including the Americans and their enemies, the Bosnian Serbs, were both able to get their way. Conversely, the UN and the Dutch government were "deprived of the means and capacity for obtaining intelligence" for the Srebrenica deployment, helping to explain why they blundered in, and contributed to the terrible events there.

Secret intelligence techniques can be war-winning and life-saving. But they are not being properly applied. How the UN can have good intelligence in the context of multinational peace operations is a vexing question. Removing light weapons from a conflict can be crucial to drawing it down. But the secret services of some states - including Israel and Iran - continue to be a major source of covert supply, pouring petrol on the flames of already bitter conflicts.

Š Richard J Aldrich is Professor of Politics at the University of Nottingham. His 'The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence' is published in paperback by John Murray in August.

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16-2-2002

The United States and Germany prepared plans for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in the late 1980's and have since reconfigured Yugoslavia into mini-states, with only Serbia and Montenegro remaining in the Yugoslav federation, a situation which has opened the way to the re-colonization of the Balkans.

In 1991, the European Community, with US involvement, organized a conference on Yugoslavia that called for the separation, sovereignty and independence of the republics of Yugoslavia. President George Bush's administration passed the 1991 Foreign Operations Act, which provided aid to the individual republics, but cut off all aid to Belgrade, the capitol of Yugoslavia. This stimulated the eventual secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. With secession came civil wars. Ethnic Serbs living in Croatia had been loyal to that Yugoslav republic, but great power meddling now forced them to defend their region in Croatia known as Krajina. The U.S. covertly provided arms, training, advisors, satellite intelligence and air power to the Croats in "Operation Storm" directed against the helpless Serbs in Krajina. When the bombing began, the Krajina Serbs fled to Belgrade and Bosnia. Approximately 250,000 Serbs were thus ethnically cleansed from the Krajina and all evidence of Serb habitation was systematically destroyed. Civilians were executed, livestock slaughtered and houses were burnt to the ground.⁷

To avoid a similar human catastrophe in Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs consolidated Serb-owned lands, an area constituting about two thirds of Bosnia/Herzegovina. Germany and the U.S. quickly aided the military alliance of Bosnian Muslims and Croats against the Serbs, and, supported by American bombing and regular army forces from Croatia, the Muslim/Croat alliance soon swept the Serbs from the majority of Bosnia/Herzegovina. As in the Krajina, the conflict forced ethnic Serbs off of their lands, creating one hundred thousand Serb refugees.

Under the U.S.-brokered Dayton Agreement, Bosnia/Herzegovina was divided into two parts, a Muslim-Croat Federation and Republica Srpska. The central government today is controlled by US/NATO forces, the IMF, and international NGOs. With no history of independence, Bosnia/Herzegovina's economic assets have been taken over by foreign investors who now own their energy

16-02-02



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facilities, water, telecommunication, media and transportation.

The effects of the Bosnian civil war on the city of Srebrenica were reported extensively in the western media. Reports claimed that 7,414 Bosnian Muslims were executed by the Serbian army. After years of searching, digging and extensive investigations, only seventy bodies were found, but the original charges of genocide are still circulated in the media.

van holst en steijnen

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Sent: zondag 17 februari 2002 05:32
Subject: At The Hague, It's a Leader on Trial, Not a People

Dear Editors,

Usually when I read an article in your paper on Milosevic and the Balkans like Barbara Crossette's 'At The Hague, It's a Leader on Trial, ...' I get so angry at all the little droppings of ignorant misinformation--most of which, like the 7,000 dead in Srebrenica, have by now been parroted into legend--that I have to hold my 21 month old son real close to calm myself down. But by this stage in the 'Trial of the Century', even if Max had jammed a half dozen valiums in my mouth I'd still be way pissed.

For openers: Crossette's remark that [Milosevic] is not even on trial before the world because he was president of the former Yugoslavia during a decade when Serbs were attacking, killing, raping and evicting first Bosnian Muslims and Croats, then Kosovar Albanians' contains enough mis-juxtapositions and NYTimes doctrinal swamp gaz to make Flora Lewis' hysterical International Herald Trib editorial of Friday 15 Feb ('Slobodan Milosevic, who had sparked the whole Yugoslav disaster to maintain his power, refused to be intimidated, so the Western powers invoked the "duty to intervene.") seem almost historical.

Has Crossette read any history apart from the graffiti on the walls of the NY Times toilets? Milosevic didn't become President of Yugoslavia until 1997, when he was 'voted by the Parliament' to what had theretofore been pretty much a ceremonial position, and was the popularly elected President of Serbia at the time of the Croatian and Bosnia wars. And, in fact, it was because of Milosevic's amending the Yugoslav constitution that the Yugoslav Presidency was decided by was 'almost' decided by popular vote in October 2000. But, hey, any dictator who allows a foreign power to invest more'n \$100 million in his opposition doesn't deserve to win the election.

And as far as his starting these wars: What is often called the first battle of the 'Croatian war of independence' is the incident at Borovo Selo, 'an insignificant suburb of Vukovar' [in Misha Glenny's words]. In his *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, Glenny continues the story:

On the night of Wednesday, 1 May [1991], two Croat policemen in a police patrol car were arrested by Serb irregulars from Borovo Selo. According to the Croat Interior Ministry, their car and a second police vehicle were fired on by automatic weapons when they entered the village. The federal Interior Ministry, however, said that they were in civilian clothes and that at the exit of Borovo Selo, one had fired at random with an automatic weapon while the other tore down the YUGOSLAV flag which stood at the edge of the village. They were fired on by Serbs and then arrested. [p 75-6]

Now, like so much Balkan lore, this story has mutated significantly over the years as to just who fired first on whom, how many were on each side, and to what extent the dead were mutilated (à la Racak in Kosovo). But no one disputes that the Croat police had come to Borovo Selo to take down the Yugoslav flag. Because the war in Croatia, like the war in Bosnia soon after, was a war of illegal, unconstitutional secession and, therefore, a war over names and symbols.

and the Yugoslavs, who for the expediency of Western propaganda, were renamed Serbs (and what had been internationally recognized as Yugoslavia was similarly renamed 'the Former Yugoslavia' and ideologically transmuted into 'A Greater Serbia'), were fighting a resistance struggle to maintain their old flag, their old street names, their old-age pensions, and their old lives. And Milosevic, who at the time was well down the road in Belgrade, did not become involved with (or, some would say, did not recuse himself from) this war until well after its tip-off at Borovo Selo.

As for Srebrenica, which has become every Human Rightists cause for keening (read fund-raising) over widows and orphans and let's-dress-up-in-long-black-gowns-and-read-mournful-Muslim-verse OOB shows: Here's how Lord David Owen, famous, along with Bernie Kouchner, as that other Dr Death who wanted to bring peace to the Balkans through strategic bombing,--here's how Lord Owen describes the fall of Srebrenica in his *Balkan Odyssey*:

On 7 July [1995] an observation post of the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica came under attack from Bosnian Serb tanks. The Dutch commander requested close air support. This was allegedly refused by General Smith in Sarajevo on the grounds that the attack did not yet justify it, and that close air support would interfere with negotiations [ongoing peace negotiations which eventuated in the Dayton Accords and which Milosevic unstintingly supported--my note]. The next day the Dutch withdrew from the observation post but were fired at by Bosnian [Muslim] government troops, who killed one Dutch soldier. Another observation post was overrun by Bosnian Serbs, who took hostage the Dutch soldiers manning it. In total, fifty-five Dutch soldiers were taken hostage during the Bosnian Serb assault on Srebrenica. On 9 July the Dutch put up a blocking position on the southern road into the town. The Muslim soldiers had not put up any serious resistance against the Bosnian Serb advance. Their commander had left Srebrenica some days before the final assault, and, according to the Dutch government, on 10 July most Muslim men of fighting age, totalling 15,000, of whom some 3,000-4,000 carried arms, were thought to have slipped out of the enclave. But it now looks as if some of them never managed to escape and were massacred. That evening the Dutch commander put in another request for close air support, which was also refused, this time because of bad visibility. On 11 July the Serbs launched a frontal attack on Srebrenica. After several more requests from the Dutch commander on the ground, two successful air strikes by Dutch and American F-16s on Serb tanks were launched in the afternoon, but UNPROFOR Commander General Janvier and the Dutch government were concerned about the safety of the Dutch hostages and called off further strikes. The Dutch soldiers withdrew to Potocari, accompanied by thousands of panic-stricken Muslim refugees. Those men of fighting age who had remained were separated by the Serbs from their families, and the older men, women and children were put on buses to Tuzla. Some 40,000 Muslims were ethnically cleansed. On 21 July the Dutch soldiers were allowed to leave the enclave. [352-3]

Please note that Owen states that of the 15,000 men of fighting age only 3-4,000 were carrying weapons--and most of the 15,000 were thought to have abandoned Srebrenica along with their commanders. What these 4,000 armed men of the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps had been doing for months before the Serbs took the town was using the UNPA and its Dutch monitors as a blind from which to shell Serb positions in hopes of provoking a military response that would attract even more Western sympathy and support. And they were ordered to evacuate by the Izetbegovic [Bosnian Muslim] government at just the moment that this Serb response was certain because Bill Clinton had suggested to the Bosnian leader that a catastrophe involving 5-7,000 Muslim victims would guarantee Western military intervention. And so it did.

Now the number of actual Muslim victims of the siege is still unknown. But Milosevic's involvement is known. Owen continues:

The War Crimes Tribunal will investigate whether after the fall of Srebrenica an appalling massacre of male Muslims took place--the very thing which many of us had feared would happen in the spring of 1993. I had actually discussed this with Milosevic, who was himself very concerned that the bad blood that existed between the Serbs around Bratunac [site of a huge Muslim massacre of Serbs] and the Muslims in Srebrenica would lead to some horror.

[p 353]

Needless to say, just as with every other so-called Serb atrocity, nowhere near 7,000 bodies have been uncovered--and many of the cadavers claimed to be those of Muslim victims of the Serbs were actually Yugoslav villagers slaughtered by Naser Oric and autopsied by the noted Serb pathologist Dr Stankovic, whose testimony before the Tribunal was conveniently lost.

It seems to me that the question of exactly who is on trial in The Hague is quite apt. Is it Milosevic? The Serbian People? NATO? Maybe even Enron's involvement in this gruesome Fascist recolonization of the Balkans will jump out of this trial. But one thing is clear: History and the language of this particular debate are still up for grabs. And the NYTimes along with the rest of the Western media are desperately trying to hold on to their idiotically, if not criminally, misinformed version of what happened to bring about this renaissance of Monopoly Capitalism's glory days--the new 1,000 year Reich.

Mick Collins
Cirque Minime, Paris

van holst en steijnen

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Sent: zaterdag 16 februari 2002 12:49
Subject: History on the Flop?

Hcy,

If Fukiyama was right and history ended in 1989 or 1990 or whenever he said it was supposed to end, then maybe everybody really just changed sides of the ballroom and the dance went on. The Nazis became the good guys (they always had cooler clobber! Hugo Boss, right?) and the Partisans became the Nazi baby-butchers and . . . Naw! It's just too fucking complicated. It's a lot easier to see history continuing as the same old--however more repressed--Master-Slave disco dialectic.

Fascism and Communism were never really equatable--or even conflatable. The former continues to preserve, protect and defend surplus value in the form of advanced waste-capitalist behemoths like Enron and Global Crossing, while the latter, prematurely--or just falsely--pronounced dead in 1989, continues to inspire the Resistance, as has been alleged in the case of the once and future President of Serbia/Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic.

Louis Dalmas, editor of Balkans Infos, told me that--contrary to all the NYTimes reports which have all Serbs cheering their imminent indenture to Western finance capital and the prosecution of their former strong-man from Del Ponte's peanut gallery--if Milosevic ran for President of Yugoslavia today, he'd cop 90% of the vote and send Djindjic and Kostunica back to emptying ashtrays at a Belgrade sports club.

The historical origins of the wars in the Balkans have, from the beginning, been deeply buried in media bullshit by all the lisping mouthpieces (eg, Hill&Knowlton, Ruder/Finn) of the dominant class. But maybe--just maybe--the Trial of Slobodan Milosevic will bring some of this long forgotten history into the light of day--or at least the light of daytime TV.

Here's something from Counter Punch which I found very interesting--though the current 'most important Trial in Europe since Nuremburg' (or maybe OJ?!) is not even mentioned. It's as if the Serbs and Gypsies and Jews mentioned in this article are a completely different people from those whom NATO bombed for 78 days and 79 nights in 1999. And the results of these Western war crimes are so grisly that when Milosevic displayed some in his opening remarks, CNN and EuroNews had to cut their telecasts out of fear of disturbing the very criminals who continue to celebrate them as 'humanitarian intervention in protection of human rights' (sick).

But here's Counter Punch:

February 14, 2002

Ante Pavelic:
 The Real Butcher of the Balkans

By Jonathan Levy and Tom Easton

Ante Pavelic was the original 'Butcher of the Balkans.' He was the leader of the Nazi puppet government of the "Independent State of Croatia" who died peacefully in Madrid in 1959. The mass murderer of 80,000 Jews, 30,000

Gypsies, and over 500,000 Serbs survived the Second World War and never faced a war crimes tribunal.

Instead Pavelic was offered sanctuary by the Vatican and became a security advisor to Juan and Eva Peron before retiring to fascist Spain. Key to Pavelic's survival was the so-called Croatian Treasury, really nothing more than Pavelic personal wealth, the plunder of concentration camps and massacres throughout the Balkans and beyond. Wherever the loyal Ustashe (Croatian Nazis) served Pavelic and Hitler, Orthodox Christian churches and Jewish synagogues were plundered and the property of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Ukrainians and others were confiscated. The crimes of Pavelic and the Ustashe were so barbaric that even hardened Nazis were disgusted by it.

In the final days of World War II, Pavelic and his inner circle bought and bribed their way to Rome where help was waiting at the Vatican. Pavelic committed genocide on a level far greater than any known before or since in the Balkans but he had been personally received by Pius XII during his reign of terror. The Franciscan Order and Vatican bank eagerly helped launder Pavelic's loot the proceeds of which were used to establish the so called ratline which helped thousands of Nazis and Ustashe escape to South America.

Over 50 years later, a class action lawsuit was filed in Federal Court in San Francisco in 1998 seeking an accounting of the Pavelic loot. The defendants, the Vatican bank, Franciscan order, and the remaining Ustashe were asked to account for the gold, silver, and gems plundered so many years ago. A Federal judge has taken the case under submission.

Last month, an ex-US Army intelligence official revealed that Pavelic's body is secured at a secret location in Madrid awaiting its eventual return to the "homeland". Pavelic's followers view the current Croatian state as the successor to the Nazi inspired Independent State of Croatia, their legacy will be fulfilled only by the return of their supreme leader or in the Croatian language, Poglavnik, to lie in state in Zagreb. Tudjman, the late blood stained ruler of Croatia, was a proponent of returning Pavelic to Croatia and indeed Pavelic's ghost must be pleased to find so many new public monuments to his loyal Ustashe springing up like toadstools after a spring rain in democratic Croatia.

Attorneys in the class action lawsuit while awaiting the court's ruling are opening up a second front against the Croatian Nazis in Madrid. It is thought a large portion of the Croatian treasure was secreted in Madrid and remains there yet along with Pavelic's relatives and ever loyal Ustashe who maintain a vigil over their leaders grave. Spanish law firms have been contacted and an action of some sort in Spain is likely especially in light of the Spanish National Court's recent interest in the Pinochet case. The Spanish courts have demonstrated an interest in fighting Fascism abroad, now they are presented with even worse case at home. Let's hope they will put the principles of International Law to work on this domestic case and stop the Ustashe.

An annual ceremony presided over by Croatian Franciscan priests is thought to take place annually on Pavelic's birthday. At such Ustashe ceremonies eternal hatred towards Serbs and others are sworn on a crucifix, knife, and a revolver. Many Ustashe returned to Croatia in 1991 and have played a role in the ongoing hostilities in Herzegovina.

Jonathan Levy is a California attorney who has represented organizations and individuals in a variety of Holocaust related lawsuits including banking, insurance, and slave labor matters.

Tom Easton is a veteran civil rights attorney in Northern California. Tom has traveled extensively in Russia and Europe and holds a Masters degree in History. They can be reached at: resistk@yahoo.com A summary of the class action suit can be found at: <http://www.vaticanbankclaims.com/>

So, now you see why the Yugoslavs in Croatia back in 1990-91 might have gotten a little edgy when Tudjman slapped sahovnicas all over the place, changed the names of all the streets and plazas to celebrate either Pavelic or some old Fascist bishops, and reconfigured all the 'You are now entering Yugoslavia' signs to read 'We alone will decide the destiny of our Croatia'.

See you in Court. Mick

Nico Steijnen

From: Mick Collins <cirquemini@club-internet.fr>
To: Yana Collins <ycollins24@aol.com>; Joseph Goodrich <jgoodrich63@yahoo.com>; John Stepling <stepling@yahoo.com>; David Thompson <DThomp2741@aol.com>; Danise Delgado <DaniseD@fox.com>; Danielle Alexich <dalexich@csuchico.edu>; John O'Connell <JohnOC46@aol.com>; Peter Schaaf <peterschaaf@hotmail.com>; Alan Mandell <AVRAMNOAC@aol.com>; Alain Jejcic <Alain.Jejcic@lmd.jussieu.fr>; Diana Johnstone <107764.116@compuserve.com>; Louis Dalmás <lodalmas@wanadoo.fr>; Antoine Colonna <intelsecurite@wanadoo.fr>; Michael Parenti <mp@michaelparenti.org>; Noam Chomsky <chomsky2@mit.edu>; Ed Herman <hermane@wharton.upenn.edu>; Kathi Montgomery <brdcoup316@msn.com>; Christopher Black <bar@idirect.com>; Paul Davidson <p.davidson@btinternet.com>; Bob Locke <palinbob@yahoo.com>; Claudia Lewis <claudial@fox.com>;
Sent: zaterdag 2 februari 2002 13:22
Subject: Now heareth Lord Owen:

Hey, y'all, Here's what Lord David Owen, in his book Balkan Odyssey, has to say about President Milosevic. Jared Israel at Emperors Clothes asked me to glean some passages from the book to give to Mr M himself. So, since it almost killed me going back over all this, I thought I'd share the fruits of my toil.

The Milosevic trial begins in The Hague on the 12th of February. In this weekend's Herald Tribune, 'the visibly demented' Wes Clarke, former NATO General and mass murdering war criminal, in scribbling a craven rationalization for his monstrous acts, implied that it was, in fact and in deed, NATO terror that

'enabled the international community to bring to justice the man most responsible for a decade of strife and destruction in the Balkans.'

Well, I'm sure if Lord Owen were to find himself at a mixer among the Brusselsprouts, elbow to leather-packed elbow with this former five-star asshole, they would have a lot to laugh and nod in agreement about.

But take a look at how historical truth will not be denied: how it burns right through even this war-loving teabag's bullshit.

I give you the good Lord, David Owen, on the once and future President of Serbia and Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic:

pg35--The main reason why Slovenia had an easy time fighting off the Yugoslav National Army in the ten-day war in 1991 was that the JNA were not allowed to fight. There was no territorial dispute between Slovenes and Serbs, because Slovenia consisted of more than 90 per cent Slovenes with their own language and there was no significant Serb minority. There are indications that the Slovenian leadership passed on to President Milosevic an offer for a deal under which Slovenia would stay neutral in the dispute between Serbs and Croats if it were allowed to secede from Yugoslavia. By contrast, in Croatia there were substantial areas where there had been Serb majorities for centuries. As Misha Glenny explains [The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin, 1992]:

Following Tudjman's victory in the April elections, Milosevic was increasingly willing to raise the spectre of the right of all Serbs to live in a single state, should Tudjman attempt to take Croatia and its 600,000-strong Serbian minority out of Yugoslavia. Milosevic's chosen weapon, the Serb minority in Croatia, was a dangerous club to brandish. The two presidents, Milosevic and Tudjman, began pulling and grabbing this excessively sensitive group of people like two small children arguing over a toy. Every time Croatia and Slovenia pushed their claims for independence, Milosevic simply said that Croatia could go but without the regions where Serbs live.

Amazingly, neither before, during or after the Serb-Croat war did EC mediation touch on these territorial questions: all that was offered was a level of autonomy for Serbs living within the republic of Croatia. Map-making apparently was too sensitive an issue to contemplate. For the EC it was a question of either keeping Yugoslavia together or separating it into independent countries divided by the republican boundaries determined in most particulars in 1945. But what were these boundaries?

pg53--In Belgrade I met Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, for the first time. Both Prime Minister Panic and President Cosic had tried to persuade us not to see him, but Cy Vance was, rightly, firmly of the view that though his star was waning we must keep up a relationship with him. He was the man with whom Cy had negotiated the crucial ceasefire in Croatia at the end of 1991, and he suspected that Milosevic was unlikely to remain on the sidelines for long. It was clear when we met that Milosevic had a deep respect for Cyrus, as he always called him. I talked little in these early meetings, measuring up Milosevic and trying slowly to build a relationship with him, knowing it would be a long time, if ever, before I could command the same authority with him as Cy did.

With President Cosic, however, I had as good a relationship as Cy from the start. It was encouraging that Cosic appeared to have distanced himself from Milosevic and was ready to play an active role as President of the FRY and to give more support to Milan Panic. We encouraged him then and subsequently as the legitimate counterweight to Panic's flamboyance. We thought he might be ready to build a sufficient electoral power base to challenge Milosevic in the elections for the Serbian Presidency, and indeed for a short time in November (1992) it looked as if Cosic might even beat Milosevic.

pg59--[The Russians] felt I was too sanguine over the chances of the Serbs moving on their two sacred cows--Kosovo and the Krajina--and also that if Cosic and Panic recognised Croatia they would be disowned in Belgrade and branded as national traitors. In truth, Vance was much more cautious than I over the Krajina and probably over autonomy for Kosovo as well, mainly because he knew the area better and, having spent months negotiating with Milosevic, Cosic and Panic towards Tudjman while trying to persuade Milosevic not to block their agreements, in effect letting Cosic take any political flak for decisions which Milosevic knew he would have to take responsibility for if he replaced Cosic.

On the basis of extensive travelling by their diplomats inside FRY the Russians had concluded that while at first sanctions had drawn Serbs together in a determination to hold out against foreign bullying, the consensus had now begun to crack. In the northern areas and in the cities throughout the country there was clear evidence of a shift in opinions towards the policies of Panic, though not necessarily towards support for Panic himself, as those most likely to rehabilitate the country. This feeling was particularly strong among the intelligentsia and the young. The main exception to this picture was southern Serbia, where support for Milosevic was strong and where the proximity of the 'Albanian threat' fuelled nationalist sentiment. Apparently, Cosic told the Russians in Belgrade on 13 October [1992] that Milosevic had now dropped his mask of reasonableness and must be fought openly to the last, and it appeared that Cosic was now genuinely concerned about the survival of Serbia. The Russians were even then trying to persuade the Sanctions Committee of the case for allowing Serbia to import natural gas for humanitarian reasons but also as a carrot for Belgrade's cooperation. They eventually succeeded in February 1995.

Vance and I agreed with the Russian analysis on Cosic and Panic and we began to pursue the strategy of persuading Cosic to challenge Milosevic for the Serbian Presidency in the elections likely before the end of the year. It was essential to persuade Panic to drop his own ambitions but to provide the energy and ideas behind Cosic. It is arguable that had Cosic not developed a recurrence of prostate trouble those close to him would have persuaded him to stand. Given the eventual result which Panic achieved, I believe that Cosic could have beaten Milosevic. After his removal from office by Milosevic, Cosic reverted somewhat to his earlier nationalistic stance, keeping links to Panic and opposing the pragmatism Milosevic showed

in the summer of 1994 when he argued that the Contact Group plan could be the basis for a settlement. Milosevic later privately and self-mockingly referred to his performance in 1992 as being an unfortunate period when he made many mistakes. Perhaps it was the surprising success of Cosic and Panic which made him reassess his position. During October and November, we in ICFY were able to deal with two separate centres of power in Belgrade, and in doing so hopefully made Milosevic aware that he might not be the sole arbiter of what was going to happen in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY.

pg82—In Early December we had to make a decision as to whether Vance and I should overtly intervene in the Serbian elections. An internal ICFY note on the elections laid out the facts well enough, and this was accompanied by pressure from US supporters of Panic for us to declare in his favour. Ever since I accepted an invitation from the then Norwegian Labor Prime Minister to visit Norway in 1973 to encourage young voters to vote OYes¹ in their referendum on joining the EC I have been convinced that outsiders telling people how to vote is strongly resented. Vance and I were also both still firmly of the view that only Cosic could beat Milosevic, and felt that when he had decided not to challenge any chance of Milosevic being beaten had been lost. On 15 December we had issued a public declaration which had been carefully designed to sound supportive of Panic—as we were—but to avoid attracting allegations of interference and being drawn too far into the election. It seemed to both Vance and me wiser to keep our lines of communication open to all, including Milosevic, and eschew any further involvement in the elections. Indeed, I counselled the EC against even sending monitors for what would never be fair elections. Milosevic controlled the most watched television station, and his line predominated in the press.

pg102—It was Milosevic who suggested over lunch the face-saving formula of merging the first two constitutional principles of the Co-Chairmen's draft (of the VOPP), without any substantive change. In the evening in the Hotel des Bergues the Serb facade of unity cracked and Vance and I witnessed late at night Cosic, Milosevic and the Montenegrin President, Bulatovic, turning on the Bosnian Serb leaders, who included General Mladic, demanding that they negotiate seriously. Splitting the Serbs was something we had to achieve, not for its own sake but because otherwise the Bosnian Serbs would remain totally intransigent, and that became the pattern for the future. First we had to convince Belgrade. Without pressure from Serbia and Montenegro the Bosnian Serbs would never give an inch, for they were not pragmatists, like Milosevic, but ideologues, Serb nationalists who did not want a single Muslim to live on the territory they claimed for themselves, and preferably no Croats either. Many were aggressively anti-Communist, practising Orthodox Christians, and intent on demonstrating their democratic credentials, hence their determination to refer all decisions to their so-called Parliament or Assembly. Too many commentators do not recognize that many Muslims live in Serbia and Montenegro, not just Albanians in Kosovo, but also in the Sandzak and elsewhere, and that Muslims and other nationalities trade and live in their big cities, particularly Belgrade. This is a big difference between Belgrade and Pale, for the Bosnian Serb leaders wanted their 'Republika Srpska' to be an independent state without any links to the Muslim parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in effect a Muslim-free area. After Milosevic had made it clear that Belgrade would not go on supporting the Bosnian Serb army and had ensured that General Mladic understood this, a tired, incoherent and somewhat broken Karadzic next day caved in at the eleventh hour. Karadzic explained to the press that he had proposed eight principles, the Co-Chairmen ten principles and they had they had settled for nine principles. But even so, he did not sign, insisting on taking even this issue back to Pale for the endorsement of his Assembly. This small breakthrough did however sustain the Conference, for we had now achieved, on the three documents before the Conference, six of the nine signatures we needed. The Croats had signed the constitutional principles, the map and the cessation of hostilities agreement. The Muslims had signed the constitutional principles and the cessation of hostilities. Another important aspect of this session was that Tudjman, Cosic and Milosevic had all been able to talk together and we hoped some progress had been made on mutual recognition and on cooperation in the Krajina.

pg153—The relief that we had seemingly broken through left us all a little light-headed and, as it turned out, over-confident. I had no doubt then, and have never doubted since, that it was the prospect of financial sanctions which Milosevic most feared: the chance of avoiding any further economic misery was too attractive domestically for him to go on humouring Karadzic as he obstructed virtually any deal. As far as Milosevic was concerned, the Bosnian Serbs had protected all their vital interests and in that sense had won. That it was not Greater Serbia in terms of one country stretching from Belgrade to Banja Luka to Knin had not been vital for him since our meetings in Geneva in January. I do not believe he was particularly concerned by the talk of US military action, which continued to be rather unfocused, though it made the useful point that NATO's patience was running out; but so, fortunately, was Milosevic's with the Bosnian Serbs.

[Here it is, though just part of the paragraph]

*** From this point, 25 April 1993, onwards Milosevic formally gave up Greater Serbia and argued for settlement on terms a majority in the Security Council could have accepted, and throughout the next two years he did not waver in seeking such a solution. ***

The interests of Serbia and Montenegro from then on were the decisive factor, and he grew more and more disillusioned with Karadzic's lack of courage as a true Serbian leader in the process. In this respect sanctions had worked. Unfortunately, in the US the demonization of Milosevic had reached such a level that administration, Congress and media alike seemed unable to adjust to this new reality and kept talking about Milosevic being committed to a Greater Serbia.

[On Srebrenica]

pg352-3—For a moment under President Chirac it appeared France wanted the new reinforcements to operate outside the UN, but it was soon clear that they were going to take the form of a rapid reaction force operating within a UN mandate and not be an intervention force. General Rupert Smith might have been tempted to conclude that the Fiasco and the humiliation for the UN following the NATO air strikes on Pale was a price worth paying to get these reinforcements in, for they undoubtedly restored some credibility to UNPROFOR and gave it a useful new artillery capacity. But there was also a serious downside, for the actual announcements about reinforcement helped trigger the Bosnian Serb army decision to take Srebrenica and Zepa before these new forces were effectively deployed. I doubt Milosevic could have prevented Mladic from taking these eastern enclaves even if he had tried to. He had frustratingly seen his agreement with Frasure on recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for a suspension of sanctions turned down in Washington. Milosevic now, like Tudjman, may well have thought it best to have the map changed by force of arms, having seen the divisions in the Contact Group and the chance of a negotiated territorial trade-off recede.

On 7 July an observation post of the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica came under attack from Bosnian Serb tanks. The Dutch commanders requested close air support. This was allegedly refused by General Smith in sarajevo on the grounds that the attack did not yet justify it, and that close air support would interfere with negotiations. The next day the Dutch withdrew from the observation post but were fired at by Bosnian government troops, who killed one Dutch soldier. Another observation post was overrun by the Bosnian Serbs, who took hostage the Dutch soldiers manning it. In total, fifty-five Dutch soldiers were taken hostage during the Bosnian Serb assault on Srebrenica. On 9 July the Dutch put up a blocking position on the southern road into the town. The Muslim soldiers had not put up any serious resistance against the Bosnian Serb advance. Their commander had left Srebrenica some days before the final assault, and, according to the Dutch government, on 10 July most Muslim men of fighting age, totalling 15,000, of whom some 3,000-4,000 carried arms, were thought to have slipped out of the enclave. But it now looks as if some of them never managed to escape and were massacred. That evening the Dutch commander put in another request for close air support, which was also refused, this time because of bad visibility. On 11 July the Serbs launched a frontal attack on Srebrenica. After several more requests from the Dutch commander on the ground, two

successful air strikes by Dutch and American F-16s on Serb tanks were launched in the afternoon, but UNPROFOR Commander General Janvier and the Dutch government were concerned about the safety of the Dutch hostages and called off further strikes. The Dutch soldiers withdrew to Potocari, accompanied by thousands of panic-stricken Muslim refugees. Those men of fighting age who remained were separated by the Serbs from their families, and the older men, women and children were put on buses to Tuzla. Some 40,000 Muslims were ethnically cleansed. On 21 July the Dutch soldiers were allowed to leave the enclave.

The War Crimes Tribunal will investigate whether after the fall of Srebrenica an appalling massacre of male Muslims took place—the very thing which many of us had feared would happen in the spring of 1993. I had actually discussed this with Milosevic, who was himself very concerned that the bad blood that existed between the Serbs around Bratunac and the Muslims in Srebrenica would lead to some horror. It will also be for the War Crimes Tribunal to determine the truth over the allegations about the role of General Mladic. The whole tragic episode of the fall of Srebrenica has many lessons attached to it for us all. The Dutch soldiers had been placed in an impossibly difficult position. For the Dutch government it was a moment of truth, because for years Dutch ministers had lectured their European colleagues about the use of force in the former Yugoslavia and had sought to adopt a tough moralistic stance; now their public wanted to know more about what had happened. The problems of and the limitations on the use of force, whether by NATO in the air or the UN on the ground, were painfully exposed before the eyes of the world in Srebrenica.

pg291—Markovic is a professor at the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics of the University of Belgrade. A Marxist theorist, as is obvious from her words, she helped found the League of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ) in 1990, which later became part of JUL (the Yugoslav United Left), and members of her party are increasingly in posts of influence where one might have expected to see members of Milosevic's own party. Before lunch while walking in the grounds with President Milosevic, I said to him that I had no difficulty in saying that he was not a racist but I could not convince people he was not a nationalist. He put up some arguments as to why he was not a nationalist but he could see that neither Debbie nor I found them convincing. When we returned to the house for lunch and were joined by him and his wife, she came straight to the point, saying: 'I gather from my husband that he has failed to convince you that he is not a nationalist. I will tell you why he is not. I would never have married or stayed married to him if he was a nationalist.' Personally I do not believe that he is a nationalist, or even was one in the late 1980s, but rather that he played the nationalist card to gain and hold power. We had many hours that day of fascinating conversation and I sent a rather unconventional COREU describing them so as to give Foreign Ministers some insight into Milosevic's family background.

pg309—[from COREU OPersonal for Foreign Ministers Only]

3. The key as always is Milosevic. He understands power and he will only pressurise the Bosnian Serbs further if the Contact Group convince him that they are serious. He must receive a sharp reminder as a result of the Ministerial Contact Group meeting that we expect him to act against the Bosnian Serbs, and that if he does not deliver, we will take further action against him. This means Milosevic being well aware of the contents of two draft UN resolutions over sanctions by the end of this month, one of which encourages him to isolate the Bosnian Serbs, the other of which shows him the heavy price he will pay for a failure to cooperate.

4. There is only one threatened action which Milosevic will respect, and that is if the resolution addresses the closure of Serbia's border with Macedonia. We have the power to do it, and it will be seen as pusillanimous behaviour if we do not both threaten this and clearly mean to carry it out. The latest figures for traffic across the border show 1,018 trucks and 148 railway wagons going north in one week, and 1,173 trucks and 351 railway wagons going south. This is an intolerable situation. We know that President Gligorov's freedom to act is circumscribed by the continuing

weakness of his economy. Without the black market dealing it would be in an even worse situation. He has to be granted generous financial support immediately, and the vehicle to use is Article 50 of the UN Charter, and a Security Council Resolution taken under Chapter VII, which will automatically bind all European Union states. There will also have to be a simultaneous strengthening of the UN presence in Macedonia. Any other action on sanctions, be it further attempts to free Serbian assets or demands on the neighbouring governments, will not be taken seriously either by those governments or by the rest of the world.

5. The second fundamental sanctions issue is to deal with Serb extraction of oil from the wells in the Djeletovci area in the eastern UNPA. UNPROFOR in UNPA East think that there are currently 12 wells operating over an area of 5-10 km. The estimated production varies from 300-400 tons per day. Accurate information is impossible to obtain as the Serbs deny all access to this area. The oil is moved by a pipeline under the Danube (which existed before the war began) for refining in Serbia either at Novi Sad or Pancevo, just outside Belgrade. The refined products are moved by road. Serbia charges for the refining and is paid in food. Karadzic openly boasts that all this oil comes back through the Republika Srpska either for their use, or for onward shipment to the RSK, and there is every reason to believe that this is the case. We cannot be sure that even if Milosevic seals the border, some oil will not get across. There is an overwhelming case for passing a Security Council Resolution that oil production in the Djeletovci area should cease and UNPROFOR should be given all necessary powers under Chapter VII to ensure that no oil passes down the pipeline. If we find that UNPROFOR does not have the military capacity to deal with this, then this is a further case for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, so as to free us up to use air power to tilt the balance in favour of the Croatian army within the borders we have recognized for Croatia, and for the Bosnian government army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

pg314—These arguments I found even more valid in August 1994 than in May 1993, for the chances of Milosevic allowing the JA to intervene were even less, given the depth of the split between him and Karadzic. Also, the humanitarian relief effort by 1994 had reached a point where, if the military escorts were withdrawn, I felt that the alternative Oblack market¹ supply routes for the Bosnian Muslims were sufficiently robust that they would have continued despite political or military pressure from Croatian or Bosnian Serb leaders to stop trading across the confrontation lines. Too much money was changing hands for these political leaders to be heeded, and anyhow many of them were involved in the racketeering. In addition, UNHCR was supplying the Bosnian Serbs with humanitarian aid; if they clamped down on UNHCR aid to the Muslims, they too would be affected. I believed governments exaggerated the humanitarian cost of withdrawing UNPROFOR in summer 1994. Its most vital task had been in the winter of 1992-3 when chaos reigned and there were no alternative supply routes.

I knew from my talks with Mladic that he had very little wishful thinking in his strategic analysis. He was contemptuous about the pusillanimous behaviour of the Western democracies but he also knew that Russia was hesitant to lock horns with the US. He hoped that Milosevic would in the last analysis not dare leave him and the Bosnian Serb army to be defeated on the battlefield, but he knew that he had deeply offended Milosevic over the VOPP and I sensed that he was wary about having another personal clash over the Contact Group plan. Mladic's intransigence was always qualified. There was just enough flexibility to let the minimal amount of UN food aid through. He would return UN hostages after having exposed UN vulnerability, accept some NATO close air support if his field commanders went too far, but react very strongly to punitive NATO air strikes because he knew they could do real damage. I felt in 1994 that he would be able to make the Bosnian Serbs withdraw when they knew our strategic analysis made sense. 'O'leave, lift and strike' in the context of imposing a specific peace settlement did make sense, and Mladic knew this. For all his bluster about safeguard against NATO air power tilting the balance against him. Sadly, 'O'leave, lift and strike' was not adopted in August 1994 by the Contact Group countries. They waited until August 1995 to use air power, by which time the soldiers had changed the Contact Group map and the people had suffered a renewed bout of extensive ethnic cleansing.

pg383--The duplicities of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have never been better illustrated than by a conversation between a Muslim commander and his Serb counterpart picked up by intercept radios during the Muslim-Croat war. First they bargained over the price in Deutschmarks of Serb shells which the Muslims wanted to buy from the Serbs to fire on the Croats in Mostar. After a price was agreed and routes for the supply in lorries arranged, the Muslim commander was heard to come back and ask if the Serbs could for a little extra money fire the shells if they were given the cross-bearings. After a brief haggle on the number of extra Deutschmarks this would involve, the Serbs duly fired on the Croats, paid for by the Muslims. When Stoltenberg and I told President Milosevic about this on 12 November 1993 he was very angry and asked Karadzic in our presence whether this had happened. Karadzic confirmed that it had, but said orders had been issued that it must not happen again. Another example was when in early 1995 fuel came in from Split and Zadar through the Krajina corridor to the Bosnian Serb army, with the complicity of the Croats, at a time when Milosevic was prohibiting oil to the Bosnian Serbs. The Croats sold fuel to the Bosnian Serb army partly in return for their protection of Bosnian Croat areas against Muslim attacks, and partly to underwrite the Bosnian Serbs' assistance to the Bihac Muslim leader [Fikret] Abdic, who had strong links with the Croat financial community. The fuel was brought in at a price of 1.2-1.8 DM per litre and then sold on to the Bosnian Serbs at 3.2-4.0 DM per litre; occasional payments were made to local commanders to persuade them to stop fighting while the fuel trucks passed through safely. Abdic was also being supported from Belgrade.

...

Only the US can chronicle any strategic thinking that lay behind the Washington Accords of March 1994 that brought about a Federation of Croats and Muslims within Bosnia-Herzegovina and also an agreement in principle for a Confederation between this new Federation and the Republic of Croatia. The best account of how that relationship developed is to be found in *The Death of Yugoslavia* by Laura Silber and Allan Little. The immediate justification for the Accords was that they stopped the Croat-Muslim war, which is indubitable. Unfortunately, the Accords were increasingly perceived by the Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs as an anti-Serb alliance. Yet instead of making a hard-nosed political and military assessment of the strengths of the Muslims and Croats working together, the Serb leaders in Knin and Pale still refused to be serious about negotiating. Only Milosevic saw how the Washington Accords could be turned to the advantage of the Serbs. That is why he backed the Contact Group Plan in July 1994 but insisted that there must be similar confederal links with the FRY for the Bosnian Serbs. That is why he wanted an economic cooperation agreement in Croatia, for he knew that the Serbs had to be encouraged to drop their demand for secession and to be given the confidence to live within Croatia. A high priority in 1994, if war was to be avoided in the Krajina in 1995, was to build quickly on an economic agreement in Croatia. To do this we, as Co-Chairmen, needed to offer both a carrot and a stick to the moderate Croatian Serb leader Mikelic, who wanted a negotiated settlement with the Croatian government and was the only person who could stand up to the hard-liner Martić. But he, and we, needed Milosevic's help. The Contact Group also needed a carrot and stick to coax and push the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table and end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this too Milosevic's help was crucial.

Yet there were key people in Washington and Bonn who still saw Milosevic as the fount of all evil and really did not want to have any negotiations with him at all. Some were so antagonistic that they were ready to contemplate bombing Serbia and Montenegro. In particular, they had in their sights the air defence system in the FRY, which was integrated with the air defence system nominally controlled by the Croatian Serb army in Croatia and the Bosnian Serb army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in reality controlled and even staffed from Belgrade. Even Senator Sam Nunn, the most influential and sensible Senator on defense questions, had raised publicly the possibility of extending the range of air attacks to these sites if NATO planes were shot down over Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the imposition of the Sarajevo exclusion zone. In London and Paris the view held strongly by both political and military figures was that such action would not only destroy Russian cooperation across the board but risk prompting an insistence by the

Russian military that Russian air force planes be flown into FRY airfields. This assessment was one I fully shared and it lay behind my anxiety over the handling of the Russians at the time of the Sarajevo exclusion zone in 1994.

Another strand in the US administration was one that saw Milosevic as a strategic genius always three or four moves ahead of us on the chessboard of Balkan politics and who believed that nothing connected with him was as it seemed and that he was always playing according to the Greater Serbia game plan. On this view—which was in part shared by some in the EU, particularly in the Dutch and German governments—any apparent movement towards our position, as in April 1993 over the VOPP, was a foul plot from which we should steer clear. In the eyes of people who thought like this, to establish the ICFY Mission in Belgrade in September 1994 was to be hoodwinked from the outset. It would have been too tedious to chronicle here all the petty arguments we had to have, as Co-Chairmen, with Washington and later with Bonn, to sustain the ICFY Mission. The factual record is covered in our published reports as Co-Chairmen to the UN Secretary-General. The US administration seemed to operate in separate compartments, with a sanctions team that would not face up to the importance of the ICFY Mission for their Contact Group members' negotiating strategy with Milosevic. The result was to prevent serious negotiations on the Contact Group Plan for over a year, during which the situation deteriorated sharply in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.


pg387—The Victors in the Yugoslav wars of 1991-5 have been the Croats and President Tudjman. The losers have been the Croatian Serbs and their useless leader, Martić. Whether the Bosnian Muslims will let the Croatian ascendancy in Bosnia continue unchallenged is the big question. In the immediate circumstances they have little alternative, since Milosevic and Tudjman can prevent war from continuing. But the strains within the Federation will be very considerable in the next few years, and the US and the EU will have to do much more of the type of action the EU is taking in Mostar to prevent a re-eruption of the Muslim-Croat war of 1993-4. As to Milosevic, he has beaten off Karadžić's challenge to be the King of the Serbs. He appears to have rescued the Serbs from what they see as their fate, winning battles but losing the peace. He will gain a larger Serbia, but not the Greater Serbia of the nationalists' dreams. I never considered Milosevic as being on our side when he supported the VOPP in April 1993, the Union of Three Republics in September 1993, the EU Action Plan in December 1993 or the Contact Group Plan in July 1994. It was just a case of his interests and ours coinciding for a period. But it is hard to gainsay his judgement of 9 August 1995: 'Hundreds of thousands of people would have avoided the horrors of war if the Vance-Owen Plan had been accepted over two years ago.' Milosevic blamed the Bosnian Serb leadership, but leaders in Washington bear a heavy responsibility too for prolonging a war, with miserable consequences: as I predicted in May 1993, there is no honour left for any settlement.g

FREE SLOBO!!! OFF THE HAGUE!!!!!!

Mick

Ontbinding of vernieuwing van de NAVO

WASHINGTON (Reuter) In een vooruitblik op de vijftigste verjaardag van de NAVO deed de Amerikaanse Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Madeleine Albright, een aantal uitspraken over de toekomstige rol van het bondgenootschap in de Balkan en de rest van de wereld.



Zij noemde de Balkan een belangrijk deel van Europa maar ook een directe bron van onrust. Zij beschuldigde de Joegoslavische President Milosevic van het uitlokken van vier Balkan-oorlogen en zei dat de NAVO werd getest op haar taken in de 21e eeuw. "Wij zijn vastbesloten deze test met goed gevolg af te leggen", zo verklaarde zij. Volgens haar was de Balkan het missende puzzelstukje in een vrij en verenigd Europa en het zou onaanvaardbaar zijn als dat gedeelte van Europa een instabiele factor zou blijven. De NAVO zou in de komende eeuw, naast haar kerntaak van het beschermen van de lidstaten, ook opdrachten buiten het haar toegewezen gebied moeten gaan vervullen, zoals in Bosnië en Kosovo. Halve maatregelen zullen geen oplossingen bieden. Voor wat betreft Kosovo waarschuwde zij voor "een uitbreiding van het conflict".

De NAVO top van 23 tot en met 25 april ter gelegenheid van de vijftigste verjaardag van de organisatie werd geheel beheerst door de problemen rond Kosovo. Volgens sommige commentatoren zal de wereld de komende tijd getuige zijn van een aanstaande ontbinding van de NAVO in plaats van een vernieuwing ervan.

Door de aanval op Joegoslavië schendt de NAVO de internationale wetten

1. Het is een schending van Artikel 2 van het handvest van de Verenigde Naties dat het gebruik van geweld tegen een soevereine staat verbiedt als deze geen agressie gebruikt tegen andere staten. Joegoslavië heeft geen aangrenzende staten aangevallen. De Veiligheidsraad heeft de aanval van de NAVO niet gesanctioneerd. Als de aanval in de Veiligheidsraad in stemming zou zijn gebracht, zou er zeker een veto zijn uitgesproken door Rusland en China. De NAVO voorzag dat en passeerde daarom de Veiligheidsraad.

2. De NAVO schendt het eigen handvest waarin is vastgelegd dat zij een defensieve organisatie is en alleen geweld zal gebruiken indien een van de lidstaten wordt aangevallen. Er heeft geen aanval op een van de lidstaten plaatsgevonden.

3. De zogenaamde Overeenkomst van Rambouillet (er is geen 'overeenkomst' met Joegoslavië) is een schending van de Conventie van Wenen uit 1980 die het gebruiken van dwang om een verdrag of overeenkomst te tekenen verbiedt. Op straffe van NAVO-bombardementen wordt getracht Joegoslavië tot tekenen te dwingen.

4. Het is een schending van het in 1975 overeengekomen Slotverdrag van Helsinki, waarin de grenzen van de landen van Europa worden gegarandeerd. Rambouillet voorziet daarentegen in (a) de onmiddellijke afscheiding van Kosovo door NAVO-bombardementen of (b) in de afscheiding van Kosovo na drie jaar door een bezettingsleger van de NAVO.

5. Als het gevolg van de bombardementen de erkenning van een onafhankelijk Kosovo zou zijn, is dat een schending van het internationaal recht dat de erkenning van eenzijdig afgescheiden provincies verbiedt. Een dergelijke ontwikkeling zou een precedent scheppen en de stabiliteit in andere regio's ernstig bedreigen. ■

Bron: Raju G.C. Thomas, faculteit politieke wetenschappen, Marquette University.

Mr. gg

Ontwrichting van de Balkan door Westerse monetair politiek

Volgens de Canadese econoom Michel Chossudovski, verbonden aan de Universiteit van Ottawa, hebben westerse politici en internationale financiers vanaf het begin van de jaren '80 ertoe bijgedragen dat de Joegoslavische economie in een neergaande spiraal terecht kwam en dat zij mede daardoor de smeulende etnische en sociale conflicten bewust hebben aangewakkerd.


Kort voor de dood van maarschalk Tito, onder wiens leiding Joegoslavië eens een stabiele veelvolkerenstaat was, drongen de internationale schuldeisers erop aan dat de rentevoet in Joegoslavië zou worden opgetrokken en de dinar moest worden gedevalueerd. De levensstandaard begon daarop terug te lopen en de sociale onrust nam toe. Dat proces raakte in een stroomversnelling toen de regering van de Verenigde Staten onder Ronald Reagan een speciale politiek begon te voeren die Joegoslavië moest openstellen voor de vrije markteconomie. Deze strategie had het gewenste resultaat: in 1989 tekende de Joegoslavische premier Marcovic een overeenkomst met het IMF en de Wereldbank waarin hij zijn land tot vergaande economische hervormingen dwong. Dat leverde weliswaar vers geld op, maar leidde ook tot een verdere verzwaring van de schuldenlast, bevrozing van de lonen, nieuwe muntdevaluaties en strenge bezuinigingen op de overheidsuitgaven. De import steeg, maar de lokale produktie daalde en de werkloosheid nam toe. De economie van Servië, Kosovo, Macedonië en Bosnië kreeg de zwaarste klappen.

Toename spanning door buitenlandse schuld

De spanning tussen de federale overheid en de deelstaten in Joegoslavië nam toe. "Staatsinkomsten die voorheen voor een deel naar de deelstaten en de autonome provincies vloeiden, moesten opeens dienen om de buitenlandse schuld af te betalen", schrijft Chossudovski. "De deelgebieden waren steeds meer op zichzelf aangewezen. Deze budgettaire crisis en het opereren van rechts-nationalistische krachten waren de belangrijkste oorzaken voor de afscheiding van Kroatië en Slovenië in 1991".

Foreign Operations Law

De feitelijke nekslag werd toegediend op 5



november 1990, toen in het Amerikaanse Congres de "1991 Foreign Operations Law 101-153" werd aangenomen. Deze wet bevatte een voor de Socialistische Federale Republiek Joegoslavië rampzalige clause. In 23 regels werd bepaald dat binnen zes maanden alle hulp, handel en kredieten van de VS aan de FR Joegoslavië stopgezet zouden worden. De hulp zou pas worden hervat als aan een aantal dwingende politieke eisen zou worden voldaan. Zo werden voor elk van de deelrepublieken verkiezingen geëist. Alleen partijen die door het State-Department als 'democratisch' werden gezien konden rekenen op (forse) financiële ondersteuning. In de praktijk betekende dit een enorme toevloed van fondsen naar kleine, rechts-nationalistische partijen. Hiermee was de aanzet tot een bloedige burgeroorlog gegeven.

Vrijplaats voor Privé-sector

Multilaterale financiers als de Wereldbank kloppen zich vandaag op de borst voor de inspanningen die ze leveren om de nieuwe Balkanstaten de ellende van de voorbije oorlogen te doen vergeten, maar "ze blijven aandringen op de terugbetaling van de buitenlandse schulden die het voormalige Joegoslavië had uitstaan en zij lijken alleen geïnteresseerd in de Balkan als een vrijplaats voor de privé-sector", zegt Chossudovski.

De NAVO-oorlog tegen Joegoslavië is volgens de meeste westerse politici om de bevolking van Kosovo te beschermen tegen Servisch geweld. Toch blijven er feiten opduiken die aantonen dat morele principes niet aan de orde zijn. In een recent gesprek met een vakbondsdelegatie liet Clinton zich ontvallen dat "Europa een sleutelrol vervult" in de mogelijkheden voor Amerikaanse bedrijven om wereldwijd zaken te doen. "We hebben een Europa nodig dat veilig, vrij en eendrachtig is; een goede handelspartner", aldus Clinton. ■

Ontmante- ling van voormalig Joegoslavië

Her- kolonisatie Bosnië

Door Michel Chossudovsky, Universitair
Professor, Ottawa (*)

De Macro-economische herstructurering in Joegoslavië heeft bijgedragen aan de verwoesting van een heel land, maar de rol die dit heeft gespeeld is door de wereldmedia reeds vanaf het begin van de oorlog in 1991 ontkend. In plaats daarvan zijn culturele, etnische en religieuze verdeeldheid gepresenteerd als de enige oorzaak van de crisis, terwijl de strategische belangen van de machten van het westen werden verzwegen. Manifest plaatst deze studie in drie delen (dit is deel 3). Samen met de analyse van Sean Gervasi (Manifest 13 en 14, 1996 en andere recente uitgaven (#) kan deze analyse worden gebruikt voor een beter inzicht in de Balkantragedie.

Onderhandelingen met de clubs van Parijs en Londen waren echter in 1994 vastgelopen, op het onderwerp 'hoeveel van de schuld van voormalig Joegoslavië' Kroatië op zich wilde nemen. Erkenning door Zagreb van haar volledige aandeel

ringsbank. Het geld dat de Steun-groep verschaftte was niet bedoeld voor het herstel van Macedonië. De zogenaamde 'brug financiering' werd gegeven om het de regering in Skopje mogelijk te maken haar achterstallige schulden aan de Wereld Bank terug te betalen [13]. Een tweede fase van structurele aanpassingen werd gestart in mei 1994, door de regering van minister-president Branko Crvenkovski en het IMF. Paul Thomsen, die aan het hoofd stond van deze IMF missie, uitte zijn tevredenheid door te verkondigen: "de resultaten van het stabilisatie programma [op basis van het STF] waren indrukwekkend"; in het bijzonder met betrekking tot "de efficiënte loonpolitiek", aangenomen door de regering van Skopje (in het kader van de Wet op de Lonen). Volgens de onderhandelars van het IMF moesten de pogingen tot verkleining van het tekort (dat reeds was verlaagd met 50% in 1994) doorgaan. Dit streven zou echter onvermijdelijk het verder snijden in sociale programma's en verlaging van pensioenbetalingen vereisen. Krachtens de overeenkomst met het IMF moest de regering in Skopje komen tot herstelbetalingsregelingen met de clubs van Parijs en Londen.

De IMF-overeenkomst vereiste nadrukkelijk dat de regering in Skopje 'onvermogen' ondernemingen moest sluiten en 'overtollige' arbeiders ontslaan. In 1994 "was elk tweede bedrijf in Macedonië een verliesleidend bedrijf, waarmee het aantal van dergelijke ondernemingen opliep tot 4.000 (MILS News, 11 april 1995, Macedonian Information and Liaison Service). In dit kader bevestigde de minister van Financiën dat met zulke hoge rentetarieven van de banken (krachtens de door donoren gesteunde Wet voor Herstel van de Banken) "het letterlijk onmogelijk was om in het land een onderneming te vinden die in staat zou zijn.....om de kosten te betalen van de aflossing van rente [tarieven]". De economische therapie van het

op haar algemene toegang tot gezondheidszorg [14]. De voorgestelde 'oplossing', aangeboden door de Wereld Bank, bestaat uit het ontwikkelen van een 'marktgeoriënteerd' gezondheidszorg systeem.

Wederopbouw van Bosnië-Herzegowina

Bij de Bosnische vredesregeling, onder invloed van NATO-geweren, onthulde het Westen in 1995 een programma van 'wederopbouw' dat Bosnië-Herzegowina volledig beroofde van haar economische en politieke soevereiniteit. Dit programma behelst grotendeels de ontwikkeling van Bosnië-Herzegowina als een verdeeld grondgebied, met militaire bezetting door de NATO en onder westers bestuur. Steunend op de Dayton akkoorden van november 1995, hebben de VS en de Europese Unie een volwaardig koloniaal bestuur geïnstalleerd in Bosnië. Aan het hoofd daarvan staat de door hen benoemde Hoge Afgevaardigde (HA), een niet-Bosnische burger.

De HA heeft de volledige uitvoerende macht met betrekking tot alle civiele aangelegenheden, met het recht om de regeringen van zowel de Bosnische Federatie als de Bosnisch-Servische Republiek Srpska te overstemmen. De HA handelt in nauwe samenwerking met het hoge militaire commando van de IFOR en ook met de instanties die geld doneren.(2)

Een internationale civiele politiemacht is onder de hoede van een buitenlandse commissaris, aangewezen door de secretaris-generaal van de Verenigde Naties. Overeenkomstig de verklaring van de Verenigde Naties in januari, werden uit 15 verschillende landen ongeveer 1700 politie-agenten, waarvan de meesten nog nooit in de Balkanlanden waren geweest, met spoed naar Bosnië gezonden, na een vijfdaags trainingsprogramma in Zagreb.

Terwijl het westen haar steun voor de democratie had onderstreept, werkte de parlementaire vergade-

geld, in dat opzicht functionerend als een deviezenraad" (Artikel VII). Noch mag het de nieuwe 'soevereine' staat toegestaan worden om een eigen munt te hebben (papiergeld wordt alleen uitgegeven als er een volledige dekking is van buitenlandse deviezen), het zal ook niet zijn toegestaan om de binnenlandse (geld)-middelen te mobiliseren. Net zoals in de andere nieuwe staten wordt de mogelijkheid om het eigen herstel met eigen middelen te financieren (zonder enorme toename van de buitenlandse schuld) van buitenaf geblokkeerd. De taken die nodig zijn om de economie van Bosnië te besturen zijn zorgvuldig verdeeld tussen de donor-instellingen: terwijl de Centrale Bank onder de hoede staat van het IMF, bestuurt de Europese Bank voor Herstel en Ontwikkeling (EBRD) de Commissie voor Openbare Bedrijven die toezicht houdt op de verrichtingen van alle ondernemingen in de publieke sector, waaronder energie, water, posten, wegen, spoorwegen etc. De president van de (EBRD) benoemt de voorzitter van de commissie, die tevens toezicht heeft op de herstructurering van de publieke sector, wat hoofdzakelijk de uitverkoop van de staat en de staatseigendommen betekent en het verschaffen van lange-termijn investeringsfondsen [15].

Men kan niet om een fundamentele vraag heen: is de Bosnische grondwet, formeel overeengekomen tussen staatshoofden in Dayton, een echte grondwet? Een somber en gevaarlijk precedent is geschapen in de geschiedenis van de internationale relaties: westerse schuldeisers hebben hun belangen vastgelegd in een grondwet, die haastig is opgesteld in hun belang; leidende posities binnen de Bosnische staat moeten worden bekleed door niet-staatsburgers die zijn benoemd door westerse financiële instituten. Geen constitutionele (Grondwetgevende) vergadering, geen overleg met organisaties van de burgers in Bosnië en Herzegowina, geen

verschafte van 37 miljoen dollar. Dit geld is echter bedoeld om het Bosnië mogelijk te maken haar achterstallige schulden terug te betalen aan het IMF, een voorwaarde die het IMF heeft gesteld voor het lenen van nieuw geld. Maar het is een wrede en absurde paradox: de veel gevraagde lening van het onlangs door het IMF gecreëerde 'vangnet' voor zogenaamde 'post-conflict landen' zal niet gebruikt worden voor na-oorlogs herstel. In plaats daarvan zal het worden gebruikt om de schulden aan de Centrale Bank van Nederland terug te betalen, die aanvankelijk het geld heeft opgehoest om de achterstallige schulden aan het IMF af te lossen. Terwijl de schuldenlast toeneemt, komen er geen nieuwe financiële bronnen Bosnië binnen, voor de wederopbouw van haar door oorlog verscheurde economie.

De territoriale verdeling van Bosnië-Herzegowina, krachtens de Dayton overeenkomst, is van strategische betekenis voor de westerse economische belangen. De Dayton overeenkomst moet de 'inter-entitey' grenslijn tussen de Federatie van Bosnië-Herzegowina en de Bosnisch-Servische Republiek Srpska kracht bijzetten. Documenten in handen van Kroatië en de Bosnische Serviërs wijzen erop, dat voorraden kolen en olie zijn ontdekt op de oostelijke helling van de Dinarië Thrust, een gebied dat "het eerste slagveld was van de massale aanvallen deze zomer [1995] van het Kroatische leger op de opstandige Serviërs in Bosnië en het Kroatische gebied Krajina...Volgens Bosnische functionarissen was Amoco (American Oil Company), het hoofdkantoor is in Chicago gevestigd, één van de vele firma's die daarna begonnen met verkennende onderzoeken in Bosnië". Het westen staat te popelen om deze gebieden te ontwikkelen: "De Wereld Bank - en de multi-nationals die operaties hebben geleid [augustus 1995] - zijn terughoudend om hun nieuwste onderzoeksrapporten openbaar te

Macro-economische herstructurering, in Joegoslavië uitgevoerd in het kader van de neoliberale politieke agenda, heeft ondubbelzinnig bijgedragen aan de verwoesting van een heel land. Ondanks dat is reeds vanaf het begin van de oorlog in 1991 de centrale rol die de macro-economische hervormingen hebben gespeeld zorgvuldig over het hoofd gezien en ontkend door de wereld media. De 'vrije markt' is gepresenteerd als de oplossing, de basis voor de wederopbouw van een door oorlog vernietigde economie. De toonaangevende pers heeft een gedetailleerd dagboek van de oorlog en van het proces van 'vrede stichten' gepresenteerd. De sociale en politieke gevolgen van economische herstructurering in Joegoslavië zijn zorgvuldig uit ons sociale bewustzijn gewist en uit ons collectieve inzicht in 'wat werkelijk is gebeurd'. Culturele, etnische en religieuze verschillen zijn overbelicht, dogmatisch voorgesteld als de enige oorzaak van de crisis, terwijl zij in werkelijkheid het gevolg zijn van een veel dieperliggend proces van economische en politieke verdeeldheid.

Dit 'valse bewustzijn' is binnengedrongen op alle terreinen van kritisch debat en discussie. Het verhuult niet alleen de waarheid, het voorkomt ook dat wij kennis nemen van de exacte historische gebeurtenissen. Uiteindelijk verdraait het de werkelijke oorzaken van het sociale conflict. De eenheid, solidariteit en identiteit van de zuidelijke Slaven hebben hun oorsprong in de geschiedenis, nu is deze identiteit tegengewerkt, gemanipuleerd en vernietigd. De verwoesting van een economisch systeem, inclusief de overname van produktieve bezittingen, de uitbreiding van markten en de 'gevechten om grondgebied' in de Balkanlanden vormen de werkelijke oorzaak van het conflict. Wat in Joegoslavië op het spel staat zijn de levens van miljoenen mensen. Macro-economische hervor-

ders ontslagen en sociale programma's moeten gestopt worden. deze context moet de economische crisis in Joegoslavië begrepen worden. Tot het uiterste doorgevoerd zijn de hervormingen de wrede afspiegeling van een destructieve 'economisch model', opgedrongen in het kader van de neo-liberale agenda voor nationale samenlevingen over de hele wereld.

Bronnen

- [12] Zie Wereld Bank, 'Croatia, Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan', Public Information Centre, De Wereld Bank, 16 februari 1995.
- [13] Zie Wereld Bank, 'Macedonia Financial and Enterprise Sector', Public Information Department, 28 november 1995.
- [14] Wereld Bank, 'Macedonia, Health Sector Transition Project', Public Information Department, Washington DC, 15 november 1995.
- [15] Zie the Agreement on Public Corporations under the Dayton Peace Accord, Art. 1, Commission on Public Corporations, Dayton Peace Accords, 15 november 1995.
- [16] Frank Viviano en Keneth Howe, 'Bosnia Leaders Say Nation Sit Atop Oil Fields', The San Francisco Chronicle, 28 augustus 1995. Zie ook Scott Cooper, 'Western Aims in Ex-Yugoslavia Unmasked', The Organiser, 24 September 1995.
- [17] Wereld Bank, World Development Report 1991, Statistical Annex, Tabel 1 en 2, Washington DC, 1991.

Noten

- (1) 'Overtollige arbeid' in de industrie werd door de missie van de Wereld Bank gemeten in de orde van grootte van 20% van de totale arbeidskracht van 8.9 miljoen - dat is ongeveer 1.8 miljoen. Dit cijfer blijkt echter het werkelijke aantal overtollige arbeiders grof te onderschatten gebaseerd op de categorisering van 'noodlijdende' ondernemingen. Alleen al in de industrie...

DE COLUMN VAN...
RINZE VISSER

'Rotte vis'

een lullig salaris voor rotte vis laten uitmaken, zegt dit heerschap. En, het kan niet genoeg gezegd worden: dit geachte heerschap heeft gelijk! Vanuit de positie van de heersende elite Het was me altijd wat met die kamerleden. Er kon geen plan ter verbetering van hun financiële positie - hoe miezerig ook - naar voren worden gebracht of de angst om voor zakenluiers te worden uitgekreten sloeg om het hart. Maar sinds enige tijd is daar verandering in gekomen. Een aantal moderne, eigentijdse geachte afgevaardigden, zich bewust geworden van hun eigen- en marktwaarde, vond het tijd worden dat zo veel jaren na de val van de muur wel eens uit een ander vaatje getapt mag worden.

Niks geen terughoudendheid! Wat zullen we nou! Wij zijn keihard werkende mensen en er is geen enkele reden waarom onze offeren voor volk en vaderland minder betaald zouden moeten worden dan die van de moderne zakenluiers. Dat gelu over op! Dat is immers taal van de straat, van 'het plebs' uit Schilderswijk en omstreken...

Daarom heeft de VVD'er Remkes ook groot gelijk. Hij heeft alle gelijk van de wereld van de elite! Het salaris van een kamerlid moet fors omhoog en niet bang zijn om uitgescholden te worden voor zakenluiers. Want, goede mensen uit het bedrijfsleven bedenken voor een politieke functie, zij willen zich niet voor

Als de geachte afgevaardigde door het gewone volk niet geacht maar veracht wordt, dan blijft de destijds gekozen term 'schadeloosstelling' voor het kamersalaris nog niet zo slecht gekozen. Er zijn nog elf kameries verhoging van het kamersalaris er door te krijgen. In het belang van het kapitalistenvolk en het kapitalistenvaderland moet dat lukken... Die Berlijnse Muur is

Van een regio-correspondent

Vernietigend oordeel

dat kinderen het zouden gaan uitvoeren. B. en W. hebben samen met de directie van de openbare scholen in de gemeente besloten dat het materiaal vernietigd zal worden, vanwege het feit dat er "sprake is van gevaarlijke en wellicht zelfs kwetsende passages". Hier kan de regering en met name staatssecretaris Netelenbos het wel mee doen...

Afwijzende reactie

De landelijke koepel van de zgn. categorie 3 scholen in het met

op het door het Procesmanagement Weer Samen Naar School naar de basisscholen gestuurde materiaal. Zij achten "deze benaderingswijze van het veld niet bevorderlijk voor het realiseren van de 'integratie' van 'probleemkinderen' in het reguliere onderwijs.

Doortrekken!

Directieleden van de Onderwijsbonden CNV hebben, samen met de PCSO, in het onderwijsoverleg met staatssecretaris Netelenbos in december van vorig jaar al gevraagd het materiaal weer bij de scholen op te halen en milieuvriendelijk te vernietigen. De staatssecretaris had een voorwoord geschreven bij het project, ze zei de muziek aansprekend te vinden, maar geen opvatting te hebben over de tekst. "Wij wel", schrijven de directieleden in hun onderwijsbondsblad: "doortrekken!"

KORTKORTKORTKORT
BINNENLAND

Kok verlangt medewerking van sociale partners

Premier Kok heeft werkgeversorganisaties en bonden opgeroepen niet met hun cao's de kabinetsplannen met het minimumloon te dwarsbomen. "Ik hoop dat iedereen zijn gezondheid zal gebruiken", zei Kok na afloop van het kabinetsberaad. Werkgevers en werknemers moeten de kabinetsplannen rond het minimumloon in hun cao's niet 'monddood' maken, meent Kok... De vakbeweging is fel tegen het kabinetsoverstel dat bedrijven in staat stelt alleenstaande langdurig werklozen tijdelijk 70 procent van het minimumloon te betalen. De sociale partners kunnen in cao's afspreken geen gebruik te maken van de tijdelijke ontheffing van het minimumloon. Het kabinet dreigt nog niet hardop met het niet algemeen verbindend verklaren van cao's van bedrijfstakken die niet meewerken. (Hoezo vrijheid van onderhandelen en voordelen van de overlegconomie? Klas-sensstrijd, dat is nodig!, red)(AD, 1-2-1997)

Ontmanteling van voormalig Joegoslavië

Herkolonisatie Bosnië

16-1-92

Door Michel Chossudovsky, Universitair Professor, Ottawa (*)

De Macro-economische herstructurering in Joegoslavië heeft bijgedragen aan de verwoesting van een heel land, maar de rol die dit heeft gespeeld is door de wereldmedia reeds vanaf het begin van de oorlog in 1991 ontkend. In plaats daarvan zijn culturele, etnische en religieuze verdeeldheid gepresenteerd als de enige oorzaak van de crisis, terwijl de strategische belangen van de machten van het Westen werden verzwegen. Manifest plaatst deze studie in drie delen (dit is deel 1).

Samen met de analyse van Sean Gervasi (Manifest 13 en 14, 1996 en andere recente uitgaven (#) kan deze analyse worden gebruikt voor een beter inzicht in de Balkantragedie.

De Westerse publieke opinie is misleid: de toestand waarin voormalig Joegoslavië zich bevindt is het resultaat van een 'agressief nationalisme', het onvermijdelijke resultaat van diep gewortelde etnische en religieuze spanningen, die hun oorsprong hebben in de geschiedenis[1].

Duitsland en de VS worden niet genoemd, de diepgewortelde economische crisis die aan de burgeroorlog vooraf ging is al lang vergeten. In de ogen van de wereldmedia, dragen de Westerse machten geen verantwoordelijkheid voor de verarming en vernietiging van een natie van 24 miljoen mensen. Toch staat de breuk van de Joegoslavië

daling in de levensstandaard van de gemiddelde Joegoslaaf...De economische crisis was een gevaar voor de politieke stabiliteit...en dreigde tevens de sluimerende etnische spanningen te verergeren"[3].

Deze hervormingen, gepaard gaande met het ondertekenen van overeenkomsten tot schuldenherstel met officiële en commerciële schuldeisers, dienden ook om de instituten van de federale staat te verzwakken, wat een politieke splitsing creëerde tussen Belgrado en de regeringen van de republieken en autonome provincies. "De minister-president Milka Planinc, die het programma uit moest voeren, moest het IMF een onmiddellijke toename van de disconto-tarieven beloven en nog veel meer voor het hele scala aan Reaganomic's maatregelen..."[4].

Economische en 'strategische herstructurering' werden gelijktijdig uitgevoerd. Het eerste was bedoeld om het tweede te versterken. Washington's interventie in verband hiermee werd geformaliseerd in 1984 in een VS National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133) getiteld 'Politiek van de Verenigde Staten tegenover Joegoslavië', geclassificeerd als 'Geheim Gevoelig'. Een gecensureerde versie van dit document werd openbaar gemaakt in 1990. Het document had grote overeenkomsten met een eerdere VS National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 54), uitgevaardigd in 1982 met betrekking tot Oost-Europa. De doelen opgenomen in laatstgenoemd document bevatten onder meer "toename van pogingen om een 'stille revolutie' te bevorderen om de Communistische regeringen en partijen omver te werpen" en tegelijkertijd de landen van Oost-Europa te reintegre-

ter-president. Na een niet succesvolle poging om een alternatieve 'anti-recessie politiek' aan te nemen, werd een meer orthodoxe benadering gelanceerd door zijn minister van financiën, Oskar Kovac. In 1988 werd het zogenaamde 'Mei anti-inflatie programma' in werking gezet. In werkelijkheid droeg dit programma eerder bij aan de versnelling dan aan vermindering van het inflatieproces: 'Alles kelderde omlaag na de stijging van oktober [1988] in Vojvodina en Montenegro. Slobodan Milosevic zei op de bijeenkomst van Presidenten van de YCLCC dat de belastingtarieven de economie uitputten. In een klimaat van totale chaos, werden de lonen gedereguleerd'[4]...Mikulic trad enkele maanden later af. De economische hervormingsmaatregelen bereikten hun hoogtepunt onder de pro-VS regering van Ante Markovic. Minister-president Markovic "ging door met dezelfde oude beloftes van een 'positieve politiek' van steun aan fabrikanten, terwijl hij in werkelijkheid de deregulatie van het systeem inleidde. Nadat de regulerende verplichtingen werden losgelaten, resulteerde de inflatiedruk, in de loop der jaren geaccumuleerd, in een golf van hyperinflatie..."[4].

De inflatie werd bijna opzettelijk bewerkstelligd. Aangewakkerd door prijsderegulatie en devaluatie van de munteenheid, nam de consumenten prijs index toe met 2.700% in 1989.

Structurele aanpassingen

Markovic reisde naar Washington om president George Bush te ontmoeten in de herfst van 1989, vlak voor de val van de Berlijnse Muur. Een 'pakket aan financiële hulp' werd beloofd in ruil voor radicale hervormingen in de

uitgaven gelijk aan 5 procent van het Bruto Binnenlands Produkt (BBP). Terwijl de inkomsten waren gedaald door de inflatie, had het IMF ook opdracht gegeven om de lonen te bevriezen op het niveau van midden-november 1989. Ondanks dat de dinar verbonden was met de Duitse mark, bleven de prijzen onverminderd stijgen. De netto-lonen daalden met 41% in de eerste zes maanden van 1990 [6].

De inflatie bedroeg meer dan 70 procent in 1990. In januari 1991 werd nog eens een devaluatie van de dinar van 30 procent uitgevoerd, die leidde tot een nieuwe ronde van prijsstijgingen. De inflatie (het betreft hier cijfers met betrekking tot Kroatië) liep op tot 140% in 1991 en steeg tot 937% en 1.134% in respectievelijk 1992 en 1993...('Zagreb's About Turn,' The Banker, Londen, Januari 1995). De economische maatregelen van januari 1990 omvatten ook de volledige inwisselbaarheid van de dinar (met westerse valuta, red), de liberalisatie van belastingtarieven en verdere vermindering van de importquota. De schuldeisers hadden de controle over de monetaire politiek: de met het IMF ondertekende overeenkomst voorzag dat de federale regering toegang had tot de kredieten van haar eigen centrale bank (de Nationale Bank van Joegoslavië). Deze voorwaarde verlamde vrijwel het gehele budgettaire proces en belemmerde de mogelijkheid van de federale staat om haar economische en sociale programma's te financieren. Bovendien bevorderde de deregulatie van commerciële kredieten samen met bankhervormingen een verdere ineenstorting van investeringen door de staatsbedrijven. De bevrozing van alle transferbetalingen aan de republieken creëerde een situatie van 'failliete

hebben de conflicten van politieke persoonlijkheden overbelicht: "Tudjman en Milosevic scheuren Bosnië-Herzegovina in stukken"[2].

Westerse bemiddeling, afgerond met het Dayton Airforce Base

met het programma van macro-economische herstructurering, opgelegd aan de regering van Belgrado door haar buitenlandse schuldeisers. Dit programma, aangenomen in verschillende fases, heeft sinds 1980 bijgedragen aan

mie. Ondanks Belgrado's niet in de pas lopende politiek en haar uitgebreide handelsrelaties met de Europese Gemeenschap en de VS, waren de regeringen van Reagan en Bush gericht op het ontmantelen van het Joegoslavische 'markt socialisme'.

sief een nieuwe gedevalueerde munteenheid, bevrozing van de lonen, de beperking van regerings-uitgaven en de opheffing van de ondernemingen met zelfbestuur. Dit economisch maatregelenpakket werd gelanceerd in januari 1990


afscheiding'. De uitvoering van deze voorwaarden (vastgelegd in de met het IMF getekende overeenkomst) was ook onderdeel van de schuldhervormingen, overeengekomen met de Clubs van Parijs en Londen. De door het IMF veroor-

De markten in het Oosten domineren

In Polen, Roemenië, Hongarije, Tsjechië, enz. zijn reserves aan grondstoffen, goedkope werkkrachten en afzetmarkten.

Rusland afblokken

De invloed van Rusland in de Balkan uitschakelen, dez mogelijke konkurrent verzwakken en controleren. De Navo voorbereiden op "herstel van de orde" in de ex-Sovjetunie



Uitbouw van militaire bases

De VS zijn militair al sterk aanwezig in Turkije, Albanie, Bulgarije. Zij installeren zich ook in Bosnië en Macedonië.

De 2 olie-routes controleren

De Balkan en Turkije zijn strategische regio's voor de toegang tot de olie van het Midden-Oosten (Arabië, Irak, Koeweit). Maar ook voor de enorme reserves in de ex-Sovjetunie (Kaspische zee, Kazakstan).

De Balkan: strategisch kruispunt voor Washington en Berlijn

Agreement in november 1995, is nauwgezet afgeschilderd als het middel om 'de vrede te herstellen' in Bosnië-Herzegovina, terwijl het in werkelijkheid, onder het motto van 'de vrije markt', bijdraagt aan de wederopbouw van de nieuwe soevereine staten.

Het overzicht van de vele diplomatieke initiatieven wordt levendig weergegeven en de nauwgezette agenda van de Verenigde Naties met betrekking tot 'het bewaken van de vrede' (peace-keeping) en humanitaire hulp wordt vertoond op TV-schermen over de hele wereld. Gedurende dit gehele proces zijn de economische en sociale oorzaken van de burgeroorlog zorgvuldig verborgen gehouden. De strategische belangen van

de ineenstorting van de nationale economie, heeft geleid tot de desintegratie van de industriële sector en bij stukjes en beetjes de afbraak van de welvaartsstaat.

Stille revolutie

Afscheidingstendensen, gevoed door sociale en etnische verdeeldheid, hebben in kracht toegenomen juist gedurende een periode van onmenselijke verarming van de Joegoslavische bevolking. De eerste fase van macro-economische hervormingen is begonnen in 1980, kort voor de dood van maarschalk Tito "....verzwakte economie en politieke verwoesting...Vertraagde groei, de accumulatie van buitenlandse schulden en in het bijzonder de afbetalingskosten daarvan en ook de devaluatie leidden tot een

Washington's strategische doel was het integreren van de Balkanlanden in de sfeer van het 'vrije markt systeem'.

In 1983 werd een tweede economisch stabilisatie programma toegepast met hulp van het IMF, resulterend in een enorme inflatie. Gecombineerd met de invloed van de importvrijheid bevorderde de stopzetting van kredieten een ongekende daling van investeringen. De groei van de industriële produktie was gemiddeld 7.1% per jaar gedurende de periode 1966-79. Volgend op de eerste fase van macro-economische hervormingen in 1980, daalde de industriële groei tot 2.8% in de periode 1980-87 en kelderde tot nul in 1987-88 en tot -10.6% in 1990 [5]. In 1986 werd Branko Mikulic minis-

met behulp van een zgn. IMF stand-by overeenkomst (SBA) en een Structurele Aanpassingen Lening (SAL II) van de Wereld Bank. De kortingen op het budget vereisten nieuwe richtlijnen tot opschorting van de overboeking van betalingen door Belgrado aan de regeringen van de republieken en autonome provincies, wat weer voeding gaf aan het proces van politieke balkanisatie en afscheidingstendensen. De regering van Servië verwierp het soberheidsprogramma openlijk, wat leidde tot een protestdemonstratie van ongeveer 650.000 Servische arbeiders. De vakbondsbeweging was verenigd in deze strijd, waarbij etnische grenzen werden overschreden.

De met het IMF getekende overeenkomst vereiste kortingen op de

zaakte budgettaire crisis had de ineenstorting op gang gebracht van de federale fiscale structuur. Deze situatie deed zich voorkomen als een voldongen feit, voorafgaand aan formele verklaring van afscheiding door Kroatië en Slovenië in juni 1991. Politieke druk op Belgrado door de Europese Gemeenschap, gecombineerd met streven van Duitsland om de Balkan-landen in haar geo-politieke gebied te trekken, hebben ook het afscheidingsproces aangemoedigd. De economische en sociale condities voor de breuk van de federatie, resultaat van 10 jaar 'structurele aanpassingen', waren reeds stevig geworteld.

DONDERDAG 30 JANUARI 1997

Ontmanteling van voormalig Joegoslavië (deel 2)

Herkolonisatie Bosnië

Door Michel Chossudovsky, Universitair Professor, Ottawa (*)

De Macro-economische herstructurering in Joegoslavië heeft bijgedragen aan de verwoesting van een heel land, maar de rol die dit heeft gespeeld is door de wereldmedia reeds vanaf het begin van de oorlog in 1991 ontkend. In plaats daarvan zijn culturele, etnische en religieuze verdeeldheid gepresenteerd als de enige oorzaak van de crisis, terwijl de strategische belangen van de machten van het westen werden verzwegen. **Manifest** plaatst deze studie in drie delen (dit is deel 2). Samen met de analyse van Sean Gervasi (Manifest 13 en 14, 1996 en andere recente uitgaven (#) kan deze analyse worden gebruikt voor een beter inzicht in de Balkan-tragedie.

Bedrijfshervormingen

De bedrijfshervormingen in 1989, aangenomen onder Marković, speelden een centrale rol in het aansturen op een bankroet in de industriële sector. In 1990 was het jaarlijkse niveau van de groei van het BBP gedaald tot 7,5 procent. (Er moet rekening mee worden gehouden dat het begrip BBP gebruikt in Joegoslavië en Oost-Europese landen om het nationaal product te meten niet overeenkomstig het BBP is in het

onderneming over te nemen en/of de activa van de onderneming met schulden te liquideren.

De Buitenlandse Investerings Wet (Foreign Investment Law) uit 1988 had een onbeperkte binnenkomst van buitenlandse kapitaal mogelijk gemaakt, niet alleen in de industrie maar ook in het bankwezen, de verzekeringen en de dienstensector. Voorafgaand aan de aanneming van deze wet waren buitenlandse investeringen beperkt tot joint-ventures met de staatsondernemingen. Vervolgens maakten de

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berekeningen)[6]. In 1991 daalde het BBP nog eens met 15 procent en de industriële produktie daalde met 21 procent [7]. Het herstructureringsprogramma dat door Belgrado's schuldeisers werd geëist was bedoeld om het systeem van sociaal beheerde bedrijven af te schaffen. De ondernemingswet van 1989 vereiste de afschaffing van de 'Basic Organisations of Associated Labour (BOAL)'. Dit waren produktie-eenheden in sociaal eigendom onder zelfbestuur, met de Arbeiders Raad (Workers' Council) als belangrijkste beslissingsorgaan. De ondernemingswet van 1989 vereiste de transformatie van de BOAL's in private kapitalistische ondernemingen, waarbij de Arbeiders Raad werd vervangen door een zogenaamde 'sociale commissie' onder controle van de eigenaren van de onderneming, inclusief de schuldeisers [8]. "Het doel was Joegoslavië te onderwerpen aan een massale privatisering en afbraak van de publieke sector. Wie moest het uitvoeren? De Bureaucratie van de Communistische Partij, in het bijzonder haar militaire- en inlichtingensector, werd speciaal geworven en kreeg politieke en economische steun onder de voorwaarde dat massale terugdringing van de sociale bescherming voor de Joegoslavische arbeiders werd opgelegd..."[9].

Een aantal ondersteunende wetten werd in de haast in elkaar gezet, met hulp van westerse advocaten en adviseurs. De Financiële Handelingen Wet (Financial Operations Act) van 1989 zou een cruciale rol spelen in het bewerkstelligen van de ineenstorting van de industriële sector van Joegoslavië. Het was bedoeld om een 'onpartijdig' en zogenaamd 'transparant' 'aansturingsmechanisme' te verschaffen waarmee zogenaamde 'noodlijdende' ondernemingen naar een bankroet of faillissement geleid konden worden. Een hiermee samenhangende wet, de 'Wet op Gedwongen Afrekening, Faillissement en Liquidatie' (Law on Compulsory Settlement, Bankruptcy and Liquidation), was bedoeld ter bescherming van de 'rechten van de schuldeisers'. Laatstgenoemden konden zorgen voor het starten van faillissementsprocedures die het hen mogelijk maakten om de

ment van Sociaal Kapitaal Wet uit 1990 en de Sociaal Kapitaal Wet van 1990 en de Sociaal Kapitaal Wet van 1990 de beroving van staatsondernemingen mogelijk, inclusief de verkoop aan buitenlands kapitaal. De Sociaal Kapitaal Wet zorgde ook voor het instellen van 'agentschappen voor herstructurering en rekapitalisatie' met een mandaat om de 'waarde te schatten' van bezittingen en activa van ondernemingen voorafgaand aan privatisering. Zoals in Oost-Europa en de voormalige Sowjet-Unie werd deze waardering van de activa gebaseerd op de geregistreerde 'boekwaarde' uitgedrukt in de lokale munteenheid. Deze boekwaarde was over het algemeen ongelooflijk laag en garandeerde daarmee de verkoop van staatsgoederen/bedrijven tegen bodemprijzen. Slovenië en Kroatië hadden in 1990 reeds hun eigen ontwerp privatiseringswetten gemaakt.

Ook werd in 1989 en 1990, in verschillende onderdelen van wetgeving, een nieuwe bankwet vastgesteld, met de bedoeling om de liquidatie van de 'verenigde banken' in staatseigendom in gang te zetten. Meer dan de helft van de banken van het land werd ontmanteld, de nadruk lag op het vormen van 'onafhankelijke op winst georiënteerde instellingen'. In 1990 was het gehele 'driehoeksbank systeem', bestaande uit de Nationale Bank van Joegoslavië, de nationale banken van de acht republieken en autonome provincies en de commerciële banken, ontmanteld onder begeleiding van de Wereldbank. In 1990 werd er onderhandeld over een aanpassingslening van de Wereldbank voor de financiële sector. In 1991 werd dit aangenomen door de regering in Belgrado.[9]

In juni 1990 werd er een federaal agentschap ingesteld voor verzekering en bankrehabilitatie, met een mandaat om de gereorganiseerde banken verder te herstructureren en te 'reprivatiseren'. Dit proces moest plaats vinden in een periode van vijf jaar. De ontwikkeling van financiële intermediairs die geen bank zijn, onder andere makelaars, firma's voor investeringsmanagement en verzekeringsmaatschap-

vervolg van pagina 4

Ontmanteling van voormalig Joegoslavië...

pijen, moest ook bevorderd worden.

Industriële ondernemingen waren zorgvuldig in categorieën ingedeeld. Als onderdeel van de hervormingen gesponsord door de IMF-Wereldbank, werden kredieten aan de industriële sector bevroren met de bedoeling om het proces van faillissementen te versnellen. Zogenaamde 'beëindigingsmechanismen' werden bewerkstelligd onder de bepalingen van de Financiële Handelingen Wet uit 1989. Deze laatste bepaalde dat als een onderneming voor een aaneengesloten periode van 30 dagen of gedurende 30 dagen in een periode van 45 dagen niet in staat was tot betalingen, deze verplicht was om binnen 15 dagen een vergadering te beleggen met de schuldeisers om tot een regeling te komen. Dit mechanisme maakte het voor schuldeisers mogelijk (inclusief nationale en buitenlandse banken) eenvoudig hun leningen om te zetten in een controlerend aandeel in het noodlijdende bedrijf. Binnen deze wet kon de regering niet tussenbeide komen. Wanneer men niet tot een regeling kon komen werden faillissementsprocedures gestart, in dat geval ontvingen de arbeiders geen gewone eindbetalingen.

In 1989, volgens officiële bronnen, gingen 222 bedrijven failliet, 86 werden geliquideerd en 89.4000 arbeiders werden (tijdelijk) ontslagen. Gedurende de eerste negen maanden van 1990 direct volgend op de aanname van het IMF-programma, werden nog eens 889 bedrijven, met een gezamenlijk arbeidsvolume van 525.000 arbeiders, onderworpen aan faillissementsprocedures. Met andere woorden, in minder dan twee jaar had het 'aansturingsmechanisme' (onder de Financiële Handelingen Wet) geleid tot het ontslag van meer dan 600.000 arbeiders, uit een totaal industrieel arbeidsvolume van 2.7 miljoen. De grootste concentraties van failliete bedrijven en ontslagen waren in Servië, Bosnië-Herzegovina, Macedonië en Kosovo.

Vele staatsbedrijven probeerden een faillissement te voorkomen door het niet uitbetalen van lonen. Een half miljoen arbeiders, zo'n 20

procent van het industriële arbeidsvolume vertegenwoordigend, werden niet uitbetaald tijdens de eerste maanden van 1990, in de hoop te kunnen voldoen aan de eisen van de schuldeisers in het kader van de procedures voor de 'regelingen', vastgelegd in de Wet op de Financiële Organisaties. Netto-lonen bevonden zich in een vrije val, sociale programma's waren ingestort en door de faillissementen van industriële ondernemingen was de werkloosheid hand over hand toegenomen, wat bij de bevolking een sfeer creëerde van sociale wanhoop en hopeloosheid. "Toen Meneer Markovic uiteindelijk zijn 'geprogrammeerde privatisering' begon, kozen de republikeinse oligarchieën, die allen hun eigen visioenen hadden van een 'nationale renaissance', in plaats van een keuze te maken tussen een onvervalste Joegoslavische markt en hyperinflatie, voor oorlog die de werkelijke oorzaken van de economische catastrofe moest verhullen" [4].

Het door het IMF gesponsorde maatregelenpakket in januari 1990 droeg ondubbelzinnig bij aan de toename van het verlies van bedrijven door het versnellen van de faillissementen in vele van de grote elektriciteitsbedrijven, petroleumraffinaderijen en bedrijven van apparaten, machinebouw en chemie. Bovendien, met de deregulatie van handelsbeperkingen in januari 1990, droeg een stroom van geïmporteerde artikelen bij aan de verdere destabilisatie van de binnenlandse productie. Deze importartikelen werden gefinancierd met geleend geld, gegeven in het kader van het IMF-pakket (d.w.z. de verschillende 'snelle leningen voor voorschot', verleend door het IMF, de Wereldbank en bilaterale sponsors die de economische hervormingen steunden). Terwijl de enorme import bijdroeg aan de toename van de buitenlandse schuld van Joegoslavië, hadden de abrupte stijgingen in belastingtarieven en investeringsprijzen, opgelegd aan de nationale ondernemingen, de vervanging en uitsluiting van binnenlandse bedrijven van hun eigen nationale markt bespoedigd.


Bovendien, zoals het geval was in Oost-Europa, de strategie van de geldschietters was ofwel het destabiliseren van grote industriële ondernemingen of deze opdelen in kleinere units met het oog op 'efficiencyverhoging' en 'concurrentiebevordering'. Dit proces, aangeduid als 'hervorming door verdeling', bestond uit het opdelen van een geïntegreerd systeem van publiek transport of wegvervoer in een veelheid van kleine private transportbedrijven, aangeduid als 'opvolgers-ondernemingen' [10].

De gangbare situatie in de maanden voorafgaand aan de afscheiding van Kroatië en Slovenië (juni 1991) wijst op de enorme omvang en onmenselijkheid van het proces van industriële ontmanteling, dat onverminderd doorging gedurende de periode van de burgeroorlog en daarna. Vergelijkbare industriële herstructureringsprogramma's werden opgelegd aan de staten die Joegoslavië opvolgden.

De Wereldbank had geschat dat er in september 1990 nog steeds 2.435 verlieslijdende ondernemingen waren, uit een restant van in totaal 7.531 bedrijven. Met andere woorden, deze 2.435 bedrijven, met een totaal arbeidsvolume van 1.3 miljoen arbeiders, werden gecategoriseerd als 'noodlijdend' binnen de uitgangspunten van de Financiële Handelingen Wet, wat de onmiddellijke toepassing van faillissementsprocedures vereiste. Als men in gedachten houdt dat reeds 600.000 arbeiders waren ontslagen bij failliete bedrijven vóór september 1990, duiden deze cijfers erop dat zo'n 1.9 miljoen arbeiders (van een totaal van 2.7 miljoen) waren geclassificeerd als 'overtollig'. De 'noodlijdende' bedrijven concentreerden zich in de energie, zware industrie, metaalverwerking, bosbouw en textielsector en behoorden tot de grootste industriële ondernemingen van het land, 49,7 procent van het totale (blijvende en ontslagen) industriële arbeidsvolume vertegenwoordigend (in september 1990). (1)

Waar de Financiële Organisaties Wet voorzag in automatisch ontslag van arbeiders van failliete ondernemingen zonder compensatie, werden ontslagen in 'winstgevende' ondernemingen, inclusief die bedrijven die werden overgenomen door het privatiseringsprogramma, uitgevoerd onder de bepalingen van de Arbeids Wet uit 1989. Deze laatste, liet het bedrijf toe hun 'overtollige arbeidskracht te dumpen', maar kende een clause waarin overtollige arbeiders desondanks uitkeringen toegerekend kregen. De Wereldbank was van mening dat het legale raamwerk voor het 'wegwerpen van overtollige arbeid' binnen de Arbeids Wet onnodig onsmachtig en duur was, de kosten voor uitkeringen die de onderneming zich op de hals haalde, werden beschouwd als 'afschrikwekkend hoog': "onder de huidige wet kunnen de kosten van bezuinigingen alleen vermeden worden als een onderneming failliet wordt verklaard" [6].

Om de tekortkomingen van de Arbeids Wet te verhelpen, stelde de Wereldbank voor om een nieuw systeem op te zetten om 'ontslagen



arbeiders te beschermen', waarbij organisaties op het niveau van gemeente, republiek en federatie aan elkaar worden gekoppeld door de formatie van een 'sociaal vangnet' maar ook door het verwijderen van 'starheden' op de arbeidsmarkt. Om werk te creëren voor ontslagen arbeiders stelde de Wereldbank voor om kleine tot middelgrote private bedrijven te stimuleren. Deze doelen, evenwel, moesten bereikt worden onder de voorwaarden van fiscale soberheid en 'strakke kredieten' voor de industrie.

Politieke ontbinding

Soberheidsmaatregelen hadden de basis gelegd voor de 'herkolonisatie' van de Balkan-landen, daarbij grote strategische belangen ondersteunend. Tijdens de meer-partijen verkiezingen in 1990 stond bij het politieke debat de economische politiek centraal en de afscheidingscoalities verdrongen de communisten in Kroatië, Bosnië-Herzegovina en Slovenië. Na de beslissende overwinning in Kroatië van de rechtse Democratische Unie in mei 1990, onder leiding van Franjo Tudjman, kreeg de afscheiding van Kroatië de formele instemming van de Duitse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hans Dietrich Genscher, die bijna dagelijks contact onderhield met zijn Kroatische collega in Zagreb. Duitsland steunde niet alleen de afscheiding, maar het 'forceerde ook het tempo van de internationale diplomatie' en oefende druk uit op haar westerse bondgenoten om slovenië en Kro-

atië te erkennen. De grenzen van Joegoslavië herinneren aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog, toen Kroatië (inclusief de territoria van Bosnië-Herzegovina) een satelliet van cruciaal belang was onder het fascistische Ustasa regime.

Washington op zijn beurt was voor een "losse eenheid en moedigde tegelijkertijd democratische ontwikkeling aan...[de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de VS] Baker vertelde [de president van Kroatië] Franjo Tudjman en [de president van Slovenië] Milan Kucan dat de Verenigde Staten eenzijdige afscheiding niet zouden aanmoedigen of steunen...maar als zij afscheid van elkaar zouden moeten nemen, dan gaf hij hen de dringende aanbeveling dit op basis van een onderhandelingsovereenkomst te doen"....[1].

De vooruitzichten voor de wederopbouw van de nieuwe onafhankelijke republieken bleken somber: herstelbetalingen van de schulden is een integraal onderdeel van het vredesproces. Het voormalige Joegoslavië is opgedeeld onder de onmiddellijke kritische controle van haar buitenlandse schuldeisers, haar buitenlandse schuld werd zorgvuldig verdeeld en toegewezen aan de republieken, die nu allemaal gewurd worden door afzonderlijke herstelbetalingen en structurele aanpassingsprogramma's. De leiders van de republieken hebben allemaal volledig meegewerkt met de schuldeisers: "Alle huidige leiders van de voormalige Joegoslavische republieken waren functio-

narissen van de Communistische Partij, en elk van hen wedijverde om te voldoen aan de eisen van de Wereldbank en het Internationale Monetair Fonds, om als beste in aanmerking te komen voor investeringsleningen en substantiële inkomsten voor de leiding... Staatsindustrie en staatsapparaat werden geplunderd door functionarissen. Produktiemiddelen werden omgezet in 'private ondernemingen', geleid door familieleden van de partijbonzen" [11]. De privatiseringsprogramma's, ingevoerd onder toezicht van de geldschietters, hebben bijgedragen aan een volgende fase van economische ontwrichting en verarming van de bevolking. Het BBP was gedaald met niet minder dan 50 procent in vier jaar tijd (1990-93), Kroatië, Slovenië en Macedonië voerden inmiddels aparte onderhandelingen over leningen met de Bretton Woods Organisaties. Volgens het IMF had de 'shock behandeling' van januari 1990, onder Ante Markovic, aangenomen voorafgaand aan de afscheiding, niet volledig zijn doelen bereikt. Een volgende ronde van 'stabilisatie-door-hervormingen' was noodzakelijk.

Op grond van de in 1993 met het IMF ondertekende overeenkomst was het de regering in Zagreb niet toegestaan om haar eigen productieve (geld)middelen in omloop te brengen door middel van fiscale en monetaire politiek. Deze politiek werd zwaar gecontroleerd door de buitenlandse schuldeisers. De enorme bezuinigingen op de budgetten die de overeenkomst vereist, stonden de mogelijkheid van na-oorlogs herstel in de weg. Dit laatste kon alleen uitgevoerd worden door het afsluiten van nieuwe buitenlandse leningen, een proces dat de buitenlandse schuld van Kroatië zou doen toenemen tot ver in de 21-e eeuw. De kosten voor wederopbouw van de door oorlog verscheurde economie van Kroatië werd geschat op ongeveer 23 miljard dollar.

Door de schok van het IMF-programma uit 1993 steeg het officiële werkloosheidscijfer van Kroatië van 15,5 procent in 1991 tot 19,1 procent in 1994. Door de inflatie waren de lonen gedaald tot bodemloze diepten. Een nieuwe nationale munteenheid, de kuna, werd gelanceerd in oktober 1994. Volgens recente officiële cijfers is 95 procent van de staatsbedrijven overgegaan in joint-ventures met aandelen - 50 procent van de aandelen is in particuliere handen, 29 procent in handen van het Kroatische Privatiserings Fonds en wat overblijft heeft de staat. Een veel strengere Faillissementswet werd ingevoerd, tezamen met procedures voor ontbinding door 'verde-

ling' van grote nutsbedrijven van de staat. Ook opgenomen in de 'intentieverklaring' aan de Bretton Woods organisaties is dat de regering van Zagreb de gehele banksector moet herstructureren en volledig privatiseren, met hulp van de IBRD (Internationale Bank voor Reconstructie en Ontwikkeling) en de Wereldbank.

Bronnen

- [1] Zie het verslag van Warren Zimmermann (voormalig VS Ambassadeur in Joegoslavië), 'The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia', Foreign Affairs, Vol 74, Nr. 2, 1995.
- [4] Dimitrije Boarov, 'A Brief Review of Anti-inflation Programmes, the Curse of Dead Programs', Vreme News Digest Agency, Nr. 29, 13 april 1992.
- [6] Wereldbank, Yugoslavia, Industrial Restructuring, pag.VIII
- [7] Judit Kiss, 'Debt Management in Eastern Europe', Eastern European Economics, Mei-Juni 1994, pag. 59.
- [8] Zie Barbara Lee en John Nellis, Enterprise Reform and Privatisation in Socialist Economies, De Wereldbank, Washington DC, 1990, pag. 20-21.
- [9] Ralph Schoenman, 'Divide and Rule Schemes in the Balkans', The Organiser, 11 september, 1995.
- [10] Zie Ezra Benathion en Louis S. Thompson, 'Privatisation Problems at Industry Level, Road Haulage in Central Europe', World Bank Discussion Paper No. 182, De Wereldbank, Washington DC, hoofdstuk 3.

Noten


(1) 'Overtollige arbeid' in de industrie werd door de missie van de Wereldbank gemeten in de orde van grootte van 20% van de totale arbeidskracht van 8.9 miljoen - dat is ongeveer 1.8 miljoen. Dit cijfer blijkt echter het werkelijke aantal overtollige arbeiders grof te onderschatten gebaseerd op de categorisering van 'noodlijdende' ondernemingen. Alleen al in de industriële sector waren 1.9 miljoen arbeiders (september 1990) van de 2.7 miljoen werkloos in bedrijven geclassificeerd als noodlijdend. Zie Wereldbank, Joegoslavië Industrial Restructuring, Annex 1.

(*) Vertaling uit 'Economic and Political Weekly' 2 maart 1996. Door J. Bernaven.

(#) en ook bijvoorbeeld diverse nummers van Vredesinfo van Cie. Stop Starwars, 'de tragedie van Bosnië: De rol van de VS en de Nato' van Sara Flounders en Sean Gervasi, uitg. Global Reflexion en In Vredesnaam Overleven, Stg. Volk voor Vrede.



In mei 1993 kampte Servië met een gebrek aan benzine en dieselolie als gevolg van de VN-sancties en het gebrek aan deviezen. Deze wachtende inwoners van Belgrado raakten tegelijkertijd in hoog tempo hun spaargelden kwijt. (Foto AP)



In oktober 1993 was er in ex-Joegoslavië een groot gebrek aan zuivelproducten. Deze inwoner van Belgrado houdt geiten in een stadspark. (Foto AP)

Hyperinflatie beroofde Serviërs van hun spaargeld

Op 1 november 1993 kostte in Joegoslavië (Servië en Montenegro) een liter melk 25.000 dinar. Twee maanden later kostte een liter melk 9,5 miljard dinar. De prijs van een brood steeg in die periode van 12.500 dinar tot vier miljard dinar. Op het hoogtepunt van de Duitse hyperinflatie van 1923, het klassieke voorbeeld van een uit de hand gelopen monetair beleid, beliep de geldontwaarding 32.400 procent per maand. De Joegoslaven overtroffen dat: in januari 1994 beliep de inflatie 62 procent per dag, 313.563.558 procent per maand. De geldontwaarding over heel 1993 bedroeg 352,4 biljoen procent. Om precies te zijn: 352.459.275.105,195 procent.

Joegoslavië had al eens hyperinflatie gekend. In de jaren tachtig begonnen de deelrepublieken steeds schaamtelozer misbruik te maken van de bevoegdheden die ze in de decentralisatiegrondwet van 1974 hadden gekregen. Ze stoorden zich niet meer aan het centrale gezag in Belgrado en hun eigen beleid vooral.

In 1993 beliep de hyperinflatie in Joegoslavië (Servië en Montenegro) het astronomische percentage van 352 biljoen. Die hyperinflatie was bewust aangewakkerd door een kleine politiek-financiële elite, die de Servische bevolking in die periode van haar spaargeld — miljarden Duitse marken — beroofde. Die miljarden verdwenen naar buitenlandse rekeningen van de leiders.

cards stalen, waarmee bankrekeningen van particulieren werden geplunderd. Een in Madrid of Oslo gerolde portefeuille werd nog dezelfde dag naar Wenen overgebracht. Daar werden die bankrekeningen leeggehaald, waarna het geld naar Belgrado werd gesmokkeld. Andere netwerken richtten zich op de smokkel van brandstof. Bij Szeged in Hongarije zijn ondergrondse pijpleidingen ontdekt, waarmee benzine naar Joegoslavië werd gepompt — en alcohol vanuit Joegoslavië naar Hongarije. Het meer van Shkodër, aan de Albanees-Montenegrijnse grens, is inmiddels volledig vervuild door de olie die er deze vier jaar in is beland door ongelukken met smokkelbootjes.

Maar hoe efficiënt die netwerken ook zijn geweest, ze geven geen antwoord op de vraag achter de hyperinflatie van 1992 en 1993.

Door onze redacteur PETER MICHIENSEN

straatwisselaars. Op dat moment was de zwarte koers — bijvoorbeeld — 10 dinar per mark. Voor die 75 miljoen dinar kochten de wisselaars 's ochtends op straat 7,5 miljoen mark op. Door de massale uitgifte van nieuw geld steeg de koers tot 15 dinar per mark. Daarop verkochten de wisselaars 's middags 5 miljoen mark. Ze kregen daar de 75 miljoen dinar voor die 's ochtends uit de kluisen van de NBJ en de postkantoren waren gehaald. Dat in de kluisen gelegd, zodat dat had verlaten. De winst: 7,5 minus 5 miljoen mark: 2,5 miljoen mark. Die truc werd toegene-

Een ander voorbeeld van de beroving van de bevolking was het grote graanbedrog van 1993. De regering was in de lente van 1993 met de boeren overeengekomen voor een kilo graan de toenmalige tegenwaarde van 0,24 mark te betalen. Om de aankoop van graan te betalen werd voor 390 miljoen mark nieuwe dinars gedrukt. In plaats van dat geld de boeren te geven, werd het uitbetaald aan tussenpersonen — banken, ministeries — die er prompt mee gingen speculeren op de valutamarkt. De koers van de mark schoot door die enorme toevloed van nieuw geld omhoog. Na de operatie was de dinar aanzienlijk

ling van de sancties werd het naar Roemenië gesmokkeld en naar Cyprus overgevlogen, naar het filiaal van de bank Beobanka, dat werd geleid door Borka Vučić, vriendin, vertrouweling en oud-collega van de Servische president Slobodan Milošević, ex-directeur van Beobanka.

Diverse pseudo-particuliere banken hebben in de grote beroving van het Servische volk een belangrijke rol gespeeld. Jugoskandic, de bank van de schimmige zakenman Jezdimir Vasiljević, was er een. Dinkić vergelijkt hem met „de bokser die elke tegenstander aankan als het maar donker genoeg is”. Zijn Jugoskandic trok miljoenen spaarders aan met valutarekeningen waarop hij per maand uiteindelijk veertien procent rente beloofde — uit te betalen in marken. Dat fenomenale

werd welgeteld drie miljoen mark aangetroffen. Bejaarden die hun huis hadden verkocht kregen uiteindelijk de tegenwaarde van één brood voor hun inleg terug. De rest was verdwenen in de zakken van wat de socioloog Stjepan Gredelj de nieuwe „lumpenoligarchie” heeft genoemd. Aldus verpauperde de bevolking. De dinar was waardeloos, en valuta had eind 1993 vrijwel niemand meer. In december 1993 kon van het gemiddelde maandpensioen welgeteld één kilo wortelen worden gekocht.

De hyperinflatie werd uiteindelijk op simpele wijze gestopt: op 24 januari 1994 introduceerde de nieuwe voorzitter van de Nationale Bank, Dragoslav Avramović, oud-medewerker van de Wereldbank, een nieuwe dinar, die convertibel werd en op basis van één op één werd gekoppeld aan de mark. De geldpers werd stilgezet. Het psychologisch effect was verbazingwekkend: op slag herstelden de Serviërs hun vertrouwen in de eigen munt, de prijzen begonnen te dalen, fabrieken gingen weer draaien en er werd weer ge-

De Servische economie Miljard Dinkić heeft na een studie van twee jaar veel vragen kunnen beantwoorden. Zijn boek *Ekonomija destrukcije / Velika pljačka naroda* (De economie van de vernietiging / De grote beroving van het volk) is inmiddels in Servië aan zijn derde druk toe.

Dinkić komt tot de conclusie dat het eerste en waarschijnlijk enige doel van de Servische leiders, tevens het belangrijkste motief achter de bewust aangewakkerde hyperinflatie, erop was gericht zich meester te maken van de valuta-reserves van de Servische bevolking. Dat geld, twintig miljard mark in contanten in de oude sok, moest de bevolking uit de zak worden geklopt. Het lukte met de hyperinflatie — en hoe.

De inflatie werd aangewakkerd door de geldpers zo hard mogelijk te laten draaien. De regering nam de Nationale Bank haar controle op de gelduitgifte af en zette de geldpers, Topcider in Belgrado, in de hoogste versnelling. In 1993 werden per etmaal 1,9 miljoen biljetten van de hoogste denominatie gedrukt. Daarnaast werden door instanties buiten de Nationale Bank om enorme hoeveelheden grijs geld geproduceerd. Enkele geprivilegieerde banken — staatsbanken en pseudo-particuliere banken — deden dat door ongedekte leningen te geven, doorgaans aan bedrijven. De hoeveelheid grijs geld liep ondanks die op topsnelheid werkende geldpersen op tot zes keer de hoeveelheid contant geld in omloop.

De bedrijven gebruikten dat geld niet voor de productie, want daarvan was nauwelijks nog sprake. Dat nieuwe geld was alleen bedoeld om snelle winsten te maken op de valutamarkt: de bevolking kreeg te maken met een dinar die dagelijks minder waard werd, was al snel niet meer in staat van het in dinars uitbetaalde loon te leven en moest haar valuta-reserves aanspreken.

De zwarte markt in valuta — geldwisselaars op straat en wisselkantoren — maakte de indruk spontaan te zijn. In feite werd die zwarte markt geschapen en strikt gecontroleerd door de staat en die paar geprivilegieerde banken die de geldstroom controleerden. Er bestond een heel netwerk van nauwkeurig gecontroleerde zwartgeldwisselaars die elke ochtend stapels nieuwgedrukt geld in ontvangst namen. En elke transitie leverde dankzij de razendsnelle geldontwaarding reuzenwinsten op.

Een voorbeeld. De nationale bank NBJ gaf voortdurend nieuwe bankbiljetten uit. Nieuwe biljetten, met een gezamenlijke waarde van — bijvoorbeeld — 150 miljoen dinar, werden in kluisen van de NBJ en de postkantoren opgeslagen. Eén dag voordat ze officieel in omloop kwamen werd voor 75 miljoen dinar aan biljetten uitgedeeld aan geprivilegieerde

handen kreeg kocht het bij een wisselkantoor marken tegen de koers van 125 dinar per mark. Het kocht aldus 5600 mark. Het wisselkantoor had nu de 700.000 dinar om de burgers te betalen van wie het een dag eerder 7000 mark had gekocht voor de toen geldende koers van 100 dinar per mark. Het wisselkantoor hield aan de transactie dus 1400 mark winst over (7000 minus 5600 mark).

Na 30 dagen moest bedrijf de bank een miljoen dinar — in feite 700.000 dinar — terugbetalen. Omdat de koers van de mark inmiddels was gestegen tot 500 dinar per mark, had het daarvoor maar 1400 mark nodig. Het bedrijf hield aan deze transactie dus 4200 mark winst over. Het bedrijf en het wisselkantoor wonnen — de gewone man verloor: hij was zijn zuurverdiende marken kwijt.

Het lijkt of in deze voorbeelden de werkelijkheid wordt aangedikt en dat de vermelde koersdaling van de dinar ten opzichte van de mark wordt overdreven. Maar midden 1993 steeg de koers van de mark ten opzichte van de dinar met 9,2 procent per dag en het zou nog erger worden.

Alle banken en wisselkantoren in Joegoslavië hebben in de jaren 1992 en 1993 niets anders gedaan dan dit soort transacties — op miljardenschaal. En al die transacties werden gecontroleerd door een kleine politiek-financiële elite, die daar steenrijk van is geworden. In twee jaar is de bevolking met dat grijze geld zo goed als al haar spaargeld ontfoetseld, aan contant geld alleen al tenminste zes miljard mark. Toen aan deze praktijken een eind werd gemaakt omdat niemand nog dinars accepteerde en alleen de mark nog als betaalmiddel fungeerde, in december 1993, beliep de inflatie 20.000 procent per maand — een maand later was die 313 miljoen procent.

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in 1993 in omloop werden gebracht. De winst voor de architecten van de manoeuvre: tussen 2,5 en 16,7 miljoen mark per nieuw biljet in 1993.

Ook met grijs geld werden gigantische winsten behaald. Een voorbeeld: een bank gaf een bedrijf een krediet van één miljoen dinar over een periode van dertig dagen. Als borg betaalde het bedrijf de bank 300.000 dinar. Voor de 700.000 dinar die het bedrijf in

Spaargeld van 28 miljard mark werd bevolking van Servië en Montenegro met hyperinflatie uit de zak geklopt

mer van 1993 uiteindelijk de tegenwaarde van 0,02 mark per kilo graan. De staat kreeg zó veel graan voor zó weinig geld dat hij — nobel als hij is — gratis graan kon uitdelen om de toenemende ontevredenheid te dempen. De rekening werd, als altijd, door de gewone man betaald: niet alleen raakte hij zijn gespaarde marken kwijt, de door bedrog wijs geworden boeren besloten voortaan hun oogst voor valuta te verkopen. De

stedeling kreeg dus wel gratis graan, maar moest marken neertellen voor het vlees, de aardappelen en de uien.

Wat gebeurde er met de miljarden die aldus uit de zakken van de gestaag verpauperende bevolking werden geklopt? Werd de import ermee gefinancierd? Nee — daarvoor had Belgrado valuta genoeg gestolen uit de boedel van het oude Joegoslavië. Werden er wapens mee gekocht? Nee, alle zes de ex-Joegoslavische republieken gaven tussen 1992 en 1994 samen maar anderhalf miljard dollar uit aan wapens. Werden er begrotingstekorten mee aangevuld? Ook niet: die werden gedekt door de geldpers van Topcider.

Het overgrote deel van de woekerwinsten verdween, zo concludeert Dinkić, in de zakken van die kleine politiek-financiële elite: ministers en directeurs van geprivilegieerde banken, wisselkantoren en staatsbedrijven, een kleine kongs van manipulerende leiders die de geldschepping controleerden. De meeste politieke leiders in Servië leidden — nog steeds — florerende bedrijven. De Servische premier leidt het bedrijf Progres, de grootste gasimporteur en een van de grootste exportbedrijven van het land. De voorzitter van het parlement is tevens chef van Jugopetrol, 's lands grootste oliedistributeur. De minister voor monetaire hervormingen leidt de grootste holding voor meubel- en textielfabricage. De vice-premier is baas van 's langs grootste supermarktketen, de minister van landbouw heeft een voedselverwerkingsbedrijf en de die van economie is manager van een groot metaalbedrijf.

De miljoenenwinsten van deze elite werden per diplomatieke post in zakken met 20 tot 30 miljoen mark naar het buitenland gevlogen, op weg naar privérekeningen in het buitenland. Na de instel-

ten van nieuwe inleggers, het witwassen van legale en illegale winsten van Westerse bedrijven en het monopolie op de distributie van sigaretten en olieproducten, dat Vasiljević van de regering kreeg. Met die distributies werden schatten verdiend: Jugoskandić betrof benzine in het buitenland voor 0,35 mark per liter en verkocht die voor 0,80 mark per liter. Invoerrechten werden in dinars betaald — met zoveel vertraging, dat uiteindelijk door de geldontwaarding vrijwel niets werd betaald.

Maar op den duur kon de maandelijks uitbetaling van veertien procent rente op markenrekeningen natuurlijk niet goed blijven gaan: daarvoor groeide Jugoskandić te snel. In de nacht van 7 op 8 maart 1993 ontvluchtte Vasiljević Joegoslavië, miljoenen spaarders bedrogen achterlatend. In het buitenland legde hij uit dat de staatsambtenaren die hij had moeten omkopen, te gierig waren geworden. Bij opening van de kluisen bleek honderd miljoen mark spoorloos verdwenen: dat was het geld dat Vasiljević de politiek-financiële elite had betaald om het land ongedeerd te kunnen verlaten. Zelf had hij 'slechts' een half miljoen mark meegenomen.

Nog bonter maakte het Dafina Milanović, een wegens fraude en vervalsing herhaaldelijk veroordeelde bankemployée die de bak Dafiment oprichtte. Zij beloofde de Serviërs op hun markenrekening dertien en uiteindelijk zelfs achttien procent rente per maand, te betalen in marken. Miljoenen trapt erin: voor de loketten vormden zich kilometerslange rijen en mensen verkochten, in de hoop snel rijk te worden, hun woningen, auto's en laatste bezittingen om de hyperinflatie te ontkomen, hun steeds waardelozer dinars in marken om te wisselen en die marken naar Dafina, „de moeder van Servië“, te brengen. Uiteindelijk telde Dafiment veertien miljoen inleggers — meer dan de totale bevolking van Joegoslavië — die samen meer dan een miljard mark hadden ingelegd.

Het ingelegde geld werd zogenaamd belegd in projecten die nooit werden gerealiseerd: kantoorgebouwen die nooit werden gebouwd, metrolijnen die nooit werden aangelegd. Later bleek dat zeshonderd miljoen mark aldus of via alleen in naam bestaande bedrijven was verdwenen naar bankrekeningen van de politiek-financiële elite in het buitenland. Dafina zelf pikte 58 miljoen mark in, haar broer twaalf miljoen.

Het liep natuurlijk uiteindelijk mis. Toen Vasiljević vluchtte kwam ook het eind van Dafiment. Het vertrouwen in „de moeder van Servië“ was op slag verdwenen en opnieuw vormden zich kilometerslange rijen voor de loketten van Dafiment, nu van mensen die hun geld opeisten. In de chaos werden mensen doodgedrukt en onder de voet gelopen.

Helaas: geld was er niet. Van de één miljard ingelegde marken

Het gaat sindsdien beter, vooral dankzij Avramović, architect en bewaker van de Nieuwe Dinar. Maar echt goed gaat het niet, en hoe kan het ook als de communistische politiek-financiële elite die de hyperinflatie bewust op touw heeft gezet om het eigen volk te beroven, nog steeds dezelfde is? De monetaire discipline duurde niet lang en er werden al in 1994 weer onbeperkt kredieten gegeven aan de verkeerde bedrijven — geprivilegieerde, maar inefficiënte en verlieslijdende staatsbedrijven. Al in juli 1994 stonden tachtig van de honderd banken in het rood. In oktober 1994 werd ook weer op grote schaal illegaal grijs geld uitgegeven, waarna de koers van de nieuwe dinar instortte. In november vorig jaar had de superdinar al 61 procent van zijn waarde verloren. In 1995 beliep de inflatie 119 procent en waren de reële inkomens na een korte opleving weer gaan dalen. En de inflatie groeit: in januari van dit jaar beliep ze 9,5 procent, vorige maand vijftien procent. Joegoslavië lijkt opnieuw op weg naar hyperinflatie. Net als in 1992 daalt ook de produktie weer: in januari werd 4,1 procent minder geproduceerd dan het maandgemiddelde van de sancties.

De kleine elite is blijven zitten waar ze zat: aan de geldkraan. Niemand heeft tot nu toe de arrestatie van de daders van de meest massale diefstal in decennia gevraagd. Al te makkelijk hebben die daders, de Servische leiders, de schuld van alle misère op het buitenland kunnen afweten: dat heeft Servië met de internationale sancties te gronde gericht. En de Serviërs geloven het. De ergste consequentie van de hyperinflatie is echter niet die verpaupering, maar de psychologische schade die is aangericht. De principes van de vrije markt en het vertrouwen in de centrale instanties van de staat en het bankwezen zijn hopeloos gecompromiteerd. De geldende economische logica is vernietigd, mensen zijn op massale schaal uitgeschud, en abnormale fenomenen als zwarte markt, financiële speculatie, illegale transacties, diefstal, opkorting, corruptie, afzetterij, wetteloosheid, omkoping en straathandel werden in de ogen van iedereen, rijk of arm, 'normaal' en alledaags: de hele samenleving is weggegleeden in de misdaad. Alle morele normen zijn ingestort en gecompromiteerd, omdat de Serviërs is geleerd dat eerlijkheid tot niets leidt, en oneerlijkheid althans nog een kans biedt op overleven. Dinkić: „Er is een sociaal en psychologisch gedegeneerde samenleving geschapen.“ De heersende elite heeft van Servië een land van criminelen gemaakt: alleen als crimineel kon men het lot ontkomen van die bejaarde in Kraljevo, die zijn laatste geld uitgaf aan een stuk salami, naar huis ging, zijn salami opat en zich opging, met achterlating van een briefje: „Ik zal niet van honger sterven.“

Kadare vertelt over eeuwenoude haat op de Balkan

Ismail Kadare: Een breuk in april. Vertaling Jacqueline Sheji. Van Gennep, Amsterdam; 191 blz. - f 34,90.

Ismail Kadare: Dossier H. Vertaling Roel Schuyt. Van Gennep, Amsterdam; 191 blz. - f 34,90.

Ismail Kadare: De versteende bruidsstoet. Vertaling Roel Schuyt. Van Gennep, Amsterdam; 157 blz. - f 29,90.

"Wat! Niet geëngageerd?" was de enigszins polemische kop van een lezing die Margriet de Moor een aantal jaren geleden in *Trouw* publiceerde (Letter & Geest 4-2-95). Zij stelde dat het kortzichtig was van kunstenaars engagement te eisen: „Zal en moet er een intellectueel debat zijn? Een overbodige vraag. Intellectuelen en schrijvers, verzot als ze zijn op het woord doen hun zegje wel."

Maar aangezien het domein van de kunst de verbeelding is, zo meende De Moor, zal dat 'zegje' danig verschillen van een politiek betoog of een journalistiek verslag: „Zo gauw een gebeurtenis verleden tijd is, en u weet, dat is het heel gauw, valt hij toe aan de verbeelding. De snelste vorm van publieke verbeelding is de journalistiek. Het is vaak goed te zien hoe feiten hun literaire leven met het veldwerk van de journalistiek beginnen en dan langzaam, meestromend met de tijd, in de literatuur terechtkomen, in hun ware leven zogezegd."

Het was de opmerking over 'het ware leven' van de literatuur die mij te binnen schoot bij lezing van werk van de Albanese schrijver Ismail Kadare. Zijn romans zijn in talrijke talen vertaald en worden geregeld herdrukt; in Nederland gebeurde dit onlangs met 'Een breuk in april'. In deze roman beschrijft Kadare de Kanon, het gewoonterecht, zoals het werd opgetekend door de vijftiende eeuwse edelman Lek Dukagjin. Belangrijkste element van de Kanon is de bloedwraak: een systeem van regels dat bepaalt wat een man te doen staat wiens eer is aangetast.

Het is niet toevallig dat 'Een breuk in april' draait om een traditioneel gegeven uit de Albanese cultuur; telkens opnieuw toont Kadare dat de Balkan gekluisterd zit aan zijn geschiedenis, en aan zijn verhalen over de geschiede-

nis. Waarschijnlijk nergens ter wereld speelt 'het ware leven' van historische gebeurtenissen zo'n grote rol in de alledaagse werkelijkheid als op de Balkan. En dan denk ik niet eens zo zeer aan romans, maar eerder aan de traditionele orale literatuur, de heldendichten, die generatie op generatie worden doorverteld.

Deze heldendichten vormen de kern van 'Dossier H', een roman uit 1980 die onlangs in het Nederlands is verschenen. 'Dossier H' speelt zich af in de jaren dertig. Twee Ieren uit New York arriveren in het dorpje N. voor een onderzoek naar het oude Albanese heldendicht. Door middel van dit onderzoek hopen ze het mysterie van Homerus' dichtkunst op te heffen: „Dat alles was onlosmakelijk verbonden met de vraag wie of wat Homerus eigenlijk was geweest. Een geniale dichter, een geniale redacteur, een klerk, een rebel of een ideoloog?"

Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden, en inzicht te krijgen in mondelinge overlevering, reizen de onderzoekers Max Roth en Willy Norton af naar het enige land dat nog in staat is homerische gezangen voort te brengen: het Balkan-schiereiland. „Deze regio (...) was in feite nog de enige plek op aarde waar nog poëtisch materiaal geschapen werd zoals we dat bij Homerus vinden, met andere woorden, het was de laatste werkplek."

Eenmaal op deze werkplek aan de slag gegaan, begeven de onderzoekers zich al snel op gevaarlijk terrein: Albanen en Serviërs twisten al eeuwenlang over de ouderdom en de origine van de heldendichten. Zoals een personage opmerkt: „Beide partijen kunnen het niet los zien van een aantal andere, fundamentele vraagstukken van nationaal belang, zoals de oorsprong van de volkeren op de Balkan, het historisch recht op Kosovo en de politieke allianties die op dit moment bestaan."

'Dossier H', het onderzoek naar Homerus, is een fantastische vertelling over de eeuwenoude haat op de Balkan. Het verhaal verbijstert meer, of op een andere manier, dan talloze krantenberichten die de afgelopen jaren dezelfde haat onder woorden brachten. Dit is wat De Moor bedoelde met 'het ware leven' van gebeurtenissen en gevoelens. Kunst, zo zegt zij in hetzelfde



De politie treedt hard op tijdens rellen na beperking van het zelfbestuur van Kosovo in 1989.

FOTO REUTERS

essay, kijkt niet vooruit, ontraadselt geen geheimen, 'zoekt niet naar waarheid maar naar waarachtigheid'. 'Dossier H' is zo'n waarachtig boek, dat zonder het letterlijk te zeggen, zinspeelt op de alledaagse werkelijkheid in Albanië.

Het is juist deze verhalende omweg die ik mis in 'De versteende bruidsstoet', Kadare's andere recent vertaalde roman uit begin jaren tachtig. De titel verwijst opnieuw naar het verleden, naar een Albanese ridderepos dat, hoe somber en bloedig ook, wit zag van de bruidssluiers, verlovingsen en huwelijken tussen Albanen en hun Slavische burenen. „Maar ze verkeerden in een voortdurende angst, namelijk dat de bruiloftsgasten het huis van de bruid nooit zouden bereiken. De Orë, de Albanese of Slavische tegenhangers van de Oud-Griekse Erinyen of wraakgodinnen, lieten de bruidsstoet onderweg verstenen."

'De versteende bruidsstoet' speelt in april 1981, in de tijd dat het Joegoslavische leger in het autonome Kosovo een opstand van Albanese studenten neerslaat. Het verhaal van de versteende

bruidsstoet krijgt in deze roman een moderne pendant, namelijk in een veelbelovende liefde tussen een Albanese student en zijn Servische studiegenote. Een liefde die gedoemd is te mislukken als in Kosovo, na een korte periode van ontspanning, de onderdrukking van het Albanese volksdeel in alle hevigheid hervat wordt.

Op de dag van de opstand heeft de chirurg Teuta Shkreli in het ziekenhuis tientallen gewonden behandeld. Essentie van de roman is het onderzoek dat de autoriteiten vervolgens instellen. Dag in dag uit wordt het ziekenhuispersoneel gevraagd wie aan de vooravond van de rellen extra bedden heeft laten plaatsen, waar het patiëntenregister gebleven is, en waarom er zo doeltreffend hulp geboden is aan de 'vijanden van Joegoslavië'.

Hoewel de gedachte dat het misdadig is hulp te bieden aan gewonden, een vondst genoemd kan worden - onmiddellijk is duidelijker dat de gebeurtenissen zich afspelen in een land dat bestuurd wordt door barbaren - ontroert het boek niet. Dat ligt niet aan het feitenmateriaal, dat is schokkend

genoeg, het ligt aan de taal waarin het verbeeld wordt. Deze taal is te braaf. Zo zegt een medewerker van de veiligheidsdienst: „Kijk, daar is het huis van dat verrekte wijf, die dokter (...). Hm, daar brandde gisteren en eergisteren ook al licht tot diep in de nacht. Ik heb ze een hele tijd in de gaten gehouden. Ik zou er heel wat voor over hebben om te weten wat ze daar uitspoken met dat licht aan. Ik heb zelfs op het punt gestaan naar binnen te gaan, maar op een of andere manier kon ik het toch niet." Met het taalgebruik van Mladic en Arkan in het achterhoofd klinkt deze beambte wat aan de slappe kant.

'De versteende bruidsstoet' geeft de indruk te snel na de studentenopstand van 1981 geschreven te zijn, alsof de feiten nog niet lang genoeg met de tijd meegestroomd zijn om een eigen leven te gaan leiden. Alsof Kadare een 'geëngageerd zegje' gedaan heeft dat verdacht dicht tegen de journalistiek aanschurkt, en dus veel meer over waarheid gaat dan over waarachtigheid.

PETER HENK STEENHUIS

Zonder Madeleine Albright zou Milošević nu mogelijk niet gevangen zitten. Albright was de drijvende kracht achter het NAVO-ingrijpen in Bosnië en Kosovo, zo blijkt uit studies van de Nederlandse insider Ivo Daalder.

Ivo H. Daalder: *Getting to Dayton. The Making of America's Bosnia Policy*. Brookings Institution Press, 204 blz. f 40,90


Ivo H. Daalder en Michael E. O'Hanlon: *Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Brookings Institution Press, 343 blz. f 64,15

Petra Pinzler en Günther Wessel: *George W. Bush. Wende in Amerika*. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 223 blz. f 19,25

Ronald Havenaar

Zou Milošević in zijn cel of in zijn ziekenhuisbed wel eens aan Madeleine Albright denken? Zonder haar was hij daar mogelijk nooit terecht gekomen. Zij nam als Amerikaans minister van Buitenlandse Zaken twee jaar geleden het initiatief tot de NAVO-luchtaanvallen die Milošević dwongen zijn troepen uit Kosovo terug te trekken. De Servische economie raakte door de bombardementen ontwricht. De bevolking kreeg genoeg van hem, vervang hem door Koštunica, die Milošević liet arresteren. Een paar maanden na haar aftreden had Madeleine hem te pakken, zij het dat hij (nog) niet in de Haagse, maar in de Servische kerker terecht kwam.

Albright wekte de indruk de wereld aan te kunnen. Dat ze altijd goed was voor een bijtende oneliner, riep ook kritiek op. Probeerde zij niet met haar bluf een gebrek aan intellectuele diepgang te verhullen? Maar als minister zou Albright bewijzen dat in haar functie intelligentie niet de meest gevraagde eigenschap is. 'A lot of clever people have got everything but judgment', zei de Britse premier Attlee eens. Ook al was Albright misschien niet de intelligentste, aan een uitgesproken oordeel ontbrak het haar niet. 'My mindset is Munich, not Vietnam', zo vatte zij haar credo eens bondig samen. Als kind had zij met haar ouders haar geboorteland Tjechoslowakije eerst voor Hitler en daarna voor Stalin moeten ontvluchten. In Milošević herkennen zij, veel eerder dan anderen, het soort politieke gangster dat slechts



Gemaskerde commando's bestormen op 31 maart j.l. het huis van Slobodan Milošević in Belgrado. Foto Reuters/Ivan Milutinovic

Madeleine's oorlogen

De strijd in Washington over ingrijpen op de Balkan

luisterde naar de taal van het militaire geweld.

Albright had ook al tijdens de kwestie-Bosnië ('92-'95), toen zij nog Amerikaans afgezant in de VN-Veiligheidsraad was, een groot aandeel gehad in het verzet tegen Servische agressie. Dat blijkt uit het boek van Ivo Daalder over de Amerikaanse Bosnië-politiek, *Getting to Dayton*. Deze Nederlander zat erbij en keek ernaar: in de jaren '95 en '96 was hij als Director for European Affairs verbonden aan Clintons nationale veiligheidsraad en nauw betrokken bij de besluitvorming op het hoogste niveau. Zijn boek is een poging om de indruk te corrigeren dat Richard Holbrooke, die als Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs de bureaucratische rivaal was van Daalder, een beslissende rol speelde in

het besluit tot gewapende interventie. Nationaal veiligheidsadviseur Anthony Lake speelde volgens Daalder een grotere rol. Slagvaardig bijgestaan door zijn Nederlandse assistent, aldus *Getting to Dayton*, was het Lake die in de zomer van 1995 Clinton zover kreeg om met een forse bombardementscampagne de Bosnische Serviërs tot inkeer te brengen. Juist die hoofdrol van zijn veiligheidsadviseur bracht de president ertoe het mokkende State Department een troostprijs toe te kennen door Holbrooke de onderhandelingen met Milošević te laten voeren.

Meer nog dan Lake was VN-ambassadeur Albright de drijvende kracht achter de omslag die zich in de zomer van 1995 in Washington voltrok, zo blijkt uit Daalder's boek. Zij was al in een vroeg stadium voorstander van

luchtaanvallen op de Bosnische Serviërs, zelfs als Amerika die alleen moest uitvoeren. Zij was er steeds van overtuigd dat onderhandelingen met de Servische leiders alleen zin hadden met deze stok achter de deur.

Wapenleveranties

Het was vooral op haar aandrang dat Clinton besloot tot gewapend ingrijpen, na jaren van aarzelingen. Wat waren zijn motieven om deze stap uiteindelijk toch te zetten? Het antwoord van Daalder is even complex als overtuigend. In Europa stond het voortbestaan van de NAVO op het spel, in Bosnië begonnen begin augustus de kansen te keren dankzij een Kroatisch offensief dat mede door Amerikaanse wapenleveranties mogelijk was gemaakt. Maar het belangrijkste waren

de politieke verhoudingen in Amerika zelf. In het Congres, dat aanvankelijk fel was gekant tegen elke inmenging, was de stemming omgeslagen. De CNN-factor bracht de Servische gruweldaden aan de Amerikaanse eettafels. Veel kiezers maakten hun afgevaardigden duidelijk dat dit zo niet kon doorgaan.

Deze interventie, zo concludeert Daalder, betekende een ommekeer in de Amerikaanse Europapolitiek. Het idee dat de Europeanen na het einde van de Koude Oorlog hun eigen rommel konden en moesten opruimen was van de baan. Dit ingrijpen legde bovendien de politieke basis voor de NAVO-actie waarmee bijna vier jaar later Kosovo werd bevrijd van de terreur die Milošević daar uitoefende.

Een half jaar na het verschijnen van

Getting to Dayton heeft de productieve Daalder, inmiddels in dienst van het prestigieuze Brookingsinstituut, ook over deze operatie een boek gepubliceerd, ditmaal samen met zijn collega Michael O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly* (is het mogelijk een oorlog op een nette manier te winnen?) laat zien hoezeer Albright domineerde. Zij maakte deze interventie mogelijk door in Amerika zelf en bij de bondgenoten de onmisbare steun te werven. En zij hield de geallieerden bij elkaar toen de actie eenmaal begonnen was en het gewenste resultaat op zich liet wachten. Bovendien had ze de leiding, actief geassisteerd door de Duitse minister Joschka Fischer, van de diplomatieke inspanningen die Moskou afhielden van steun aan Milošević. En het was tenslotte ook weer Albright die op het idee kwam om de Finse president Martti Ahtisaari naar Belgrado te sturen om Milošević tot inkeer te brengen. Ze maakte fouten, vooral door te verwachten dat het karwei binnen een paar dagen, hooguit weken, geklaard zou zijn. Maar toen ook in Washington de twijfel toesloeg over de effectiviteit van de luchtaanvallen, bleef zij een monument van zelfvertrouwen. Met haar devies dat er geen alternatief was voor volhouden en doorzetten, dwong ze respect af.

Kritiek

Het boek van Daalder en O'Hanlon is geschreven in de stijl van een strenge beleidsnota. Kritiek wordt niet geschuwd. De auteurs menen dat de Amerikaanse regering met deze interventie te laat kwam en te weinig deed. Hun bezwaren overtuigen niet. Uit hun eigen relaas blijkt dat eerder handelen en meer doen vrijwel onmogelijk was. Al in maart 1998 had Albright in het openbaar gewaarschuwd dat Amerika geen tweede Bosnië zou accepteren. De Servische terreurma-chine begon toen al warm te draaien: tot het begin van de NAVO-actie, een jaar later, werden driehonderdduizend Kosovaren uit hun huizen verjaagd. Tweeduizend werden er vermoord. Lange tijd, zo schrijven Daalder en O'Hanlon, kreeg Albright met haar pleidooi actie te ondernemen in Washington geen voet aan de grond. De oppositie in het Congres nam pas af na januari 1999, toen Servische troepen in het dorp Račak een moordpartij aanrichtten die veel publiciteit trok. Hetzelfde patroon dus als in de kwestie Bosnië: voordat het Congres een militaire actie wilde ondersteunen, moesten de zaken eerst veel erger worden, vooral visueel.

Snel handelen bleef echter ook toen onmogelijk. Want Albright moest niet alleen het voorzichtige Pentagon en de aarzelande veiligheidsadviseur Berger meekrijgen, maar ook nog de NAVO-bondgenoten. Die waren pas na de mislukte conferentie in Rambouillet, in maart '99, overtuigd van de noodzaak tot gemeenschappelijk

ingrijpen. Daalder en O'Hanlon maken in hun boek korte metten met de mythe dat deze bijeenkomst stukliep op de voor Milošević vernederende eis de NAVO-troepen die in Kosovo zouden worden gestationeerd, het recht op vrije doorgang over Servisch grondgebied te geven. In werkelijkheid kon dit verlangen hem niet worden voorgelegd omdat Belgrado ho dan ook niet bereid was de NAVO te Kosovo toe te laten. Was dat laatste wel het geval geweest, dan had het bondgenootschap de onderhandelingen onmogelijk kunnen laten stuklopen op de eis dat de Westerse troepen zich ongehinderd door Servië zouden kunnen bewegen.

Trok Amerika ten strijde om het lo van de Kosovaren te verlichten, ter wille van humanitaire doelstellingen dus? Zo ja, was deze interventie dan niet in hoge mate de oorlog van een vrouw die niet Vietnam maar we München in haar hoofd had? Deze vragen leiden naar de veelbesproken kwestie of met de vervanging van Clinton/Albright door Bush/Powell alles anders is geworden. Petra Pinzler, correspondent van *Die Zeit* in Washington, relateert in het samen met Günther Wessel geschreven *George W. Bush. Wende in Amerika* deze verwachting. Nationaal belang in plaats van humanitaire waarden. De tegenstelling is een versimpeling waar ook Albright zich tegen keerde. De NAVO had in Kosovo net als in Bosnië de taak haar bestaansrecht te bewijzen als de organisatie die garant staat voor de stabiliteit in Europa. Daar lag voor de Amerikanen een belang dat ver uitreikte boven het lot van de verjaagde Kosovaren. Pinzler wijst op uitspraken van Condoleezza Rice, de veiligheidsadviseur van Bush, die dit standpunt bevestigen.

Tegelijkertijd kan uit de kwestie Bosnië en Kosovo worden afgeleid dat een interventie in bijvoorbeeld Macedonië pas mogelijk zal zijn als de zaken dermate uit de hand lopen dat publieke opinie en volksvertegenwoordiging geen andere uitweg meer zien. En ook dan moeten de risico's beperkt blijven. Uit de boeken van Daalder valt vooral de conclusie te trekken hoezeer het Congres, met zijn wisselende stemmingen, zijn machtheft uitgebreid. Het verzet tegen de grote Koude Oorlogsvijand is als ander weggevalen. Prioriteiten worden bepaald door de publicitair-parlementaire waan van de dag. Het pleidooi van Bush – uitvoerig besproken door Pinzler – om in navolging van Nixon en Kissinger het nationale belang tot leiddraad te maken van de buitenlandse politiek is niet bedoeld om afstand te nemen van transatlantische verplichtingen. Het is veel meer een poging om lijn aan te brengen in de wirwar van taken die de speelbal van congressionele bemoeizucht zijn. Kissinger kan navertellen dat succes niet verzekerd is.

gawg6

De tragedie van Bosnië

De rol van de VS
en de NAVO

Sara Flounders

Sean Gervasi



DE TRAGEDIE VAN BOSNIE
De rol van de VS en de NAVO

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en van de NAVO**

**Sara Flounders
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De onbekende rol van de regering van de VS en het Pentagon

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DAYTON: CONSOLIDATIE VAN DE NAVO zijn niet eerder
verschenen.

Sean Gervasi

WAAROM IS DE NAVO IN JOEGOSLAVIE

Oorspronkelijke titel:

WHY IS NATO IN YUGOSLAVIA

Paper gepresenteerd op de conferentie over de uitbreiding van
de NAVO naar Oost-Europa en de Middenlandse Zee.

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Yes, Kouchner lied...

MICHEL COLLON

The co-author of one of the biggest media lies of the nineties has just confessed. A good example for the future because ways of manipulations are always the same...

Flash-back. Summer 92, war in Bosnia. Bernard Kouchner and his "doctors of the world" (Médecins du monde) broadcasted into the press and on the walls in Paris an advertisement, outstanding and expensive. The photograph showed "prisoners" of a Serbian camp in Bosnia. Behind barbed wires, Kouchner sticking the picture of a watchtower from Auschwitz. His text blamed Serbians for "mass executions".

Was it right or wrong? Wrong, admits Kouchner twelve years later. His latest book, the warriors for peace, recounts an interview with Izetbegovic (the Muslim nationalist leader in authority at the time of Sarajevo), in his deathbed:

-Kouchner: those places were awful, but they didn't exterminate consistently. Did you know about that?
 - Izetbegovic: Yes. The assertion was false. There were no extermination camps even if those places were terrible. I thought that my revelation would bring faster bombings.

This media lie did actually change the opinion towards the support for bombings. All the Western press broadcasted it massively but the latest rectification was not communicated. The public could actually not be informed that they get rolled.

The half-confession of Kouchner and this media silence makes us asking some important questions:

1. Did Kouchner know all about it previously?

Answer: Yes. Since 1993, a journalist from *France 2* channel, Jacques Merlino, revealed the deception in his book with an eloquent title "All the truths are not good to say". He was interviewing the director of Ruder Finn, US agent for public relations. The latter, very proud to tell that his campaign on "extermination camps" was just fake :

- "We got around three big Jewish organisations: B'nai B'rith, American Jewish Committee et American Jewish Congress. And right away, we managed to make the link between Serbians and Nazis concerning the public opinion. The case was complex, nobody understood what was going on in Yugoslavia, but bolt upright it was not really difficult to formulate who was the nice and the good people.

- By lying, points out the journalist! Answer: We are professionals. We are not paid to give moral lessons." So, Kouchner knew since a long time and that's not nice to charge up the entire blame on a dead person.

2. Did the media hide all the proofs of the deception?

Answer: Yes. A German journalist Thomas Deichmann showed since 1994 that the photograph about barbed wires was fake, and also the prisoners were not locked.

I reality, it was taken from an *ITN* reporting where they declare to be well-treated, but the journalist took away those declarations!

You can find the Kouchner poster, Deichmann comments, and our paper about special effects in our book *Liar's Poker*. Dated from 1998. So, we didn't have to wait today to adjust.

Nota Bene for the url : this site is up to now in French (we look for help from translators), but books and film are also available in English.

http://www.michelcollon.info/display.php?image=img/tm/tm_yougo34.jpg

www.michelcollon.info/display.php?image=img/tm/tm_yougo34.jpg

In a video-reporting "Under NATO bombings" (1999), we also showed the pictures recorded by a local TV, where they were proving the cheating of the *ITN* reporting.

3. Did Kouchner receive protection, even from "media critics"?

Answer: Yes. One example: Daniel Schneidermann(Arrêts sur images, France 5 channel TV) contacted us about this paper, and he dropped us from Kouchner in order to not annoy him.

No questions about the media lies on Kosovo and neither his disastrous statements on this province were asked to Kouchner.

We are talking about media lies and not mistakes. His career plan focusing the UN general secretary post, and he has to do whatever to please USA.

4. Why did they have to tell a story "simple", but false?

- der to hide the responsibilities of big Western powers in this conflict:
- Since 1979, the German CIA (the BND) was supporting extremists to collapse Yugoslavia.
 - In 1989, the IMF put neoliberal pressure to eradicate the auto management and the workers rights, provoking the crisis and nationalisms.
 - In 1991, German gave weapons to the Croatian and Muslim extremists before the war.
 - From 1992 to 1995, the USA intentionally extended and prolonged the conflict as certified by a special European reporter in Bosnia, Lord Owen.
 - Are there any advantages in those actions? Eradicate a social system too much in the left side, and also control the strategic Balkans and the oil roads.

5. Is it a matter to contradict all the crimes committed?

Not at all, but when our governments try to pull us into a war propaganda "nice versus bad people", it is important to think about their hidden interests. And their fake information. For example, concerning prison camp in Bosnia, the UN counted six Croatsians, two Serbians and one Muslim. And they were rather gathering camp for exchanges, not extermination camp. But, the Croatian and Muslim nationalists as being our allies or rather "our" agents, Kouchner, Bernard Henri Levy and the permanent media guests whitewashed them.

We would have to judge the war criminals. All the war criminals, in all camps. But not by phoney courts created by a justice of winners where the USA and the NATO are sitting above the law and straight out outlaw since they are violating the UN bill without embarrassment.

6. Are there any more media lies "well-done" in this war?

Yes. Just one example. When NATO started bombing Yugoslavia, in 1999, it claimed its action after the "massacre of 40 civilians" by the Yugoslavian army, in Racak, Kosovo village. But Belgrad was talking about a fight between two armies, caused by the Albanian separatist forces. The UN asked for a report to a medical examiner commission led by a Finnish doctor, Mrs Ranta who confirmed what Belgrad asserted. The media lie remains intact for the opinion.

Why? Because media lies of Kouchner, BHL and others, allowed to divide the left and stopped it from opposing to the war in reality unfair. The public opinion needs to be manipulated. And the next time, it will start again.

Books *Liars' Poker* and *Monopoly* (English) : ask to unwrittenhistory@hotmail.com

Film *The Damned of Kosovo* (English) and *Under the bombs of Nato* (French) : ask to nessa.kovic@indymedia.be

Thanks to the translator Hanene Hamdoun !

Draft Transcript
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RECORD

Of Franjo Tudman's conversation with American representatives Holbrooke et al held in Presidential palace on 18-Aug-1995

Start: 14:30 Hs

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

As I understood the agenda, Mr President, we will divide this meeting in two parts approximately. After the introduction, in which we would like to inform you about our talks in Belgrade, the ambassador and I would like to talk with you privately, especially because Dr Kreuzel and General Clark have talks with Minister Šušak and General Chervenko. In addition, at 16:00 Hs we will meet Prime Minister Silajdžić. We did not know that he is here, that is a coincidence, but a very lucky one. We will meet Silajdžić in private, without any publicity, hopefully. Silajdžić will probably generate publicity himself.

PRESIDENT:

Probably.

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RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Do you agree, Mr President? Firstly, thank you for seeing us so often and for giving us so much time. We really appreciate that. The ambassador Frasure and Nelson Drew are at the embassy, they are sending some reports to Washington, so we left them there.

First I would like to inform you about our meetings with president MILOŠEVIĆ. We met him twice, the meeting went on for five hours yesterday, and for three hours this morning.

PRESIDENT:

You could have discussed all five continents!

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We could have, however, sadly, we discussed a small part of one continent. In addition, General Clark met General PERIŠIĆ this morning, perhaps he could also say something about that conversation. We have not met anyone else in Serbia except for the Foreign Secretary Milutinović, who is new and who was there sitting with them, and that was all. There is only one word that I could use to describe our talks, and that is "unconvincing". I use that word publicly, we requested the White House and the Pentagon to use that word. I read in papers that our peace process is becoming more dynamic, which is not true. We spend a lot of time travelling around and we use a lot of aircraft fuel, but I do not know whether we are making progress or whether we are stuck, I really do not know. Unconvincing. To be specific, we presented our peace plan, all our proposals, exactly the way we presented them to you.

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However, we really emphasised the President's firm position that we have to make progress. MILOŠEVIĆ listened carefully and he did not start, as I thought he would, with the thousand-year-old history of Serbian people. He started talking about various things, and his problem number one was the threefold recognition. Of all the issues we discussed that was the principal problem for him. And, he said, I can quote him exactly... Joe, correct me if I do not repeat his words correctly... "cannot do that after a humanitarian catastrophe of this size" /unclear - possibly they cannot do that or I cannot do that/. Have I quoted him correctly? (Dr. Kruzel confirms by nodding). Humanitarian catastrophe (incomprehensible). It should also be pointed out that, when he speaks of "humanitarian catastrophe" - let us speak frankly within our special private relationship - he also means a political catastrophe. We saw refugees along the roads. Carl Bildt, who arrived immediately after us and met us last night, told us that he stopped and spoke with some refugees and those who spoke with him were not willing to go back to Krajina. On the other hand, other refugees may be willing to return. However, the issue of the return of refugees, or their right to return, or the issue of their property rights, all of that is of absolutely fundamental importance. In that regard, I emphasised to Milošević and I also emphasise that to You, Mr. President, that the USA are strongly convinced that Serbs, who deserted Krajina, regardless of the fact whether they left voluntarily or they were expelled or they escaped because of the clashes, they have to have the right to return, their right as the citizens of Croatia, and, should they decide not to return, the right to compensation for their property. You told us that you made all of that public. It is very important for that to continue.

PRESIDENT:

But that must be also applicable to Croatian refugees from Serbia, from Bosnia...

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RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Of course. The central...

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ

The same principles.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Of course, Mate. If I had to reduce our goals to two, if you asked me "what the hell are we trying to do here," I would reduce that to two goals. I would say: these two goals are, regardless of the order they are in, the equal treatment of all three ethnic communities, regardless of the country they live in, and the Bosnian state within its current international borders, a sustainable state that would be recognised by its neighbours. There are also other issues, but these two issues are the *sine qua non*. When I speak of the right of Serbs to return, I mean, of course, the right of all to return, including Croats and Muslims. However, we are talking about my conversation with Milošević and I would like to emphasise what Milošević said. He was absolutely uncompromising regarding the recognition of Croatia. Concerning the recognition of Bosnia, his position was precisely the same as four months earlier. He would recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina within its international borders, but he would not recognise the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would not recognise Izetbegović. I told him "I am not asking you to recognise Izetbegović," and we struggled around that. That is why I said that the conversation was unconvincing, that it did not result with any conclusion. Regarding Eastern Slavonia, he expressed great concern with regards to the situation over there, and we said that, upon a request by President Clinton, and following his instructions, we are inviting all sides in these area to exercise militarily restraint with regards to new offensive operations and that certainly also includes Eastern

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Slavonia, in our estimate. I especially emphasised that, because there are certain confusions, and I understand why, in relation to what we object to, i.e. to what we do not object to, regarding the military operations. Already two-days ago I spoke about that with my friend Defence Minister, and I would like to state clearly, in connection with the famous red, green or yellow signal, in relation to Eastern Slavonia, that the USA absolutely, firmly supports the view that each action in Eastern Slavonia would be really dangerous and that it would drag Milošević into the conflict in a way in which he clearly does not want to be involved.

He does not want to enter this war. He wants to get out of it, but Eastern Slavonia is different. He told us several times that he accepts the principle of Eastern Slavonia being a part of the Republic of Croatia, but he would not state that publicly because of the mass catastrophe he just experienced. We talked about negotiations on solution in the course of three to five years, and about all these gradual processes, but he constantly dodged the issue, and we did not get far. We are constantly putting on the map the importance of the Croatian issue, the peace in Eastern Slavonia and the elements of the plan Z-4, which could still be applied.

Of course, a good deal of the plan Z-4, as the Ambassador Galbright emphasised two days ago, is in the past, but the principle of the right to return, to compensation, to equal rights, etc... Now let us leave the Croatian issue for a moment, Mr. President, I would like to go back to where we are now. This afternoon we will meet Silajdžić. Silajdžić and Izetbegović are in a real political quarrel, same as President Clinton and Senator Dole, which in fact is very similar because Silajdžić is so close to Senator Dole. This is actually the factor that complicates the situation. Firstly, I would like to ask you if you could influence Silajdžić, to tell him that the conflict between him and Izetbegović works only for his enemies and that we have to co-operate. Of course, we will tell him that, but it would be useful if an advice like that would arrive from the people in Zagreb that he listens to. I do not know which one of you is closer to Silajdžić, but that would be really useful.

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PRESIDENT:

Not closer than Izetbegović.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Do you have a good relationship with Silajdžić, personally?

PRESIDENT:

No, only...

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

It is civilised.

PRESIDENT:

Civilised, Yes.

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

During the negotiations I...

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

Valentić, President of the Government, he has...

PRESIDENT:

All right, we could try.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I think that this could be the message we would send. The next question, Mr. President, is what to do next? As I mentioned the day before yesterday, in my rather long expose, I would like to emphasise several elements, because I spoke for almost 30 minutes, I would like to emphasise the key elements, which may have not been mentioned. In my introductory expose, I said that we would - in about one month - we would like to hold an international conference. Mate even spoke of the "five + three" formula, regarding the representation /(?) a note by a translator: Halbroke in fact said "regarding the even location"/. We believe that this is the right thing. The Contact Group plus You, Milošević and Izetbegović.

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

Presidents of states, those five states. Leadership meeting...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I cannot make a commitment on behalf of President Clinton, but that would be either President Clinton or the State Secretary Christopher... I do not know on which level. Let us ensure firstly that that be a real conference that would give real results. The location and the level of our representatives would depend on the type of the conference, but I know that you want a leadership meeting with the five state leaders, including Yeltsin and Clinton, together with the three of you. We understand that completely. Nevertheless, the prospects for that are connected with the prospects of success. I also know that both Yeltsin and Chirac have proposed direct leadership meetings with you. We think that such meetings should be well prepared, but what is essential is the fact that we have about four weeks. I would like to clarify that... should that never happen, if we do not embark on something, we will head toward withdrawing the UN from Bosnia and to the NATO entering,

in one form or another, following the UNPROFOR. According to the original plan, that would mean approximately 75,000 to 100,000 NATO soldiers on the battlefield, 25,000 of which would be Americans. That is, as you know, the withdrawal plan, but it will not be that easy. Then there is also the plan for further engagement that I presented to you two days ago, which includes the organisation of forces that would succeed the UN, which would actively support Bosnians, actively support Bosnians. We would be training, arming and equipping them, the arms embargo would be abolished, there would be shelling, either by the NATO or by the USA, that is the wartime plan. However, that is not what we want. Nevertheless, should the UN start pulling out, this is what we will get. And the UN will start pulling out if we do not make progress on a diplomatic level. That is why I am so concerned with Silajdžić, because he is causing so many problems here, because we need Silajdžić's support. I told that to Milošević at great length, not in only 30 seconds, we talked about that for hours. I do not have any idea whether he believed at all in what I told him, but we must not ease the grip. As you well know, he lives in his fantasy world, in Belgrade. However, his English is really good, he lived in New York and we spoke in the urban street-jargon, and I hope that he understood everything, that jargon.

Regarding that conference, it should be prepared by practical progress in the field. We will make the effort to achieve that. I will not know whether we could achieve that until I meet Izetbegović and Silajdžić. At this moment the essential problems are: firstly, Croatia. He is ready for that limited recognition of BiH, however, as I just mentioned, he will not recognise Croatia at the present. Maybe later, perhaps we could make a secret agreement of a sort, I do not know, because I have not given up our position. I wanted to talk to you first; my colleagues and I both want to speak with our colleagues in Washington. However, of all the issues that we discussed with him, he was the least flexible in his position

that he would not recognise Croatia in any form, at this moment, although he already has the liaison personnel here, and even though he knows that he would have to do that one day, he will not do it now. We all know why. Because you just won your biggest victory and he suffered the biggest defeat since 1389. He is personally (incomprehensible) Serbian people, he really is... that is an overwhelming experience. The second issue that we focussed on with Milošević, besides his problem with recognition, as well as the most difficult issue for us is "who speaks on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs." We talked a lot about Mladić and Karadžić and all those other people, and you know what he said about Karadžić ? He said, I quote, "that man is a damn crack-brained maniac." You know, I never met Karadžić and whether he is... However, with regard to Srebrenica and Žepa, he told us, I don't know whether that is true or not, Mr. President, but we are only informing you now, he told us that he attempted to prevent that from happening, he thought it to be a disgrace. When we told him that war crimes were committed in Srebrenica, he actually agreed, he said "I know." It should be pointed out that this is not at all in question, we just spoke with the US Embassy officials who spoke with refugees and ...

PRESIDENT:

And what about Mladić and Karadžić? And the relationship of Mladić and Karadžić with Perišić?

Gen CLARK:

I could say something about that.

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RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We will discuss Perišić in a minute. He... That is very unclear. I asked him to whom is Mladić subordinated. Who commands him. And he answered, I do not know whether that is true or not, "sometimes I influence him in limited affairs, and sometimes I cannot influence him." In Srebrenica... he claims that he did not have anything to do with that, that he attempted to stop it. However, that has happened and I am not relieving him of responsibility. What I wanted to emphasise in conversation about the Bosnian Serbs was not the history, although the history is extremely important, we will talk about that later, but instead I wanted to emphasise the fact that we cannot find the solution to the problem in this area through negotiations if there is no- one who could speak on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. And all that game, that... pardon my expression... "shit" because no- one speaks up etc., is still bothering us. This is how it went approximately, Mr. President. We will return to Belgrade on Tuesday... On Sunday, today is Friday. Tomorrow we are leaving for Sarajevo, today we will meet Silajdžić, tomorrow Izetbegović and then again Milošević on Sunday. If we cannot make any progress, if we feel that we are not going any further, by the end of this - to put it that way - second round, in which I met you twice, I will meet him two times and three times the Bosnian Government, but every time separately Silajdžić, Šaćirbej, Izetbegović... then we will return to Washington, and we will tell the President that we did not achieve anything, and the President will have to decide through consultations with Chirac, Major and Kohl, how to proceed. And it is very probable that then we will be on the way of NATO's presence in the field in Bosnia after the UN pulls out. Accordingly, we think that we have three or four weeks... That would in fact be everything I can tell you at this moment. I would like to hear your reaction or remarks and then I would like to ask General Clark to say something about his meeting with General Perišić.

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PRESIDENT:

I would be very interested to hear something about the conversation with...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Would you like the General to speak first? Go ahead, Les.

Gen CLARK:

Mr. President, I believe that in that meeting two issues emerged first. Firstly, the fact that you are facing a very resolute and a very sombre military circles in Yugoslavia. They put up a map on the wall so that I could see it, with display of the Croatian forces' incursion in Bosnia. They displayed the incursions around Dubrovnik, around Glamoč, and the concentration of Croatian forces around Eastern Slavonia. Although they did not threaten at any moment, they made it clear to me... They said "if Croatia invades Eastern Slavonia, the Serbs over there will fight, and there is no prospect of these fights being limited to the area around Danube." They also said "that is why we are accumulating our forces in order to protect our territory." Therefore, I received a very...

PRESIDENT:

Eastern Slavonia is...

Gen CLARK:

So, I received a very clear message, coming from the General who probably does not have an authorisation to say what the possible critical point would be. However, that was a very clear message.

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I have not received that message (incomprehensible).

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Perhaps Kreuzel could add something to our talks with Milošević. Do you have any additional ... Can you think of anything?

GENERAL CLARK:

I would only like to say something about Mladić. You asked me to speak there with Perišić. And I did that.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That was your idea, we did that because it was a good idea.

GENERAL CLARK:

So, I told him, he stated those military estimations that I just described, I described our plan, what would happen when the NATO comes to the field, NATO air raids... He agreed with me, that the balance of forces changed drastically at the expense of Bosnian Serbs, that was not in question at all, and they see this. That is why I said that we have to have peace, that we have to accomplish peace now, and that we have very little time, and he agreed. I also mentioned what the ambassador Holbrooke requested in his report, I asked who or what controls the Bosnian Serbs and whether he could speak on their behalf. And he said, he did not answer, he said "maybe Karadžić, maybe... who knows." And I said "some say that you control Mladić, is that correct?" He denied that, of course. And I said "but he

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respects you, he is your military colleague */unclear – as printed/*,” and he said “no, he is the leader of his own army.” That is where we stopped...

PRESIDENT:

And who provides supplies for Serbs?

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

Mladić controls him, he does not control Mladić.

PRESIDENT:

But Perišić provides supplies...

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

Mister President, Perišić commanded Mostar when we took Mostar, and Mladić was his superior. Then Perišić was promoted after he lost Mostar and Tasovčić and all that, so he was promoted and recalled to Belgrade. This is the complex, Mladić was his superior for 15 years...

GENERAL CLARK:

After that I had a feeling that we could not control Mladić through Perišić. If that is so, Perišić denied it at any rate. */as printed/*

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PRESIDENT:

All right, I agree, there is that personal motive... However, in relation to supplies etc., that is handled by Serbia, Perišić.

Dr MATE GRANIĆ:

Milošević practically controls...

PRESIDENT:

Not completely... But, without Serbia, without the supplies provided by the Yugoslav Army, Mladić would not be able to conduct this war.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That is obviously clear.

Dr MATE GRANIĆ:

That is exactly how it is.

Gen CLARK:

The question is whether he is willing to be a channel and to be a certain force... General Perišić.... And he did not show that. He may do that at a future meeting. I told him that I will maybe speak with him again if we come again to Belgrade, on Sunday.

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PRESIDENT:

You did not meet Mladić?

Gen CLARK:

No.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Joe, could you maybe reconstruct the discussion to a greater detail than I have, especially yesterday, regarding Eastern Slavonia? For the President. I have the feeling that there were also nuances other than what I presented, and I believe that to have been the most important part of the discussion.

Dr. KRUZEL:

Mr. President, I think that President Milošević acknowledges the issue that is the most important for you, i.e. that Eastern Slavonia is Croatia. His is facing a political problem, and I think that we have to find a way of accepting the things that he agrees with, the fact that that is Croatia, expressing the agreement with the fact that this issue would be dealt with in the future. However, this should be an agreement that would in certain way be politically acceptable to Milošević and that would at the same time enable us to reach a solution for Bosnia. Therefore, we will need your help in finding a way for clarifying how would all that end in two or three years, sometime in the future. But that should not complicate the fundamental task, i.e. finding a solution for Bosnia.

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PRESIDENT:

All right. I already said that the main problem for Milošević is a resolution for Bosnia, and that is connected with... I understand.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We would be interested... I know that my colleagues must soon go to that other meeting, but before that we would like to hear your reactions to our report about the situation where we are now, especially with regard to what you just mentioned in your answer to Dr. KRUZEL... The issue that Bosnia is the focal point now. Do you think, if we concentrate in Bosnia now and meet Izetbegović and Milošević in turns, that we could achieve something? Or do you think that Milošević would continue spinning in the same circle until we all plunge into an abyss?

PRESIDENT:

I think that Milošević - for political and economic reasons - is interested in reaching solutions, but that the solution must be such that the Serbian part of Bosnia would have the right to rely on that, on that Confederate support from Serbia and that he would accept that.

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

And a referendum.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

About which referendum are you talking?

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Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

The referendum on separation, in few years...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

A ha, on succession after a number of years. I understand.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

President, the essence of their question is whether we will agree to their talking with Izetbegović and Milošević, to Eastern Slavonia not to remain a topic, to be frozen as topic. That is their question.

PRESIDENT:

No, No.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

That should be clearly stated to them.

PRESIDENT:

That is what I said. I start from the position that Milošević said that he does not recognise Eastern Slavonia and Baranja...

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

But he will not say that publicly.

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PRESIDENT:

It can not be that long before he says that, that is what I said, that is what I said the last time. That must not be done, because Milošević, regardless of the fact that he can realise that he cannot go further, still this is a Byzantine approach that he would, because he would not admit it, that he could perhaps get that too in the future. */as printed/*

Thus, it should not be agreed to abolish sanctions until he recognises Croatia.

The evidence, two years earlier he told us in Geneva that, when he would get rid of Hadžić, that Martić would be his man and that we have a solution to the Serbian issue within the Croatian borders. */as printed/*

However, Martić did become his man and the things went from bad to worse. From his side, that is. Then, he appointed General MRKŠIĆ, also from the YU Army, in Novaković's position. That General MRKŠIĆ too was even more radical than before. Therefore, he cannot be fully trusted.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr. President, this was very useful... Maybe we could split in two groups now, because I know that Minister ŠUŠAK and Joe would like to talk, same as General Clark and your General, and then we could talk for few minutes. And then we will have to go and meet Silajdžić. Do you agree?

PRESIDENT:

All right. Is it maybe, but we can leave that for later, is Milošević willing to

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discuss the problems in a broader perspective, besides with you also with some European and even, he relied largely on France and England, and he showed signs that he would also like to talk directly */as printed/*.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

What do you think about that, Joe?

Dr. KRUZEL:

To talk directly with you, Mr. President?

PRESIDENT:

That too.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I would... Firstly, when he is with us, he says that he wants the US to be a negotiator, but maybe he says the total opposite to Carl Bildt, I do not know. He tells us that he wants us to be negotiators, because we are the only world super-power. In either case, we are here to do everything we can. Second. Regarding your meeting with Milošević, I could tell you exactly what Milošević's game is. He want a private meeting with you, a private meeting with Izetbegović, and he wants to break-up the Federation. There is no doubt about that, I would do the same in his place and I would like to emphasise as much as possible that - in my opinion - you should not meet him privately, nor should Izetbegović do that. That must be a part of the process that would lead to the three of you meeting together. That is my opinion. Would you like to add something, Joe?

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If he meets you privately, be it secretly or in public, that would become public and the world would have the impression that the two of you are dividing Bosnia. That would lead to a crisis in Sarajevo, it would split the Federation and, as you know, we are constantly repeating that the USA would never agree to an unwilling settlement, with a division. The two of us sat in this room many times and you were assuring us, I know that you were also assuring the Ambassador, that you would never divide Bosnia with Belgrade. We take these assurances very seriously. And should it happen that Belgrade and Zagreb divide Bosnia in between themselves, America would not support Croatia anymore in western institutions. We will not do that. I cannot speak on behalf of the future US Presidents, but Clinton will be the President for another year and a half at least, and I also think for the next five and a half years. He will be re-elected, and this is not acceptable for us. And your secret meeting with Milošević, which he would make public, would be planned for that purpose. Would you like to add something, Joe?

Dr. KRUZEL:

I agree with Ambassador Holbrooke regarding two things: first, that President Clinton would be re-elected and second, not only the US but the entire western community would not forgive you easily.

PRESIDENT:

That is absolutely clear.

Dr. KRUZEL:

However, Mr. President, the meetings with you and your associates have really

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convinced us that the frame of solutions for Bosnia, which we presented to you, would be acceptable to you. Of course, you will consider the details. But the big question is Eastern Slavonia. I know you said that you would rather have a peaceful solution to that problem. Would you pledge yourself to that, for a certain time? To efforts for reaching a peaceful solution?

PRESIDENT:

That was historical, Serbs never had, as I said, borders between Croatia and Serbia but the Danube border, a natural boundary if it exists at all */as printed/*, and it exists, even in a military tactical view, such border exists.

According to that, I am in favour, we could see let us say by the end of the UNCRO mandate or I do not know what, for all the attempts for a peaceful solution */as printed/*, but if there is no peaceful solution, the mood, then we have still have 100 000 expelled people and the mood in Croatian people is such we cannot allow ourselves speculations...

GOJKO SUŠAK:

Unless there is recognition.

PRESIDENT:

If there is a political solution, yes. I am in favour as I said for the democratically elected Government to return and for the presence of the international community or European observers

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or the United Nations to control the implementation of humanitarian and ethnic rights.

But gentlemen, let us return to one issue that has been raised about an agreement between Milošević and myself, an agreement that was never made and about whether that is acceptable for the United States of America or not. Yugoslavia itself was in a crisis since its very creation in 1918, prior to the WW II when the civic politicians were leaders of Yugoslavia, I had more experience than these today and even more democratic experiences *as printed*. Then the so-called Croat-Serb agreement took place under the patronage of England and France and with the agreement of America. And then, please - this should be kept in mind, then, in order to save Yugoslavia, the Croatian - Serbian agreement was on the creation of Banovina Croatia, which included the - if you are familiar with that - the parts that were within the boundaries of Herceg-Bosnia and Bosanska Posavina, whereas the remaining part was to be discussed in terms of either autonomy or separation. reminding part either an autonomy or separation should be discussed. That was the situation that the Monarchist Yugoslavia disappeared in, in 1941.

Gentlemen, you are probably also familiar with this map from the NATO and EU circles, the year of ninety and something, 93...

Gen CLARK:

I don't recall that I (incomprehensible) not a one like this of the NATO...

PRESIDENT:

NATO or the EU... That is the division between the eastern, Russian... whatever Russia was like... and the West.

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Gen CLARK:

At any rate, this not an official NATO document...

PRESIDENT:

Not as an official document, but as a strategic analysis, a
conception...

Gen CLARK:

Mr. President, I can tell that NATO does not have any strategic
conception of this kind. I would like to say, I saw all those documents, but this one is
not there.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

This has been used in order to attribute it to us that we are allegedly
making agreements with Milošević. That is not our... (incomprehensible, all speak at
once).

PRESIDENT:

This is the Brussels map. And let us be...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Allow me to double-check whether I understand this map. I did not
want to speak about it. The issue has been raised. I want to understand this correctly.
You say that the map, which was published by London papers, does not fit in your
vision of Bosnia, and that you described this map to Paddy Ashdown, but that this is
not something that you personally support.

PRESIDENT:

Of course. However, I support Henry Kissinger's standpoint. He said "if we could not save Yugoslavia, we cannot save Bosnia and Herzegovina."

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr. President, since we now clarified the issue of the map, and since we can state that this was not your map, but instead that you drew someone else's map ... The other day you said, during a lunch...

PRESIDENT:

I have not described that map etc. */as printed/*

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

No, obviously not. Since we now understand your explanation, we will say that you told us that the map that appeared in London papers was not your idea but someone else's and that you were explaining it. But you also said, I am not interested in Henry Kissinger in that sense.... You know, Henry Kissinger had many crazy ideas in his time...

PRESIDENT:

But they were quite logical...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

He is not stupid, but here he does not speak on our behalf. I would like to state clearly, in

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relation with this, in our conversation today you clearly said that you and Milošević would not divide Bosnia. This is extremely important. However, you just quoted Kissinger saying "they could not preserve Yugoslavia, so they cannot preserve Bosnia either," and you agreed with that. In my opinion, these two statements are not consistent with each other. We must be able to tell President Clinton, very clearly, that you share the American view that the future of this area includes Bosnia as a separate nation. I would like to be sure that I have not missed something.

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

As a separate state.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

...Union, Federation, we understand. You know what I mean, I mean one individual country within the UN, within its current borders. Let us leave aside the issue we discussed, the Union, Federation, Republic... We do not want a division of Bosnia, or its break-up...

PRESIDENT:

Dear Mr. Halbrooke, it was not a coincidence that I mentioned the agreement of 1939. Communists wanted to resolve that problem, to make it easier by declaring Muslims a separate nation, but they had not made it easier, and instead they made it more serious. Please, you cannot have peace in Bosnia today unless you recognise the right of the Serbs to connect to Serbia as well as the right of Croats to connect to Croatia. There is neither a practical nor theoretical possibility for achieving peace, this has to be clear to us. That is the only possibility for creation

the preconditions for a new stable international order on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr. President, in my lengthy, too long expose two-days ago I emphasised many important points. Some of them represent changes also in the American policies. One of the issues that I mentioned was that the US accepts the fact that the Bosnian Serbs should have a separate *unclear* – possibly special/ and parallel relationship with Serbia. That is a shift in the American position. Originally, that was also the position of Alan Juppe. We agree for this to be a part of the future. Thus, let us agree that we agree on that.

PRESIDENT:

I agree.

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

Plus referendum...

PRESIDENT:

In two, three, five years... A possibility...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Referendum, of course, but the issue of succession and separatism leads to another question, which is how to apply that. When Czechoslovakia voted for separation in two parts, the US and the rest of the world never said a word. Why? Because that was an honest vote

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in peace. Even in Ethiopia after the WW II, the world community led by the US and the UN, agreed with referendum for Eritrea after a number of years, and today Eritrea today is a UN member. That is a separate issue.

PRESIDENT:

Gentlemen, let me add to this, what I said, to this historic strategic observation of that problem. It is absolutely certain that - also from the Churchill - Stalin agreement on a 50/50 division of the interest spheres in the former Yugoslavia - that that was not just a whim of theirs, but that behind it were their Staffs and analyses of the possible solution of the problem.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr. President, could Ambassador and I spend few minutes with you? In addition, I would also like Dr. Kruzel to talk to Minister Šušak, because two-days ago I took the time he should have spent with Joe. And they wanted to talk. Your head of Staff is also waiting for us, as well as Silajdžić. We are seeing each other often and we will return. Do you agree?

PRESIDENT:

I agree, just one more sentence. Without understanding the historical depth of this division that practically led to this terrible war, along with the great responsibility of Western Europe... Because, had Western Europe not allowed such aggression of the Yugo-Communist Army and Serbia, we would not have the situation as it is today.

Thus, without understanding of all aspects of the problem, we can not get out of the war and ensure future. Accordingly, through half-solutions we will not satisfy demands of the time.

PETER GALBRIGHT:

Allow me too, Mr. President, to say something. We understand that aspect, and we showed great sympathy in that regard - since President Clinton took office - in regard of the importance of emphasising the territorial integrity and independence of Croatia. You saw this in our policies, and in a way they developed from the Bush Government, which has, frankly speaking, hesitated in recognising Croatia, and did not agree with its current boundaries. Thanks to the US, the UN recognised you in the beginning of 1993, you saw what I did following Clinton's instructions, and I acknowledged that very publicly. The precondition for that was the territorial integrity of Croatia as well as of BiH. You just asked whether the alleged agreement that never existed would be acceptable for the US or not. The answer to that is very clear: it could never be acceptable for the US. We simply would not be able to participate in the division of Bosnia, under no circumstances. The Secretary Holbrooke spoke on behalf of the current Government. I can only speak from my own perspective, after working with the Congress for 14 years, by which I want to say that every such plan would cause a very strong reaction from the Congress and that that would be a catastrophe.

PRESIDENT:

Yesterday I said, so: if you accept what you just said, that the Serbian part has the right to rely on Serbia, then there are no differences in fact, pending there

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is no hidden idea that, through this, Croatia could return to the Yugoslav framework.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Of course not.

Dr. MATE GRANIĆ:

(incomprehensible)... standpoints are no big differences, but we fear... (all speak at once).

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mate, this Government never had any crazy ideas about a renewal of Yugoslavia. What Ambassador Galbright wanted to say is exactly...

PRESIDENT:

Mr. Eagleburger was not the only one in efforts to...

GOJKO ŠUŠAK:

That was the former Government.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That is exactly what I wanted to say. I am glad you mentioned Eagleburger. The former Government had that crazy idea... Baker's speech in Belgrade. Eagleburger. Scowcroft... That is in the past.

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PRESIDENT:

And Ambassador Zimmermann.

(A part of representation leaves)

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We just reviewed some of these issues, but I would rather discuss them in detail. Firstly, Eastern Slavonia and Milošević. Earlier you said that nothing would happen in Eastern Slavonia in the following several months, but that you could undertake certain actions when the UNCRO mandate expires.

PRESIDENT:

Should there be no progress in negotiations.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I understand. I would like to be very frank, because our Government gave certain different signals regarding the military activity in the past several months. In November, we asked you not to attack and you did not attack. In March, I flew over here, we agreed, then you and Al Gore made that public in Copenhagen, and you did not attack. However, then the war started again. And when the war started again, and when you headed towards Western Slavonia, and both Ambassador Galbright and I understood the strategic value of that operation, and the pressure that it imposed on the Serbs, then we stated very energetically in Washington that we should show understanding for military action, although we emphasised the rights of the Croatian people.

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PRESIDENT:

And had the Serbs observed the agreement then, I would not have gone. However, they not only humiliated the Croatian Government, but also the Croatian people, and they killed my people down there. Thus, I was not the one who allowed or chose the aggression for no reason. One day they open the oil, and on another day they close the road, etc. */as printed/*

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Mr. President, I would like to be absolutely honest with you, speaking not only as an American official, but also as a person who cares about this issue as an individual, as a man who considers himself a friend of Croatia and I certainly see myself as a friend... (unclear)... and Ambassador. (unclear)... that you did a lot for creation of conditions for peaceful solution and that you had justification for your military action in Eastern Slavonia. I defended it, always, in Washington. You will recall that the two of us met in London immediately after that, we met in private, and then we went to the US Embassy and met Gore. That was a very dramatic exchange. There were some, who wanted Gore to tell you to pull out from Western Slavonia, and we said "absolutely not," you have to stay there, you closed the back door, that's your country. Afterwards, we discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje. We said again "continue." We said publicly, as you know, that we were concerned, but privately, you knew what we wanted. And again you improved the situation, you strengthened the Federation, etc. Then the issue of Knin and of sectors North and South emerged. At that moment, we were in the middle of a very... Peter was preoccupied with that conversation with Babić about the plan Z-4, there was a lot of confusion... You went ahead. From a political and a military point of view, that was a triumph, and it used the situation again, it assisted again. */as printed/* Refugees are the only problem.

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If you could return those people, if you would give a speech stating that the war has finished and that they should return... The majority would not return... But tell them to return, emphasise that, and convince at least some of them to return.

PRESIDENT:

I would be very pleased if around 10 percent of them would return...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Allright, invite them to return. Give them a compensation, but if we leave the humanitarian issue aside for a moment, I will never forget it, but let's leave it aside for now, you helped the situation again. I would like to be clear, since I told you how I feel secretly, and in my heart, and that is that you did great things to help peace. I do not feel the same in relation to the sector East, Eastern Slavonia. I am very convinced that that would be a different situation because it is situated on the Serbian border and the president authorised me to tell you that we would like to request from you a symbolic withdrawal of your forces from the edge of the area under the UN protection. You are accumulating forces there and the shelling from both sides is constantly taking place, some days that shelling increases, between the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and you. Milošević too is accumulating forces. Milošević told me to tell you that he too would like to request you to consider the withdrawal of some units, in a visible way. You should only withdraw them for 10 or 15 miles, just something symbolic. Should a crisis occur, you could return them within an hour. However, do something to make people realise that you are prepared to negotiate peacefully about Eastern Slavonia. And, do not forget, Mr. President, we stated publicly... And I also told Milošević, who knows how many times, that Eastern Slavonia is a part of Croatia, we will never alter our

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position. On behalf of President Clinton, I beg you, since I discussed that with Milošević, withdraw part of your units, publicly, within the next few days. Let the world see that you are contributing to the President's peace initiative represented by us. Do that, please.

PRESIDENT:

Alright, I agree. I really am for a peaceful solution.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I know that you are.

PRESIDENT:

You know, 200 of my men were killed, 1,400 wounded, and if I could reach a peaceful solution, alright. Although the entire Croatian public and opinion, they are all prepared to go...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Of course. You know that if you attack in the sector East and if Milošević remains outside of the conflict, you will win. However, we think that he would no be able to stay aside.

PRESIDENT:

I know.

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RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Thank you. Secondly, I think that we do not have to repeat the early conversation. I also wanted to discuss the issue of a secret meeting with Milošević, but we already discussed that. Milošević told me a really interesting thing. Namely, I am new in this area, I arrived only three or four years ago, and you of course lived through the history of your country. And you indeed are the father of modern Croatia. If everything ends in the way I think it will. I observed Milošević, and at one moment, this morning... we discussed Bosnia almost the entire time... he became mad, criticising the events in Krajina, saying how he cannot recognise you under those conditions, maybe later... and then he suddenly said "you know, at the end of it all, in this region it all comes down to Croats and Serbs, we must make a deal one day with the Croats, we must, we must resolve that, because that is the history of this region, and the history of this region is the painful relationship between the Croats and the Serbs."

He said all of this very excitingly.

PRESIDENT:

Do not think that the meeting these days would be...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That would break up the Federation. Until the Bosnian issue is resolved... What I had heard, as he was speaking... he spent most of his time discussing Karadžić, regarding that "damn crazy maniac," and he really hates him, he is not acting. But you know, this is like a quarrel between communists, between Đilas and Tito, and Stalin and Kaganovich, he said, not once, that Bosnia is the main problem but then at the end he said "that comes down to

Meeting of Tudjman, Holbrooke, Clark et al on 18-Aug-1995

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Croats and Serbs." I think that we should freeze the situation in Croatia as it is. You regained 90 percent of your lost territory, before, 26 percent of your territory was under the enemy... and now... how much is it now?

PRESIDENT:

4,6 percent of the continental part. And if we count the sea, the percentage is 2,8.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I can openly call you the liberator of your country. The creator in the first place, and then the liberator. You regained 98 percent of your territory, if you count the water, and since you have the most beautiful coast in Europe, let us count that water too. Now you have the opportunity to consolidate, to show how you want to contribute to peace by freezing the situation in Slavonia by the public withdrawal of some units... I asked you for that and you said you would do that... by concentrating on Federation and by helping us to reach the solution in Bosnia, and then we will deal with Slavonia. The US President told us to tell you, Milošević and Izetbegović, that we only have few weeks. We would like to call that big international conference. Of all the leaders in this area, most of our meetings were with you, Clinton, Gore, Christopher and I had most meetings with you. I spent most of the time in these chambers. We are prepared to co-operate with you in order to make Croatia part of the West. If you go on Eastern Slavonia, not right now, all our efforts would be in vain.

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PRESIDENT:

You should not waste time on that. But, that we achieve at this time...

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

However, Mr. President we will not achieve progress within the next few weeks. I would like to concentrate on Bosnia during the next month. I cannot achieve progress in both Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia at the same time. And Milošević may show his willingness for progress in Bosnia, but not in relation to Slavonia. And a secret meeting between the two of you, now, is only an attempt to break-up the Federation. If you help us by supporting us during one month, which is very difficult for you, but you are the victor... In the current triangle between Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo, you are on top of the triangle, not Milošević. He is very annoyed by that. But you are the victor. Do not go too far, freeze the situation, I beg you, consolidate with Ambassador Galbright in relation to all public statements in relation to peace, the restraint and the return or compensation for Krajina refugees. Let us focus on Bosnia, let us focus on Bosnian Serbs again, and let us focus on recognition, so we will see what we will achieve. Give us some space, in term of diplomacy (incomprehensible). Just to mention this, you will notice that I have not mentioned the restraint in Livanjsko Polje, I have not mentioned the restraint in Western Bosnia, where Federation units are active. That is another level of quantity. We want an overall restraint. However, I draw a very strong red line in relation to Eastern Slavonia. Because, what is happening in Bosnia must be connected with negotiations in Bosnia. This is a very sensitive issue. However, here we are, Mr. President, and I am grateful to you for giving me your time. I do not believe that I will manage to convince Milošević to recognise Croatia now. However, on the other hand, speaking in long term, Croatia is the one that he will actually recognise, not Bosnia. However, on a short-term we have to

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focus on Sarajevo. That is why I am begging you for a bit of negotiating flexibility. It is self-understood that, the sooner you give us as much as possible flexibility, restraint and leadership that you will show on the international level, the sooner will Croatia become a part of Western Europe. And that is where you belong.

PRESIDENT:

As you said, with all actions I made an effort to resolve that problem in that manner.

PETER GALBRIGHT:

Mr. President, in that context, perhaps in the next few days, as Secretary Halbrooke proposed, maybe in the next few days the symbolic pullout could take place, and the issuing of a public statement about the wish to...

PRESIDENT:

Today I have a press conference at 18:00 hrs, and I will...

PETER GALBRIGHT:

I think that that would be good.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

That would be excellent. You say that today, do not connect that with my visit, and just make a statement. However, let us send a message to Milošević, let us say in private

that that was a reaction... That would be splendid.

PETER GALBRIGHT:

In relation to Eastern Slavonia, as Holbrooke stated, it will not be possible to achieve anything during the next month, no steps that would solve the problem. I know that, because - as you know - I am obviously in contact with the so-called Krajina Serbs in relation to that. There may be a possibility to make small steps forward that would show some progress. E.g., it would be possible to return some refugees, as well as to undertake some other steps, even in the context of some protected villages or something. In fact I do not know, I am only thinking aloud about some small steps that would show that the wall is breaking over there.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

Precisely.

PETER GALBRIGHT:

In order to help you somehow... that, of course, cannot be a precondition for anything, but I think that we could achieve that within the efforts to bring that wall down.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

I would like to clarify one thing, especially because you mentioned Eagleburger. The US Government will never, never accept any changes of Croatian borders. They are your borders. We will support you. However, at this very moment... Because you won in this war, you won the war in Croatia, except in Eastern Slavonia, and you can do that later, and you are winning

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in Bosnia and I hope that you will continue winning as long as we do not achieve peace... Let us suspend Eastern Slavonia, let us deal with what Peter mentioned, and let us not condition that by any specific later deadlines.

I sincerely thank you for your today's comments, they gave me a great impetus and we will stay in close contact. At what time is your press conference?

PRESIDENT:

At six o'clock.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE:

We will be with Silajdžić. And we will watch Television. Thank you for your time Mr. President.

PRESIDENT:

Thank you for your efforts.

/finished at 16:00 Hrs/

misdadig zouden zijn aan te merken.
Dat dergelijke voorbereidingshandeling **niet** onbetwisbaar misdadig zouden zijn, is alleen bestaansbaar als de rechtbank en/of het OM daadwerkelijk met een onderzoek op de propen zou komen waarin wordt aangetoond dat, bij een daadwerkelijk gebruik van de kernwapens die zich op Volkel bevinden, het niet alleen **mogelijk** zou zijn, maar zelfs **verzekerd** zou zijn dat daarbij de regels en beginselen van internationaal humanitair recht niet geschonden zouden worden.

Zouden het OM of de rechtbank er inderdaad in slagen, tegen de verpleterende aanwijzingen van het tegendeel in, om op basis van een onderzoek aan te tonen dat een dergelijk rechtmatig gebruik van deze kernwapens toch **mogelijk**, en zelfs **verzekerd** zou zijn, dan zou het vervolgen van degenen die daadwerkelijk optreden tegen de voorbereidingen van het gebruik van kernwapens tenminste in rechtsopzicht nog als legitiem kunnen worden beschouwd. Want dan verzetten zij zich immers, met rechtens on gepaste midde len, tegen iets wat althans uit rechts oogpunt in de haak zou kunnen zijn.

U ziet, rechters en het OM wordt een eerlijke kans geboden om aan te tonen dat zij, met hun streven om het verzet tegen de kernwapens op Volkel zoveel mogelijk de kop in te drukken, voor een rechtens juiste zaak staan!

Maar strijk en zet weigeren rechters en het OM om alsnog een dergelijk onderzoek te doen.

Zij besef ten natu urlijk heel goed dat de uitkomsten van een dergelijk onderzoek niet anders dan desastreus kunnen uitpakken voor hun gezamenlijk streven om de nucleaire misdadigheid van de Staat af te schermen en van rugdekking te voorzien.

Zodra deze weigering uit hun mond is vernomen, is voldoende bewijs vergaard dat de betrokken rechters en OM-functionaris er alles aan doen om de Staat in de gelegenheid te stellen om diens misdadige kernwapenbedrijf ongestoord te kunnen voortzetten.

Alsdan is het moment aangebroken voor de enig juiste conclusie, en wordt tegen de betrokken rechters en de betrokken OM-functionaris aangifte gedaan wegens **medeplichtigheid** aan de mega-misdadigheid van de Staat. De Staat maakt zich immers reeds nu schuldig aan een misdrijf tegen de vrede door het voorbereiden van eventuele misdadige inzet van kernwapens, en dit ongeacht of het daartoe ooit daadwerkelijk zal komen.

En de rechters en het OM doen, zo is dan afdoende gebleken, manifest niet anders dan hun uiterste best om de Staat de gelegenheid te geven om daarmee ongestoord door te gaan.

Tegelijkertijd wordt dan bij het daartoe bevoegde college erop aangedrongen om deze rechters en OM-functionarissen te ontslaan wegens gebleken **ongeschiktheid** voor hun taak.

Van een drietal leden van het gerechtshof Den Bosch en hun compaan bij het OM wordt inmiddels op die manier strafrechtelijke vervolging geëist. Alsmede hun ontslag.

Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.

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Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (14)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T. & Harvill Press, London, 1998)

Another question that needs to be answered is whether the political settlement obtained by the Dayton Agreement could have been achieved in 1994. In my view, it probably would have been, had the Americans understood earlier the political realities of the situation in Bosnia. While it was morally laudable for the US Administration to declare in 1993 "the aggressor must be punished", it did not provide a basis for political settlement, ^{only} military action.

If no country is prepared to go to war against the aggressor then, to obtain a political settlement, the participation of that aggressor must be sought in some sort of negotiation process. The opportunities for peace created by the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993 and UNPROFOR in 1994 were repeatedly destroyed by unenforceable demands being ^{made by} the Bosnian Government, backed by the US and wedded to the Contact Group's "take it or leave it" approach towards the Serbs. When this approach was finally abandoned in ¹⁹⁹⁵ the exchanges of territory agreed at Dayton on 21 November did not differ significantly ^{from} those proposed by Karadzic and broadly accepted by the Bosnians in the summer of 1994. (page 241)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (13)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T. & Harvill Press, London, 1998)

On my return, there was a Foreign Office telegram waiting for me telling me that Mohammed Sacirbey, the Bosnian representative in the UN in New York, had demonstrated protest against my demand that the Bosnian Army should withdraw from the demilitarised zone on Mt Igman. He claimed that this demand was inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 836, which permitted the Bosnians to retain their forces within safe areas. He had been instructed by the Vice-President Ejup Ganic to make this point, and to explain that the Bosnians had never officially agreed to the demilitarised zone on Mt Igman. What he said was complete nonsense, and I sent a signal to Kofi Annan in New York telling him that the August 1993 agreement had in fact been signed by both sides. The demilitarised zone was not a safe area, and was covered by a different NATO ultimatum. Nonetheless, Ganic continued to repeat these statements, presumably using the old principle that if you repeat something often enough it becomes true.

One evening we invited a friend in the Bosnian Army, Maj. Sisak, to dine with us. An intelligent man, he had previously been military assistant to Delic, and he always understood what the UN was doing for the people of Bosnia. He had recently completed a military staff course in America and was now working as a liaison officer in the UN embassy next door where we rarely saw him. He regretfully declined the invitation

grounds that he would not be able to attend unless accompanied by a US embassy. He was no longer a free agent. Jamie Daniell commented how sad it was that the of such a great country as America, founded on the principles of freedom of speech and rights of the individual, should act in such a repressive manner.

That night, Gobillard decided to clear all the Bosnian Army troops from the demilitarised zone on Mt Igman and led the assault himself. French troops moved on to Bosnian positions at last light with armoured bulldozers capable of physically destroying the trenches. The Bosnians hurled grenades down the slopes at the French and fired at their vehicles, fortunately without causing serious injury. By dawn Gobillard had driven the Bosnians out of the demilitarised zone with the exception of one small, isolated position.

The next day, Gobillard calmly sat in the President's office and explained to Izetbegovic as well as to his army commander, the details of the operation. Delic looked furious. Izetbegovic said nothing. Gobillard always led from the front and was a wonderful commander to his soldiers. He was always full of fun, and I had heard that he had taken to doing parachute rolls from his desk.

The Bosnians reacted to the actions of UNPROFOR by passing a motion in their parliament calling for my dismissal and replacement by someone who was more impartial. Akincic was incensed, and when I told him that I would frame a copy of the edict and hang it over my lavatory, he gave me an inscrutable stare through his glasses and said: "No, it is far too good for it. Use it first, then flush it down the loo!"

The next day, Maj. Indic, the Bosnian Serb liaison officer and one of Mladic's chief intelligence officers, asked Mike Stanley what would happen if I was assassinated by Muslims. When I told this to Goose, for the first time during my tour he looked slightly thoughtful. (page 191-192)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (12)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by The Harvill Press, London, 1998)

I had wondered many times about the extent of Izetbegovic's complicity in the problem that arose through his army's control of the tunnel. My initial view of him was that of a decent man, honourably pursuing the goal of creating a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Bosnia. If terrible things happened within the jurisdiction of the Bosnian Government it was a consequence of the confusion of war or it was because he had been misled in the dark by his army and police. In retrospect, I believe he knew exactly what was going on in Bosnia, and was personally responsible for the decision to keep his forces in the demilitarised zone on Mt Igman. (page 188)

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Subsequently Robert Fox and Patrick Bishop, writing in the Daily Telegraph, complained of the carping that was coming from within the UN organisation by UNPROFOR officers who regularly but anonymously let journalists know their misgivings about my strategy approach. More dangerous, they added, was the badmouthing from across the Atlantic because of the encouragement that it gave to the Bosnian Muslims to believe they were winning on the battlefield given the support of NATO bombing.

Although much of the criticism came from the absurd logic that I was being so imprudent as a peacekeeper that I was being partial to the Serbs, any accusation of being one-sided

dangerous to me as UNPROFOR Commander. It was my job as a peacekeeper to create conditions necessary for peace, and this meant I had to publicly identify whoever was working against peace, even if, as in this instance, it meant denouncing the Bosnian Government. (page 180)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (11)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by I Harvill Press, London, 1998)

As we left Ganic's office, news came in of a shooting at a tram in Sarajevo in which a person had been killed and 12 injured. It was all very depressing and as I went to the scene of the incident, I said to the interpreter, Darko, that I felt there was really no hope for a country that was so full of barbarism and hatred. He agreed with me.

It was clear that no side wanted peace in Bosnia, and whatever we did in the UN to bring about a halt to the slaughter, the leaders of the warring parties, who were revelling in themselves to be no better than their snipers, always undermined our efforts. I hoped that in the end, they would pay for their crimes, but for the time being it was the UN that I had to live with the consequences.

I spoke on the telephone that evening to Gen. Corvault, Chief of Staff to Adm. LeMay, to clarify NATO's position regarding the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Army which was in permanent violation of the NATO ultimatum covering the demilitarisation of Mt Igman. All my attempts to get the Bosnian forces to leave the zone using diplomatic means had failed and although we had tried some military action against the Bosnian Army, it was impossible for the UN to control such a vast area without air support. If we failed to react to the incursions by the Bosnian forces, then not only was the impartiality of the UN undermined, but also the credibility of NATO.

Corvault replied that, if the Bosnian Army fired on the UN, NATO would only be asked to help the French soldiers defend themselves. NATO was not prepared to carry out air strikes against the Bosnian Army merely because they were in the demilitarised zone. It was a violation of the NATO ultimatum. For the first time I was being officially told that NATO had taken sides in the war. My concern was how to prevent UNPROFOR being dragged along with it. Sadly, this failure by NATO to act impartially was to prove terminal for the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. (pages 184-187)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (10)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by I Harvill Press, London, 1998)

Based on the evidence presented so far, this action constituted a war crime, and Akashi courageously denounced the killings as an atrocity. The Bosnian Government court of appeal by claiming that the action was a legitimate military operation. "Our guys just wiped them out," bragged Ganic, while Izetbegovic accused Akashi of slandering his army.

On 8 October Milovanovic predictably sent a furious signal to Brinkman and me about the raid, accusing UNPROFOR of complicity. "By mistake or merit, 37 of my soldiers unfortunately have been killed and 34 of them wounded so far ... You did not do anything except that you meanly killed my troops. They are not guilty, you, the generals who are with them, are, and if a revenge occurs, it is clear against whom it will be taken. You promised yesterday that you would strike the Muslims on Igman by NATO aircraft today. And

happened? As usually, you ... are not programmed for the Muslims." True indeed. 'wretched man had a point, but this did not prevent me from writing a letter of protest to Karadzic that day about a sniping incident that had occurred in Sarajevo, calling on the UN to prosecute the perpetrators.

As peacekeepers we were not the moral guardians of either side in the war. Although we could collect evidence of war crimes, the UN had not been deployed in Bosnia to a investigating officer or judge. It is only the victorious side in a war that can do that

At a meeting with Ganic, also on 8 October, I once again threatened him with NATO strikes if I found his troops in the demilitarised zone. When he denied that they had entered the zone and that they had infiltrated from another direction, I showed him a photo taken that day of a Bosnian patrol crossing through the zone. At this, he became agitated and started waving his hands about, saying that his soldiers were in the demilitarised zone because of the incompetence of the UN. At one point Ganic said to David Harland, an amusing New Zealand lawyer working in Sarajevo for the UN: "You clearly have not read the August 1993 demilitarised zone agreement and do not understand it."

David replied drily: "You forget, Mr Ganic, that I was the person who drafted it and I can explain it to you in the first place!" I often wondered who, at MIT, had been responsible for giving such an incredibly inept man a doctorate in thermodynamics.

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (9)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T & A Harvill Press, London, 1998)

Since the early spring I had been striving to get the Bosnian Army to withdraw from the demilitarised zone. I reinforced the French battalion stationed on Mt Igman with a British Warrior company and then, from October to May, with a Swedish unit used to fighting in the deep snow that covers the mountain. On one or two occasions, after a warning, Swedish troops had opened fire on newly dug Bosnian trenches, forcing the Bosnians to withdraw. Nevertheless, encroachments had continued.

Izetbegovic denied the presence of Bosnian Army forces in the demilitarised zone, but once even agreed that, under the terms of the NATO ultimatum, he would have no objection to air strikes being carried out against any military forces found there. He told me I had given unequivocal orders that no Bosnian troops should enter the zone. However, a French unit, under their new Sector Commander Gen. Herve Gobillard, attacked a Bosnian Army position well inside the zone, Izetbegovic protested. "But I thought you said there were no Bosnian soldiers in the zone!" Gobillard replied. By the beginning of October the Bosnian Army had become much subtler, infiltrating the zone at night and, using newly acquired night-vision aids, attacking Serb positions on the far side of the zone.

At a meeting in Pale on 5 October, attended by Akashi, de Lapresle and me, Karadzic protested that these attacks had resulted in an increasing number of Serb deaths. He demanded to know why the UN always used force against the Serbs when they were in violation of a NATO ultimatum, but never used force against the Bosnians? With a dramatic flourish, he said that the situation was becoming intolerable to him. What should he do about the widows and orphans of people killed in the NATO air strikes, some of whom were civilians? As he spoke, I noticed that Mladic was silently weeping. Karadzic went on to say that it would be better if the UN departed, and left the Serb Army to finish the job it had been prevented from completing by the arrival of the UN.

He ended by warning us that if another NATO air strike was threatened against his army, he would deem himself to be at war with the UN, and his army would start shelling UNPROFOR positions. At this point Mladic miraculously cheered up and launched

of his more crazed accounts of what he would do to anyone who threatened the Ser

That same day, protests to the Bosnian Government brought angry denials from Ga proceeded to call on Akashi to resign for allowing ethnic cleansing to continue aro Luka, and for allowing the Serbs to block UN convoys and close the airport. "If a J aeroplane crashes," he insisted, "then the Minister of Transport in Japan resigns." (

On the following night (6 October), having successfully achieved the return of its r prisoners, a Bosnian Army patrol crossed the demilitarised zone and killed 20 Serb and nurses in a medical aid and command post. Passing through the zone, the patrc the Serbs unawares and most of the victims had been killed in their sleeping bags. . doctor summoned to the scene found that eight of the Serbs had been killed with ki most of them had been finished off with a single bullet in the back of the head. Sor bodies had been badly burned. Four of the victims were female nurses. The next af an open lorry passed us in Sarajevo with a group of black-suited soldiers with blackhandkerchiefs knotted round their heads waving weapons in the air and shout "Allah Akbar!" We were told they were a specially trained unit that had just had a , victory on Mt Igman.

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (8)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T Harvill Press, London, 1998)

On our return to Sarajevo, we warmly welcomed Glynne Evans. We looked forward visits as she invariably introduced a breath of fresh air into the debate about Bosnia never accepted that serious damage would be done to US-UK relations through dif of opinion over Bosnia. Indeed, she felt that if we allowed the UN to cross the "Mc Line" - the line that separates peacekeeping from war-fighting - then a much greater would be put upon the Alliance, as it would then become embroiled in a war, which create far greater divisions.

After each visit, she always wrote an amusing report, full of common sense and ins latest was entitled "Strangulation of Sarajevo?" and it began with the words: "Well really". She went on to say:

Sarajevo is now more at peace than I have ever known it. Late at night, the only so dogs barking. The city is filled with flickering lights. Electricity is back. Seven out nine water pumps have been repaired. I went out to dinner in Sarajevo; tomato sala cream cheese followed by knuckle of veal with potatoes accompanied by wine and bread. The restaurants and cafes are thriving. After a packed Mass at the Cathedral attended with Gen. Rose on Sunday, we strolled through the centre of the city thro people. Flower-packed stalls selling eggs, vegetables, running shoes, Ray bans and jeans. The trams, which rushed past, were full. A shiny new white Mercedes with a number plate drove past us. The Sarajevan soul is alive and kicking.

This was certainly not what the warmongers in Bosnia and elsewhere wished to he. did the press write about this resurgence of life in Sarajevo. It was more interesting about the continuing strangulation of the city, or focus on outbreaks of fighting bet armies elsewhere in Bosnia. Peace has no news value and the Bosnian Governmen soon give the press what they wanted.

A demilitarised zone had been established on Mt Igman in August 1993, when Bos Government forces were in full retreat from the Bosnian Serbs. At that time they h recently captured the summit of Mt Igman and were about to achieve the complete

encirclement of Sarajevo. The potential consequences of this were extremely serious. The fall of Sarajevo would have almost certainly resulted in the end of the Bosnian State. In desperation, Izetbegovic appealed to the world for help and, following an ultimatum from NATO to the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Mt Igman, an agreement between the Bosnian Government and Delic was negotiated on 14 August 1993 by Gen. Briquemont for all forces to be withdrawn from the region. Brig. Vere Hayes, Chief of Staff to Briquemont, had then drawn up a map, showing the boundaries of this newly formed demilitarised zone. Any troops entering the zone would be deemed to be in violation of the NATO ultimatum and subject to air strikes.

Since the spring of 1994 the Bosnian Army had started to move into the old Serb positions on Mt Igman, despite attempts to prevent this by the French and Swedish troops who were garrisoning the zone. It was clear the Bosnian Government had begun to assume, with good reason, that the international community would turn a blind eye to any attempt to recover lost territories by force. Natural justice and a feeling of sympathy would allow them to breach the international agreement that prevented them from doing this, even though the Bosnian Government had originally asked for that agreement. It was inconceivable that NATO could be seen bombing the "victim State". (...)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (7)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by I B Tauris, London, 1998)

There was a limit to the hard line that we could take with the Bosnian Government. We knew that the Americans were unlikely to allow NATO air power to be used against the Bosnian Army, even though it was in breach of a NATO ultimatum, nor was it likely that economic sanctions would be imposed on the Bosnians for breaking UN Security Council resolutions. In this context, UNPROFOR was not able to sustain the principle of impartiality that is so essential to any peacekeeping mission.

As a result, relations between the UN and the Bosnian Serbs became lastingly and immeasurably more difficult after the Bosnian Army offensive. On 20 September, a meeting in Pale held to prevent the Serbs from cutting off the electricity, gas and water to Sarajevo in response to the Bosnian attack, Karadzic subjected Viktor and me to a diatribe. "How can you talk about the restoration of utilities to the Muslims in Sarajevo when they have just attacked us with heavy weapons in breach of the Airport Agreement and the NATO ultimatum? How can you raise such issues when they have systematically refused to talk about a cessation of hostilities, and the international community has subjected us to economic sanctions which are causing our people to live far worse than the citizens of Sarajevo? How dare you complain on behalf of a leadership that cares so little for its own people!"

Viktor, who was generally treated with a certain deference by the Bosnian Serbs, was visibly shaken by Karadzic's anger. We reiterated the fact that we had publicly condemned the actions of the Bosnian Government and that to respond to the Bosnian attack would merely strengthen the image of a city under siege and that would not help the Serbs. Karadzic eventually calmed down and said he would reconnect the Sarajevo utilities. In return, the Bosnian Government allowed the electricity lines that passed through Bosnian territory to Banja Luka to be repaired. This seemed a reasonable trade-off. A civilian committee of the UN normally dealt with the restoration of utilities in Bosnia, but in 1993 negotiations had remained, until then, in a state of deadlock.

When we presented this new proposal to Izetbegovic the next day, his attitude had changed and he seemed warm and friendly. I think he had begun to appreciate that by stopping

fighting before there were any serious civilian casualties, he had managed to contain a situation that could potentially cause great damage to the Bosnian image abroad; and he had the UN to thank for this. He told Viktor that he wanted to develop closer relations with the UN, and he agreed to allow the repair of the Serb electricity lines where they ran through Bosnian-controlled territory. All this promised well and Viktor and I left the meeting in happier mood. In retrospect, it was probably naive of us to think that Izetbegovic's friendly attitude towards the UN was anything other than a short-term tactic designed to recover a potentially damaging situation prior to his visit to Washington. He mistakenly thought that launching the attack in Sarajevo on 18 September would produce images of war helpful to his cause. Now, faced with our evidence, he was forced to make a dramatic U-turn. The Bosnians, above all, understood the relationship between military and political action. (pages 170-174)

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On 22 September Karadzic had told Sergio de Mello that the partiality of the UN was no longer tolerable... He did agree that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo was an attractive idea that should be pursued, although this was dependent upon the Muslims agreeing to a total cessation of hostilities in Bosnia. (page 180)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (6)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T Harvill Press, London, 1998)

We returned to the Residency, and I immediately sent letters of protest to the military commanders of both sides threatening them with NATO air strikes if the fighting continued the next day. The next morning I received a reply from Gvero, Mladic's Deputy Army Commander, in which he stated that the Muslim forces had attacked across the line of confrontation in two places in the area of Trebevic and in the region of the villages Faletici and Lapisnica. His estimation was that the Bosnian Army had intended to cut off two main Serb routes that ran north and south of Sarajevo. Gvero ended his signal by pointing out that the Serbs had not attempted to recover their weapons from the UN-identified weapon-collecting sites, although they had suffered a number of casualties. In an informal note, Gvero had ended by wondering "whether the attacks were accidental". The Bosnian Army did not answer my letter.

The next day limited fighting was still going on, so Viktor and I summoned a meeting with Izetbegovic, with Gen. Delic in attendance. I presented Izetbegovic with the evidence produced by the Cymbeline mortar-locating troop showing that the Bosnian Army had plainly started the fighting and had deliberately fired from positions around the hostilities Presidency, and even close to my own HQ.

Probably for the first time in the war, the Bosnians had been caught red-handed. The evidence was incontrovertible and their actions probably constituted a war crime as a violation of the NATO ultimatum, as it is against the Geneva Protocol deliberately to involve civil populations in war. I reminded Izetbegovic that while the UN had to remain neutral as a mediator, it was not indifferent to the plight of the people in Bosnia who were suffering so greatly. Nevertheless, the UN could not overlook such actions by the Bosnian Army. I had to know whether it was the Bosnian Government's policy to return to the status quo; if this were so, the UN would have no alternative but to withdraw from Bosnia. I had been in touch with NATO regarding the use of air strikes against the Bosnian mortar positions. I explained to him how tragic it had been the day before to see a mother with children desperately fleeing for cover. I showed him the Cymbeline mortar traces superimposed on a map.

I would release them to the media unless he called a halt to the fighting.

Izetbegovic, who had been looking reasonably calm when I began, went white in the face. Releasing the mortar traces to the press would erode any political or moral support he might be expecting to obtain when he went to Washington the following week. He looked over the map, asking where the Kosevo hospital was in relation to the mortar positions while Delic sat snorting and blowing like an old walrus washed up on the beach. Before the meeting, Izetbegovic had been reduced to saying that his army had been repulsed by an increasing number of sniper attacks on their positions and that the mortars had been fired "by a drunken mortar crew". When he saw the look of incredulity that greeted this explanation, he added that he did indeed wish the UN to remain in Bosnia and that he respected our impartiality. He agreed to issue orders for an immediate cessation of fire. Viktor Andreev then introduced the subject of the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. Clearly on the defensive, Izetbegovic said that he supported the idea in principle, but he doubted the Serbs would agree. Viktor said that he was confident they would support the plan and added that future prospects for peace would be improved by restraint being shown by both sides. It was impossible for the UN to carry out its mission when both sides were determined on war.

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (5)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by I B Tauris Press, London, 1998)

Shortly after the signing of the Sarajevo Airport Agreement on 9 February, I had deployed a number of British Cymbeline mortar-locating radars, capable of tracking shells from the moment of firing to the point of impact. I told the Bosnians and the Serbs that this equipment allowed me to accurately identify who was responsible for breaking the ceasefire. In reality the equipment was outdated and much time had to be spent in maintenance. It was only possible to keep the radars switched on for very limited periods of time and even then the arc of observation was extremely narrow. Only when the sound of a mortar was heard could the radar equipment be switched on. A single shell could not be identified. After 45 years of the cold war, this was the best that was available from British military inventory. Although the Jordanians and Pakistanis had better radar equipment, it could not be deployed outside central Bosnia as the Serbs would not allow UN convoys from Muslim countries to transit their territory.

When we got to the fort, we found that the British radar operators had positioned themselves in the thick of the battle. They had switched on the radars when they heard the first mortar fire and the traces of the shell trajectories that they had obtained so far made it clear that the Bosnian Government forces had fired the first salvos. Behind us on a hill, we could see the Bosnian infantry in the midst of a largescale attack against the Serbs. The Serbs were responding with heavy machine-guns and rocket launchers. The noise was deafening. The British position was being hit by fire from both sides. Fortunately, the radars were installed in two old APCs, and the operators had also taken the precaution of sandbagging their position. As I got out of the Range Rover and walked rather rapidly behind the sandbags, Jamie Daniell wandered over to the edge of the fort, supposing that the people behind the sheets that had been put up to provide cover from view were in fact sandbags. He was fortunate not to be killed by a heavy burst of machine-gun fire that hit the compound just below where he was standing. He rapidly joined us in the sandbagged compound looking rather sheepish.

Inside the radar vehicles, the operators, under command of a highly experienced Royal Artillery sergeant, were calmly plotting the shells as they passed overhead. We waited for about two hours, after which the fighting began to die down. The Serbs,

could clearly see in their trenches in the pine-covered forest behind us, had beaten Bosnian Army attack. By then, they were using their own artillery and mortars to fire Bosnian mortars, one of which had been established in the grounds of Kosevo hospital. A tactic already observed and pro-tested about my predecessor, Gen. Francis Briquien. Bosnians had evidently chosen this location with the intention of attracting Serb fire. I hope that the resulting carnage would further tilt international support in their favor.

History is likely to pass judgement on the Bosnian leaders for using these inhuman weapons. "History will judge us accordingly," as Winston Churchill once said, "but do not fear. I will be one of the historians." On this occasion it was the Cymbeline mortar-locust troop who were the historians.

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (4)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by I B Tauris Press, London, 1998)

On 18 September, all our efforts to restore confidence in the peace process in Bosnia were shattered. The Bosnian Army launched a major infantry assault and mortar bombardment against Serb positions in the eastern part of the city of Sarajevo. I had returned from Brussels two days previously, and Viktor and I had spent the earlier part of that day there. We had attempted to persuade Karadzic that the position taken by the Contact Group was not tantamount to a declaration of war against the Bosnian Serbs by the international community. We explained to him that it was unlikely the arms embargo would be lifted and that the Bosnian Serbs should persevere with the peace process. He was looking ill and covered in sores.

Gen. Mladic was not present, and towards the end of the meeting, Karadzic said he would like us to pass a private message to the Contact Group, which still refused to see him. Indicating a map on the wall, he told us that, although he strongly disagreed with the Contact Group map, he would be prepared to accept less than 50% of Bosnia in any territorial division of the country. Exactly where the boundaries between the two parts of the country lay would have to be the subject of further negotiation but the Serbs would be prepared to give up claims to Sarajevo. The lines on his map showing the proposed territorial division of Bosnia looked remarkably like the original Vance-Owen proposal. He ended on an optimistic note: he was going to build a new capital city of the Republic of Srpska on the other side of the Sarajevo airfield.

It would be a European Hong Kong. I told him that I would pass his message on to the British Foreign Office, and duly did. He never received a reply.

We returned to Sarajevo that afternoon believing that some sort of compromise between the Serbs and the Bosnians would be possible. I was further encouraged to see a copy of an order that had been sent that morning by Milovanovic telling his forces around Sarajevo to withdraw all heavy weapons remaining in the TEZ to a distance of at least 20 kilometers from Sarajevo. I was in my office at 1730 reading this order, when an immense artillery barrage erupted in the hills nearby, to the immediate east of the Residency. The Residency building began to shake and dust drifted down from the ceiling. From the window I saw people, who seconds before had been enjoying a peaceful Sunday afternoon, see their children and run for cover in a way they had not had to do for many months. Jamie and I jumped into the Range Rover, and with Goose driving we tore through the rapidly emptying streets to the scene of the battle.

People were sheltering in doorways, looking utterly shocked by the cruel resumption of the fighting. In what, until then, had seemed to be a city gradually returning to normality. One woman holding a tiny baby was crouching behind a wall, crying helplessly, and as we passed her she turned towards us, her face frozen with fear. Her eyes were devoid of hope. It seemed as though her world had come to an end.

We made for the old Turkish fort at the eastern end of Sarajevo to find out what had brought this outbreak of fighting and which side had brought the ceasefire to an end. As we approached the scene of the fighting, we saw bullets and shrapnel striking the wall: buildings and the embankment of the river.

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (3)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T Harvill Press, London, 1998)

On 11 September, Adm. Leighton Smith wrote a letter to de Lapresle stating that the ceasefire violations of the Bosnian Serbs were undermining the collective credibility of NATO and the UN, and suggesting that NATO should attack significant targets within the next 48 hours. In a revealing line in the letter, he told de Lapresle that "his instructions were clear".

The Admiral's letter provoked surprise and shock in Zagreb and Brussels, given the level of military activity in Bosnia that summer, as well as the apparent decision of the international community to give peace another chance. Until then, Adm. Leighton had seemed to understand the careful balance that had to be maintained between the occasional need to use force and the requirements of the humanitarian mission.

There were, after all, more than a million people still wholly dependent for their survival on UN aid in Bosnia, and UNHCR had warned that the coming winter would significantly increase this number. Dropping bombs on the Serbs would not help the dire human situation.

It seemed probable to de Lapresle and me that the letter had been drafted higher up the chain of command, possibly by Joulwan, whose prime interest seemed to be the "credibility" of NATO, and that Smith had sent it against his better judgement. In a tough reply, Lapresle restated that force should be used only in relation to a confirmed violation and that it should be proportional to the event. This accorded with his "conscience as an officer" and the troops under his command had been sent to Bosnia as peacekeepers, not combat units. He insisted that he fully supported the policies being pursued by the Commander in Chief, Gen. Rose. On a visit to Brussels shortly afterwards, we were consequently subjected to a charm offensive by Joulwan. I heard later that his less than sensitive handling of the situation had been noted in Washington, and he had been obliged to adopt a more conciliatory approach in what was supposed to be a supporting role.

At the meeting, I dismissed the idea that UNPROFOR had gone soft on the Serbs by allowing a reimposition of the siege of Sarajevo as nonsense. The Serbs had not halted the delivery of aid into Sarajevo, although the recent offensives by the Bosnian Army had caused the Serbs to deny the passage of commercial traffic into the city. The utilities had been restored and the trams were running once again, although there were still occasional exchanges of fire. The anti-sniping agreement was generally being respected, and the flow of goods in the shops in Sarajevo were still falling. Restaurants and cafes were reopening and life for the citizens, if not pleasant, was survivable.

Because of the success of UN mediation, people tended to forget there was still a very real fight between the two sides. To achieve this, the UN had pushed peace enforcement to its limits, despite its marginalisation by the Contact Group. Many of the NATO nations had troops in Bosnia had warned me not to use any greater levels of force. These countries had sent peacekeepers, not combat units, to Bosnia. I ended by quoting President J. F. Kennedy: "the road to peace is a slow and painful one. You proceed step by step. There are no immediate solutions."

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (2)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by 1 Harvill Press, London, 1998)

In Washington at the end of February Prime Minister Silajdzic had agreed to the opening of Tuzla airfield, but at our meeting on 6 March with the Bosnian Government, Izetbegovic went back on this agreement. At the same meeting Ganic reneged on the agreement made with me to open the Brotherhood and Unity bridge, between the Bosnian-held part of the city and the Serb suburb of Grbavica (...) Ganic, on the other hand, who was responsible for the Bosnian Armed Forces and the para-military police, had become ever more powerful. He remained close to President Izetbegovic and by the end of 1994 he was the main point of contact between the UN and the Bosnian Government. As a member of the inner cabinet he also controlled the Bosnian press, radio and television. (pages 79-80)

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By 8 June it was apparent that the Geneva talks would produce no substantial agreement. Although the Serbs would have settled for a four-month cessation of hostilities, they would only do this if it was linked to a political deal. The Bosnians would only agree to it if it returned to the status quo ante in Gorazde remained a pre-condition. In the end, to save everyone's face, Akashi cobbled together a four-week ceasefire; but the day after Clinton signed this agreement, the Bosnian Army, under his direction, launched a major attack against the Serbs in the Ozren mountains, north-west of Tuzla. (page 138)

* * *

On 10 August a Bosnian Army T55 tank was spotted leaving a tunnel behind the Ruzica. Although the Bosnian Army often fired 120mm mortars at the Serbs in the Jewish Cemetery from the grounds of the Kosevo hospital, this was the first time that we had seen one of their tanks. I therefore asked for a US AC130 aircraft that was circling Sarajevo at the time to look for it. Although the aircraft carried a sophisticated weapon system capable of putting a 105mm shell down a rabbit hole from 5,000 feet, it was unable to identify the Bosnian tank that was moving around amid the traffic and clutter of buildings in Sarajevo. (page 161)

* * *

In mid-August, the Bosnian Army shelled the Serb town of Ilijas on the outskirts of Sarajevo. Ilijas was well within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and again the Bosnians were in breach of the NATO ultimatum. In the attack, a school teacher and women and children killed. (page 163)

* * *

On 4 September, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke had visited Bosnia to see for himself the progress being made by the UN. Holbrooke was a man in a hurry. He told Andrew Ridgeway that he did not like briefings, and proceeded to question him on the situation in central Bosnia and on the consequences of lifting the arms embargo on the newly formed Federation. Andrew explained that the Bosnian Army was responsible for most of the ceasefire violations in south-west Bosnia, and that the lifting of the arms embargo would result in a return to war and a break-up of the Federation. At this point an official in the US embassy in Sarajevo was overheard saying to the ambassador, Vukobratovic: "This is awful. It's not what we want him to hear at all!" This encouraged Andrew to continue in his current vein, as he realised that the US embassy reports

sent back to Washington were probably painting a very different picture from the c was now describing to Holbrooke. (pages 167-168)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Ceasefire agreements (1)

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by T Harvill Press, London, 1998)

Since there is no such thing as a tidy end to fighting, a certain amount of shelling in Sarajevo continued throughout the day, mostly from the Muslim side. When I sent protest to Divjak, he replied that he would no longer talk to me because of the way treated him the day before. (...) About that time, I watched a dramatic report by Pet of CNN, filmed from the roof of the Holiday Inn, implying that the UN ceasefire had already broken down and that Sarajevo was under heavy attack by the Serbs, although his footage, it seemed to us that the rounds were outgoing and had been fired by the Muslims, not by the Serbs. Someone commented that he appeared to be confusing with Baghdad.

I immediately complained to CNN, and I was not sorry to see Arnett leave Bosnia. (53-54)

* * *

The day after the ceasefire came into effect I was asked by Sue McGregor on the E Today programme to reply to a statement made earlier by Mohammed Sacirbey, the Government representative to the UN. Speaking from Miami where he had a law practice he said that the UN-brokered ceasefire was a sham and that Serb shells were still falling on the besieged city of Sarajevo. Nothing, he said, had changed. As he spoke, I looked out the window.

I could see in the streets the people of Sarajevo walking peacefully in the sunshine with their children, something they had been unable to do for many months. I described to Sue McGregor the view from my window and suggested that it was the people of Sarajevo rather than I, who should reply to Mohammed Sacirbey, who was, or so I understood, "speaking from a sunbed in Miami".

Every time I met him thereafter, he would try to convince me that he had actually been in his office at the time, not on the beach, and complained that my comment had done much damage. It was curious that so consummate an advocate for the Muslim cause did not appreciate how propaganda can work both ways. (pages 54-55)

* * *

Not to be outdone, Ambassador Charles Redman, President Clinton's special envoy to Bosnia, also flew in. Chuck Redman, as he was known to all, was a calm, assured man who looked a little out of place in the chaos and destruction of Sarajevo. He was protected by a posse of nervous-looking US Secret Service bodyguards. Redman was up to date on much of what was happening and at our first meeting he told me that at all costs we must stop the Serbs from playing cat-and-mouse with us. I explained that the Serbs had offered themselves to be more than happy to stop the fighting while they were ahead, and that it had been the Muslims who had tried to renege on the meeting at the airport.

Redman replied that the Serbs could not be allowed to benefit from their aggression and that nothing would stop America from pursuing its goal of re-establishing a unitary Bosnia. It was obvious he had been sent to Sarajevo with a specific agenda, influenced by the need for Clinton to be seen to get tough on the Bosnian Serbs in the run up to the congressional elections. (page 59)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

About the crimes against own people

General Michael Rose - Extracts from his book Fighting for Peace, published by The Harvill Press, London, 1998)

More serious were reports we started to receive from the French in the city that the forces were sometimes firing on their own citizens. In one such incident a tram had been fired on from a building on the Bosnian side of the conflict line normally occupied by paramilitary police. In another incident, following a mortar attack near the Residency which killed two children, two more shells had been fired at the same location while a French Army team was investigating the first incident. These secondary shots could only have come from the Bosnian side of the firing line. On the other side of the city, on several occasions UN and NATO aircraft at Sarajevo airport had been fired at from the Muslim-held area of Butmir.

The Bosnian Government always denied that their forces had ever fired on their own people or on the UN. Nor, in the circumstances of civil war in Bosnia, was it always possible for the UN to prove conclusively who had fired any particular shot, though it was sometimes possible to identify the firing point. It is also possible that the Bosnian Government gave orders for such attacks. Nonetheless, in my view the moral distinction between Bosnian forces firing at the Serbs with the intention of provoking retaliation against civilians and the Bosnians themselves firing on their own people is a fine one. (page 198)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Crime at the "Markale" market place in Sarajevo

General Michael Rose - Extract from his book Fighting for Peace, published by The Harvill Press, London, 1998)

Although the Serbs had now agreed virtually everything the Bosnians had asked for, the UN was reluctant to sign up to a ceasefire, once again on the grounds that the UN proposal was not linked to any long-term political settlement. I told him that the people of Sarajevo at that moment certainly settled for something short of this, just to be able to live in peace. He still would not agree.

At this point I sprang a nasty surprise on him. I told him that the first UN examination of a bomb crater in the Markale market place indicated that the bomb had been fired from the Bosnian side of the battle lines. The room went dead silent and Hajrulahovic looked very anxious. He coldly asked me to explain. I told him that the angle of the trajectory of the mortar bomb suggested that it had been fired at extremely short range from their side of the lines or perhaps detonated in situ. It was difficult, I said, to be precise when only one witness had been fired and also because the Bosnian Army had removed some of the important forensic evidence before the UN arrived. (page 48)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Initial Muslim tactics

General Michael Rose - Extract from his book Fighting for Peace, published by The Harvill Press, London, 1998)

As we crossed the conflict line on to the Bosnian side a detachment of 120mm mortar opened fire close by the road to our left. Bosnian forces were shelling Serb positions on the hills above the city. I asked rather nervously what was happening and Viktor Andrejko

Russian UN civil adviser in Sarajevo, who had come to meet me and who was to be my inseparable friend and colleague, told me there was nothing to worry about. There was no such thing in the eyes of the Bosnian Government, he explained, as a military action. There was only political action. They always greeted new arrivals to Sarajevo in this way, and the Serbs always responded in kind with artillery fire on visitors. Visitors were thus given a practical demonstration of the aggression being committed against the State of Bosnia. In this way, the Bosnian Government hoped to persuade the West to become involved in the war on their side. When I asked about the civilian toll that this tactic resulted in, Viktor merely shrugged and replied that civilians mattered more to the Bosnian Government than images of suffering and war.

In New York, I had mentioned this tactic of the Bosnian Government to Madeleine Albright. She confirmed that the US Administration knew what was happening but could do nothing about it! (...) Obviously my first task would be to tell President Izetbegovic that this strategy of inflicting such horrors on his own people would never succeed and that I would do all in my power to prevent the UN from becoming engaged in a war in Bosnia as a combatant. (page 18)

* * *

Full demilitarisation of Sarajevo would have required the removal of all Bosnian military units. For the Bosnian Government this was a step too far, as it would mean that they were no longer sovereign in their own capital. Handing over the security of Sarajevo to the UN would also reduce the possibility of any financial gain that UN control of all movement in and out of the city generated for the party leaders. In the view of some extremists in the SDA it was better to keep the shells falling on their people in the hope that the US would one day enter the war on their side and to conceal this inhuman strategy, they continued to blame the world for allowing "slow-motion genocide" to take place in their country. (page 45)

* * *

The French battalion guarding the airport had managed to pin down one of the firing positions that was in the Bosnian-held town of Butmir, close to the confrontation line. On one occasion, a French soldier had actually seen a mortar fired from Butmir, across the airport, at aircraft waiting to unload on the dispersal apron. The Bosnian forces were evidently doing this to sustain the image of a city under siege. (page 162)

* * *

However, the Serbs never blocked convoys in such a systematic manner that a military response from UNPROFOR became inevitable. Even during 1994, at a time when the Serbs were accused of the "strangulation of Sarajevo", stocks of food in the city were never completely exhausted, gas and water remained connected and so, for much of the time, there was electricity. (page 246)

Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac

Civil War

General Michael Rose - Extract from his book Fighting for Peace, published by The Press, London, 1998)

Bosnians frequently pointed out that an international coalition led by America took action against Iraq when Kuwait was invaded, whereas the international community did nothing to help Bosnia in the face of a similar aggression. However, the situation in Bosnia was not simply that of one nation invading another. It was a civil war about territory.

which the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs sought to secede from the State and with their compatriots in neighbouring Croatia and Serbia.(page 3)

Looking back, the cautious response by the international community to the war in Bosnia is understandable. It had attempted to prevent war by keeping the former Yugoslavia together. When that policy failed, it sought to limit the conflict by imposing an arms embargo and tried to alleviate suffering by sending humanitarian relief. (page 251)

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Prologue

The history preceding the conflict: Yugoslavia up till 1991

Chapter 1

The era up till 1945

1. Introduction

In January 1991 J. Fietelaars, the Dutch ambassador to Yugoslavia, sent a message from Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague that Slovenia was virtually certain to leave the Federation of Yugoslavia.[1] The Dutch diplomat felt this would lead to a political momentum where Croatia would rapidly follow Slovenia's example and the remaining republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro would no longer wish to belong to the remnants of a Yugoslav state that would be dominated by Serbia.

An answer to the question of what would happen if Yugoslavia were to disintegrate came on 16 January from none other than President Milosevic of Serbia during a four-hour lunch in Belgrade with the European Community ambassadors to Yugoslavia. Here, Milosevic indicated 'the ultimate compromise' that Serbia was prepared to make if Yugoslavia were to collapse: 'If this cannot be achieved peacefully, Serbia will have to opt for the power resources that we have at our disposal but they (the remaining republics) do not possess.' According to the coded message that Ambassador Fietelaars sent to The Hague, the Serbian president continued by saying:

'... [B]ut let there be no misunderstanding about this: if a federal Yugoslavia is no longer supported then the Serbian willingness to make sacrifices is rendered superfluous and is robbed of its value. We will then return to our starting point, to our Serbia. But this is not the present administrative department but the Serbs' fatherland, and the Serbs in Yugoslavia who declare themselves in favour of a return to the Serb fatherland have the right to do this and the Serbian people will enforce that right.' [2]

Milosevic told his diplomatic audience that Serbia had no objection to Slovenia leaving the Yugoslav state structure because hardly any Serbs lived there. In Croatia, where 650,000 Serbs lived, 'the borders will be adjusted and the Serbian enclaves will be secured. This is inevitable and is non-negotiable. Otherwise leaving the federation cannot be accepted and will be opposed by every available means.' As yet the Serbian leader had reached no conclusions about Macedonia's position. But Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to remain a part of Yugoslavia. 'There's no place for concession.' [3]

Five months later Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. During the days that followed, images appeared throughout the world of terrified Yugoslav People's Army conscripts who had found themselves caught up in a real war in Europe. For 45 years Europe had been synonymous with the absence of war. This almost idyllic situation came to an abrupt end in June 1991. For the Europeans, war was no longer something distant.

At first it still seemed like a 'drôle de guerre': an operetta-like war in Slovenia. It was a war that would last for ten days and would claim no more than a few dozen dead and wounded.[4] By contrast in Croatia, which had also proclaimed its independence, the conflict between Belgrade and the

renegade republics rapidly took a sinister turn. Serbs and Croats were fighting a war where the Geneva Convention was repeatedly violated.

The conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. This occurred shortly after the United Nations had decided to station troops in Croatia that were known as the *United Nations Protection Force*, or UNPROFOR for short. It was under this UNPROFOR flag that the Netherlands soon became involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as ultimately it was also to be in the fall of Srebrenica. This was because UNPROFOR's mandate was rapidly extended to include Bosnia.

The Netherlands contributed to the UNPROFOR peacekeeping force from the very start. At first its contribution included a signals battalion and a transport battalion but this was later extended to the formation of a fighting unit in East Bosnia in March 1994. This meant that the Netherlands had sent 2339 armed soldiers to the former Yugoslavia so that the Dutch were the fourth largest supplier of troops to UNPROFOR (after France, Great Britain and Jordan) and were the eighth worldwide in terms of the 17 United Nations' peace operations that were currently underway.^[5] In addition, approximately 400 men of the Dutch Royal Navy and an additional 400 members of the Dutch Royal Air Force were deployed for the operations in and around the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, with its contingent of 50 unarmed UN observers, the Netherlands also supplied the largest proportion of the 600 *United Nations Military Observers* (UNMOs) in the former Yugoslavia. Most of the unit, or 'Dutchbat' as it was known in UN jargon, was stationed at Srebrenica, a Muslim enclave in East Bosnia. Its role was security, a task for which other countries had shown little enthusiasm.

In July 1995, sixteen months after the deployment of the first Dutch fighting battalion, Bosnian Serb troops overran the United Nations Safe Area of Srebrenica. The Dutch UN troops who were present were forced to abandon their task and over the following days several thousand Muslims were killed in the forests and at execution sites in this 'safe area's' immediate vicinity.

Many felt that this was proof of the moral bankruptcy of an international community that had worked for three years without finding a political solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This was a bitter blow, certainly when bearing in mind the radical changes to the world stage that had recently occurred. The world order had changed radically since the reformer Mikhail Gorbachev had taken office in Moscow in 1985: Soviet control over Eastern Europe had been dismantled, the Berlin Wall had fallen and, finally, Communism had ceased to be the Soviet Union's governing movement in the summer of 1991. This led around 1990 to a general sense of euphoria about the new world order that had been created by the end of the Cold War which had dominated international relations for more than 40 years. This euphoria became still more intense at the beginning of 1991 when an international force under the leadership of the United States rapidly ended the occupation of Kuwait. American President George Bush declared that his country had entered the war against Iraq because of 'more than one small country; it is a big idea, a new world order'.^[6] This new world order would include new forms of co-operation between countries, a peaceful settling of differences, international solidarity against aggression, arms reduction, arms control and the fair treatment of all peoples. It was received with general acclaim.

However, there was also cause for concern. Now that a suicidal war between East and West was no longer an issue, there was an increasing awareness that there were also fewer restraints on outbursts of violence, particularly in the Balkans.^[7] Indeed, rather than suddenly improving, the international context had simply changed. This does not alter the fact that the violent outbursts in the Balkans in the early 1990s were difficult to understand within this international context.

The violence in the Balkans was also in stark contrast to the solemn tributes at the 1980 funeral of Josip 'Tito' Broz. This event in a still-united Yugoslavia was attended by the largest imaginable collection of heads of state from both East and West along with the Non-Aligned Movement countries. All of them paid their last respects to the man who, for 35 years, had enabled Yugoslavia to gain a unique position and respect in the world.

What happened in the 11 years between 1980 and 1991 when the country that Tito had forged together was finally to disintegrate? Where are the causes of the dramatic end of the multi-ethnic state

of Yugoslavia? Do these causes exclusively exist in Yugoslavia itself or were there also external ones? Have other nations or the international community either intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia's political structure? Would it have been possible to try to prevent this deterioration externally? And what were the outside world's options to end or to limit the conflict once it had started? Which routes were open here and what resources were available? These questions are mainly discussed at the beginning of the preceding history because they are necessary for a good understanding of the events that occurred in and around the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. What follows reveals an all-too-frequent collision between the reality of international decision-makers and the reality of the developments within the region itself. The consequences were to be fateful.

As was previously stated, a good understanding of the events in Srebrenica can only be achieved by exploring the history of Yugoslavia. This chapter has already referred to President Tito who managed to maintain his country's unity for dozens of years. We must now focus on the period of his regime and on the preceding era so as to be able to understand that the conflict in the early 1990s had an extensive and contiguous history.

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[1] Hazewinkel, 'Beleid', pp. 10 and 13.

[2] ABZ, DDI-DEU/ARA/00408, Joegoslavië/Binnenlandse politiek/Servië, Fietelaars 14, 21/01/91.

[3] ABZ, DDI-DEU/ARA/00408, Joegoslavië/Binnenlandse politiek/Servië, Fietelaars 14, 21/01/91.

[4] Zametica, *Conflict*, p. 15 mentions the Slovenian armed forces sustaining 19 fatalities with the federal army incurring 45.

[5] Apart from the three countries already mentioned, it came after Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Malaysia. M.A.W. Scheffelaar, 'De blauwe onmacht', *Carré* 1995, no. 11, p. 11; the Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Nederlandse militairen in en rond voormalig Joegoslavië. Stand van zaken 1 maart 1994'.

[6] Quoted in Dore, *Japan*, p. 116.

[7] K. Koch, 'Het nieuwe dreigingsbeeld, Nederlandse defensie tegen een nieuwe achtergrond', p. 11.