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SREBRENICA
III

NUMBERS/

BACKGROUND

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(AARL) JONDER.

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In deze bijdrage staat het concept 'human security' centraal. In het eerste deel wordt een beeld geschetst van het nut en gebruik van dit concept met betrekking tot het beleid en de concrete activiteiten van overheden en burgerinitiatieven in oorlogssituaties. In het bijzonder wordt stil gestaan bij 'lifeline operations' in het kader van het (nieuwe) 'human security'-beleid van vredesgroepen en de soms gespannen relatie met het (oude) 'advocacy'-beleid. Het tweede deel gaat nader in op het drama-Srebrenica – precies tien jaar geleden. Hier wordt getracht om vragen te beantwoorden over de toepasbaarheid op en hantering van het begrip 'human security' door de bij het drama-Srebrenica betrokken partijen.

Een leerstoel met de naam 'Burgerinitiatieven in oorlogssituaties' is een *mer à boire*. Je kunt er immers alle kanten mee op. Burgerinitiatieven zijn talrijk, te veel om op te noemen, zelfs en misschien wel juist in oorlogssituaties. Want zekerheden vallen dan weg en mensen worden op zichzelf teruggegooid. Als je in een stad (bijvoorbeeld Sarajevo) woont die dagelijks wordt beschoten, kunnen je kinderen niet meer over straat om naar school te gaan. Dus ga je met andere ouders uit de flat een

schooltje aan huis of in de kelder-ruimte onder de flat organiseren. Dat is een burgerinitiatief. Wellicht leg je met behulp van een paar buurlieden ook een groentetuintje in enkele kamers aan omdat de gemeenschappelijke buitentuin helaas in het schootsveld ligt. Nog een burgerinitiatief. Maar het kan ook zijn dat je het besluit neemt om met vele anderen te vluchten naar veiliger streken; een veelvoorkomend burgerinitiatief in oorlogssituaties. En passant heb ik inmiddels een vorm van oorlogvoering geïntroduceerd, waarin een stad wordt belegerd en beschoten. Maar er zijn oorlogen en oorlo-

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gen.¹ Er zijn hete en koude oorlogen, burgeroorlogen en oorlogen tegen het terrorisme, moderne en postmoderne oorlogen.² Daar komt nog eens bij dat we het over oorlogssituaties willen hebben, met andere woorden: over de situatie die door een oorlog wordt bepaald of, andersom, die voor een oorlog bepalend is. En dus ook over de aanloopperiode naar een oorlog toe en over de nasleep van een oorlog. Inderdaad, een *mer à boire*. Om niet te verdrinken zullen we keuzes moeten maken en grenzen trekken, zo precies mogelijk moeten aangeven over welke oorlog in welke situatie we het hebben. En over welke burgerinitiatieven. En, *last but not least*, over wat we eigenlijk willen weten.

Eén veld van mijn belangstelling waar ik het in deze bijdrage wat uitvoeriger over wil hebben, betreft burgerinitiatieven die zijn gericht op het wegnemen of verlichten van de fysieke bedreiging die mensen ondervinden in een oorlogssituatie. Dat zijn vaak zelfhulpinitiatieven - je bouwt een kelder in je tuin om, als er weer hevig wordt geschoten, in weg te kunnen duiken. Maar het kan ook hulp van buiten zijn: je angst wordt iets dragelijker en je weerstand neemt toe als je dagelijks kunt afstemmen op een radiostation (Radio Oranje in de Tweede Wereldoorlog of Radio Free Europe nu); zenders die je op de hoogte brengen van allerlei inspanningen in de buitenwereld om jou in je netelige situatie terzijde te staan en

de hoop op bevrijding levend te houden. In het algemeen kunnen betekenisvolle contacten met instanties en mensen buiten het oorlogsgebied een bijdrage leveren aan het bestrijden van de angst voor (oorlogs)geweld. Ik vat al deze initiatieven samen in een categorie *freedom from fear* (vrijwaring van angst).

De uitdrukking *freedom from fear* verwijst naar de beroemde State of the Union van president Franklin D. Roosevelt, uitgesproken op 6 januari 1941, voor het Amerikaanse Congres.³ Een rede, waarin hij vier essentiële *human freedoms* opsomde. Naast *freedom from fear* waren dat *freedom from want* (vrijwaring van gebrek), *freedom of speech* (vrijheid van meningsuiting) en *freedom of worship* (vrijheid van godsdienst). De eerstgenoemde twee vrijheden - *freedom from fear* en *freedom from want* - worden in de hedendaagse literatuur wel samengebracht onder de term *human security*. Een mens is pas dan veilig als hij gevrijwaard is van angst (voor geweld⁴) en van gebrek (aan elementaire levensbehoeften). In het vervolg van mijn betoog zal ik het vooral over deze twee hebben: *freedom from fear* en *freedom from want* als de bouwstenen van *human security*, de veiligheid van de mens.

Human security als onderdeel van buitenlands beleid

In liberale democratieën wordt hu-

man security gezien als een taak van de overheid. Naast de bescherming van het grondgebied (*state security*) heeft de overheid ook de plicht om de veiligheid van haar onderdanen (*human security*) te garanderen. Tegenwoordig zijn er echter ook landen die in hun buitenlandse politiek een onderdeel *human security* opnemen. Zij proberen in andere landen een bijdrage te leveren aan de veiligheid van (groepen) mensen, daar waar de lokale overheid tekort schiet. Canada gaat hierin voorop en is de ongekroonde aanvoerder van een groep van dertien landen, waaronder Nederland, die samen een Human Security Network hebben opgericht.⁵ *Human security* is voor Canada een op mensen gerichte benadering van het buitenlands beleid, vanuit de overtuiging dat duurzame stabiliteit in de wereld niet kan worden bereikt zolang de rechten, de veiligheid en de levens van mensen worden bedreigd.⁶

Vervolgens worden vijf aandachtsvelden van het Canadese *human security*-beleid gedefinieerd, te weten: bescherming van burgers, vredesoperaties, conflictpreventie, goed bestuur, en de veiligheid van de publieke ruimte. Zo te zien ligt de nadruk overduidelijk op *freedom from fear*-maatregelen. Dat is anders voor andere landen. Thailand, ook lid van het Netwerk, beschouwt *human security* eveneens als een centraal onderdeel van zijn buitenlands beleid, maar richt zich daarbij op de armoedeproblematiek en Aids-preventie. Met andere

woorden: op *freedom from want*-maatregelen. Dat geldt in belangrijke mate ook voor de Verenigde Naties. *Human security* is een thema dat al meer dan tien jaar de aandacht trekt van de volkeren gemeenschap, echter meestal benaderd vanuit een *freedom from want*-perspectief.⁷

Ten slotte nog één voorbeeld: de ontwikkeling van een *human security*-beleid binnen de Europese Unie. Op verzoek van Javier Solana, de hoogste EU-ambtenaar voor defensie en buitenlandse zaken, heeft een onderzoeksgroep een rapport geschreven onder de titel: *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*.⁸ De doctrine die zich nadrukkelijk op *freedom from fear* richt, bestaat uit drie elementen: (1) zeven principes voor het uitvoeren van operaties in onveilige gebieden, waaronder een primaat voor mensenrechten en een 'bottom-up' (mensgerichte) benadering; (2) een Human Security Response Force van vijftienduizend man/vrouw, waarvan ten minste eenderde deel bestaat uit niet-militairen; en ten slotte (3) een wettig kader ter legitimering van een *human security*-interventie en de uitvoering ervan. De onderzoeksgroep betoogt dat internationale instellingen tot nu toe te zeer zitten vastgebakken aan een 'top-down'-benadering, zowel in de houding van functionarissen als in de cultuur van de organisaties. Het is een vastgeroeste gewoonte van vertegenwoordigers van internationale organisaties, de zogenaamde *internationals*, om

vooral te vertoeven in de eigen groep, slechts korte bezoeken af te leggen in het veld en het liefst kortlopende verplichtingen aan te gaan. Daarom adviseert de onderzoeksgroep de Europese Unie meer aan diepte-investeringen te doen en een *human security*-beleid te ontwikkelen dat is gebaseerd op communicatie, consultatie, dialoog en partnerschap met de direct betrokken mensen in een conflictgebied.⁹

Ik ben geneigd dit advies te onderschrijven, maar zou er nog iets aan willen toevoegen. Een *human security*-benadering dient inderdaad niet vanuit elders in een conflictgebied te worden gearachuteerd. Want de lokale bewoners weten meestal niet alleen beter dan buitenstaanders door wie en wat zij worden bedreigd, maar ook hoe zij zich daar het beste tegen kunnen beschermen en welke extra bescherming zij het meest nodig hebben. Het allereerste dat buitenstaanders, in het bijzonder de *internationals*, zouden moeten doen, is de lokale bewoners terzijde staan in hun pogingen zichzelf te beschermen tegen het geweld dat hen bedreigt en vervolgens aanvullende bescherming te leveren. Pas dan kan worden gesproken van een echte *bottom-up*-benadering. Ik kom straks nog uitvoerig te spreken over Srebrenica. Nu alleen dit: toen op 11 juli 1995 enkele tienduizenden Moslims uit lijfsbehoud de vlucht namen en zich meldden bij Camp Potocari – de VN-basis in de enclave Srebrenica –

waren ze toen aan het verkeerde adres omdat de Verenigde Naties geen aanvullende bescherming kon leveren? Of waren ze wel aan het goede adres, maar schatte de Verenigde Naties verkeerd in welke bescherming zij nodig hadden? Dat de kloof tussen de lokale veiligheidsbehoeften en de respons van de internationale gemeenschap enorm kan zijn, laat het volgende voorbeeld zien. In september 1998 bezocht een delegatie van drie jonge journalisten uit Kosovo het NAVO-hoofdkwartier in Brussel. Zij hadden in de voorafgaande maanden reportages gemaakt in vluchtelingenkampen in het hooggebergte van Kosovo, waar Albaneese Kosovaren een schamel onderdak hadden gevonden nadat ze door Servische troepen letterlijk uit hun dorpen waren geschoten. De belangrijkste vraag die de journalisten te horen hadden gekregen uit de mond van veel vluchtelingen ging niet over het gebrek aan voedsel, medicijnen, water of een dak boven het hoofd, maar over de levensbedreiging die zij ondervonden. Wanneer komt de NAVO om ons te beschermen? Dat was de hoofdvraag. Met andere woorden: hun eerste zorg was *freedom from fear*, pas daarna kwam *freedom from want*.

In Brussel kregen de journalisten te horen dat een humanitaire operatie op de grond, lees: een *human security*-operatie, niet in het draaiboek van de NAVO voorkwam. Mocht de toestand echter dramatisch verslechteren, dan was een

luchtoperatie niet uitgesloten. Dat was het geval en eind maart 1999 begon de NAVO een luchtcampagne met het doel de Servische troepen uit Kosovo te verdrijven en de Joegoslavische machthebber Milosevic voor een fait accompli te plaatsen. De campagne, die 78 dagen duurde, is de geschiedenis ingegaan als een *humanitarian intervention*,¹⁰ dat wil zeggen een militaire ingreep van buitenaf, zonder toestemming van de regering van het betreffende land, met het doel een einde te maken aan massale schendingen van mensenrechten. Bovendien, een succesvolle humanitaire interventie! Dat is eigenlijk vreemd, want het was een humanitaire operatie zonder een *human security*-component, hetgeen op een innerlijke tegenstrijdigheid duidt. Kosovo liet echter zien dat in de praktijk de twee weinig tot niets met elkaar te maken hoeven te hebben. Want tot twee keer toe werden tijdens de humanitaire interventie bedreigde groepen aan hun lot overgelaten. In reactie op de NAVO-bombardementen reageerde Milosevic met een groot-schalige etnische zuiveringscampagne. Honderdduizenden Albanezen werden op ruwe wijze uit Kosovo verdreven en vaak na dagen van wachten en ontberingen over de grens gedumpt. De NAVO bombardeerde door, maar stuurde geen grondtroepen om hen te beschermen. Toen Milosevic eindelijk zijn nederlaag had aanvaard, keerden de Albanezen massaal terug naar huis, en werd en passant

wraak genomen op talrijke Servische bewoners van Kosovo van wie huizen in brand werden gestoken en die vervolgens massaal op de vlucht werden gejaagd, richting Belgrado. De grondtroepen van de NAVO die nu wel Kosovo binnentrokken, ondernamen aanvankelijk niets om tussenbeide te komen. *Human security* was in die dagen zeker geen NAVO-beleid.

Lifeline operations

De etnische zuiveringen tijdens de Balkanoorlogen brachten overal in Europa burgers op de been. Op veel plaatsen werden inzamelingsacties gehouden en talrijke transporten met een grote variëteit aan hulpgoederen (knuffelbeesten!) vertrokken naar de Balkan. Een massale actie gericht op *freedom from want*, zoals we die in de jaren negentig ook zagen tijdens of na afloop van gruwelijke oorlogen in Afrika. Daarenboven waren we getuige van een tamelijk nieuw verschijnsel, te weten een groeiende aandacht van vredesgroepen voor de andere poot (*freedom from fear*) van *human security*. Tijdens de Koude Oorlog hadden enkele toonaangevende vredesgroeperingen in het Westen ontdekt dat wat zij van oudsher als hun hoofdtaak beschouwden – te weten: *advocacy*, oftewel het mobiliseren van mensen en het beïnvloeden van politieke instanties teneinde interstate-lijke gewapende conflicten te voorkomen of te beëindigen¹¹ – vaak te

eenzijdig en ontoereikend was. Het *advocacy*-beleid werd aangevuld met een *human security*-beleid ten behoeve van mensenrechtenactivisten in Oost-Europa die evenzogoed streefden naar het einde van de Koude Oorlog, maar daar in hun eigen samenleving geen ruimte voor kregen. Integendeel, zij werden om hun burgerinitiatieven vervolgd. Door hen op te zoeken, hun namen, ideeën en activiteiten bekend te maken in het Westen, en te protesteren tegen hun onderdrukking en gevangenschap, werd hun een *lifeline* naar de vrije wereld aangereikt. Wat deze vredesgroepen uit het Westen deden, kan worden aangeduid als een *freedom from fear*-operatie ten behoeve van mensenrechtenactivisten in Oost-Europa.

Tijdens de oorlogen op de Balkan, in de jaren negentig, werd het *human security*-aspect verder ontwikkeld. Om te beginnen door de betrokkenen zelf. Gedwongen door het geweld en de etnische zuiveringen, zochten honderdduizenden mensen in Bosnië bescherming in een aantal enclaves en stedelijke gebieden. Maar ook daar was hun veiligheid niet verzekerd. De steden en enclaves werden omsingeld en onophoudelijk beschoten, met name door de Bosnische Serviërs. Toen de toestand steeds nijpender werd, besloot de VN-Veiligheidsraad, mede onder druk van de betrokkenen die steun kregen van vredesgroepen uit het Westen, om een zestal *safe areas* (veilige gebieden) in te stellen.¹² Een goed voor-

beeld van een *human security*-maatregel.¹³ Helaas leidde ook de instelling van *safe areas* niet tot een staakt-het-vuren en de inwoners van de enclaves moesten zelf allerlei maatregelen nemen om de veiligheid van hun kinderen, hun familie, de buurt en wat dies meer zij te verbeteren. In het begin van mijn betoog heb ik verteld dat in Sarajevo schooltjes werden georganiseerd in kelders onder flatgebouwen, omdat de kinderen niet meer veilig over straat konden. Een van de onderwijzers gaf zijn leerlingen de opdracht om brieven te schrijven aan onbekende leeftijdsgenootjes, ergens ver weg in een vreemd maar vrij land. Stapels brieven waren het resultaat die vervolgens werden meegenomen door enkele vredesactivisten uit West-Europa die tijdens de oorlog regelmatig Sarajevo bezochten. Zij verspreiden de brieven op scholen in hun eigen land en honderden kinderen schreven ontroerende antwoorden. De kelderklas in Sarajevo was dolblij toen ze de levenstekens uit de buitenwereld ontving. Er was een *lifeline* naar de vrije wereld gelegd, een *freedom from fear*-operatie.

Dit is maar één voorbeeld dat met vele andere kan worden aangevuld. In enkele *safe areas* hadden studenten een radiozender en een geïmproviseerde studio gebouwd. Vredesactivisten uit het Westen werden uitgenodigd voor interviews en talkshows waarin luisteraars via de telefoon met hen discussieerden over de internationale

maatregelen die nodig waren om een einde te maken aan de hachelijke situatie waarin zij verkeerden. Sommige vredesactivisten kregen het verzoek om bij een volgend bezoek de nieuwste cd's mee te nemen, want ook muziek uit de vrije wereld werd ervaren als een *lifeline*, een hulpmiddel tegen de angst. Ook ten tijde van de Kosovo-oorlog (1999) en de Irak-oorlog (2003) hebben vredesactivisten uit het Westen *lifeline operations* uitgevoerd ter ondersteuning van burgers in Kosovo en Irak die zich keerden tegen het onderdrukken van de geweld van de Servische heerser Slobodan Milosevic, respectievelijk de Iraakse dictator Saddam Hussein.

Ik ben van plan om in het kader van de leerstoel (burgerinitiatieven in oorlogssituaties) onderzoek te (laten) doen naar wat ik hier genoemd heb *lifeline operations*, zowel naar de betekenis ervan, de omvang, de verscheidenheid, de effecten en *last but not least* de vaak moeizame relatie tot wat nog steeds wordt gezien als de primaire taak van de vredesbeweging, te weten: *advocacy*, het voeren van campagnes tegen interstatelijke oorlogvoering.

Srebrenica: freedom from fear

De *safe area* Srebrenica was onbereikbaar voor vredesactivisten gedurende de oorlog in Bosnië. Niemand van hen was ter plekke toen in juli 1995 de enclave werd over-

rompeld door het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs en er een genocide volgde. Pas nadat de overlevenden van de massaslachting elders in Bosnië, vooral in Tuzla, opgedoken, konden hun verhalen over de gebeurtenissen van de laatste dagen in de *safe area* worden opgetekend. Wat daarbij sterk in het oog springt is het contrast in beleving, tussen enerzijds de overlevenden en anderzijds hun beschermers, het Nederlandse VN-bataljon (Dutchbat). Daarover wil ik het hebben in het tweede deel van deze bijdrage. De centrale vraag in mijn betoog luidt: biedt het concept *human security* een aanknopingspunt voor het beter leren begrijpen van de handelwijze van de verschillende partijen die rechtstreeks waren betrokken bij de dramatische gebeurtenissen?

Mijn verhaal begint bij het moment dat duidelijk wordt dat het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs, aangevoerd door de gevreesde generaal Mladic, de enclave Srebrenica onder de voet loopt en zodoende een eind maakt aan het bestaan van deze VN-*safe area*. Het is 11 juli 1995 en de Nederlandse regering probeert te bewerkstelligen dat Dutchbat zo snel mogelijk uit de enclave wordt geëvacueerd. De missie die het bataljon naar Srebrenica bracht, is op een mislukking uitgelopen. Minister Voorhoeve van Defensie stuurt twee generaals (Van den Breemen en Van Baal) naar Zagreb om de evacuatie van Dutchbat te bespreken met de hoogste VN-generaal op de Balkan,

de Franse generaal Janvier. Voorhoeve laat aan de Nederlandse media weten dat de veiligheid van Dutchbat nu de allerhoogste prioriteit voor de Nederlandse regering is. Anders gezegd: de evacuatie van Dutchbat wordt gezien als een *human security*-operatie, een *freedom from fear*-opdracht, aangezien de persoonlijke veiligheid van de Nederlandse militairen in het geding is. In Zagreb worden Van den Breemen en Van Baal op de hoogte gesteld van de ontwikkelingen in de enclave. Zij horen dat de enclave in de handen van generaal Mladic is gevallen, dat er geen slachtoffers onder de Nederlandse militairen zijn, dat duizenden vluchtelingen bescherming zoeken op de Dutchbat-basis in Potocari, vijf kilometer ten noorden van Srebrenica, en dat in het licht van deze ontwikkelingen Dutchbat aan het begin van de avond per fax nieuwe instructies heeft gekregen vanuit het hoofdkwartier van de Verenigde Naties in Bosnië. De fax heeft als onderwerp: 'Orders for the defence of Dutchbat and protection of refugees in Srebrenica'.¹⁴ De tweede instructie luidt: "Concentreer uw troepen op de VN-basis in Potocari, met inbegrip van de observatieposten die moeten worden teruggetrokken. Neem alle mogelijke maatregelen ter bescherming van de vluchtelingen en burgers die aan uw zorg zijn toevertrouwd". Het is een voor de hand liggende instructie, aangezien de *safe area* niet meer bestaat en Dutchbat zich derhalve zal moeten

terugtrekken op de eigen *compound*, waar, zo weet men inmiddels ook in Sarajevo, tevens veel vluchtelingen hun toevlucht hebben gezocht. Dit bevel kan bovendien moeilijk anders worden gelezen dan dat de VN-bazen in Sarajevo en Zagreb ervan uitgaan dat deze vluchtelingen zich nu op de basis in Potocari bevinden of worden toegelaten. Alleen daar kan Dutchbat de vluchtelingen immers beschermen nu het zelf de opdracht heeft gekregen zich terug te trekken op de basis.¹⁵ Bovendien heeft een VN-*compound* als zodanig een beschermde status, tot op zekere hoogte te vergelijken met de status van een ambassade. Sprekend over de evacuatie van Dutchbat, houdt generaal Janvier zijn Nederlandse collega's nog eens voor dat het ondenkbaar is om de vluchtelingen onbeschermd achter te laten in Potocari. De beste optie is dat Dutchbat gezamenlijk met de vluchtelingen uit de enclave wordt geëvacueerd.¹⁶ Die opvatting wordt door de Nederlandse regering onderstreept. In een speciale ministerraadsvergadering, in de vroege avond van 11 juli, spreken enkele ministers hun grote zorg uit over het lot dat de Moslimmannen te wachten staat als zij in handen vallen van de Bosnische Serviërs.¹⁷ En de volgende ochtend, 12 juli, zegt premier Kok dat Dutchbat de militaire basis in Potocari pas dan kan verlaten als de vluchtelingen mee mogen. Andere scenario's zijn ondenkbaar.¹⁸ Het is belangrijk om vast te stellen

dat in een paar uur tijd er niet alleen een geheel nieuwe situatie is ontstaan in Srebrenica, maar dat ook Dutchbat een geheel nieuw mandaat heeft gekregen. Noch in het NIOD-rapport *Srebrenica, een 'veilig' gebied*, noch in het eindrapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie *Srebrenica Missie zonder vrede* wordt dit echter opgemerkt. Het nieuwe mandaat van Dutchbat is wederom een *human security*-opdracht, maar met een andere invulling. Het oude mandaat vereiste dat de gedemilitariseerde status van de VN *safe area* Srebrenica in stand werd gehouden, de bevolking beschermd en humanitaire hulpverlening gefaciliteerd.¹⁹ Dat wil zeggen een *human security*-opdracht met zowel een *freedom from fear*- als een *freedom from want*-component. Met het nieuwe mandaat aanvaardt Nederland (en in het verlengde daarvan de uitvoerende instantie Dutchbat) de opdracht de vluchtelingen op de basis in Potocari (te halen en) te beschermen en tevens een veilige evacuatie voor hen te garanderen. In het nieuwe mandaat ligt alle nadruk op *freedom from fear*.

Potocari: *freedom from want*

Terwijl deze beleidslijn wordt overeengekomen door de Verenigde Naties (Zagreb en Sarajevo) en Den Haag, speelt zich in de enclave Srebrenica een ontwikkeling af die hier vrijwel haaks op zal blijken te staan. Een vluchtelingen-

stroom van ongeveer 25 duizend mensen spoedt zich in de loop van de middag van 11 juli naar Potocari om bescherming te zoeken op de VN-basis. In de stroom bevinden zich slechts zo'n tweeduizend mannen, van wie driekwart in de weerbare leeftijd (zestien tot zestig jaar).²⁰ De rest, twaalf- tot vijftienduizend Moslimmannen, waaronder een paar duizend lichtbewapende militairen, heeft puur uit lijfsbehoud ervoor gekozen een uiterste poging te ondernemen om door de Bosnisch-Servische linies heen te breken, in de noordwesthoek van de enclave. Als de vluchtelingenstroom de VN-basis in Potocari bereikt, worden ongeveer vijfduizend mensen toegelaten op de basis. Alhoewel het oppervlak van de *compound* zeker toereikend is om alle vluchtelingen te herbergen, wordt het merendeel van hen toch door Dutchbat gesommeerd elders onderdak te zoeken, in enkele fabrieksruimten in de buurt. Dutchbat heeft een aantal redenen om maar een beperkt aantal mensen op de basis te dulden.²¹ Het bataljon wil voldoende speelruimte voor zichzelf houden, om zo nodig militair te kunnen reageren mochten de Bosnische Serviërs de basis bedreigen. Tevens vindt majoor Franken, de waarnemend commandant van Dutchbat, het te riskant om het merendeel van de vluchtelingen op het terrein in de open lucht te laten zitten, in het zicht van artillerie-eenheden van de Bosnische Serviërs. In de fabrieksruimten buiten de basis zijn

de vluchtelingen weliswaar aan het zicht van de artillerie onttrokken, maar daar staat tegenover dat Dutchbat geen militaire bescherming tegen binnendringende Bosnische Serviërs zal (kunnen) leveren. Aan het eind van de ochtend van 11 juli is in het zicht van de val van de enclave besloten zich nog uitsluitend op humanitaire activiteiten te richten ten behoeve van de vluchtende bevolking.²² Dus nog wel aandacht voor *freedom from want*-, maar geen *freedom from fear*-maatregelen.

De vluchtelingen mogen niet zelf kiezen waar zij zich het meest veilig voelen. Bovendien is dat geen vraag voor hen; ze hebben niet zo maar *en masse* het initiatief genomen om naar de VN-basis in Potocari te vluchten. Dutchbat kiest anders. De VN-basis wordt gesloten, nadat er alsnog een aantal vrouwen en kinderen worden toegelaten, omdat die volgens majoor Franken in humanitair opzicht de meest kwetsbare groep vormen. Aldus voltrekt zich een tweedeling onder de vluchtelingen nog voordat de Bosnische Serviërs in Potocari op het toneel verschijnen. De vluchtelingen op de basis schijnen te zijn gered en verzekerd van *human security*, in de betekenis van *freedom from fear*, terwijl de veel grotere groep vluchtelingen buiten de basis niets anders rest dan in dodelijke angst te wachten op de dingen die staan te gebeuren. De instructies van het VN-hoofdkwartier in Sarajevo om de vluchtelingen op de basis (te halen en) te be-

schermen, bereiken Potocari aan het begin van de avond. Maar inmiddels zijn ze achterhaald door de feitelijke gang van zaken. Dutchbat heeft enkele uren eerder al besloten, op basis van een eigen afweging, uitsluitend nog een *freedom from want*-lijn te volgen. In de kantlijn van de *freedom from fear*-instructie, die overste Karremans uit Sarajevo ontvangt, schrijft hij dan ook veelbetekend: 'onmogelijk'.

In de loop van 12 juli wordt alom zichtbaar welke gevolgen deze keuze heeft voor de vluchtelingen. Als aan het begin van de middag, generaal Mladic in Potocari verschijnt, met in zijn kielzog lege bussen en andersoortig vrachtvervoer, rennen de vluchtelingen die zich buiten de VN-basis bevinden panisch van angst naar de voertuigen in de hoop zo snel mogelijk naar veilig gebied te worden getransporteerd. De chaos die ontstaat en de ruwe behandeling die de vluchtelingen van de kant van de Bosnische Serviërs ten deel valt, is voor Dutchbat aanleiding om regulerend op te treden. Op initiatief van luitenant Van Duijn wordt de stroom mensen gekanaliseerd. Er wordt water uitgedeeld en de vluchtelingen worden samengesteld in kleine groepen van zestig tot zeventig mensen die zich achtereenvolgens naar de voertuigen begeven. Daar aangekomen worden Moslimmannen, jong en oud, uit de groep gehaald door de Bosnische Serviërs en voor onderzoek naar mogelijke oorlogsmisdaden

afgevoerd. In de nacht van 12 op 13 juli dringen Bosnisch-Servische soldaten en milities, vaak gekleed in gestolen VN-uniformen, de fabriekshallen binnen om Moslimmannen op te pakken, af te voeren en dood te schieten of af te slachten.²³ Ook enkele Dutchbat-soldaten zien die nacht en de volgende ochtend lijken in het veld liggen. Bovendien hebben zij waargenomen dat de Bosnische Serviërs geen enkele interesse hebben om uit te vinden of sommige Moslimmannen inderdaad oorlogsmisdaden hebben begaan. Want zij vinden stapels identiteitspapieren, op een hoop gesmeten, dus kennelijk afgepakt om te worden vernietigd. De mannen zelf worden, beroofd van hun identiteit, naar een voetbalstadion in het naburige Bratunac gebracht, waar op 13 juli vierduizend Moslimmannen bijeen zijn gedreven, voor wie, zo vreest de Verenigde Naties in Zagreb, het laatste uur heeft geslagen.²⁴ De Dutchbat-leiding in Potocari doet er echter alles aan om de rapportages over de gruwelijkheden die haar bereiken binnenskamers te houden. Men wil namelijk geen paniek onder de vluchtelingen, omdat de evacuatie dan wel deportatie hierdoor zou kunnen worden vertraagd. Dat moet koste wat kost worden voorkomen, omdat ieder oponthoud het uitbreken van een humanitaire catastrofe in Potocari dichterbij brengt, vanwege een gebrek aan voedsel en medicijnen, de hitte en de abominabele sanitaire voorzieningen. Majoor Franken

vat de zorgen van Dutchbat pregnant samen: "Op het moment dat je roept: We zijn inderdaad bang dat de mannen allemaal vermoord worden, heb ik gegarandeerd paniek binnen die hele vluchtelingengemeenschap. Onder die omstandigheden gaven wij prioriteit aan het lot van de 25.000 vrouwen en kinderen. We accepteerden dat het lot van de mannen onzeker was en dat ze inderdaad onder de meest walgelijke omstandigheden terecht konden komen".²⁵ Of die 25 duizend vrouwen het met deze prioriteitskeuze eens waren, werd hen niet gevraagd. Dutchbat had op eigen gezag hun probleem verasmald tot *freedom from want* en daaraan een zodanige prioriteit gegeven, dat het *freedom from fear*-probleem van hun mannen en zonen een hinderpaal werd die zoveel mogelijk moest worden ontweken.

Aan deze gedragslijn werd strak vastgehouden. Toen alle vluchtelingen buiten de VN-basis waren afgevoerd, kregen ook de zich veilig wanende, op de basis verblijvende vluchtelingen het bevel van Dutchbat om te vertrekken. Ofschoon op dat moment duidelijk was aangetoond dat de Moslimmannen voor hun leven moesten vrezen, werd niet overwogen om de drie- tot vijfhonderd mannen die zich op de basis bevonden daar achter te houden. Het *freedom from want*-beleid bleek gaandeweg absolute trekken te hebben gekregen. Zelfs toen het risico van een dreigende humanitaire catastrofe in

Potocari veel kleiner was geworden, omdat het overgrote deel van de vluchtelingen inmiddels was afgevoerd, mocht niets de evacuatie van vrouwen en kinderen in de weg staan. Dus moesten ook de Moslimmannen de basis verlaten, ongeacht de prijs die zij daarvoor zouden betalen. Aan het eind van de middag, op 13 juli 1995, worden de laatste vluchtelingen afgevoerd. Rond 20:00 uur is de deportatie voltooid. Overste Karremans roept vervolgens al zijn manschappen terug op de basis. Hij beseft dat zijn bataljon met een *freedom from fear*-probleem worstelt en neemt passende maatregelen: hij voorziet de poort van extra wachten.²⁶

Waarheid en fictie

De vluchtelingen die zich naar de VN-basis in Potocari spoedden, deden dat uit lijfsbehoud. Toen het overgrote deel van de vluchtelingen niet werd toegelaten op de basis werd de kans op lijfsbehoud aanmerkelijk verkleind. In feite was een snelle evacuatie – op hoop van zegen – onder toezicht van de Verenigde Naties de enige mogelijkheid die restte. Voor de Moslimmannen was ook dit al spoedig geen reële optie meer, omdat Mladic duidelijk had gemaakt dat hij hen wilde afzonderen, zogenaamd om te worden ondervraagd over vermeende oorlogsmisdaden. Wellicht heeft een enkeling het geluk gehad onopgemerkt te ontsnappen

in een van de voertuigen, vast staat dat vrijwel alle Moslimmannen die naar de VN-basis waren gevlucht, zijn vermoord.²⁷ Pleidooien van de betrokkenen, zowel op 12 als op 13 juli, tot op het allerlaatste moment aan toe, om de deportatie te stoppen of slechts één enkele jonge man bij zijn broer (een VN-medewerker) op de basis te laten blijven,²⁸ werden afgewezen. Voor Dutchbat was de afvoer een *must* geworden waarvoor het ook een eigen redengeving bleek te hebben ontwikkeld.

Alhoewel de Nederlandse regering de ontwikkelingen in Potocari van minuut tot minuut volgde en akkoord was gegaan met de assistentie die Dutchbat verleende aan de deportatie, zij het onder de voorwaarde dat het bataljon niet daadwerkelijk meewerkt aan de scheiding van mannen en vrouwen, had zij toch moeite het gevolgde beleid precies te definiëren. Minister Voorhoeve vreesde dat de term 'collaboratie' zou vallen als bekend zou worden dat Dutchbat heeft geassisteerd bij de deportatie.²⁹ Hij vraagt de ministerraad, in vergadering bijeen op 13 juli, in te stemmen met de in de praktijk gevolgde beleidslijn, die inhield dat Dutchbat zo lang mogelijk heeft gepoogd een "vorm van toezicht" op de deportatie te houden.³⁰ Geen woord over een dreigende humanitaire catastrofe, die de assistentie van Dutchbat bij de deportatie noodzakelijk zou hebben gemaakt. Eerder een impliciete erkenning

dat de *human security*-operatie zoals die was voorzien en afgesproken, niet gerealiseerd is, noch wat betreft *freedom from fear* noch wat betreft *freedom from want*.

Dat de afvoer (evacuatie dan wel deportatie) van de vluchtelingen bovenaan de agenda stond van alle partijen ter plekke, lijdt geen twijfel. Alleen, vanuit zeer verschillende motieven. Het motief van de Bosnische Serviërs luidde: *ethnic cleansing & massacre*.³¹ Daarentegen was het motief van Dutchbat: *freedom from want*. Ten slotte was het motief van de vluchtelingen zelf: *freedom from fear*. Het schokkende van de situatie was dat de agenda's van de Bosnische Serviërs en Dutchbat in elkaar werden geschoven, ten koste van de vluchtelingen, in het bijzonder de Moslimmannen. De Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie zegt het dilemma voor Dutchbat dat hieruit voortvloeide ten volle te erkennen, namelijk "het maken van een keuze tussen de 25.000 vrouwen en kinderen en het belang van de mannen".³² Maar als dit inderdaad het dilemma is, dan rijst ogenblikkelijk de vraag of zo'n ingrijpende keuze niet eerst aan de betrokkenen zelf had moeten worden voorgelegd? Welk moreel recht had Dutchbat om eigenmachtig een besluit te nemen – over mensen die aan de zorg van het bataljon zijn toevertrouwd – dat met aan zekerheid grenzende waarschijnlijkheid de dood van zeer velen tot gevolg zou hebben?

Ik heb echter mijn twijfels of hier

werkelijk sprake was van een dilemma. Wordt hier, met dit zogenaamde dilemma, niet een fictie geconstrueerd – om welke reden dan ook – die de waarheid, de werkelijke verklaring van het gedrag van Dutchbat, verhult? Duidt wat er zich in Potocari voltrok niet veeleer op een aaneenrijging van noodlottige gebeurtenissen als gevolg van het niet uitvoeren van een opdracht om alle vluchtelingen op de basis van Dutchbat te halen en te beschermen? Aan die opdracht werd geen gevolg gegeven, omdat Dutchbat reeds een andere keuze had gemaakt waardoor op 11 juli het overgrote deel van de vluchtelingen onbeschermd buiten de basis vertoefde. Een dag later vielen zij ten prooi aan de Bosnische Serviërs, die plotsklaps op het toneel verschenen en in grote haast rücksichtslos een deportatie op gang brachten. Ik waag de stelling dat Dutchbat vervolgens werd meegesleept in het drama dat zich rond het middaguur van 12 juli ontvouwde en ieder vermogen verloor om de kant te kiezen van de Moslimmannen die met de dood werden bedreigd. Zeker, Dutchbat verleende humanitaire assistentie, maar niet omdat het voor een dilemma was geplaatst. Want in de chaotische situatie, die deels door eigen toedoen was ontstaan, had het bataljon elke greep op de gebeurtenissen verloren, waarna het tegen wil en dank en uit pure armoede hand- en spanndiensten ging verlenen. Wat in Potocari feitelijk gebeurde, was dat

de *freedom from want*-agenda van Dutchbat werd uitgevoerd binnen het raamwerk van de *ethnic cleansing & massacre*-agenda van Mladic. Binnen dat laatste raamwerk bestonden geen dilemma's omtrent het lot van de vluchtelingen. Wat er gebeurd zou zijn als wel alle vluchtelingen op de *compound* waren toegelaten, staat niet vast. Wel zou er zich een ander scenario hebben ontplooid, vanwege de bijzondere status van de VN-basis en de noodzaak voor de internationale gemeenschap om zelf handelend op te treden aangezien Dutchbat zich dan, met de vluchtelingen, in een patsituatie had gemanoeuvreed. Ook zou Dutchbat zodoende hebben erkend dat voor alle vluchtelingen *freedom from fear* het belangrijkste probleem was en dat het leveren van optimale bescherming daar een antwoord op was. In mei 2005 beginnen de voorlopige getuigenverhoren voor de rechtbank in Den Haag, aangespannen door enkele familieleden van slachtoffers van de genocide in Srebrenica. Zij verwijten de Nederlandse staat geen bescherming te hebben geboden aan hun geliefden die (met instemming van de Nederlandse regering) door Dutchbat van de basis werden gestuurd en zo werden overgedragen aan hun latere moordenaars.

Ten slotte

In het eerste deel van deze bijdrage

heb ik een beeld geschetst van het nut en gebruik van het concept *human security* met betrekking tot het beleid en de concrete activiteiten van overheden en burgerinitiatieven in oorlogssituaties. Ook heb ik mijn belangstelling kenbaar gemaakt om onderzoek te doen naar *lifeline operations* in het kader van het (nieuwe) *human security*-beleid van vredesgroepen en de soms gespannen relatie met het (oude) *advocacy*-beleid.

In het tweede deel heb ik stilgestaan bij het drama-Srebrenica – precies tien jaar geleden – en geprobeerd om met behulp van het concept *human security* een aantal vragen te formuleren, deze nader tegen het licht te houden en van antwoorden te voorzien. Mijn hoofdvragen waren:

- (1) Is het concept *human security* toepasbaar op het mandaat van de Verenigde Naties in de *safe area* Srebrenica, met name na de val van de enclave?
- (2) Is het concept *human security* eenduidig gehanteerd door alle betrokkenen bij het drama-Srebrenica, te weten de verschillende geleidingen van de Verenigde Naties, de Nederlandse regering en de vluchtelingen?
- (3) Heeft de hantering van het *human security*-concept door Dutchbat tot een verwrongen beeld van de werkelijkheid geleid?
- (4) Wat waren en zijn de gevolgen van deze aanpak, tot op de huidige dag?

Expliciet dan wel impliciet heb ik

de eerste vraag met 'ja', de tweede met 'nee' en de derde weer met 'ja' beantwoord. Toch is daarmee niet het laatste woord gezegd. Het drama Srebrenica zal ook ons tot in lengte van dagen achtervolgen en

steeds weer nieuwe vragen en antwoorden oproepen. De antwoorden die in mijn betoog liggen opgeslagen dragen dus het stempel 'voorlopig'. Dat is misschien maar goed ook.

Noten

1. Zie de conflictmap van de Nobelprijsorganisatie <nobelprize.org/peace/educational/conflictmap/index.html>.
2. Moderne (interstatelijke) oorlogen zijn in onze tijd een uitzondering, terwijl postmoderne oorlogen die worden gekenmerkt door onder meer het verhoudingsgewijs hoge aantal burgerslachtoffers regel lijken te worden. Het aantal burgerslachtoffers in de Eerste Wereldoorlog bedroeg vijf procent van het totaal aantal slachtoffers; in de Tweede Wereldoorlog was dat vijftig procent en in de oorlogen van de jaren negentig bedroeg het aantal negentig procent.
3. Zie: <www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm>.
4. In dit verhaal beperk in mij tot oorlogsgeweld.
5. <www.humansecuritynetwork.org>.
6. <www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>.
7. Zie ook het recente rapport: *A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, 1 December 2004.
8. Barcelona Report, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* <www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/StudyGroup/StudyGroup.htm>.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
10. De Adviesraad voor Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV) definieert 'humanitaire interventie' als "De dreiging met of het gebruik van geweld door één of meer staten, eventueel in het kader van een internationale organisatie, binnen het territorium van een andere staat: a) met het doel het beeindigen van reeds bestaande, dan wel het voorkomen van onmiddellijk dreigende grootschalige ernstige schendingen van fundamentele mensenrechten, in het bijzonder het recht op leven van individuen, ongeacht hun nationaliteit; b) zonder voorafgaande autorisatie van de Veiligheidsraad en zonder toestemming van de legitieme regering van de staat, op het grondgebied waarvan de interventie plaatsvindt". AIV/CAVV (2000), *Humanitaire interventie*, Den Haag: Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken/Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, p. 7.
11. Sinds het eind van de negentiende eeuw concentreert de vredesbeweging zich voornamelijk op het voorkomen van interstatelijke gewapende conflicten.
12. De precieze betekenis van de *safe areas* wordt bepaald door de resoluties 819, 824 en 836 van de VN-Veilighedsraad, aangenomen in april, mei en juni 1993. Zie: <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>.
13. De discussies in de VN-Veilighedsraad laten zien dat de essentie van de *safe areas* het beschermen van mensen was. Over de wijze waarop, met name het eventuele gebruik van geweldsmiddelen, worden geen expliciete instructies gegeven. Zie: <www.un.org/News/pressg/srebrenica.htm>.
14. "In view of the new situation in Srebrenica the following are the orders of Acting Commander UNPROFOR for the defence of Dutchbat and the protection

- of refugees in Srebrenica. [...] b. Concentrate your forces into the Potocari [sic; MJE] Camp, including withdrawal of your Ops. Take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your care". Zie: Karremans, Th. (1998), *Srebrenica, Who cares? Een puzzel van de werkelijkheid*, Nieuwegein: Arko, p. 340.
15. Opmerkelijk en eigenaardig is de interpretatie die het NIOD-rapport aan deze instructie geeft. Bij de opdracht tot terugtrekking op het Potocari Camp, wordt aangetekend dat het onduidelijk is "of hieronder het terrein van de compound moest worden verstaan". Zie: NIOD (2002), *Srebrenica. Een 'veilig' gebied*, Amsterdam: Boom, p. 2624.
 16. Kort verslag van de bijeenkomst van CDS en PBLs bij FC UNPF (eveneens aanwezig COS UNPFO 11/07/95. Zie: Faber, M.J. (2002), *Srebrenica, de genocide die niet werd voorkomen*, Baarn: Ten Have, pp. 126-127.
 17. Notulen van de ministerraadsvergadering van 11 juli 1995.
 18. Notulen van de ministerraadsvergadering van 12 juli 1995.
 19. De opdracht die Dutchbat in januari 1994 van de Verenigde Naties ontving bestond uit drie onderdelen: militaire bijstand verlenen aan hulporganisaties bij humanitaire activiteiten; bescherming en zorg aan de bevolking geven; de gedemilitariseerde status van de enclave handhaven. Zie: NIOD (2002), p. 1361.
 20. Zie: NIOD (2002), p. 2620.
 21. Zie: *Missie zonder Vrede*, pp. 207-208.
 22. Luitenant Van Duijn vertelt de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie dat aan het eind van de ochtend op 11 juli, enkele uren voor Srebrenica definitief wordt veroverd door de Bosnische Serviërs, het consigne is gegeven dat Dutchbat zich nog uitsluitend op humanitaire hulpverlening zou richten en dus geen bewakings- of verdedigingsacties meer zal doen (buiten de basis). Zie: *Missie zonder Vrede*, p. 206.
 23. Het aantal slachtoffers ligt vermoedelijk tussen de honderd en vierhonderd. Zie: NIOD (2002), p. 2774.
 24. In een brief van de speciale VN-vertegenwoordiger voor Joegoslavië, Yasushi Akashi, gericht aan Kofi Annan, schrijft Akashi: "[...] we believe there are about 4.000 males of draft age still in Bratunac awaiting 'screening' by the BSA. Their fate is of obvious concern to everyone here". Report no. Z 1.154. Geciteerd in Nuhanovic, H., *The Role of International Factors in Srebrenica*.
 25. Zie: NIOD (2002), p. 2743.
 26. Zie: Karremans (1998), p. 220.
 27. Het aantal vermiste Moslimmannen, voor het laatst gezien in Potocari, bedraagt 1.913. Het aantal vermiste vrouwen is zes. Zie: NIOD (2002), p. 2661.
 28. De lokale VN-tolk, Hasan Nuhanovic, had zijn ouders en zijn jongere broer Mohamed (18 jaar) in veiligheid gebracht op de VN-basis. Hij heeft tevergeefs van alles ondernomen om Mohamed op de lijst van personen te krijgen die samen met Dutchbat de enclave zouden mogen verlaten.
 29. Zie: Faber (2002), p. 135.
 30. Notulen van de ministerraadsvergadering van 13 juli 1995.
 31. Ik gebruik hier de term *massacre* en niet de term *genocide*, omdat het vooraf duidelijk was dat de Moslimmannen moesten rekenen op een bloedige afrekening (*massacre*) als zij in handen van de Bosnische Serviërs zouden vallen. De term 'genocide' is een beoordeling achteraf van de wijze waarop de *massacre* zich heeft voltrokken.
 32. Zie: *Missie zonder Vrede*, p. 447.

Serviërs erkennen moorden Srebrenica

SARAJEVO, 12 JUNI. Een commissie van de Servische Republiek in Bosnië concludeert dat Bosnische Serviërs verantwoordelijk zijn voor de moord op meer dan zeven-duizend moslim-mannen in Srebrenica in 1995. De regering van de Bosnische Serviërs heeft de massamoord altijd ontkend.

De massamoord wordt in het gisteren verschenen rapport geen genocide genoemd. Het Joegoslavië-tribunaal in Den Haag bestempelde eerder dit jaar de massamoord in Srebrenica, een moslim-enclave die destijds door Nederlandse militairen werd bewaakt, wel als genocide.

De commissie – die bestond uit vijf Bosnisch-Servische juristen, een moslim-onderzoeker en een internationale deskundige – spreekt van „ernstige” schendingen van de mensenrechten en een poging om bewijsmateriaal te verdoezelen. Het rapport beschrijft ook 32 tot nu toe onbekende massagraven. Vier daarvan zijn originele graven, in de overige 28 werden lijken herbegraven om ontdekking te voorkomen. De commissie heeft 7.779 namen van vermiste personen van het drama in Srebrenica achterhaald. Tot nu toe zijn 1.332 lijken geïdentificeerd.

Commissievoorzitter Milan Bogdanić noemt het rapport „historisch”. Volgens Bogdanić zullen de Bosnische Serviërs hun betrokkenheid „onder ogen moeten zien”. Paddy Ashdown, VN-bestuurder in Bosnië die de Serviërs anderhalf jaar geleden dwong tot dit onderzoek, hoopt dat het rapport een indicatie is van een nieuwe bereidheid om hun verantwoordelijkheid te nemen.

Critici zeggen echter dat er pas sprake is van werkelijke erkenning van schuld, als de Bosnisch-Servische regering zou meewerken aan arrestatie en berechting van de daders van de massamoord. Nog maar anderhalve maand geleden was Ashdown woedend omdat de autoriteiten van de Servische Republiek in Bosnië de commissie dwarsboomden. De commissie had Ashdown toen laten weten dat ze werd gehinderd bij het verkrijgen van toegang tot documenten en getuigen. Ashdown dreigde met het intrekken van financiële steun aan de Servische Republiek. (Reuters, AFP)

Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: dinsdag 9 maart 2004 23:34
Onderwerp: Fw: MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS - FEBRUARY 12, 2004: THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIPPE MORILLON

— Original Message —

From: nebojsa
To: Ruza
Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 9:49 PM
Subject: MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS - FEBRUARY 12, 2004: THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIPPE MORILLON

MILOSEVIC "TRIAL" SYNOPSIS - FEBRUARY 12, 2004: THE END OF THE PROSECUTION CASE - THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIPPE MORILLON

www.slobodan-milosevic.org - March 9, 2004

Thursday - February 12, 2004 – The French General, Philippe Morillon testified at the so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic last month in what was ultimately the "grand finale" of the prosecution's case against Slobodan Milosevic.

Gen. Morillon served as deputy UNPROFOR commander in Croatia until September 1992 at which time he became UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia Herzegovina, a position he held until July 12, 1993.

During the examination-in-chief, Gen. Morillon testified that after the war in Bosnia began that he had a meeting with President Milosevic and that they discussed the fighting in Sarajevo. Morillon claimed that at the meeting Milosevic agreed to "use his influence in order to have this shelling stopped."

Morillon explained to Mr. Groome with regards to the eastern enclaves in Bosnia that "These enclaves were partly occupied by forces, Muslim forces under the command of Naser Oric, who engaged in regular fights. So the possibilities of getting supplies of food for the population from Bosnia, which it was hoped would come both from Belgrade and from Split through Mostar were considerably hampered and hindered, and the Bosnian Serbs were telling us that it was due to the fighting which took place."

The General went on to explain that Nasir Oric, the Muslim military commander of the Srebrenica enclave, "engaged in attacks during Orthodox holidays and destroyed villages, massacring all the [Serb] inhabitants. This created a degree of hatred that was quite extraordinary in the region."

General Morillon described a meeting he had with Oric in chilling detail – saying: "Naser Oric was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the population itself. I think that he realized that those were the rules of this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to my recollection, he didn't even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One can't be bothered with prisoners." Morillon described what the situation in Srebrenica as "hellish circle of revenge."

In keeping with their usual tactics the prosecution provided President Milosevic with General Morillon's witness statement at the very last minute. As Mr. Groome explained, "it was given to the accused just prior to the testimony today." Of course this made it quite difficult for President Milosevic to prepare, but he did a good job any way.

Under cross-examination from Milosevic, Morillon confirmed that prior to the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Cutileiro plan had been agreed on, and that Karadzic, Boban, and Izetbegovic had all signed it, but that Izetbegovic withdrew his signature at the last moment upon receiving encouragement to do so from the U.S. Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman.

Morillon was quick to defend Izetbegovic. He was of the opinion that Karadzic also bore some of the blame for the outbreak of the war, and to demonstrate his point he talked about how "Karadzic's men" opened fire on a peace rally from the Sarajevo Holiday Inn hotel in April of 1992.

Unfortunately for Morillon, the fire that was opened on that rally was opened by the Muslims, and not by Karadzic's men as he had claimed. Aleksandar Vasiljevic's testimony of February 17, 2003 is quite clear on this, and is well worth reading. Vasiljevic explains in exquisite detail how the Green Berets fired on the rally from the school next to the Holiday Inn, and how they had video tape and the intercepted radio communications of the Green Berets that proved it.

But that aside, Morillon accepted Milosevic's claim that the Bosnian Serbs' goal was to preserve Yugoslavia, and that they made a great concession in the interests of preserving peace when they signed the Cutileiro plan, and agreed to live in an independent Bosnia.

Morillon also agreed that prior to its withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina that the JNA was a stabilizing factor. He explained in his statement that the so-called "siege of Sarajevo" began when the Muslims surrounded and laid siege on the Marsal Tito barracks, forcing the JNA to liberate its barracks and free its soldiers.

Morillon also confirmed that when the JNA withdrew from Bosnia, the Muslims attacked them as they were trying to leave. Milosevic cited the massacre of JNA soldiers at Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo as an example. These soldiers were withdrawing, and the Muslims attacked them and killed them as they were trying to leave. Morillon remembered the event and said that it "was one of the dramatic events that I experienced the spot and we all suffered because we didn't have the means to prevent it."

Unfortunately, that was not the only example. Milosevic read out other examples where the JNA was attacked as it was trying to evacuate Bosnia. Hundreds of soldiers were killed in this way, not only in Sarajevo, but also in Tuzla and at other locations throughout Bosnia.

Morillon confirmed Milosevic's claim that the influence that he had was a political influence, which he used to try and stop bloodshed from taking place in Bosnia. Morillon also confirmed that Bosnia was a civil war, and not some aggression waged by the Serbs or by Serbia. Morillon claimed that Croatia, on the other hand, had its regular army troops in Bosnia.

Morillon also testified that Muslims from Serbia, or "Sandzaki" as they were called came to Bosnia to fight on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, and were primarily deployed in and around Srebrenica.

Morillon discussed the role of Mujahedeens who came to Bosnia from the Middle East. He said that they were brought to Bosnia in 1993 and were especially active in the region of Vitez. To drive this point home President Milosevic read from the indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, which states clearly that the Al Qaeda terrorist organization was active in Bosnia.

Milosevic read out a quite interesting quotation from Lord Owen's book. Owen says, "in Sarajevo, it became increasingly clear that in fact there were two sieges of the town, one which was implemented by the Bosnian Serb army with shells, sniper fire and blockades, and another by the army of the Bosnian government which prevented their people from leaving through internal blockades and bureaucratic complications. Able-bodied men from 18 to 65 and women from 18 to 60 were not allowed to leave because they were essential for the defense of the town, but their main reason was a different one. The Serb siege in the propaganda war evoked compassion on the part of the world, and that is why they needed the elderly and the children to remain. That was their most emotional propaganda weapon to draw the Americans into the war, and they didn't want that to weaken."

In response Morillon said, "Well, I am not denying what Lord Owen may have written." He then went on to say that "the Bosniaks used the presence of their population, as you have just said, to keep the attention of the world focused on their situation, it is true, but similarly they prevented the evacuation from Srebrenica."

So not only did the Muslims hold their population hostage in Sarajevo as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy, but they did the same thing in Srebrenica where, as Morillon explained earlier, Nasir Oric was terrorizing even the Muslim population.

Morillon explained in his statement that "The aim of the [Bosnian Muslim] Presidency from the very outset was to ensure the intervention of international forces for their own benefit, and that is one of the reasons why they never were inclined to engage in talks. In those days, the Serbs were ready for talks since they considered that they were winning. Whenever such an agreement was signed on humanitarian corridors, the problems came from the Presidency. Finally, the corridors would be accepted. The beginning of their implementation was to be the withdrawal of heavy weapons, which should have taken place at 1700 hours on the 24th of December. However, on that day, my residence in Sarajevo was shelled. The shell was fired by the Bosnian

forces. That is quite certain."

In spite of the fact that the Muslims tried to kill him, Morillon apologized for Izetbegovic. He said, "there was a war. Izetbegovic had lost just then [...] He had only the possibility of defending himself with whatever means he had at his disposal. And he was not in a position to strategically win a battle. [...] I did everything at the time as the mandate I had was to try and establish peace. If you want me to say that it was not in Izetbegovic's interest to comply, I agree."

Milosevic turned his attention to Srebrenica, and he read this passage out of Morillon's testimony in front of the French parliament: "Mladic had entered an ambush in Srebrenica, a trap, in fact. He expected to find resistance, but there none. He didn't expect the massacre to occur but he completely underestimated the amount of hatred that accrued. I don't believe that he ordered the massacres, but I don't know. That is my personal opinion."

So according to Morillon, Mladic didn't order any massacres, and he was tricked into coming to Srebrenica.

Morillon went on to say "I was convinced that the population of Srebrenica was the victim of a higher interest, of a state reason," as Morillon put it, "but this higher interest which was located in Sarajevo and New York but certainly not in Paris. Had I been able to evacuate all those who had wanted me to do so at the time that I intervened in Srebrenica, we could certainly have saved a number of human lives."

So, Morillon says that the population was the victim of some "higher interests" in Sarajevo, obviously these some higher Muslim interests he is speaking of. Unfortunately, the French Government had its in the court room, and the "court" unceremoniously went into closed session at their request, as if it wished to hide what these Muslim interests might be.

When the "tribunal" came out of closed session, Milosevic continued reading out from Morillon's testimony before the French Parliament. Morillon said, "The authorities of Izetbegovic were the ones who stood up against the [Srebrenica] evacuation of those towards Tuzla for all those who wanted to, and there were many of them who wanted to. And I said that Naser Oric in my opinion succumbed to the orders that he received from Sarajevo to leave the area. I don't wish to say that Sarajevo intentionally created this drama. This was done by the Presidency. This was done by Izetbegovic. Naser Oric in Sarajevo listened to the Presidency."

Morillon continued by saying, "When I say that he, Mladic, entered into a trap and the trap was an intentional one, I'm not criticising Izetbegovic. In my opinion, he had no other way of causing what he wanted, that is to say the — putting the international community on his side."

So according to Morillon, Izetbegovic intentionally provoked Mladic, and tricked him into entering Srebrenica precisely to provoke a reaction on the part of the international community against the Serbs. Of course Morillon didn't like it when Milosevic put it that way, and so he tried to backpedal, but he didn't have much success.

During the examination-in-chief, Morillon said that fire emanating from the FRY was directed against Srebrenica in 1993. In the cross-examination it was revealed that this fire was opened because Nasir Oric's men were firing on the hydro electric dam at Bajina Basta. The VJ had to return fire in order to keep Oric from destroying the dam.

Morillon tried to accuse Milosevic of sowing nationalist hatred, but to no avail. Milosevic challenged Morillon to quote an example where either he, or the government of the FRY, or the government of Serbia undertook any actions to incite nationalistic hatred. Mr. Robinson warned Milosevic that this was a bold question, and asked him if he was sure that he wanted to put it. Milosevic said that he did indeed want to put the question, and Morillon fell flat on his face, he couldn't think of any example where Milosevic incited ethnic hatred.

Morillon also tried to say that Milosevic controlled the Bosnian Serbs, and so Milosevic challenged him to give an example of where he issued orders, or used his influence for any purpose other than the pursuit of peace, and again Morillon had nothing.

Morillon believed that the Muslims attacked their own people on numerous occasions, including the breadline massacre, and the Markale market massacre. He wasn't sure on each instance, but he did believe that it happened.

To sum-up Milosevic read out a quote from General Nambiar saying: "Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was not only counter-productive but also dishonest. According to my experience, all sides were guilty but only the Serbs would admit that they were no angels, while the others would insist that they were. With 28,000 forces under me and with constant contacts with UNHCR and the International Red Cross officials, we did not witness any genocide beyond killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions."

Morillon agreed with the quote, and with that Milosevic's cross-examination ended. Mr. Tapuskovic then examined the general.

Under cross-examination from Tapuskovic, Morillon admitted that he met Naser Oric on several occasions and that Oric "admitted killing Bosnian Serbs every night." Morillon said that Oric told him "that those were the rules of the game, and that in this type of partisan warfare, he cannot take prisoners." In other words Oric didn't take Serb prisoners, he just killed them instead.

Immediately after he clarified these points Tapuskovic asked the following question, "And when speaking about March and April in 1993 in that statement of yours, in paragraph 3 it says: 'Naser Oric's reign implied a thorough knowledge of the area held by his forces. It appeared to me that he was respecting political instructions coming from the [Bosnian Muslim] Presidency.' Is that correct too?"

Morillon answered by saying, "Yes. I don't see the point of the question. Naser Oric obeyed. He was head of a band. He was waging guerilla war in the enclave, but he himself considered himself to be a combatant in the service of the [Bosnian Muslim] Presidency."

Obviously, the point of it is this: Oric boasted that he "killed Serbs every night," and he was acting on instructions from Izetbegovic, therefore Izetbegovic is guilty together with him. That is the point.

Tapuskovic read out a quote from Morillon's testimony to the French Parliament regarding the Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo. Morillon said, "We saw a [Muslim] mortar there ready to provoke a reaction from the Serbs. They did that all the time. I know that some UN observers saw that mortar at Kosevo. Very frequently they used mortars at Kosevo for provocation purposes."

Morillon confirmed that this was true and that he denounced that practice. It is unconscionable that anybody could be so evil that they would try to draw their fire on to a civilian hospital for the purposes of propaganda, but that is exactly what the Muslim authorities did in Sarajevo.

After Morillon withdrew, an employee of the Office of the Prosecutor testified. His name was Tore Soldal. He carried out an investigation into claims made by the secret witness C-48. You may remember that C-48 is the one who claimed to work for the Royal Casino in Novi Sad where he, on the basis of a diary, claimed that Milosevic was in the casino issuing orders to people that they should commit atrocities in Croatia.

C-48 claimed that this alleged diary was destroyed by his mother when he came to The Hague. Mr. Soldal, who works for the OTP, carried out an investigation to ascertain whether the diary ever existed in the first place.

The key questions are these:

MILOSEVIC: Very well. Now, is it true, then, that on the basis of your research and investigation, this doubtful testimony of the witness was rendered even more suspect because you didn't find anything, any of the things you were looking for?

SOLDAL: That's correct, I didn't find a diary.

MILOSEVIC: Mr. Soldal, a moment ago in response to a question from Mr. Nice as to whether you were able to establish anything that coincided with the events that that famous witness of yours talked about or, rather, the waiter from this place [i.e. C-48], you — your answer was that you weren't able to establish or ascertain anything; is that right?

SOLDAL: Yeah, that's right.

In other words the whole testimony of C-48 is worthless. Even the prosecution's own employee can't bring

himself to claim that this witness was telling the truth.

With this the prosecution's pathetic excuse for a case against Slobodan Milosevic ended. And a fitting end it was. The prosecutor's own employee forced to say that he can't confirm the truthfulness of their own witness's claims, and this witness was one of their most important witnesses, because he was the only one who to have seen Milosevic issuing orders to commit atrocities.

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Srpska beseft dat zijn toekomst Bosnisch is

25-6-2004
Analyse | Spijtbetuigingen over Srebrenica tonen voorzichtig einde van psychologisch verdringingsproces

Het is een doorbraak, maar nog geen cultuuromslag. Dragan Cavic, de president van de Republika Srpska, het door Serviërs in de periode 1992-1995 veroverde en deels etnisch gezuiverde deel van Bosnië, heeft dinsdag erkend dat het Bosnisch-Servische leger in juli 1995 in Srebrenica een massamoord heeft begaan.

Cavic noemde Srebrenica, waar tussen 10 en 19 juli 1995 meer dan zeventienduizend moslims werden geëxecuteerd, in een televisietoespraak 'een zwarte bladzijde in de geschiedenis van het Servische volk'. Paddy Ashdown, de internationale Hoge Vertegenwoordiger in Bosnië, noemde de uitspraak 'een historisch moment'.

De president is afkomstig uit de Servische Democratische Partij (SDS) die tot 1996 geleid werd door Radovan Karadzic. Nog in 1998 werd hij door Ashdowns voorganger Carlos Westendorp wegens onverzoenlijke taal uit het

parlement van de Republika Srpska verwijderd.

Cavic ging in zijn toespraak nog niet zo ver om voor de misdaden van Srebrenica vergiffenis te vragen. Dragan Mikerevic, de premier van de Republika Srpska, deed dat maandag wel. Ook riep Mikerevic de nog voortvluchtige Karadzic op zich over te geven.

De schuldbekekenissen van Cavic en Mikerevic komen niet onverwacht. Zij komen in een politiek klimaat waarin de Republika Srpska steeds meer van haar aparte, uit het vredesakkoord van Dayton uit 1995 voortvloeiende bevoegdheden verliest. Hoge Vertegenwoordiger Ashdown voert meer dan zijn voorgangers een harde politiek om het Servische deel met de rest van Bosnië te verenigen.

De afgelopen jaren keerden vele tienduizenden Moslim-vluchtelingen terug naar hun huizen in de Republika Srpska. En de samenwerking van het Bosnisch-Servi-

sche leger met dat van de Moslim-Kroatische Federatie, de andere helft van Bosnië, is in volle gang.

Daarbij komt dat Ashdown sinds begin dit jaar hard optreedt tegen politici en zakenmannen die ervan worden verdacht deel uit te maken van een netwerk dat Radovan Karadzic beschermt. Zo ver-

'Veroordeel Moslims pas nadat we onze fouten hebben erkend'

loor Nikola Sarovic, Cavic' voorganger als president, in februari alle officiële functies die hij nog bekleedde op verdenking van hulp aan Karadzic.

Veel Bosnisch-Servische politici koesterden in de eerste jaren na de oorlog nog de hoop dat de Republika Srpska zich op termijn bij

Servië zou kunnen aansluiten. Daar kan in het huidige klimaat geen sprake meer van zijn. Het besef van de politieke klasse dat haar toekomst hoe dan ook in Bosnië ligt, is sterk gegroeid. In de eerste jaren na de oorlog trachtte de toenmalige verzoeningsgezinde premier Milorad Dodik reeds een hand naar de Moslims uit te steken.

Het leverde hem de toorn op van de SDS en een reputatie van 'slechte patriot' onder de Bosnisch-Servische bevolking. Nu komt de uitgestoken hand van de SDS zelf.

De spijtbetuigingen van Cavic en Mikerevic moeten evenwel niet alleen in een politiek licht worden bekeken. Het is inmiddels bijna negen jaar geleden dat de Bosnische oorlog werd beëindigd. Voorzichtig lijkt een einde te komen aan een psychologisch verdringingsproces bij zowel daders als slachtoffers van alle etnische groepen.

Uit Cavic' televisietoespraak bleek duidelijk dat hij het taboe op het drama van Srebrenica doorbreekt in de hoop dat Moslims en Kroaten nu ook de verantwoordelijkheid zullen nemen voor het leed dat zij Serviërs hebben aangedaan.

Het feit dat Serviërs weigerden de massamoord in Srebrenica te erkennen heeft volgens Cavic in hoge mate bijgedragen tot de bevestiging van 'het stereotype van Moslimslachtoffers en Servische daders'. Als Serviërs eisen dat misdaden tegen hen worden berecht moeten ze 'eerst zelf de misdaden van hun eigen volk onder ogen zien'.

De mate waarin Moslims en Kroaten hun misdaden tegen Serviërs bespreekbaar zullen maken, zal bepalend zijn voor de mate waarin de nieuwe toon van een de Bosnisch-Servische politieke elite er een wordt van de Bosnisch-Servische bevolking zelf.

Olaf Tempelman

BINNENLAND

NOS-team smokkelde stukjes mensenbeen uit Srebrenica

Door onze redacteur FRANK WESTERMAN

ROTTERDAM, 28 MAART. Twee stukjes mensenbeen uit de omgeving van Srebrenica zijn begin februari in de bagage van een team van het NOS-Journaal naar Nederland vervoerd. Onder regie van de hoofdredactie, die met de botten in haar maag zat, heeft een ander Journaalteam ze twee weken later in Belgrado bij een patholoog-anatoom bezorgd.

„We waren verrast”, zegt plaatsvervangend hoofdredacteur Jan Rodenburg. „De vraag was: waarom hebben jullie dit meegevoerd? Dat is geen goede beslissing geweest.” Volgens hem ging het om „twee aangevreten botjes van ongeveer tien centimeter”.

Het reportageteam van verslaggeefster Maria Henneman wilde de botten door het gerechtelijk laboratorium in Rijswijk laten onderzoeken, aldus een van haar

medewerkers. „Ze zijn afkomstig uit een veldje waar volgens de Amerikanen vermoedelijk tweeduizend moslimlijken begraven liggen”, zegt hij.

In het Journaal waren beelden te zien van een bevroren veldje waaruit knoken en stukken textiel staken: mogelijk sporen van de duizenden vermiste moslims uit de door Dutchbat bewaakte enclave Srebrenica, die in juli 1995 door de Bosnische Serviërs was overrompeld. „Zijn dat nou menselijke of dierlijke resten”, had het NOS-team zich volgens Rodenburg afgevraagd.

Om dat uit te zoeken besloten

Henneman en haar medewerkers om twee monsters ter onderzoek aan te bieden aan een Servische patholoog-anatoom in Belgrado, maar die bleek onvindbaar. Verpakt in een plastic zak zouden de botten in het vriesvak van de minibar van het hotel zijn bewaard. De medewerker zegt dat hij ze vervolgens „in een doosje” naar Nederland heeft vervoerd.

Plaatsvervangend hoofdredacteur Rodenburg: „In theorie neem je dan een zeker risico. Als de douane je koffer opent dan moet je wel kunnen verklaren waarom je dat bij je hebt en wat je ermee beoogt.” De leiding van

het Journaal was niet gelukkig met de meegebrachte stoffelijke resten, die binnenskamers al gauw „de soepbotten” werden genoemd. Het laten onderzoeken van de botten in het land zelf vindt Rodenburg een journalistiek verdedigbare werkwijze, maar het meesmokkelen niet. „Het was lastig. We vroegen ons af: wat doen we nou?” zegt Rodenburg. „Het leek ons niet zinnig om het in Nederland te laten onderzoeken.”

Half februari werd verslaggeefster Pauline Broekema op reportage gestuurd naar Servië om en passant de Bosnische botten bij de patholoog-anatoom in Belgrado

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Rodenburg.

Drama laat Karremans niet los

20-6-2004
Achtergrond | Belang van nieuwe getuigenis over val Srebrenica wordt betwijfeld

Vandaag staat oud-Dutchbat-bevelhebber Karremans opnieuw voor het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal. Het is de vraag of hij meer kan toelichten dan bij zijn eerste stuntelige optreden.

Haag moest gaan getuigen. De laatste keer, acht jaar terug, was immers geen succes.

Zijn onhandigheid bevestigde toen het beeld van de officier die zich vooral druk maakte om zijn militairen, terwijl om hem heen de grootste massamoord in Europa sinds 1945 plaatshad. 'Hij vindt het gewoon niet makkelijk', zegt strafpleiter en internationaal-strafrechdeskundige Michail Wladimiroff. 'Logisch. Maar of zijn optreden nieuw licht laat schijnen op wat er toen is gebeurd? Geen idee.'

Omdat hij zich onveilig voelde door bedreigingen verruilde de oud-Dutchbat-commandant Nederland voor Spanje, maar het Srebrenica-drama kan hij niet achter zich laten. Negen jaar na de genocide die zich in de nabijheid van vierhonderd Nederlandse militairen voltrok, moet Karremans opnieuw in het openbaar vragen beantwoorden over de val van de moslim-enclave. Dat gebeurt nota bene in de zaak van een toenmalige Bosnisch-Servische officier, Blagojevic, die de hand zou hebben gehad in de moord op zeventienduizend moslims.

Bijna twee maanden lang pro-



Thom Karremans FOTO ANP

beerde diens Amerikaanse advocaat Karnavas de oud-commandant van Dutchbat te pakken te krijgen, maar de Nederlandse overheid werkte amper mee. Pas na bemoeienis van het tribunaal en dreiging met een opsporingsbevel werd het Spaanse adres van Karremans verstrekt. De vraag is echter wat Karnavas nu met diens getuigenis wil bereiken.

Blagojevic, wiens brigade verantwoordelijk was voor de veiligheid rond Srebrenica, wordt ver-

dacht van betrokkenheid bij de massamoord. Volgens de aanklagers zou hij, als een van de commandanten onder bevelhebber Radko Mladic, medeplichtig zijn geweest aan de genocide. In de drie maanden dat Blagojevic nu terechtstaat, heeft Karnavas echter steeds betoogd dat hiervoor geen enkel bewijs is.

Volgens de advocaat zou Blagojevic vanwege de chaos in de enclave geen greep hebben gehad op de situatie en zijn manschappen. Karremans, commandant van het onder de voet gelopen Nederlandse bataljon, zou deze 'chaos' moeten bevestigen. Karnavas: 'Hij is de enige van Dutchbat die alle informatie kan geven over de ontwikkelingen voor en tijdens de val van Srebrenica.'

Karnavas wil Karremans ook laten getuigen over de etnische zuivering in de enclave. Karnavas: 'Wiens idee was het en onder wiens leiding vond dat plaats?' Betwijfeld moet worden of Karremans dat kan zeggen. Want als zijn eerste optreden voor het tribunaal iets duidelijk maakte, was het wel dat hij een machteloze commandant was die geen weet had van de moord op duizenden.

Servische spijt over 'Srebrenica'

SARAJEVO, 23 JUNI. De president van de Servische Republiek in Bosnië, Dragan Cavic, heeft voor het eerst openlijk de massamoord door de Bosnische Serviërs op meer dan zeventienduizend moslims in Srebrenica, in juli 1995, toegegeven en veroordeeld. Srebrenica was een moslimenclave die onder bescherming stond van Nederlandse VN-militairen.

Cavic verwees in een televisietoespraak naar het rapport dat een regeringscommissie van de Servische Republiek eerder deze maand over de massamoord heeft opgesteld. Het toont aan, zei hij, dat in juli 1995 negen dagen lang gruweldaden zijn gepleegd. „Na dit alles moet ik, eerst als mens en als Serviër, daarna als vader, broer en zoon, en pas daarna als president van de Servische Republiek, zeggen dat deze negen dagen van juli in de tragedie van Srebrenica een zwarte bladzij betekenen in de geschiedenis van het Servische volk.”

Dragan Cavic zei dat het feit dat de Serviërs tot nu toe niet in het reine zijn gekomen met hun oorlogsverleden een eerlijke beoordeling van wat in de oorlog de Serviërs is aangedaan in de weg heeft gestaan,

omdat „het stereotype van de moslimslachtoffers en de Servische daders” erdoor is bevestigd. Als de Serviërs eisen dat misdrijven tegen hen worden onderzocht, moeten „ze eerst zelf de misdrijven van hun eigen volk onder ogen zien”.

Dragan Cavic is lid van de Servische Democratische Partij, die is gesticht door Radovan Karadzic, nummer één op de lijst van meestgezochte oorlogsmisdadigers. Cavic werd in 1998 nog door de toenmalige Bosnië-bestuurder, Carlos Westendorp, uit het parlement van de Servische Republiek gegooid wegens opmerkingen die volgens Westendorp „een bedreiging van de veiligheid van de internationale gemeenschap en een oproep tot geweld” vormden. Westendorp verbod hem toen ooit nog een openbare functie te bekleden.

Dat verbod werd in 1999 opgeheven. Hij is president sinds eind 2002.

Cavic bood geen excuses aan voor de massamoord en hij riep evenmin mensen als Karadzic op zich over te geven. De premier van de Servische Republiek, Dragan Mikerevic, deed dat maandag wel. (Reuters, BBC)

'Srebrenica dieptepunt in Servische geschiedenis'
SARAJEVO - Voor het eerst heeft een Bosnisch-Servische president erkend dat Serviërs gruweldaden hebben begaan tegen moslims in Srebrenica. President Dragan Cavic noemde dinsdag in een televisietoespraak de massamoord op duizenden Bosnische moslimmannen een 'zwarte bladzijde' in de Servische geschiedenis. Cavic is lid van de SDS, de partij die is opgericht door Radovan Karadzic, een van de hoofdverdachten van de massaslachting. (Reuters)

BINNENLAND

Dutchbat geraakte in Srebrenica 'tussen hamer en aambeeld'

Door onze redacteur
FRANK WESTERMAN
ROTTERDAM, 31 OKT. In stilte heeft het ministerie van Defensie vorige maand een eigen boek over Dutchbat in Bosnië gepubliceerd: *Tussen hamer en aambeeld* - de Luchtmobiele Brigade in Bosnië.

Bij de aanbidding van het eerste exemplaar op 30 september in Den Haag gaf minister Voorhoeve - die zelf het voorwoord heeft geschreven - blijk van zijn scepsis over „alweer een boek Srebrenica”. De pers was niet uitgenodigd en de publicatie van het boek ging evenmin vergezeld van een persbericht.

„De presentatie is geruisloos gegaan omdat Defensie geen behoefte had aan nieuwe publiciteit”, zegt kapitein G.Jansen, één van de samenstellers van het ‘herinneringsboek’ dat onder redactionele verantwoordelijkheid van Defensie bij uitgeverij Brouwer in Delft is verschenen. Het ministerie heeft ervoor gekozen om geen ruchtbaarheid aan het boek te geven „omdat alleen al de naam Srebrenica een gevoelige snaar raakt”, aldus B. van Vroenhoven van Brouwer Delft. Een woordvoerder van het mi-

nisterie noemt de presentatie „sober maar niet geheimzinnig”. Volgens hem is de pers niet uitgenodigd omdat het boek geen actualiteitswaarde heeft.

Vorig jaar wilde minister Voorhoeve ‘het dossier Srebrenica’ sluiten, maar sinds de zomer is hij voorstander van een gedegen, door het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie uit te voeren onderzoek naar de omstandigheden waaronder de grootste massamoord in Europa sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog kon plaatsvinden.

Adjutant W. Dijkema, die als voorlichter van de laatste Dutchbat-lichting de val van de enclave meemaakte, denkt dat Defensie een kater heeft overgehouden aan de publiciteit rond ‘Dutchbat in Vredesnaam’, het gedenkboek van het 13de Infanteriebataljon Luchtmobiel. De pers kwam toen

niet verder dan het hek van de Johan Willem Friso-kazerne in Assen, was niet gewenst. Het bataljon van overste Karremans kwam opnieuw negatief in het nieuws.

Was ‘Dutchbat in Vredesnaam’ revanchistisch van toon (het zet zich af tegen „het hysterische gebel van allerlei ‘deskundigen’, politici en tv-mensjes”), het boek ‘Tussen hamer en aambeeld’ geeft een politiek wenselijke kijk op het optreden van de Nederlandse *peacekeepers* in Bosnië. Een hoofdstuk heet: ‘Met ons valt niet te sollen’ en een bijschrift bij een foto van drie Moslimkinderen achter rollen prikkeldraad zegt: ‘Voor deze Bosnische kinderen geen bezorgde toekomst, maar een perspectief vol verdriet en onzekerheid.’

„Om een eerlijk en onopgesmukt beeld te krijgen” bevat het boek artikelen die eerder

in de Defensiekrant en de Legerkoerier zijn afgedrukt en die „bewust niet herschreven zijn”, aldus de Defensiekrant. Toch blijkt er aan de tekst te zijn gesleuteld. Op pagina 113 zegt sergeant G. Gurgjes, commandant van een observatiepost bij Srebrenica: „Het is onze taak moslimstrijders binnen de pocket te houden, om incidenten te voorkomen”. Het oorspronkelijke citaat in de Legerkoerier luidt: „Wij zijn hier niet om de moslims te helpen, zoals velen denken. Het is onze taak de moslimstrijders binnen de pocket te houden, zodat er geen incidenten worden uitgelokt.”

Opvallend is ook de titel. Samensteller Jansen, destijds de voorlichter van Dutchbat 1, had ‘Mission impossible’ geopperd. De uiteindelijke keus wordt in een ‘ten geleide’ toegelicht: de Nederlanders zaten

„tussen de hamer van de Bosnische Serviërs en het aambeeld van de moslims”. De boodschap (Dutchbat heeft gedaan wat het kon, maar is door de wereld in de steek gelaten) wordt bijna visueel uitgedragen: tussen de kleurenfoto’s van Sea Harriers, Tornados, Super Etendards, Mirages, F-15’s en F-16’s staat drie keer dat het bataljon „verstoken bleef van luchtsteun”, waardoor de enclave viel. In het bieden van hulp en bescherming „aan 40.000 volledig van de buitenwereld afgesloten ontheemde mannen, vrouwen en kinderen” had de Luchtmobiele Brigade „een nobele taak”, schrijft Voorhoeve in zijn voorwoord. Maar: „Door de aanval van de Bosnische Serviërs op de enclave Srebrenica werd de opdracht ten slotte onuitvoerbaar.”

Voor adjunct Dijkema is dit boek „de verwaterde versie” van wat generaal Brinkman, destijds commandant van de Luchtmobiele Brigade, voor ogen stond toen hij opdracht gaf tot het bijhouden van een kroniek, met de bedoeling die later te publiceren. Brinkman (inmiddels korpschef van de Rotterdamse politie) was niet bij de presentatie aanwezig.

‘De Serviërs hebben Dutchbat vorig jaar gered’

DOOR ALFRED VAN CLEEF
SREBRENICA, 12 JULI. Voor een volle zaal brengt het plaatselijke kinderkoor het volkslied van de Servische Republiek ten gehore: „God, red de Servische geschiedenis en het Servische volk.” Wellicht als klein teken van protest laat hij de regen tijdens de viering van de ‘bevrijding’ van Srebrenica met bakken tegelijk over het halfverwoeste plaatsje neerdalen.

De voormalige wachttorens van de VN-troepen liggen er nog net zo bij als tijdens de val van de moslim-enclave een jaar geleden, op het muurtje bij de zandzakken staat zelfs nog HQ Dutchbat gekalkt. Sommige huizen zijn weer enigszins opgelapt, maar de aanblik van ruïnes overheerst. Op het Plein van Broederschap en Eenheid markeert een grote berg stenen de plaats waar zich de moskee bevond, op een afgebrokkelde muur valt nog een Koran te ontwaren. In alles wat maar enigszins bewoonbaar is, zijn Servische vluchtelingen uit West-Bosnië en Sarajevo getrokken. Zij vormen de overgrote meerderheid van de huidige bevolking en niemand van hen was aanwezig bij de deportatie van de dertigduizend moslims die er op 11 juli 1995 verbleven.

Dat geldt niet voor de notabelen die om tien uur ’s ochtends hun opwachting maken bij de welkomstborrel in het culturele centrum. De plaatselijke top van Radovan Karadžić ‘Servische Democratische Partij SDS is er, burgemeester Stanislav Rakić, en een groot deel van de hoogste leiders van het Bosnisch-Servische leger, generaal Mladić uitgezonderd. De Nederlandse verslaggever is welkom. Hem wordt verzekerd dat de Serviërs een jaar geleden „de Nederlandse soldaten hebben gered, vlak voordat ze door de moslims als slaven zouden zijn weggevoerd”.

Momčilo Cvjetinović, leider van de SDS in Srebrenica, zegt er zeker

van te zijn dat moslims en Serviërs nooit meer zullen kunnen samenleven. „In Tuzla demonstreerden moslim-vrouwen voor duidelijkheid over hun vermiste mannen. Zij treuren en wij vieren feest. Dat laat hun zien dat we niets met elkaar gemeen hebben. Deze oorlog was vreselijk, je kunt je wel voorstellen hoe de volgende eruit zal zien. Iedereen moet blijven waar hij nu is.” De meeste vermiste moslims uit Srebrenica „kwamen bij onderlinge gevechten om het leven”, weet hij, „en ik kan het weten want ik heb aan de bevrijding van onze stad deelgenomen.”

De ochtendborrel vormt het eerste onderdeel van een uitgebreid programma dat twee dagen zal duren. Dr Miroslav Jevtić uit Belgrado zal een lezing houden over ‘Islamitisch fundamentalisme’. In de orthodoxe kerk zal een mis worden opgedragen, gevolgd door een bezoek aan de begraafplaats, ter nagedachtenis aan de helden van de natie. Voorts vindt de onthulling plaats van het monument voor Kosta Todorović, een uit Srebrenica afkomstige legercommandant die in de Eerste Wereldoorlog tegen het leger van de Oostenrijks-Hongaarse dubbelmonarchie vocht.

In de hal van het culturele centrum is een foto-expositie ingericht. In vitrines hangen portretten van gesneuvelde Servische soldaten. „Mijn Rade, mijn lieve zoon”, gilt een bejaarde vrouw. Snikkend drukt ze zich tegen het glas aan en roept: „Mijn noodlot, mijn noodlot! Waarom hebben de Ustaše je vermoord?”

Naast de vitrines van de ‘martelaren van het Servische volk’ is de 62-jarige Stefan Milivojević bezig de

foto’s op te hangen die hij sinds vorig jaar juli in het ‘bevijsde’ Srebrenica heeft gemaakt: generaal Mladić, geflankeerd door een pope van de orthodoxe kerk, Radovan Karadžić met de plaatselijke SDS-leiders, een gezelschap bebaarde etniks. Dan verschijnt plotseling generaal Milenko Živanović ten tonele, inmiddels gepensioneerd maar op 11 juli 1995 commandant van het Drina-korps en als zodanig samen met Mladić bevelhebber van de troepen die Srebrenica bestormden.

‘Moslim-mannen zijn gedood in onderlinge strijd’

„Ik respecteer uw komst”, zegt de generaal, „maar u was in uw vak een Eiffeltoren geweest als u iets geschreven zou hebben over de verwoesting van mijn dorp. Mijn geboortehuis is verbrand, het huis dat ik bouwde verwoest, mijn familie gedood. Ruim honderd van onze burgers zijn er vermoord.” Dat gebeurde op 12 juli 1992, toen moslims uit Srebrenica enkele dorpen in de omgeving aanvielen. De daders waren Turken, zegt hij, want zo noemt hij de moslims consequent. Hij heeft „een databank” ter beschikking vol namen van Servische slachtoffers van „de Turkse agressie”.

De generaal is niet gewend om

vragen te beantwoorden, hij preferert de monoloog. En zo raast hij door de geschiedenis, van 1914 naar 1942 en van 1992 weer terug naar de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Steeds waren de Serviërs het slachtoffer en niemand die het voor hen opnam, ook nu niet en zelfs niet het Joegoslavische JNA-leger dat de voorkeur gaf „aan het communistische utopia”.

Over Dutchbat geen kwaad woord van de generaal. „Hele goede vrienden van me, hun commandant is een waar voorbeeld van vakmanschap.” De Nederlandse soldaten verdienen volgens Živanović „alle mogelijke” eer. „Ze begrepen alleen niets van de mujahedeens en dat is logisch ook, want moslims liegen altijd. Ik zei nog tegen Karremans: de Turken zullen jouw onvoorzichtigheid gebruiken en een van jullie mannen doden om ons daarvan de schuld te kunnen geven. En zie wat er gebeurde? Een Hollander kreeg een moslim-kogel door zijn hoofd.” Zelf heeft hij tijdens de inname van Srebrenica nog veertig Nederlanders gered, meldt hij. „Ik bracht ze naar het hotel, liet een paar varkens slachten en zei ze: neem maar eens even pauze.”

Van executies is de generaal niets bekend, van het wegvoeren van de moslim-mannen evenmin. Aan getuigenissen van ‘Turken’ hecht hij geen waarde. „Ook Dutchbatters verklaren executies te hebben waargenomen? Goed dat was dan misschien een Turk die een Servische moeder had afgemaakt. Meerdere executies? Nou ja, er zijn ook vele Servische moeders vermoord.” De generaal krijgt er zin in, inmiddels staat een veertigtal mensen aandachtig luisterend om hem heen.

Na een nieuw breedvoerig uitstapje naar 1914 komt hij op het punt van de achtduizend vermiste moslim-mannen.

Wie in Potočari aankwam, is netjes naar moslim-gebied afgevoerd, stelt de generaal. „Maar voor hen die naar de bergen vluchtten, kan ik geen verantwoordelijkheid nemen. Als je iemand in de bossen tegenkomt, kun je geen vragen stellen. De vermiste Turken zijn de mannen die Servische begraafplaatsen hebben verwoest, die Servische vrouwen en kinderen vermoordden, zijn de mannen met bloed van hun handen tot aan hun schouders.” Hoeveel moslims door zijn troepen zijn gedood kan Živanović niet zeggen. „Ik ben geen kantoorclerk. Ik tel geen mensen, hoeveel duizend het er waren, ik heb geen idee.”

Dat collegageneraal Mladić door het Haagse tribunaal als oorlogsmisdadiger wordt bestempeld, verbaast hem niet. „Hoge bomen vallen veel wind. Maar ik weet wie Mladić is. Iedere natie zou gelukkig zijn met zo’n genie. Hij staat borg voor menselijkheid, eerlijkheid en rechtvaardigheid. In het gevecht ben ik een harde, maar evenals Mladić ben ik een vredelievend mens, vraagt u dat maar na bij overste Karremans. Ze noemen ons Serviërs agressors. Maar hoe kan je een agressor zijn in je eigen land?”

In het hotel van Srebrenica, een zwaar beschadigd gebouw zonder ramen in de spionningen, worden familieleden van gesneuvelde soldaten op een maaltijd getraakteerd. Ze luisteren geduldig naar de toespraken die legerleiders en de plaatselijke SDS-voorman over hen uitstorten. De langste komt van generaal Živanović die nog eens memoreert dat hij het was die „een jaar geleden, om tien voor half vijf precies” de vlag van de Servische Republiek in Srebrenica kon hijsen. „God zal het paradijs openen voor onze gesneuvelde martelaren”, zegt hij, onder luid applaus.

Srebrenica, de zweer

H.J.A. Hofland

Het is niet onmogelijk dat historici van 2006 op hun blote knieën riod, kabinet en Kamer voor dit onderzoek zullen danken

sico dat niet alleen deze onderzocht worden. Maar als dat het geval zou zijn, kan ook dit zijn eigen waarde hebben, en bovendien heeft de eerste weerstand geen onoverkoemelijke te zijn. Dat het materiaal deze oude angst der overheden om de oorzaak van een trauma dat nu

menheden van de tegenstander om het eigen en veel groter gebrek te maskeren. Dat is een politieke kwestie. Betreffende deze is er de wetenschappelijke. Is het per se noodzakelijk de duur van een menscheit te wachten tot er volgens de strengste eisen van de wetenschap, afstand kan worden genomen? Toevallig las ik in het just verschenen nummer van de *New York Review of Books* een artikel van Timothy Garton Ash over de Hongaarse Revolutie van 1956. Hij verzecht tegen de algemene opvatting (in de zaak Srebrenica kennelijk gedeeld door prof. H.W. van der Dijk) dat alleen na jaren, door een zorgvuldige bestudering van de documenten, we werkelijk te weten kunnen komen wat er toen is gebeurd. Hoeveel jaren staan daarvoor? En is er enige garantie dat de historici over een eeuw of vijf dusdanig bevrijd van belangen zullen zijn dat ze met absolute zuiverheid het verleden kunnen beschrijven? En als dat zo is, wie is er dan nog met hun zuiverheid geduid? „De waarheid is”, schrijft Garton Ash, „dat zoveel van de geschiedenis met een kleine g — het grootste deel in feite — verloren gaat” (met degenen die erbij zijn geweest). Hij geeft dan een paar treffende voorbeelden uit de dagen van de revolutionaire bewegingen

in de Koude Oorlog. Zo is het ook met Srebrenica. De misgelopen belangrijke volledigheid van de latere onderzoekers sluit de waarde van de eigenlijke vrij tot weten niet uit. Het is zelfs niet onmogelijk dat de historici van 2006 op hun blote knieën het riod, het kabinet en de Tweede Kamer voor dit onderzoek zullen danken. Wordt het door een oordeel afgerond, dan des te beter. Ook het oordeel is materiaal voor de toekomstige geschiedschrijving, en iedere tijdschrift staat het vrij het te betwisten of te verwerpen. Maar er is nog een ander argument dat voor dit onderzoek pleit. Srebrenica — datgene wat men er nu onder samenvalt: de twijfel, het wantrouwen, de verdedigingsmaximen, de onzekerheden — is een zweer. Men — de media, de wetenschap, het publiek — zal blijven streven naar opheldering. De behoefte om alles te weten is niet gestild met gedeeltelijk onderzoek, individuele ondernemingen, *indefinite guesing* en incidentele onthullingen, hoe bewonderenswaardig die ook mogen zijn. Het voorgenoemde onderzoek van het riod zal met de best denkbare wetenschappelijke garanties worden uitgevoerd onder de best denkbare omstandigheden. Vriend is het als men zich daaraan verzet. Het alternatief is de zweer die blijft.

H.J.A. Hofland is columnist van NRC Handelsblad

Opgravingen bij Srebrenica lijken te bevestigen dat daar genocide heeft plaatsgemaakt op de moslim-bevolking. Maar hoeveel bewijs is daar eigenlijk van? Volgens René Grémaux en

Abde Vries niet voldoende om vergaande conclusies te trekken.

Binnendruppelende onderzoeksresultaten van de opgravingen bij Srebrenica lijken te bevestigen wat al een jaar wordt gevreesd: Serviers hebben vluchtende mannelijke moslimburgers en massa geëxecuteerd. Bij Cerska vonden onderzoekers van het Joegoslavie-tribunaal onlangs meer dan tachtig slachtoffers, sommigen met de handen nog vastgebonden en in burgerkleden. „Het lijkt om burgers te gaan”, zei een woordvoerder van het onderzoeksteam afgelopen zaterdag in het journaal.

Nu ontkent vrijwel niemand dat in en bij Srebrenica executies hebben plaatsgevonden. Maar vormen degenen die een dergelijke dood zijn gestorven ook de meerderheid van alle 6.000 als vermist opgegeven moslims, zoals alom wordt gesuggereerd? En is iedere dode die zonder uniform en wapens wordt aangetroffen echt een burger? Krachtens een maatregel van de moslimleiding waren alle mannen in Srebrenica tussen 17 en 60 jaar dienstplichtig en was het hun uitdrukkelijk verboden zich over te geven. Velen hadden niet de beschikking over een uniform of herkenningsplaatje. Bij alle aandacht voor het noodzakelijke opgravingswerk van het tribunal worden dergelijke complicaties gemakkelijk uit het oog verloren. Dat is onterecht, want de getuigenverklaringen van de eerste tien dagen nu de val spreken van paniek, mijnen en bloedige gevechten, niet van massa-executies. Belangrijker nog, deze verklaringen komen heel wat geloofwaardiger over dan de meer dan een week later opgedoken, maar nog steeds niet bevestigde vermoedens van grootschalige massamoord.

In de nacht van 10 op 11 juli vertoefde een grote groep militairen en een kleiner aantal ongewapende dienstplichtigen Srebrenica, om in het noordwesten aansluiting te zoeken bij het Bosnische regeringsleger. De mannen weigerden zich over te geven en werden daarom door de Serviers als vijanden beschouwd. Die hadden met een dunne bezetting twee linies ingericht om contact tussen de twee moslimlegers te voorkomen; de eerste ruw-weg langs de lijn Milici-Konjević Polje-Kravica, de tweede van Zvornik westwaarts. Toen de uit Srebrenica vertrokken moslims op deze linies stootten, is er zwaar gevochten, precies in de gebieden waar nu massagraven worden geopend.

Ter staving een viertal getuigenverklaringen, tussen 17 en 19 juli 1995 in respectabele kranten gepubliceerd. In *The Guardian* van 17 juli staat het verhaal van Hazim Hristanović, een soldaat uit Srebrenica. Toen de moslims, voor het merendeel soldaten, Konjević Polje bereikten, liepen ze tegen Servische stellingen op en werden ze met gewoerf verspreid. „Het was een complete chaos en iedereen begon te lopen voor zijn leven (...)”, zegt Hristanović. Hij vluchtte de bossen in en trok verder. De volgende dag zag hij een dorpje dat met grachten beschoten werd, een paar honderd meter van hem vandaan. „Toen realiseerde ik me dat er Servische loopgraven voor me lagen, vische soldaten die met zware machinegeweren vuurden en mortieren afschoten”.

Bart Rajs in *De Volkskrant* van dezelfde dag: „Maar de vluchtelingen in Tuzla spreken over tientallen, soms honderden lijken die in de velden en langs de wegen zouden liggen. Toen de Serviers het stadje Srebrenica maandag dreigden in te nemen, vluchtten veel mensen naar de bossen, in de hoop op de een of andere manier moslim-gebied te bereiken. Servische granaten zouden veel slachtoffers hebben gemaakt onder de vluchtenden.”

Coen van Zwol in *NRC Handelsblad*, 18 juli: „Mehmet, een blonde broodmagere soldaat, heeft een helmetocht van zes dagen achter de rug.

Waar blijft het bewijs voor genocide in Srebrenica?



Opgravingen in de omgeving van Mirković Grad. (Foto AP)

Dinsdagavond, toen de Serviers Srebrenica hadden ingenomen, trok hij met een lange stoel burgers en militairen de bossen in, vooral mannen, in het kielzog van drie-tot vierduizend soldaten van de regimentstroepen, met minder dan dertig kilometer lang, zegt Mehmet. De groep is in tweeën gesplitst toen we de grote weg naar Zvornik oversnaken en de Serviers kwamen aanrijden met pantservoertuigen. Vierduizend mensen stonden toen aan de verkeerde kant van de weg en hebben zich in de bossen verspreid.”

En Julian Borger in *De Volkskrant* van 19 juli: „Volgens de overlevenden hebben honderden moslims de dood gevonden bij hun poging Srebrenica te ontvluchten, doordat ze in een Servische hinderlaag liepen of doordat ze omkwamen van de honger. Anderen zijn, volkomen in de war van angst en

paniek, Deze verklaringen met overlevende soldaten kloppen met het verhaal van de moslim-artist Ilijas Pilav in Bob van Leeuwens boek *Srebrenica: getuigen van een massamoord* (Antwerpen: Arsen Zonder Grenzen, 1996). „We liepen rond het dorp Snagovo (zuidwest van Zvornik, red.), waar we hun hinderlaag ontdekten. In plaats van te wachten tot ze ons aanvielen, besloten we met de moed der wanhoop zelf aan te vallen! De lijst werkte: de tsjelniks waren zo overdonderd dat ze na een kort gevecht in onze handen vielen, samen met hun commandant Janković.”

„Op 15 juli om 5 uur passeerden we de asfaltweg tussen Zvornik en Caparde. (...) Met onze Motorola (walkie-talkie, red.) namen we contact op met de Serviers en probeerden een ruil voor te stellen: commandant Janković voor een vrijaftocht door hun linies. (...) We hadden nu iets meer wapens door onze verassingsaanval op de groep van commandant Janković en besloten ons vechtelend een weg te banen, nu de tsjelniks hun materiaal nog niet ter plekke hadden.”

De moslims maakten twee tanks buit die ze in stelling brachten tegen Servische tanks, vertelt Pilav. Het gevecht werd opgemerkt door het Bosnische leger ten oosten van Tuzla, dat zich met de strijd ging bemoeien en met beschietingen begon. Zo werden drie Servische tanks buiten gevecht gesteld. Na een lange strijd trokken de Servische troepen zich onverwachts terug, zodat de moslims de grens konden passeren. Pilav: „Het was intussen 16 juli geworden, twee uur 's middags. Ik was een vrij man.”

Wanneer doken de berichten over massa-executies in de pers op? Op 28 juli, twaalf dagen nadat Pilav vlucht gebied bereikte, wordt het schokkende verhaal van Smail Hodžić, een 63-jarige boer uit Cerska, door Alexandra Stiglmayer in *Die Woche* opgetekend.

Enkele dagen later (vlak voordat het door Amerikanen getroude Kroatische leger begon met de ernstige zuivering van meer dan 200.000 Serviers uit de Krajina) arriveerde de Amerikaanse onderminister van Buitenlandse Zaken, John Shattuck, in Bosnië (NRC

Handelsblad, 10 augustus).

Op 9 augustus maakte Shattuck bekend dat er „geloofwaardige verklaringen” waren over massamoord op mannen en jongens uit Srebrenica. Eerder die dag zei ook de CIA over sterke aanwijzingen te beschikken dat de Serviers misdaden hadden begun. En op 10 augustus presenteerden de Verenigde Staten luchtfoto's van terreinen bij Nova Kasaba en Konjević Polje. Daar zouden zich massagraven bevinden met mogelijk 2.700 lijken. Alle moslims zouden zijn geëxecuteerd, volgens Smail Hodžić.

De inconsistentie in de verhalen van Hodžić is al eerder uitgebleed aan de orde geweest (zie *De Volkskrant*, 10 oktober 1995 en *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 maart 1996). In oktober en november kreeg Hodžić nog gezelschap van Hurem Suljić (getuige A' van de tribunaalhoorzitting, Mevudin Orić (militair, commandant van een speciale een-

Met huidige bewijzen kan een aanklager niets

heid) en nog enkele getuigen van massa-executies. De plaatsen des onheils die zij aanwijzen en waarover zij elkaar tegenspreken, liggen op of vlakbij de twee confrontatiepunten die hierboven zijn aangeduid: Nova Kasaba, Konjević Polje, Kravica, Karakaj (of Glumina, of Sahavica, niet). De kans dat op die plaatsen lijken worden aangetroffen is dus groot, maar de vraag hoe de slachtoffers zijn omgekomen blijft. Veel moslims zijn geseuveld in de paniek, die met de uitbraakpoging gepaard ging, anderen zijn op mijnen gelopen of hebben de hand aan zichzelf geslagen. Verder blijkt uit het Debriefingsrapport van de Landmacht dat minstens op twee plaatsen moslims onderling slaags zijn geraakt, en ook Servische bronnen maken hier melding van. Volgens *Politika Ekspres* van 29 april zouden alleen al in het dorp Buljini, tussen Srebrenica en Konjević Pol-

je, driehonderd mensen op deze manier zijn omgekomen.

In het artikel worden drie overlevenden geïnterviewd. Een van hen, de 25-jarige Zurjet Mehić, verklaart: „Het leger verliet Srebrenica enkele dagen voordat de Serviers de stad innamen. Bij het volk was slechts een begeleidend bataljon achtergebleven, onder commando van Ejub Bobić, en loch kwam het bevel dat niemand zich mocht overgeven. Onder de mensen heerste angst, paniek, en zo begonnen ook de onderlinge ruzies en afrekeningen. In het dorp Buljini kwam het tot onderlinge gevechten, mannen doodden elkaar over en weer. Het was een afschuwelijk schouwspel. Het kwam mij voor dat er bij de weg duizenden doden lagen, er ontstond echt chaos.”

Hoeveel aanwijzingen er ook zijn dat er honderden, wellicht duizenden doden bij gevechten zijn gevallen, dat alles betekent nog niet dat de Bosnische Serviers geen executies hebben uitgevoerd. Het zijn echter de getuigen zelf die het vermoeden van grootscheepse massamoorden met twee-tot drieduizent slachtoffers onaanneemelijk maken. Hurem Suljić zegt samen met Smail Hodžić te zijn gevlucht en na drie dagen in Bosnisch gebied aangekomen te zijn, maar Smail Hodžić beweert er elf dagen over gedaan te hebben. Nota bene de meest belustende getuige in de hoorzittingen van het Joegoslavie-tribunaal, de Kroaat Drazen Erdemović, blijft zowel voor de Kroaten, de moslim als de Serviers te hebben gevochten. In Den Haag zei hij plotsklaps niet op 20 juli te hebben deelgenomen aan een bloedbad (zoals verteld aan *Le Figaro*), maar vier dagen eerder op 16 juli.

Nogmaals: de Bosnische Serviers hebben moslims vermoord. Derschuldigen moeten worden opgespoord en gestraft. Maar of ze honderden, duizenden onschuldigen mensen op een rij hebben gezet, zoals 51 jaar geleden nog ging, was? Met het bewijsmateriaal dat nu voorhanden is kan geen enkel zichzelf respecterende aanklager iets beginnen.

René Grémaux en Abde de Vries zijn antropoloog en publicist.

Srebrenica, media maken volkerenmoord

In 1996

"Radio en pers staan ons ter beschikking. We zullen een meesterstukje van propaganda uithalen (1)."

Door E. Kaszó

Na mijn verslag van de 6-de dag in de Rule 61 hoorzitting tegen Karadzic en Mladic te hebben voltooid, kan ik toch niet nalaten mijn eigen visie over wat er nu werkelijk gebeurde in die juli-dagen in dat rampzalige jaar 1995 in de enclave Srebrenica te geven. Wat me altijd opviel aan het geval 'Srebrenica', is de enorme drukte die de media daarover maakten, en die onevenredig is met het relatieve gebrek aan belangstelling van diezelfde media waar het volkomen vergelijkbare gebeurtenissen in diezelfde oorlog betrof. bijvoorbeeld de slachtingen onder de Servische bevolkingen in dorpen in de omgeving van Srebrenica, die plaatsgevonden hadden in '92 en '93. Waar Srebrenica als uitvalsbasis, van de moslims diende bij dergelijke moordpartijen. Ik vrees dat nu, tijdens de opgravingen die de zo lang verwachte 'bewijzen' tegen Mladic moeten opleveren, zelfs de lijken van slachtoffers die toen vielen dichtbij Srebrenica, doodleuk als zijnde 'moslimlijken' worden gepresenteerd. De mogelijkheid zit er tenminste dik in, als men de krampachtigheid in aanmerking neemt, waarmee de media, met de moslims en de V.S. als financieel krachtigste stimulators, kost wat kost willen bewijzen dat er een massamoord heeft plaatsgevonden door de Serviërs na de inname.

Er hangt dus kennelijk veel van af, dat het bewezen wordt. Of het nu gebeurde of niet, zou je kunnen denken. Wat tenminste te denken geeft is dat men zich van alle tekenen die erop zouden kunnen wijzen dat er géén slachting plaatsvond, niets tot bijna niets aantrekt. In ieder geval mag het grote publiek, en daarbij Nederland en de V.S. voorop, niet gaan twijfelen. De verklaring van de enige ter plekke zijnde VN-militair in Bratunac, waaruit blijkt dat deze VN-militair, kapitein-ter-zee-arts Schouten, van 13 juli tot en met 21 juli aldaar, niets wat ook maar

wees op een bloedbad, terwijl hij kon gaan waar hij wilde, heeft gezien, komt gewoonweg nooit ter sprake. En de bevestiging van de publicist Ivanisevic, die ook ter plekke was van 6 tot 16 juli, dat hij ook niets dergelijks heeft waargenomen, daar wordt ook gewoon overheen gewalst. Ook de manier waarop kolonel Karremans en zijn manschappen werden behandeld door de media, nadat dezen niet de 'vereiste' verhalen over gruwelijkheden mee naar huis hadden gebracht, doet tenminste vermoeden dat hier grote belangen op het spel staan!

Moslimsoldaten onderling slaags

Opvallend tijdens de verhoren van Karremans was dat ook niemand inhakte op de door hem herhaaldelijk gemaakte opmerking, dat hij sedert april geen enkel teken meer had gezien van het Bosnische moslimleger, in het bijzonder van hun commandant Nasr Oric. Die toch bijzonder ijverig was geweest in die regio, want ook nadat Srebrenica in april '93 tot UN Safe Area werd verklaard, gingen onder zijn commando uitvallen vanuit de omgeving van de enclave op Servische dorpen, die daarbij werden platgebrand en de mannen vaak onthoofd, te zien op een videoband die, aan de Washington Post werd getoond door de heer Oric 'himself' (!), gewoon door. De UN heeft hierbij ook medeverantwoordelijkheid doordat zij haar resoluties van '93, waarin de enclaves ontwapend zouden worden, niet naleefde!

Hierdoor werd de spanning tussen de Serviërs en de Bosnische moslimsoldaten systematisch op peil gehouden en wanneer nodig verhoogd. Maar plots is dus deze Oric met de noorderzon vertrokken, en met hem de manschappen. Die daarbij voor de goede orde vaak onderdoken onder de burgerbevolking, compleet in civiele kleding.

Ook wordt nooit gevraagd, waarom vele moslim 'strijders' onmiddellijk voor de aanval, op 10 juli, richting Tuzla zijn gevlucht. Terwijl zo blijkt dat van alle overgebleven vluchtelingen slechts 2 à 3 % man-

nelijk was, (Dat kwam dan ook weer naar voren tijdens de verhoren voor het Tribunaal, op 4 juli om precies te zijn) wordt voetstoots aangenomen dat het aantal mannelijke vermisten (de meest genoemde cijfers belopen 6.000 tot 8.000 man) juist in de dagen van de verovering, dus ná de 11-de, door de Serviërs zijn afgeslacht. En dat terwijl andere beweringen van mensen die ter plekke aanwezig waren en die luidden dat de Serviërs juist zoveel mogelijk mannen in leven wilden laten om ze later tegen Servische krijgsgevangenen te kunnen ruilen, meteen weggevuifd werden.

Sprookjes over 'killing fields'

Maar om na te gaan wat er werkelijk gebeurde, is het nuttiger om te kijken wie er belang hebben of hadden bij het 'sprookje van de killing fields'. De Serviërs hadden er duidelijk belang bij om de moslimmannen te kunnen ruilen, omdat zij door de jarenlange oorlog een tekort aan manschappen gekregen hadden. Wie er wel garen bij hebben gesponnen, en dit klinkt heel sinister, maar toch moeten we die mogelijkheid open laten, is de propagandamachine van de moslims, wel te verstaan van de kring rond Izetbegovic en de top van de SDA-partij. Zij kregen met dit verhaal een unieke anti-Servische propagandacampagne van de grond, die erop gericht was om Navo-luchtaanvallen en openlijke militaire steun van hun sterkste bondgenoot, de V.S., aan de wereldopinie te doen verkopen en aanvaardbaar te doen maken. De enclave Srebrenica was strategisch gezien toch onhoudbaar en van minder economisch en cultureel belang dan de nu nog door Serviërs bewoonde wijken in Sarajevo. Al in mei stelde de top in Sarajevo voor om drie enclaves, waar ook Srebrenica toe behoorde, te ruilen voor geheel Sarajevo. Dat zou een grote etnische zuivering onder de 130.000 Serviërs die daar nog woonden ten gevolge hebben, indien de Navo ná hun openlijke aanvallen op de Bosnische Serviërs, die gepland stonden voor het najaar, Pale en Belgrado tot 'vredesbesprekingen' zouden dwingen. De moslimregering

in Sarajevo wist dus al in mei dat de enclave zou 'vallen', beter gezegd opgegeven zou worden. In samenspraak met de Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst, die wist wanneer zijn adviseurs het Kroatische leger zover hadden dat ze de Krajina konden veroveren, hoogstwaarschijnlijk óók wanneer dat zou gebeuren. Eventuele getuigen en niet-SDA gezinde soldaten zouden zo ook, in of buiten de enclave, door fundamentalistische moslimcommandanten als bijvoorbeeld. Tursun, Golic en Mandzic, opgevoerd kunnen worden. Inderdaad zijn er zowel door Serviërs als door Unprofor-mannen gevechten tussen moslims gemeld, ook vlak ná de val van Srebrenica. Dat zijn de lijken die de mensenrechten-onderzoekster, de Finse mevr. Rehn, werden aangetroffen en die natuurlijk meteen als slachtoffers van de Bosnische Serviërs werden gecatalogiseerd!

Ik merkte eerder op dat de verovering van de Krajina verband houdt met Srebrenica. In de reguliere pers gebeurt dit ook niet, maar het is zonneklaar dat Srebrenica schaamteloos is gebruikt, samen met luchtfoto's van 'massagraven' door de V.S. gemaakt, om de onbeschrijflijke ellende van de 200.000 (!) Servische vluchtelingen uit de Krajina uit de herinnering van de mensen te kunnen gummen, en als het even kan, uit de geschiedenisboekjes. En dat is schitterend gelukt.

Ook was het lokken van verse regimenten van het Bosnisch-Servische leger naar het zuiden, dus naar o.a. Srebrenica, nuttig om de Krajina met zo min mogelijk Servische weerstand te kunnen innemen. Inderdaad is er bijna geen schot gelost in die augustusdagen. Knin viel bijna zonder slag of stoot. De Amerikaanse adviseurs hadden de Kroaten goed getraind en bewapend. En wisten natuurlijk dat Srebrenica al op de netvliesen van het wereldpubliek moest staan gebrand alvorens de niet geheel te verzwijgen ellende van de Krajina-vluchtelingen begon.

Navo op zoek naar uitbreiding 'werkterrein'

Dat Dutchbat niet op de hoogte

was van de deal tussen Washington en Sarajevo, is zonneklaar. Dutchbat kreeg later de klappen, via de media, om toch maar vooral het 'falende' optreden van de VN, lees Unprofor, aan de wereld duidelijk te maken. Want de Navo zat al veel langer te azen op een 'out-of-area' actie. En daarbij zat Unprofor in de weg. Dus zo ziet men maar weer, vaak is het nagaan van wie er ergens belang bij hebben een vruchtbare methode om tot nieuwe inzichten in bijna dood gediscussieerde onderwerpen te komen. Op het Tribunaal heb ik alleen voor twee executies een begin van bewijs gehoord: 1 van 9 mannen en 1 van 1 man. Opgeteld zijn dat 10 mannen. Waar blijven de overige duizenden? En welke patholoog-anatoom kan mij vertellen, wat het verschil is tussen de botten van Bosnische moslims en Bosnische Serviërs (christenen), maar beiden Slavisch? Ik hou me aanbevolen!

Westen heeft

Marionetten nodig

Last but not least was 'Srebrenica' inderdaad, en dat is door meerdere commentatoren opgemerkt, het voertuig om Karadzic, maar vooral de als tegenstander natuurlijk veel geduchtere generaal Mladic, af te kunnen schilderen als duivels, als oorlogsmisdadigers, en zo van hun eventuele latere politieke carrière te kunnen beroven. De Bosnische Serviërs zouden op die manier, mocht er 'vrede' uitbreken, van hun leiders en vooral van generaal Mladic, waar het hele Bosnisch-Servische leger als één man achter stand, beroofd kunnen worden. Daarna is het alleen nog maar zaak om een marionet, goed gehoorzaam aan Sarajevo en Washington, en natuurlijk voorgesteld als een 'democraat', naar voren te schuiven en te installeren, om ook dat deel van Bosnië tot gehoorzaamheid aan de Nieuwe Wereldorde te dwingen.

- (1) Joseph Goebbels, dagboek, enige dagen voor de Rijksdagbrand.
- (2) Artikel werd op 10 juli geschreven
- (3) In dit artikel heb ik gebruik gemaakt van vele artikelen, uit

vele dagbladen en weekbladen, maar aparte vermelding verdient toch het zeer scherpzinnige artikel van R. Grémaux en Abe de Vries in de Groene Amsterdammer van 13 maart 1996, waar ik veel aan heb gehad. Ook heb ik gebruik gemaakt van mijn aantekeningen tijdens de verhoren van Karremans en Dutchbat-mannen voor het Tribunaal te Den Haag. De stukken in het maandblad 'Konkret' door Jürgen Elsasser zijn in deze ook echte 'verfrissers', want vaak, als ik op de t.v. de oneindige vluchtelingstromen en de met MIG's beschoten kolonnes Krajina-vluchtelingen zag, kon ik het woord 'Srebrenica' bijna niet meer horen.

Naschrift van de redactie.

De redactie acht de zienswijze van de schrijfster van dit stuk belangwekkend genoeg om te plaatsen. Het stuk gaat in tegen de stroom van wilde berichten over massa-executies door de Bosnische Serviërs. Het werpt een ander daglicht op 'Srebrenica'. Dat geldt ook voor de artikelen van de schrijvers R. Grémaux en Abe de Vries, die in de NRC, d.d. 18 juli jl. een kritische analyse gaven (zie ook G.A./13 maart jl.). De redactie van Manifest mist in het stuk een duidelijke politieke totaal-analyse, maar acht de conclusie gerechtvaardigd dat de aanval op Karadzic en Mladic vooral tot doel heeft de weg vrij te maken voor minder nationalistische, meer hanteerbare leiders. In het verlengde daarvan verwachten wij dat de aanvallen op de Bosnische Serviërs en de Serviërs onverkort door zullen gaan tot de invloed van m.n. de VS voldoende groot is. Autonomie en soevereiniteit in de Balkan worden door de grote wereldmachten niet op prijs gesteld. De permanente aanwezigheid van de Navo, onder Noord-Amerikaanse leiding, bewijst dat. De accoorden van Dayton en de Navo-bezetting van Bosnië tonen aan dat de VS erin geslaagd zijn om hun aanvankelijke achterstand in de Balkan tegenover Berlijn in te halen en er zelfs de beste kaarten in handen te krijgen. De Duitse bourgeoisie heeft dit feit voorlopig geaccepteerd en werkt op dit moment samen met Washington.

Tribunaal negeert kritiek Amerikaanse briefschrijvers

Het Joegoslavië Tribunaal wil niet reageren op een open brief die het 'Americans for International Justice Committee' (AIJC), 'een associatie van professionele, ontwikkelde en verantwoordelijke Amerikanen die bezorgd zijn over de toepassing van het internationaal recht in de 'Nieuwe Wereld Orde', op 23 juli jl. in de Haagsche Courant heeft gepubliceerd. In die brief, die ondertekend is door dr. Raymond K. Kent, emeritus hoogleraar in de geschiedenis aan de Berkeley Universiteit van Californië, wordt het Tribunaal als een 'bedrieger' omschreven, een instrument in de handen van grote landen die 'macht met recht verwarren'. Volgens de Amerikanen heeft het Tribunaal een 'opdracht' die als 'een directe aanval op het recht' gezien moet worden. De briefstellers sommen een aantal in hun ogen flagrante schendingen van de rechtspraak op. Alles wat er vóór 1991 op de Balkan aan ellende gebeurd is, wordt door het Tribunaal buiten beschouwing gelaten, waardoor grote groepen niet tot hun recht kunnen komen. Het Tribunaal eist dat willekeurig tot oorlogsmisdadigers bestempelde lieden in Den Haag worden afgeleverd en vraagt de NAVO zelfs, met het risico van bloedvergieten, tot arrestaties over


(Vervolg op pagina 6)

Moslimleiding mede schuldig aan 'Srebrenica'

In ons „verraderlijk” artikel (‘Waar blijft het bewijs voor genocide in Srebrenica?’) beweerden wij met een „bedrieglijk vertoon van documentatie” dat over Srebrenica het laatste woord nog niet is gesproken (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 18 juli). Dat is Wim Notenboom met terugwerkende kracht rauw op de maag gevallen. Zijn reactie (‘Moslims stierven niet in reguliere gevechten’, 15 augustus) kan bondig worden samengevat. Wie waagt te twifelen aan het alom geproclameerde simpele goed/fout-schema is politiek corrupt en bedriift Servische propaganda.

Politiek corrupt, dat is de kwalificatie die Notenboom gebruikt voor de opleiding op het Centrum voor Vredesoperaties (cvv) van de landmacht, waar wij in de beginfase werkzaam waren. „Een instructie waarin de formele VN-regel te velde zodanig is omgekeerd dat een materiële stellingname zowel versluierd als gerechtvaardigd is”, schrijft hij. Een bewering die in ieder geval niet wordt ondersteund door vertoon van documentatie. Feit is immers dat het merendeel van het Dutch-atpersoneel zich helemaal nooit op het cvv heeft gemeld, voor welke instructie dan ook. De blauwhel-

Waar blijft het bewijs voor genocide in Srebrenica, vroegen René Grémaux en Abe de Vries zich onlangs in deze krant af. Wim Notenboom diende hen van repliek. Grémaux en De Vries verwijten hem blind te zijn voor de (mede-)verantwoordelijkheid van de moslimleiding voor de tragedie rond Srebrenica.



Stoffelijke resten van Bosnische Serviërs gedood in Mrkonjić-Grad, ten zuiden van Banja Luka. (Foto AP)

Militairen en burgers gijzelaars van eigen leiders

men werden opgeleid, ongetwijfeld geheel onpartijdig, door de Luchtmobiele Brigade zelf.

Hoewel Notenboom met zijn naar karaktermoord neigende betoog vooral zichzelf in diskrediet brengt, mogen ook enkele andere van zijn vele beweringen niet onweersproken blijven. In het gewraakte artikel hebben wij aanwijzingen op een rij gezet, die doen vermoeden dat de vermiste mannen van Srebrenica in meerderheid niet door executiepelotons zijn doodgeschoten. Daar was alle reden toe, gezien het verbazingwekkende gemak waarmee ook in de Nederlandse media werd gesproken van „de luizenden vermoorde moslims van Srebrenica”. Of de gevechten tussen de wegtrekkende moslims en de Bosnisch-Servische troepen ‘regulier’ waren, daarover deden wij geen uitspraak.

Notenboom noemt terecht enkele factoren die in het nadeel van de moslims waren, zoals hun lichte bewapening, hun gebrek aan logistiek en geneeskundige verzorging, het moeilijke terrein en de mijnenvalden. Zij konden daar echter een numeriek overwicht tegenover zetten, iets waarvan de Serviërs op de hoogte waren en dat zij vreesden. Notenboom toont zich in al zijn naviteit geschokt over het feit dat de

Servische troepen hun voordelen verwoestend hebben uitgebuit. Maar had hij ook niet verontwaardigd moeten zijn over de beslissing van de moslimleiding dit risico maar op de koop toe te nemen?

Volgens de Servische journalist en cameraman Zoran Petrovic, die Notenboom in een ander verband zo instemmend citeert, hebben de Bosnische Serviërs bij Srebrenica „ongekend zware verliezen geleden” (Algemeen Dagblad, 11 oktober 1995). Bij het gevecht ten zuiden van Zvornik waarover wij spraken, zijn 80 leden van een speciaal Servisch commando omgekomen. Is dat een ‘schermutseling’? Liever, en in navolging van NRC Handelsblad (26 augustus 1995), laat Notenboom Petrovic zeggen dat de Servische troepen „in totaal 2.000 moslims hebben afgemaakt”. Petrovic heeft echter tegen een van ons verklaard dat zijn uitspraak sloeg op het aantal in gevechten omgekomen

moslims (zie De Groene Amsterdammer, 13 maart).

Ook wat betreft berichten in de media over massa-executies treft een op ons gerichte pijl geen doel. De verhalen uit Servische bron over slachtpartijen in een school en op een sportveld in Bratunac verschenen ná de geciteerde berichten over gevechten. De vermeende massa-moord in Bratunac komen in de aanklachten tegen Karadžić en Mladić ook niet voor, mede omdat ze al direct door een Nederlandse officier werden ontzenuwd. Waarom vermeldt Notenboom dit niet?

Verder zouden wij om geheimzinnige redenen de anonimiteit van een getuige van massa-executies hebben geschonden. Maar de bedoelde getuige heeft zich sinds vorig najaar met naam en toenaam door diverse grote kranten en televisiestations laten interviewen en filmen. Gaat het tribunaal wel zo zorgvuldig om met het gunnen van

anonimiteit aan getuigen, zoals onze opponent beweert?

In de hele discussie blijft ongesproken dat toch zeker een deel van de verantwoordelijkheid voor de tragedie bij de moslimleiding ligt. Volgens een overeenkomst gesloten op 12 juli tussen vertegenwoordigers van moslims en Serviërs, zouden alle dienstplichtigen uit Srebrenica die hun wapens afgaven en zich aansloten bij de burgerbevolking worden behandeld als burgers. Wie dat niet deed, was een ‘rebel’ en dus een vijand.

Natuurlijk, bij veel mannen uit Srebrenica bestond een alleszins concrete angst voor overgave, al was het maar vanwege de ongeveer 1.200 doden die aan Servische zijde vanaf voorjaar 1992 in en rond Srebrenica zijn gevallen. Kravica en andere Servische dorpen langs de vluchtroute waren in de winter van 1992/93 het toneel van slachtpartijen. In een interview in Slobodna

Bosna (14 juli 1996) beschuldigt het Bosnische dissidente parlamentslid Ibran Mustafić (de oprichter van de SDA in Srebrenica) de machthebbers in Sarajevo en Srebrenica er dan ook van zelf de rampspoed over de bevolking van Srebrenica te hebben afgeroepen. De opdracht om vanuit de enclave stelselmatig terreuraanvallen op omliggende Servische dorpen uit te voeren, maakte zowel militairen als burgers tot gijzelaars van de eigen criminele leiders.

Diezelfde aanvoeders waren vorig jaar juli overigens niet meer in de enclave aanwezig. Zij die daar nog wel waren hebben begrijpelijkerwijs alles op alles gezet om uit Servische handen te blijven, en in die (zelfmoord)poging hebben ze duizenden mannen meegesleept.

Wij zouden, beweert Notenboom, het genocidale karakter van de Servische campagne onvoldoende onderkennen. Wij vragen ons

echter af waarom de door Notenboom gehanteerde juridische omschrijving van het begrip ‘genocide’ niet ook wordt toegepast (door bijvoorbeeld het Joegoslavië tribunaal) op andere moorddadige acties, plannen en ideologieën in de Bosnische en Kroatische oorlog. Zolang dat niet gebeurt, heeft het woord ‘genocide’ voor ons een bijzonder kwalijk politiek bijmaakje.

Men bedenke dat de Serviërs minstens 25.000 vrouwen, kinderen en bejaarden (de enige echte burgers) per bus naar Kladanj hebben gebracht. Gedeporteerd, zo u wilt. Maar hoezeer de onschuldigen onder alle partijen ons medelijden en onze solidariteit ook verdienen, en hoe terecht het tribunaal ook probeert om Serviërs te straffen die zich aan overkill hebben bezondigd en die weerloze gevangenen hebben vermoord, voor genocide in de klassieke betekenis kan men nog steeds beter terecht in het Europa van de jaren ‘40-’45.

Hoe nu verder met ‘Srebrenica’? Het is zaak om de onderste steen boven te krijgen, ondanks de weinig coöperatieve houding van de VN en Frankrijk, en wellicht ook van het Nederlandse ministerie van Defensie. Een parlementair onderzoek

Woord ‘genocide’ heeft politiek bijmaakje

naar de toedracht laat al veel te lang op zich wachten, getuigt op de speciale band die Nederland met Srebrenica heeft. Een en ander mag toch niet spaak lopen op tegenwerking uit het buitenland.

Wél bepleiten wij een onderzoek dat veel verder gaat dan de toedracht rond de val alleen. Het drama Srebrenica moet vanaf het begin van de oorlog nauwgezet in kaart worden gebracht, want zonder kennis van de voorgeschiedenis blijft de val onbegrijpelijk. Wat moslims melden zou systematisch vergeleken moeten worden met wat hun Servische tegenspelers naar voren brengen.

Zo’n werkwijze stelt echter hoge eisen aan de onderzoekers. En hier wringt misschien de schoen. Want al die Notenbooms, met hun voor ons allang niet meer opvallende partijdigheid en hun hang naar een simpele verdeling in goed en kwaad, zullen vermoedelijk wel nimmer wegwijzen worden in het Bosnische doolhof, met zijn talloze valkuilen en dubbele bodems. Hun motto is immers: ‘Als de hele wereld iets beweert, hoef ik het zelf niet meer te onderzoeken en er over na te denken’.

René Grémaux en Abe de Vries zijn resp. antropoloog en publicist.

MAANDAG 5 FEBRUARI 1996

'Vermisten uit Srebrenica zijn zeker dood'

SREBRENICA, 5 FEBR. De zeven- tot achtduizend moslimmannen die sinds de val van Srebrenica worden vermist, zijn „met zekerheid dood”.

Dat hebben Bosnisch-Servische autoriteiten gisteren Elizabeth Rehn, de speciale VN-gezant voor mensenrechten in ex-Joegoslavië, verzekerd. Rehn bezocht de voormalige moslim-enclave in het oosten van Bosnië.

Rehn heeft in en rond Srebrenica geen massagraven aangetroffen en daar ook niet intensief naar gezocht. De Bosnisch-Servische autoriteiten vertelden haar dat „duizenden moslims” die sinds juli vorig jaar, toen Srebrenica door de Bosnische Serviërs werd ingenomen, worden vermist, niet meer leven. Ze zouden zijn gedood in gevechten met de Bosnische Serviërs of in gevechten onderling, naar aanleiding van ruzies over de vraag of ze zich moesten overgeven of niet.

Rehn zei dat het „naïef zou zijn” geloof te hechten aan de uitleg van de Bosnisch-Servische autoriteiten over de manier waarop de vele duizenden vermiste mannen uit Srebrenica om het leven zijn gekomen, maar wel te vrezen dat de vermisten inderdaad dood zijn. De Bosnische Serviërs hadden haar ervan overtuigd dat ze geen moslim-mannen uit Srebrenica meer gevangen houden.

Rehn, die voor haar reis naar Srebrenica in Tuzla uitvoerig met gevluchte vrouwen uit Srebrenica had gesproken, bezocht in de voormalige enclave onder andere een voormalige supermarkt en een lagere school, die volgens de vluchtelingen uit Srebrenica nog steeds als gevangenkampen voor mannen worden gebruikt. Daarvan bleek bij het bezoek van Rehn echter niets. Ze trof ook

geen aanwijzingen aan dat deze locaties als detentiecentra waren gebruikt.

Rehn — die vorig jaar Tadeusz Mazowiecki opvolgde als speciaal gezant van secretaris-generaal Boutros-Ghali — bezocht ook een heuvel in de buurt van het dorp Kravica, enkele kilometers van Srebrenica. Hier trof ze rond twintig nog onbegraven lichamen van moslim-mannen aan. Een daarvan was gekleed in een militair uniform en leren laarzen, een ander droeg een spijkerbroek en andere burgerkleding. Op het grasveld werden persoonlijke bezittingen gevonden als een hoep kleren, een kapotte plastic wekker, een nylon tas, een doorweekt aantekenboekje en een handvol bestek. Of het hier — zoals de Bosnische Serviërs zeiden — om gesneuvelde moslim-soldaten ging of om moslim-burgers, kon Rehn ter plaatse niet met zekerheid vaststellen. Ze maakte wel melding van haar „verbazing” dat de Bosnisch-Servische autoriteiten pas een dag eerder de toegang tot het terrein in Kravica hadden vrijgegeven en dat ze nooit melding hebben gemaakt van de aanwezigheid van onbegraven lichamen.

Rehn drong er gisteren bij de Bosnisch-Servische autoriteiten op aan internationale onderzoekers toegang te verschaffen tot alle locaties waar massagraven worden vermoed. „Elk lichaam dat kan worden geïdentificeerd is één naam minder op de lijst van vermisten. Dat is ook in het belang van de autoriteiten van de Servische Republiek [in Bosnië]”, zei ze. (Reuter, AP)

BELGRADO, 8 MAART. In Joegoslavië is een soldaat van het Bosnisch-Servische leger aangehouden op verdenking van oorlogsmisdaden in Srebrenica. Hij is een van de twee Bosnisch-Servische soldaten om wier aanhouding het Haagse VN-tribunaal voor oorlogsmisdaden de Joegoslavische autoriteiten had gevraagd. Het tribunaal heeft de autoriteiten in Belgrado om uitlevering van de man gevraagd.

Het tribunaal liet vandaag weten een arrestatiebevel te hebben uitgevaardigd tegen Milan Martić, de „president” van de eenzijdig door de Kroatische Serviërs uitgeroepen „Servische Republiek Krajina”. Martić gaf vorig jaar zijn troepen opdracht de Kroatische hoofdstad Zagreb met fragmentatiebommen te beschieten.

Verdachte bloedbad Srebrenica in arrest

Het arrestatiebevel wordt ook naar de NAVO-vredesmacht in Bosnië gestuurd. Martić woont in Banja Luka in Noord-Bosnië.

De in Joegoslavië gearresteerde verdachte, Dražen Erdemović (25) — geen Serviër maar een Bosnische Kroaat, die vorig jaar diende in het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs — zit sinds 3 maart vast in Novi Sad, de hoofdstad van Vojvodina ten noorden van Servië. Hij heeft volgens de Servische autoriteiten inmiddels bekend te hebben deelgenomen aan

de massaexecuties van moslims uit Srebrenica, de moslim-enclave in het oosten van Bosnië die in juli vorig jaar in handen van de Bosnische Serviërs viel. Na de verovering van Srebrenica zijn zeker drieduizend moslims vermoord; vijftienduizend anderen worden nog steeds vermist.

Begin deze maand vroeg het tribunaal de autoriteiten in Belgrado om de uitlevering van twee Bosnisch-Servische militairen die bij de massamoord in Srebrenica

betrokken zouden zijn geweest: Radoslav Kremenović en Dražen Erdemović. Het tribunaal wil hen verhoren over de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica. Het Joegoslavische persbureau Tanjug meldde dat ook Kremenović in Novi Sad is opgepakt, maar dit is niet bevestigd.

De adjunct-procureur van het tribunaal, de Australiër Graham Blewitt, gaat naar Belgrado om met de Joegoslavische autoriteiten te praten over de overbrenging van de verdachte of verdachten naar Den Haag. De aanhouding van Erdemović is een doorbraak, omdat de Joegoslavische autoriteiten tot dusverre hebben geweigerd met het tribunaal samen te werken of de autoriteit van het tribunaal te erkennen. (Reuter, AFP)

'Ik heb maar 70 mensen gedood'

Door een onzer redacteurs

Op de dag voor zijn arrestatie in Novi Sad heeft Dražen Erdemović — overigens geen Bosnische Serviër maar een uit Tuzla afkomstige Bosnische Kroaat die dienst deed in het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs — op 2 maart in een gesprek met verslaggevers van het Franse blad *Le Figaro* toegegeven betrokken te zijn geweest bij de massamoord in Srebrenica.

In *Le Figaro*, dat dit vraaggesprek vandaag publiceert, zegt Erdemović dat een groepje Bosnische Serviërs waarvan hij deel uitmaakte na de inname van Srebrenica binnen 24 uur twaalfhonderd mannelijke moslims uit de stad heeft vermoord. Het ging om moslims die bij de nadering van de Serviërs niet waren gevlucht, maar zich onder bescherming van de Nederlandse blauwhelmen hadden geplaatst, en die na de evacuatie van de vrouwen en kinderen uit Srebrenica aan de Bosnische Serviërs waren overgedragen.

Tegen *Le Figaro* maakte Erdemović melding van een waar bloedbad. Hij vertelt hoe de Serviërs elke terughoudendheid verloren toen de moslims in bussen werden aangevoerd. Dronken Serviërs sloegen met ijzeren staven op de moslims in en begonnen hen in het wilde weg neer te schieten. Toen dat met geweren niet snel genoeg ging, gebruikten

ze mitrailleurs. Maar ze waren zo dronken en hadden zo'n haast dat veel moslims niet direct dood waren. „Daarom gaf Stanko Sovanović hen met een revolver een genadeschot. Na afloop zei hij zeventienhonderd kogels te hebben verbruikt”, aldus Erdemović.

Erdemović vertelde dat hij met zeven andere soldaten van het Bosnisch-Servische leger op 20

demović: „Ze riepen: doodt ons niet, we hebben familie in Oostenrijk, we zullen geld sturen! Een van mijn kameraden riep de moslims toe: wie marken heeft wordt gespaard! Maar Brano zei: maak je niet druk, ze hebben hun in Zvornik alles al afgenomen. Daarop begon het schieten.”

Volgens Ermenović werden de moslims steeds in groepjes van

ten”. „Ik denk niet dat ik meer dan zeventig mensen heb gedood.” Hij had zich een half uur lang onderhouden met een van de moslims, die hem had verteld dat hij twintig Serviërs had geholpen bij hun vlucht uit Srebrenica in een eerder stadium van de oorlog. Zijn poging om het leven van die man te sparen was echter mislukt, want „Brano wilde geen enkele getuige in leven laten”.

Op die dag vermoordden de Serviërs de inzittenden van vijftien tot twintig bussen met moslims uit Srebrenica. „Ze werden met steeds dezelfde vijf bussen uit Zvornik aangevoerd. De chauffeurs waren doodsbang, maar Brano dwong elk van hen persoonlijk minstens één moslim te doden, zodat ze niet tegen hem zouden getuigen.”

Om half drie 's middags kwam er een eind aan het bloedbad. Toen waren volgens Ermenović twaalfhonderd moslims vermoord. Een officier gaf de groep opdracht af te rekenen met vijftienhonderd moslims die in het cultuurhuis van Pilice werden vastgehouden, maar dat had de groep geweigerd. De officier had daarop vrijwilligers gevonden in een ander groepje Servische soldaten. De vijftienhonderd moslims werden eveneens vermoord. De groep van Erdemović had tegenover het cultuurhuis in een café bier zitten drinken terwijl de moslims met handgranaten werden vermoord.

'Ze werden in groepen van tien vermoord. Wat zal ik zeggen? Ze smeekten om hun leven'

juli onder leiding van ene Brano Gojković naar een plek in de buurt van het dorp Pilice werd gebracht. Daar werden bussen met moslims uit Srebrenica aangevoerd. Het bloedbad begon volgens Erdemović toen Gojković een tiental moslims uit de eerste bus opdracht gaf weg te lopen. „We stonden tien meter achter hen. De vrienden van Brano openden het vuur. Iedereen volgde dat voorbeeld. Ik richtte en schoot. Binnen enkele seconden waren ze dood.” Toen een volgende groep van tien moslims aankwam, smeekten ze om hun leven. Er-

tien vermoord. „Wat zal ik zeggen? De meesten smeekten om hun leven, beloofden ons geld. Anderen beledigden ons. Ze riepen: Allah is groot.”

Ermenović zegt in *Le Figaro* dat hij op een bepaald moment een eind aan het bloedbad wilde maken. „Ik fluisterde een van mijn kameraden — net als ik een Kroaat — toe: God weet hoe we hier op een dag de rekening voor krijgen. Maar hij zei: hou je mond en schiet, anders weet je dat je er zelf aan gaat.” Ermenović zei zelf „zo min mogelijk mensen te hebben doodgescho-



Onderzoek bij een massagraf in de omgeving van Srebrenica. (Foto AP)

Moslims stierven niet in reguliere gevechten

'Waar blijft het bewijs voor genocide in Srebrenica', vroegen Abe de Vries en René Grémaux (Opiniepagina 18 juli), één week nadat het Joegoslavië-tribunaal een hernieuwde aanklacht wegens genocide tegen Karadžić en Mladić formuleerde. Wim Notenboom heeft bezwaar tegen het betoog van De Vries en Grémaux.

Zonder één moment concreet in te gaan op de motivering van de hernieuwde aanklacht tegen Karadžić en Mladić en de verificatieprocedures die eraan ten grondslag liggen, menen De Vries en Grémaux — twee voornamige medewerkers van de Joegoslavië-opleiding van de landmacht in Ossendrecht — dat er toch voldoende redenen zijn om te twijfelen aan de omvang van de massamoorden rond Srebrenica. Zij vragen zich af of er dan nog wel van genocide mag worden gesproken.

De eerste twijfel die hun beschouwing echter oproept, is of zij wel op de hoogte zijn van het verschil tussen oorlogsmisdaden en genocide. De omvang van een massamoord is immers bij de bewijsvoering van genocide van minder belang dan het bewijs van een weloverwogen streven naar de gehele of gedeeltelijke vernietiging van een religieuze, nationale, etnische of raciale groepering als zodanig. Dit vernooede oogmerk, de intentie to destroy, bepaalt of een aantal afzonderlijke oorlogsmisdrijven worden samengevoegd en besnoeid als systematisch uitroeiend van een en hetzelfde misdadige streven. Vanuit dat oogpunt kunnen de moorden, waarvan ook de auteurs wel aannemen dat zij hebben plaatsgevonden, in direct verband worden gebracht met de deportatie van vrouwen, kinderen en bejaarden, de vernietiging van religieuze erfgoed, vernietiging en roof van persoonlijk eigendom, marteling, vernietiging en verkrachting, wat ook een marteling is. 'Het loebrengen van ernstige lichamelijke en geestelijke schade aan leden van de (vervolgde) groepering' valt immers onder het begrip genocide en de strafbaarstelling ervan.

Een andere twijfel betreft de methode van de auteurs. Aan de hand van een vertaal getuigenverklaring van een overlevende van de tocht naar Tuzla, pogen zij aan te tonen dat de meeste vernietigen van die tocht tijdens reguliere gevechten met de Serviërs zijn omgekomen. De Vries en Grémaux spreken zelfs van 'zwarte gevechten'. Maar wie de door hen geciteerde bronnen leest, komt tot een andere conclusie: een lichtbepaand legerij op de vlucht, zonder logistiek, met zorg voor gewonden en burgers, gaat geen grote gevechtshandelingen aan; het is bovendien gemakkelijk door spervuur te verspreiden en in grotere of kleinere groepen te isoleren. Dat is het beeld dat uit de citaten naar voren komt. Die spreken op z'n best van schermutselingen en in een enkel geval van een overval van moslim-zijde, zoals verhaald door de arts Plav in het boek *Srebrenica: getuigen van een massabreivak*.

moord van Bob van Laethoven.

Verder was het inderdaad dood en verderf, want de 'dun bezette linnen' van de Serviërs waren in werkelijkheid goed opgestelde eenheden bij strategische weg- en waterovergangen, passen en dalen, met een overmacht aan vuurkracht op de vluchtenden. De getuigen spreken dan ook zelf van vele slachtoffers, angst, uitputting, krankzinnigheid, zelfmoord en... overgave. Dit laatste nu kunnen De Vries en Grémaux maar moeilijk accepteren. Dat velen op die tocht zijn omgekomen, is hun niet genoeg. Om het do-identaal van de 'zwarte gevechten' nog op te voeren, bedienen zij zich van het volgende argument: 'Kraichens een maatregel van de moslim-leiding waren alle mannen in Srebrenica van 17 tot 60 jaar dienstplichtig en was het hen uitdrukkelijk verboden zich over te geven. (...) De mannen weigerden zich over te geven en werden daarom door de Serviërs als vijanden beschouwd.' Daarom? Zouden er geen dwingendere redenen geweest zijn?

Waarom zwijgen De Vries en Grémaux over het geleine akkoord tussen generaal Mladić en generaal Rupert Smith op 19 juli 1995, waarin de moslim-gevangenen de status van krijgsgevangene werd onthouden? Waarom laten zij bovendien in het door hen uitvoerig geciteerde interview van Julian Borger van *The Guardian* met enkele overlevenden, juist die passage weg die licht werpt op de huiver van de moslims zich over te geven? Die passage luidt: 's Nachts hoorden we de Serviërs. Ze riepen door hun megalfoons dat wij ons moesten overgeven,' zegt Avdo Sofić (33). Maar overgave was uitgesloten, nadat een soldaat had verteld hoe hij was ontsnapt aan een bloedbad bij Konjević Polje, waar zeventig Moslim-gevangenen werden gedood.' (*de Volkskrant*, 19 juli 1995).

Het betoog van De Vries en Grémaux wordt nog veraderlijker wanneer zij de geloofwaardigheid van belangrijke getuigen voor het Joegoslavië-tribunaal in twijfel trekken en daarbij niet schromen de protectie te schenden die een van die getuigen door het tribunaal gegeven is. Dat protectie door anonimiteit niet lichtzinnig door het tribunaal gegeven wordt, is vorig jaar (3 oktober) al eens in deze krant uit de doeken gedaan door

Ian Guest, rapporteur over ontsaan en werkwijze van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Hij bracht daarbij onder de aandacht dat de arrestatie van de verdachte Tradić, in Banja Luka is gevolgd door een aantal moorddaanslagen op familieleden van hen die hem in Duitsland hadden herkend. Aan deze overwegingen hebben De Vries en Grémaux zich niets gelegen laten liggen: ach, telooos geven zij de identiteit van getuige 'A' prijs. Waarom eigenlijk?

De auteurs suggereren, door middel van een terloopse nevenschikking, dat de eerste berichten en getuigenverklaringen van massaeccuties geheel en al onder Amerikaanse rege toel stand zijn gekomen — vlak voordat het door de Amerikanen getrande Kroatische leger begon met de zuivering van meer dan 200.000 Serviërs uit de Krajina. In werkelijkheid kwamen de eerste berichten en geruchten juist uit Servische bron. Nog afgezien van de berichtgeving in *The Independent*, waarin Robert Block verslag deed van de verhalen die in het Servische plaatsje Libovija de ronden deden over massa-eccuties in het naburige Bratunac aan de overzijde van de Drina, waren de eerste sinistere aanwijzingen al vrij spoedig na de val van Srebrenica op de Nederlandse televisie te zien, toen de nos beelden uitzond van het Servische propagandafilmje van Zoran Petrović. Wie herinnert zich niet die wat oudere, doodsbrange man, die naderbij wordt gesommeerd en gevraagd of hij soms bang is? En de grote groep mannen gezeten op een veld in de brandende zone met gewpende Serviërs om hen heen? Wijzend naar die laatste beelden, verklaarde Petrović in Belgrado tegenover de verslaggever van deze krant (26 augustus '95): 'In totaal hebben onze strijdkrachten 2.000 moslims afgemaakt. Hier op deze plek zo'n vijfhonderd.'

Het is niet de eerste keer dat het *parti pris* van de auteurs de aandacht trekt. Ufgerkend op de dag waarop Srebrenica onder de voet werd gelopen, verschenen op deze pagina een artikel van hun hand, waarin met eenzelfde bedrijvigheid vertoon van documentatie werd betoogd, dat in Nederland nooit een nuchtere geschiedenwisseling over de oorlog had plaatsgevonden, de westerse pers geheel en al naar de pijpen van de Bosnische regering zou dansen, de Serviërs de medin-

oorlog (hadden) verloren, als zij die al ooit zijn aangegaan; en dat 'onder druk van de media (...) het Westen een volstrekt onkritische houding (had) aangenomen jegens de machtsaanspraken van de moslimregering.' (SRK HANDELSBLAD 11 juli '95) Wie twaalf dagen later met *groeiende schrik* het onkeningsgedrag van Nederlandse officieren gadesloeg, kon hij dit artikel te rade gaan. Het roept nog steeds ernstige vragen op. De schrijvers waren immers, als voorlichter en organisator van de Joegoslavië-cursus van het Centrum voor Vredesoperaties van de landmacht in Ossendrecht, verantwoordelijk voor de vormgeving van de neutraliteitsinstructie waarmee de mannen en vrouwen van Dutchbat maar Bosnië zijn gezonden.

De vijandige gezindheid van het Dutchbat-personeel jegens de bevolking van Srebrenica wordt door de regering en de landmacht-leiding verklaard door te wijzen op het vijandige gedrag van die bevolking zelf én het isolement waarin Dutchbat verkeerde. Hoeveel hiervoor moge spreken, toch kan dit niet de volledige verklaring zijn. En zelfs als gedeeltelijke verklaring niet zelf als gelijke partner is erkend en gehoord. Dat dit vijandighedscomplex meerdere wortels heeft, blijft uit een opmerking van de generaal-majoor b.d. A.J. van Vuren in de Volkskrant van 2 september 1995, waarin hij zegt, dat in zijn diensttijd op het hoofdkwartier van Kisejčak leederten anti-moslim was. Die staf verkeerde niet in het isolement en de omstandigheden van Dutchbat.

'Gevoelens van mensen laten zich niet commanderen,' mekte de generaal bij dezelfde gelegenheid op. Zeer waar. Maar zijn zij daarvoor niet des te beter te bespelen door andere partijen in het geding? En, belangrijker, zijn zij niet even gemakkelijk op te wekken als te bestendigen wanneer zij door officieze opinies van bovenaf bekrachtigd worden? En, nog belangrijker, worden deze gevoelens niet zelf normatief wanneer zij gesanctioneerd worden door een corrupte, want politieke, neutraliteitsinstructie? Een instructie waarin de formele vr-regel te velde zodanig is omgekeerd dat een materiele stellingname zowel versluierd als gerechtvaardigd is. Dit alles onder het motto: 'Als de hele wereld, pers, parlement en publieke opinie, voor de Bosnische zaak is, dan kan alleen Servische propaganda de gewenste balans herstellen.'

Wim Notenboom is vertaler

Press Release . Communiqué de presse
(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)

TRIAL CHAMBER

**CHAMBRE DE 1ÈRE
INSTANCE**

The Hague, 2 August 2001
OF/P.I.S./609e

**RADISLAV KRSTIC BECOMES THE FIRST PERSON TO BE CONVICTED OF GENOCIDE AT
THE ICTY AND IS SENTENCED TO 46 YEARS IMPRISONMENT**

Today 2 August 2001, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, composed of Judges Rodrigues (Presiding), Riad and Wald, rendered its Judgement in The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. The Trial Chamber stated that it was "convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that a crime of genocide was committed in Srebrenica" and that General Radislav Krstic is guilty of genocide. Please find below the summary of the Sentencing Judgement of Trial Chamber I, read out by Presiding Judge Almiro Rodrigues at today's Judgement hearing.

Introduction

"May justice be done lest the world perish" said Hegel. The Trial Chamber is doing its duty in meting out justice and, in this way, hopes to have contributed to creating a better world."

The Trial Chamber is rendering its Judgement today in the Prosecutor's case against General Krstic who stands accused of genocide, complicity to commit genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forced transfer or deportation and of crimes committed between July and November 1995 following the attack of the Serbian forces on the town of Srebrenica. At the time the attack was launched, General Krstic was the deputy commander of the Drina Corps, one of the corps which constitute the army of Republika Srpska, often known as the VRS. The exact date General Krstic became the Drina Corps commander has been the subject of professional, courteous but, at times, particularly acrimonious debates between the parties. I will return to this point.

I wish to make several preliminary comments.

First, I wish to point out that throughout the trial the debates proceeded smoothly and the parties conducted themselves in an exemplary manner. In this case, both the Prosecution and Defence demonstrated in the most striking fashion that co-operation and confrontation need not be mutually exclusive. The arguments were always correct and, in particular, were of the highest quality. The final arguments were presentations of excellent legal and factual summaries of the respective positions of the Prosecution and the Defence. I wish to extend my appreciation to all counsel and their teams for the work they have done and the atmosphere in which it was carried out.

I wish to pay tribute to the work of the Office of the Prosecutor in the broadest sense and, in particular, to Mr. Jean-René Ruez, the former team leader in the Office of the Prosecutor. I also have in mind everyone working for the Prosecution and the Defence who travelled on-site: the experts and their assistants, the investigators, technicians, soldiers, security officers and also all those who saw, smelled, touched, exhumed, washed, autopsied, and analysed. It is not difficult to imagine how much patience, perseverance and devotion was required to perform this thankless but indispensable task.

I also wish to thank everyone who offered us their unstinting assistance, frequently after normal
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p609-e.htm>

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working hours.

I also wish to thank the staff of the Detention Unit and the Serbian and Dutch physicians and surgeons who shared their experience with us so that the accused would receive the treatment required for his medical condition.

Lastly, I wish to underscore the work of the military analysts and experts, Mr. Richard Butler and General Dannatt for the Prosecutor and General Radinovic for the Defence.

All this work made it possible to hear 128 witnesses, two of whom were called by the Trial Chamber. In all, more than eleven hundred exhibits (some several hundred pages long) were admitted during the proceedings.

I will move quickly over the details of the proceedings which appear in the annex to the Judgement. I will note only that because of General Krstic's medical condition, the trial was interrupted for several weeks at the start of the year. Nonetheless, as you know, the Trial Chamber's work did not stop since it was hearing two cases at the same time.

I now come to the reason for this hearing, pronouncing of the judgement in the case The Prosecutor against Radislav Krstic. I do not intend to read out the entire written Judgement but to present a summary thereof so that you, General Krstic, and the public will know essentially the reasons why the Trial Chamber reached the conclusions it has reached. I wish to point out that the only authoritative text is the written Judgement which will be available after this hearing and nothing I am going to say can be seen as modifying that Judgement in any way.

General Krstic, the crimes of which you stand accused are based on the events which occurred following the attack of the Serbian forces on the town of Srebrenica in July 1995. Srebrenica - the name of a town which has become synonymous with the conflict which devastated the former Yugoslavia. It is a name which immediately calls to mind thousands of people subjected to siege, famine and deprivation of everything - even water and time to breathe. The name of an enclave which the United Nations declared a safe area and which fell almost without a shot being fired. Srebrenica - a name which conjures up images one would prefer not to see: women, children and old people forced to climb into buses leaving for destinations unknown; men separated from their families, stripped of their belongings, men fleeing, men taken prisoner, men never to be seen again, men who would be found - but not always - dead, corpses piled up in mass graves; corpses with their hands tied or their eyes blind-folded - frequently; dismembered corpses as well; unidentified corpses ... corpses.

Srebrenica is also a name for a post-traumatic syndrome, the syndrome displayed by the women, children and old people who did not die and who, ever since July 1995, six years now, still have no news of their husbands and sons, fathers, brothers, uncles, grandfathers. Thousands of amputated lives six years later, robbed of the affection and love of their kin now reduced to ghosts who return to haunt them day after day, night after night.

The Trial Chamber was presented with a great deal of evidence which could be called impressive.

Because of the violence of the crimes, the almost unbearable images put before it, and the pain to which the victims gave voice in their testimony, the Trial Chamber needed to be particularly vigilant so that it could take the necessary distance for carrying out its work of justice with the requisite calm and as objectively as possible. During its meticulous analysis of inter alia all the evidence, testimony, exhibits, it was especially attentive to the need to ensure that the evidence it had made it possible to verify whether crimes had been committed. It carried out a scrupulous examination of all these in order to decide on which or any of the criminal characterisations the Prosecutor set out in her indictment a conviction could be entered. Lastly and above all, the Trial Chamber carefully weighed whether one or several of the crimes could be ascribed to General Krstic.

Essentially, the Trial Chamber is responding to three questions: what are the facts, which are the crimes that were committed, can General Krstic be held responsible for any of these crimes? I will now present a summary of the conclusions the Trial Chamber reached in respect of these three questions.

I - What are the facts?

Transfer of women, children and old people

The attack of the Serbian forces on the Srebrenica enclave followed several months, actually several years, of confrontation. Srebrenica is located in a part of eastern Bosnia, central Podrinje, which was of particular interest to both parties involved. To the Bosnian Muslims because the town was predominantly Muslim before the conflict; because it is located between Tuzla to the north and Zepa to the south both of which were under Muslim control; because the fall of Srebrenica could have extremely negative consequences for Sarajevo under siege at the time. To the Bosnian Serbs because the region known as central Podrinje was in that part of Bosnia bordering Serbia and because it was important to establish the continuity, in Bosnia like in neighbouring Serbia, of the territories under Serbian control; and, of course, for the opposite reasons of those of the Bosnian Muslims.

In 1992-1993, there were many clashes between the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims for control of the region. After several successful operations, the ABiH (the Bosnian Muslim army) was confronted with a counter-offensive mounted by the VRS (the Bosnian Serb army) which finally reduced the enclave to about 150 km². In March 1993, siege was laid to Srebrenica and part of the population was transferred.

On 16 April 1993, the United Nations Security Council declared Srebrenica a "safe area" and an agreement signed by the parties turned it into a demilitarised zone to which an UNPROFOR contingent was dispatched. However, the parties did not agree on the definition and interpretation of the notion of demilitarised zone. In particular, the Bosnian Muslims considered that only the town of Srebrenica itself was demilitarised and the ABiH sent weapons and munitions to the enclave.

Still, the situation remained relatively stable until January 1995 when the Bosnian Serbs adopted a more hard-line position, in particular, in respect of the supply of humanitarian aid.

On 8 March 1995, the President of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, issued the order under the name of "Directive 7" to separate the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. In respect of what concerned the Drina Corps in particular, President Karadzic wrote "By well thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

On the basis of this directive, on 31 March 1995, General Ratko Mladic also issued a directive which he sent inter alia to the Drina Corps. The Directive organised a large-scale attack known as "Sadejstvo-95" whose objective was to defend the territory of Republika Srpska on all fronts and, in particular, to avoid, and I quote, "at any cost" the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. General Mladic foresaw that whatever the result of the events and the escalation of the conflict, UNPROFOR land forces and NATO forces would probably not be engaged, except in those cases when they come under direct physical threat. During the operation, he stated that the forces of the Republika Srpska army would collaborate in strategic camouflage and improvement of the tactical position by carrying out, among others, active combat operations (...) around the Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde enclaves.

In the spring of 1995, the situation in Sarajevo deteriorated significantly. Humanitarian convoys were obstructed and sometimes blocked. Even the Dutch UNPROFOR contingent could not effect its normal troop rotation. Some of the observation posts reported a significant reinforcement of the nearby Serbian positions. The humanitarian situation became catastrophic. The 28th ABiH Division, that is, the Bosnian Muslim army in the Srebrenica enclave, asked that the blockade

lifted. Harassment operations were launched against the Serbian positions. This is known as "Operation Skakavac" and, apparently, crimes were committed while it was being carried out, in particular in the Serbian village of Visnjica on 26 June 1995. At the same time, the Bosnian Serb army was on the move. On 31 May 1995, it captured one of the UNPROFOR observation posts.

On 2 July 1995, the Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic signed the orders for a planned attack on Srebrenica. On 6 July the attack was launched from south of the enclave. Thousands of Bosnian Muslims fled to the town. The Bosnian Serb forces encountered no resistance. On 9 July, President Karadzic decided that, under the prevailing conditions, the town was to be taken. On 10 July, the panicked Bosnian Muslim population began to flee toward the United Nations facilities in the town (Bravo company) or out of the town towards the north, on the Bratunac road, to Potocari. The commander of the Dutch Battalion often called Dutchbat, asked for air support but did not receive it.

On 11 July, General Mladic, Chief-of-Staff of the Bosnian Serb army, along with General Zivanovic, General Krstic and many other VRS officers, made a triumphant entry into a Srebrenica deserted by its inhabitants.

By the evening of 11 July, Srebrenica was a dead town in the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces. The inhabitants of Srebrenica and the refugees there fled en masse to the United Nations base in Potocari. The Bosnian Serb forces would soon learn that there were very few men in the milling crowd gathering around the UNPROFOR camp. In Potocari there were mostly women, children and old people.

There were very few men in Potocari because, even though one cannot know for sure who gave the orders or organised the departures, they took a different route. Whether members of the 28th Division or not, they assembled in the little villages of Jaglici and Susnjari north-west of Srebrenica and decided to flee through the woods towards Tuzla much further to the north in territory under Bosnian Muslim control. About ten to fifteen thousand men formed a column several kilometres long and left on foot through the woods.

However, General Mladic did not yet know that when, on 11 July, he called the Dutchbat commander Colonel Karremans to a meeting at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac. Along with General Mladic were many VRS officers, including General Zivanovic, but not General Krstic. At 20.00 hours on 11 July, General Mladic asked Colonel Karremans whether UNPROFOR could organise the transport of the population. He also asked him to return with a representative of the population of Srebrenica. The second meeting was held in the same hotel on that same day. It was about 23.00 hours. General Mladic was in attendance with General Krstic but without General Zivanovic. Colonel Karremans came with a teacher, Mr. Mandzic, who represented the population. This time, General Mladic's tone and attitude were much harder. Through the open window came the sounds of a pig being slaughtered. General Mladic had the signboard of the Srebrenica town hall which had been removed from the building placed on the table. The Dutchbat commander said that there were about 15-20,000 refugees and that the humanitarian situation was distressing. General Mladic raised his voice and became threatening. He said that he would organise the transport of the population and demanded that the ABiH lay down its weapons. He also demanded that Mr. Mandzic make sure that this was done although Mr. Mandzic tried, in vain, to explain that he had no power to do so. The answer fell and it was final: that's your problem; bring in the people who can ensure that the weapons are laid down and save your people from destruction.

Another meeting was scheduled for the following day. It began around 10.00 on 12 July. General Mladic was still there with General Krstic beside him. Colonel Popovic, to whom we will return later, was also there. The Dutchbat representatives returned with Mr. Mandzic and two other "civilian representatives", Mrs. Omanovic, an economist, and Mr. Nuhanovic, a businessman. General Mladic again insisted that the condition for the survival of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica was that they lay down their weapons. He said that he would supply the buses to transport the population but that the fuel would have to be provided by UNPROFOR. Everyone understood that the Bosnian Muslims were to leave the enclave. Last, General Mladic

said that all the men in Potocari would be separated in order to identify any possible war criminals.

At around noon on 12 July, General Krstic gave a filmed interview to a journalist from Serbia. This took place right next to the United Nations base in Potocari. Behind him, passing trucks could be seen. Buses as well. These were the buses the women, children and old people would get into. The video the journalist made shows resigned people. The men are being separated from the women. Here and there one sees bags, bundles, a few belongings. Further away, a larger pile. The Trial Chamber would learn that these were the belongings of the men who had come to seek refuge in Potocari and who had been ordered to leave them there. The Trial Chamber knows that the belongings were subsequently burned by the Serbian forces.

How did the situation appear to the Bosnian Muslims who had sought refuge in Potocari? It was extremely serious. One needs to remember the shelling, including the shelling of the United Nations base in Srebrenica. One needs to imagine thousands of people crowded into a few buildings without water or food other than a few pieces of candy thrown in by General Mladic in front of the cameras and, we were told, taken back once the cameras had left. One must imagine the heat. One must picture the dozens of soldiers and Serbian armed men coming and going shouting out discriminatory insults. One must see the houses set on fire, the night falling and the rising screams. The witnesses described to the Trial Chamber the prevailing atmosphere of terror, the rapes and murders and the mistreatment so pervasive that some of the refugees committed suicide or attempted to do so.

In the evening of 13 July, all the women, children and old people were transferred. The Trial Chamber concludes that for legal reasons which it explains in its Judgement, there was no expulsion. There was, however, a forced transfer of the women, children and old people of Srebrenica. The men were systematically separated and were forced to leave behind their meagre possessions, leave behind even their identify papers. They were taken to a white house several metres from the United Nations base. They were beaten. Some were taken behind the house and killed. The survivors were taken away to various detention locations, including Bratunac. Those who were able to get on the buses were stopped right before leaving the territory under VRS control and driven to other detention locations (bus, school, hangar).

During that time, the column, with most of the 28th Division armed forces at the head, tried to go through the forest and cross the east-west Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. There were about ten to fifteen thousand men in the column. About one-third was able to get through, including 3,000 men of the 28th Division. The first of these arrived in Bosnian Muslim controlled territory on 16 July. The others, subjected to shelling and automatic weapons fire, were captured or surrendered, sometimes to the so-called UNPROFOR soldiers who were, in fact, none other than members of the Serbian forces using equipment stolen from Dutchbat. Some of these were killed immediately. Most were taken to collection centres, like a meadow in Sandici or a football field in Nova Kasaba. A last group would be luckier because when they came into contact with the Serbian forces, negotiations were initiated and they would, finally, be able to go to territory under Bosnian Muslim control.

In all, 7 to 8,000 men were captured by the Serbian forces. Almost all of them were killed. Only very few survived and some of them testified before the Trial Chamber and described the horror of the mass executions which they miraculously escaped.

The mass executions began on 13 July

Some of the executions involved only a few individuals, like the one in Jadar on the morning of 13 July. In the afternoon of 13 July, there was another execution at a relatively isolated place, the Cerska Valley. 150 bodies would be exhumed there on which 50 metal ties would be found, some of them still wrapped around the victims' wrists. Late in the afternoon, the Serbian forces indulged in a real killing spree. A large number of Bosnian Muslims, about 1,000 - 1,500, were assembled in a warehouse in Kravica. The soldiers opened fire and lobbed in grenades. Those who tried to escape were killed immediately. The next day, the Serbian forces called out to any survivors. Some of those who responded were forced to sing Serbian songs and then executed.

A large machine came to carry away the bodies and, in so doing, ripped off part of the warehouse doorframe. The experts would find traces of hair, blood and human tissue on the floor and walls.

On 13 and 14 July, there were executions in Tisca also, that is, the place where the buses were to stop so that the Serbian forces could verify whether there were still men on board, and if so, to force them to get off. They were then taken to a school and, after their hands were tied, to a field where they were executed.

On 14 July, a thousand Bosnian Muslims were assembled in the Grbavci school (Orahovac) gymnasium. Their eyes were blindfolded and they were taken by truck to a field where they were executed. Machines were already digging up the ground before the executions had been completed.

There were other executions from 14 to 16 July. A group of 1,500 - 2,000 Bosnian Muslims was being detained at the Petkovci school. They were taken to an execution site next to an artificial lake, the Petkovci dam. Their hands were tied and they were barefoot. They were executed with automatic weapons.

This would also be the fate of 1,000 to 1,200 men at the Branjevo military farm. The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of a former VRS soldier convicted by the Tribunal for his participation in that execution - Mr. Drazen Erdemovic. The Bosnian Muslim men were brought in by truck, many with their hands tied, some wearing blindfolds. All but one were dressed in civilian clothing. The execution squad fired over and over again until, as Mr. Erdemovic said, their fingers hurt. Immediately afterwards, the soldiers went to Pilica. Several hundred Bosnian Muslims were locked up in the village cultural centre, the Pilica Dom. Mr. Erdemovic and several others refused to participate any further in the executions and sat down in the café across from the cultural centre from where they could hear the shots and explosions. There would be no survivors. When the investigators forced open the door to the cultural centre, they discovered clear traces of the massacre and the conditions in which it had been perpetrated: bullet marks, traces of explosives, blood stains, bits of human remains, everywhere, high up on the walls and even under the stage of the theatre. And a single forgotten identity document belonging to a Bosnian Muslim. The cultural centre is located on the side of the main road crossing the village at the point where buses stop. In front of the cultural centre today stands a memorial in honour of the ... Serbian heroes who died for the Serbian cause. There were other executions as well, in particular, in Kozluk and Nezuk. The last mass execution appears to have been on 19 July 1995.

In all, the experts estimate that between seven and eight thousand Bosnian Muslim men were executed between 13 and 19 July 1995.

Despite the efforts which have been made, very few mortal remains have been found. Why? Because in the fall of 1995 measures were taken in order to attempt to cover up the scale of crimes.

The proof of what happened can be seen, in particular, in the aerial photographs provided to the Prosecutor. These photographs have made it possible: to identify the number of mass grave sites at the time the executions were carried out; and to note that other sites appeared after September 1995. The work of the experts has also made it possible to confirm the data by comparing the older mass graves with the more recent ones since the latter are always located in regions with more difficult access than those of the first group. No particular care was taken when the bodies were moved and it has not been uncommon to find bodies with missing limbs. There can therefore be no doubt about the deliberate desire to conceal the existence of mass graves and therefore the mass executions of civilians or persons no longer fit for combat.

II - Which are the crimes that were committed?

The Prosecutor has characterised all the crimes and has charged General Krstic with: genocide (or complicity therein); persecution by means of murder, cruel treatment, acts of terror, destruction of personal property and forced transfer; extermination; murders within the

meaning of Article 5 of the Statute; murders within the meaning of Article 3 of the Statute; deportation or the inhumane act of forced transfer.

In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber responds to all these points and concludes by applying the case-law of the Appeals Chamber in respect of cumulative charges. It is clear that the principal question which arose was whether genocide was committed against, in the Prosecutor's words, "a part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical, or religious group".

The notion of genocide is itself a recent one. It appeared for the first time in the Second World War and was codified in December 1948 in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which came into force on 12 January 1951. Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal, "Genocide", repeats the definition of the Convention word for word. I quote: "genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Among the acts of genocide are killing members of the group and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.

There is little case-law on genocide. While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has rendered several decisions on this point, the case-law of our Tribunal on the subject is almost non-existent.

In this case, the fact that serious bodily or mental harm was inflicted on the Bosnian Muslims or that they were murdered has not been disputed. The Trial Chamber considers that one also cannot dispute the fact that the victims were chosen because of their membership in a national group, that is, precisely because they were Bosnian Muslims. However, can one claim that there was a will or intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such protected by the Convention?

The Defence submitted that there was not and expressed this opinion exhaustively and most clearly both in its written submissions and final arguments. I will present a very brief, and therefore incomplete, summary of its arguments.

The Defence does not dispute the fact that the Serbian forces attacked Srebrenica's Bosnian Muslim population of fighting age. It claims, however, that precisely for this reason, one cannot speak of genocide, despite the scale of the murders committed. It points out first that the women, children and old people were transferred and not killed. It goes on to state that a part of the column, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, was able to pass into territory under Bosnian Muslim control after negotiations had taken place. According to the Defence, it cannot even be claimed that all the Bosnian Muslim men of fighting age were targeted. Lastly, and in any case, the Defence sets out that the intent to destroy all the Bosnian Muslim men of fighting age cannot be interpreted as the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute.

The Trial Chamber does not share this view.

The Trial Chamber observes that although Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were able to escape the hands of the Serbian forces after the fall of the enclave, this was due to chance or the Serbian forces' inability to prevent the passage of the end of the column into territory under Bosnian Muslim control given the operations in which it was engaged elsewhere. In other words, the Serbian forces really had no other choice at the time than to allow the rest of the column to pass. Subject only to the reservation which we have just stated, the executions were carried out on such a mass scale that the men from Srebrenica of fighting age were annihilated.

The Trial Chamber points out that the decision to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of fighting age was taken after the decision to transfer the women, children and old people. For this reason, the Serbian forces had to realise the impact such a decision would have on the group's survival.

The Trial Chamber is not stating, nor does it wish to suggest, that a plan to commit genocide existed prior to the attack on Srebrenica or even right before the city fell. However, according

the Appeals Chamber decision in the Jelacic case, a plan of genocide need not have been formed. Nor is it indispensable that, should such a plan exist, some time must pass between its conception and its implementation.

What we are asserting here, on the basis of all the evidence presented to us, is that a decision was first taken to carry out "ethnic cleansing" of the Srebrenica enclave. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to note that the men could be separated from the women, children and old people. Furthermore, the men taken prisoner could subsequently serve as a "bargaining chip" as was frequently the case throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. What was important at that time was to drive out all the Bosnian Muslims from the enclave, including the women, children and old people.

However, for reasons the Trial Chamber has been unable to clarify, the decision was then taken to kill all the men of fighting age. The result was inevitable: the destruction of the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica. At issue is not only the commission of murders for political, racial or religious reasons, which already constitutes a crime of persecution. At issue is not only extermination of the Bosnian Muslim men of fighting age alone. At issue is the deliberate decision to kill the men, a decision taken with complete awareness of the impact the murders would inevitably have on the entire group. By deciding to kill all the men of Srebrenica of fighting age, a decision was taken to make it impossible for the Bosnian Muslim people of Srebrenica to survive.

Stated otherwise, what was ethnic cleansing became genocide.

The Trial Chamber is also convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that a crime of genocide was committed in Srebrenica.

Finally, for the reasons set forth in detail in its Judgement, the Trial Chamber considers that the following crimes were committed: genocide, persecution, extermination, murder within the meaning of Article 3 of the Statute; murder within the meaning of Article 5; and the forced transfer of Bosnian Muslims.

In light of the rules applicable to cumulative charging, only the crimes of genocide, persecution and murder within the meaning of Article 3 of the Statute have been retained.

III - Is General Krstic guilty of any of these crimes?

The final question which the Trial Chamber must answer is whether General Krstic can be held guilty of these crimes. The Prosecution claims that he can; the Defence claims that he cannot. In order to establish the possible responsibility of General Krstic for these crimes, the Trial Chamber took account of his position as Deputy Commander and then Commander of the Drina Corps at the time these crimes were committed. The Drina Corps, as I have already said, had authority over the entire area in which the crimes took place. For this reason, the Trial Chamber first reviewed what in the evidence presented by the parties would make it possible to establish whether or not the Drina Corps forces were involved in the crimes. This review allowed the Trial Chamber to conclude beyond any reasonable doubt that the Drina Corps forces participated in, if not all the crimes, at least some of them.

However, it appeared also that other forces played a role, and sometimes a decisive one at that, in what happened and, in particular, in the capture of the Bosnian Muslims and the executions. The Judgement thus makes it clear that the following were involved in these crimes:

- the forces of the Ministry of the Interior, more commonly known as the MUP;
- forces answering in principle to the Main Staff and, in particular: the 65th motorised regiment; or the 10th sabotage detachment of which Mr. Erdemovic was a member;
- the military police forces;
- other armed forces which probably included civilians or reservists who had taken up arms.

However, the evidence also leads to the conclusion that all these forces acted in a co-ordinated

manner and were organised for the same objective. The presence of General Mladic in Srebrenica and Potocari was mentioned on several occasions. At the time, General Mladic was the Chief-of-Staff of the General Staff of the armed forces of Republika Srpska, that is, the number 2 man in the military hierarchy right below President Karadzic. The Trial Chamber then sought to verify General Krstic's role at the time of the crimes and, in particular, any role he may have played in their commission. I will sketch out the positions taken by the Prosecution and the Defence.

The Prosecution claims that General Krstic was the Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps at the time the attack on Srebrenica was launched. As such, he was involved in the organisation of the troops who took part in the attack. General Krstic assumed command of the Corps by the evening of 13 July 1995 at the latest. According to the Prosecutor, he is thus responsible for all the crimes committed on the territory of the Drina Corps by virtue of Article 7(1) of the Statute, that is, individually responsible. However, the Prosecutor claims that General Krstic is also responsible as a commander by virtue of Article 7(3) of the Statute.

The Defence contends that General Krstic was a professional officer trained in the JNA and was well aware of the rules applicable to armed conflicts. The Defence never disputed that General Krstic was alongside General Mladic when the town of Srebrenica fell, that he was present at two of the three meetings at the Hotel Fontana, that General Krstic was successively the Deputy Commander and then the Commander of the Drina Corps, a corps whose territorial jurisdiction covered all the territory on which the crimes occurred.

It points out however that General Krstic in no manner committed any crime himself and claims that he cannot be held responsible as a superior either. First, the attack on Srebrenica in which he participated was not unlawful as such. However, according to the Defence, General Krstic became the Commander of the Drina Corps only on 20 July 1995 and learned of the mass executions of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica only after that date. He had in fact been tasked by General Mladic to carry out the attack on Zepa on 13 July at the latest. The Defence goes on to claim that General Krstic therefore had to change the position of his forward command post and found himself isolated in respect of the communications he was receiving. Lastly, the Defence asserts that General Krstic had no involvement whatsoever in the digging up and reburial of the bodies.

The Trial Chamber has carefully reviewed all the arguments. It has conducted a scrupulous examination of all the exhibits in the case-file as well as the testimony whether of United Nations staff or victims. The Trial Chamber has meticulously weighed the information provided by the radio taps. In this respect, I recall that the Trial Chamber did not admit the recording in which a voice alleged to be that of K. is heard saying: kill them all! I emphasise this point because it might have appeared that this exhibit was part of the case-file whereas it has NOT been admitted and is not an exhibit. However, the Trial Chamber did admit many other recordings some of which are the subject of a detailed analysis in the Judgement. Lastly, the Trial Chamber analysed the reports of the military experts submitted both by the Prosecution and the Defence. And there is no possible doubt.

When you entered Srebrenica with General Mladic on 11 July 1995, General Krstic, you found a deserted town. You thus knew that the population had fled. You were the Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps and your commander, General Zivanovic was there along with many other VRS officers.

Assuming that you did not already know, you must have wondered where the population had gone. Because, according to your own statements, your objective was to separate Srebrenica from Zepa and to reduce the enclave to its urban area. It was therefore essential for you to know where at least the forces of the 28th Division might be since they were not there.

You were not at the first meeting in the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac on the evening of 11 July around 20.00 hours. But you were present at the second meeting around 23.00 hours. You say that you did not hear the scream of the pig being killed at that moment. But because you were sitting right next to General Mladic, you heard him speak in an arrogant and threatening voice both to the Dutchbat commander and the "representative" of the Bosnian Muslim population of

Srebrenica who was there. You saw when General Mladic had the signboard which had been removed from the Srebrenica town hall put on the table. You heard General Mladic asking the Bosnian Muslim armed forces to surrender and the Dutchbat commander to organise the transfer of the women, children and old people from Potocari. You were there, General Krstic, on 12 July around 10.00 hours when General Mladic told the UNPROFOR officers that the forces of the VRS were going to organise the transfer but that UNPROFOR would have to provide the necessary fuel. You heard General Mladic's tone of voice, even more menacing than the day before, when he spoke to the people who you knew were acting as representatives of the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica. You gave orders for buses and other transport to come to Potocari quickly. You knew, at least by early morning on 12 July, that a large column of Bosnian Muslims was trying to cross the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. In any case, you knew that the column was moving north and therefore represented no danger for the rest of your operations in the other United Nations safe area which you were preparing to attack. You were in Potocari giving an interview when the first buses arrived. You were there when they began to separate the men from the women, children and old people. You could not not have seen their physical condition. You could not not have heard the screams of the men who were taken to the building called the White House as they were being beaten.

In accordance with the orders you received from General Mladic, on 13 July, you focused on the preparations for the attack on Zepa. But you received information on a regular basis. You knew that when the buses arrived at the border of the area under Bosnian Muslim control, Drina Corps soldiers were making the men seeking refuge there get off. On 13 July in the evening, you knew that thousands of men from the column had been captured. On the evening of 13 July, I repeat - 13 July - you took command of the Drina Corps and signed your first order as the corps commander around 20.30 hours. On 14 July, you launched the attack on Zepa. Nonetheless, you remained perfectly well informed of what was going on in the area to the north of the town of Srebrenica. In the night of 14-15 July, troops from the Zvornik Brigade (one of the Drina Corps brigades) moved up from Zepa towards Srebrenica and you knew why they were doing that. On 15 July in the morning, the security chief of the Main Staff called you and asked for your help in dealing with "3,500 packages". You knew exactly what was meant by "packages", General Krstic - Bosnian Muslims who were to be executed. You expressed your displeasure. That same officer told you that the MUP forces, the Interior Ministry police, did not want (no longer wanted) to do it. You said you would see what you could do. On 16 July, some of your subordinates, men from the Bratunac Brigade, participated in the mass executions at the Branjevo military farm. On 16 July, the security chief of the Drina Corps whose commander you were, continued to keep you informed about the situation. You asserted to the Trial Chamber that, subsequently, you wanted to take measures against that officer, but out of fear of reprisals against yourself or, more specifically against your family, you decided not to. The Trial Chamber, however, found nothing to confirm your assertions. Not a single soldier of the Drina Corps was punished for the murder of one or several Bosnian Muslims. On the contrary. Nothing makes it possible to establish that you participated in the activities designed to conceal the massacres and, to this end, in the operations of digging up and reburial of the corpses. But how could anyone think that you would not have known about work requiring the use of such large machines? In any case, General Krstic, you were seen being congratulated for the action you took in Srebrenica. You were seen right next to General Mladic when in December 1995 a ceremony was organised for the Drina Corps. Finally, General Krstic, you supported General Mladic against President Karadzic when he tried to remove General Mladic.

GENERAL KRSTIC, PLEASE RISE.

The Trial Chamber does not dispute that you are a professional soldier who loves his work. The Trial Chamber can accept that you would not of your own accord have taken the decision to execute thousands of civilians and disarmed persons. Someone else probably decided to order the execution of all the men of fighting age.

Nonetheless, you are still guilty, General Krstic.

You are guilty of having knowingly participated in the organised forced transfer of the women, children and old people in Srebrenica at the time of the attack on 6 July 1995 against the United

Nations safe area.

You are guilty of the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslims between 10 and 19 July 1995, whether these be murders committed sporadically in Potocari or murders planned in the form of mass executions. You are guilty of the incredible suffering of the Bosnian Muslims whether these be the ones in Potocari or survivors of the executions. You are guilty of the persecution suffered by the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. Knowing that the women, children and old people of Srebrenica had been transferred, you are guilty of having agreed to the plan to conduct mass executions of all the men of fighting age. You are therefore guilty of genocide, General Krstic.

In order to determine the penalty you deserve, we have, of course, taken into account the extreme gravity of the crime. Still, we also wished to show that, in respect of the crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there are certainly people whose individual responsibility is much greater than your own.

At this point I wish to make a personal observation. Kant has said that if justice is ignored, life on this earth has no value.

I believe it is essential to make a distinction between what might be collective responsibility and individual responsibility. The Tribunal has not been established to deal with the possibility of collective responsibility. What is of interest to me in each of the trials in which I have sat in this court is to verify whether the evidence presented before it makes it possible to find an accused guilty. I seek to judge an accused. I do not judge a people. Yes, in the former Yugoslavia there were attacks against civilian populations. Yes, there were massacres and there was persecution. Yes, some of these crimes were committed by Serbian forces. However, to paraphrase a great humanist, I consider that to associate this evil with Serbian identity would be an insult to the Serbian people and would betray the concept of civil society. But it would be just as monstrous not to attach any name to this evil because that could be an offence to the Serbs.

In July 1995, General Krstic, you agreed to evil.

This is why the Trial Chamber convicts you today and sentences you to 46 years in prison.

The court stands adjourned.

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Richard May, Presiding

Judge Antonio Cassese

Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba

Registrar: Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh

Order of: 12 May 1998

FILED AT GENEVA!

PROSECUTOR

v.

MILAN KOVACEVIC

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A PROSECUTORIAL CODE OF CONDUCT

Office of the Prosecutor:

**Ms. Brenda Hollis
Ms. Ann Sutherland
Mr. Michael Keegan**

Counsel for the Accused:

**Mr. Dusan Vucicevic
Mr. Anthony D'Amato**

THE TRIAL CHAMBER

NOTING the Defendant's Motion For A Prosecutorial Code Of Conduct filed on 29 April 1998 ("Motion"), the Response to the Motion filed by the Office of the Prosecutor ("Prosecution") filed on 4 May 1998, the Defendant's Substitute Motion For A Prosecutorial Code Of Conduct filed on 5 May 1998 ("Substitute Motion") and the Response to the Substitute Motion filed by the Prosecution on 7 May 1998,

HAVING HEARD the arguments of the parties on 11 May 1998 and having ruled on the Substitute Motion at that time, reserving its written decision to a later date,

CONSIDERING that the relief sought by the Defence is neither warranted in this particular case nor within the power of this Trial Chamber to order in respect of all cases before the International Tribunal,

HEREBY DENIES the Substitute Motion.

Richard
May

Presiding
Judge

Dated this twelfth day of May 1998

At The Hague

The Netherlands

[Seal
of
the
Tribunal]

Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-
 Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient;>
 Verzonden: vrijdag 12 maart 2004 1:17
 Onderwerp: CDSM:Fw: Srebrenica

French General Philippe Morillon was the last big hitter for the prosecution.

Mr Milosevic was given a copy of the witness' statement only hours in advance, yet Morillon's evidence turned out to be of greater benefit to the defence than the prosecution, as mentioned in the following article. Thus the prosecution's case ended with a whimper.

Also we say farewell to Judge Richard May. A weak man, lacking in principles and moral fibre, who was no match for Mr Milosevic in the courtroom.

What follows is a lengthy article but is useful in regard to Srebrenica.

I.J.

<http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/051.shtml>

Srebrenica: The Untold Story

By Carl Savich

Introduction: What Really Happened in Srebrenica in 1992-1993?

On Thursday, February 12, 2004, the former UN commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, French General Philippe Morillon, testified at the Hague trial of Slobodan Milosevic. He was the last major prosecution witness against Milosevic before the prosecution finished its case. He was supposed to provide "the smoking gun" against Milosevic by showing that Milosevic bore responsibility for the fall of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995 and for the alleged massacre of "7,000 Muslim men and boys". He failed, however, to provide a smoking gun. Instead, Morillon inadvertently revealed what had led up to the fall of Srebrenica. He stated that "in Srebrenica something terrible could happen" and that he "foresaw Srebrenica", that "there was going to be terrible tragedy in Srebrenica." The fall of Srebrenica was the result of and a reaction to Bosnian Muslim attacks against Bosnian Serbs in the Srebrenica area. Morillon was the commander of UN troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina from September, 1992 to July, 1993. He was referring to the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 and the alleged executions of Bosnian Muslim troops and irregular forces. In 1993 he had established the "safe haven" of Srebrenica to save it from military defeat after the Bosnian Muslim offensives had failed.

But why did Morillon suspect that "something terrible could happen" in Srebrenica? What happened in Srebrenica before its fall in 1995 that would lead him to this conclusion? This part of the Srebrenica story is suppressed and stringently censored by the US government and media and the historians and the news services. This is the story that is covered-up by the so-called West. What happened in Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993? This is the untold story of Srebrenica.

Why was Morillon concerned for Srebrenica? What happened to warrant his fears and concerns? In the BBC article "UN General 'foresaw Srebrenica'", February 12, 2004, it was reported:

He told the tribunal that he feared that attacks by Muslim forces in which Serbian civilians had been targeted, had enraged the Bosnian Serbs and would result in fierce retaliation in the city.

UN commander Philippe Morillon, saved Oric and Srebrenica from military defeat in 1993. In the

February 12, 2004 AP article by Toby Sterling, "French General Says He Warned Milosevic", Morillon testified that he had talked to Milosevic to intervene "to prevent a massacre" in Srebrenica in 1993. Milosevic pressured the Bosnian Serbs to halt their offensive and to allow the UN to set up a "safe haven" for Srebrenica. Milosevic had influence or power over the Bosnian Serbs until May, 1993.

Why was Morillon imploring Milosevic to intervene in Bosnia? What precipitated the Srebrenica crisis? The AP story alluded to this in the following statement:

Morillon feared that attacks by Muslim forces on Serbian civilians had enraged the Bosnian Serbs and would result in fierce retaliation.

The Western media used the euphemistic terminology of "attacks" to diminish and lessen the impact of Bosnian Muslim crimes against humanity and violations of international law. Bosnian Muslim Government troops had in fact engaged in a planned and systematic policy of murdering Serbian civilians in the Srebrenica pocket, by terrorizing them to leave their villages. By using the sanitized term of "attacks", the Western media seeks to negate the fact that these Muslim attacks were war crimes and even constitute genocide against Bosnian Serbs. In other words, the terms were carefully and judiciously chosen to cover-up facts and crimes by the Bosnian Muslims. Ironically, this cover-up of Bosnian Muslim war crimes was perpetrated during a so-called war crimes trial.

Why couldn't the truth be told about Srebrenica? Why did the Western media engage in propagandistic falsifications of the facts and in infowar brainwashing? This is because the media does not want to inform its readers or listeners that the Bosnian Muslim Government committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Bosnian Serb population. Why not tell the truth? After all, this is supposed to be the "free world", the "democratic" world, the New World Order? Why the media brainwashing and propaganda? To tell the truth about Srebrenica would result in an objective and factual account of the events that occurred during the Bosnian civil war of 1992-1995. This would undermine the position of the US/NATO and ultimately the purpose of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The US/NATO/EU rationale is based on a scenario of good guys and bad guys, a simplistic black and white dichotomy that assigns sole criminal culpability or responsibility on the Serbian people. Culpability is denied to US/NATO proxies/client states. By telling the truth about Srebrenica, this dichotomy would be negated and a complex picture of a civil war would emerge where culpability was shared by all the actors and participants. This is why what happened in Srebrenica remains censored and covered-up.

1991 Vox magazine cover for October, 1991 showing a Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS member stepping on the heads of Serbs. The caption reads: "Spremna Handzar Divizija" [Ready Handjar Division]. The color of the magazine is in green, the symbolic color of Islam. **Civil War in Eastern Bosnia**

The civil war in eastern Bosnia erupted in April, 1992, when Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats began seizing territory. On April 6, the European Community (EC), later the European Union (EU), recognized Bosnia as an independent state. The US followed on the next day. Bosnian Serb forces seized Srebrenica and held it for three weeks. On April 20, 1992, Bosnian Serb militiamen were ambushed by Bosnian Muslim forces near Potocari. Half a dozen of the Bosnian Serbs were killed. This started the killing in the Srebrenica area. The Bosnian Serbs then retaliated. On May 3, Bosnian Serb forces killed thirteen Bosnian Muslims. Four days later, the Bosnian Muslims retaliated, in an attack in which an elderly Serb farmer with poor eyesight "was burned up in his house." On May 8, one of Naser Oric's men shot Bosnian Serb political leader Goran Zekic in the head and attempted to throw a grenade in his car as he was driving from Srebrenica to Bratunac, killing him. Zekic was the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) as the representative from Srebrenica in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament and had been a judge in Srebrenica. His assassination exacerbated the conflict. The remaining Serbs in Srebrenica fled to Bratunac, while Bosnian Muslims in Bratunac were driven out.

The Bosnian conflict was a classic civil war in which differing and opposing factions seize territory and mutually expel populations of the opposing faction. What happened in Bosnia was not different from any other civil war. The same happened in the ethnic and religious conflict in Cyprus between Greeks and Turks. Each ethnic faction established control of territory driving out the population of the opposing faction. Cyprus was divided into two ethnic zones, a northern Turkish zone and a southern Greek zone, divided by the UN Green Line of separation. An estimated 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced out of the north while 60,000 Turkish Cypriots left the south zone. In 1974, 40,000 Turkish troops invaded Cyprus and occupied 37% of the island. Cyprus thus was divided into two zones. The same happened in the Lebanese civil war that erupted in 1975 between Muslim and Christian factions. The Shi'ite, Sunni, and Druze Muslim factions were opposed by the Christian Phalangist and Maronite factions. Both factions were made up of Arabs. The city of Beirut became a war zone and was divided by the Green Line into Muslim and Christian sectors. During the civil war, 44,000 were killed, 180,000 were injured, while thousands were displaced and became refugees. During the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1948, Israeli forces occupied Palestinian territory and drove out the Palestinian population, settling the territory with Jewish settlers and refugees from Europe. Israeli forces are alleged to have destroyed 400 Palestinian villages and to have driven out 840,000 Palestinians while killing 15,000 Palestinians.

Bosnia was not different from these conflicts, indeed, from any civil war that preceded it. US/NATO/EU propaganda made the Bosnian civil war a focus of attention because the US/NATO/EU sought the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia, the "Balkanization" of the former Yugoslavia, because it would facilitate NATO and EU expansion into eastern Europe and the Balkans. The way US/EU/NATO expansion could be facilitated was by isolating a single faction that was perceived to hinder that expansion. Creating a propaganda rationale based on genocide and the Holocaust was what the US government devised as a way to intervene militarily to ensure the expansion of US/NATO/EU interests. This is the reason why the genocide/Holocaust propaganda was utilized by NATO. It was the way to make an end run around international law and sovereignty and achieve military intervention and occupation by NATO. And, indeed, that is precisely and exactly what resulted. NATO still occupies Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004.

1943 Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS Division Handzar occupied Srebrenica area in World War II. Nuremberg trial held all SS members to be war criminals. The historical continuity is clear here between 1943 and 1991. Some 25,000 Muslim War Criminals exists because of their WWII atrocities. **Srebrenica**

Srebrenica became a Muslim enclave and stronghold early in the civil war. The Muslim military command at Muslim-held Tuzla pumped weapons and equipment and Bosnian Muslim troops into the Srebrenica pocket. Bosnian Muslim military offensives were then launched from Srebrenica against Bosnian Serb-held villages. A major goal of the military operations was to establish a link with Muslim-held territory near Tuzla. The military offensives out of Srebrenica were lead by Naser Oric. His forces had taken and burned over 50 Serbian villages and killed hundreds of Serbian civilians and soldiers. He even reached the Serbian border at Skelani and threatened to cross over and occupy Serbian territory. Who was Naser Oric? On April 17, 1992, at the beginning of the Bosnian civil war, Naser Oric was made commander of the Potocari Territorial Defense. Naser Oric was born on March 3, 1967 in Potocari, a neighboring village of Srebrenica. His parents were Dzemal Oric and Hata Mustafic. Chuck Sudetic noted in Blood and Vengeance that "Naser Oric's grandfather had been a member of the Ustase during World War II." He went to a trade school where he learned metalworking. In 1985 and 1986 he served his compulsory military service in the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia where he was part of a special unit for the nuclear and chemical defense of the JNA, the Yugoslav National Army. He achieved the rank of Corporal in the JNA. In 1988, he took a six-month course in Zemun, Serbia, to become a police officer. Oric worked as a bouncer in a Belgrade disco in the late 1980s. He enlisted in a special police unit as part of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) that Milosevic assembled in Kosovo to combat Albanian separatists who were engaged in a terrorist war against Kosovo civilians and police. He then became a bodyguard to Milosevic. He was then transferred as a police officer to Ilidza, a suburb of Sarajevo.

In late 1991, Oric was moved to the police station in Srebrenica. On April 8, 1992, he was made police chief of Potocari. On April 17, the Potocari Territorial Defence was created and Oric was made commander. On May 20, Oric was appointed commander of the Srebrenica Territorial Defence. On June 27, 1992, Sefer Halilovic, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirmed Oric as commander. On August 8, 1992, his position as commander was re-confirmed by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1995, the 8th Operation group Srebrenica HQ was re-designated the 2nd Corps, 28th Division. On March 1, 1994, Oric was awarded a "Golden Lily", the highest military award by Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. On April 15, 1993, he had been awarded a Certificate of Merit. On July 17, 1994, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. Oric had de facto and de jure control over the Muslim military units and irregulars in the Srebrenica area, including the two infantry brigades of the 28th Division.

Naser Oric's forces killed over a thousand Bosnian Serb civilians and troops in the Srebrenica area and burned and destroyed at least 50 Serbian villages. It was these Bosnian Muslim attacks that caused a Bosnian Serb reaction and ultimately culminated in the Bosnian Serb takeover of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. In *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II*, Christian Science Monitor reporter-turned-historian David Rohde conceded that "Serbs estimated that 2,000 Serbs---mostly soldiers but also several hundred civilians---had died around Srebrenica since the outbreak of the war. Over 50 Serb villages were burned, according to Serbs, and dozens of Serb graves desecrated...."

According to Bosnian Serb General Milenko Zivanovic, the commander of the Drina Corps, "Naser Oric's soldiers burned his village and his house to the ground on June 21, 1995. Twenty-seven Serbs died in eleven towns around Ratkovici. Naser's men desecrated the graves of his mother and other Serbs by knocking over their headstones...."

Rohde chronicled the string of attacks and atrocities committed by Oric's forces in Srebrenica: "Forty-six Serb men were allegedly missing after the attack on Zalazje on the Serb holiday of St. George's Day in May 1992. A St. Peter's Day attack on July 12, 1992, left 120 dead in Zalazje. In Kravica, more than 100 Serbs, including ten to fifteen women, were allegedly killed; civilians were burned alive in their houses when the Muslims took the town in the surprise Orthodox Christmas attack in January 1993...."

Rohde discussed many of Oric's atrocities as "spectacular accounts" by Serb nationalists or propagandists, or Serb "claims": "Some of the more spectacular accounts involved Muslims beheading Serbs, cutting bodies in half with chain saws, nailing men to trees and skinning them alive. One story Serb propagandists seized on was that Muslims kept sheep in the Serbian Orthodox church in Srebrenica. The story was partially true. One group of men returning from a successful trip to Zepa or a raid on an outlying Serb village had corralled several dozen sheep in the local church. The sheep were held there for several days before they were sold for as much as 100 deutsche marks apiece."

Rohde admitted that "Oric's men did commit atrocities, but how many is unclear. He was cavalier enough to show a videotape of a burned-down Serb village and headless Serb corpses to foreign journalists visiting the enclave in February 1994. Several Muslims and Dutch peacekeepers reported seeing a photo of Oric standing over a Serb corpse in the ruins of a village. "

Rohde is disingenuous and intellectually dishonest here. The atrocities and war crimes that Oric committed were well-documented and the evidence incontrovertible. The Bosnian Serbs had statements of eyewitnesses, affidavits, police reports, reports submitted to the UN, MUP reports, autopsy reports, photograph and video documentation, and Bosnian Serb prosecution documents. Indeed, Naser Oric's forces had videotaped many of their atrocities and war crimes against Bosnian Serbs. The evidence was overwhelming, but Rohde made a conscious decision to ignore and discount it because it ran counter to the US government and media propaganda or information war. Oric

himself provided the self-incriminating evidence by videotaping his atrocities.

The Bosnian Muslim forces chose Orthodox festivals and holidays to launch their attacks on Serbian villages. On May 6, 1992, on the Orthodox religious feast of St. George (Djurdjevdan), the village of Bljeceva in the Bratunac municipality was attacked by Muslim forces under Hasib Ibrahimovic. The Gniona attack was led by Naser Oric himself. An elderly Bosnian Serb woman, Kosana Zekic, "whose throat was slit inside her house," was one of the civilians killed. In Gniona, an ailing and half-blind man, Radojko Milosevic (born 1928) was burned to death in his own house and the village was destroyed and burned. In this attack, Oric used loudspeakers to announce himself: "This is Naser Oric speaking..." He demanded that Serbs surrender or they would be killed. Gniona was the first Serbian village completely burned and destroyed in eastern Bosnia.

1943 Nazi Bosnian Muslim Handzar SS Division at Islamic prayer. On May 7, 1992, in an attack on the village of Osmace in the Srebrenica municipality, seven Serbs were killed. Naser Oric organized and ordered this attack.

On May 21, a truck taking eleven Serbian civilians from Podravanje to Milici was attacked and eight Serbs were killed.

On June 21, in an attack on Ratkovici, 18 Serbs were killed. Radenko Stanojevic had his throat cut while Desanka Stanojevic was burned in her house.

On August 8, 1992, Jezestica was attacked. Andjelko Bogicevic, born in 1965, had his head cut off and taken away by Muslim forces.

On June 30, Brezani was attacked and 19 residents killed. Milos Novkovic was beheaded while Vido Lazic was crucified and set on fire. Kristina Lazic was set on fire in her house.

On July 5, 1992, Krnjici and Oricevi were attacked and 16 killed. The throat of elderly Bosnian Serb Vaso Paraca, born in 1912, was slit.

Rohde sarcastically dismissed Bosnian Serb claims that the Srebrenica area was an "epicenter of genocide" where Serbian civilians were being systematically killed, mutilated, having their throats slit, beheaded, tortured, and driven from their villages. Rohde attributed the irrefutable evidence of Bosnian Muslim war crimes in the Srebrenica area to "Serb nationalists". Rohde did concede that Oric and his forces deserved punishment: "Naser Oric and the Muslim soldiers who may have deserved retribution were in Tuzla..." According to Rohde, "Serb nationalists" did not care. This is a bit of sophistry and self-delusion on the part of Rohde. His implication is that Oric and his forces were guilty of committing atrocities and deserved punishment, but because they were evacuated from Srebrenica by helicopter to Muslim-held Tuzla, then the Muslim military forces in Srebrenica should be let off the hook and amnestied. But why did the Bosnian Muslim Government and the military command abandon their troops in such a cowardly manner in Srebrenica, knowing they would face punishment and retribution for atrocities and war crimes that they committed? Why did Oric flee? By committing massacres and atrocities against Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers, was it reasonable and logical to expect that the Bosnian Serb forces would not take Srebrenica as they did in 1995? Rohde is a self-deluded propagandist.

In the Srebrenica pocket, it was Naser Oric's forces who were attacking villages and occupying territory. These Bosnian Muslim offensives and attacks forced the Bosnian Serbs to launch a counterattack. Morillon explained why the Bosnian Serb forces were counterattacking in Srebrenica: "Oric was responsible for several massacres in which dozens of women and children had been killed, and it seemed to me there was more hatred in that one small corner of Bosnia than anywhere else... Mladic wanted to avenge his dead."

Oric's war crimes and atrocities provoked the Bosnian Serb response. New York Times journalist

Roger Cohen emphasized the war crimes committed by Oric's forces as a cause for the Bosnian Serb retaliation:

Naser Oric, commander of Bosnian Muslim Army in Srebrenica. Naser Oric, a former bodyguard to Milosevic, who placed himself at the head of an increasingly effective Bosnian guerrilla force that, in the fall and winter of 1992, wreaked havoc on surrounding Serb villages. Oric liked to show visitors videos of piles of Serb bodies. He would boast about the number killed in a succession of lightning raids in the Bratunac area in which Serb communities were massacred and buildings torched. ... Mladic liked to usher United Nations officials into desecrated Serb cemeteries in Bosnia in order to explain why he could never trust "the Turk".

Several news accounts managed to sneak through the US government and media censorship. These news accounts brazenly and arrogantly detailed the war crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs. In The Toronto Star article "Fearsome Muslim Warlord Eludes Bosnian Serb Forces", July 16, 1995, Bill Schiller described his visit to Oric's headquarters in Srebrenica in 1994:

I met him in January, 1994... Oric, as blood-thirsty a warrior as ever crossed a battlefield, escaped Srebrenica before it fell... On a cold and snowy night, I sat in his living room watching a shocking video version of what might have been called Naser Oric's Greatest Hits... There were burning houses, dead bodies, severed heads, and people fleeing... Oric grinned throughout, admiring his handiwork. "We ambushed them," he said, when a number of dead bodies appeared on the screen. ... The next sequence of dead bodies had been done in by explosives: "We launched those guys to the moon," he boasted. ... When footage of a bullet-marked ghost town appeared without any visible bodies, Oric hastened to announce: "We killed 114 Serbs there." ... Later there were celebrations, with singers with wobbly voices chanting his praises... Lately, however, Oric increased his hit-and-run attacks at night. And in Mladic's view, it was far too successful for a community that was supposed to be suppressed.... The Serbs regard Oric... as a war criminal.

But because Oric was a proxy and client of US/NATO, he was not regarded a war criminal by the US/NATO.

In the February 16, 1994 Washington Post article "Weapons, Cash and Chaos Lend Clout to Srebrenica's Tough Guy", John Pomfret described Oric's atrocities and war crimes: "Nasir Oric's war trophies don't line the wall... They're on a videocassette tape: burned Serb houses and headless Serb men, their bodies crumpled in a pathetic heap.... "We had to use cold weapons that night," Oric explains as scenes of dead men sliced by knives roll over his 21-inch Sony."

Pomfret acknowledged that the Muslim troops in Srebrenica sneaked past the U.N. Canadian observation posts to take "pot shots" at Serbian troops.

The US government and media propaganda claimed that the Bosnian Muslim faction supported a "multi-ethnic", "secular", and "tolerant" state. This US infowar was conducted on behalf of their Bosnian Muslim proxies. But what the US government/media propaganda censored were the following facts. In Srebrenica, the Bosnian Muslim Government forces blew up and demolished the Orthodox Church of the Shroud of the Holy Mother of God built in 1903, even though it was outside the zone of military operations. The parish hall was also demolished by Bosnian Muslim forces. The Church of the Holy Archangel Michael built in 1971 was blown up and completely destroyed. In Kravica, north of Srebrenica, the interior of the parish church was plundered and damaged. The parish hall was completely burned down. The church cemetery was partly damaged. When the Bosnian Serb forces retook Serbian villages, they found that the Bosnian Muslim Army had written on a Serbian house "Izlam ce pobedi" (Islam will win). Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers had their throats slit, their eyes gouged out, their brains extracted; they were mutilated, burned, roasted on spits like animals, circumcised, massacred on Orthodox holidays. Only US government and media propaganda could claim that these actions represented a "multi-ethnic", "tolerant", "pluralist", and "secular" Bosnian Muslim Government and Army. How credible and believable was this US

government and media propaganda?

Geneva Convention violation on the treatment of POWs: Bosnian Serb POW. Muslims roasted and skewered him on a spear and his body was exhibited in front of a hotel. **Podravanje**

On September, 1992, Oric planned an attack on the Serbian village of Podravanje which was on the road between Srebrenica and Zepa. Oric sought to drive out and ethnically cleanse the Serbs from the Srebrenica/Zepa area to clear the road between the two towns. Oric assembled troops with the commander of Zepa, Avdo Palic. Oric made use of torbari, or the bag people. These were "a horde of Muslim refugees, men and women, young and old." Sudetic described them as follows: "Thousands strong, these people would lurk behind the first wave of attacking soldiers and run amok when the defenses around Serb villages collapsed. Some of the refugees used pistols to do the killing; others used knives, bats, and hatchets."

In Podravanje, history was repeating itself. During World War I, Austrian and Bosnian Muslim troops had burned the Serbian village down. During World War II, Bosnian Muslim troops in the Ustasha formations had murdered 250 Bosnian Serbs and had also burned the village down a second time. Sudetic explained these genocidal attacks against Serbs in Podravanje as follows: "They had not forgotten that the Austrian army, which included many local Muslims, had burned their village in 1914 and that the Ustase, who also included many Muslims from neighboring villages, had killed over 250 Serbs and burned the place in 1942 and 1943."

This is how Sudetic described the Bosnian Muslim attack on Podravanje: "At six o'clock in the morning on September 24, 1992, Muslim soldiers opened fire on Podravanje from three sides. The Serbs tried to defend the village but panicked and ran when they realized how grossly outnumbered they and how quickly the Muslims were coming at them. The Serb fighters left behind men and women who had been wounded and killed by Muslim gunfire. Then the torbari rushed in. Muslim men shot the wounded. They fired their guns into the bodies of the Serb dead. They plunged knives into their stomachs and chests. They smashed their heads with axes and clubs, and they burned the bodies inside buildings. Oric's men grabbed half a dozen prisoners; one, a fighter from Serbia who had relatives in Podravanje, was beaten to death, and the others emerged bruised and battered when they were exchanged a month later. ... The torbari plundered everything else."

The 31 Serbs killed in Podrovanje had their throats slit, others were beheaded, burned, and some had their stomachs slit open.

Milici

On September 24-26, 1992, 37 Serbs were killed when Oric's forces attacked the villages of Nedeljista and Rogosija in the Milici municipality. Most of the victims were first wounded in the legs and then were burned. Two victims were impaled. Those who were wounded had their throats slit, others were decapitated, some had their skulls smashed with axes and sledge hammers and their brains extracted. Some of the dead and wounded were circumcised and several were castrated. These atrocities and war crimes were carried out under the command of Naser Oric, Fadil Turkovic, and Becir Mekanik.

Grabovacka Rijeka

Two weeks later, on October 5, Oric attacked the Serbian villages along the Drina River by the Grabovacka Rijeka. The Muslim forces attacked in overwhelming numbers of troops who were followed by the torbari. Sudetic described the attack as follows: "Again the Serbs panicked. Again the stragglers were killed and their bodies mutilated. Again Oric's men captured weapons, and the torbari streamed back to Srebrenica with bags stuffed with food."

Loznicka Rijeka

On November 28, the first UN humanitarian aid convoys reached Srebrenica. Forty tons of food were brought in. The Muslim military command along with the torbari called on Oric to organize more attacks against Serbian villages and civilians. The Muslim military command in Sarajevo sought to use Oric's offensives to create a diversion as a diversionary tactic. The Muslims wanted to tie down Bosnian Serb troops in the Srebrenica pocket to allow the Muslim forces to launch an offensive north of Tuzla. They also wanted to maintain a crisis situation in eastern Bosnia to gain media attention and intervention by NATO.

On December 14, Oric's forces attacked the Serbian villages astride the Drina River in Loznicka Rijeka. Sudetic described the attack: "The Serbs, caught completely off guard, waged war from the windows of their houses. Women picked up automatics and blasted away. Villagers scurried toward the river and were pinned down on the bank. Muslims cut many of them down at almost point-blank range as they tried to cross the river in panic. About 130 Serbs had been living in Loznicka Rijeka, and by midnight a quarter of them had been killed. Scores more Serbs had perished in the villages to the north. The Muslims had seized about forty square miles of territory...."

Naser Oric and his troops in Kravica on January 7, 1993, Orthodox Christmas. They stand in front of destroyed and burned out Serbian buildings. They killed everyone and everything they could find, including cats and dogs **Kravica Attack**

On January 7, 1993, Orthodox Christmas, "a high holy day for the Serbs, a national as much as a religious occasion" according to Sudetic, the Bosnian Muslim forces based in Srebrenica launched a massive attack against the Serbian village of Kravica, northwest of Srebrenica. Cakes, bread, salads, and meat were prepared for the Orthodox Christmas festivities. Two weeks before the attack on Kravica, Oric's forces had taken the neighboring town of Glogova killing "a number of Serb men" and critically wounding the military commander of Kravica, Jovan Nikolic. The Muslim troops were able to surround the town and to cut the only asphalt paved road to Bratunac. The only access to Kravica now was a dirt path that was constructed across the mountains to the Drina River two years earlier. There were about 300 Bosnian Serb defenders at Kravica.

Sudetic described the Muslim attack on Kravica as a calculated, premeditated assault: "Naser Oric had spent days preparing his attack. It came with anything but surprise. After dark on Christmas Eve, some three thousand Muslim troops assembled on the slushy hilltops around Kravica. Behind them lurked a host of torbari who lit campfires to warm themselves. At dawn they started clattering pots and pans. "Allahu ekber! God is great!" the men shouted. The women shrieked. Shooting began. The Serb men in Kravica scrambled into their trenches. They told their wives and mothers they would be home in a few hours."

The Muslim attack was from the direction of Potocari. Muslim troops were burning houses in Serb hamlets above Kravica under a Muslim assault from Glogova. The Serbs attempted to hold out but were overwhelmed by the overwhelming numbers of Muslim troops, ten to one.

Sudetic described the scene when Muslim troops entered Kravica on "bloody Christmas" as follows: "The first of the torbari to arrive in Kravica found entire Christmas dinners that had been waiting to be eaten by Serb men who had gone off to fight that morning thinking they would be back by noon. Three Muslim soldiers barged into one home and stood there as if paralyzed at the sight of the pastries and the jelly, the bottles of brandy and the roast pork on the stove. They laughed and shouted and plunged into a cake. The ashes of burning houses and stalls fell like snow on the hillside. The pigs ran wild. Sheep were butchered and roasted on the spit or herded back to Srebrenica with the cows and oxen. The dead lay unburied, and within days the pigs, dogs, and wild animals had begun to tear away at the bodies....The torbari combed the homes in Kravica for the next two weeks scavenging for food."

The torbari located frozen potatoes, pickled peppers, a sack of oats, and a pair of bell-bottom pants.

Forty-five Serbs died in the Kravica attack, thirty-five of them were soldiers. All 690 houses in Kravica were looted and set on fire. Bosnian Muslim Mirsad Sulejmanovic "Skejo" said that "after the attack on Kravica, Naser's soldiers caught five or six Serbs in the village of Kajici and they slit their throats." Oric now had occupied 350 square miles of territory in eastern Bosnia.

Skelani

In January, 1993, Oric attacked the town of Skelani on the Drina River. Hundreds of Serbian civilians fled eastward across the Drina River into Serbia in boats. Muslim troops advanced to about a hundred yards from the steel-girder bridge in Skelani. The Muslim forces sought to take the bridge and to blow it up. Sudetic described the attack as follows: "gunfire ripped back and forth across the river, but the Serbs held the Muslims off. During the gun battle, a Muslim machine gunner cut down panicked Serb villagers, including women and children, as they tried to scurry across the bridge to the safety of the Serbian side." The images of Bosnian Serb civilians fleeing across the Drina River from Bosnia into Serbia were similar to those in World War II when Serbian refugees fled from Bosnian Muslim and Croat Ustasha troops.

Bosnian Muslims fired artillery shells into Serbia. The Serbian town of Banja Koviljaca was hit by three 82 mm caliber artillery shells fired by Bosnian Muslim units from Bosnia into Serbia. A 79 year old woman, Vera Vukasinovic, was killed, while another Serbian civilian was seriously injured.

Sudetic described the effect the border attack had in Serbia: "The stories of the fleeing civilians shot down on the Skelani bridge enraged all of Serbia." Mladic was able to launch a counterattack that drove northwest and pushed the Muslim forces back into Srebrenica. The Bosnian Serb forces stopped at Kara Marko's Territory ten miles southwest of Srebrenica. In Srebrenica itself, the Muslim troops retaliated against Serbian civilians in the town. Sudetic described what happened in Srebrenica as a result of the counterattack: "A double murder had been committed the night before in the apartment building just below the Celik house. A Muslim soldier seeking revenge for the death of a relative, a military-police chief killed near Skelani, had used the butt of his revolver to smash the skulls of a Serb man and his elderly mother." They were Slobodan Zekic and his mother Zagorka. Dragica Vasic knew them both. Sudetic described the murder: "Dragica had known both of the victims; Slobodan Zekic and his mother, Zagorka, were the second Serb family that Dragica had seen murdered since the war began. Zagorka, an elderly woman, had suffered a stroke and had been bedridden for years; and Slobodan, a middle-aged former factory worker, had stayed on in Srebrenica to care for her."

Oric's offensives now provoked a Bosnian Serb counteroffensive. This is when the so-called Western media began covering the conflict in eastern Bosnia. So long as the Bosnian Muslim troops were killing Serbian soldiers and burning Serbian villages and massacring Serbian civilians, the West did not cover events in eastern Bosnia. There was a virtual news blackout in the West of Oric's offensives in eastern Bosnia. The systematic slaughter of Serbian civilians and the burning of Serbian villages was not news. As Misha Glenny explained in *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*: "The Bosnian Government troops moved swiftly through Serbian villages, slaughtering a large number of civilians on the way. Because the atrocities were being perpetrated by Muslims, they received relatively little attention in the world media." But once Mladic launched a counteroffensive, then the spotlight was focused on eastern Bosnia and it became the major news story in the world and became a primary focus of the Bosnian civil war. Then Srebrenica became the front page news story around the world.

Dobrina Prodanovic holds the skull of her 17 year old son, Zivan, killed with 20 others in Ratkovici on June 21, 1992 by Muslim forces and the village was burned. Oric's attacks had led to counterattacks and refugees fleeing the scene of the fighting. The Serbs claimed that "the Muslims fired on their own civilians fleeing toward Tuzla." By February 9, 1993, Mladic had launched a full-scale counteroffensive against Oric's troops. Five days later, Bosnian Serb troops took the town of Kamenica north of Srebrenica. Sudetic described how journalists were shown incontrovertible

evidence of Bosnian Muslim war crimes and atrocities: "Foreign journalists escorted to the Kamenica area by the Serb army were shown corpses that had been devoured by animals and other bodies that had been pulled from a pond and exhumed from three muddy graves on a forested ridge. The Serbs alleged that the bodies belonged to prisoners whom the Muslims had tortured and killed."

Even when they witnessed Bosnian Muslim atrocities and war crimes with their own eyes, the Western media still was able to dismiss them with the phrase "Serbs allege".

At this stage a major propaganda operation was launched. The Muslim leadership in Sarajevo then demanded that the UN deliver food to the Srebrenica pocket. The Bosnian Muslim leadership boycotted UN aid deliveries to Sarajevo, demanding aid be sent to Srebrenica. It was a form of extortion or blackmail. Philippe Morillon reacted against this Muslim blackmail. According to Sudetic, Morillon saw through the Muslim plan: "He condemned the Muslim aid boycott as a ploy to lure the Western nations into intervening militarily." Morillon alleged that the Muslims and the media were exaggerating the events in eastern Bosnia to get the US/NATO to fight on the Muslim side against the Bosnian Serbs. This is when the infamous Muslim ham radio operators appeared on the scene detailing preposterous propaganda stories which the US media and government lapped up as truth. Morillon, however, "dismissed these reports as lies."

This all resulted in a crisis. The Muslim boycott and media propaganda allowed the US to push the lift and strike strategy. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued for more aggressive aid deliveries to Srebrenica. On February 27, two US Air Force C-130 cargo planes clandestinely flew with their running lights shut off from Rhein-Main air base in Frankfurt, Germany, into Bosnian air space and delivered a million leaflets over Srebrenica and Zepa notifying them that aid shipments would be dropped. The next night, four C-130s parachuted supplies north of Srebrenica in Muslim-held Cerska. But by this time, the Bosnian Serb troops had taken most of the town and seized the US aid packets.

What followed was the ratcheting up of the US propaganda war on behalf of its surrogate forces, the Bosnian Muslim army. Anders Levinson from Denmark, who headed the UNHCR office in Tuzla, wanted to get the US/NATO to intervene against the Bosnian Serbs. So he compiled summaries of the reports from the Muslim ham radio operators. These were passed on to Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who quoted Levinson's line: "Civilians, women, children and old people, are being killed, usually by having their throats cut." These reports came from Bosnian Muslim "government officials" and Muslim ham radio operators. And as Ogata emphasized, they had an interest to exaggerate and falsify the facts. They were in fact propaganda. Nevertheless, Ogata stated that: "If only ten percent of the information is true, we are witnessing a massacre in the enclaves without being able to do anything about it."

This was an example of propaganda projection, or inversion, "zamena teza" in Serbian, psychologically projecting one's own crimes onto the enemy. The Bosnian Muslim forces were routinely and systematically cutting or slitting the throats of Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers. This Bosnian Muslim war crime was then imputed to the Bosnian Serbs. Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung termed this "the shadow", projecting the worst vices and crimes onto an Enemy or Other. The person consciously blocks out his or her own guilt or knowledge of culpability, denies or suppresses it, while projection into onto another, or the Other, the Enemy, the Shadow. A schizophrenic orientation results where all positive traits are conscious while all negative traits are transferred to the Other. It is the result of a paranoid orientation. Moreover, the paranoid exhibits infantile characteristics that vacillate between sadistic domination to submissive or masochistic victimization. This is demonstrated in the Srebrenica case where Bosnian Muslim troops slit the throats of Serbs and decapitate them and mutilate their bodies in the sadistic domination cycle or phase but then shift to the victimization phase when they become victims. The infantile paranoid personality is unbalanced and unstable and thus vacillates between sadistic cruelty to passive victimization. It takes one to know one. The propagandist accuses the enemy of committing crimes which in fact the propagandist himself is guilty of. The propagandist merely projects these crimes on the Enemy. In

short, the propagandist looks into a mirror when devising a propaganda construct for the Enemy. This can be seen in the Srebrenica case. The Bosnian Muslim ham radio operators accused the Bosnian Serbs of cutting the throats of Muslims when in fact the Bosnian Muslims were guilty of this. The Bosnian Muslims decapitated Bosnian Serbs, mutilated their bodies, burned their bodies, roasted them on spits, gouged and cut out eyes, performed circumcisions. Bosnian Muslim troops routinely and systematically decapitated Bosnian Serb soldiers and civilians. When the Bosnian Muslim forces exchanged bodies with Bosnian Serb forces, the Bosnian Serbs discovered that the Muslims routinely and systematically decapitated Bosnian Serb troops. In 1994, Bosnian Muslim troops violated a UN exclusion zone around Sarajevo and slit the throats of 20 Bosnian Serb soldiers and military support personnel, including four female nurses, and then mutilated and burned the corpses. Bosnian Muslim troops routinely cut the throats of Bosnian Serb soldiers and civilians. These Bosnian Muslim crimes were projected on the Bosnian Serb people and leaders.

Morillon was able to verify and determine for himself that the Bosnian Muslim claims were lies and propaganda constructs. Morillon went to Konjevic Polje north of Srebrenica and found no fighting or starvation there. Morillon concluded: "I did not see any trace of massacres." It was only a ploy to get the US/NATO to save Oric's troops from military defeat. The Bosnian Serbs wanted to exchange the Serbs in Tuzla for Muslim civilians in the Srebrenica pocket. But Naser Oric and Alija Izetbegovic wanted to use the Muslim civilians as hostages and human shields in the conflict. The torbari were also useful as scavengers and paramilitaries for Oric's forces.

Srebrenica Safe Haven

On April 17, 1993, Srebrenica was made a "safe haven", but Muslims continued to kill Serbian civilians and engage in sabotage activities. On May 27, 1995, Muslims from Srebrenica attacked Rupovo Brdo in the Milici municipality and killed five Serbian civilians who were cutting wood in the forest. On June 23, four Serb civilians were killed in the Skelani municipality. Three days later, Visnjica in the Milici municipality was attacked and one Serb killed and two injured and the village was burned down.

Bosnian Serb Miladin Asceric, decapitated in Kamenica north of Srebrenica by Oric's troops. Nazi and Ustasha Legacy in Srebrenica

US government and media propaganda sought to censor and suppress the Nazi and Ustasha legacy in Srebrenica. US propaganda presented the Srebrenica crisis as sui generis, as a conflict with no prior history. By censoring and suppressing the Nazi and Ustasha legacy of Srebrenica, the US/NATO falsified the motivations of the Bosnian Serb leaders, many of whom had lost relatives to Bosnian Muslim and Croat Nazis and Ustashes during World War II. Roger Cohen explained that this Nazi/Ustasha legacy motivated Ratko Mladic: "Mladic, born in the Bosnian village of Bozinovici in 1943, lost his father in 1945 to the combined forces of Nazism and Croatian fascism. It was through this prism that he saw the war." An inscription in Srebrenica noted that 145 Serbs were killed in the town during World War II, 36 of them being children under the age of seven. In 1914, the Austrians had tried 20 of the most prominent Serbs in Srebrenica for "treason" and several thousand Serb families were expelled from Srebrenica. In 1942, Srebrenica was occupied by the Ustasha Black Legion, or Crna Legija, the 1st Ustasha Infantry Regiment, made up of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. During 1944, the Bosnian Muslim Nazi 13th Waffen Gebirgs Division der SS Handzar/Handschar occupied the Srebrenica region.

Mladic saw the recognition of Croatia and then Bosnia by first the Vatican, then a re-united Germany, derisively dismissed as the "Fourth Reich", as a repeat of history, as occurred on April 10, 1941 when the Vatican and Germany recognized the Croat and Bosnian Muslim Independent State of Croatia, Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (NDH). Cohen noted that the unilateral German recognition was perceived by Mladic as reflecting an anti-Serbian agenda:

When, in December 1991, the European Union was browbeaten by Germany into recognition of

Croatia, Mladic called the decision "a second Munich." In the barracks of the Bosnian Serb army posters showed soldiers wearing Nazi uniforms above a screaming slogan---"Are you ready for Deutschmocracy?"

Mladic asked Lt. General Lars Wahlgren of the UN forces: "General, do you remember your father?" "In my case," Mladic continued, "my son is the first in many generations to know his father. Because there have been so many attacks on the Serb people, children do not know their fathers."

Simplistic Good Guys and Bad Guys Scenario

Dutch Lt. Colonel Ton Karremans explained that culpability should not be assigned to one faction: "The Muslims burned 192 villages in Eastern Bosnia. Therefore I am saying that in this war there are no 'good guys' and 'bad guys'."

Honig and Both noted that the Bosnian Muslims bore responsibility for the crisis in Srebrenica:

Dutch contacts with the members of the Srebrenica presidency were far from easy. The Dutch were blamed for the perceived failure of the UN to do enough for the people of Srebrenica. Matters were not helped by the character and behaviour of the dominant personalities in the enclave. Naser Oric, the overall military commander, and his two main 'brigade' commanders, Zulfo Tursunovic (281 Bde) and Hakija Meholic, appeared to the Dutch to be little more than gangsters, who terrorized the refugee population and profited greatly from the war. These men jealously protected their own fiefdoms. As the refugees were not represented in the local government, international aid agencies suggested in the second half of 1993 that the refugees should elect their own representative to assist in the distribution of food. The man was found murdered the day after his election.

Honig and Both also explained that Oric's attacks on Serbian villages and civilians around Srebrenica had led to the recent fighting and the strained relations:

Oric and his cronies were also responsible for much of the trouble with the Serbs, which stemmed from Muslim raids on Serb communities just outside the enclave. Also, Oric's men had the disconcerting habit of taking up positions close to the Dutch and then opening fire on the Serbs, hoping to entice them and the Dutch into a firefight. At times, when the Presidency found the Dutch insufficiently accommodating at supplying them with desired items, they would turn off the water supply to the Dutch compounds. Local commanders would stop Dutch patrols when it suited them. The Dutch were not at all impressed by the behaviour of the Bosnian Army, and many of the Dutch soldiers had little sympathy for the Muslims. Most shared the judgement of General Nikolai's predecessor, Dutch general Jan Willem Brinkman, that the Bosnian conflict was 'not a matter of good guys against bad guys'.

In The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, Misha Glenny noted the "complex origins of the Bosnian conflict for which the Serbs are not solely responsible." The first UN commander in Bosnia, Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie, described the Bosnian civil war as follows: "Dealing with Bosnia is a little bit like dealing with three serial killers." He noted that all three factions had committed war crimes and atrocities. UN Secretary-General Bhutros Bhutros Ghali, an Egyptian, dismissed Bosnia as "a rich man's war", noting that there were a dozen places around the world that were greater humanitarian disasters than Bosnia. In Rwanda, a real genocide was allowed to occur because it was totally ignored by the US and the West. Why? The victims were black and US/NATO/EU interests could not be advanced. The US/NATO did not seek expansion in Rwanda.

The Bosnian Muslims alienated and lost the support of UN personnel by killing UN troops and even their people merely to gain sympathy and score propaganda points to induce US/NATO military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. UN commander Sir Michael Rose from the UK dismissed Muslim propaganda as "images of war" meant to induce NATO/US bombing against the Bosnian Serbs.

The Bosnian Muslim troops alienated the Dutch UN contingent by killing a Dutch UN soldier. UN Dutch Private Raviv van Renssen, a gunner, was killed when Bosnian Muslim troops threw a grenade at his armored vehicle. He failed to close his hatch in time and was hit in the head by shrapnel.

The charred remains of Milomir Prodanovic, killed in Muslim attack on Podravanje. Morillon went to Srebrenica to prevent a humanitarian disaster. "I wanted to avert a catastrophe," Morillon said. Morillon established the safe haven of Srebrenica but no provision was made for the demilitarization of the enclave. What resulted was that the Muslim military sent reinforcements and arms and weapons into the so-called safe haven. UNHCR humanitarian aid convoys delivered a total of 5,858 tons of aid in 1994. In 1993, 8,916 tons were delivered. The Dutch UN battalion, Dutchbat III, was assigned to protect UNHCR aid deliveries. The Bosnian Muslim forces continued to engage in hit and run tactics, however, killing Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers. Srebrenica became a military base for the Bosnian Muslims, who were using the Muslim civilians as human shields.

Chetniks, Ustashas, and Turks

All three factions in the Bosnian civil war referred to each other not as Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, or Croats, but as "Chetniks", "Ustashas", and "Turks". Why? The US government and media never delved into this phenomenon. These were ethnic stereotypes or archetypes, caricatures, that were ingrained during World War II when Bosnia was engulfed in a civil war between the same factions. The Western media never sought to explain or comprehend the roots to the Bosnian conflict. The US government and media carefully suppressed and covered up the historical background to the civil war during World War II. For example, although the Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS Division Handzar/Handschar was one of the largest and most photographed SS divisions during World War II, US and Western historians, analysts, and pundits could never locate any photographs or any historical information or documentation of the famous division. There was even a famous German news reel from 1944 showing Heinrich Himmler reviewing the Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS troops. But all of this was meticulously and carefully covered up by the US government, media, and historians. Similarly, the US government, media, and scholars could never obtain any information about the Ustasha NDH regime in World War II. The US government and media knew nothing about Jasenovac, the largest concentration and extermination camp in the Balkans during World War II. The US position was that by presenting the World War II background it would be helping the Serbian position so it was meticulously suppressed, censored, and deleted.

The Bosnian civil war of 1992-1995 was merely the continuation of the civil war of 1941-45. It was the final chapter or denouement of that earlier conflict. The ethnic animosity or ethnic hatreds could be explained and understood if the World War II civil war was examined and analyzed. But the US government and media sought to explain the Bosnian conflict as sui generis, with no connection to World War II. Moreover, by perceiving each other as "Chetniks", "Ustashas", and "Turks", all three factions sought to dehumanize and objectify the others in stereotypes created by the Communist regime of Josip Broz Tito, which defined the national identities of all three groups in this way. What resulted was a caricature and propaganda construct or image of the enemy which allowed for the killing of that Other. It was much easier to cut the throat and cut the head off of a caricature and Communist-created stereotype than it was of a human being not so dehumanized. The US propaganda machine failed to take into account this Communist era dehumanization that had occurred. All three factions were programmed and brainwashed to see each other in these negative stereotypes by the Communist regime. This stereotyping was one of the reasons that compromise was not possible.

Morillon explained this historical animosity as follows:

They were in this hellish circle of revenge. It was more than revenge that animated them all. Not only the men, women, the entire population was imbued with this. It wasn't the sickness of fear that

had infected the entire population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fear of being dominated, of being eliminated. It was pure hatred.

War Crimes Indictment

Naser Oric was arrested on April 10, 1993 by SFOR/NATO forces in Tuzla. He was indicted by the ICTY for violating the Laws and Customs of War by committing murders, wanton destruction, and plunder. His arrest and indictment reflected a change in the policy of the Hague, which assigned sole criminal culpability to the Serbian faction in the civil war. In an April 11, 2003 Globe and Mail article, it was noted that "the Muslims have been seen so far only as victims in Srebrenica." Nevertheless, Oric was not seen as a war criminal by Bosnian Muslims: "Mr. Oric is considered a hero by Bosnian Muslims." In a news report by Voice of America (VOA) of April 16, 2003, it was noted that "Naser Oric is considered a hero to many Bosnian Muslims." One man's terrorist and war criminal is another man's patriot and freedom fighter. The Women of Srebrenica Union protested in front of the UN Mission building maintaining that the arrest of Oric "is an act of hatred towards the Moslems" because "he defended his own people in 1992." NATO secretary-general George Robertson stated that "each fugitive sent to The Hague makes it easier to build a lasting peace in the Balkans." NATO wanted to dispel the impression that it was anti-Serbian.

Naser Oric had been questioned and released in 2001. In the AP story "Protesters Storm U.N. Building in Bosnia" by Aida Cerkez-Robinson for April 2, 2001, it was noted that Oric was questioned and released: "U.N. officials, however, said Oric had been brought in for questioning, but had left the building and has not been indicted." "We want Naser!" Bosnian Muslims screamed in support of Oric. Jim Landale, an ICTY spokesman, noted that Oric was "called in for questioning about a routine investigation."

Naser Oric was finally indicted for war crimes in an indictment dated March 28, 2003 by ICTY prosecutor Carl Del Ponte in Case No: IT-03-68-I. In Counts 1-2, Oric was charged with Murder and Cruel Treatment.

Oric was charged with the following killings. On September 25, 1992, Dragutin Kukic was beaten to death in the Srebrenica Police Station. Between February 6 and March 20, 1993, Jakov Dokic, Dragan Ilic, Milisav Milovanovic, Kostadin Popovic, Branko Sekulic, and Bogdan Zivanovic were killed in the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal Building.

Oric was charged with Cruel Treatment for the treatment of Bosnian Serb detainees between September 24 and October, 1992 at the Srebrenica Police Station by the Bosnian Muslim Military Police. Nedeljko Radic was beaten with wooden poles and iron bars, punched and kicked. His teeth were forcibly extracted using pliers. Muslim soldiers then urinated in his mouth and he was forced to swallow urine. His teeth were broken and his ribs were fractured. Slavoljub Zikic was punched with fists and beaten with boots. He was beaten with rifle butts. He was beaten unconsciousness. His teeth in his upper jaw were broken and his ribs fractured. One of his shoulders was broken. His vision and hearing were impaired. Zoran Brankovic, Nevenko Bujanj, and Veselin Sarac were punched, kicked, and beaten with wooden poles and iron bars.

Between December 15, 1992 and March 20, 1993, Ilija Ivanovic was beaten with fists, wooden poles, metal bars, baseball bats, and kicked with boots. He was stabbed with knives. His ribs were fractured, his teeth, nose, and cheekbone were broken. His head was smashed against metal bars and concrete walls, until losing consciousness. Bosnian Serb civilians Rado Pejic, Stanko Mitrovic, Miloje Obradovic, Mile Trifunovic were beaten with wooden poles, baseball bats and metal bars, kicked and punched, losing consciousness. Pejic lost so much weight as a result of the beatings and inhumane treatment that he was unable to walk and was exchanged on a stretcher.

Oric was charged as follows: Count 1: Murder, a violation of the Laws and Customs of War under the ICTY and Geneva Conventions. Count 2: Cruel Treatment under the tribunal and Geneva

Conventions. Counts 3-6 were wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, not justified by military necessity, plunder of public or private property. From May 1992 to February 1993, his forces burnt, destroyed, plundered a minimum of 50 predominantly Serbian villages and hamlets. "As a result, thousands of Serb individuals fled the area." Cattle, furniture, and television sets were plundered.

In a 1998 UN Report to the Secretary-General termed the Srebrenica Report, the UN conceded that Naser Oric's forces "used techniques of ethnic cleansing" in burning Serbian villages and terrorizing Serbian civilians to flee. It was also conceded that they "apparently tortured and mutilated" Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers. The Report also acknowledged that "Serb sources claim that over 1,300 people were killed" in the Srebrenica area by Naser Oric's forces based in Srebrenica. The UN further acknowledged that the Bosnian Muslims had the 28th Division in Srebrenica, made up of 3,000 to 4,000 Bosnian Muslim soldiers.

Geneva Convention treatment of POWs and enemy combatants violations. Muslim mujahedeen soldier in Bosnian Muslim army stands on the decapitated heads of Bosnian Serb soldiers Blagoje Blagojevic, Brana Duric, and Nenad Petkovic in Crni Vrh near Teslic. US/NATO propaganda claimed that Srebrenica was made up of unarmed, Bosnian Muslim civilians. The ICTY indictment of Naser Oric for war crimes, however, lists the following military formations in the Srebrenica area: Company Srebrenica from Independent Battalion Srebrenica, Brigade Potocari, Brigade Sukeska, Brigade "3 Maj" Kragljivoda, Independent Battalion Osmace, Company Puzmulići of the Srebrenica Independent Battalion, Independent Battalion Skenderovici, 114th East Bosnian Brigade, Independent Battalion Voljavica, Independent Battalion Biljeg, 1st Cerani Detachment, Company Kazani from Independent Battalion Srebrenica, Independent Battalion "5 Juli" Tokoljaci, 6th Detachment Kamenica, and Company Stari Grad. The Bosnian Muslims were organized in military formations and were equipped with AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, grenade launchers, mortars, artillery, anti-tank missiles, and even tanks. Helicopters were used to transport arms and personnel from Tuzla. In the US propaganda on Srebrenica, it is erroneously stated that civilians were executed after the fall of the town. The AP and the Detroit Free Press stated that Srebrenica was the worst "massacre of civilians" since World War II. But this is untrue. When Srebrenica fell, the Bosnian Serb forces made certain that civilians, women, and children would not be harmed. Srebrenica was made up of armed formations of the Bosnian Muslim Army. They were combatants. By the same token, the killing of thousands of Bosnian Serb combatants would be an instance of a massacre. But the US government and media apply differing and contradictory standards. The number of Bosnian Muslim troops or POWs allegedly executed at Srebrenica is disputed. CNN gave a figure of 6,000 Muslim men and boys executed. AP and The Detroit Free Press gave a number as 8,000 Muslim men and boys executed. The New York Times and the US State Department number is 7,000. Other figures are of 7,000-9,000 executed. None of these figures have been substantiated. The propagandistic term "Muslim men and boys" is purposely misleading. These men were members of the armed forces, i.e., the Bosnian Muslim Army, they were combatants who had violated the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of POWs by torturing, mutilating, and executing Bosnian Serb POWs. These Bosnian Muslim soldiers had also burned at least 50 Serbian villages in eastern Bosnia and had tortured, mutilated, and murdered Serbian civilians.

One of the problems with the "safe area" or "safe haven" concept was that it failed to adequately provide for the demilitarization of the safe areas. The Bosnian Muslim military and political leaders took advantage of this loop hole to turn Srebrenica into an armed military base. This is something that has been covered up about the safe havens. Also covered up is the fact that Srebrenica was captured after the Bosnian Muslims violated a cease-fire and launched multiple offensives against Bosnian Serb forces, seizing Bosnian Serb territory and killing and injuring Bosnian Serb troops. The Bosnian Muslim violations of the cease-fire accords and the bombing of Bosnian Serb targets by the UN/NATO forces made the safe haven agreements null and void and Srebrenica became a legitimate military target. As Lewis MacKenzie noted, the capture of Srebrenica was "all very explainable".

On November 6, 1992, Bosnian Muslim military units from Srebrenica attacked and captured the

village of Kamenica in the Zvornik district, in which action Bosnian Serb soldiers were captured. When the troops of the Republika Srpska recaptured Kamenica in February, 1993, they discovered seven mass graves containing the bodies of 41 Bosnian Serb soldiers. The exhumed bodies were examined by pathologist Major Zoran Stankovic, who was able to establish that the arms and legs of the majority of the bodies had been broken and the heads had been smashed and cut off. Some of the bodies still had the wires, belts, and cables, with which they were tied up and tortured. Eight of the bodies were so badly mutilated that they could not be identified. The Bosnian Muslim units murdered not only Bosnian Serb civilians, but also Bosnian Serb POWs in violation of the laws and customs of war and the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of POWs. When enemy combatants commit blatant and incontrovertible war crimes, they abrogate reciprocity. When they are taken prisoner themselves and become POWs, they are subject to execution by the opposing armed forces. During the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 in World War II, German troops wore US military uniforms and spoke English to create chaos and confusion behind US lines. When captured, these German troops were executed by American firing squads because they had violated the laws and customs of war. Similarly, the German armed forces executed US and British POWs who attempted to escape from German POW camps because they violated the laws of the combatant country. This is why there are conventions and international guidelines for the reciprocal treatment of POWs. But once the Bosnian Muslim armed forces were executing, torturing and mutilating Bosnian Serb POWs, they were committing clear-cut war crimes that abrogated the application of the Geneva Conventions with respect to themselves. The Bosnian Muslim troops were war criminals that could justifiably be executed when captured by Bosnian Serb troops. This is an aspect of the Srebrenica story that is ignored. Bosnian Muslim troops abrogated the requirement that they be treated as POWs under the Geneva Conventions and international law because they had committed war crimes against Bosnian Serb civilians and soldiers.

Mujahedeen member of Bosnian Muslim Army holds decapitated head of Blagoja Blagojevic as a trophy for the camera in Crni Vrh. Bosnian Muslim Army systematically executed, tortured, and beheaded Bosnian Serb POWs. ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's indictment of Naser Oric for war crimes in Srebrenica is a whitewash while at the same time a belated attempt to acknowledge the war crimes committed by the Bosnian Muslim Government and armed forces against Bosnian Serbs. The indictment seeks to minimize the war crimes committed by Oric and to limit their scope to Oric, exculpating Bosnian Muslim military leaders and the Muslim political leadership. Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic escaped culpability and criminal liability. Oric was indicted in 2003 after being apprehended by NATO forces in Tuzla where he had lived with his family since 1995 after he was evacuated from Srebrenica by helicopter to Muslim-held Tuzla. The war crimes with which he is charged by Del Ponte are limited to killing seven Serbs and torturing several civilians in Srebrenica and for burning and destroying at least 50 Serbian villages in the Srebrenica area. But the nature of the crimes committed by Oric constitutes crimes against humanity and genocide. Bosnian Serb civilians were systematically murdered by having their throats slit, their bodies mutilated, their heads cut off, and their corpses burned. Serbian villages were systematically burned and destroyed in a policy even the UN termed "ethnic cleansing." Why wasn't Oric charged with crimes against humanity and genocide? The reason is to preserve the US/NATO position that the Bosnian Serbs bear sole culpability for the Bosnian civil war. Only the Bosnian Serbs are culpable of the serious crimes of crimes against humanity and genocide according to the US and NATO. The ICTY is merely a puppet/proxy of the US/NATO. So the ICTY is implementing the political agenda and policy of the US and NATO. The result is the absurd charging document by Del Ponte against Oric.

Oric is charged with seven counts of murder by beating to death seven Bosnian Serbs. Even though Oric is alleged to have killed over a thousand Bosnian Serb civilians in eastern Bosnia by slitting their throats, torturing and mutilating and burning their bodies, he was charged with only the murder of seven Bosnian Serbs. The premeditated and systematic burning and destruction of at least 50 Serbian majority villages was deemed merely wanton destruction not necessitated by the war. There can be no doubt here that Oric was getting a slap on the wrist while he should be tried for committing crimes against humanity and genocide.

What is genocide? The Polish jurist Rafael Lemkin defined the concept of genocide: "The word is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, clan) and the Latin suffix *cide* (killing) ... Genocide is the crime of destroying national, racial or religious groups." According to Lemkin, "the conscience of mankind has been shocked by this type of mass barbarity." The Genocide Convention defined genocide as any act committed with the intent to destroy an ethnic group, in whole or in part, including killing members of the group, causing serious harm to the group, inflicting on the group living conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Attacks against the life, liberty and property of a group are deemed to be genocide when part of a conspiracy to destroy a national, ethnic, or religious group. The criminal intent to kill or destroy all members of a group shows premeditation, deliberation, and a state of systematic criminality. Under these criteria, why wasn't Naser Oric charged with crimes against humanity and genocide for his systematic and planned murders of Serbian civilians and the burning of at least 50 Serbian villages?

Conclusion

The US government and media ignored the link or connection between Naser Oric's genocidal attacks against Bosnian Serb civilians and villages and the 1995 fall and capture of Srebrenica. There is an obvious link between the two. But the Western NATO governments, the ICTY, and the media have purposely sought to negate the connection between the two. Morillon made this connection at the Hague tribunal during his testimony. Morillon stated that the capture of Srebrenica in 1995 was a reaction to the crimes the Bosnian Muslim army committed against Srebrenica Serbs. This admission was unacceptable to the US/NATO governments and media because it imputed culpability to the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslim response was to threaten to sue Morillon for his testimony. In a February 15, 2004 article in *Vecernji List*, a Croatian news magazine, it was noted that the Srebrenica association of Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica planned to sue Morillon as "an accessory to genocide" because he testified in court that the capture or fall of Srebrenica was in reaction to Oric's war crimes. This is reminiscent of what happened to former UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia Major General Lewis MacKenzie. MacKenzie had made the statement that all sides in the Bosnian civil war were committing atrocities. This claim was counter to the US/NATO/EU propaganda position that only the Bosnian Serbs were committing atrocities, only the Bosnian Serbs were culpable. The Bosnian Muslim faction reacted by charging that MacKenzie had raped four Muslim girls who he had subsequently killed. MacKenzie recounted that "a witness had seen me come by and pick up four Muslim girls, who were taken away and presumably raped and murdered." Now it was Morillon's turn to be attacked by the Bosnian Muslims. Both MacKenzie and Morillon, and later Sir Michael Rose, were ostracized and attacked because they challenged the US/NATO/EU propaganda falsifications.

The Srebrenica story was never fully told because it would undermine the US/NATO/EU propaganda line. This is why the events of 1992-1993 in Srebrenica were censored and suppressed by the US government and media.

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"Official" Story of Srebrenica Casualty Number is Challenged by Experts

WASHINGTON, DC, September 18, 2003:

On the eve of the dedication of a monument to Muslims killed at Srebrenica, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1995, a group which includes a former UN official, intelligence experts, and journalists, released a statement challenging the official alleged casualty number of 7,000 victims as "vastly inflated and unsupported by evidence."

They asserted that one-sided interventionist policies permitted al-Qaeda forces and radical Islamists backed by the Iranian clerical government to take root during the Bosnian war, which clouding the future of the region. As well, they agreed that the "memorialization" of false numbers in the monument actually appeared to be intended to perpetuate regional ethnic hatred and distrust and to deliberately punish one of the victim groups in the Bosnian civil war..

Former US President Bill Clinton is expected to attend and legitimize the dedication of the monument at Srebrenica, which was constructed with using one million in dollars of US Embassy funds at the request of High Representative Paddy Ashdown. But former BBC journalist Jonathan Rooper, who has researched the events in Srebrenica since 1995, says that the region was a graveyard for Serbs as well as Muslims and that a monument to inflated casualties on one side "serves neither truth nor the goal of reconciliation."

Phillip Corwin, former UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia during the 1990s, said: "What happened in Srebrenica was not a single large massacre of Muslims by Serbs, but rather a series of very bloody attacks and counterattacks over a three year period which reached a crescendo in July of 1995," says Phillip Corwin former UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia and Mr Corwin is author of Dubious Mandate, an account of about his experiences during the conflict. and He points out that Srebrenica, which was designated a safe zone, it was never demilitarized as it was claimed to be, and that Muslim paramilitary leader Nasir Oric, who controlled Srebrenica, launched repeated attacks on surrounding Serb villages.

He noted: "I was the United Nations's chief political officer in Bosnia the day that Srebrenica fell. Coincidentally, it was the same day that the Bosnian Government tried to assassinate me as I drove over Mount Igman on the way to Sarajevo."

Intelligence expert expert and strategist Gregory Copley, President of the International Strategic Studies Association and the ISSA's Balkan & Eastern Mediterranean Policy Council, accused the US Ambassador David Donald Hays, who serves as Deputy High Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of using the power of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) governing Bosnia "to force Bosnian Serb elected officials to sign a fraudulent document accepting the official version of events in Srebrenica. The leaders of the Serbian Republic Republika Srpska [the predominantly Serbian province of

Bosnia-Herzegovina] invited the office of the High Representative to join their investigation of the events in Srebrenica. Instead they were told they were told to sign a statement drafted by OHR endorsing casualty figures they publicly disagreed with."

Copley added: "It is significant in that the former US Clinton Administration fought this war unquestioningly supporting only the Croat and Muslim factions and disregarding the historic alliance of the Serbian peoples with the US. Then, after the war, the Clinton Administration failed to follow US tradition in helping to heal the wounds of war, but, rather, perpetuated ethnic divisions and hatreds. This differs from the US role in all other wars."

"Unfortunately, all of the policies and officials put in place in the region by the Clinton Administration remain. The current Bush Administration has neglected the Balkans and has, instead, allowed the Clinton policies to continue, which has meant that divisive politics continue. This, then, requires the ongoing commitment of US peacekeeping forces in both Bosnia and in the Kosovo province of Serbia."

Copley added that, according to intelligence obtained from Islamist sources, that the monument is was likely intended to become a shrine for radical Islamists in Europe and site for annual pilgrimages.

He added: "Deputy High Representative Donald Hays forced the Republica Srpska Government to issue a statement which accepted the radical Islamists' version of the Srebrenica affair, despite the fact that the Office of High Representative does not have any investigative capability of its own to make a valid assumption on the matter. As well, the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague - no friend of the Serbs - has itself not completed its investigation of Srebrenica, and nor has the office of the Government of Republica Srpska which has been working with the ICTY."

"Amb. Hays and OHR chief Paddy Ashdown forced the Republica Srpska statement merely to ensure that the opening of the 'shrine' - to be attended by Clinton - would vindicate Clinton Administration policies of support for the radical Islamists."

Yossef Bodansky, who has written several books on the war in Yugoslavia and also serves as Chief of Staff of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Research Director of ISSA, calls the 7,000 figure "disinformation" and notes that "all independent forensic evidence points to Muslim casualties in the hundreds, possibly the low hundreds. Continued emphasis on such allegedly high numbers of Muslim deaths at Srebrenica also obfuscates the Muslim murders in that city, earlier, of Serb civilians." Bodansky also wrote extensively on the link between Osama bin Laden and the Bosnian Islamists in numerous articles and special reports and three books, including *Offensive in the Balkans: the Potential for a Wider War as a Result of Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (1995), *Some Call it Peace: Waiting for War in the Balkans* (1996), and *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America* (1999).

Rooper says that at least one thousand 1,000 Serbs, mostly civilians, were killed by forces led by Oric who did not bother to hide his crimes, even showing videotapes of slaughtered Serbs to Western journalists.

Meanwhile a group of academic experts and journalists from the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Serbia, and the United Kingdom has been organized by Professor Edward S. Herman of the University of Pennsylvania to examine the evidence regarding events at Srebrenica in July 1995 and earlier, how the media reported these events, and the political role of claims about Srebrenica. It is expected that a report from this group will be available in June 2004.

Rooper points out that the 40,000 inhabitants the UN used in July of 1995 before the capture of Srebrenica roughly matches the number of former residents accounted for in the aftermath. A commander of the Muslim-dominated Army of BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina) later confirmed to parliament in Sarajevo that 5,000 BiH troops escaped largely intact to Tuzla while the UN registered some 35,632 civilian survivors.

While the capture of Srebrenica was reported in July 1995, as it unfolded, an international outcry only took place a month later, after Madeleine Albright, then US representative to the UN, held up a photo which she said provided evidence that thousands of Muslim victims had been buried at field near Nova Kasaba, 19 kilometers from Srebrenica. Excavations which took place following the war, however, yielded 33 bodies at Nova Kasaba. Two years after the event, a total of 400 bodies had been found at 20 sites near Srebrenica, an area which had seen bloody fighting over a three year period.

Instead of acknowledging that there was no support for the original figures, Rooper says a various means were used to prop up the official story.

—Spokesmen for the Clinton Administration suggested that Serbs might have moved the bodies to other locations. Rooper points out that excavating, transporting and reburying 7,000 bodies was "not only beyond the capabilities of the thinly stretched, petrol-starved Bosnian Serb Army, but would have been easily detected under intense surveillance from satellites and geostationary drones.

—By 1998, thousands of bodies excavated from all across Bosnia were stored at the Tuzla airport. Despite state of the art DNA testing, only 200 bodies have been linked to Srebrenica.

—Around three thousand 3,000 names on a list of Srebrenica victims compiled by the Red Cross matched voters in the Bosnian election in 1996. "I pointed out to the OSCE that there had either been massive election fraud or almost half the people on the ICRC missing list were still alive," says Rooper. "The OSCE finally responded that the voting lists had been locked away in warehouses and it would not be possible for them to investigate."

The inflated Srebrenica statistics are part of a larger picture that intelligence experts such as Bodansky and Copley find troubling. They say US policy makers have been slow to recognize that Bosnia is viewed as a strategic base for operations in Europe by al-Qaeda and the HeizboAllah. In 1993, when the Clinton Administration was strongly backing the Muslim President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, Osama Bin Ladin was regular visitor to his office, according to Renate Flottau of the German weekly, Der Spiegel. The Bosnian daily, Dani, reported that the Vienna Embassy of BiH issued a passport to Bin Ladin in 1993.

As special report by Copley, issued Tuesday, September 16, 2003, noted that BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador Huso Zivalj, who issued the passport to Bin -Ladin, later served as Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations in September 11. "It is becoming increasingly clear that the movement of Zivalj to the New York post just before (and his departure just after) the September 11,2001 attacks was not coincidental."

"To refer to US Bosnia policy as a success story is to disregard substantial evidence to the contrary., Instead of misplaced symbolism in Srebrenica, US policy makers need to take a hard look at assumptions that which have guided our US actions in the region," says Copley said.

Ends

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De straf voor Radislav Krstić is in hoger beroep door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal teruggebracht van 46 naar 35 jaar. De reacties variëren.

Door onze redacteur
CEES BANNING

DEN HAAG, 20 APRIL. Openbaar aanklager Carla Del Ponte eiste in 2001 acht keer levenslang tegen de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Radislav Krstić voor zijn rol in de genocide in Srebrenica. In hoger beroep kreeg de nu 56-jarige Krstić 35 jaar. Bij goed gedrag kan Krstić vrijkomen als tweederde van zijn straf erop zit, na 23 jaar. Hij zit sinds 1998 vast, dus zit in 2021 zijn straf erop.

Krstić leidde de Bosnisch-Servische eenheid die in juli 1995 Srebrenica veroverde, het 'veilige gebied' dat zou worden beschermd door de Nederlandse VN-militairen. In 2001 kreeg hij een 46 jaar cel

Srebrenica-vonnis 'genuanceerd'

voor zijn aandeel in de genocide op ruim 7000 moslims die door de Bosnische Serviërs werden vermoord. Het was de eerste keer dat het VN-hof iemand veroordeelde voor genocide.

In hoger beroep plaatste het hof gisteren kanttekeningen bij de directe betrokkenheid van Krstić. Krstić maakte deel uit van een 'gemeenschappelijke criminele organisatie' die zich schuldig maakte aan genocide, maar hij was geen hoofddader. Hij was medeplichtig omdat hij manschappen en materieel beschikbaar stelde. Zonder deze hulp was legerleider Ratko Mladić „niet in staat geweest om het plan voor genocide uit te voeren”, aldus de rechters. Zelf heeft

Krstić geen bevel gegeven voor de moord en heeft hij er niet direct aan deelgenomen.

„Een genuanceerd vonnis”, meent de juriste Elies van Sliedregt, specialiste op het terrein van de commandoverantwoordelijkheid. „De rechter heeft bepaald dat je medeplichtig bent aan genocide als je kennis hebt van de genocidale opzet van anderen.” In hoger beroep heeft volgens haar het indirecte bewijs van Del Ponte „te recht” geen stand gehouden.

In hoger beroep heeft het VN-hof bepaald dat er in Srebrenica een genocide, volkerenmoord, heeft plaatsgevonden, het 'ultieme delict' in het volkenrecht. Krstić advocaten vonden dat van genoci-

de geen sprake kon zijn, want vrouwen en kinderen waren gespaard. Maar als aan een patriarchale samenleving de mannen en jongens worden onttrokken, wordt zo'n gemeenschap uitgeroeid, betoogde aanklager Mark Harmon in 2001. Die redenering is in hoger beroep door het VN-hof overgenomen. De rechtbank „noemt de slachting in Srebrenica bij haar gepaste naam: genocide”, aldus voorzitter Theodor Meron.

In Sarajevo werd met gemengde gevoelens gereageerd. „Ik dank God voor die uitspraak. Het hof heeft bevestigd wat wij wisten: Srebrenica was genocide”, aldus Kada Hotić, die in juli 1995 haar man, haar zoon en twee broers verloor. Over de vermindering van de strafmaat met elf jaar is zij bitter. „Wij zijn gechoqueerd. Hij leidde de slachting. Ik kan deze beslissing niet begrijpen als het doel van het Haagse tribunaal is om een boodschap uit te sturen en toekomstig kwaad te voorkomen.”

Woede over ontkenning van massamoord in Srebrenica

SARAJEVO/DEN HAAG, 4 SEPT. De internationale gemeenschap heeft kwaad gereageerd op een rapport van een Bosnisch-Servische regeringscommissie waarin ontkend wordt dat er in Srebrenica in juli 1995 sprake was van massamoord op moslim-mannen.

Het rapport, zo zei gisteren in Den Haag Jean-Jacques Joris, politiek adviseur van Carla Del Ponte, hoofdaanklager bij het Joegoslavië-tribunaal, is „een triest voorbeeld van revisionisme”. „Het toont aan dat de opstellers totaal blind en in hoge mate ongevoelig zijn en dat ze de vaste wil hebben elke poging in de richting van verzoening, waarheid en rechtvaardigheid te verhinderen.” Het aantal moslim-mannen dat in juli 1995 door de Bosnische Serviërs in Srebrenica is vermoord wordt geschat op 7.500 – en dat is „een conservatief en voorzichtige cijfer”.

In Sarajevo sprak Paddy Ash-

down, de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger en internationaal bestuurder van Bosnië, van een „beledigend, tendentieus, absurd en provocatief” document. Een woordvoertje van een van de partijen van de Bosnische moslims tekende gisteren aan dat massa-executies in Srebrenica niet eens werden ontkend door de tweede man van het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs, generaal Krstić, die door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal is veroordeeld wegens die executies in Srebrenica.

Het bewuste document is opgesteld door de commissie die de regering van de Servische Republiek in Bosnië adviseert over de relaties met het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Het rapport meldt dat in juli 1995 in Srebrenica geen bloedbad heeft plaatsgevonden. Er vielen aan moslim-zijde 2.000 doden, aldus het rapport, maar in 1.800 gevallen ging het om moslim-soldaten die sneuvelden in de strijd, in honderd

gevallen ging het om moslims die van uitputting stierven op de vlucht. In slechts honderd gevallen zouden moslims „uit persoonlijke wraak” of „uit onbekendheid met de internationale wetgeving” zijn vermoord.

Het rapport werd gisteren in Banja Luka officieel door de commissie aangeboden aan de regering van de Servische Republiek. Siniša Djordjević, speciaal adviseur van de regering over de relaties met het Joegoslavië-tribunaal, zei bij die gelegenheid dat het er niet toe doet hoeveel mensen er zijn vermoord: „Het sjacheren over aantallen slachtoffers leidt niet tot verzoening.”

Eveneens gisteren stuurde de regering van de Servische Republiek een publicatie naar het Joegoslavië-tribunaal met documentatie over 1.300 Serviërs die in 1992 in en rond Srebrenica zouden zijn vermoord. (Reuters, AP, AEP)

Vonnis Krstić lager, Srebrenica was 'genocide'

DEN HAAG, 19 APRIL. De straf waartoe het Joegoslavië-tribunaal de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Radislav Krstić heeft veroordeeld wegens zijn aandeel in de massamoord op ruim 7.000 moslims in Srebrenica in 1995, is vandaag in hoger beroep teruggebracht van 46 naar 35 jaar. De beroepskamer van het tribunaal bevestigde dat in Srebrenica sprake was van genocide, maar vond dat Krstić (56) niet schuldig was aan genocide, maar aan het meewerken aan genocide. • Pagina 4

Krstić krijgt 35 jaar cel na genocide

Hof bevestigt volkenmoord Srebrenica

Van onze verslaggever
DEN HAAG

Het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal handhaaft het standpunt dat de massamoord op moslims in Srebrenica genocide was. Voor zijn aandeel in deze volkenmoord, in de zomer van 1995, werd de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Radislav Krstić maandag tot 35 jaar celstraf veroordeeld.

Krstić was in hoger beroep gegaan tegen de hem eerder opgelegde straf van 46 jaar. Zijn voornaamste verweer luidde dat er geen sprake was van genocide in de moslim-enclave, omdat vrouwen en kinderen bij het moorden werden ontzien. De vijf rechters wierpen deze opvatting.

Wel oordeelde het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal dat Krstić niet tot de aanstichters van de slachtpartij behoorde. Hij zou er evenmin een voorstander van zijn geweest. Er is geen bewijs dat Krstić zelf heeft deelgenomen aan de moorden. Om deze redenen wordt hem uiteindelijk een lagere straf opgelegd, zo bleek uit het vonnis dat werd voorgelezen door rechter Theodor Meron.

De aanklagers van het VN-tribunaal hadden eveneens hoger beroep aangetekend; zij eisten levenslang.

Krstić is de eerste betrokkene in het Balkan-conflict die door het tribunaal in Den Haag veroordeeld werd wegens genocide, de zwaarste oorlogsmisdad. De voormalige Servische president Slobodan Milošević, die in een cel in Scheveningen gevangen zit, wordt eveneens beschuldigd van genocide. Dezelfde aanklacht geldt tegen de Bosnisch-Servische legerleider Ratko Mladić, die nog altijd op vrije voeten is.

Mladić wordt door het tribunaal beschouwd als 'de belangrijkste figuur' achter het Srebrenica-drama dat aan ruim zeventuizend mannelijke moslims het leven kostten. De rechters oordeelden dat Krstić op de hoogte was van de plannen van zijn superieur. Hij stelde materieel en troepen van zijn Drina-legereenheid beschikbaar. Zonder deze hulp was Mladić 'niet in de staat geweest om het plan voor genocide uit te voeren', menen de rechters.

Nabestaanden van de slachtoffers en overlevenden reageerden met gemengde gevoelens op de uitkomst van de rechtszaak die jarenlang geduurd heeft. 'Het hof heeft bevestigd wat wij allemaal wisten: Srebrenica was genocide', aldus Kada Hotić van de Vereniging van Srebrenica-moeders. Anderen betreurden het dat de strafmaat met elf jaar is teruggebracht.

Straf Krstić in hoger beroep elf jaar korter

Door een onzer redacteurs

DEN HAAG, 19 APRIL. De Bosnisch-Servische Radislav Krstić is vanmorgen in hoger beroep veroordeeld tot een gevangenisstraf van 35 jaar voor zijn aandeel in de genocide na de val van Srebrenica in juli 1995. Drie jaar geleden was de generaal nog door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal veroordeeld tot 46 jaar.

De belangrijkste reden voor de lagere straf is dat Krstić volgens rechter Theodor Meron niet tot de hoofddaders van de volkerenmoord op de moslims van Srebrenica behoorde. Meron vonnist dat Krstić had deelgenomen aan een criminele organisatie die zich schuldig heeft gemaakt aan volkerenmoord. Hij heeft niet direct vermoord, maar schiep de mogelijkheid voor de massamoord op de meer dan zeventuizend moslims door manschappen en materieel beschikbaar te stellen voor de operatie.

Verdere motivaties voor de lagere straf zijn volgens Meron het feit dat Krstić vlak voor de verovering van de moslimenclave Srebrenica tot commandant van het Bosnisch-Servische Drina-Korps was benoemd. „Zijn rol in de planning was beperkt”, aldus Meron. En de VN-rechter memoreerde een bevel dat Krstić had doen uitgaan dat moslims humaner moeten worden behandeld.

Zowel Krstić advocaten als openbaar aanklager Carla Del Ponte waren tegen het vonnis van 46 jaar gevangenisstraf – de eerste keer dat iemand door het Haagse

VN-tribunaal was veroordeeld voor volkerenmoord – in hoger beroep gegaan. Del Ponte eiste levenslang omdat Krstić direct betrokken is geweest bij de organisatie en uitvoering van „de grootste massamoord in Europa sinds de Holocaust”. Krstić advocaten wilden een nieuw proces omdat tijdens de rechtsgang in 2000 bewijsmateriaal zou zijn achtergehouden, dat gunstig zou uitpakken voor hun cliënt.

In het vonnis drong Meron aan op een onderzoek bij het bureau van Del Ponte om er achter te komen hoe het mogelijk is dat bewijsmateriaal – dat ontlastend voor Krstić zou kunnen zijn – is achtergehouden. De VN-rechter meende dat de advocaten van Krstić niet hebben aangetoond dat dit nadelig heeft uitgedaakt voor hun cliënt.

De nu 56-jarige Krstić was in juli 1995 commandant van de Bosnisch-Servische eenheid die de moslimenclave Srebrenica in Oost-Bosnië veroverde. Na de verovering werden de moslims gedeporteerd, waarbij de mannen en jongens, werden gescheiden van vrouwen, meisjes en kinderen. Zo'n zeventuizend tot achtduizend mannen en jongens zijn de Bosnische Serviërs vermoord. „Etnische zuivering werd gepleegd”, vonnist tribunaal-rechter miro Rodrigues in augustus 2001. In zijn vonnis in hoger beroep vanmiddag herhaalde Meron woorden. „Srebrenica is synoniem geworden voor genocide.”

Sagittarius

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ANTIWAR

Thursday, June 24, 2004

BALKAN EXPRESS

by *Nebojsa Malic*

Reports, Confessions and the Elusive Truth

Following the publication of a 42-page report by the Srebrenica Commission of the Bosnian Serb government, media around the world carried a variation of this headline on Friday, June 11: "Bosnian Serbs Admit Srebrenica Massacre!" Many saw this as the final and incontrovertible proof that what happened in Srebrenica in July 1995 was a planned, systematic genocide of Bosnian Muslims — just as Sarajevo, the Western press and the Hague Inquisition have asserted all along.

As with so many things concerning the Balkans, the media was wrong yet again. The "June 11 Report" was a sham, a coerced confession with a Stalinist flavor. It was a result of viceroy Ashdown's personal fixation, and in great part simply repeated the unproven assertions of the Hague Inquisition. The only tangible good it produced was the existence of several previously unknown graves with bodies of the Srebrenica dead. It did not, however, cast a new light on the events of July 1995 — only on those today who continue to wave them about like a bloody shirt.

There They Go Again

Here are the opening lines of a BBC news story on June 11, typical of the general tone of reporting about the Commission's "findings":

"An official Bosnian Serb investigation into the Srebrenica events of July 1995 has found that several thousand Muslims were murdered by local Serb forces.

"It is the first time the Bosnian Serb authorities have admitted the killings which The Hague war crimes tribunal has declared an act of genocide."

Framed this way, it sounds straightforward: many Muslims were killed; this was ruled to be genocide; Serbs confessed; end of story — which is doubtless the way viceroy Ashdown had in mind when he established the Commission and ordered it to produce a conclusion he would accept, "or else." What any of that has to do with truth is an entirely different matter.

The full text of the report is not widely available yet. Though substantial excerpts were published by regional media, the Western press remained content to offer its own interpretation, mostly along the lines of the above-mentioned BBC story. One notable exception is Nicholas Wood of the New York Times, who provides the most meaningful quote from the report:

"[S]everal thousand [Bosnian Muslims] were liquidated in a manner which represents a heavy violation of international human rights."

This is clearly an admission that Serb forces executed POWs, something the Serbs never really contested. It is not an admission of genocide, or even a confirmation of the infamous number of "8,000." Those who have trumpeted both over the past ten years obviously didn't consider in their interest to note the distinction â€" but it was there, nonetheless.

Ashdown's Private War

Crucial for understanding the June 11 report is the role Bosnia's viceroy Paddy Ashdown played in its creation. Namely, the Commission was established by Ashdown in October 2003, after the Serb Republic was forced to fund the building of a Muslim "genocide memorial" in Potocari. The memorial was opened by Bill Clinton last September, prompting a rehash of all the propaganda about A month later, Ashdown gave the eulogy at the funeral of Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, making no secret of his sympathies in Bosnia.

In April this year, Ashdown vented his anger at the Commission's apparent inability to follow simple orders and sacked the Bosnian Serbs' top general as well as one of the key Commission members, Dejan Miletic. However, Ashdown's vendetta ruffled the wrong feathers.

According to a Washington-based intelligence newsletter, Defense and Foreign Affairs, SFOR officials intervened, claiming that the sacking of Miletic "dealt a major blow to counter-terrorism intelligence in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a critical time." As a result, Miletic's dismissal was reversed, and he was in fact promoted â€" the first time anything like that happened to anyone proscribed by the viceroy. Commenting on the affair to DFA, one SFOR official said:

"[Ashdown's] only concern is to protect his own reputation and his old Muslim friends who have turned out to be radical Islamists and not the democratic moderates he thought them to be."

Ashdown ended up getting his "Srebrenica confession," but he already had a new demand in store: arrest Radovan Karadzic! And while the bumbling Serb officials try to appease him but complain that Karadzic is awfully hard to find (after all, NATO occupation troops have failed to seize him for over eight years), Ashdown is already scheming to use this impossible demand as an excuse to further centralize Bosnia. News from Sarajevo is that Izetbegovic's heir Sulejman Tihic is demanding the abolition of the Serb Republic altogether.

Echoes of Inquisition

Because of Ashdown, it was virtually impossible for the Commission to produce an objective report. They went a step further, though, and simply copied crucial sections from the Hague Inquisition. Here a quote from the report, printed in the Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti on June 12:

"Because of time limitations, and to rationalize the proceedings, the Commission copied the historical context and statement of facts contained in the verdict 'Prosecution vs. Radislav Krstic,' in which the accused was convicted by the Appeals chamber of the Hague Tribunal of aiding and abetting genocide committed in Srebrenica."

There is a major problem with the "facts" from the April 28, 2004 Krstic judgment, hailed as "historic" by the pro-Tribunal press. Even a cursory analysis reveals that Krstic was never given a fair trial, and that the judgment was based on assumptions that were (among other things) self-contradictory. Furthermore, the verdict "established" genocide in Srebrenica through subterfuge: not only was the concept of genocide defined so loosely it could encompass just about any number of people, but:

"[N]o evidence was presented to substantiate the prosecutor's claims that between 7,000 and 8,000 Muslim men were ever executed in the first place. The failure of Krstic's defense team to adequately contest that assertion doesn't by any means prove that it's true."

It would be interesting to compare the Krstic verdict with the text of the June 11 report, and see how much of it was actually originalâ€

Unfinished Work

In late 2002, eminent Balkans scholar Alex Dragnich wrote a roundup of various reports on Srebrenica in the South Slav Journal, warning that "before we can have a final verdict on Srebrenica, a great deal of arduous work remains to be done." Dragnich argues that a "steady beat" of propaganda has drowned out actual research on the subject.

There are certainly many unknowns about Srebrenica that are still to be addressed. The Dutch have done some in-depth work concerning the presence of their peacekeepers; their 2002 report treats the allegation that Serbs massacred Muslims as established fact, but it is otherwise solid. One of the major issues they raise is the incongruity of having a "safe area" that has never been demilitarized, and is indeed home to an entire division of the Bosnian Muslim army.

How is it that nearly all commanders of the 28th Division were evacuated by the Sarajevo government prior to July 1995? Who decided to conduct a fighting retreat to Tuzla, instead of surrendering and hoping for an exchange? Why was the Second Corps of the Bosnian [Muslim] Army sitting idle, when it could have at least launched a spoiling attack? Did Izetbegovic purposefully let Srebrenica fall and its people suffer, to score propaganda points? These are the questions asked by several Bosnian weeklies and a few politicians, as well as war veterans.

There are other questions no one is asking. What of the Srebrenica Serbs, ethnically cleansed in What of the great Muslim offensive that collapsed in April 1993? What about Naser Oric's videotaped atrocities? One report that tried to put Srebrenica in the wider context of the war, published in September 2002 by a Bosnian Serb commission, was harshly denounced by both Muslims and Ashdown. There has yet to be another.

So, What Happened?

It has been established beyond reasonable doubt that a number of Bosnian Muslims died in July 1995, between Srebrenica and Tuzla. But while most media conjure images of unarmed civilians lined up and shot or slaughtered, most of the dead belonged to the 28th Division of the BH Army, and were not civilians. While there are civilians among the bodies exhumed and identified so far, they were among those who chose to join the 28th in its ill-fated fighting retreat. According to most sources, anywhere between four and six thousand people made it to Tuzla; others fell prey to firefights, artillery, landmines, exhaustion and starvation (it's a 50-mile hike over bad terrain) â€ and yes, some were captured and executed by the Bosnian Serbs, Malmedy-style. The real question is, how many? Forensic experts examining the exhumed bodies should be able to determine the cause of death easily â€ yet their voice has been conspicuously absent.

Bosnian Serbs never denied that their forces killed many Srebrenica Muslims; indeed, they've admitted killing several thousand in combat. What they have always contested â€ and still do, even in the June 11 report (though not explicitly) â€ was the allegation that they massacred some 8,000-plus unarmed civilians, and with genocidal intent at that.

So far, the accusation of genocide relies on assertions and conjectures of the Sarajevo government and the ICTY prosecution. Such a serious charge demands strong and overwhelming evidence, and there simply isn't any. If there were, would Ashdown have tried to extort a confession?

Though issues of the victims' identity (POW or civilian) and the manner of death are entirely legitimate, quibbling about whether 14-year-olds were combatants is simply in bad taste. Fact is, thousands of families suffered a grievous loss, and that tragedy is being cruelly manipulated to achieve political ends. Truth may be the first casualty of war, but these people are very real victims, too. Not that the list stops there.

Muslims, believing themselves the virtuous victims of "aggression" and "genocide," find themselves blinded to Izetbegovic's hateful ideology of domination that tore Bosnia apart. Serbs, targeted by propaganda of unprecedented proportions accusing them of Nazi-like evil, refuse to acknowledge any of the atrocities they may have actually committed, rightly afraid it would be considered an admission of the fabrications as well. The population of the Empire, deluded by lies of their governments and media to believe in "humanitarian" and other interventions, increasingly lose their lives, liberty and property as Bosnia has led to Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and God knows where else. All victims: of war and

politics.

The only truth about Srebrenica that no one can contest is that war is a crime against humanity. Trying to present such state-organized murder as a fight against "evil" by putting enemies on trial for "war crimes" is simply an attempt to mask that fact.


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'Nederland om de tuin geleid in Srebrenica'

Door Ans Bouwmans
New York

Hij ziet er nog altijd jongens-achtig uit: gevangene nr. 54884-054, Muhamed Sacirbey. Mo voor vrienden, beter bekend als ex van Mabel Wisse Smit. De 47-jarige Sacirbey zit al meer dan zevenenhalve maand in een Newyorkse cel. Bosnië heeft om zijn uitlevering gevraagd in het kader van een gerechtelijk onderzoek naar machtsmisbruik.

Sacirbey zou als VN-ambassadeur van Bosnië een paar miljoen dollar hebben verduisterd. Hij zegt onschuldig te zijn en hij wil per se niet worden uitgeleverd aan zijn vaderland.

„Daar kom ik niet levend uit de gevangenis”, zegt hij tijdens het bezoek aan het Metropolitan Correctional Center. Het relaas van Sacirbey raakt Nederland dieper dan alleen de affaire rond Mabel. Het heeft ook te maken met Nederlands pijnlijkste periode uit de recente geschiedenis: de val van Srebrenica op 11 juli 1995. Sacirbey heeft een eigen versie van die gebeurtenissen. Zijn kritiek op de Dayton-akkoorden en zijn passie voor het door de regering-Bush gehate Internationale Strafhof zouden hem vijanden bij het Amerikaanse State Department (Buitenlandse Zaken) hebben opgeleverd. Sacirbey denkt dat sommige

mensen er baat bij hebben als hij nimmer kan getuigen over oorlogsmisdaden voor het Tribunaal in Den Haag, waar nu Slobodan Milosevic terechtstaat. Als VN-ambassadeur was Sacirbey in de jaren negentig ten tijde van de oorlog op de Balkan de tussenpersoon tussen Bosnië en het Westen.

„Men” is bang voor wat hij kan vertellen over de inschikkelijkheid van westerse functionarissen, zegt hij. Misnoegd: „Mijn woorden zijn nu al niet meer zo geloofwaardig, omdat ik spreek van achter tralies.”

Er hebben lang verhalen de ronde gedaan dat de Verenigde Naties de door het Nederlandse VN-bataljon Dutchbat te verdedigen enclave Srebrenica met opzet hebben laten vallen, een conclusie die niet terug te vinden is in het Nederlandse NIOD-rapport. Er is echter wel degelijk sprake geweest van machinaties, zegt Sacirbey. Volgens hem zijn Milosevic (president van Servië), Mladic (Servische generaal in Bosnië), Janvier (VN-bevelhebber), Akashi (VN-gezant), Bildt (Bosnië-onderhandelaar van de Europese Unie) en een inmiddels overleden Amerikaanse vertegenwoordiger op de vrijdag voor de aanval op Srebrenica bijeen geweest, en is op die bijeenkomst besloten de enclave te laten vallen.


De reden dat de westerse vertegenwoordigers zich daarin

schikten was dat de situatie op de grond moest veranderen om onderhandelingen over de indeling van Bosnië op gang te brengen, zegt Sacirbey. „Carl Bildt heeft me verteld dat ze ook niet van plan waren Zepa en Gorazde te beschermen”. Dat waren de volgende enclaves die vielen. Nederland is volgens hem om de tuin geleid. Beoefde luchtsteun bleef uit. Srebrenica werd onder de voet gelopen en 7.500 moslimmannen werden door de Serviërs vermoord.

Mabel

Zijn relatie met Mabel was inmiddels op de klippen gelopen en Sacirbey zegt dat dit een rol speelde bij zijn besluit zich uit het publieke leven terug te trekken. „Ik werkte twintig uur per dag. Dat offer kun je brengen als er wat tegenover staat. Mabel was degene die me ondersteunde en mijn ideeën deelde in die bijna spookachtige wereld, met figuren die helemaal uit proportie geblazen waren.” Dat zijn vrouw Susan heeft gezegd dat ze niet meer waren dan „uitstekende” vrienden, wuift hij weg. „Dat zal ze gezegd hebben omdat ze er niet meer over wilde praten. Ze wist ervan.”

Ook maakt hij duidelijk waarom hij nooit van Susan, met wie hij 20 jaar geleden trouwde, is gescheiden. „Ik hecht de grootste waarde aan loyaliteit.



Muhamed Sacirbey: „Nederland werd verblind als herten in het licht van een auto”. (Foto ANP)

Wat er ook gebeurde, we waren de beste vrienden. Ik kon toch niet tegen haar zeggen, dat is niet goed genoeg. Als zij het kon accepteren, dan kon ik dat niet in haar gezicht werpen. Ik kon haar alleen maar meer respecteren en van haar houden.” Hij suggereert dat Ma-

bel gezien zijn opstelling geen toekomst in de relatie zag die volgens hem een jaar of vier à vijf heeft geduurd. „Ik was niet degene die er een eind aan wilde maken. Het heeft me verschrikkelijke pijn gedaan. Ik denk dat ik nog steeds van haar hou.”

'Serviërs Srebrenica werden geproyoceerd'

De Bosnische legerleiding geeft in het als 'militair geheim' geclassificeerde document aan de moslimsoldaten in Srebrenica het bevel om met terreurdaden „paniek te zaaien” in de buurt van het hoofdkwartier van de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Mladic. De naar schatting veertigduizend door het Nederlandse VN-contingent Dutchbat be-

waakte vluchtelingen liepen daardoor het gevaar doelwit te worden van vergeldingsacties van de Bosnische Serviërs.

Het bevel van 20 juni 1995 is afkomstig van het Tweede Bosnische Legerkorps in Tuzla en is met een handtekening bekrachtigd door de wroede van generaal Mladic, die op 23 juni in een brief aan Dutchbat-

limtroepen in Srebrenica. Bećirović bevestigt de echtheid van het bevel, maar weigert verder commentaar.

Aan de militaire operatie namen volgens moslims uit de voormalige enclave ongeveer driehonderd met mijnen en raketwerpers gewapende strijders deel. De overval wekte de woede van generaal Mladic, die op 23 juni in een brief aan Dutchbat-

commandat Karremans zijn beklag deed over de uitval. Karremans antwoordde hem twee dagen later dat de blauwhelmen wel wat hadden gehoord maar niets hadden gezien.

Volgens Rijs en Westerman toont het nu gevonden document aan dat de Bosnische autoriteiten de veiligheid van de vluchtelingen van ondergeschikt belang achtten. Eerder

schreven zij dat het Bosnische leger niets had ondernomen om de enclave in staat van verdediging te brengen toen het over aanwijzingen beschikte van een ophanden zijnd Servisch offensief. Na de overrompeling van Srebrenica op 11 juli weigerde de legerleiding om de moslimmannen te hulp te schieten die door de bergen Tuzla probeerden te bereiken. Bij het Rode Kruis staan sinds de val van het Veilige Gebied meer dan zesduizend moslims als vermoord of vermist te boek.

Getuige: vergadering met Mladic was een 'rookgordijn'

Serviërs misleidden Karremans

ANP
Den Haag

De vergadering die de Bosnisch-Servische legerleider Mladic op 12 juli 1995, daags na de val van Srebrenica, had met Dutchbat-commandant Karremans, was een 'rookgordijn'.

Het besluit tot het doden van de moslimmannen uit de enclave was immers elders al genomen. Dit verklaarde Miroslav Deronjic, door de toenmalige Bosnisch-Servische president Karadzic benoemd

tot 'civiel commissaris' van de pasveroverde enclave, gisteren voor het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal. Karadzic had enkele dagen eerder bij een vergadering in Pale al aangegeven: „Die mensen moeten worden gedood.”

Deronjic is door de rechters van de Kamer van Beroep als getuige opgeroepen als voorbereiding van het hoger beroep van de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Krstic dat volgende week formeel begint.

Deronjic was aanwezig, toen Mladic en Karremans op 12 juli 1995

in Hotel Fontana in Bratunac vlakbij Srebrenica onderhandelden met moslim-vertegenwoordigers. Het doden van de moslimmannen werd bij die vergadering niet besproken, vanwege de aanwezigheid van de Nederlandse VN-soldaten en de pers in Bratunac, aldus Deronjic.

Krstic werd in augustus 2001 tot 46 jaar cel veroordeeld wegens genocide na de val van Srebrenica. Vlak na de val van de enclave had Deronjic, in zijn nieuwe functie van 'civiel commissaris' en tevens partijvoorzitter in Bratunac,

nog een telefoongesprek met Karadzic. Hij klaagde toen over het gevaarlijk geachte feit dat zo veel moslimmannen midden in het Bosnisch-Servische stadje gevangen zaten.

Karadzic' antwoord wijst erop dat hij de codetaal van de moordenaars kende: De 'goederen' moesten naar opslagplaatsen worden gebracht en 'het' zou 'niet daar, maar elders' gebeuren. De gevangenen moslimmannen werden de dagen daarna op tal van plaatsen elders opgesloten en daarna naar executieplaatsen overgebracht.

'Karadzic gelastte slachting Srebrenica'

The Guardian
BRUSSEL

Het is Radovan Karadzic, destijds leider van de Bosnische Serviërs, die in 1995 rechtstreekse orders heeft uitgevaardigd om de Moslims uit Srebrenica te doden. Dat heeft Miroslav Deronjic, die een hoge functie bekleedde in de Servische Democratische Partij, vrijdag gezegd in zijn getuigenis voor het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal in Den Haag.

„Die mensen moeten dood, je moet iedereen doden die je kunt”, zei Karadzic volgens Deronjic. Karadzic doelde op de duizenden mannen die onder leiding van de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Ratko Mladic waren afgevoerd uit het door Nederlandse VN-troepen bewaakte Srebrenica en werden vastgehouden in het naburige Bratunac. Naar schatting zeventienduizend mannen uit Srebrenica werden vermoord.

Deronjic zelf heeft schuld bekend aan een massamoord op meer dan zestig Moslims in Bratunac die werd gepleegd in het begin van de oorlog in Bosnië, in 1992. Hij treedt nu op als getuige in andere zaken voor het tribunaal.

Volgens Deronjic ontmoette hij Karadzic op 8 of 9 juli 1995 in Pale, de hoofdstad van Servisch Bosnië. Op 12 juli ontmoette hij ook generaal Mladic. De volgende dag ontving hij een afgeant van het Bosnisch-Servische leger, kolonel Ljubisa Beara. De kolonel was dronken, maar probeerde toch hem een in code gestelde boodschap over te brengen: „Vóór het aanbreken van de dag moeten de goederen in het pakhuis zijn”. De betekenis werd duidelijk toen Beara eraan toevoegde: „Ik heb instructies van de top dat deze mensen in Bratunac moeten worden gedood.”

Zowel Radovan Karadzic als generaal Ratko Mladic is nog altijd voortvluchtig.

Proces Serviërs tegen moslims Srebrenica

ZVORNIK, 18 APRIL. In Zvornik, in de Servische Republiek in Bosnië, is gisteren het proces begonnen tegen zeven moslims, die zeggen uit Srebrenica te zijn ontsnapt en die door de Bosnische Serviërs zijn beschuldigd van moord en andere misdrijven. De internationale gemeenschap heeft de gang van zaken bij het proces gisteren gehekeld. De zeven werden in mei vorig jaar door Amerikaanse soldaten van de internationale vredesmacht IFOR aangehouden en overgedragen aan de politie van de Bosnische Serviërs.

Vier van de zeven moslims staan in Zvornik terecht op beschuldiging van moord. Drie van hen zouden gezamenlijk vier Serviërs hebben vermoord, kort voor ze zich aan de Amerikanen overgaven. Een vierde man wordt beschuldigd van moord op een andere moslim. De drie resterende moslims worden beschuldigd van illegaal wapenbezit. (Reuter, AFP)

Interview Sacirbey in c

'Srebrenic doelbewus opgeofferd'

Door Ans Bouwmans

New York - Muhamed Sacirbey, de ex-vriend van M Wisse Smit die vanuit een gevangenis in New York uitlevering aan Bosnië aanvecht, zegt dat Dutchbat bij de verdediging van Srebrenica in 1995, voor de heeft laten houden.

Sacirbey was tijdens de Bosnië-oorlog VN-ambassadeur van Bosnië in New York. Volgens hem hebben vertegenwoordigers van Verenigde Naties, Europese Unie en de VS zich voorafgaand aan de aanval op Srebrenica - op 11 juli 1995 - in een ontmoeting met de Servische president Milosevic en de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Mladic neergelegd bij de val van de moslimenclave. Ze hoopten dat een verandering op de grond tot een doorbraak in de onderhandelingen over de verdeling van Bosnië zou leiden, aldus Sacirbey. De Nederlandse Dutchbat-troepen die Srebrenica moesten verdedigen, werd volgens hem zand in de ogen gestrooid.

Sacirbey zit sinds maart in een Amerikaanse gevangenis omdat Bosnië om zijn uitlevering heeft gevraagd. In 2000 zou hij 2,4 miljoen hebben verduisterd. Sacirbey denkt dat de VS hem mede hebben laten vallen zodat hij nooit meer kan getuigen voor het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal in Den

Haag. Volgens Sacirbey wil liever niet dat hij internationaal aandacht krijgt voor zijn beding dat westerse functionarissen zich tijdens de Bosnië-schikten naar de Serviërs zou men bang zijn dat hij getuigen over westerse betrokkenheid bij oorlogsmisdaden in Bosnië. „Mijn woorden zijn niet meer zo geloofwaardig, dat ik spreek van achter de tralies,” zegt hij in een gesprek met deze krant.

Sacirbey ging in het gesprek in op zijn relatie met Mabel Wisse Smit, met wie hij naar zeggen vier, vijf jaar een relatie heeft gehad die was seerd op idealisme en integriteit. De breuk met de Nederlandse leidde mede tot zijn besluit uit het openbare leven te trekken, zegt hij. Hij suggereert dat zijn onwil om te scheiden zijn echtgenote ertoe leidde Wisse Smit de relatie beëin-

Op pagina 9:
Nederland om de tuin geleid

Door een onzer redacteuren
ROTTERDAM, 6 MEI. Het Bosnische regeringsleger heeft de veiligheid van de moslimbevolking in Srebrenica op het spel gezet door kort voor de val van de enclave in juli 1995 gewapende uitvalen te organiseren op stellingen van de Bosnische Serviërs. Dat blijkt uit een Bosnische legerdocument dat wordt opgenomen in de derde druk van het boek Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario van de journalisten B. Rijs en F. Westerman.

Zware straf 2007 in zaak over Srebrenica

Vonnis Joegoslavië-Tribunaal overtreft eis

| Van onze buitenlandredactie
| AMSTERDAM

De Bosnisch-Servische commandant Momir Nikolic is gisteren door het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal veroordeeld tot 27 jaar cel voor zijn rol bij de massamoord van Srebrenica. De straf viel aanzienlijk zwaarder uit dan de eis. Nikolic is de eerste Bosnische Serviër die voor het tribunaal schuld heeft bekend voor zijn aandeel in de tragedie van de Moslim-enclave, waar in 1995 meer dan zeventuizend Moslims werden vermoord.

De aanklagers hadden een celstraf van vijftien tot twintig jaar gevraagd nadat ze een akkoord hadden gesloten met de verdediging. Door de raadslieden van Nikolic was een straf van maximaal tien jaar bepleit. Nikolic (48) toonde zich aangeslagen toen hij het vonnis hoorde; hij sloeg de handen voor het gezicht.

De Bosnische Serviër werd vorig jaar opgepakt door SFOR, de vredesmacht in Bosnië, en ontkende aanvankelijk alle schuld. In mei van dit jaar gaf Nikolic plotseiling toe dat hij had meegedaan aan de planning en organisatie van de massamoord. Achter de schermen hadden aanklagers en verdediging afgesproken dat het zwaarste punt van de aanklacht – genocide – zou vervallen in ruil voor een schuldbekentenis.

Nikolic erkende dat hij bijeenkomsten van het leger had bijgewoond waar het executeren van Moslim-mannen openlijk werd besproken. Voorts beloofde hij tegen twee andere ex-commandanten (Vidoje Blagojevic en Dragan Jokic) te getuigen.

Nikolic werd schuldig bevonden aan etnische vervolging, een misdaad tegen de menselijkheid. Twintig jaar cel is volgens de Chinese rechter Liu Daqun niet voldoende voor de misdaden die door hem zijn begaan. 'De massamoord van Srebrenica is uitgevoerd met een mate van wreedheid en verdorvenheid die tot dan toe ongekend was in het conflict in ex-Joegoslavië.'

Nikolic was een ondergeschikte van generaal Krstic, de enige die tot nu toe is veroordeeld wegens genocide (volkenmoord) na de val van Srebrenica. Nikolic was aanwezig bij het scheiden van mannen en vrouwen in Potocari, vlakbij de basis van het Nederlandse VN-bataljon Dutchbat.

De rechters plaatsten vraagtekens bij de *deals* tussen aanklagers en verdediging, die steeds meer in zwang raken bij het tribunaal. Aan het besparen van tijd en geld mag volgens de rechters geen overdreven gewicht worden toegekend, gelet op de ernst van de misdaden van Srebrenica. Het was de eerste keer dat het tribunaal een langere straf oplegde dan in een *deal* was afgesproken.

Dodental in Srebrenica politiek gemanipuleerd

Aan de vooravond van de onthulling van een monument voor gevallen moslims in Srebrenica in Bosnië-Herzegovina in 1995 hebben experts van de inlichtingendienst en journalisten een verklaring uitgegeven waarin ze stellen dat het vermeende aantal van zeventienduizend slachtoffers 'hoog opgeblazen en niet gesteund op bewijs' is.

Volgens hen heeft de eenzijdige interventionistische politiek al-Qaidatroepen en radicale islamisten die gesteund worden door de Iranese regering, de kans gegeven zich tijdens de Bosnische oorlog in de Balkan te wortelen. Ook stellen zij dat de verkeerde aantallen op het monument bedoeld zijn om de regionale etnische haat en het wantrouwen in stand te houden en om opzettelijk de schuld bij een van de partijen in de Bosnische burgeroorlog te leggen.

Bill Clinton, voormalig president van de VS, was aanwezig bij de onthulling van het monument, dat tot stand kwam mede dankzij een bijdrage van 1 miljoen dollar van de Amerikaanse ambassade op verzoek van de hoge vertegenwoordiger Paddy Ashdown. Voormalig BBC-journalist Jonathan Rooper, die de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica sinds 1995 heeft onderzocht, zegt dat de regio een begraafplaats was van zowel Serviërs als moslims en dat dit monument voor een politiek gemanipuleerd aantal moslim slachtoffers 'noch de waarheid noch de verzoening dient'.

Geen bloedbad

Philip Corwin, voormalig coördinator civiele zaken van de VN in Bosnië in de jaren negentig, zei: 'Wat er in Srebrenica gebeurde was niet zozeer een bloedbad dat door de Serviërs onder moslims werd aangericht, maar eerder een serie van zeer bloedige aanvallen en tegenaanvallen van beide kanten over een periode van drie jaar die zijn hoogtepunt bereikte in juli 1995.'

Corwin is auteur van 'Dubieus mandaat', een verslag van zijn ervaringen tijdens het Bosnische conflict. Hij wijst erop dat Srebrenica, dat was aangewezen als een veilige zone, nooit gedemilitariseerd is, zoals wel geclaimd wordt. De leider van de paramilitaire moslims, Nasir Oric, die Srebrenica onder controle had, voerde bij herhaling aanvallen uit op de omliggende Servische dorpen. Corwin: 'Ik was de belangrijkste politieke VN-functionaris in Bosnië op de dag dat Srebrenica viel. Toevallig was het op dezelfde dag dat de Bosnische regering mij probeerde te vermoorden, terwijl ik over de berg Igman reed op weg naar Sara-

jevo.'

Inlichtingendienstexpert en strateeg Gregory Copley, voorzitter van de International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) en van de ISSA beleidsraad voor de Balkan en het oostelijke Middellandse Zeegebied, beschuldigde de Amerikaanse ambassadeur Donald Hays, die tevens assistent hoge vertegenwoordiger voor Bosnië-Herzegovina is, ervan de macht van het kantoor van de hoge vertegenwoordiger te misbruiken 'om Bosnisch-Servisch gekozen functionarissen te dwingen een frauduleus document te tekenen waarmee zij de 'officiële' versie van de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica accepteren'. 'De leiders van de Republiek Servië nodigden het kantoor van de hoge vertegenwoordiger uit om samen de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica te onderzoeken. Als antwoord werden ze gesommeerd een verklaring te tekenen die opgesteld was door het kantoor van de hoge vertegenwoordiger en waarin aantallen slachtoffers worden genoemd waarmee de Serviërs het openlijk oneens zijn.'

Copley zegt: 'Het is tekenend dat de voormalige regering-Clinton deze oorlog uitvocht met onvoorwaardelijke steun aan de Kroaten en de moslim facties en met het negeren van de historische alliantie van het Servische volk met de VS. Na de oorlog hielp de regering-Clinton niet – zoals gebruikelijk is – om de verwoestingen van de oorlog te herstellen, maar bestendigde juist de etnische scheiding en haat. Dit is een duidelijk verschil met de Amerikaanse rol in alle andere oorlogen.'

'Helaas zijn de door de regering-Clinton ingezette politiek en de functionarissen in de regio gebleven. De regering-Bush heeft de Balkan verwaarloosd en heeft in plaats daarvan het door Clinton ingezette beleid, wat een politiek van verdeling zaaien is, gecontinueerd. Hierdoor is een blijvende inzet van Amerikaanse vredestroepen in zowel Bosnië als in de Servische provincie Kosovo vereist.'

Uit inlichtingen die verkregen zijn uit islamistische bronnen blijkt dat het monument bedoeld is om een bedevaartsoord te worden voor radicale islamisten in Europa en doel van jaarlijks terugke-

rende pelgrimstochten. Copley: 'Donald Hays dwong de regering van de Republiek Servië een verklaring uit te geven met de versie van de radicale islamisten over de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica, ondanks het feit dat het kantoor van de hoge vertegenwoordiger zelf geen mogelijkheden heeft om een eigen onderzoek in te stellen naar de gebeurtenissen en op basis daarvan een eigen oordeel te vellen. Bovendien heeft het Joegoslaviëtribunaal in Den Haag, dat geen vriend van de Serviërs is, haar onderzoek naar de kwestie Srebrenica nog niet afgerond, evenmin als het kantoor van de regering van de Republiek Servië dat met het Joegoslaviëtribunaal samenwerkt.'

Bedrog

Yossef Bodansky, die verschillende boeken heeft geschreven over de oorlog in Joegoslavië en die tevens onderzoeksdirecteur van ISSA is, noemt het aantal van zeventienduizend moslim slachtoffers 'desinformatie' en zegt dat 'alle onafhankelijke forensische bewijzen eerder wijzen op honderden moslim doden, waarschijnlijk minder dan vijfhonderd'. 'De voortdurende nadruk op zulke vermeende hoge aantallen moslim doden in Srebrenica leidt de aandacht af van de eerdere moorden op Servische burgers door moslims.'

Bodansky schreef ook uitgebreid over de band tussen Osama bin Laden en de Bosnische moslims in verschillende rapporten en drie boeken.

Rooper zegt dat ten minste duizend Serviërs, vooral burgers, gedood zijn door troepen die geleid werden door Oric, die niet de moeite nam zijn misdaden te verbergen en zelfs videobanden met afgeslachte Serviërs liet zien aan westerse journalisten.

Ondertussen is een groep academische experts en journalisten uit de VS, Canada, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Servië en Groot-Brittannië samengesteld door professor Edward Herman van de Universiteit van Pennsylvania om het bewijs inzake de gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica in juli 1995 en daarvoor te onderzoeken. Ook zullen zij onderzoeken hoe de media over deze gebeurtenissen verslag hebben gedaan en wat de rol van de politiek geweest is. Naar verwachting zal het rapport van deze groep in juni 2004 beschikbaar zijn.

Rooper wijst erop dat er volgens de VN in juli 1995 voor de inname veertigduizend inwoners van Srebrenica waren en dat dat aantal ruwweg overeenkomt met het aantal voormalige bewoners waarvoor rekenschap is afgelegd tijdens de nasleep. Een commandant van het door moslims ge-

domineerde leger van Bosnië-Herzegovina bevestigde later aan het parlement in Sarajevo dat vijftienduizend van zijn manschappen grotendeels intact ontsnapten naar Tuzla, terwijl de VN ruim 35.000 overlevende burgers registreerde.

Terwijl de inname van Srebrenica in juli 1995 werd gerapporteerd, kwam internationaal protest pas een maand later op gang, nadat Madeleine Albright, toen Amerikaans vertegenwoordiger bij de VN, foto's toonde die volgens haar aantoonde dat duizenden moslim slachtoffers begraven waren bij Nova Kasaba, 19 kilometer van Srebrenica. Opgravingen na de oorlog vonden slechts 33 lichamen in Nova Kasaba. Twee jaar na het incident waren in totaal vierhonderd lichamen op twintig plekken in de buurt van Srebrenica gevonden, een gebied waarin gedurende drie jaar bloedige gevechten hadden plaatsgevonden. In plaats van toe te geven dat er geen bewijs was gevonden voor de genoemde aantallen, werden volgens Rooper alle middelen uit de kast gehaald om de opgepompte aantallen te 'ondersteunen'. 'Woordvoerders van de regering-Clinton suggereerden dat Serviërs de lichamen naar andere locaties hadden overgebracht.'

Rooper stelt dat het opgraven, vervoeren en opnieuw begraven van zeventienduizend lichamen niet alleen onmogelijk was voor het kleine, slecht bevoorradete Bosnisch-Servische leger, maar bovendien zeker opgemerkt was door de intensieve observatie met satellieten.

In 1998 waren duizenden lichamen, opgegraven op locaties verspreid over heel Bosnië, opgeslagen op het vliegveld van Tuzla. Ondanks toepassing van de modernste DNA-technieken, konden slechts tweehonderd lichamen gekoppeld worden aan Srebrenica.

Rond drieduizend namen op een lijst met slachtoffers uit Srebrenica die opgesteld was door het Rode Kruis, kwamen overeen met namen van mensen die hun stem uitgebracht hadden in de Bosnische verkiezingen van 1996.

'Ik wees de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE) erop dat er óf massale verkiezingsfraude had plaatsgevonden óf dat bijna de helft van de vermisten op de lijst nog steeds in leven was', zegt Rooper. 'De OVSE antwoordde uiteindelijk dat de stemlijsten achter slot en grendel werden bewaard en het daarom voor hen niet mogelijk was om deze te onderzoeken.' (Bron: ISSA)

van holst en steijnen

From: Despotovic, Ruza <despot@wish.net>
To: Dolf Loth <dolfloth@hotmail.com>; Richard van Houten <richardenbeba@wxs.nl>; Herman de Tollenaar <my636847@asianhistory.myweb.nl>; <speerpunt@wxs.nl>; Nico & Neeltje Steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>; Hans Hupkes <HANS.Hupkes@Planet.NL>; Globalreflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>
Sent: zaterdag 14 juli 2001 15:49
Subject: Fw: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

----- Original Message -----

From: john peter maher <jpmaher@neiu.edu>
To: Miroslav Antic <miroslav@antic.org>
Cc: Sorabia <sorabia@yahoogroups.com>; NSP <STOP-NSP@topica.com>; News <news@siem.net>; SIM-Egroups <srpskainformativnamreza@egroups.com>; SIM <sim@antic.org>; BALKAN <balkannews@egroups.com>
Sent: Friday, July 13, 2001 8:24 PM
Subject: Re: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

> Opa edit
 > From:
 > "Miroslav Antic" <miroslav@antic.org>
 >
 > 1031
 >
 > Subject:
 > [sorabia] Deconstructing the Srebrenica Myth: A Bosnian Muslim
 > Perspective
 > To:
 > "SNN" <news@antic.org>, "BALKAN" <balkannews@egroups.com>, "SIEM
 > NEWS" <news@siem.net>
 > CC:
 > "Sorabia" <sorabia@egroups.com>, "Skwl" <skwl@lists.golden.net>,
 > "STOP-NSP@topica.com" <STOP-NSP@topica.com>, "Balkanpeace. Org"
 > <seditor@balkanpeace.org>
 >
 >
 >
 > Deconstructing the Srebrenica Myth: A Bosnian Muslim Perspective
 > By: Konstantin Kilibarda (7-31-00)
 >
 > "The international press made the battle for Srebrenica sound like
 > Stalingrad. There is a kind of dialectical relation between the attention
 > of
 >
 > a great power and the power of the media. It creates a distortion in our
 > work. What I am trying to do, without great success, is to correct this
 > distortion." - UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali
 >
 > The "Srebrenica Massacre" is a crucial tactic in a strategy of portraying
 > Serbs, collectively, as genocidal aggressors. That the Bosnian Serb Army
 > (
 > Vojska Republike Srpske - VRS) conducted a premeditated slaughter of 7,000
 > unarmed Bosnian Muslim civilian males at Srebrenica in July 1995 is a
 > durable belief. Is it true?
 >
 > However, not only from the Serb side, there is another, non-CNN,
 > perspective on this chapter of the Balkan story.
 >
 > From the very ranks of the Islamist Bosnians, trained and armed "covertly"
 > by the strange bedfellows, USA and Iran, the "Bosnian Army" (Armija Bosne
 > i
 > Hercegovine - ARBiH), comes incontrovertible evidence that the Islamist
 > -American allies in Sarajevo conspired to manufacture a hoax in Srebrenica
 > with the ultimate objective of provoking and justifying Western
 > intervention.

precedent for such a scenario is well documented in the BBC documentary "Death of Yugoslavia," in which Germany is shown to have deliberately engineered the "fall" of the town of Vukovar in order to gain support for the neo-fascist Croatian secessionists in late 1991.

- >
- > Mr. Annan's Srebrenica Report. In UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recently released report on Srebrenica an astute reader might spot a curious tangent within the text that is never fully explored by Annan. This and the critical omissions within it, hold the key to understanding the complex nature of events that later transpired in the Drina Valley in the summer of 1995.
- >
- > Describing the deliberations of the Izetbegovic regime over the Contact Group's peace initiative, introduced aboard the HMS Invincible in the summer of 1993, the UN Report conveys the following information:
- >
- > "115. Representatives of the Bosniac community gathered in Sarajevo on 28 and 29 September to vote on the peace package. A delegation of Bosniacs from Srebrenica was transported to Sarajevo by UNPROFOR helicopter to participate in the debate. Prior to the meeting, the delegation met in private with President Izetbegovic, who told them that there were Serb proposals to exchange Srebrenica and Zepa for territories around Sarajevo. The delegation opposed the idea, and the subject was not discussed further. Some surviving members of the Srebrenica delegation have stated that President Izetbegovic also told them he had learned that a NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible, but could only occur if the Serbs were to break into Srebrenica, killing at least 5,000 of its people."
- >
- > This would normally be a rather strange assertion for a head of government, such as is not so strange coming from Alija Izetbegovic. It is established that Izetbegovic's own party, the SDA, specialized in staged mortar attacks on civilians which were then blamed on Bosnian Serb forces.
- >
- > This operational tactic of the Sarajevo regime's Special Forces (AID) was designed to gain sympathy and invite NATO intervention on behalf of the Izetbegovic regime. The strategy has been confirmed not only by members of the ARBiH but also by diplomats in the region, including chief negotiator Lord David Owen and UNPROFOR force commanders in Bosnia, General Satish Nambiar of India, General Louis Mackenzie of Canada, and General Michael Rose of Great Britain.
- > A similar deceit on the scale of Srebrenica was not without precedent.
- >
- > As mentioned earlier, an analogous "sacrifice" had already occurred in Croatia.
- > The ruling Croatian neo-fascist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica - HDZ) had decided, at a critical juncture in the battle over Vukovar, not to send necessary reinforcements to the city.
- >
- > This was done on the instructions of Bonn in order to gain maximum propaganda value when Yugoslav forces inevitably retook the city under the circumstances. A similar scenario could therefore ostensibly be engineered between the Sarajevo regime and their handlers in Washington in order to produce a similar propaganda effect on public opinion.
- >
- > By mid-1995 the Clinton Administration had already succeeded in fulfilling

US-foreign policy objectives in the Balkans by ending the
 m-Croat

War in Central Bosnia, by forging an anti-Serbian, Muslim-Croat military
 and

- > political alliance, by increasing military support for these pro-Western
- > belligerents, and by securing UN Security Council approval for limited
- > air-strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.
- >
- > However British, French, German and Russian foreign policy establishments
- > wavered on the question of full-blown NATO intervention against the Serbs
- > for complex domestic-political reasons. The already firmly anti-Serbian
- > position of the Contact Group had to be further instilled in the general
- > populace before a full-blown NATO intervention could be launched against
- > the
- >
- > Serbs. Such an intervention would invariably include changing the "facts
- > on
- >
- > the ground" and would involve large-scale Western-backed ethnic-cleansing
- > of
- >
- > Serbian populations throughout Croatia and large swaths of Bosnia. In
- > order
- >
- > to sustain such a criminal enterprise the West needed to demonize the
- > Serbs
- > to such an extent that their large scale victimization would only be
- > greeted
- >
- > with, at best, a "now they're getting a taste of their own medicine"
- > logic.
- >
- > Clinton's Modest Proposal.
- >
- > Although Izetbegovic has denied making the above statement about the
- > possibility of NATO intervention in the wake of Srebrenica's fall, the
- > allegations have persisted in the Bosnian press. In fact there is an
- > added
- > twist to the story. This appeared in a 22 June 1998 interview with Hakija
- > Meholic in the Bosnian weekly DANI ("Days").
- >
- > Meholic had been Srebrenica's chief of police. Together with Naser Oric
- > he
- > spearheaded
- > anti-Serbian pogroms in the Drina Valley. Meholic was present at the
- > meetings in Sarajevo on 28 and 29 September 1993. He was present when Serb
- > forces
- > took Srebrenica in 1995. According to Meholic, Izetbegovic had said:
- >
- > "You know, I was offered by Clinton in April 1993 (after the fall of
- > Cerska and Konjevic Polje) that the Chetnik forces enter Srebrenica, carry
- > out a slaughter of 5,000 Muslims, and then there will be a military
- > intervention.' [Meholic then continues] Our delegation was composed of
- > nine
- >
- > people, one among us was from Bratunac and unfortunately he is the only
- > one
- > not alive now, but all the others from the delegation are alive and can
- > confirm this."
- >
- > Thus in contrast with the UN report, it is clearly stated that none other
- > than US President Bill Clinton had personally suggested that a "Srebrenica
- > Massacre" scenario would produce NATO intervention on behalf of the ARBiH.
- > Hakija Meholic and the hardcore Srebrenica militants in the ARBiH to this
- > day insist that "everybody betrayed us" and are determined to press for an
- > inquiry.
- >
- > Srebrenica's Troubled Demons. Although designated a UN protected
- > "safe-haven," which was supposed to mean complete demilitarization, in
- 1993,

for US-foreign policy objectives in the Balkans by ending the Muslim-Croat

War in Central Bosnia, by forging an anti-Serbian, Muslim-Croat military and

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- > political alliance, by increasing military support for these pro-Western belligerents, and by securing UN Security Council approval for limited air-strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.
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- > people, one among us was from *Herzegovina* and unfortunately he is the only one
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> not alive now, but all the others from the delegation are alive and can confirm this."

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- > Thus in contrast with the UN report, it is clearly stated that none other than US President Bill Clinton had personally suggested that a "Srebrenica Massacre" scenario would produce NATO intervention on behalf of the ARBiH. Hakija Meholic and the hardcore Srebrenica militants in the ARBiH to this day insist that "everybody betrayed us" and are determined to press for an inquiry.
- >

> Srebrenica's Troubled Demons. Although designated a UN protected "safe-haven," which was supposed to mean complete demilitarization, in 1993,

"safe haven" Srebrenica was packed with active with ARBiH units
 1995. Various intelligence reports estimate that 1,500-5,000 ARBiH troops
 were stationed in the enclave when it was lost to the VRS on July 12,
 1995.

- >
- > The UN protected "safe-haven" was used as a de facto launching pad for ARBiH
- >
- > attacks on surrounding Serbian villages and civilians. Thus the real
- > tragedy was the UN's failure to protect the entire civilian population of
- > the Drina Valley by failing to demilitarize the enclave.
- >
- > The ARBiH units stationed in Srebrenica were militant and uncompromising
- > towards Serbs, whom they termed "Chetnik aggressors". It is not
- surprising
- > that an alternate scenario about Srebrenica's fall emerges from the ARBiH
- > soldiers in the enclave itself. They were instrumental in spreading fear
- in
- > the surrounding countryside by brutal attacks on undefended Serbian
- > villages.
- >
- > For these Bosnian Muslim nationalists the whole Srebrenica scenario that
- > played out in the Western media after the enclave's fall was profoundly
- > injurious to the reputations of these "defenders" of the "Bosniac" people.
- >
- > In fact in the days before the enclaves fell, key figures in Srebrenica
- were
- >
- > ordered out of the enclave by Sarajevo,. Factional fighting, confirmed by
- > Dutch
- > peacekeepers on the ground, erupted between ARBiH factions as to the
- > ultimate fate of Srebrenica. The cause of their dispute was not only
- > whether or not to abandon the town to the small advancing VRS forces, but
- > also stemmed from complex political struggles within the ARBiH and the
- SDA.
- > The struggle was a result of long-standing tensions between locally
- > unpopular Izetbegovic loyalists, who took into consideration the situation
- > in all of Bosnia, and those local leaders more narrowly committed to
- > "defending" Srebrenica. What becomes clear from the picture, however, was
- > that Izetbegovic was interested in bargaining away Srebrenica in order to
- > achieve full control of Sarajevo, most of which - except the Serbian
- > neighborhoods, were already in the hands of his inner-circle. Srebrenica
- > was
- > therefore politically expendable to Izetbegovic, and it is increasingly
- > evident that he exploited this for maximum political advantage. With one
- > defl
- > political maneuver he could not only eliminate popular elements within his
- > own party un beholden to his directives but at the same time
- > invite Western military intervention against the hated "Chetnik
- aggressor".
- >
- > In an 18 January 1995 interview with DANI, Nesib Buric, former member of
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- > ARBiH battalion stationed in Srebrenica, and now Deputy Mayor for Social
- > Security of War Veterans and Disabled Persons in Srebrenica, summed-up the
- > perspective of the local Srebrenica faction within the ARBiH, "I know that
- > they are now trying to humiliate people from Srebrenica and spread rumors
- > that we supposedly did not fight and were slain while running away from
- > Srebrenica. No one can deny that in the Srebrenica municipality there are
- > 2,000 buried fighters. No one can deny that we set up a large free
- > territory. However, without assistance from outside we could not hold out
- > for long surrounded by the enemy. You can write that I absolutely support
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- >
- > refute his assertions with arguments? Instead they are using slander and
- > saying that Hakija was like this and like that. Hakija was among the first
- > people in Srebrenica to pick up a rifle and work on the organization of
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> In short the veterans in Srebrenica make a three-fold claim, that:

> 1) A high-level political decision was made between the leadership in
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> enclave,

> 2) That the ARBiH militants in the enclave were betrayed by the
Izetbegovic

> regime during the critical days in mid-June 1995 when the enclave fell,
and

> that
> 3) Those killed in Srebrenica were ARBiH soldiers who were defending their
> positions and not fleeing civilians.

> Any version of events that doesn't seriously consider this perspective on
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> dynamics of the conflict in the Balkans. By obscuring the real facts and
> presenting a simple scenario about Srebrenica, the Western foreign policy
> establishment and media have designed a narrative with the sole objective
of

> demonizing the Serbs and justifying the continued existence of NATO and
its

> presence within the Balkans.

> The description of events described above, however, suggests a much more
> complex scenario. It becomes increasingly evident that there was a
conscious

> decision made in Sarajevo to abandon the enclave's "defenders" and extract
> maximum propaganda value by presenting their defeat as a massacre of
> helpless people. Furthermore, the distinct possibility that the Clinton
> Administration was intimately involved in this decision - and the
precedent

> set by Germany and Croatia in Vukovar - suggest the profound control by
> Western nations over the decision and war-making apparatus of the
> secessionist republics during key phases of Yugoslavia's dismemberment.

The

> fact that the Western media has only played a marginal role (and even then
> with giant time-lags) in exposing the foreign policy machinations of our
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> Miroslav Antic,
> <http://www.antic.org/SNN/>

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> rda

> From:

"Miroslav Antic" <miroslav@antic.org>

1031

> Subject:
 > [sorabia] Deconstructing the Srebrenica Myth: A Bosnian Muslim
 > Perspective
 > To:
 > "SNN" <news@antic.org>, "BALKAN" <balkannews@egroups.com>, "SIEM
 > NEWS" <news@siem.net>
 > CC:
 > "Sorabia" <sorabia@egroups.com>, "Skwl" <skwl@lists.golden.net>,
 > "STOP-NSP@topica.com" <STOP-NSP@topica.com>, "Balkanpeace. Org"
 > <scditor@balkanpeace.org>

> Deconstructing the Srebrenica Myth: A Bosnian Muslim Perspective

> By: Konstantin Kilibarda (7-31-00)

> "The international press made the battle for Srebrenica sound like
 > Stalingrad. There is a kind of dialectical relation between the attention
 > of

> a great power and the power of the media. It creates a distortion in our
 > work. What I am trying to do, without great success, is to correct this
 > distortion."

> - Comments by UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali at the time of
 > the

> Srebrenica's 'fall'

> For all intents and purposes the "Srebrenica Massacre" has become for many
 > advocates of the "New Interventionism" the sine qua non of the Western
 > presence in the Balkans. The notion that the Bosnian Serb Army or Vojska
 > Republike Srpske (VRS) organized and executed a premeditated slaughter of
 > 7,000 unarmed Bosnian Muslim civilian males has become a crucial element
 > in

> portraying Serbs, collectively, as genocidal aggressors.

> However, one need not look too deep, or even to the Serbian side, for
 > another, non-CNN, perspective on this chapter of the Balkan story. A
 > completely different narrative emerges from within the ranks of the Armija
 > Bosne i Hercegovine (ARBiH), in other words the army of the US-backed
 > Islamist faction in Bosnia.

> There exists strong evidence that the United States and the pro-American
 > leadership in Sarajevo conspired to manufacture a tragedy in Srebrenica
 > with

> the ultimate objective of provoking Western intervention. A precedent for
 > such a scenario is well documented in the BBC's Death of Yugoslavia in
 > which

> Germany is shown to have deliberately engineered the "fall" of the town of
 > Vukovar in order to gain support for the neo-fascist Croatian
 > secessionists
 > in late 1991.

> About That Odd Tangent in Mr. Annan's Srebrenica Report.

> In UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recently released report on
 > Srebrenica

> an astute reader might spot a curious tangent within the text that is
 > never

> fully explored by Annan. This tangent, and the critical omissions within
 > it, hold the key to understanding the complex nature of events that later
 > transpired in the Drina Valley in the summer of 1995.

> Describing the deliberations of the Izetbegovic regime over the Contact
 > Group's peace initiative, introduced aboard the HMS Invincible in the

1993, the UN Report conveys the following information,

115. Representatives of the Bosniac community gathered in Sarajevo on 28 and 29 September to vote on the peace package. A delegation of Bosniacs from

> Srebrenica was transported to Sarajevo by UNPROFOR helicopter to participate

> in the debate. Prior to the meeting, the delegation met in private with > President Izetbegovic, who told them that there were Serb proposals to > exchange Srebrenica and Zepa for territories around Sarajevo. The delegation

> opposed the idea, and the subject was not discussed further. Some surviving

> members of the Srebrenica delegation have stated that President Izetbegovic

> also told them he had learned that a NATO intervention in Bosnia and > Herzegovina was possible, but could only occur if the Serbs were to break > into Srebrenica, killing at least 5,000 of its people."

> This would normally be a rather strange assertion for a head of government > but it is not so strange coming from Alija Izetbegovic. It is well > established that Izetbegovic's own party, the SDA, specialized in staged > mortar attacks on civilians which were then blamed on Bosnian Serb forces. > This operational tactic of the Sarajevo regime's Special Forces (AID) was > designed to gain sympathy and invite NATO intervention on behalf of the > Izetbegovic regime. This strategy has been confirmed not only by members of

> the ARBiH but also by many diplomats in the region, including chief > negotiator Lord Owen and several UNPROFOR force commanders in Bosnia, such > as General Satish Nambiar of India, General Louis Mackenzie of Canada, and > General Michael Rose of Great Britain.

> A similar deceit on the scale of Srebrenica was not without precedent. As > mentioned earlier, an analogous "sacrifice" had already occurred in Croatia.

> The ruling Croatian neo-fascist HDZ had decided, at a critical juncture in > the battle over Vukovar, not to send necessary reinforcements to the city. > This was done on the instructions of Bonn in order to gain maximum > propaganda value when Yugoslav forces inevitably retook the city under the > circumstances. A similar scenario could therefore ostensibly be engineered > between the Sarajevo regime and their handlers in Washington in order to > produce a very similar propaganda effect on public opinion.

> By mid-1995 the Clinton Administration had already succeeded in fulfilling > major US-foreign policy objectives in the Balkans by ending the Muslim-Croat

> War in Central Bosnia, by forging an anti-Serbian, Muslim-Croat military and

> political alliance, by increasing military support for these pro-Western > belligerents, and by securing UN Security Council approval for limited > air-strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

> However British, French, German and Russian foreign policy establishments > wavered on the question of full-blown NATO intervention against the Serbs > for complex domestic-political reasons. The already firmly anti-Serbian > position of the Contact Group had to be further instilled in the general > populace before a full-blown NATO intervention could be launched against the

> Serbs. Such an intervention would invariably include changing the "facts on

> the ground" and would involve large-scale Western-backed ethnic-cleansing

erbian populations throughout Croatia and large swaths of Bosnia. In
er

> to sustain such a criminal enterprise the West needed to demonize the
Serbs

> to such an extent that their large scale victimization would only be
greeted

>
> with, at best, a "now they're getting a taste of their own medicine"
logic.

>
> Clinton's Modest Proposal.

>
> Although Izetbegovic has denied making the above statement about the
> possibility of NATO intervention in the wake of Srebrenica's fall, the
> allegations have persisted in the Bosnian press. In fact there is an
added

> twist to the story. This additional information appeared in a June 22nd,
> 1998 interview with Hakija Meholic in the Bosnian weekly DANI. Meholic
had

>
> been Srebrenica's chief of police. Together with Naser Oric he spearheaded
> anti-Serbian pogroms in the Drina Valley. Meholic was present at the
Sept.

> 28th and 29th, 1993 meetings in Sarajevo. He was present when Serbian
forces

>
> took Srebrenica in 1995. According to Meholic, Izetbegovic had said:

>
> "You know, I was offered by Clinton in April 1993 (after the fall of
> Cerska and Konjevic Polje) that the Chetnik forces enter Srebrenica, carry
> out a slaughter of 5,000 Muslims, and then there will be a military
> intervention." [Meholic then continues] Our delegation was composed of
nine

>
> people, one among us was from Bratunac and unfortunately he is the only
one
> not alive now, but all the others from the delegation are alive and can
> confirm this."

>
> Thus in contrast with the UN report, it is clearly stated that none other
> than US President Bill Clinton had personally suggested that a "Srebrenica
> Massacre" scenario would produce NATO intervention on behalf of the ARBiH.
> Hakija Meholic and the hardcore Srebrenica militants in the ARBiH to this
> day insist that "everybody betrayed us" and are determined to press for an
> inquiry.

>
> Srebrenica's Troubled Demons

>
> Although designated a UN protected "safe-haven" (which was supposed to
mean

> complete demilitarization) in 1993, it is abundantly clear that the
> Srebrenica enclave continued to be filled with ARBiH units through 1995.

> Various intelligence reports estimate that between 1,500-5,000 ARBiH
troops

> were stationed in the enclave when it was lost to the VRS on July 12,
1995.

>
> The UN protected "safe-haven" was used as a de facto launching pad for
ARBiH

>
> attacks on surrounding Serbian villages and civilians. Thus the real
> tragedy was the UN's failure to protect the entire civilian population of
> the Drina Valley by failing to demilitarize the enclave.

>
> The ARBiH units stationed in Srebrenica were quite militant and
> uncompromising in their attitude towards Serbs, whom they deemed
invariably

> as "Chetnik aggressors". It is not surprising that an alternate scenario
> about Srebrenica's fall emerges from the ARBiH soldiers in the enclave

They were instrumental in spreading fear in the surrounding countryside by carrying out brutal attacks on undefended Serbian villages. For these Bosnian Muslim nationalists the whole Srebrenica scenario that played out in the Western media after the enclave's fall was profoundly injurious to the reputations of these "defenders" of the "Bosniac" people.

> In fact in the days before the enclaves fall, key figures in Srebrenica were

> called out of the enclave. Factional fighting, confirmed by Dutch peacekeepers on the ground, erupted between ARBiH factions as to the ultimate fate of Srebrenica. The cause of their dispute was not only whether or not to abandon the town to the small advancing VRS forces, but also stemmed from complex political struggles within the ARBiH and the SDA.

> The struggle was a result of long-standing tensions between locally unpopular Izetbegovic loyalists, who took into consideration the situation in all of Bosnia, and those local leaders more narrowly committed to "defending" Srebrenica. What becomes clear from the picture, however, was that Izetbegovic was interested in bargaining away Srebrenica in order to achieve full control of Sarajevo (most of which - barring the Serbian sections - being already in the hands of his inner-circle). Srebrenica was

> therefore politically expendable to Izetbegovic, and it is increasingly evident that he exploited it for maximum political advantage. With one deft

> political maneuver he could not only eliminate popular elements within his own party that weren't beholden to his directives but at the same time invite Western military intervention against the hated "Chetnik aggressor".

> In a January 18th interview with DANI, Nesib Buric, former member of an ARBiH battalion stationed in Srebrenica, and now Deputy Mayor for Social Security of War Veterans and Disabled Persons in Srebrenica, clearly summed-up the perspective of the local Srebrenica faction within the ARBiH,

> "I know that they are now trying to humiliate people from Srebrenica and spread rumors that we supposedly did not fight and were slain while running away from Srebrenica. No one can deny that in the Srebrenica municipality there are 2,000 buried fighters. No one can deny that we set up a large free

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> Miroslav Antic wrote:

>> FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

>>> Rasprava u srpskom parlamentu juce se jedva doticala dnevnog reda, suzbijanja divlje gradnje. Zucnu raspravu, optuzbe, pa i pokusaj politicke promocije za skupstinskom govornicom i ispred skupstinske sale izazvao je dokumentarni film "Vrisak iz groba", koji je predhodne veceri emitovan na RTS povodom seste godisnjice masakra nad muslimanskim stanovnistvom u Srebrenici.

>>> Zasedanje parlamenta je pocelo zahtevom Aleksandra Vucica iz SRS-a da Skupstina formira anketni odbor koji ce se baviti "utvrdivanjem cinjenica o sistematskoj kampanji koju nad srpskim narodom sprovodi javno glasilo Republike Srbije, RTS". On je emitovanje filma o zrtvama u Srebrenici nazvao istorijskom sramotom i histericnom propagandom protiv

skog naroda.

Cedomir Jovanovic je rekao da nemaju razloga za trijumf oni koji su bili
akteri svega onoga kroz sta smo prosli, pa i onoga sto im smeta, cak i
> kada se nalazi na filmskoj traci i dodao da Skupstina nema razloga da se
> bavi uredivanjem TV ili bilo kog drugog medijskog prostora.
>> (Glas javnosti)

>>

>> Miroslav Antic,

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Verklaring van ex-minister Voorhoeve

20/10/
1998

verdediging zou dragen. Binnen een veilig gebied zouden alle aanwezigen dan ontwapend moeten worden. Dat zou een echt veilig gebieden beleid zijn geweest.

Een tweede stel vragen heeft de heer Voorhoeve over het beleid van de Bosnische regering in Sarajevo in de periode mei tot en met juli 1995. Begin juni werd in Parijs de Rapid Reaction Force opgericht. Er was in Bosnië sprake van constante gijzeling van VN-personeel. In Parijs sprak de heer Voorhoeve met de heer Sacirbey. Deze stelde dat de Bosnische regering op de hoogte was van de overwegingen van de VN ongewapende waarnemers in plaats van blauwhelmen te sturen. Sacirbey zei dat de Bosnische regering in staat was de veilige gebieden zelf te verdedigen. Zowel qua aantallen manschappen als qua wapens zou dit volgens Sacirbey te realiseren zijn. Hij pleitte ervoor dat de VN serieus een andere aanpak dan tot nu toe gevolgd zouden overwegen. Deze opzet zou Sarajevo de controle geven over de gebieden.

De heer Voorhoeve zag echter niet in, hoe met de aanwezige Bosnische manschappen, zonder zware wapens in fysiek moeilijke omstandigheden, Srebrenica effectief verdedigd kon worden. Hij meende dat de enclave onverdedigbaar was. Als de Bosnische regering meende dat zij zelf Srebrenica kon verdedigen, waarom werd daar in juli 1995 dan geen poging toe ondernomen? De vraag is van belang, wat het beleid was van de Bosnische regering toen begin juli duidelijk werd dat de Serviërs de enclave zouden aanvallen. De heer Voorhoeve schetst drie mogelijkheden. Allereerst kan het zijn dat Sarajevo geen besluit heeft genomen. Een tweede mogelijkheid is dat het opdracht heeft gegeven de enclave Srebrenica te verdedigen. Er waren per slot van rekening ± 8000 bewapende mannen in de enclave bestaande uit 4-5000 militairen en ca 3000 milities. Een derde optie is dat vanuit Sarajevo de opdracht is gegeven de enclave te verlaten omdat deze toch zou vallen.

De heer Voorhoeve heeft geen bewijzen maar slechts tegenstrijdige aanwijzingen voor bepaalde scenarios. De eerste aanwijzing betreft de melding van Nederlandse militairen in de enclave. Zij hebben op een berghelling op de avond van 10 juli een grote verzameling mensen waargenomen. Zij maakten zich kennelijk klaar om de enclave te verlaten. Ze droegen nieuwe wapens en leken formaties te vormen. Later werd bekend dat er een exodus heeft plaatsgevonden, dat de Serviërs deze exodus onder vuur hebben genomen en dat er vele mannen krijgsgevangen zijn gemaakt en toen of later vermoord. Een Servische kolonel zou volgens de heer Voorhoeve tegen een Nederlandse militair gezegd hebben dat ze ± 6000 krijgsgevangenen hadden gemaakt. Van deze exodus zijn ongeveer 3000 mannen in Centraal-Bosnië aangekomen, waaruit later de 28^e brigade is gevormd. Deze aantallen passen binnen de vaak genoemde cijfers van een exodus van 10 tot 15 000 mannen. Niemand weet natuurlijk de precieze getallen.

De Bosnische bevelhebber Delic zou in het Bosnische parlement gezegd hebben dat de uitbraak uit Srebrenica een geslaagde operatie is geweest (of woorden van die strekking). Dit zou impliceren dat er opdracht gegeven is de enclave te verlaten. Het is volgens de heer Voorhoeve mogelijk dat zon opdracht tot verlating is gegeven, omdat de verwachting bestond dat wanneer de Serviërs de enclave zouden aanvallen dit zou leiden tot een hopeloos gevecht dat zou eindigen in een bloedbad. Indien dit de achtergrond van de uittocht was, heeft Delic onderschat, dat Mladic de exodus ten westen van Srebrenica stond op te wachten, waardoor het merendeel is uitgemoord.

Een geheel andere aanwijzing berust op meldingen van Nederlandse blauwhelmen die meldden dat er sprake was van groepen moslimstrijders die grote onderlinge meningsverschillen hadden.

Er zou leiding ontbreken. De leider Oric was afwezig. Hij zou in Tuzla zitten. Er vonden schermutselingen plaats, bijvoorbeeld bij OP-M waar sprake zou zijn van een liquidatie vanwege insubordinatie. Er waren

Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <desper@wish.net>
 Aan: "Nico & Neeltje"
 Verzonden: zondag 6 april 2003 0:11
 Onderwerp: Srebrenica

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Explaining the Srebrenica "Massacre"

Information compiled by Antiwar.com columnist Nebojsa Malic
 (if you'd like to contribute links, please send to [Jeremy Sapienza](mailto:Jeremy.Sapienza))

What happened in Srebrenica in July 1995?

Note the question mark. To Bosnian Muslims, Srebrenica is a story of mass murder, and they use this assertion as a "bloody shirt" to accuse the Serbs of genocide. Many Serbs, in response, simply raise the issue of Srebrenica Muslims' crimes against their Serb neighbors – which are indisputable, but irrelevant to the debate. Meanwhile, the Srebrenica refugees are used as expendable political capital. Any murder in Srebrenica was a death too many. Anyone who murdered prisoners or unarmed civilians is a war criminal. But what happened? No one is in any hurry to find out. The myth is much more convenient. This page is not offering the answer, but merely asking questions no one else seems to be asking. It may well be that some 7000 people died in the aftermath of Srebrenica's fall. Or it may be they did not. Without a serious, honest inquiry, how will anyone ever know for sure? There can be no justice, no peace, no reconciliation (if any) without the truth.

Nebojsa Malic
 August 2002

Links Libraries

Centre for Peace in the Balkans has a library of links regarding Srebrenica.

Emperors-Clothes has also dealt with the subject extensively.

Serbian Unity Congress, a Serbian-American NGO, has collected a few

resources on Srebrenica that include articles from Western press questioning the accepted story.

Individual Resources

From Antiwar.com:

Shadows of Srebrenica

Not letting facts get in the way

Nebojsa Malic's take on the official Srebrenica story.

'Srebrenica' – Code Word to Silence Critics of US Policy in the Balkans

HOLOCAUST! GENOCIDE! ETHNIC CLEANSING!

Stella Jatrass, in July 2000, quoted many official and journalistic sources to show the purposeful anti-Serb, "pro-" genocide bias created by the Empire.

Srebrenica: The Fall of a "Safe" Area, the report release in April 2002 by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation – Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses the fall of Srebrenica. This is the official Dutch document on Srebrenica.

Here is a transcript of the 31 March 1998 hearing "The Betrayal of Srebrenica," organized by the US House Committee on International Relations - Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. It features witnesses from Human Rights Watch, Coalition for International Justice (a lobby for the ICTY), Amnesty International, "human rights" experts and even a Muslim from Srebrenica who worked for the UN and came away unscathed.

Naser Oric was a known war criminal as early as 1994.

Serbian-American Alliance of New England (SANE) has an informative page on Srebrenica.

The key to ICTY's "massacre" and "genocide" charges was Drazen Erdemovic, a Croat allegedly member of the Bosnian Serb army, who was given a short jail sentence (and later released) in exchange for accusing Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Erdemovic allegedly fought on all three sides in the Bosnian War, and was diagnosed as insane at a hospital in Serbia.

Erdemovic's sentence speaks of 1200 Muslims - not 8000!

Srebrenica was officially declared "genocide" when Serb General Radislav Krstic was convicted by the ICTY in August 2001.

However, his verdict dealt with estimates and beliefs, not facts.

US Committee for Refugees site features interviews with the Srebrenica displaced, which frequently contradict themselves in an attempt to sound more tragic.

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van holst en steijnen

From: Despotovic, Ruza <despot@wish.net>
To: Globalreflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>; <speerpunt@wxs.nl>; Nico & Neeltje Steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: zaterdag 14 juli 2001 16:03
Subject: Fw: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

----- Original Message -----

From: john_peter maher <jpmaher@nciu.edu>
To: Miroslav Antic <miroslav@antic.org>
Cc: Sorabia <sorabia@yahoo.com>; NSP <STOP-NSP@topica.com>; News <news@siem.net>; SIM-Egroups <srpskainformativnamreza@egroups.com>; SIM <sim@antic.org>; BALKAN <balkannews@egroups.com>; Worldservice, BBC <worldservice.letters@bbc.co.uk>; BBC <letters@bbc.co.uk>
Sent: Friday, July 13, 2001 8:03 PM
Subject: Re: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

> PBS USA also re-broadcast the BBC fabrication.
 > Just like Christmas re-runs, watch for it again on 10 July 2002 et ad
 > infin.
 >
 > jpm
 >
 > c/o PBS,
 > Re: "SREBRNICA-A Cry from the Grave."
 > (PBS/TV. 17-1-99, 11PM PST)
 >
 > 19-1-00
 >
 > Dear Bill Moyers,
 >
 > Years ago, I respected you as an honest reporter of some depth,
 > well worth listening to. I am aware that you did not produce, write and
 > direct the so-called "Documentary." Yet, you cannot be simply extracted
 > from an intimate association with it as the fully supportive narrator.
 As
 > such it was an exercise in self-immolation, moral and intellectual. Out
 of
 > an earlier recollection of you I have sent you a request to postpone the
 > Srebrnica presentation until I could direct you into research avenues
 which
 > would not support the claim that "7,000" Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered
 in
 > cold blood by the Serbs. I wanted to provide you with the broader contexts
 > into which Srebrnica needs to be placed for a comprehensive and balanced
 > approach aiming not at sensationalism but at an approximation of truth. I
 > suggested that you could get a fax of an article by George Pumphrey which
 > would, at once alert you to step back before going on TV. You did not take
 > me seriously and I no longer feel any restraint in embarking on a
 criticism
 > you are not likely to dismiss. I fervently hope that whatever decency is
 > left still in Bill Moyers it will at least singe your conscience. I divide
 > my criticism into several sections.
 >
 > First, I have both practical and theoretical experience with making of
 > documentaries. Back in the late Fifties, I used to work for MGM-Metrotone
 > News doing just that. I also taught at Berkeley a graduate seminar in
 "Film
 > and History." Thus, my first point is that the celluloid is no match for
 > historical research. It can, however, present the findings from such
 > professional endeavors with a dramatic flair that does not leap as easily
 > out of text pages. Your piece on Srebrnica is a collage, a pastiche. It
 does
 > not have the slightest connection with serious research. It is barely
 held
 > together by focusing on two obviously educated and physically attractive
 > Bosnian Muslims, a woman and a man who lost one or more immediate

- relatives
- > in the aftermath of Srebrenica's fall to the Bosnian Serb army.
- > While no one has been able to find 7,000 bodies, even after the post-Dayton
- > occupation of Republika Srpska and a sustained, large amount of search digs
- > under NATO protection, you "introduce" the claim by telling the viewers that
- > the green countryside is actually one vast "mass graveyard." You neither
- > have on hand nor could you show any credible evidence in this respect. The
- > mere comment that there "is some evidence that bodies were re-buried" does
- > not really do it, Bill. Nor do you prove anything by showing repeatedly
- > heavy Serb-manned machine guns spraying nearby forests. There was a civil
- > war in Bosnia. Srebrenica was defended by Bosnian Muslim forces commanded by
- > Nasir Oric (who, by the way, was once Milosevich's bodyguard). It was taken,
- > even by your statement, through a well-executed military plan. Gen. Ratko
- > Mladic asked for surrender of men and arms after the Serb troops captured
- > Srebrenica. You cannot claim total innocence about one of the basic problems
- > in civil wars. Soldiers and civilians blend imperceptibly in civil wars.
- > Throw the rifle away and you are a civilian. Carry it and you are a soldier.
- > This is why in Bosnia's three-way conflicts all sides isolated male
- > captives. The largest portion of Srebrenica's defenders fled into the forests
- > on their way to Tuzla and other places under the control of Bosnian Muslims.
- > Some threw their weapons away and some did not. In failing to meet Radic's
- > basic demand the ex-army of defenders, fleeing in disarray, left themselves
- > open to Serb reprisals. But there are two other dimensions, one more distant
- > in time but powerful in the minds of Bosnia's Serbs and the other
- > immediate, doubly powerful and glossed over in your presentation. I am
- > referring first to the period of 1941-1943 when tens of thousands of Serb
- > civilians -- men and women and children indiscriminately -- were really
- > slaughtered by the Bosnian Muslims, spearheaded by the infamous Handzar
- > Division (some of its men, by the way again, fought also against U.S. forces
- > landing in Italy at the time when the Serbs were returning hundreds of
- > parachuted American pilots to duty). Their bodies were buried in pits, real
- > mass graves(cemented [over]) by Tito and re-opened as Yugoslavia began to
- > disintegrate). The Bosnian Serbs and Serbs in general believed and said, as
- > did the Jews after the Holocaust, to "never again" allow this to happen to
- > them and go unpunished.
- > A second dimension concerns the fact that Srebrenica, while being declared
- > as a UN protected safe zone, regularly spewed forth Oric's henchmen who
- > tortured and massacred Serb villagers around the main town. Some 200 Serb
- > villages were looted, burned and emptied of its live inhabitants into
- > "other" graves which are never mentioned. This took place over a period of
- > just under one year. Some of the Serb soldiers who took Srebrenica had fled
- > from the killings in a countryside devoid of foreign reporters and cameras,
- > except one. It belonged to Nasir Oric. He took films of atrocities and
- > bragged about them. He even went as far as to show a video tape to two
- > foreign correspondents. One was from Canada and the other from Boston's
- > Globe. The celluloid did have a three-foot shot or two of Oric and you
- > mentioned, in passing, that he did some terrible things but this was
- > "buried" in such a way as to make him appear almost as an "avenging angel."
- > Would you have had any humanitarian feelings toward the fleeing and defeated
- > Bosnian Muslim men had you been in the place of a young Serb soldier whose
- > father was roasted on the spit by the "defenders" of Srebrenica? To put it
- > another way, your presentation completely decontextualized the Srebrenica
- > Story, isolating the alleged "slaughter of 7,000 Bosnian Muslims" in such
- > a
- > way as to turn the Serbs in general into "neo-Nazi butchers" of "innocent

- > Muslim victims." Interestingly enough from a purely pictorial and almost
- > certainly unintended point of view, neither General Mladic, nor most of his
- > men, nor yet the Serb civilians celebrating in Srebrenica looked remotely
- > like the intended monsters.
- >
- > This brings me to the next section. One of the fundamental principles of any
- > research is to find first the sources, ascertain their credibility and be
- > especially cautious when it comes from self-serving governments. The figures
- > of "7,000" advanced (especially the addition of 14 more since no one in
- > this world could possibly know the exact number) "8,000" earlier and later
- > of "4,000" -- all of them are from claims of the Sarajevo Government. You
- > have no way of knowing to what extent they can be trustworthy and the PBS
- > presentation shows that no one associated with the "Srebrenica Story" cared
- > much about accuracy but mainly about "impact." This makes it more dramatic
- > and more "powerful" as the TV announcements of Srebrenica claimed through
- > advance notices of the show. I mentioned, in an attempt to warn you, that
- > long after the Bosnian Serb army took Srebrenica some 3,000-plus of the
- > presumably "missing" names from Srebrenica turned up on the electoral
- > rolls.
- > Equally, while the Sarajevo Government proclaimed Oric as "dead," he has
- > been seen in Tuzla, making money as a disco owner. But, being dead, this
- > self-admitted war criminal cannot be indicted like the live Ratko Mladic
- > whose record throughout the Bosnian wars (and in carrying out the military
- > provisions of Dayton later) is very different from Oric's.
- >
- >
- > As a historian who appreciates the indisputable basic value of contexts I
- > had to ask myself why again and now Srebrenica pops up as the "worst
- > example
- > of Serb "crimes" in ex-Yugoslavia, without any de-escalation of the claim
- > if for no other reason because there is insufficient evidence. Yes, there
- > were beatings, tortures and executions. There is nothing nastier than
- > civil
- > wars in which factors of religion and ideology merge with ethnicities.
- > From
- > the antiseptic distance of our "civilized" drawing-rooms such horrors
- > become
- > incomprehensible. To the "locals" on the ground they are widely understood
- > as the "price" of belonging to a defeated group. No matter what angle of
- > vision enters into one's assessment such behavior must be condemned. Yet,
- > there is no need to "overload" the story and deliberately hide the
- > contexts.
- > How many fleeing men were actually killed after the military battle?
- > Probably in the range of about a 1,000. A leading American Serb went to
- > Srebrenica after the Serbs took it and asked personally one of the
- > high-ranking officers (whom, if I recall correctly, he had known in his
- > youth) to tell him what really happened with the beatings and executions
- > of
- > Muslim men. He was told that in looking for Oric's killers who had
- > terrorized Serb villagers hundreds of times egregious brutalities and
- > killings did take place but that there was no real attempt to
- > "exterminate"
- > the local Muslim population. This is further confirmed by the fact --
- > which
- > was shown in the TV collage -- that women and children were allowed to
- > leave
- > and were given transportation as well (fuel being paid for by the UN).
- > That
- > is not a case of "genocide" by any standards of logic and definition, and
- > doubly so when it is recalled that a state of civil war did exist against
- > the background of routinized war crimes committed by Oric and his "elite
- > corps."
- > In asking the question "why are Moyers and PBS pushing Srebrenica now" I
- > came
- > up with some rather sobering observations. I note that in this century -
- > suddenly -- reporting from Kosovo in the major scribal and audio-visual
- > media has virtually stopped. The news out of Kosovo (which I continuously
- > have through other avenues of information) is so bad and so lopsided that
- > each passing day steadily diminishes any and all of the justifications for

- > the "air war" over Yugoslavia. NATO is coming more and more into view as a
- > war criminal itself (the evidence is not just overwhelming it is
- > staggering). So far about 150,000 Serbs have been ethnically cleansed from
- > Kosovo under the occupation of 40,000 NATO troops and crime is rising
- > astronomically as Albanians commit crimes against Albanians. It therefore
- > becomes imperative to keep dehumanizing "the Serbs" for anything in the
- > earlier years of fratricidal (both the Bosnian Muslims and Christians are
- > Slavs, originally the same group of Serbs) armed conflicts in
- > ex-Yugoslavia. Massive reports by the European Community (900 pages),
- > followed by individual OSCE Observers (who had been posted to Kosovo in
- > November 1998), by the German intelligence, by a number of foreign
- > reporters, by Catholic Albanians, a handful of Jews at Kosovo, and others
- > too many to enumerate, show that the Serbs did not target Kosovo Albanians
- > as a people before the NATO air war (March 24-June 4, 1999) and that there
- > was no "genocide" carried out by the Serbs even during the 78 days of NATO
- > bombings. As Presidential Elections approach here at home, it is
- imperative
- > to protect the "war we won" as a needed punishment to those horrible
- Serbs.
- > As they appear less and less as aggressors at Kosovo and more and more as
- > victims it cannot be allowed to have a role reversal now and in November
- of
- > 2000.
- > Have you ever heard of the "Mighty Wurlitzer" Bill? No? Well, it was a
- quip
- > by a former Deputy Director of the CIA. He meant to convey that the CIA
- > enlists all sorts of people in the media at home and abroad to influence
- the
- > "climate" and "policy" in the direction that the Company is looking for
- > presumably on orders from the White House (even though it is illegal by law
- > for the CIA to influence and intervene in domestic affairs). For example,
- as
- > some 200,000 Serb civilians were cleansed by the U.S.-trained Croat army
- > from Krajina in August 1995, our leading Serbophobe and then UN Ambassador
- > of the Clinton Administration was showing dated CIA aerial photographs of
- a
- > large field ostensibly near Srebrenica. It had been freshly ploughed. By
- > suggesting that the CIA "knew" that the field was one huge "mass-grave"
- > containing "8,000" dead Muslim male civilians, the Serbs again became the
- > aggressors while being victimized. In one of its reports the New York
- Times
- > once linked another "massacre" at Racak, Kosovo, with Srebrenica as a
- > precondition of the need to keep the "damnation" of the Serbs "operative"
- > for other purposes.
- > To conclude, all of us cannot be regarded as imbeciles to be more or less
- > subtly manipulated. What our "shakers" behind the scenes constantly fail
- to
- > grasp is that their decade of ongoing Serb hate-mongering has served no
- > useful purpose. At home, it has given the jollies to a growing number of
- our
- > own extremist groups. In turn, this makes us increasingly uneasy about
- > home-spun terrorism acts. When will our spin doctors come to understand
- that
- > hate-mongering only promotes hate? What goes around, comes around. Abroad
- > our current Administration's practice to punish populations whose leaders
- we
- > do not like borders on insanity. The US/NATO intervention in Yugoslavia
- is
- > a disaster proclaimed as a "victory." It hides some of the most
- > reprehensible features that can be assigned to our ruling elites. I look
- > forward to the day when you and your media colleagues stop bashing the
- Serbs
- > and, yes, even come to genuinely feel remorse for a decade of structured,
- > deliberate, premeditated and carried out cerebral torture and
- assassination
- > of the Serbs as a people It brings your profession no luster, only
- profound
- > disgust. Because I valued you much in the past I cannot express how sorry
- I
- > am to see you descending to the pits even if you are only a victim of
- > adherence to a selective, asymmetrical Humanitarian Ideology. It is more
- > broadly reflected when a "special Jury" gives its 1999 Award at

Amsterdam's

- > International Documentary Film Festival to an atrociously poor celluloid
- > pastiche because its incompetent "moralist-producer" "enlightens mankind"
- > with what is little more than political catharsis of someone who has not a
- > clue what is really involved in searching for truth.

> Sincerely,

> Raymond K. Kent (Emeritus)

> History Department,
 > University of California,
 > Berkeley, CA. 94720
 > (510) 642-1971

> Miroslav Antic wrote:

>> FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

>> Rasprava u srpskom parlamentu juce se jedva doticala dnevnog reda,
 >> suzbijanja divlje gradnje. Zucnu raspravu, optuzbe, pa i pokusaj
 >> politicke promocije za skupstinskom govornicom i ispred skupstinske sale
 >> izazvao je dokumentarni film "Vrisak iz groba", koji je predhodne veceri
 >> emitovan na RTS povodom seste godisnjice masakra nad muslimanskim
 >> stanovnistvom u Srebrenici.

>> Zasedanje parlamenta je pocelo zahtevom Aleksandra Vucica iz SRS-a da
 >> Skupstina formira anketni odbor koji ce se baviti "utvrdivanjem
 >> cinjenica o sistematskoj kampanji koju nad srpskim narodom sprovodi
 >> javno glasilo Republike Srbije, RTS". On je emitovanje filma o zrtvama u
 >> Srebrenici nazvao istorijskom sramotom i histerienom propagandom protiv
 >> srpskog naroda.

>> Cedomir Jovanovic je rekao da nemaju razloga za trijumf oni koji su bili
 >> akteri svega onoga kroz sta smo prosli, pa i onoga sto im smeta, cak i
 >> kada se nalazi na filmskoj traci i dodao da Skupstina nema razloga da se
 >> bavi uredivanjem TV ili bilo kog drugog medijskog prostora.
 >> (Glas javnosti)

>> Miroslav Antic,
 >> <http://www.antic.org/>

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van holst en steijnen

From: Despotovic, Ruza <despot@wish.net>
To: Hans Hupkes <HANS.Hupkes@Planet.NL>; Globalreflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>; Nico & Neeltje Steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: zaterdag 14 juli 2001 15:51
Subject: Fw: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

----- Original Message -----

From: john_peter maher <jpmaher@neiu.edu>
To: Miroslav Antic <miroslav@antic.org>
Cc: Sorabia <sorabia@yahoo.com>; NSP <STOP-NSP@topica.com>; News <news@siem.net>; SIM-Egroups <srpskainformativnamreza@egroups.com>; SIM <sim@antic.org>; BALKAN <balkannews@egroups.com>; sn-vesti <sn-vesti@hi-ho.ne.jp>
Sent: Friday, July 13, 2001 8:15 PM
Subject: Re: [www.antic.org] FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU

> HAPPY SREBRENICA SLAUGHTER DAY:

> Tues

> Nov 2000 18:03:07 -0600 (CST)

> J. P. Maher, Chicago. 07 November 2000.

>

> Hors de Combat

> [glossed in the late 1940s best-seller "Fractured French as "camp
 > followers"].

>

> In early November 2000 the whores de combat and their scandal sheets are

> again hitting the streets. They are purportedly reporting on the trial of

> Bosnian Serb General Krstic in the Hague, after his kidnapping in Serb

> Bosnia.

> If Krstic had harbored the slightest thought that he was targeted by the

> Hague's kangaroo court, he would not have been living in the open, without

> security.

> Maggie O'Kane, Marcus Tanner et al. are patently working from the 60

> Minutes

> TV "documentary," as if this were a respectable source. That US program

> was

> adapted from a British source and fitted with voice-overs for audiences in

> North America and Australia. One might just wonder who might be the

> coordinator of all this "journalism."

>

> "Finger prints" - identical loci, such as misinterpretations of the

> Balkan terms "Turk" and the Mladic speech on taking Srebrenica - are

> evident in the American, British, and Australian packages. Details to

> follow in a separate report. For now, dear Readers, consider the

>

> 15 September 2000.

> Mladic's "revenge".

>

> The street sign saga. General Mladic orders:

> "Skini ovu tablu! Ulica Selmanagic Reuf - Crni!" . He points to a street

> sign. "Take down that sign! Selmanagic Reuf 'the Black' Street!"

> Aussie "60 Minutes" tells the viewers that this is a case of the Serbs

> destroying the Muslim history of the town. -Seasoned tourists, not to speak

> of historians, know that when wars end or famous people die, street names

> are changed. In Chicago the "Congress Parkway" became "the Eisenhower

> Tollway," and there was no "Kennedy Expressway" before 22 November 1963.

> At the Srebrenica junction where General Mladic gives his order, there

> had

> been a Tito-era street sign, which was destroyed and replaced after 1992

> by

> an Islamist sign. Mladic was restoring the secular history of the town, as

> "Adolf Hitler-Platz" signs everywhere in Germany came down after V-E Day.

> "Crusade in Europe" was the title of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's

> memoirs

> as Commander in Chief of Allied forces. Readers in the West understood his

> choice of words to mean a struggle against Hitler Germany. Muslims and

Jews

- > familiar with Western languages understood this, too, but in addition,
- > unlike the general Christian readership, they also knew that in alluding to
- > the medieval wars of Christendom against Muslim infidels, the Jews suffering
- > "collateral damage," Eisenhower had no intention of canonizing Richard Lion
- > Heart etc. or re-starting a holy war to redeem the Holy Land for Christendom.
- > A comparable allusion occurs in the brief prepared speech that General Ratko
- > Mladic delivered on Bosnian Serb television in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.
- > Glancing at his notes, General Mladic spoke into the microphones of the Bosnian Serb TV service. This footage was paid for by the Australian "60 Minutes" program and re-broadcast. Anyone with a VCR and a satellite dish
- > could have recorded it at the time. I have some such videotapes of my own.
- > Mladic's words with subtitles purporting to translate them were transmitted
- > on the Aussie "60 Minutes" program. The "60 Minutes" sub-titles, however,
- > were not a faithful translation that communicated the intention of the speaker, General Mladic and the impression received by a knowing audience.
- > Another Australian TV program re-broadcast the footage, with a voice-over,
- a
- > Yugoslav voice reading a script that was in no way a translation: "The Serbs
- > take revenge on the Muslims."
- > Aussie TV did not provide the commentary that would be absolutely necessary
- > before a non-Yugoslav audience could grasp Mladic's meaning. Up to the last
- > couple clauses the translation was fairly accurate, as far as literal
- > translation goes. However the last four words of the English text cannot
- > even be called a translation:
- > "Here we are, on 11th June 1995, just before yet another great Serbian
- > holiday remembering the uprising against the Turks."
- > A literal translation by itself without a commentary does not suffice to get
- > the story across to an audience that does not intimately know the Balkans.
- > The footage was in effect an image without a context, to be interpreted - or
- > misinterpreted, like a Rorschach blot, by an audience that ranged from the
- > intelligent and unbiased newcomer to Balkan affairs to the most brain-washed
- > Serb-bashers.
- > Most "western" viewers had already been prepared after five years of the PR
- > companies' smears to hear the worst about the demonic, or demonized, Serbs.
- > Stripped of the immediate context of the events of 1995 and more remote
- > facts of local history, the "60 Minutes" program was incomplete, yellowest
- > journalism, bombastic, jingoistic, and saturated with untruths and
- > disinformation. General Mladic's exact words were:
- > "Evo nas, jedanaestog jula, hiljadu-devetsto-devedeset-pete godine u
- > Srpskoj Srebrenici, uoci jos jednog velikog praznika srpskoga. Srpskom
- > narodu poklanjamo ovaj grad napokon dosao je trenutak da se posle bune
- > protiv dahija Turcima osvetimo na ovom prostoru." Here is a literal
- > translation:
- > "Here we are, on 11th June 1995, on the eve of yet another great Serbian
- > holiday. To the Serb people we present this city now that the moment has
- > come, after the Rising against the Dahis, to settle our score with the
- Turks
- > on this territory."
- > Context of tradition. The date 11 July is "Petrovdan." In the Byzantine
- > church this is the eve of the feast of SS. Peter and Paul. To this
- > celebration, Mladic's winning the battle of Srebrenica adds solemnity for
- > the Serbs of Bosnia. In the period 1801-1804, while under Ottoman
- > sovereignty, the Christians of Serbia and the adjacent Serb land of Bosnia
- > suffered under the horrific misrule of those lords known as the "Dahi."
- > Serbia was ruled by four of these Janissaries, the Turks' equivalent of
- > Hitler's SS and death squads. Beheadings and impalings were the order of

the

- > day. The Serbs rebelled against the Dahis, with in fact the blessing of the
- > Sultan in Istanbul. Not much later the Sultan's own troops beheaded the Serb
- > leaders at the city of Nish and built a memorial tower of their skulls.
- > The Serb use of the term "Turk" has repeatedly been misinterpreted by
- > incompetent or mendacious journalists to be a case of Serb racism. How is
- > the term "Serb" used these days?
- > In any case, when the Ottomans were riding high, Bosnia's Muslims
- > themselves, flaunted the name Turk". Even in our time, before this war,
- > you
- > could hear a typical Bosnian Muslim kid say "I like the Turks better than
- > the Serbs." This means Bosnian Muslims.
- > (Let those who do not recognize the term Janissary take a vow of silence
- > until they find a book in the library that would fill this lacuna in their
- > schooling; if they can find a library.)
- > Immediate context. January to autumn 1993. Naser Oric, once a trooper in
- > Slobodan Milosevic's body guard, is pictured on horseback in the "60
- > Minutes" fraud. Naser Oric waged a religious and cultural jihad against
- > the
- > poor Serb farm villagers in the hills surrounding Srebrenica. Serbs lived
- > largely out there for the same reason the Irish did the same under English
- > landlords, infidel slaves forbidden to live in towns and damned glad to be
- > at a distance from the Jim Crow system they were subjected to.
- > The Serbs' rising against the Dahis in the 1800s compares with Ireland's
- > 1916 Easter Rising, America's Fourth of July, France's Bastille Day, and
- > Afro-America's Emancipation Proclamation.
- > "Petrovdan," 11 July 1995 was a re-play of the Serbs rebelling against
- > their
- > murderers and the renewal in 1992 of Ottoman religious and cultural jihad
- > by
- > "believing" overlords who were receiving enormous aid-military, financial
- > and material - from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, other Muslim states,
- > Britain, Germany and the good old USA. UN "Humanitarian Aid" often was the
- > tarpaulin under which the ammunition was loaded.
- > Naser Oric and his men, not just the Dahis of 1801, carried out slayings,
- > crucifixions, beheadings and impalings in summer 1993 at Milici, near
- > Srebrenica. Oric even showed his videotapes of the fun to "Western"
- > journalists.
- > The Wall Street Journal's Roger Thurow and the New York Times' Anthony
- > Lewis
- > made fun of reports of these inhuman, typical practices of Alija
- > Izetbegovic's mujehadin, but these brave cheer leaders for undeclared wars
- > never answered their mail when photographs of the victims were sent to
- > them.
- >
- > Commentary. Mladic's brief speech alluded both to the gory Ottoman past
- > AND
- > to its recrudescence between 1992 and 1995 "na ovom prostoru" -- on this
- > territory."
- > Mladic was thus alluding to the Serb Rising of 1801-1804 and to the
- > recrudescence of Ottoman atrocities in the Bosnian war. The Serbs offered
- > surrender terms to the Muslim "Bosnian" Army, but were turned down. Under
- > Izetbegovic's orders, which were heard by Serb and Muslim alike, in clear
- > text in open radio transmissions.
- > There was no separation of males 16 years of age and up from the women and
- > children. The women, children and elders were not shot at, raped, or
- > slaughtered, but put on busses for Tuzla.
- > At Tuzla, the Serb population was not ethnically cleansed, but would have
- > welcomed such. The Serb population was held hostage, which is far worse
- > than
- > ethnic cleansing.
- > Once in Tuzla [guarded by US forces] the Muslim refugees were segregated
- > and
- > the defeated Srebrenica garrison was kept out of sight because the Muslim
- > leadership wanted to keep the debacle as quiet as possible. Srebrenica's
- > defeated mujehadin had abandoned their women, children and old people in
- > Srebrenica. Terrified of retribution for their atrocities, the cowards
- > took
- > to the woods and made for Tuzla, to the north. 3000 of the dead men voted
- > in

- > the next elections.
- > The "Srebrenica Massacre" was a smoke screen. Clinton and the
- > media-government complex need it as a pretext for their next Tonkin Gulf
- > caper.

> Miroslav Antic wrote:

>> FILM O SREBRENICI POKRENUO RASPRAVU
>>

- > > Rasprava u srpskom parlamentu juce se jedva doticala dnevnog reda,
- > > suzbijanja divlje gradnje. Zucnu raspravu, optuzbe, pa i pokusaj
- > > politicke promocije za skupstinskom govornicom i ispred skupstinske sale
- > > izazvao je dokumentarni film "Vrisak iz groba", koji je predhodne veceri
- > > emitovan na RTS povodom seste godisnjice masakra nad muslimanskim
- > > stanovnistvom u Srebrenici.

- > > Zasedanje parlamenta je pocelo zahtevom Aleksandra Vucica iz SRS-a da
- > > Skupstina formira anketni odbor koji ce se baviti "utvrdivanjem
- > > cinjenica o sistematskoj kampanji koju nad srpskim narodom sprovodi
- > > javno glasilo Republike Srbije, RTS". On je emitovanje filma o zrtvama u
- > > Srebrenici nazvao istorijskom sramotom i histericnom propagandom protiv
- > > srpskog naroda.

- > > Cedomir Jovanovic je rekao da nemaju razloga za trijumf oni koji su bili
- > > akteri svega onoga kroz sta smo prošli, pa i onoga sto im smeta, cak i
- > > kada se nalazi na filmskoj traci i dodao da Skupština nema razloga da se
- > > bavi uređivanjem TV ili bilo kog drugog medijskog prostora.
- > > (Glas javnosti)

>> Miroslav Antic,
>> <http://www.antic.org/>

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IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before:

Judge Carmel Agius, Presiding
Judge Hans Henrik Brydensholt
Judge Albin Eser

UNIKU CADUOTJE VOOR ORIC /

Registrar:

Mr. Hans Holthuis

Decision of:

21 October 2004

PROSECUTOR

v.

NASER ORIC

**ORDER CONCERNING GUIDELINES ON EVIDENCE AND THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES
DURING TRIAL PROCEEDINGS**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Jan Wubben

Counsel for the Accused:

Ms. Vasvija Vidovic

Mr. John Jones

TRIAL CHAMBER II of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ("the Tribunal") issues the following Order Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During Trial Proceedings.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. It is evident from the exchange of correspondence between the Parties in the course of the pre-trial stage as well as from the debate during the pre-trial conference held on 28 September 2004 that there is lack of agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence ("Parties") on various basic issues in relation to the admission of documents into evidence. In addition, trial efficiency, trial fairness and the administration of justice throughout the trial, can be better served if the Parties are aware from the very beginning of the trial of the rules that the Trial Chamber will apply in admitting or excluding evidence, particularly with regard to documentary evidence. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber informed the Parties that it would provide them at the very early stages of the trial with various guidelines that will govern the proceedings in this case.

Following this undertaking, the Trial Chamber now issues an oral order stating guidelines which will be followed in the course of this trial. While the Parties are bound by the Statute of the Tribunal ("Statute"), the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal ("Rules") and the Code of Professional Conduct of Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal ("Code of Professional Conduct"), the present order emphasises in particular guidelines governing the admission of evidence and the conduct of the Parties during trial proceedings.

II. DISCUSSION

3. For the purposes of the trial, evidence will be taken to mean the information which will be put before the Trial Chamber in order to prove the facts at issue and may take the following forms: a) testimony, b) documents produced for the inspection of the Trial Chamber, c) real evidence, i.e. exhibits and other material objects, and d) admissions of fact. In the exercise of deciding upon the admissibility of evidence, the Trial Chamber will categorise evidence into a) direct and indirect evidence, b) original and hearsay evidence, c) primary and secondary evidence, and d) circumstantial evidence. Hearsay and circumstantial evidence will be considered as indirect evidence with the understanding that indirect evidence may be given equivalent weight to direct evidence. The Trial Chamber views primary evidence as the best evidence. However, where only secondary evidence is available of a relevant document, it may be admitted without prejudice, provided that the reliability is not at issue.
4. The Accused is entitled by Article 21(3) of the Statute to a presumption of innocence. This presumption places the burden of establishing the guilt of the Accused firmly upon the Prosecution, i.e. the burden of proving all the facts and circumstances which are material and necessary to constitute the crimes charged and the Accused's criminal responsibility. This burden of proof remains upon the Prosecution throughout the entire trial. It never changes. In accordance with Rule 87(A) of the Rules, the Prosecution must establish the Accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the Trial, the Trial Chamber will determine whether or not the cumulative evidence taken as a whole carries sufficient weight to establish the facts alleged beyond reasonable doubt and, ultimately, the guilt of the Accused, as charged in the Indictment.
5. The Trial Chamber acknowledges the right of the Accused to remain silent. Consequently, silence by the Accused as such may not, and will not, be used as evidence to prove guilt and may not, and will not, be interpreted as an admission of guilt.
6. In the context of the Rules, the approach of the Statute of this Tribunal is to lay down a framework or a structure, stated in general terms, with due regard to the accused's rights to a fair and public hearing. The Trial Chamber, therefore, has the responsibility to ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious and that the proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Tribunal's Rules, with full respect for the procedural and substantive rights of the accused and also for the protection of victims and witnesses.
7. The Rules are based upon a mixture of common and civil law rules of procedure and evidence. Thus, in matters of admissibility of evidence the procedure of this Tribunal does not purport to conform to any particular system or tradition. Rather, it is inspired by the need for a fair determination of the matter before it.
8. The question of admissibility of evidence before this Tribunal is governed by Section 3 of the Rules. Rule 89(A) makes it clear that a Trial Chamber shall not be bound by national rules of evidence whether from the common law or civil law traditions. The Appeals Chamber in *Aleksovski* held that "there is no reason to import such rules into the practice of the Tribunal which is not bound by national rules of evidence [...]. The purpose of the Rules is to promote a fair and expeditious trial and the Trial Chambers must have the flexibility to achieve this goal."¹
9. In contrast to common law systems, where questions of admissibility and the exclusion of evidence occupy a prominent place in criminal proceedings, the provisions of the Rules regulating all evidentiary matters in Tribunal proceedings do not contain a detailed set of technical rules relating to

admissibility and the exclusion of evidence.² Apart from those listed in Section 3 of the Rules, the Trial Chamber is not restricted in its choice of methodology for the search to uncover the truth. Indeed, in the opinion of this Trial Chamber, the most important rule in this context is Rule 89, which lists the general evidentiary provisions. Sub-paragraph (B) provides that

[i]n cases not otherwise provided in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence, which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.

10. Sub-paragraph 89(C) permits the Chamber to admit any relevant evidence with probative value. Sub-paragraph 89(E) allows a Trial Chamber to request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of court. It is clear that the approach adopted in the Rules is one that favours the admissibility of evidence, provided it is relevant and has probative value.³ Needless to say, irrelevant evidence must be, and will be, excluded in the most unequivocal way in the interest of a fair and expeditious trial. This has resulted in practice of the Trial Chambers in this Tribunal towards firstly admitting the evidence and, secondly, in assessing its relative weight at a later stage in the context of the whole trial record.⁴ The Trial Chamber will follow this practice throughout these proceedings.
11. Another conspicuous practice that has been followed by the Trial Chambers of this Tribunal, and which will be followed by this Trial Chamber, is that the general rules relating to the exclusion of evidence applied in common law systems will not be followed as a rule.⁵ The reasoning is that the common law rules on the exclusion of evidence were developed in the context of trials by jury. In a jury trial it is imperative that lay jurors are kept away from any prejudicial material of little or no relevance or probative value that may have a detrimental influence on decision-making. By contrast, proceedings before this Tribunal are conducted by professional judges. This Trial Chamber attaches great importance to this characteristic. The position was made very clear by the *Celebici* Trial Chamber in its "Decision on the Admissibility of Evidence":

While the importance of the rules on admissibility in common law follows from the effect which the admission of a certain piece of evidence might have on a group of lay jurors, the trials before the International Tribunal are conducted before professional judges, who by virtue of their training and experience are able to consider each piece of evidence which has been admitted and determine its appropriate weight.⁶

III. GUIDELINES ON EVIDENCE

(i) The Parties should always bear in mind the basic distinction that exists between the legal admissibility of documentary evidence and the Trial Chamber's judgement as to its weight.

(ii) The Trial Chamber will reject evidence if it is not satisfied of its relevance and probative value, whereby the burden of prove with respect to relevance and probative value lies on the party seeking to introduce a particular piece of evidence. The Trial Chamber will follow the principle that the Prosecution must prove relevance, probative value and reliability of such evidence beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the Defence is only required to prove the admissibility of its evidence on a balance of probabilities.⁷

(iii) The "mere admission of a document into evidence does not, in itself, signify that the statements contained therein will necessarily be deemed to be an accurate portrayal of the facts. Factors such as authenticity and proof of authorship will naturally assume the greatest importance in the Trial Chamber's assessment of the weight to be attached to individual pieces of evidence".⁸ This Trial Chamber agrees that "the threshold standard for the admission of evidence [in terms of introducing it into the proceedings] should not be set excessively high, as often documents are sought to be admitted into evidence, not as ultimate proof of guilt or innocence, but to provide a context and complete the picture presented by the evidence in general".⁹

(iv) The fact that the Trial Chamber may, at some point in the course of the proceedings, issue a ruling upon the admissibility of a particular document or other piece of evidence, will not prevent that ruling being reversed at a later stage as further evidence emerges that is relevant to the admissibility of the evidence in question.

(v) When objections are raised on grounds of authenticity, the Trial Chamber will follow the practice this Tribunal has previously adopted, namely, to admit documents and video recordings and also telephone intercepts unless this appears to be manifestly inappropriate to do so. The Trial Chamber will then decide what weight to give them in the context of the trial record as a whole.¹⁰

(vi) There is no blanket prohibition on the admission of documents simply on the grounds that their purported author has not been called to testify.¹¹ Similarly, an unsigned and unstamped document does not, *a priori*, render it void of authenticity. Factors, such as proof of authorship, will naturally assume the greatest importance in the Trial Chamber's final assessment of the weight to be attached to individual pieces of evidence.

(vii) As far as hearsay evidence is concerned, the Trial Chamber reiterates the position of the Appeals Chamber in *Aleksovski* that "it is well settled in the practice of the Tribunal that hearsay evidence is admissible."¹² Thus, relevant out of court statements, which a Trial Chamber considers probative, are admissible under Rule 89(C).¹³ As stated by the Appeals Chamber in *Aleksovski*,

Trial Chambers have a broad discretion under Rule 89 (C) to admit relevant hearsay evidence. Since such evidence is admitted to prove the truth of its contents, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied that it is reliable for that purpose, in the sense of being voluntary, truthful and trustworthy, as appropriate; and for this purpose may consider both the content of the hearsay statement and the circumstances under which the evidence arose; or, as Judge Stephen described it, the probative value of a hearsay statement will depend upon the context and character of the evidence in question. The absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statements, and whether the hearsay is "first-hand" or more removed, are also relevant to the probative value of the evidence. The fact that the evidence is hearsay does not necessarily deprive it of probative value, but it is acknowledged that the weight or probative value to be afforded to that evidence will usually be less than that given to the testimony of a witness who has given it under a form of oath and who has been cross-examined, although even this will depend upon the infinitely variable circumstances which surround hearsay evidence.¹⁴

(viii) In determining the matter before this Trial Chamber, the so-called "best evidence rule" will be applied, provided that such evidence is evidently available. This essentially means that the Trial Chamber will rely on the best evidence available in the circumstances of the case and the Parties are directed to regulate the production of their evidence along these lines when possible. What is the best evidence will, of course, depend on the particular circumstances attached to each document and to the complexity of this case and the investigations that preceded it, as well as the difficulties that this Tribunal can encounter in its attempts to acquire documents and other pieces of evidence. The Trial Chamber is also aware that this rule has lost much of its importance in some common law jurisdictions. The Trial Chamber will exercise its discretion in the spirit that lies at the basis of the Statute and the Rules.

(ix) The Trial Chamber considers circumstantial evidence as being the evidence of circumstances surrounding an event or an offence from which a fact at issue may be reasonably inferred.¹⁵ Crimes are often committed without the presence of eye witnesses. This is especially true with the nature of criminal trials before this Tribunal. It can therefore be difficult, if not impossible, to establish an alleged fact by relying solely upon the direct and positive testimony of eye-witnesses or by conclusive documents. Here, circumstantial evidence may become necessary. The individual items of such evidence may by themselves be insufficient to establish a fact, but, when taken together, their collective and cumulative effect may be very revealing and sometimes decisive.¹⁶ The Trial Chamber endorses the principle that "it is no derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial."¹⁷ Consequently, the Trial Chamber will not consider circumstantial evidence to be of less substance than direct evidence. In evaluating circumstantial evidence, the Trial Chamber will take notice of the

Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During Trial Proceedings... pagina 5 van 6
definition arrived at by the Trial Chamber in the *Krnjelac* case, namely: "Evidence of a number of different circumstances which, taken in combination, point to the existence of a particular fact upon which the guilt of the accused depends would usually exist in combination only because a particular fact did exist."¹⁸ In that same case, the Trial Chamber added that such a conclusion must be the *only* reasonable conclusion available.¹⁹

(x) The Trial Chamber draws the attention of the parties to Rule 95, which provides that evidence that was obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or evidence that is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings, is not admissible. The Trial Chamber makes it clear at the very outset that involuntary statements, obtained from witnesses by oppressive means, cannot pass the test under Rule 95.²⁰ The burden of proof in establishing that a statement was voluntary lies on the party seeking to introduce it, whereby the standards discussed under guideline B shall be applicable.

(xi) It seems that the Rules implicitly require that reliability be a component of admissibility and indeed, following previous case-law of this Tribunal on the matter,²¹ this Trial Chamber agrees that reliability is an inherent and implicit component of each element of admissibility. This is largely because if the evidence put forward is unreliable, then it cannot be either relevant or of probative value. Therefore such evidence will be inadmissible in terms of Sub-paragraph 89(C). However, in respect to other documentary evidence, the Trial Chamber makes it clear that the determination of the issue of reliability, when it arises, should not, and will not, be seen as a separate, first step in assessing a piece of evidence offered for admission.

(xii) Pursuant to the Statute, the Trial Chamber is the guardian of the procedural and substantive rights of the Accused. As a trial is an often complex journey in the search for truth, the Trial Chamber considers that questions of admissibility of evidence do not merely arise when one of the parties raises an objection to a piece of evidence brought forward by the other party. When there is no objection to the authenticity of a document, the task of admitting evidence will be made easier. However, this Trial Chamber has an inherent right and duty to ensure that only evidence which qualifies for admission under the Rules, will be admitted. For this purpose, as may turn out to be necessary from time to time, the Trial Chamber will intervene *ex officio* to exclude from these proceedings those pieces of evidence which, in its opinion, for one or more of the reasons laid down in the Rules, ought not to be admitted in evidence.

IV. GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES DURING TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

(i) The Trial Chamber envisages the possibility of *ex parte* meetings with the Trial Chamber upon the request of either party. When justified, such meetings will be held and the other party will be informed accordingly.

(ii) The Parties shall demonstrate respect, integrity and courtesy for legal assistants and staff members of the Tribunal and for all persons who facilitate and participate in the proceedings.

(iii) The Parties shall not seek to influence or communicate with a Judge, legal assistant or other staff member of the Tribunal by means prohibited by the Statute, the Rules or the Code of Professional Conduct. In particular, communications between the Parties and any of the members of the legal team of this Trial Chamber ought to be restricted to administrative and house-keeping matters.

(iv) Each party shall recognise the representatives of the respective other party as professional colleagues and shall act fairly, honestly and courteously towards them.

Done in French and English, the English version being authoritative.

Dated this 21th day of October 2004,

<http://www.un.org/icty/oric/trialc/order-e/041021.htm>

The Hague
Netherlands

Carmel Agius
Presiding Judge

[Seal of the Tribunal]

- 1 - *Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski*, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 January 1999, para. 19.
- 2 - *Ibid.*, para. 15.
- 3 - *Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution for the Admissibility of Evidence ("Delalic Decision on Admissibility of Evidence"), para. 16.
- 4 - *Vide, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic*, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Order on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence, 15 February 2002, para. 13.
- 5 - Sub-paragraph 89(D) allows a Trial Chamber to exclude any evidence if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
- 6 - *Delalic* Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 20.
- 7 - *R v Matthey* [1995] 2 Cr App R 409; *Rush v. DPP* [1994] RTR 268.
- 8 - *Delalic* Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 20.
- 9 - *Delalic* Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 20; *R v Matthey* [1995] 2 Cr App R 409; *Rush v. DPP* [1994] RTR 268.
- 10 - *Vide, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic*, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Order on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence, 15 February 2002, para. 19.
- 11 - *Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of the Prosecution for the Admissibility of Evidence, 19 March 1998, para. 22.
- 12 - This is being stated without prejudice to the Motion of the Prosecution of requesting the authorisation of the Trial Chamber to tender evidence in pursuance of Rule 92 Bis (C).
- 13 - *Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski*, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 January 1999, para. 15. See also, *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Motion on Hearsay, 5 August 1996; *Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic*, Decision on Standing Objection of the Defence to the Admission on Hearsay with no Inquiry as to its Reliability, 26 January 1998.
- 14 - *Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski*, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 16 January 1999, para. 15.
- 15 - Richard May and Stephen Powell, *Criminal Evidence*, 5th Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London, 2004).
- 16 - "[...] Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence - there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction or more than a mere suspicion, but the whole taken together may create a conclusion of guilt with as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of": Exall [1866] 4 F. & F. 922, 929.
- 17 - Taylor, Weaver and Donovan [1928] 21 Cr. App. R. 20, 21, per Lord Hewart C.J.
- 18 - *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 67.
- 19 - *Krnjelac* Trial Judgement, para. 67 (emphasis in original). The *Krnjelac* Trial Chamber referred to *Celebici* Appeal Judgement, para 458.
- 20 - *Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. al.*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, 2 September 1997, para. 43: "it is extremely difficult for a statement taken in violation of Rule 42 to fall within Rule 95, which protects the integrity of the proceedings by the non-admissibility of evidence obtained by methods which cast substantial doubts on that reliability".
- 21 - *Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic & Mario Cerkez*, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, A.C., 21 July 2000: Although the Trial Chamber in that case discussed the issue in context of hearsay evidence, this Trial Chamber understands it to be a general statement regarding hearsay evidence.

Moslimprotest tegen verhoor van 'held' Oric

3-9-2001

Honderden Bosnische moslims hebben gisteren, vergeefs, geprobeerd om te voorkomen dat hun 'held' Naser Oric verhoord zou worden door onderzoekers van het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal. Oric is de voormalige commandant van de moslimtroepen in Srebrenica.

„Hij is een held, geen misdadiger“, riepen de demonstranten, onder wie veel vrouwen uit Srebrenica die familieleden verloren bij de val van de enclave. „Hij heeft ons verdedigd.“ De groep probeerde zich met geweld toegang te verschaffen tot het VN-kantoor waar Oric werd verhoord.

Volgens een VN-woordvoerder meldde de 34-jarige voormalige moslimcommandant zich vrijwillig voor verhoor en loopt er geen arrestatiebevel tegen hem. Lokale media schrijven dat er een geheime aanklacht tegen Oric ligt. Hij zou terecht moeten staan voor aanvallen op Servische dorpjes bij Srebrenica.

Het tribunaal bereidt nieuwe aanklachten voor tegen Bosnische moslims, zei hoofdaanklaagster Del Ponte vorige week. In de Bosnische stad Mostar begon gisteren het proces tegen dertien moslims die worden beschuldigd van moord en marteling van Bosnisch-Kroatische gevangenen, in '93 en '94. Bij de wreedheden kwamen 17 gevangenen om door dwangarbeid in de frontlinies, één man stierf door marteling.

FOTO EPA



De tolk Hasan Nuhanovic werkte bij de val van Srebrenica, deze week vier jaar geleden, voor Dutchbat. In een brief aan Mient

SREBRENICA LIJST 242

Jan Faber (IKV) vertelt hij voor het eerst zeer gedetailleerd het verhaal van de lijst 242, waarop 242 personen stonden die door de Nederlanders zouden worden beschermd, maar die veiligheid uiteindelijk niet kregen.

Niemand weet wat er precies met hen is gebeurd. (Deel 2)

Beste Mient Jan,

12-7-94

's Ochtends vroeg (12 juli) ging ik op nieuw uitgeput naar de basis. Ik viel in slaap en werd tussen zeven en acht uur wakker. Ik maakte een wandeling over de basis en keek wat er aan de hand was. De Nederlanders maakten een checkpoint, met plastic tape gemarkeerd, tussen het kamp en het gebied waar de vluchtelingen zaten. Niemand kon meer bij de hoofdingang komen. Aan de andere kant van het gebied waar de vluchtelingen waren, zag ik twee of drie Nederlandse pantserwagens (APC's) op de weg geparkeerd. Op deze manier was het vluchtelingengebied buiten de basis aan twee kanten verzegeld langs de hoofd-

weg Srebrenica-Bratunac. De zijkanalen waren nog steeds open.

Om ongeveer negen uur die ochtend hoorde ik dat mijn vader en twee anderen samen met een commandant van Dutchbat, generaal Mladic zouden ontmoeten in de stad Bratunac, op slechts twee tot drie kilometer ten noorden van de Nederlandse basis. Ik was bang dat ik mijn vader niet meer zou terugzien. Wij wisten wat de Serviërs deden met de mensen die zij in de oorlog hadden gearresteerd of gevangen. In mei 1992, drie jaar eerder, hadden de Serviërs de gehele moslimbevolking van Bratunac opgebracht naar het voetbalveld. De mannen en jongens werden van de rest gescheiden en naar een nabijgelegen lagere school gebracht. Meer dan duizend van hen werden op de meest afschuwelijke wijze gemarteld en geëxecuteerd. Dat alles gebeurde voordat zelfs een enkele kogel in het gebied was afgevuurd.

Ik wist het, anderen wisten het en we dachten dat kolonel Karremans wist met wie hij te maken had. Ook dat hij wist dat generaal Mladic, de man die hij zou ontmoeten, al in 1994, een jaar eerder dus, door het Internationaal Oorlogstribunaal in Den Haag werd beschuldigd van oorlogsmisdaden. Ik zag drie of vier Nederlandse jeeps van de basis naar Bratu-

nac vertrekken. Naast Karremans waren namens de vluchtelingen advocate Camilia Purkovic en ingenieur Nesib Mandzic vertegenwoordigd. Mandzic was ook directeur van de middelbare school van Srebrenica. Mijn vader was econoom en manager van de grootste bosbouwmaatschappij in Oost-Bosnië.

Men wilde zich graag laten vertegenwoordigen door goed opgeleide mensen. Maar alle officiële vertegenwoordigers van Srebrenica, burgers en militairen, waren de bergen al ingetrokken. In Potocari wisten de mensen niet of hun leiders in leven waren. Niemand wist wat zich in de bergen afspeelde.

Toen ik de jeeps zag vertrekken, ging ik naar mijn broer in de hoofdbunker van de Nederlanders. Hij zat daar vanaf het moment dat ik hem naar het kamp bracht op 10 juli. Er waren ook 50 tot 60 Nederlandse soldaten, drie Britse SAS-mensen en drie waarnemers (UNMO), een Nederlandse, een Ghanese en een Keniaanse officier.

De hoofdbunker was onder het dak van hetzelfde enorme gebouw waar enkele duizenden vluchtelingen zaten. Daar hoorde en zag ik om 10 uur de Nederlanders via hun walkie-talkies praten alsof er iets onverwachts was gebeurd. Mij werd verteld dat de Servische troepen uit het noorden

kwamen – uit de richting Bratunac.

Ik verliet de bunker en liep naar de ingang. Ik sprak met de bewaker bij de poort en enkele andere Nederlanders die ik onderweg ontmoette. Ze vertelden dat Servische soldaten en voertuigen over de weg vanuit Srebrenica (richting zuiden) kwamen en nu stonden opgesteld tegenover de Nederlandse APC-pantserwagens. En dat de Servische troepen al het gebied buiten de basis binnendrongen waar de vluchtelingen zaten.

Na enkele minuten zag ik rook opstijgen uit de richting van de Nederlandse OP (observatiepost) Papa, de noordelijke toegang tot de enclave Srebrenica. Ik keerde terug naar de bunker en kreeg te horen dat Servische troepen en tanks de Nederlandse OP Papa hadden ingenomen. Ik ging opnieuw naar buiten en zag het dorp Budak aan de voorkant van het kamp branden. De Servische tanks en troepen bewogen zich voort op de weg voor de basis, komende uit de richting Bratunac (noorden).

Opnieuw ging ik naar de bunker en zag dat alle Nederlandse soldaten in paniek verkeerden. Op de vraag wat er aan de hand was vertelden ze mij dat de Serviërs naar de basis kwamen. De Nederlanders begonnen hun fotocamera's op de grond te gooien en te vertrappen. Sommigen probeerden de

toestellen in gaten te verbergen. Anderen begonnen te huilen en zeiden iets in het Hollands, wat ik niet kon begrijpen. Het Servische leger had verboden om camera's in de enclave mee te nemen. Ze leken bang voor een reactie van de Serviërs als ze eenmaal op de basis waren.

Na enkele minuten kalmeerden ze. Gezegd werd dat majoor Franken in onderhandeling was met de Serviërs bij de hoofdboort. Het leek erop dat hij een afspraak met hen maakte over de komst van slechts vijf Servische soldaten, onder escorte van majoor Franken zelf. De Serviërs wilden op de basis controleren of er gewapende moslim-soldaten waren, vertelden ze majoor Franken. Zelf zag ik de vijf Serviërs niet binnenkomen, maar ik begreep wat er gebeurde door de gesprekken van Nederlanders in de bunker per walkie-talkie met anderen buiten. Bovendien hield een Nederlandse soldaat bij de deur van de bunker de situatie buiten in de gaten. Na vijf minuten vertelde die soldaat iedereen in de bunker dat de Serviërs het kamp hadden verlaten. Een andere Nederlandse soldaat kwam binnen en vertelde dat er in totaal vijf Servische soldaten onder begeleiding van majoor Franken op de basis waren.

Volgens hem waren de Serviërs erg bang toen ze door de fabriek liepen

naar de hal met vluchtelingen. Ze keken in alle richtingen en vreesden een aanval van iemand. Hun handen trilden. Ze keken alleen naar de menigte in de hal en keerden terug. Daarna begeleidde Franken hen weer naar de poort.

Het gebeurde allemaal in de tijd dat Karremans en de drie vertegenwoordigers met Mladic in Bratunac spraken. Het moet gezegd worden dat dit het enige moment was dat de Serviërs de basis wilden op komen. Zij hebben daarna nooit meer (ik kan dat verklaren vanaf de morgen van 12 juli toen ik naar Potocari kwam tot 21 juli toen Dutchbat vertrok) geprobeerd het kamp binnen te komen, niet met machtsmiddelen, niet lopend door de poort en ook niet via de omrastering, waar je in feite gemakkelijk overheen zou kunnen klimmen. Het was een normaal metalen hekwerk van ongeveer twee meter hoog. De Nederlanders hadden er, voorzover ik me herinner, prikkeldraad bovenop gedaan (met scheermesjes). Maar het zou een soldaat of een ander slechts vijf minuten kosten om het met een tang door te knippen.

Hasan Nuhanovic

Het eerste deel van de brief van Hasan Nuhanovic werd zaterdag 10 juli gepubliceerd en is op Internet te vinden: www.trouw.nl.

The New York Times, late news
November 29, 1996.

Tribunal Jails Confessed Srebrenica Killer for Ten Years

A United Nations court handed down its first sentence Friday, sending a Croat soldier to prison for 10 years for his role in the massacre of 1,200 Muslims after the fall of the Bosnian town of Srebrenica. The sentence was the first since the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal was established in 1993 and the first international war crimes sentence since the post-World War II tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo.

Prosecutors had recommended no more than 10 years for Drazen Erdemovic, 25, who had pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity in the July 1995 massacre organized by the Bosnian Serb army at a farm in Pilica north of Srebrenica. The Associated Press reported. The slaughter was one of the biggest single massacres of Bosnia's 3-year war. Thousands of Muslim men and boys were killed after Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica -- a U.N. designated "safe haven" -- and overwhelmed the few Dutch peacekeepers there. Erdemovic's attorney had demanded an acquittal, arguing that Erdemovic, a Croat, had to participate in the mass killing of unarmed civilians or be shot by a Serb firing squad. The attorney, Jovan Babic, said he was planning to appeal. At a pre-sentencing hearing last week, Erdemovic told the U.N. court that taking part in the massacre ruined his life. "It destroyed me. It killed me. I simply thought that my life was worthless after that," he said. His commanding officer in a Bosnian Serb army execution squad repeatedly ordered him to shoot groups of 10 Muslims, many blindfolded and with their hands bound behind their backs, he said. The alternative, Erdemovic said, was to line up with the prospective victims and be shot himself.

Srebrenica-verdachte hoopt op akkoordje

DEN HAAG - De wegens 'Srebrenica' aangeklaagde Bosnische Serviër Dragan Obrenovic wil het op een akkoordje gooien met het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal in Den Haag. Obrenovic, een van de vier aangeklaagde officieren, bekent schuld aan etnische vervolgingen. Als de rechters dat accepteren, komen andere aanklachten te vervallen en is een proces niet nodig. Obrenovic zou dan 'slechts' vijf tot tien tot twintig jaar krijgen. Zonder akkoord zou de straf veel zwaarder uitvallen. (Reuters)

Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-johnson@lineone.net>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:>
Verzonden: zaterdag 12 juli 2003 14:48
Onderwerp: CDSM:Fw: On 8th Anniversary... Srebrenica 'Massacre': Is Hague Hying a

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From: <emperorsclothes1@aol.com>
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> On the eighth anniversary...
>
> Srebrenica 'Massacre': Is The Hague Hying a Hoax?
> Part Ia
>
> by George Pumphrey
> [Originally posted 8 May 2000]
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> "As a result of the Srebrenica hoax, a new order of the world is beginning to take shape, where the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] assists in creating refugees, where the Red Cross helps separate families and where Tribunals indict first and look for crimes later."

> -- G. Pumphrey

> * Introduction *

>
> Five years ago, George Pumphrey wrote "Srebrenica: Three Years and Still Waiting..." That was a ground breaking article because it convincingly challenged the almost unanimous stance of the Western mass media and the political left, right and center. They all said that the Bosnian Serb Army had slaughtered 7000 (or 3000 or 8000) POWs and/or civilians when the Army re-took the town of Srebrenica.

>
> Two years after his first article, Pumphrey produced an entirely new analysis. Though shorter, the new article includes new information and arguments. I find its handling of the labyrinth of contradictory reports about Srebrenica clearer and easier to read as well.

>
> Now on the eighth anniversary of this alleged event (imagine - in our brave new world, we have 'alleged events!') Pumphrey's article takes on special significance. The Hague Tribunal is pressing to get hold of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Serbian Gen. Radko Mladic. And Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is already in The Hague, fighting the accusation that he is responsible for an alleged massacre which the Tribunal has yet to prove even happened at Srebrenica.

>
> -- Jared Israel
> Editor, Emperor's Clothes
> 11 July 2003

> =====
>
> Srebrenica 'Massacre': Is The Hague Hying a Hoax?
> Part Ia
> by George Pumphrey

> =====
>
> The "massacre of Srebrenica", where 8,000 Muslim males of military age are reported to have been summarily executed by Bosnian Serbian troops in the aftermath of the takeover of the town [July 11-12, 1995], has been termed the worst war crime in Europe since World War II. Most significantly, it has been deemed not merely a crime of war, but evidence of a campaign of genocide, the worst war crime imaginable.

>
> The case of Srebrenica, and the subsequent genocide indictment, can be seen to have brought about a major change in the political and social rules of conduct in international relations, and not only for this region of Europe. A new set of factors has been introduced into world politics. Some of the most important changes are:

>
> * The discrediting of the United Nations for supposedly having stood idly by, allowing a "genocide" to take place on territory under its authority, which was a prerequisite for:

>
> * Promoting NATO as the world's new "peace keeping" force, allowing the US-led military alliance to strike and eventually occupy sovereign states or to take sides in civil wars outside the constraints of the democratic and peace-oriented principles of the United Nations Charter;

>
> * The relativisation and resulting trivializing of Nazi barbarism, a prerequisite for releasing Germany from its obligations to seek reconciliation with its World War II victims and allowing it once again to exercise military force anywhere in the world;

>
> * Creating public acceptance of inquisitorial methods of journalism and judicial inquiry, depriving the accused not only the presumption of innocence

and the benefit of the doubt, but of long-established democratic rights to proper legal defense;

>
> * Undermining journalistic standards of fairness in favor of propaganda in a media industry organically linked to dominant economic and military powers;

>
> * The imposition of a discriminatory "moral" double standard of "human rights", selectively applied in favor of particular national, social, cultural or "ethnic" groups, leaving others without "rights" worthy of respect by Euro-American powers, and therefore:

>
> * Growing acceptance of treating a whole nation or people as inherently criminal and therefore unworthy of basic rights of equity before the law.

>
> In short, with Srebrenica important mainstays in the international political order of the post-war period were ushered out the door. This has all been made possible through a massive propaganda campaign spreading the story of a yet-to-be-proven massacre, which has become the key piece of evidence for an also yet-to-be-proven campaign of genocide. Momentous political decisions have been based upon and justified by the supposition that a huge massacre took place in Srebrenica, decisions determining the welfare of the peoples of this region and beyond.

>
> Three years later, in 1998, the effort to find evidence was still underway, as yet more areas in the vicinity of Srebrenica were being dug up in search of the "mass graves" presumed to contain the remains of the victims of the "Srebrenica massacre." As with previous years' excavations, representatives of the UN Security Council's ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia held their press conference at the beginning of the dig.

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>
> A revealing press conference

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>
> Information from this press conference, as reported in the New York Times, provokes questions about the basis of the juridical work of this ad hoc Tribunal. Mike O'Connor, reporting on the beginning of a dig in the village of Kamenica, in the spring of 1998, writes that:

>
> "Exhumations in 1996 [the first year of digging] recovered 460 bodies, (...) 7,500 others were still missing from the town of Srebrenica. Finding the others has been the goal of war-crimes investigators for more than two years." [1]

>
> Anonymous investigators (investigators for the Tribunal spoke to the reporter "on condition of anonymity") said that what they hoped to find "will bolster the cases against [the] 2 Bosnian Serb leaders" Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Radko Mladic, indicted for genocide by the Tribunal. [1]

>
> Two months later, the NY Times reported that the total number missing was 7,300, that 1,000 bodies had been found, but that "only about 15 bodies have

been identified.[2] Other reports have given similar, though slightly inconsistent, figures.[3] This inconsistency is based on the different sources of the figures. Whereas O'Connor sticks to the quasi-official (because least partisan) figures given by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the author of the second Times article, David Rohde, relies on figures from the "survivors" of Srebrenica, meaning Muslim (usually Muslim government) sources. That the Muslim authorities have every reason to exaggerate the number of victims on their side of the conflict is without question and therefore their figures are to be taken with more than a grain of salt. Already throughout the course of the war their estimations of the numbers of dead - widely reported in the press without verification - have had to be revised downward.[4] !

> Thus, for this paper, the Red Cross figures will be used.

>

> But if finding the other 7,000 has been the goal of war crimes investigators for more than two years, the question should be raised: on what did the Tribunal base its charges of "genocide" if they did not even have the proof that the massacre for which the two Serb leaders are charged ever occurred? If they now - three years later - are still trying to scrape together enough bodies to make their indictment plausible, on what was their indictment based?

>

> O'Connor writes that the Tribunal now has to try to "prov[e] that the soil around the bodies came from the original mass graves." [5]

>

> Does this mean that what the Tribunal had considered to be "the original mass graves" were either empty or sheltered too few bodies to justify their charges?

>

> Under such circumstances, it appears that the Tribunal charged Karadzic and Mladic according to the principle: "Indict now. Look for evidence of a crime later". And even when the evidence is not found, there is no suggestion that perhaps the proper course would be to revise the indictment or drop the charges.

>

> Diana Johnstone, who has been closely following the developments in the Balkans, noted in The Nation:

>

> "When, in the early months of the war which raged across Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo, seconded by Croatian agencies in Zagreb, presented Western media with reports indicating that the Serbs were pursuing a deliberate policy of genocide, a basic principle of caution, essential to justice was rapidly abandoned. That is the principle that the more serious the accusation, the greater the need for proof, since otherwise accusations will become an instrument of the lynch mob." [6]

>

> In the media, each succeeding generation of speculation - even falsification - is built upon preceding generations of unproven reports, many of which were set in motion as deliberate disinformation by secret services and public relations agencies. Once they have been repeated over and over as certainty, anyone who would dare to venture upstream to the source and demand substantiating evidence runs the risk of being verbally lynched for having denied something as obvious as that the earth's surface is flat.

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> * Footnotes and Further Reading *

> Emperor's Clothes has published other articles challenging the Srebrenica massacre story. For a list, with brief summaries, go to "Was There a Massacre in Srebrenica?" at

> <http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/list-s.htm>

> * Footnotes for Part Ia: *

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19-03-2003

>
> Given the fact that the number of persons alleged to have been summarily executed could make the difference between a charge of "genocide" and a charge of "war crime", and faced with the difference between the 8,000 alleged to have been killed and the 460 dead bodies actually found, the first step in beginning to sort out fact from fiction would be to clear up this discrepancy in numbers.

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> Playing the numbers

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>
> The International Committee of the Red Cross published a press statement on September 13, 1995, which stated:

>
>
> "The ICRC's head of operations for Western Europe, Angelo Gnaedinger, visited Pale and Belgrade from 2 to 7 September to obtain information from the Bosnian Serb authorities about the 3,000 persons from Srebrenica whom witnesses say were arrested by Bosnian Serb forces. The ICRC has asked for access as soon as possible to all those arrested (so far it has been able to visit only about 200 detainees), and for details of any deaths. The ICRC has also approached the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities seeking information on some 5,000 individuals who fled Srebrenica, some of whom reached central Bosnia." [7]

>
> The September 15, 1995, New York Times gives another accounting:

>
> "About 8,000 Muslims are missing from Srebrenica, the first of two United Nations-designated 'safe areas' overrun by Bosnian Serb troops in July, the Red Cross said today. (...) Among the missing were 3,000, mostly men, who were seen being arrested by Serbs. After the collapse of Srebrenica, the Red Cross collected 10,000 names of missing people, said Jessica Barry, a spokeswoman. In addition to those arrested, about 5,000 'have simply disappeared,' she said." [8]

>
> Aside from simply adding the 3,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica upon arrival of the Bosnian Serb military (who the Serbs then took as prisoners of war) and the 5,000 Muslim men, reported to have left Srebrenica before the arrival of Bosnian Serb forces, to inflate the figures - and therefore the gravity of the accusation - this report makes no mention of the fact that by mid-September 1995 a sizable portion of the group of 5,000 had already reached Muslim territory and safety.

>
> And the fact that the Red Cross was asking the Bosnia-Herzegovina [Muslim] authorities for information about the 5,000 (the original figure) - "some of whom [had already] reached central Bosnia" - has completely disappeared from the news. The entire 5,000 of the one group and the 3,000 of the other are still today - 3 years later - being counted as "missing" and therefore presumed dead.

> Even the Red Cross played loose with the numbers

> The Red Cross report was itself lacking the objectivity that one would have hoped for from a non-partisan organization. Its very off-hand "some of whom reached central Bosnia" gives the impression that only a handful could be accounted for by mid-September. But again the press gave another picture. Within a week of the takeover of Srebrenica (July 18, 1995) one learns that:

> "Some 3,000 to 4,000 Bosnian Muslims who were considered by UN officials to be missing after the fall of Srebrenica have made their way through enemy lines to Bosnian government territory. The group, which included wounded refugees, sneaked past Serb lines under fire and crossed some 30 miles through forests to safety." [9]

> Similar reports appeared in other journals at the time. On August 2, 1995, The Times of London published the following:

> "Thousands of the 'missing' Bosnian Muslim soldiers from Srebrenica who have been at the centre of reports of possible mass executions by the Serbs, are believed to be safe to the northeast of Tuzla. Monitoring the safe escape of Muslim soldiers and civilians from (...) Srebrenica and Zepa has proved a nightmare for the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. For the first time yesterday, however, the Red Cross in Geneva said it had heard from sources in Bosnia that up to 2,000 Bosnian Government troops were in an area north of Tuzla. They had made their way there from Srebrenica 'without their families being informed,' a spokesman said, adding that it had not been possible to verify the reports because the Bosnian Government refused to allow the Red Cross into the area." [10]

> The Washington Post explains: "The men set off at dawn on Tuesday, July 11, in two columns that stretched back seven or eight miles." [11]

> ** Continued in Part Ib - "Corpses Voting, Victims Sent Abroad - What Game at Srebrenica?" **

> <http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/pumphrey/scandal.htm#1b>

> * Footnotes & Further Reading Follows the Appeal *

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- > 1) O'Connor, Mike; Mass Graves in Bosnia Bolster War-Crimes Cases; IHT (NYT-Services), 14.5.98
- >
- > 2) Rohde, David; "In Bosnian Town Where Thousands Died, Ethnic Hate Overwhelms Small Kindnesses" New York Times, July 25, 1998.
- >
- > 3) As noted below, early reports used the figures 10,000 and then 8,000. The Washington Post gives 12,000 as the original number of missing.
- >
- > 4) "News organizations and specialists, after three years of war, talk of 200,000-250,000. The Bosnian government in April 1995 lowered its previous estimate to just over 145,000, about 3 percent of the pre-war population." (my emphasis, gp) David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Harcourt Brace, 1995, pg. 80;
- >
- > 5) ibid
- >
- > 6) Johnstone, Diana, Selective Justice in The Hague: The War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia is a Mockery of Evidentiary Rule; The Nation, 22.9.97
- >
- > 7) Former Yugoslavia: Srebrenica: help for families still awaiting news; ICRC News 37
- >
- > 8) AP; Conflict in the Balkans; 8,000 Muslims Missing; New York Times; Sep 15, 1995; p. 8.
- >
- > 9) Chris Hedges; Conflict in the Balkans: In Bosnia; Muslim Refugees Slip Across Serb Lines; New York Times; July 18, 1995, p. 7.
- >
- > 10) Evans, Michael and Kallenbach, Michael; Missing' enclave troops found; The Times; 02 August 1995 p. 9.
- >
- > 11) Dobbs, Michael/ Spolar, Christine; 12,000 Muslims Massacred In July Srebrenica Exodus; Washington Post, October 27, 1995.
- >
- > Continued in Part 1b at
- > <http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/pumphrey/scandal.htm#1b>
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'Ook Sarajevo liet Srebrenica aan zijn lot over'

Den Haag sluit deze maand eindelijk het dossier-Srebrenica. Maar honderden asielzoekers uit de Moslimenclave en andere delen van Bosnië wachten nog op een Haagse beslissing. Mogen ze blijven of niet? Ze zijn de onzekerheid zat.

Van onze verslaggever
Theo Koelé
DEN HAAG

Sulja Havanovic was erbij toen Dutchbat-commandant Thom Karremans luchtsteun bij de VN aanvraag om de oprukkende Bosnisch-Servische troepen te stoppen. Havanovic had een hoge functie in het Moslimleger, of wat daarvan nog over was. 'Ik verwachtte bombardementen. Maar die kwamen niet. Karremans was

2-6-2003
machteloos. Het is niet de schuld van Dutchbat dat Srebrenica gevallen is en duizenden mensen vermoord zijn. De Nederlanders hebben gedaan wat ze konden doen.'

Havanovic laat een volstrekt ander Bosnisch geluid horen, want veel overlevenden in de enclave Srebrenica verwijten de Nederlandse VN-soldaten passiviteit - of erger.

Havanovic woont sinds enkele jaren in een azc in Dongen. Hij wil per se niet terug naar Bosnië. 'Ik word daar gediscrimineerd en bedreigd vanwege mijn opvattingen.'

De autoriteiten in Sarajevo moeten niets hebben van zijn verhaal. Dat komt erop neer dat Srebrenica niet alleen in de steek gelaten is door de VN-top, maar ook door de regering in de hoofdstad. Havanovic gebruikt zelfs het woord verraad. De regering bekommerde zich in het geheel niet om de verre, geïsoleerde enclave.

'Met de hulp van het Bosnisch regeringsleger hadden we de Cet-

niks (Bosnische Serviërs) kunnen verjagen', denkt Havanovic. In plaats daarvan moesten de lokale Moslimstrijders zelf op de vlucht slaan. Havanovic deed dat op de dag dat Srebrenica onder leiding van de Servische generaal Mladic onder de voet werd gelopen. Dat

'Omdat we de leiders aanklagen, is Bosnië voor ons niet veilig'

was op 11 juli 1995. Hij verloor enkele familieleden.

'Niemand wil de waarheid horen, nog steeds niet', zegt een andere asielzoeker die de moordpartijen heeft overleefd. Alic Fahrudin woont eveneens al enkele jaren in Nederland. 'Omdat we de leiders aanklagen, is het leven in Bosnië niet veilig.'

Ibran Mustafic valt hem bij. Dit

voormalige parlements lid woont in Sarajevo, waar hij de laatste jaren naar eigen zeggen enkele keren is aangevallen door 'bandieten'. Ook hij wijt dat aan zijn 'strijd om de waarheid' namens een groep nabestaanden, namelijk de Moeders van Srebrenica en Prodinje.

Mustafic is in Nederland om deze week het Srebrenica-debat in de Tweede Kamer te volgen. De Kamer bespreekt het eindrapport van de parlementaire enquêtecommissie en gaat later deze maand met het nieuwe kabinet in discussie.

Mustafic is tevreden met het Nederlandse onderzoek. 'In Bosnië is namelijk niets onderzocht.'

Volgens voorzitter Bert Bakker van de enquêtecommissie moet nu weliswaar het 'finale politieke oordeel' geveld worden, maar is het laatste woord nog niet gesproken over de nabestaanden van het drama in de enclave, onder wie de asielzoekers.

Het D66-Kamerlid: 'Asielzoe-

kers uit Bosnië, enkele honderden voor zover ik weet, vormen een vergeten groep. Bosnië is "uit", het drama ligt bijna acht jaar achter ons. De asielzoekers moeten eindelijk eens duidelijkheid krijgen over hun recht op verblijf in Nederland.'

De asielzoekers kunnen nu geen kant op, blijkens het verhaal van Edim Salihbegovic. De 20-jarige, die na een tweejarig verblijf in het azc Dongen zeer goed Nederlands spreekt, heeft humanitair asiel aangevraagd.

Hij is met zijn vader, moeder en ernstig zieke zusje naar Nederland gekomen. Het meisje had een hersentumor. Na een operatie in Utrecht is ze aan de beterende hand.

Edim heeft in Tilburg zijn in Bosnië afgebroken schoolopleiding kunnen afmaken. Hij zou dolgraag wiskunde gaan studeren. Tot dusverre heeft hij echter slechts een aanbod gekregen om illegaal aardbeien te plukken bij een Nederlandse boer.

Jenny Ligtenberg
Krijtmolen 3
1703 NJ Heerhugowaard
tel./fax 072-5740273.

H.H.W. 18/11/02.

Geachte Lezers,

Met veel belangstelling heb ik in het AD de vijf artikelen van Heer v. Vuren gen.b.d. en R.Franken Nov./Dec. 2002 gelezen. Waarom? Na de VUT ben ik richting v.h.Joegoslavië gegaan om hulp te verlenen in ziekenhuizen. Mijn hele bewuste keuze was de Republika Srpska vanwege de voor mij on-geloofwaardige beelden op TV. e.a.Media. Toen ik de truc-foto van die uitgemergelde man achter(??) of....VOOR het prikkeldraad zag, (waarvan de vervalsing in 1997 werd vastgesteld) waarmee de vergelijking van de jodenvervolgung WOII getrokken werd was de maat vol. Ik herinnerde mij de Holocaust van Auschwitz maar ook de Holocaust van Jasenovac/Joegoslavië 1943. De testimonies van overlevenden in mijn bezit. In WOII onze bondgenoten toen Hitler en ustasha=SSers=Kroaten 3/4 miljoen Serven, Joden, Roma en Sinti op gruwelijke wijze gemarteld en vermoord hebben. HUN ustasha kinderen anno 1991, 1993 en 1995 op dezelfde voet zijn doorgegaan. Geholpen door MPRI/Pentagon, Amerika! Vanaf 1948 hebben CIA/Amerika en Genscher/Duitsland c.s. de oorlog op de Balkan voorbereid en, waar gemaakt doorspekt met leugens en intriges dat zijn weerga niet kent. Na Dayton heb ik een eigen onderzoekje gepleegd over het WAAROM en HOE dit bloedbad Bosnie kon gebeuren na 45jr.rust in Europa. WAAROM VN, uitgehold door de VS, fascisten en islam-fundamentalisten voor hun karretje gespannen hebben om SOEVEREIN Servie tot op het bot te vernietigen. De laatste eer aan Tudjman bewezen door GROTE afwezigheid. Hij deugde niet WEL misbruikt toch? Oorlog uitlokken is een 'MISDAAD tegen de vrede', een regelrechte schending van het Volkerenrecht, opgesteld na WOII. Mijn onderzoek heeft dus een veel langere voorgeschiedenis dan Heer Franken door 'het hoofd flitste' op die commandopost. De foto van de 'uitgemergelde man' in dat, vooral door Engeland 'verzonnen concentratiekamp' en uitgebuit door CNN P.R.Ruder Finn Agency D.C.Washington heeft MET succes, vooral in Amerika onder de joden, wereldwijd de publieke opinie bepaald. De wereld opinie aldus op groffe, gewetenloze wijze gemanipuleerd, men moest geloven in de dramatische gebeurtenissen, wel of niet waar, door de Media en Politici in hun mik geduwd. De EU, 12 jaren na dato en veel spijt in 't hart, hadden partij gekozen voor Amerika, dat inmiddels uitgelopen is op een dictatoriale Machthebber. Verdragen en afspraken werden geschonden, ZONDER mandaat v.d. VN bommen gegooid, ZONDER-mandaat v.d.VN 'Safe Havens' in Bosnie omgetoverd in Amerikaanse militaire bolwerken en de VN...tot op het bot uitgehold. Het DOEL v.h. bloedbad Bosnie en de verdere escalatie naar het Oosten staat inmiddels op poten: Camp Bondsteel, de grootste Amerik.militaire basis in Zuid-Oost Kosovo is nagenoeg gereed. Op 4800 hectare GESTOLEN landbouwgrond bij Uresevic, achter de 84 km. prikkeldraad stikken de mensen van de armoe! Serven, Roma en Sinti door UCK terroristen laten vermoorden. Amerika weet hoe dat moet! Leve de OVSE: Kouchner, Clark die exact uitvoerden wat het 'Pandemonium Washington' dicteerde.

Het AMBO (Albanie, Macedonie, Bulgarije Olie) bedrijf in New-York volop in studie met de Trans-Balkan oliepijpleidingen door genoemde Landen.

Alles onder het mom: 'VREDE, Veiligheid, Democratie, Humanitaire Interventie' wordt de wereld geterroriseerd. In Bondsteel staat ook een kapel!! Om hun demonisch geweten te sussen? Foei! Srebrenica:

Onze jongens DutchbatIII, (niet de lieden leugenaars in de hogere regionen v.d. politiek) moeten voorgedragen worden voor de Nobelprijs voor de Vrede!! Hun collegae waarvoor dit leven te zwaar c.q. onleefbaar geworden was POSTHUME onderscheiden. Die EER verdienen de nabestaanden.

Ik heb diep heel diep respect voor hen die in die smerige asbest verblijven moesten wonen en werken. Een enclave (?) dat in werkelijkheid een Amerik.militair bolwerk, waar geen mens de wapens inleverden op verzoek van Karremans, erger nog via de weg en door vliegtuigen in Tuzla (zonder mandaat v.d.VN) door Amerika aangevuld werd. Serven (de hele oorlog vals beschuldigd omdat Amerika DAT het beste uitkwam) de colonnes tegenhielden VANWEGE die wapenhandel. Kwam het voedsel door, allereerst door Oric en zijn fundamentalisten Leger ingepikt, wat overbleef in de zwarte handel aan autochtone moslims in Srebrenica verkocht. 'Oric, de enige die gezag had'. Diezelfde Oric, die voor ontspanning op plundertocht ging. In de ompliggende dorpen plus minus 3000 onschuldige burgers op brute wijze vermoordde. Waar-aan het NIOD summier aandacht schonk? Oric zijn GENOEGEN op video vastlegde en met trots vertoonde aan Bill Schiller. In de Toronto Star 16 Julie 1995 doet deze Canadees verslag van dit walgelijke gebeuren.

Tijdens de presentatie van het NIOD rapport ging M.J.Faber er met de 'vrouwen v.Srebrenica' demonstratief vandoor: 'Hun mannen waren geen strijders', dus...? Moet iedereen verplicht erin geloven, terwijl op de hele Balkan iedereen een wapen bezit al is het maar om bij een Bruiloft in de lucht te schieten. Zij zouden dus deserteurs zijn? 7000 mannen? Waren allang door Izetbegovic of Hilalic, hoofd v.h.Bosn. fundamentalisten leger geliquideerd. Of...toch? in de Bandera Driehoek...waar geen mens, ook VN. overste Karremans niet mocht komen? (Who cares.) Wat zich daar afspeelde valt WEER onder de noemer: DOOFPOT? Karremans vertelde voor het Joeg.(Servisch) Tribunaal dat onder de 25000 vluchtelingen 3% mannen waren waarvan de meesten NIET weerbaar. Op school heb ik rekenen geleerd, Clinton en Albright echter konden beter 'vermenigvuldigen' om hun ONSCHULD=smerige leugens kracht bij te zetten. (Zie Kosovo)

Op Sarajevo TV ging het gerucht dat Dutchbat de Serven hielp, welk gerucht bevestigd werd door de achterban in Nederland. Wat de achterban in Nederland mij eveneens vertelde en er naar vroeg: of er 10.000 moslims vermoord waren? Op een middagschoffe? In de regio Sarajevo, Goradze en Srebrenica niet bekend. Eerst waren er de geruchten, geleidelijkaan de waarheid(?) op het moment dat 1/4 miljoen Serviërs uit de Krajina door fascist Tudjman gedeporteerd werden, door tanks en bommen achtervolgd met behulp van het MPRI/ Pentagon uit Amerika. In opdracht van de VN?? Of... alweer ZONDER mandaat? DAAR....Mijnh.Voorhoeve, kwamen geen bussen....? Er MOEST 'n schokgolf van kritiek en verbijstering door de wereld heengaan over die barbaarse Serven

Srebrenica werd tot mythe verheven! En aldus, op grote schaal aan geschiedvervalsing gedaan, zoals in WOII na de Operatie Barbarossa in Stalingrad een soortgelijk voorval tot mythe verheven werd. Later teruggedraaid moest worden. Te laat!! Daar werden overlevende Duitsers dood verklaard en tot mythe verheven om als HELDEN vereerd te worden die voor het Vaderland gestorven waren. De nazies wilde deze mythe in stand houden. Zelfs de veldpost uit de kampen werd vernietigd!

Men moet van hetzelfde kaliber zijn om op zo'n misdadig crimineel idee te komen. Past precies bij het imago van Albright, die ook Rambouillet MET OPZET liet mislukken OM te kunnen bombarderen. Zij was het die (te)snel met satelietfoto's kwam van massagraven en riep: 'Proof positive.'

Wat deze getraumatiseerde vrouw nodig heeft? Een psychiater die van al haar streken op de hoogte is. Dr. Karadzic b.v.

Een historicus schreef in die periode 1995 een artikel:

Waarom wegen de GERUCHTEN rondom Srebrenica zwaarder dan de WAARHEID van Novi Varos?

Moest de deportatie van 1/4 miljoen onschuldige burgers uit de Krajina als ROOKGORDIJN dienen om de mythe Srebrenica wereldwijd gestalte te geven? Om de eigen blunders weg te poetsen en het volk van Servie nog verder de grond in te trappen? Of waren er nog andere redenen om dit 'ernstige misdrijf van de mythe' tot waarheid te bombarderen? (om in de terminologie van het Witte Huis te blijven.)

Er lopen miljoenen 'VROUWEN v. SREBRENICA' in voorheen Joegoslavie rond! Alle drie partijen hebben zich aan moorden schuldig gemaakt, elk vanuit eigen overwegingen, wel met zekerheid opgehitst door de Politiek.

Aangemoedigd door Clinton c.s. Servie moest vernietigd worden OM de olie en nog vele andere redenen!

Mijn gedachten gaan vaak uit naar ALLE nabestaanden vooral de kinderen, wezen en half-wezen. Vooral ook naar Alle nabestaanden van ONZE jongens Dutchbat die voor een leven hiernamaals kozen. Allen slachtoffers van moordenaars Bush sr./Clinton en Albright c.s. die samen met Genscher, Kohl en Kinkel deze bloedige oorlog gepland hebben reeds vanaf WOII. De Navo-landen en de EU (v.den Broek) die weinig of GEEN ruggengraat toonden.

Men praat over genocide (zonder concreet bewijs!) Srebrenica, welke naam past dan bij de doodverzwegen genocide Krajina? Waar het hele Westen GEEN poot naar uitgestoken heeft? De leugen Srebrenica en de leugen Racak/Kosovo zijn twee met opzet geplande scenario's die de oorlog in Bosnie/Kosovo een wending moesten geven. Er zijn nog meer argumenten/vragen. VN. Kofi Annan moet verplicht gesteld worden alle dokumenten te openen! Ook die van de aanslagen in Sarajevo waarvan Serven vals beschuldigd werden! UNPROFOR deze onderzocht. Ik zag 28/01 IKON 'Srebrenica ongehoord'

Mijn hoop dat deze Vrouwen een Rechtszaak beginnen waar dan alle maar ook allen die verantwoordelijk waren voor deze misdaad tegen de VREDE voor de draad gehaald worden en Kofi Annan verplicht gesteld wordt dokumenten te openen.

Het drama achter het 'Drama Srebrenica' is: DE LEUGEN.



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Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration

While the world recalls the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, the Serbs are busy erecting a cross to Serb victims.

By Nerma Jelacic and Mirna Mekic in Srebrenica and Sarajevo (BCR No 563, 30-Jun-05)

Kravica, a village nestled in a valley 15 kilometers away from Srebrenica, is a site of bustling activity.

Handymen and builders are hurriedly finishing off their work as curious villagers come by to check their progress and bring refreshments.

The work in progress is eye catching - a seven metre concrete cross stands rigidly in the middle of a circular arena fenced off by three gates each with its own cross at the top.

"We are doing this for the memory of our loved ones, who were killed in the war," one builder, a local Bosnian Serb, told Balkans Crisis Report, BCR.

Indeed, to those in the know, a mere mention of Kravica, will send shivers down the spine - but for different reasons.

The village was a site of some of the worst atrocities against fleeing Bosniaks after the fall of what was known as the safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995.

A day after the enclave was overwhelmed, on July 12, more than 1,000 Bosniak men and boys were systematically executed by Bosnian Serb forces in Kravica.

In all, about 8,000 Bosniaks from Srebrenica were killed by Serb militia during five days of summary executions which have been labeled the worst atrocity to have taken place on European soil since World War Two.

On July 11 this year, the survivors, their families, politicians and diplomats from around the world will gather at the memorial complex in Potocari to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the massacre.

Two weeks ahead of this event, Srebrenica, a town which still looks as derelict as it was at the end of the war, is overrun by hordes of journalists that have arrived from four corners of the world to cover the commemoration. They ask the local population in this small eastern Bosnian settlement about return, reconciliation, the past and the future. The locals oblige them with answers and refresh them with freshly brewed coffee.

Just fifteen minutes away from Srebrenica is Bratunac, a Bosnian Serb town which became infamous as the place from which the final attack on the enclave was launched.

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- "Ohrid and Beyond" 2-7-05

Ten years after the massacre, both the town of the victims and that which sheltered some of the perpetrators seem equally caught in a time warp. The infrastructure has decayed and other scars of war remain visible in these divided communities.

A few minutes down the winding road from Bratunac is Kravica.

There visitors will be confronted by the most hair-raising reminder of the mindless bloodletting that took place over those five days in 1995. For it is here that the abandoned building known as the "warehouse" is to be found, its walls covered in bullet holes.

This was the place into which Serb soldiers ten years ago herded more than 1,000 Bosniak men and boys, machine-gunning them to death and finishing them off with hand grenades.

Before the 1992-5 war, Kravica's warehouse was used to store agricultural produce from the area.

Visiting it, several months after the enclave fell in July 1995, UN personnel said they spotted hair, blood and human tissue still caked to the inside walls.

A decade later, only the bullet marks remain to testify to the butchery that took place within. There's no plaque or sign of any kind that records what happened in this building one hot July afternoon a decade ago.

Across the road, a few metres away from the warehouse, lie the dozen of houses that make up the village of Kravica.

Villagers are reluctant to talk about the atrocity. "We were not here. We went with our families to Serbia," most of them tell BCR.

They do not want to discuss what it is like. Instead, they point visitors down the road to the concrete cross, which is being finished off by workmen who say it is the first stage of a memorial monument to "Serb victims of the civil war".

When complete, benches placed around the base of the cross will enable people to pray in comfort for the fallen Serbs. They also plan to build an apartment block near the complex, to house the families of Serb soldiers who died in the conflict.

The monument at Kravica is only one example of the battles for historical truth that are being waged all over the divided land of Bosnia and Hercegovina. A similar, smaller, Serb monument already stands next to the infamous detention camp of Trnopolje in the north-west of the country.

In Kravica, they started creating their own version of history three months ago, with help from the regional branch of the Organisation of Serb War Veterans.

"We want to have a place where we can pray for the souls of our victims that will not have political connotations, like the memorial in Potocari," Milos Milovanovic, president of the local veterans association told BCR.

He made it clear that he felt the monument at Potocari, which commemorates the deaths of Srebrenica's Bosniaks, was based on a historical falsehood.

Jovan Nikolic, who is on the board of the Kravica memorial complex, told BCR, "We want to commemorate our victims of war from Birac region,

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

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where we estimate some 3,500 defenders and civilians died."

The Birac region covers several towns in the Drina valley of eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Milici, Zvornik and Sekovici.

According to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague, it was also the scene of some of the most horrific acts of ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks in the entire war.

But in Kravica, the local Serbs deny all knowledge of this. Instead, they dwell on their own sufferings and especially on the events of Orthodox Christmas day, January 7 1993, when local Bosnian army forces captured the village.

Their commander was Naser Oric, who was subsequently indicted and put on trial by the Hague tribunal. Kravica is mentioned in his indictment as a place where Oric failed to prevent looting and the demolition of homes. But he is not charged with the responsibility for the death of any civilians.

Witnesses in The Hague have testified that Bosnian army troops were accompanied by hordes of desperate scavengers known as "torbari" or "bag people". But they maintain that both the soldiers and the scavengers were mainly after food.

"In Srebrenica we were cut off from the world for more than a year," Ahmet Begovic, a Srebrenica survivor, told BCR. "Aid convoys could not get through to Srebrenica as Serbs from Bratunac would steal the packages. Virtually no food was available to us, so people had to search for food."

Nura Begovic, the leader of a survivors' organisation called Mothers of Srebrenica, whose husband and son were killed in 1995, was among the torbari on the night that Kravica fell.

"It was their Christmas. We knew they would have a lot of food while we were starving," he said. "I took my daughter and followed the soldiers to Kravica in hope of securing a bite. There were a lot of us civilians, mainly mothers with hungry children. We would go into their houses and take food."

"There were 55,000 people in Srebrenica - all hungry," recalled Nedžad Mulabdić, another Srebrenica survivor. "We could not sit back and wait our children to die. We looked for any way to find food, and this was one way."

But Jovan Nikolic denies they were mainly after food. "If they say they only looked for food in our villages, they are lying," he said. "Their goal was to connect Kravica and Srebrenica in order to create more Muslim territory."


A respectable-looking middle-aged man and now director of a Bratunac high school, Nikolic told BCR that his role in the hostilities was brief. He commanded Serb troops in Kravica from the outbreak of the war until December 1992, when he was wounded and played no subsequent role in the fighting, he said.

But the Bosnian Serb interior ministry, acting on orders of the Bosnian state prosecutor, arrested Nikolic and ten other local Serbs on June 23 on suspicion of involvement in the Kravica massacre.

By 1995, he was director of the Agricultural Community of Bratunica, the

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municipality that owns the warehouse at Kravica.

An investigation into the warehouse bloodbath, initiated by the Bosnian Serb police, has found that Nikolic allowed the Bosnian Serb army to use the building to detain and then murder the Bosniaks from Srebrenica. More crucially, their investigation indicates Nikolic took part in the killings himself.

The Bosnian Serb police inquiry found that after the murders, Nikolic was also an accomplice in hiding the traces of the crime and in removing the bodies to an unknown location.

The Bosnian Serb interior ministry forwarded the file on Nikolic and the ten others to the special war crimes unit set up within the state prosecutor's office. They then ordered the arrest of the men and their transfer to Sarajevo.

But after four days in detention Nikolic was released. According to BCR's sources in the court, the judges said they lacked the evidence to keep him in detention.

Following his release, Nikolic told local media he had played no role in the massacre in Kravica and had only found out about the murders the day after they took place.

While in Kravica, BCR spoke to another prominent Serb, Milos Milanovic. Apart from heading the local war veterans association, Milovanovic also sits on the Srebrenica council for the Serbian Democratic Party, the party founded and led by the Bosnian Serb leader and a Hague indictee, Radovan Karadzic.

Milovanovic maintains that Oric's men were guilty of mass killings in the village in December 1993. "On Christmas day in 1993, 83 people, mainly civilians, were killed and their names will be on the memorial that we are building," he said.

The account does not tally with the recollections of other villagers who all said they had left the village at the start of the fighting in 1992 and crossed over the border into Serbia.

Milovanovic also refuses to admit that thousands of men and boys from Srebrenica were massacred in 1995, even though the government of the Republika Srpska, RS, has itself acknowledged the crime in a report published more than a year ago. "The massacre is a lie," he told BCR in February this year. When interviewed four months later, he maintained the same stance. "It is propaganda, created to portray the Serbian people in a bad light. The Muslims are lying and are manipulating the numbers and exaggerating what happened. Far more Serbs died in Srebrenica than Muslims."

Milanovic denies that a massacre of Bosniaks took place, even though he commanded a paramilitary unit, the Serbian Guard, that is alleged to have taken part in it.

Sources at the Hague tribunal told BCR that they now possess evidence that Milovanovic was at the site of the Srebrenica atrocity. He claimed he was in Bratunac at the time.

When interviewed this month, Milovanovic volunteered different information. "I was there [in Srebrenica] in July 1995 but I was just a soldier, no one important," he said.

He added that his name was among hundreds of others on the list of

those involved in the massacre, compiled by the RS Commission for Srebrenica.

Milovanovic does not want to talk about the Kravica warehouse and says he does not know how many Bosniaks were killed there. Like many other Serbs, he says the events in the village were provoked by the Muslims who "went around Serb villages, killing, looting and burning houses".

Back in Kravica, BCR tracked down Mijo Jovanovic, a villager who fought in the RS army. "I was defending Kravica when Oric entered with his troops on January 7 and many civilians were killed," he said. "They burnt the village and our soldiers had to retreat because Oric's men were much stronger."

He added the Bosniak victims at Kravica were not civilians but soldiers, killed in retaliation for Bosniak provocations from 1993 onwards.

"Muslim soldiers who wanted to walk to their territory in Tuzla gave themselves up to Serb soldiers who took them to the warehouse in Kravica and killed them," he said. "This was not done by the villagers but by mad soldiers who were led by [RS army chief General Ratko] Mladic."

Meanwhile, Bosniak returnees to Kravica area deeply resent the Serb decision to erect a memorial while their own victims in the village go unrecorded. Some international officials are equally critical of the Serbs' move. "Building this memorial at this time is a cynical," Charlie Powell, regional representative of the Office of the High Representative, told BCR.

And now the date of the opening ceremony of the Serb memorial has been moved. Originally planned for August, it has been shifted to July 12 this year, almost coinciding with the tenth anniversary commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre.

July 12 is symbolic for other reasons, too. It is Saint Peter's Day, the day on which a decade ago, General Mladic formally presented "liberated Srebrenica to the Serb people".

By June 29, rows of wooden benches will have been set up around the site for the guests at the opening ceremony. "We will have Bishop Vasiljevic, the RS presidency and other big names here," a workman assured BCR.

By contrast, the Serb entity's presidency has not said whether it will even attend the Srebrenica anniversary.

In Bibici, a Serb village just outside Srebrenica, many residents bitterly oppose either reconciliation or an admission of the crimes that were committed in their name.

"They got what they asked for in 1995," Radivoje Bibic told BCR. "Ninety-nine per cent of the Serbs will tell you the same."

Vukosava Bibic, whose son died while fighting for the RS army, agreed. "It would have been better if we had killed all of them, or they had killed of us," she said, "because we cannot live together ever again."

Mirna Mekic is an IWPR/BIRN trainee reporter, Nerma Jelacic is IWPR/BIRN country director for Bosnia and Hercegovina.

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
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Serbs Subvert Srebrenica Commemoration

While the world recalls the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, the Serbs are busy erecting a cross to Serb victims.

By Nerma Jelacic and Mirna Mekic in Srebrenica and Sarajevo (BCR No 563, 30-Jun-05)

Kravica, a village nestled in a valley 15 kilometers away from Srebrenica, is a site of bustling activity.

Handymen and builders are hurriedly finishing off their work as curious villagers come by to check their progress and bring refreshments.

The work in progress is eye catching - a seven metre concrete cross stands rigidly in the middle of a circular arena fenced off by three gates each with its own cross at the top.

"We are doing this for the memory of our loved ones, who were killed in the war," one builder, a local Bosnian Serb, told Balkans Crisis Report, BCR.

Indeed, to those in the know, a mere mention of Kravica, will send shivers down the spine - but for different reasons.

The village was a site of some of the worst atrocities against fleeing Bosniaks after the fall of what was known as the safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995.

A day after the enclave was overwhelmed, on July 12, more than 1,000 Bosniak men and boys were systematically executed by Bosnian Serb forces in Kravica.

In all, about 8,000 Bosniaks from Srebrenica were killed by Serb militia during five days of summary executions which have been labeled the worst atrocity to have taken place on European soil since World War Two.

On July 11 this year, the survivors, their families, politicians and diplomats from around the world will gather at the memorial complex in Potocari to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the massacre.

Two weeks ahead of this event, Srebrenica, a town which still looks as derelict as it was at the end of the war, is overrun by hordes of journalists that have arrived from four corners of the world to cover the commemoration. They ask the local population in this small eastern Bosnian settlement about return, reconciliation, the past and the future. The locals oblige them with answers and refresh them with freshly brewed coffee.

Just fifteen minutes away from Srebrenica is Bratunac, a Bosnian Serb town which became infamous as the place from which the final attack on the enclave was launched.

Agittarius

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Verzonden: dinsdag 28 juni 2005 2:04
Onderwerp: CDSM: A reply to the AP article 'Activist rattles Milosevic's war
 Dear Friends,

First, two corrections to the article previously circulated, 'Natasa Kandic and the Propaganda War Against Yugoslavia'. 1) The Diana Johnstone book is titled 'Fools' Crusade' and not 'Fools' Gold'. 2) Heather Coffin should read Heather Cottin.

Below you will find a brief reply to an article from Associated Press. The AP article has been published by various news outlets, including The State, based in South Carolina. At the end of this mailing you can find a copy of their article in full. Unfortunately it contains many points of contention, too many to address in a necessarily brief response. IJ

Dear Sirs,

I write in regard to the article 'Activist rattles Milosevic's war heritage', originating from Associated Press and appearing on the home page of your website on 27th June 2005.

Space here does not permit a full exposure of Natasa Kandic and her record as 'Serbia's leading rights activist' so please allow me to comment on just two sections of the article.

The video mentioned in the article and presented by Natasa Kandic to the ICTY, if authentic, shows a group of men apparently killing six other men.

From this it is somehow deduced according to the report, that;

"Serb leaders were forced to finally acknowledge their country's role in the killing of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995 - Europe's worst mass killing since World War II."

What kind of logic is in use that can make the giant leap to claim that if six men were killed at a location unknown, perhaps by people looking like Serb paramilitaries, it follows that 8000 men and boys were killed in Srebrenica, and moreover, the Serbs did it?

Furthermore this sentence reads as if 8000 killed in Srebrenica was an established fact, rather than what it actually is, a lie repeated so often that it now masquerades as an established fact.

Posting such irrationality without comment not only denotes a lack of critical thought on your part but is in effect an insult to your readers.

Finally I would comment on this sentence;

"Alarmed by Milosevic's war rhetoric, Kandic and a group of Serbian intellectuals set up a network of nongovernment organizations that would be the basis of the republic's anti-war movement for years to come".

Apart from the fact that the AP article does not inform its readers as to who exactly funded Kandic and the 'network of nongovernment organizations' this sentence contains the words *"Milosevic's war rhetoric."*

It is pertinent to ask, what *'war rhetoric'*?

If any such *'war rhetoric'* existed then it would most definitely have been highlighted during the two-year prosecution case at the ICTY.

The fact is that even with the vast resources at their disposal the prosecution could not find one single speech, not one sentence from a speech, not one article, pamphlet or letter from Mr Milosevic that contained any such *'war rhetoric'* as mentioned in the

As an honest journal perhaps you could make your own investigations into the claims made in such articles before posting them and becoming accomplices in an attempt to rewrite history.

Yours

Ian Johnson

Coordinator CDSM-UK.

<http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/world/11995904.htm>

Posted on Mon, Jun. 27, 2005

Activist rattles Milosevic's war heritage

JOVANA GEC

Associated Press

BELGRADE, Serbia-Montenegro - She's a nightmare for Serb nationalists, a woman who won't let Balkan war crimes remain hidden and forgotten.

Natasa Kandic, Serbia's leading rights activist, has won international praise for her relentless campaign to expose atrocities committed by Serb forces in the wars of the 1990s.

Her "crusade," as a U.S. diplomat recently put it, led to the airing earlier this month of a video she obtained showing Serb paramilitaries gunning down six Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

The shocking images have changed the way Serbs think about their role in the conflicts, shattering the illusion created by former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic that they were the victims.

"That video blew it all out in the open," Kandic told the Associated Press in an interview.

Serb leaders were forced to finally acknowledge their country's role in the killing of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995 - Europe's worst mass killing since World War II.

The film shows six prisoners in civilian clothing taken from a truck, hands tied behind their backs and lined up on a hillside. Four were then shot one by one in the back. Two others were ordered to carry the bodies into a nearby barn where they, too, were killed.

Kandic had provided the video, apparently made by Serb troops, to the U.N. war crimes tribunal trying Milosevic. After prosecutors introduced the film during hearings at The Hague this month, Kandic shared it with editors of

leading Serbian television stations, including the state-run Serbian TV, insisting they use it their main news programs.

Serb nationalists were furious but Kandic says she is used to it. "We must tell the truth so that things like that would never happen again," the 59-year-old sociologist said. "We must seek justice."

Kandic's quest for justice began in the late 1980s, when Milosevic came to power on a wave of Serb nationalism, instigating the subsequent bloody breakup of the Yugoslav federation and four Serb-led wars.

Alarmed by Milosevic's war rhetoric, Kandic and a group of Serbian intellectuals set up a network of nongovernment organizations that would be the basis of the republic's anti-war movement for years to come.

Kandic formed a team of researchers who toured war-torn regions interviewing witnesses and survivors about human rights violations during the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The resulting archive became the basis for her Humanitarian Law Center, which is linked to other databases in the region and The Hague court.

"What I tried to do was to preserve anything that would contribute to finding out the truth," she explains. "There can be no struggle for justice without proper documentation."

In 1999, during the NATO bombing of Serbia over Kosovo, Kandic interviewed ethnic Albanians expelled from the province, collecting information about the harassment by the Serb troops. She was detained by police and interrogated her for eight hours.

I told them (police) everything I knew, how they were plundering and killing in Kosovo," she said. "They told me how that was a very convenient moment for me to just disappear."

But she didn't. She was freed and returned home with hundreds of pages of witness accounts that she made available to The Hague court and the Serbian public.

It was thanks to her that a Serb paramilitary accused of killing 14 ethnic Albanian civilians in northern Kosovo was brought to trial in Serbia in 2004. The case, which ended with his conviction, was seen as a key test of Serbia's willingness to prosecute war crimes at home.

"That was a huge chance for Serbia," Kandic says. "No one realized how important it was for Serbia to hear the victims speak."

Six years after the war in Kosovo ended and five years after Milosevic was ousted from power, Kandic says Serbia's authorities are still not ready to condemn his warmongering policies.

"It is sad, but there is no political force capable of doing that," Kandic says. "Serbia's institutions are still defending the crimes."

Several lawmakers, including members of the ruling Democratic Party of Serbia, recently accused Kandic of leading an anti-Serb campaign.

"That woman is completely insane," cried nationalist politician Aleksandar Vucic, as his Radical Party lawmakers applauded, calling her a "lunatic, creep, pathological liar and trash."

The nationalist mayor of the northern town of Kikinda barred her from visiting.

But that did not stop Kandic from taking part in a television talk show there late Sunday. "If I were afraid, I couldn't do my work, I would be blocked," she said.

Another prominent human rights activist, international law expert Vojin Dimitrijevic, had this to say about the furor generated by Kandic: "Poor is the state that feels so threatened by a woman and her organization."

Sagittarius

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Special Report: Srebrenica and the Politics of War Crimes

[The exact same paradigm can be laid over Rwanda around the same time. The US proxie forces were wiping out local villiagers while receiving tacit support from the UN with the creation of heavily armed safe havens. Finally in 1993-95 the shit started hitting the fan bigtime and the genocide charges started hitting the (Serb/Yugoslav) victims of the West's original aggression to destroy Yugoslavia through Croatia and Bosnia. --mc]

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 Special Report: Srebrenica and the Politics of War Crimes
 Special Report
 Srebrenica and the Politics of War Crimes

Analysis. By George Bogdanich1. Ten years of reflection since the end of the war in Bosnia should have provided ample time to put that conflict into proper historical perspective. But judging from a recently proposed, but politically skewed, US Congressional resolution, such is not the case. The resolution in question singles out and seriously inflates reported abuses by Bosnian Serb forces following the capture of Srebrenica in 1995, and conveniently ignores equally brutal and even larger military operations directed against the ethnic Serb civilian population, both before and after Srebrenica, in the UN protected areas of Western Slavonia and the Krajina. These brutal, ethnic cleansing attacks were conducted by Croatian forces armed, trained and logistically supported by the US.

In the Autumn of 1995, former Deputy NATO Commander Charles Boyd noted in Foreign Affairs that "more than 90 percent of the Serbs of Western Slavonia were ethnically cleansed when Croatian troops overran that UN protected area in May ... This operation appears to differ from Serbian actions around the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa only in the degree of Western hand-wringing and CNN footage the latter have elicited. Ethnic cleansing evokes condemnation only when it is committed by Serbs, not against them."

Operation Flash, which took place more than a month before Srebrenica, was a straight out attack on the civilian population – men, women and children – of a UN Protected Area (UNPA), directly authorized by US President Bill Clinton. "Many Serbs perished in heavy Croatian tank, artillery and aerial bombardments on Monday and Tuesday as they tried to flee southward toward the Sava River bridge into Bosnia," wrote Roger Cohen of The New York Times, adding "The estimate of 450 Serbian dead given by Gojko Susak, the Croatian Defense Minister appears to be conservative." Very conservative. Officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church put the number of murdered civilians in the thousands.

"By acquiescing to the Croatian Government's seizure of Western Slavonia," European Union envoy Lord David Owen, observed, "the [US-dominated] Contact Group had in effect given the green light to Bosnian Serbs to attack Srebrenica and Zepa." Under existing UN resolutions, an attack on a safe area could be used

justify NATO intervention. This was a policy that the US used selectively, denying requests (including at least one from the UNPROFOR Commander in Sarajevo) to punish Muslim or Croatian violations, but triggering NATO bombing when Bosnian Serbs responded to provocations out of "safe zones" that had never been demilitarized. UN Gen. Francis Briquemont wrote in 1994:

"The Bosnian Army attacks the Serbs from a Safe Area, the Serbs retaliate, mainly on the confrontation line, and the Bosnian Presidency accuses UNPROFOR of not protecting them against Serb aggression and appeals for air strikes against the Serb gun positions"

In his book, *Balkan Odyssey*, Lord Owen makes it clear that the establishment of "safe area" by the Security Council, without demilitarizing them was "the worst decision of my time as Co-Chairman [of the International Conference on Yugoslavia]".

While extensive human rights abuses were documented on all sides throughout the conflict, it was the Muslim side which used them best as a powerful weapon to gain sympathy from the international community. When Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic told a press conference in Sarajevo that "70,000 people" had been killed near Bihac in November of 1994, his demands for NATO air strikes received wide news coverage. UN investigators, however, later told BBC reporter John Simpson that "fewer than a thousand" people had been killed around Bihac, a battle which began when Muslim forces attacked the nearby Serb-held Grabez plateau, provoking a sustained counter-attack.

A recent video screened at the War Crimes Tribunal [International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia: ICTY] purportedly showed the execution of six Muslims by Serbian paramilitaries in Treskavica, and was being used, illogically, as "proof" of highly-inflated estimates that the Bosnian Serb Army killed 7,000 Muslims following the capture of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia. If the Bosnian Serbs executed six Muslims, the "logic" goes (and the authenticity of the film is yet to be established), then Bosnian Serbs clearly executed 7,000 Muslims in their attack on Srebrenica.²

Meanwhile, for the first three years of the war in Bosnia, Srebrenica was the stronghold of Muslim warlord Naser Oric, who showed home video tapes of massacres his soldiers carried out against Serbian villages to The Washington Post reporter, John Pomfret, and Toronto Star reporter Bill Schiller. Schiller writes that Oric was "as bloodthirsty a warrior who ever crossed a battlefield" and recounts a visit to the warlord's home in January 1994:

On a cold and snowy night, I sat in his room, watching a shocking video version of what might have been called Naser Oric's Greatest Hits. There were burning buildings severed heads and people fleeing. Oric grinned throughout, admiring his handiwork. We ambushed them," he said. The next sequence of dead bodies had been done in by explosives. 'We launched those guys to the moon,' he boasted. When a bullet-marked ghost town appeared without any visible bodies, Oric hastened to announce 'we killed 114 Serbs there'. Later there were celebrations, with singers with wobbly voices, chanting his praises.

According to former UNPROFOR Commander Gen. Phillip Morillon, Nasir Oric "appeared to be respecting political instructions coming from the Presidency in Sarajevo", an observation which is confirmed by Gen. Sefer Halilovic, Commander of Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For several years early in the conflict, the Serbian population of Srebrenica and scores of nearby villages were either killed or forced to flee because of Oric. On May 8, 1992, Oric's forces assassinated Judge Goran Zekic President of the Serbian SDS Party in Srebrenica, triggering an exodus of 1,500 Serbs in Srebrenica. Scarcely a day went by without scorched earth attacks on nearby villages on towns and villages such as Bratunac, Sirkici, Konjevic Polje, Glogova, Zalazje, Fakovici, Loznica, Orlice, Biljaca, Crni Vrh, Milici, Kamenica, and Kravica. The massacre at Kravica, occurred on Orthodox Christmas Eve the Serbs' most important holiday. Writing in the London based South Slav Journal, reporter Joan Phillips observed that by March 31, 1993, at least 1,200 Serbs had been killed and another 3,000 wounded by Oric's forces. She added:

Today there are virtually no Serbs left in the entire Srebrenica municipality. Out of 9,300 Serbs who used to live there, less than 900 remain. Out of 11,500 Serbs who used to live in Bratunac municipality, more than 6,000 have fled. In the Srebrenica municipality, about 24 villages have been razed. The last major Serbian villages in the vicinity of Bratunac and Skelani were attacked and destroyed on January 7, 1993.

Why, then, despite massive and detailed evidence provided to the UN in 1993, did the Ad Hoc War Crimes Tribunal not indict Naser Oric until 2002, and even then, on relatively minor charges of "mistreating" prisoners. The systematic slaughter of the Serbian civilian population in the area west of the Drina River apparently did not qualify as a "crime against humanity".

By contrast, the quick decision to charge Bosnian Serb leaders with "genocide" after the capture of Srebrenica reflected political correctness by the Tribunal, whose staff had been largely appointed by Madeleine Albright, then serving as US Ambassador to the UN. Meanwhile, a soon-to-be-released report by

Srebrenica Research Group, a group of journalists and academic researchers led by University of Pennsylvania Professor Ed Herman, raises serious doubts about the official version of events at Srebrenica, including bias, inflated casualty numbers, and dubious methodology used to justify estimates that were made before investigations had even begun.

Significantly, the portrayal of events at Srebrenica, is also challenged by senior UN and NATO officials on the scene in Bosnia. These include, as noted previously, NATO's Deputy Commander Charles Boyd, who was NATO's Director of Intelligence; Lt.-Col. John Sray; UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator Phillip Corwin; and Carlos Martins Branco, UNMO (UN Military Observer) Deputy Chief of Operations of the UNPF (United Nations Population Fund), who debriefed UN military observers posted to Srebrenica. Corwin, the most senior UN civilian official in Bosnia at the time of the capture of Srebrenica, and the author of *Dubious Mandate*, a personal account of the last year of the war, states that the official version of events at Srebrenica has been a "campaign of disinformation that has all but buried the facts along with the bodies".

Branco, a Portuguese UN military official states that casualty estimates of 7,000 have been "used and manipulated for propaganda purposes." He wrote in 1998 that "there is little doubt that at least 2,000 Bosnian Muslims died in fighting the better trained and better commanded BSA [Bosnian Serb Army]" in three years of fierce fighting. This is roughly the number of bodies (2,028) which were exhumed by the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the region by the year 2001. Many, perhaps most, of these deaths occurred before the fall of Srebrenica, according to Branco.

Preparing a Sacrifice

The question is why? Why did the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo withdraw 18 top officers of the 28th Division of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its top officers, including Naser Oric and Zulfo Tursunovic, only a month before the fall of Srebrenica, supposedly for training exercises in Zenica? Why did the Muslim military command in Sarajevo order the remaining, nearly leaderless 28th division in Srebrenica to mount a meaningless attack on the strategically unimportant Serb village of Visnica just days before the Serbs captured Srebrenica? Was it to provoke a Serbian counter-response, as had occurred repeatedly in other safe areas?

In testimony at The Hague, Gen. Sefer Halilovic, commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina acknowledged that "there were a large number of orders for sabotage operations from the safe areas". He also confirmed that 5,500 members of the 28th Division were based in Srebrenica, before its capture and that he had sent eight helicopter loads of ammunition to Srebrenica and Zepa, from Tuzla, in violation of the demilitarization agreement. (The US Government violated its own arms embargo by flying tons of military equipment including stinger missiles to Muslim forces through secret C-130 flights to Tuzla airport at night.) Significantly, Halilovic also acknowledged that Srebrenica, was captured by a small force of only 200 Serb soldiers ("chetniks"), supported by five tanks.

Yet Dutch military observers told The New York Times that the much larger Muslim force simply fled along with most military age males in the two days before the Serbs entered to take the nearly empty town on June 11, 1995. Women, children and elderly men, meanwhile, fled to nearby Potocari, where negotiations resulted in UN supervised safe passage for civilians to Muslim-held Tuzla, in buses provided by the Bosnian Serbs. British military analyst Tim Ripley writes that prior to its capture, Dutch troops "saw Bosnian troops escaping from Srebrenica move past their observation points carrying brand new anti-tank weapons. This and other similar reports made many UN officers and international journalists suspicious." Carlos Martins Branco writes that "Muslim forces did not even try to take advantage of their heavy artillery, under control of the United Nations (UN) forces at a time in which they had every reason to do so ... Military resistance would jeopardize the image of 'victim', which had been so carefully constructed, and which the Muslims considered vital to maintain."

Was Srebrenica sacrificed by the leadership in Sarajevo in order to draw in NATO intervention on behalf of the Muslim side? That is the opinion of Ibran Mustafic head of the ruling party (SDA) in Srebrenica as well as his antagonist, Hakija Meholic, who served as police chief under Naser Oric. Mustafic later told Slobodna Bosna that orders from Sarajevo to attack the Bosnian Serb army in early July 1995 were part of a deliberate strategy to promote Western intervention:

The scenario for the betrayal of Srebrenica was consciously prepared. Unfortunately, the Bosnian Presidency and the Army command were involved in this business... Had I received orders to attack the Serb army from the demilitarized zone, I would have rejected to carry out that order without thinking, and would have asked the person who had issued that order to bring his family to Srebrenica, so that I can give him a gun and let him stage attacks from the demilitarized zone. I knew that such shameful, calculated moves were leading my people to catastrophe. The order came from Sarajevo.

UN report "The Fall of Srebrenica", issued in 1999 by Secretary-General Kofi Annan denied that a US sponsored deal had been struck to exchange Srebrenica and other eastern Bosnia enclaves for Serb held Vogosca near Sarajevo. In fact, however, this exchange became a key goal of US policy as early as 1993, according to Branco:

[then US Ambassador to the UN] Madeleine Albright suggested this exchange on numerous occasions to [Bosnian President Alija] Izetbegovic, based on proposals of the Contact Group. The truth is that both the Americans and President Izetbegovic had tacitly agreed that it make no sense to insist on maintaining these isolated enclaves in a divided Bosnia. ... In 1995, the month before military operations in Srebrenica, Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to President Clinton stated that 'American should encourage the Bosnians to think in terms of territories with greater coherence and compactness.

The problem for Alija Izetbegovic was that he felt he could not publicly acknowledge these discussions or he would lose the hardline support which had brought him to power.

In an interview with the Bosnian Muslim publication Dani, Hakija Meholic, the police chief of Srebrenica, recalled that at the Bosniak conference in Sarajevo in September 1993, Izetbegovic claimed to have discussed various scenarios for Srebrenica with President Clinton. According to Meholic, an ally of Naser Oric:

We were received there by President Izetbegovic, and immediately after the welcome he asked us: "What do you think about the swap of Srebrenica for Vogosca?" There was a silence for a while and then I said: "Mr President, if this is a done thing, then you should not have invited us here, because we have to return and face the people and personally accept the burden of that decision." Then he said: "You know, I was offered by [US Pres. William] Clinton in April 1993 that the Chetnik [derisory term used for Serbs] forces enter Srebrenica, carry out a slaughter of 5,000 Muslims, and then there will be a military intervention."

Meholic also recounted this incident for a Dutch documentary. Pres. Izetbegovic was later questioned about the incident by UN investigators and denied he made the statement regarding his discussion with Pres.

Clinton. While there is no way to confirm that President Clinton actually made such a proposal to Izetbegovic, however hypothetical, there were at least eight surviving witnesses to confirm what Izetbegovic told the Srebrenica delegation. Nor would it have been out of character for Izetbegovic to approve a plan which would sacrifice lives of his citizens for the cause, or to inflate the number of casualties for propaganda purposes.

Shortly before his death in 2003, Izetbegovic confessed to Bernard Kouchner, of the Physicians Without Borders humanitarian organization and former US envoy Richard Holbrooke, that during the war he had falsely accused the Serbs of running "extermination camps", according to a recent book by Kouchner. During the Bosnian war, all sides — Muslim, Croat and Serb — ran POW camps which were visited and criticized by the International Committee of the Red Cross. "There were no extermination camps, whatever the horror of those places," Izetbegovic acknowledged to Kouchner and Holbrooke. "I thought my revelations would precipitate bombing [against Serbs]."

"Holocaust comparisons evoke powerful feelings and images, but in this case exist only in the fertile imaginations of media sound bite writers," wrote US military analyst Lt.-Col. John Sray. "Popular perceptions pertaining to the Bosnian Muslim Government (Bosniaks as they prefer to be called) have been forged by a prolific propaganda machine ... which includes public relations (PR) firms in the employ of the Bosniaks, media pundits and sympathetic elements of the US State Department." By the summer of 1995 "the advocacy rhetoric regarding the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo finally grew sufficiently deafening enough to dupe NATO into prosecuting the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs".

On July 9, 1995, two days before the Bosnian Serbs captured the city, Pres. Izetbegovic called on Pres. Clinton to prevent "terrorism and genocide" at Srebrenica. On July 27, 1995, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Henry Wieland, whose team had spent five days interviewing scores of refugees among 20,000 Srebrenica survivors gathered at the Tuzla airport, told the London newspaper, The Daily Telegraph: "We have not found anyone who saw with their own eyes an atrocity taking place."

Indict Now, Investigate Later

Just three days later, however, indictments of Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb Pres. Karadzic for genocide were announced by the War Crimes Tribunal, whose Chief Judge, Antonio Cassese, of the Tribunal, casting any pretence of objectivity aside, called them "a great political result ... The indictment means that these gentlemen [Mladic and Karadzic] will not be able to take part in peace negotiations." The Boston Globe reported the same day: "The Clinton Administration has not obtained independent confirmation of atrocities [at Srebrenica], but does not doubt that they have occurred ... 'The bottom line is these guys have been indicted as war criminals,' said a State Department spokesman."

alized that the War Crimes Tribunal was a very valuable tool," Richard Holbrooke told the BBC. "We used it to keep the two most wanted war criminals in Europe out of the Dayton process and we used it to justify everything that followed." What followed, was Operation Deliberate Force, a US-led NATO bombing campaign which had clearly been planned well in advance against Bosnian Serb targets in Vogošća and near Gorazde. "We have become the Muslim Air Force," a US officer told former New York Times reporter David Binder. Less than a week later, Operation Storm was launched, when US-backed Croatian forces, attacked on all fronts against the Serbian civilian population of the Krajina region, driving 200,000 ethnic Serbs from their homes and then methodically killing the mostly elderly population who were unable to flee. Operation Storm was, by all accounts, the largest ethnic cleansing operation to date in the former Yugoslavia. In violation of UN Security Council resolutions, but with strong US support and planning, the Croatian Army then entered into Bosnia and launched a joint ethnic cleansing operation with Muslim forces against Serb inhabited territories in western Bosnia which displaced another 100,000 ethnic Serb civilians. In *To End a War*, Richard Holbrooke's self-serving account of this period, the former US envoy boasts that he even advised Croat Muslim forces on specific Serbian towns to attack in Western Bosnia.

Was there "Genocide" at Srebrenica?

Unlike US-supported attacks by Croatian troops on Serb-inhabited UN Protected Zones (Western Slavonia and the Krajina), the Bosnian Serb Army's capture of Srebrenica was a predictable response to military provocations. Unlike the Croatian operations Flash and Storm, the Bosnian Serbs helped arrange a massive safe passage operation to Tuzla for thousands of Srebrenica residents who chose to leave from nearby Potocari where the buses were deployed. By the first week of August 1995, 35,632 people had registered with the World Health Organization and Bosnian Government as displaced persons, survivors of Srebrenica. If the goal of the Serbs had been genocide, or even an act of genocide, there would have been no safe passage for the civilian population. According to Carlos Martins Branco, "if there had been a premeditated plan of genocide, instead of attacking in only one direction, from the south to the north – which left the possibility of escape to the north, the Serbs would have established a siege in order to ensure that no-one escaped." The premise that Serbian forces executed 7,000 to 8,000 people "was never a possibility," according to former BBC journalist Jonathan Rooper, who has investigated the events that followed the capture of Srebrenica on site and through official records over many years, and whose findings are presented in the upcoming report of the Srebrenica Research Group. He points out that numerous contemporary accounts noted that UN and other independent observers had witnessed fierce battles as the Muslim 28th Division and military age men accompanied them.

The official numbers provided also preclude the possibility of such a large number of executions. In addition to the 35,632 registered survivors, the International Committee of the Red Cross observed that "several thousand men," (at least 3,000) who fled from Srebrenica with the 28th Division had survived the harrowing journey across Serb held territory and were redeployed to fight elsewhere "without their families being informed." Dutch military observers and British SAS intelligence officers in Srebrenica witnessed a bitter battle between Muslim factions, before the Serbs entered the town. These observers say that the clash between Muslim men who wanted to stay and defend the town and those who followed orders to evacuate, left about 100 were killed and their bodies were left where they had fallen. Some 700 Muslim soldiers from Srebrenica made their way to Zepa, emerging safely when that town fell to the Serbs during the last week of July 1995.

"Taking all these factors together, in order for 7,300 people from Srebrenica to have been massacred, the population of the safe area before it fell to the Serbs, would have had to be well over 46,000 – a figure far in excess of any credible figure put forward at the time," Rooper reports. Patricia Wald, one of the Tribunal Judges who convicted Bosnian Serb Gen. Radislav Krstić of crimes at Srebrenica, wrote an article on the case for *Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics* in 2003 where she states that "prior to the attack, Srebrenica was a village of some 37,000 inhabitants".

"Judge Wald was apparently supremely unaware that her own figure made it impossible for the crimes for which Krstić was convicted to have taken place," Rooper states. According to Michael Mandel, Professor of International law at York University in Toronto

The Tribunal's claim genocide occurred at Srebrenica was not supported by the facts it found or by the law it cited. Even the trial chamber's conclusion that 'Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bosnian Muslim men [with the] total number of victims ... likely to be within the range of 7,000 to 8,000 was not supported by its specific findings.

Mandel notes that Tribunal only 'suggested', rather than proved, that the majority of (2,028) bodies actually exhumed by the ICTY had been killed in executions rather than in the many battle reported between Bosnian

forces and the Muslim 28th Division column retreating toward Tuzla after the capture of Srebrenica. Internationally respected military forensic specialist Dr Zoran Stankovic, who reviewed the findings of the six experts employed by the Tribunal wrote that the effort lacked standard procedures, several of experts also lacked familiarity with wounds inflicted by military ordinance and some parts of the reports are "contrary to the generally acceptable forensic standards".

According to Dr Stankovic, many of the bodies exhumed from 17 gravesites were found in an advance state of decay "skeletonized, disarticulated and decomposed" lacking soft tissue and body parts that could help determine the cause of death. "Ascertainment of the cause of death in the cases of decomposed bodies is generally extremely difficult and in most case impossible... It is not allowed that [ICTY] experts provide their opinion in that regard and put forward the assumption having no grounds in autopsy findings."

Some executions did take place at the hands of paramilitaries and a mercenary group led by Drazen Erdemovic, who was arrested in Novi Sad, Serbia, and turned over to The Hague in 1996. Between 200 and 300 blindfolds and ligatures were exhumed with bodies by the ICTY, and as Dr. Stankovic notes, these are sure signs of execution. "It is a crime, whether it is 300 or 30 or three persons killed in this way, but using a false number such as 7,000 and calling it "genocide" indicates that Srebrenica is still being used 10 years later as a political issue," says Phillip Corwin, the former UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia when Srebrenica was captured.

False Witnesses, Unreliable Testimonies

But other reports of massacres came from a handful of individuals close to Naser Oric, including his cousin, Mevludin Oric, whose claims to being eyewitnesses to such events, were repeatedly undermined by contradictory accounts given to different reporters. One witness, Smail Hodzic, told Alexandra Stiglmayer of Die Woche that he had been captured and taken to "a basketball stadium near Bratunac" and taken to "a large field not far from a forest". Hodzic, however told another reporter Roy Gutman, that he had been held in a soccer stadium in Nova Kasaba, but then, he and others were moved to be killed, "probably in a town called Grbavce". In a third interview with Aida Cerkez of the Associated Press, Hodzic now claimed that he went through the same experience as Mevludin Oric, this time being held in "a school in Krizevci", before being taken for execution not far from Karakaj.

Several of these alleged eyewitnesses told reporter Louise Branson of The Sunday Times and Robert Block of The Independent contradictory stories, that thousands were executed, either at a school in one version, or at a nearby sports complex. Human Rights Watch, which acknowledged it had not been able to trace survivors of such crimes, called for "more detailed investigations." However, Dutch UN officer Captain Shouten, who was the only UN officer in Bratunac during the period when this bloodbath was alleged, told the Dutch newspaper Het Parool on July 27

"Everybody is parroting everybody, but nobody shows hard evidence. I notice that in the Netherlands people want to prove at all costs that genocide has been committed. ... If executions have taken place, the Serbs have been hiding it damn well. Thus, I don't believe any of it. The day after the collapse of Srebrenica, July 13, I arrived in Bratunac and stayed there for eight days. I was able to go wherever I wanted to. I was granted all possible assistance; nowhere was I stopped"

The trial of General Radislav Krstic, demonstrated, that faced with years of prison, Serbs were equally capable as their Muslim counterparts of providing false testimony used to prop up the official version of events at Srebrenica. During the trial, a Serbian military officer named Momir Nikolic claimed that he had supervised the massacre of more than a thousand Bosnian Muslims at a warehouse in Kravica, but under cross examination, by defense lawyer Michael Karnavas, Nikolic admitted that he not only didn't give the order; he wasn't even present.

"You needed to give him [the prosecutor] something he did not have, right?" said defense attorney Michael Karnavas. "You wanted to limit your time of imprisonment to 20 years, that was part of the arrangement, yes? Quid pro quo?"

"I did not tell the truth when I said that," Nikolic admitted. "I lied."

The key witness used by the Tribunal to support the contention that Bosnian Serb leaders ordered executions at Srebrenica, was Drazen Erdemovic, leader of a mercenary group who was arrested in Serbia in 1996 after he was involved was injured in a drunken shooting incident involving another member of his group. For myriad reasons, it would be hard to find a less reliable witness than Erdemovic, an ethnic Croat from Tuzla, who claims to have fought previously at various times for the Army of Bosnia Hercegovina and the Bosnian Croat HVO.

Erdemovic claims that his group of eight was ordered to execute Muslims at Branjevo military farm near Pilica by a Lt.-Colonel, but this officer is never identified. Erdemovic states that members of his group had

... paid 12 kilos of gold, but was not able to remember who provided the funds. Anxious to use his testimony, but unwilling to expose him to cross examination, the Tribunal concluded on June 27 that Erdemovic's mental condition did not permit his standing trial.

Yet, based on a plea bargain with prosecutors, Erdemovic was allowed to participate in the farcical Rule 61 hearings later that year against Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic, a trial-by-media procedure which allowed uncorroborated testimony to be provided without cross examination. Legal experts were scathing about the procedure. The BBC called it a "circus," but Chief Judge Cassesse, said "I am relying on the pressure of public opinion" to justify indictments against Serbian leaders.

Erdemovic who, like Nikolic, had admitted to terrible crimes, received a very light sentence of five years and was not required to serve out even the full term because of the "significant cooperation that has been provided to the Office of the Prosecutor". None of the prosecutors office apparently wished to ask, why, if they had any interest in carrying out summary executions, would the Serbs High Command entrust such a mission to a mentally unstable Bosnian Croat, who had fought previously with Muslim forces and the Croatian HVO? Eventually Erdemovic's former partners-in-crime were reported serving as mercenaries in the Congo on behalf of French intelligence.

"Few outside Serbdom would object to Karadzic and Mladic being put on trial," observed former UN Assistant Secretary-General Cedric Thorneberry in the Summer of 1996 in Foreign Policy. "But is it likely, given their near universal demonization and the high places from which they have been denounced and condemned, that they could receive a fair trial?" Thorneberry asserted that Judge Cassesse and others on the Tribunal had "stretched their judicial role," by calling for political action. "Crusading and judging are two different (and incompatible) occupations," he noted and warned that "the court could leave a poisoned legacy." Former columnist George Szamuely, also with the Srebrenica Research Group, writes that the ICTY

"is a kind of Nuremburg in reverse. The principle that was supposed to have been enshrined by the post World War II war crimes trials – that carrying out the orders of superiors is no defense – has been turned on its head. The ICTY declares that lowly soldiers that committed war crimes were really not responsible for their acts, because they were only carrying out orders of their superiors. And what is the evidence that they were carrying out orders? Well it stands to reason that they wouldn't have done what they did, had they not been ordered to do so.

When the My Lai massacre was revealed during the Vietnam War, indictments never reached higher than Sgt. Calley and Captain Medina. No one of higher rank than Specialist Graner and Private England have been charged in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. Yet, because the US, and a US-dominated NATO eventually took sides in the Bosnian Civil War, not only were the scope of crimes greatly inflated, but responsibility for these abuses was placed on Serb leaders, without evidence they had ordered or approved of them.

The failure to condemn and prosecute a similar military operation by Croatian forces in Western Slavonia that preceded the capture of Srebrenica, and a much larger "scorched earth" operation driving out 200,000 Serbs out of the Krajina, shows a marked discrepancy in comparative moral standards. The ICTY moved haltingly and reluctantly moved prosecute mid-level Croatian military officials involved in Operations Storm and Flash, but because of US support for these war crimes, indictments did not reach any higher, nor was there serious consideration of prosecuting Americans involved in the operation. The Pentagon has refused to turn over satellite photos. But a recent article in Croatian Nacional Magazine, by Ivo Pukanic, asserts that US Pres. Clinton was personally involved in military arrangements for these attacks on civilians in UN Protected Areas.

The United States not only monitored the complete Operation Storm, but they also actively participated with the Croatian Military in its preparation, and in the end directly initiated the operation. The green light from the White House and then-President Clinton for Operation Storm was passed on by Colonel Richard C. Herrick, then US military attaché in Zagreb.

Senior UN official Cedric Thorneberry holds no particular brief for the Serbs, whom he accuses of shelling him out of several different residences in Sarajevo, but he expressed dismay at the bias, which impeded a solution to the war in Bosnia. "By early 1993, a consensus developed – especially in the United States, but also in some West European countries and prominently in parts of the international liberal media – that the Serbs were the only villains, all through Yugoslavia, and that the victims were overwhelmingly or even exclusively the Croats and Muslims. This view did not correspond to the perceptions of successive senior UN personnel in touch with daily events throughout the area; as a kindly soul at the UN headquarters in New York, ear to the diplomatic grapevine, warned me, take cover – the fix is on."

Whether the US Congressional Resolution on Srebrenica passes in its present form, without mentioning or

condemning well-documented and comparable abuses by Muslims and Croats, should indicate if the "fix" is all on.

Footnotes:

1. George Bogdanich is part of the Srebrenica Research Group which is led by author Ed Herman of the University of Pennsylvania; Herman is co-editor with Phil Hammond of a series of essays called Degraded Capability: The Media and Kosovo Crisis. Others in the group include former BBC Journalist Jonathan Rooper, former New York Press columnist George Szamuely, Diana Johnstone, author of Fool's Crusade: Yugoslavia NATO and Western Delusions, international law professor Michael Mandel of York University in Toronto, author Phil Hammond South Bank University in London, researchers David Peterson of the US, Tim Fenton of London, George Pumphrey of Germany, Dr Milan Bulajic, former Director of the Museum Genocide and Belgrade Professor Vera Vratusa. Mr Bogdanich has also written about the Balkans for various publications including The Chicago Tribune. He was co-producer of Yugoslavia The Avoidable War, with German television reporter Martin Lettmayer.
2. Editor's Note: Not only is the logic faulty, the motivation behind showing the video at the ICTY was clearly questionable. While showing the highly-inflammatory and graphic imagery in that video, the ICTY refused earlier to show video footage of the 505th Buzim Brigade of the Bosnian [Muslim] Government army showing heaps of mutilated bodies, torched villages and the beheading of a Serb soldier, Ensign Rade Rogic. The ICTY said that the footage was too brutal to show. As a result of the showing of the video highlighting alleged Bosnian Serb atrocities — which resulted in the arrest of at least 12 of the Serbs in the unit involved — the Belgrade newspaper, Vecernje Novosti published a picture a week later, on June 15, 2005, showing the beheading of Ensign Rogic from Sanski Most.

van holst en steijnen

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Sent: vrijdag 16 februari 2001 15:58
Subject: Oric Left Srebrenica On His Own Accord.htm

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Oric Left Srebrenica On His Own Accord

Dani Interview with General Sead Delic

After the Serbian Unity Congress published at his web-site original documents of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina which bring into question the widely accepted version of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, General Sead Delic, the then and now commander of the Second Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Army, respectively, answer the questions of our journalist. Talking about the responsibility of military structures, General revealed so far unknown data and openly spoke about supplying of weapons to the Bosniak enclaves, the arrival of the commander of the 28th Division, Naser Oric, from Srebrenica to Tuzla, the breakthrough through the Serb lines in Baljkovica and demands that the enclave which was outside the reach of the Second Corps be taken out of its command

Interview by Vildana SELIMBEGOVIC

Dani, Sarajevo, Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina, B-H, March 17 2000

DANI: Documents about the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa have made it to the Internet, but they still haven't been presented to the domestic public. What is the Second Corps hiding about the suffering of these two enclaves?

DELIC: Nothing at all. It is only in the interest of the enemies of Bosnia-Herzegovina that the real truth about the suffering of Bosniaks, especially those from the Drina River valley [Podrinje], is not made public. Our goals are very clear: we want to spread the truth in order to punish war criminals, establish the responsibility of the United Nations and the International Community for the fall of the protected zones Zepa and Srebrenica, and establish the responsibility within the ranks of the Army and political leadership for actions taken or not taken to reduce the number of victims or make sure they did not happen at all. Although the military organization is specific we have decided to open all of our archives.

In that case, what did take place in Srebrenica on the eve of its fall: there are allegations of conflicts among the local leaders, smuggling of humanitarian assistance and trade with the Ukrainian battalion based in Zepa which went on under the control of Srebrenica authorities, reign of terror by Naser Oric...?

I would prefer to answer this question more like an ordinary citizen than as a commander. An assessment of relations within political authorities, if there were any, and military structures, has never been made by us, at least as far as I know. I have heard about some of these allegations. I would say that there were two to three sources that indicated rather chaotic situation in Srebrenica. One of them was the Police, and as far as I recall, there is a letter, I believe sent from the local Police Chief to the civilian authorities in which he wrote about a large number of murders in Srebrenica and a generally chaotic situation. The other source, from which we could partially collect information and get insight in the local situation was the military security service. On the eve of the fall of Srebrenica, people were escaping from the enclave, so that we arrested six or seven soldiers from whom we obtained similar information. Also, the Security service using its methods managed to obtain some information. There is a third source: one of the UN officials who personally visited Srebrenica told me personally, several months before the fall of the enclave, about some of the allegations you've just mentioned. I do not want to deny nor confirm anything, but the fall of Srebrenica prompted activities to establish the true responsibility and we held a meeting here in Tuzla, attended by president Izetbegovic, Bakir Alispahic, at the time the Minister of Police, Hazim Rancic, the local Police Minister, and several key people from Srebrenica. For their protection I will not disclose their names, but for four hours they talked about the situation in Srebrenica on the eve of its fall and the fall itself, since, according to our assessments, the fall was more sudden than could have been expected militarily. We hoped that both enclaves, in the worst case situation, could resist for much longer.

Was Naser Oric among the participants in the meeting?

No. They were people from the Military and Police and also civilians. Naser Oric wasn't there, but commanders from that region did participate at the meeting.

Important command positions in the division, with rare exceptions, were given to friends and acquaintances of Naser Oric, although their military credentials were very dubious. For example, the defense was very shallow, there was no reserve line of defense at all...

All enclaves had a specific command and control system. The Second Corps, I have stated this on several occasions, demanded on several occasions, as early as a year before the fall of the enclave, that that operational group and division, respectively, be taken out of our command. The reason for that is that we had almost no influence apart from an advisory role. We had no way of verifying whether our orders had or had not been carried out, so that all of that basically amounted to a lot of paperwork. As a local, General Enver Hadzihasanovic was placed by the Chiefs of Staff in charge of assisting this part, so that all coordination of supplying weapons, equipment and the rest went through him. The role of the Second Corps was pretty minor and boiled down to preparing 30 to 40 soldiers, feeding them, providing them with backpacks, boots and other equipment, so that they could carry 1,000 to 1,500 bullets to Srebrenica or Zepa. They usually went to Zepa first and proceeded from there to Srebrenica. If a helicopter went, we would find out only after its return. I have to say that I had no idea that that group, led by Oric, was coming to the free territory for additional training. Therefore that was more like patronage, relying on the Chiefs of Staff. On the other hand, Zepa was again a special case. I believe that the relations between the two enclaves were not smooth. They decided on their own how many weapons and how much equipment should be sent to whom. It is true that in practice only one man had some military training: late Ramiz Becirevic, the head of the headquarters. I think that that was among the justifications for pulling out some of younger commanders for additional training in Zenica.

That could be true, but the time chosen for that is very controversial. Besides, that is one of the questions that the military leadership has failed to answer.

I can only state my opinion. Brigade commanders were not in that group. As far as I know, Naser came on his own accord, no one had invited him. I know for sure that late Ejub Golic, a commander of a battalion, also came with them (he died in the breakthrough through the Serb lines), in order to have his responsibility for several murders in Srebrenica established. I know his case very well. The commander, Rasim Delic charged me with deciding whether to send him back or try him here, since there was substantial evidence that he had been implicated in several murders in Srebrenica. We discussed this for a long time and finally decided that his potential crimes do not fall under the statute of limitations, that he would be held responsible for them sooner or later and that the priority at that time was to send him back to Srebrenica. I thank God that he was sent back since he led the breakthrough from the other side. I am sure that Enver Hadzihanovic had a plan, he even set up a small-scale model of the region, to liberate Podrinje. One plan was the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo, the other Podrinje. Because of the current political situation Sarajevo was given priority. Also the Chiefs of Staff requested plans for activities that would be directed from the other side [from the enclaves] in case of an offensive towards Podrinje. And as far as offensive activities during the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo are concerned, we concluded that a protected zone according to the International Law had a special status: no attacks, no military activities, although from the military point of view enclaves were the most sensitive spots in our military plans.

Is it true that enclaves did not receive special protection treatment and that there were problems within them?

I have between 500 and 1,000 statements by soldiers, and respected individuals from Srebrenica and Zepa made after the exodus that partly confirm that. However, Zepa cannot be compared to Srebrenica. Zepa was much better organized. The complete Zepa suffered far less casualties, almost all soldiers managed to get out of Zepa (apart from those who crossed over to Serbia), they arrived in good condition, with very few casualties. I would say that casualties were negligible in comparison with the total number of troops. They carried out their withdrawal in an organized manner, in groups. We expected that the inhabitants of the Srebrenica enclave would move towards Zepa since the Zepa plateau after all offers better conditions and is easier to defend.

You've just said that Mr. Enver Hadzihanovic, as a local, was in charge of these enclaves. As far as I know you are also from Podrinje, and are officially his superior.

Once, at a meeting held near Pazarici, where all Corps commanders and president Izetbegovic were present, I said that it did not make sense that that operational group is connected with me only on paper, and that I do not have any significant influence nor the ability to help. For example, I could not use a helicopter to transfer ammunition, nor could I get ammunition, apart from sending them some of my own supplies.

Do you at least know how the military assistance that was delivered with a lot of trouble to Srebrenica was used? There are allegations that Naser Oric kept the sniper rifle Barret 12.5 mm caliber at home and used it occasionally for hunting; then, the anti tank weapon Red Arrow was used with fatal delay in the crucial moments of the offensive.

I haven't had a chance to discover how and in what manner these resources were used. I know that the group which came here and was supposed to be sent back in a helicopter was trained in use of the weapons that had been sent or could be captured by them. I even considered, since they refused to take an ordinary helicopter, to order them to return on foot, but I always had Ruzine Vode incident in my subconscious. In that incident, in winter 1993, about 70 men, out of 100 who had left from Tuzla for Srebrenica were killed. However, we also had information that Red Arrow, in spite of instructions, had not been used adequately; we even have information that, although its success rate is supposed to be greater than 90 percent, two projectiles were fired and missed the tank at the head of the column, which only encouraged Chetniks to continue their attack. I do not know whether this and other assistance was abused. There are some statements and indications that the humanitarian assistance was distributed exclusively by the military, that the civilian authorities were not involved and that the assistance was distributed according to the wishes of certain individuals. Of course, no one has been summoned by the authorities to establish whether that is true or not, but I think that a lot of that is true.

Two stories are making rounds among the inhabitants of Srebrenica: according to one, after the fall of Srebrenica Naser Oric broke through the Serb lines with a handful of volunteers; according to the other version, he cowardly refused to carry out that action. Which one is true?

I'd say neither one. I think that this story refers to July 13, when Oric received the order to carry out combat activities with a handful of soldiers and officers in the region of Medjedja. They left in the afternoon to try to establish a contact with units of the 28th Division that had headed towards Tuzla. One soldier, only Allah knows how, had gotten through two days before and crossed over to our territory near Kalesija. Based on his story we concluded that it was possible that they could head this way. Therefore, Naser was sent with radio stations since we thought that they would recognize his voice and that he would recognize his men, so that we could figure out which way they were going. Naser tried to get through with his group; they claimed that because of weather, it was raining, they were detected by the Chetniks [Serbs]; the Chetniks opened fire on them and they had to withdraw. There were no wounded. That was the last attempt of that kind. Naser and that whole group, when the corridor was opened, went out to meet with soldiers and people and withdrew with them to the free territory. They did not stay behind in the corridor to organize and defend it, but went along with the people. A two-kilometers-wide front was broken through by the units from Srebrenik, I believe the 211th Liberation Brigade. The 242nd and 243rd Brigades also participated in the action. These were parts of brigades, mostly companies. I personally went with Senahid Hadzic, the commander of the 281st brigade, who was at the time the only officer that got through, went to Baljkovica and crossed the paved road. That implies that I had the full insight in the situation at that frontline. Naser did not break through the Chetnik lines; he did try, but the breakthrough was carried out by organized units.

The Chief of Staff general Enver Hadzihanovic issued orders for carrying out of sabotage actions in the Serb territory near Srebrenica without any strengthening of the defense lines in the enclave. Why was that order issued? What information was it based on? Are you aware that the units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are arguing about which units should be credited with the success of these actions?

As far as I am aware, the Second Corps also received that order, but it was not related, unless it went out through the unofficial lines I mentioned earlier, to Zepa and Srebrenica. That was the time of an attempted lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo, and it is customary in military tactics to try to prevent the enemy from withdrawing, moving, and regrouping forces from one region to another. That was the goal of that order. The order was to, wherever and whenever possible, carry out sabotage and other actions in order to tie the enemy down and inflict losses and prevent him from moving reinforcements to this area. I do not know whether this order made it to Zepa and Srebrenica, but that was the period in which we intensified commando actions, and smaller attacks on certain objects, which confirms that the order indeed existed.

In mid-June, the command of the 28th Division sent to the command of the Second Corps the information about Serb military activities near the enclave. Among other, they specifically in that memo mention SAMs [rockets], movement of manpower in busses on the road Vlasenica-Bratunac, digging in of Serb artillery to the east of the enclave. What did the Second Corps do after receiving that information? What sort of information has the Second Corps withheld from the public in the meantime?

None at all. I am not sure where this line of questioning is going. I would be incredibly happy if all answers were here. We informed the superior command and set up a 24-hour communication link with the enclave. Muharem Efendic was in charge of that communication and recordings of all conversations are available. We also sent Oric and he was for a while with them non-stop, he directed them. We also have records of his orders. All of that has been recorded.

Among the documents circulating on the Internet is a moving letter from Avdo Palic sent to president Izetbegovic and several conversations and letters

that imply the lack of synchronization in communication between the authorities in Zepa with the military and civilian authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you aware of the content of these conversations?

No, I only heard about that. I have never communicated with Avdo. I had been the head of the Corps for six to seven months, and I could not have communicated with them, but I did hear about that letter. Not only Avdo's letter but also of those sent by some politicians. I think that in Sarajevo, there is a physician who is from Zepa...

Heljic?

Possibly.

There are testimonies that the civilian authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, more precisely gentlemen Izetbegovic, Masovic, Muratovic, rejected the possibility of exchanging 400 captured aggressor soldiers for a secure evacuation from Zepa. What do you know about that?

Nothing. Negotiations were held at their level. I only know that we gave over 100 prisoners of war for children and wounded [from Srebrenica] who were held in the prison in Bijeljina. We exchanged soldiers for about two hundred, perhaps a few more, civilians, allegedly all that they had, only to save all that could be saved. I even held about 130 Chetniks until March in hope of being able to exchange them for a few more survivors. However, once there was no more chance of that, we had to turn them over to the Serb side via the International Red Cross.

The documents posted on the Internet state that General Mladic demanded to negotiate exclusively with Hasan Muratovic about the evacuation of the survivors from Srebrenica and Zepa and that the command of the Second Corps rejected that out of fear for Muratovic's safety? Would you care to comment?

I don't think that I have exchanged more than two words with Hasan Muratovic in my whole life. I might have said selam [hello], once or twice, I don't remember. I know that the only person from that leadership for whom I struggled for was Ajanovic. He was in captivity in Doboj. I offered for him (the Chetniks demanded 50) once 15 and on another occasion 20 prisoners. He sent me two letters from captivity and I was prepared to make an effort to get him out, to assist in that, but I failed since they demanded more prisoners than I had at the time. Therefore, we never had the information that Mladic was interested in negotiating with Muratovic.

The documents presented on the Internet imply that the activities of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina boiled down to the statements of Rasid Zorkak, Rifet Bilajic, and Zicro Suljevic, who with selam and calls on faith in God and expectations of assistance from Islamic countries tried to calm down worried officers in the field. Would you care to comment?

It could be that the General Staff placed them in charge of Zepa. But definitely not of Srebrenica, since we had here a command outpost which was working properly. I must say that president Izetbegovic on several occasions in that period called me personally to inquire about the situation in Srebrenica, need for assistance, but I do not know anything about the activities of the officers you've just mentioned.

The documents I have been mentioning are presented on the web-site of the Serbian Unity Congress, an organization of the Chetnik emigrants in the West. In your opinion, how could have these documents ended up on the Internet. And what would be the goal of repeated drawing of attention to the fall of the enclave and the circumstances in connection with the fall?

I do not know if that can be explained in several sentences, but essentially, the goal is already known. We must not allow that that be forgotten and therefore it does not hurt to always work, investigate and write about that. This topic will burden the generations that lived through this war until their death. Probably, this is another attempt to exonerate the criminals and somewhat reduce the responsibility of the International Community for this crime. Even the UN Secretary General has said that Srebrenica is the biggest mistake of the International Community since WWII.

By chance, Dutch Minister Jan Pronk was in Tuzla at the time of the fall of Srebrenica. Later he traveled to Sarajevo. In his interview to Dani, he stated, about ten days before the fall of Zepa, that Zepa would be the last enclave to fall. Does that mean that the international factors had already known what was about to happen?

I have opened the archives of the Corps. The court in the Hague has also shown interest in that. Their [Dutch] defense is that one of our soldiers in Srebrenica killed a Dutch soldier and that consequently they turned against the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another their defense is that the Serb soldiers, as they state in their reports, were a true army while on our side there was no military organization; they, because they were guests, were taking them to pubs, did what they did etc.

Will the General Staff of the Second Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate the question of responsibility of our officers for the fall of these two enclaves?

That is a difficult question. I do not know whether this falls within the scope of that responsibility, but as a man I can state that I did all I knew and could. I did not fail to at any moment do anything I could and knew how to do. Those were my capabilities and the capabilities of the Corps. Whether we could do more or better, only history can tell. The war took its toll. Of course this was the worst genocide ever done at some limited area, if we take into account that some seven to ten thousands of people were killed and our whole Corps had during four years 20,000 soldiers. It is likely that there will be further progress towards that [sic]. Wars are such that simply some battles are won and some are lost. The ethics of our Army was such that, even when an individual made a mistake, we tried to use him as much as possible. I spoke about Golick: he was responsible for some crimes in that area, but we then decided that it was more important to have him fight than to send him to prison, since it would turn out that his punishment was a reward since he would thereby get out of the enclave. On the other hand we gave him a chance to improve. In general, as far as the military is concerned, we passed a report to the Joint Chief of Staff and I think that even president Izetbegovic has received a copy, so that he could decide who did less or did not do, and by his actions or inaction contributed to the fall of Srebrenica.

There are numerous accusations against Naser Oric, for terror...

I am not afraid of anyone, let that be known. I do not have a body guard; when I go fishing, or to play chess, I use my own car. I am not afraid of anyone. I survived and it is up to Allah until when I shall go on. I think that in that way somewhat tacitly Naser's responsibility was accentuated. Simply, he was replaced from the duty of the commander of the unit, he was not accepted to the Federation Army, or he did not want to continue to serve in the Federation Army, I would rather not discuss that, but I never heard that anyone complained about his recruitment into professional Army service. This unit, namely this division was reorganized, it became a part of a larger unit that is active in this area. None of those officers stayed on the same position as before. Most of them were degraded. We have wonderful examples, wonderful people who stayed in the professional Army. I would like to mention Husic, the commander of the armored battalion, or Smajo Mandzic, also a wonderful person.

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- > region of heavy fighting, many almost surely fallen soldiers on both sides.
- > Recall also that the United States had engaged in intensive satellite imaging of this area, and Madeleine Albright had even promised to keep watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs disturbed the graves. But she never
- > produced for public view any satellite photo showing bodies being deposited in or removed from graves.
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- > Johnstone has a devastating account of the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, showing its political origin, purpose and service, as well as its violation of all Western judicial norms (including its use of "indictments" to condemn and ostracize without trial).
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- > A further illustration is afforded in her enlightening account of the novel "hearing" on the Karadzic case in July 1996, where the Tribunal innovated a judicial rule whereby Karadzic's attorney was not allowed to offer a defense of his client; he could merely observe. The main evidence of Karadzic's

- > "genocidal intent" was a phrase he uttered in 1991 while calling on
- > Izetbegovic to recognize the Bosnian Serbs desire to remain in
- > Yugoslavia,
- > saying that "do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim
- > people
- > disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is a
- > war --
- > How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"
- > Although this muddled sentence issued in the heat of debate could be
- > interpreted as a warning of the dangers of war, and comparable
- > statements
- > were made by Izetbegovic and many others, this was presented by the
- > Tribunal
- > as serious evidence of genocidal intent.
- >
- > Johnstone contends that the United States was a participant in the
- > Balkan
- > wars for a number of reasons, including the desire to maintain its role
- > as
- > leader of NATO and to help provide it with a function on its 50th
- > anniversary year (celebrated in the midst of the 78-day bombing war in
- > April
- > 1999); if Germany and others were going to intervene in Yugoslavia, the
- > United States would have to enter and play its role, and incidentally
- > show
- > that in the use of force it was still champion. The United States was
- > also
- > helping itself in its Bosnian intervention by demonstrating its
- > willingness
- > to aid Muslims, contradicting its image as anti-Muslim, and solidifying
- > its
- > relationship with Turkey and other Muslim countries helping in the
- > Bosnian
- > war. It was also positioning itself for further advances in the region
- > with
- > a major military base in Kosovo and new clients in an area of increasing
- >
- > interest with links to the Caspian basin. The humanitarian motive was
- > contradicted by inherent implausibility and by the nature and
- > inhumanitarian
- > results of the U.S. and NATO intervention.
- >
- > All-in-all the United States did well from its intervention, but the
- > people
- > of the area did poorly. The policies of it and its European allies were
- > primary causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the failure to manage
- > any
- > split peaceably. Their intervention was not "too late," but early,
- > destructive, and well designed to encourage the ethnic cleansing that
- > followed. Subsequently, they failed to mediate the conflict in Kosovo
- > and
- > collaborated with the KLA in producing a highly destructive war,
- > followed by
- > an occupation in which REAL ethnic cleansing took place, with NATO
- > acquiescence and even cooperation. Bosnia and Kosovo are under colonial

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GEGG KIEDENIS

P E R S O O N L I J K ! I N H A N D E N S T E L L E N V A N !

Geacht Kamerlid,

Misschien is het goed dat u zich, als lid van de parlementaire enquête-commissie Srebrenica, of als gewoon Kamerlid dat straks zijn oordeel moet geven over het komend rapport van deze parlementaire enquête-commissie, zich ook eens verdiept in een anderstalige visie op de zaak-Srebrenica.

Zoals hieronder weergegeven.

hoogachtend,


N.M.P. Steijnen

SREBRENICA - ZONDER IDEOLOGIE

Hoe lang kan ideologie in politieke kwesties het beeld blijven bepalen, zonder dat men bereid is om de onmiskenbare feiten hun werkelijke plaats toe te kennen ?

Srebrenica vormt het, tot op heden, ultieme testobject voor beantwoording van deze vraag.

Dat antwoord moet zijn: hoe ongerijmd ook de ideologische fixaties, als maar voldoende maatschappelijke krachten zich daarmee verknoopt hebben, dan kan die ideologische bepaaldheid vrijwel onbeperkt doorgaan.

De ideologische lading blijft immers, als vooronderstelling en als ijkpunt, bij elk nieuwe studie fier intact. En overleeft zo, als een ongenaakbare rots in de branding, moeiteloos elk hernieuwd onderzoek. Of het nu een NIOD-onderzoek betreft, of een parlementaire enquête.

Toch nog maar eens een goedbedoelde poging ondernomen om een bres te slaan in de dijk van ideologische preoccupaties rondom de feiten van Srebrenica. Die dijk waaraan het overgrote deel van het maatschappelijk spectrum zo lang en zo noest heeft gebouwd.

De ideologie die rond Srebrenica gevlochten is, bevat onder meer de volgende componenten:

1. In Srebrenica hebben de Serviërs zich op de weerloze Moslimse burgerbevolking gestort;
2. Dutchbat, althans de internationale gemeenschap, had deze grootste genocide in het Europa van na de Tweede Wereldoorlog moeten voorkomen, of in elk geval meer moeten doen dan gedaan is;
3. In plaats van op daartoe tenminste pogingen te ondernemen, heeft Dutchbat nota bene meegewerkt aan het scheiden van de mannen en de vrouwen !;

4. Zo zijn uiteindelijk 7000-8000 onschuldige burgers afgeslacht, waarmee de Serviërs hun reputatie van de *bad guys* onontkoombaar bevestigd hebben.

Wat het eerste punt betreft: de vele Srebrenica-rapporten, die inmiddels het daglicht hebben gezien, spreken hier duidelijke taal. Van een 'weerloze' moslim-bevolking was in de enclave Srebrenica geen sprake. Er bevonden zich daar duizenden manschappen van het geregelde Bosnische leger en van paramilitaire eenheden. Het VN-rapport over Srebrenica noemt een cijfer van vermoedelijk ruim 4000 man. De aanwezigheid hiervan was lijnrecht in strijd met de voorwaarden, zoals vastgelegd in de betrokken Veiligheidsraadsresolutie en zoals ook toegezegd aan de Bosnische Serviërs. Waarbij een totale demilitarisering van de enclave vooropgesteld was.

Deze Bosnische troepen gedroegen zich ook allerminst onschuldig. Vast staat dat zij de enclave gebruikten als uitvalsbasis voor militaire acties en voor strooptochten in omringend Servisch gebied. Waarbij vooral hun commandant Nasser Oric zich onderscheidde door moordpartijen en beestachtigheden op grote schaal, gericht op de Servische burgerbevolking in de dorpen in de wijde omtrek. Volgens de Bosnische Serviërs zijn bij zulke militaire acties, gebruik makend van Srebrenica als 'safe haven', in de loop van de tijd zeker 2500 Servische burgers gedood. Ieder westers onderzoek naar deze claim is tot op heden achterwege gelaten, hoewel vaststaat dat er op grote schaal wreedheden vanuit Srebrenica werden bedreven.

Een voor de hand liggende vraag, die niettemin niemand opwerpt, is dan ook waarom Dutchbat, toch de militaire macht in de enclave, er niets aan gedaan heeft respectering van de Veiligheidsraadsresolutie op dit punt te verzekeren en demilitarisering af te dwingen.

Mladic heeft altijd gezegd dat de belangrijkste reden om Srebrenica als enclave te veroveren, gelegen was in de niet-nakoming van de verplichtingen van de betrokken Veiligheidsraadsresolutie om de enclave te demilitariseren en in de noodzaak om een einde te maken aan de gewapende acties vanuit dit door de Bosnische eenheden als militaire voorpost benutte 'eiland' in Bosnisch-Servisch gebied.

Waarom dan ook op 'de internationale gemeenschap', of meer speciaal op Dutchbat, de verplichting zou hebben gerust om de val van de enclave te voorkomen, is een open vraag. We hebben het hier dan over de tweede component van het ideologische complex. Met andere woorden: onduidelijk is waarom 'de internationale gemeenschap', of een handvol Nederlandse militairen, moreel gehouden zouden zijn geweest een 'safe haven' te verdigen die, systematisch en op grote schaal, in strijd met de volkenrechtelijke afspraken, door de Bosnische regering werd misbruikt als militaire uitvalsbasis voor duizenden troepen.

Des te meer is dat een open vraag, omdat vast staat dat het overgrote deel van deze duizenden geregelde militaire en para-

militaire eenheden zich al voordat de enclave viel uit de voeten hadden gemaakt voor het oprukkende Bosnisch-Servische leger. Waarom zouden 'de internationale gemeenschap', dan wel enkele honderden Hollandse militairen, de enclave hebben moeten verdedigen, terwijl duizenden Bosnische troepen op de vlucht waren geslagen? Nadat zij eerst zelf de wraak over de enclave hadden afgeroepen door stelselmatige militaire incursies in omringend Bosnisch-Servisch gebied. Wat een onsmakelijke verdwazing van Kok en zijn regerings-kornuiten, om bij de val van het kabinet-Kok zelfs te treuren om niet-betoonde lotsverbondenheid tussen Dutchbat en de moslim-mannen!

Na de massale uittocht van Bosnische militaire en para-militaire eenheden vielen er uiteindelijk - hoe daar verder ook over gedacht wordt - voor Dutchbat niet zoveel mannen meer van de vrouwen te scheiden. Nederlandse militairen schatten, voor de enquête-comissie, dat aantal op enkele honderden; zelfs als daarbij in de verwarring veel mannen over het hoofd zouden zijn gezien, een beperkt aantal in vergelijking met de het aantal mannen dat zich uit de voeten had gemaakt. Indien 'Nederland' dan al op enigerlei wijze verantwoordelijk zou kunnen worden gehouden voor het lot van de mannen in Srebrenica, dan toch in elk geval alleen voor deze eerstbedoelde groep mannen, d.w.z. een paar honderd in getal. En niet voor de vele duizenden die al eerder de enclave hadden verlaten en zich daarmee al op voorhand onherroepelijk aan elke mogelijke beïnvloeding van hun lot door Dutchbat hadden onttrokken.

De steeds maar voortwoekerende suggestie dat Dutchbat eerst de mannen van de vrouwen heeft gescheiden en dat vervolgens als resultaat hiervan 7000-8000 Bosnische mannen zijn vermoord, is dan ook even brutaal als stuitend.

Over het immer gehanteerde cijfer van 7 tot 8 duizend tenslotte nog dit. Het betreft hier het aantal administratief vermisten. Ook als al deze in het administratief chaotische Bosnië als vermist bekend staande personen inderdaad als dood beschouwd moeten worden, dan zijn ze zeker niet allemaal vermoord. Vast staat dat er zware gevechten zijn geleverd tussen de uitgebroken Moslim-eenheden en het Bosnisch-Servische leger. Waarbij grote aantallen slachtoffers zijn gevallen, volgens meldingen vele honderden tot zelfs duizenden. Het Joegoslavië tribunaal heeft het in de zaak tegen de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Krstic niet aangedurft om hen die in deze gevechten zijn omgekomen als slachtoffer van oorlogsmisdaden te boekstaven.

Het Bosnische leger gaat er prat op dat er veel eenheden in geslaagd zijn om zich een weg te vechten naar voor hun veilig gebied. Niettemin staat vast dat er veel moslim-mannen gevangen genomen zijn. Hoeveel dat er waren en hoeveel er daarvan vervolgens zijn vermoord, blijft onbekend. Beperken we ons tot de aanklacht van het Joegoslavië tribunaal tegen generaal Krstic, dan ging het hier om een aantal van ongeveer 3500, dat ten laste werd gelegd. Krstic heeft, om procestechnische redenen, op dit punt geen verweer gevoerd.

Het vermoorden van grote aantallen moslim-mannen is vanzelfsprekend een onvoorstelbare gruweldaad. Evenals het vermoorden van grote aantallen Bosnische Serviërs, in militaire akties vanuit de enclave Srebrenica, een onvoorstelbare gruweldaad vormde. Voor eenzijdige verontwaardiging is niet langer plaats.

Om eenzijdige anti-Servische emoties op te kloppen, daarvoor bestaat trouwens ook politiek geen enkele noodzaak meer. De Bosnische Serviërs zijn al lang geleden door ons, westerse krachten, verslagen en 'gepacificeerd'. Ook Servië zelf is allang mores geleerd en voorzien van een pro-westerse regering. En Milosevic zit nu, als een trofee van de NAVO, gevangen in Den Haag.

Er is dan ook geen enkele reden meer voor om het ideologische staketsel van 'Srebrenica', inmiddels gevaarlijk uitgehold door de harde feiten, als het ultiem bewijs van de Servische moordzucht en schuld overeind te houden.

Dat dient geen enkel politiek doel meer.

Maar desalniettemin zal het, als een soort ritueel, nog wel lang in stand blijven. Totdat de wind van historie dit uitgeholde staketsel eenvoudig omver zal blazen.

N.M.P. Steijnen

NIEUWSMAKERS / Het haantje van Srebrenica

4-4-2001 Trouw

Zelfs Jezus bleef eenzaam achter / klaar voor de Turken, om hem te vertrappen [...] Kravica brandt, het cetniknest bestaat niet meer / Naser is het, die trots door Kravica paradeert

Naser Oric, de 'commandant van Srebrenica' tijdens de Bosnische oorlog, liet na de aanval van zijn militie op het dorp Kravica een heldendicht op zichzelf componeren. De overval kostte zeker honderd Bosnische Serviërs het leven. Apetrots was Oric toen de Joegoslavische regering hem tot meestgezochte oorlogsmisdadiger verklaarde.

Gisteren werd Oric verhoord door onderzoekers van het Joe-

goslavië-Tribunaal in Sarajevo. Vrijwillig, zegt de VN. Maar mogelijk gebeurt dat binnenkort onder dwang, want het tribunaal zegt zaken tegen Bosnische moslims voor te bereiden. Veel Serviërs vinden dat de zaak-Oric daarbij moet horen.

Een paar jaar voordat Oric zijn strijd tegen de Serviërs begon, in 1989, was hij nog lijfwacht van de kampioen van de Servische zaak, Slobodan Milosevic. Oric was snel gekomen in de rangen van de speciale politie, vooral vanwege zijn ongeëvenaarde vechtkunst. Behalve als lijfwacht werkte Oric in Belgrado als uit-

smijter in een disco. Toen het lijk werd gevonden van een politie-man met wie hij had gevochten op de stoep van de nachtclub, week Oric uit naar zijn geboorteplaats Potocari, bij Srebrenica.

Daar richtte hij een militie op van jongens uit de sportschool, van wie de beresterke Oric het grootste haantje was. Hij smokkelde wapens en gaf onderricht in efficiënte dodingstechnieken. In 1992 begon hij zijn oorlogje tegen Servische politie en milities. Snel escaleerde de strijd in de streek rond Srebrenica en de stad werd een moslimbolwerk. Oric werd door andere militielei-

ders tot 'commandant' benoemd. Prompt begon hij het stadje te besturen als een eigen mini-koninkrijkje.

Tientallen Servische dorpen overviel hij, om het gebied te zuiveren en buit te behalen. Daarbij vielen veel slachtoffers. Oric was zeer ingenomen met de aandacht van Servische media, die hem als 'Het Beest' aanduiden. Bart Rijs en Frank Westerman beschrijven in 'Het zwartste scenario' hoe Oric en zijn mannen, die nog nooit een moskee van binnen hadden gezien, hun wangen lieten dichtgroeien en 'Allah is groot' riepen bij een

aanval, om aan de beschrijving van *mujaheddin* te voldoen.

In 1993 omsingelden Servische troepen Srebrenica, dat daarna tot beschermd gebied werd uitgeroepen door de VN. Oric roomde ongenoevend de VN-leveringen af en scheurde met zijn Mercedes door de stad, terwijl Dutchbat met pakezeltjes werkte om benzine te sparen. Drie maanden voor de enclave viel en duizenden moslim-mannen de dood vonden, was Oric plotseling verdwenen. Hij begon een sport-school in Tuzla en slijt sindsdien zijn dagen in welstand.

Rutger van der Hoeven



Naser Oric

Srebrenica *HERVORRA NEDERLAND*

Hoe meer feiten er boven water komen over de noodlottige ondergang van het 'veilige gebied' Srebrenica, hoe lastiger het wordt de schuld bij één partij te leggen.

De journalisten Sijs en Westerman, die eerder een boek schreven over de verovering van de moslim-enclave door de Bosnische Serviërs, hebben nu een document in handen gekregen, waaruit blijkt dat de Bosnische regering voor een groot deel zelf de hand heeft gehad in het debacle.

Vanuit Srebrenica moesten gewapende burgers Servische stellingen bij de hoofdstad Sarajevo in de rug aanvallen. Dat er plundertochten waren geweest, was wel bekend, maar niet dat die door hogerhand werden geregisseerd. De

Bosnische regering heeft dus doelbewust de neutrale positie van Srebrenica ondergraven en de verovering door de Serviërs uitgelokt, luidt de nieuwe verklaring.

Alle schuldigen hebben tot nu toe de revue gepasseerd: Dutchbat (te laf), de Verenigde Naties (te weifelachtig), de Franse VN-generaal (te nationalistisch), de Europese Navolanden (te verdeeld). Nu is daar dus de regering bijgekomen van het land dat het meeste baat had bij bescherming.

Mededogen kan heel wat cynisme en opportunisme verdragen. Dat is maar goed ook, want het vertrouwen in de goede afloop van het Balkanconflict op basis van een internationale rechtsorde, wordt door dit soort onthullingen flink op de proef gesteld.

Jan Goossensen

> NATO
 > powers to seek any kind of mediated solution (including a division of
 > the
 > Kosovo territory). The war engineered by the KLA and United States then
 > ensued, with disastrous results. In Kosovo it produced great
 > destruction, an
 > immense flight of refugees, with thousands of casualties and a fresh
 > injection of hatred on all sides that contradicted the alleged NATO aim
 > of
 > producing a genuine multiethnic community. This was followed by a
 > massive
 > ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Turks and Jews by the NATO-supported
 > KLA,
 > and Kosovo was left "without a legal system, ruled by illegal structures
 > of
 > the Kosovo Liberation Army and very often by competing mafias" (quoting
 > Jiri
 > Dienstbier, UN human rights rapporteur in Kosovo). Under NATO auspices,
 > and
 > helped along by leaders of Albania, a new advance was made in the aim of
 > a
 > "Greater Albania" in Macedonia and possibly elsewhere. Finally, Serbia
 > was
 > very badly damaged by the war, reduced to penury and dependency,
 > conflict
 > ridden and with a sham democracy in place.
 >
 > Of course, there was Srebrenica. But since so much in this establishment
 >
 > Balkan story consists of lies and half-truths, is it possible that the
 > establishment version of this story is also misleading? Johnstone
 > examines
 > the various sources and finds considerable uncertainty regarding two
 > issues:
 > the number of victims, and the motives of the combatants. (16) It is
 > true
 > that 199 bodies were found bound or blindfolded following the Bosnian
 > Serb
 > occupation of the town in July 1995, almost surely slaughtered by the
 > Bosnian Serb attackers. But what about the alleged 8,000 killed? The
 > figure
 > of 8,000 seems to have been arrived at by adding a Red Cross estimate of
 >
 > 3,000 that "witnesses" said were detained by the Bosnian Serbs to the
 > figure
 > of 5,000 who the Red Cross said "fled Srebrenica, some of whom reached
 > Central Bosnia." Although there was no reason from this accounting to
 > add
 > the 5,000 as killed, this became conventional truth. The Bosnian Muslims
 >
 > shrewdly refused to tell the Red Cross how many had survived, helping
 > suggest that they were all dead.
 >
 > Six years later, Tribunal forensic teams had uncovered 2,361 bodies in
 > this

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- > region of heavy fighting, many almost surely fallen soldiers on both
- > sides.
- > Recall also that the United States had engaged in intensive satellite
- > imaging of this area, and Madeleine Albright had even promised to keep
- > watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs disturbed the graves. But she never
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- > innovated a
- > judicial rule whereby Karadzic's attorney was not allowed to offer a
- > defense
- > of his client; he could merely observe. The main evidence of Karadzic's

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Mensen vermeld op de dodenlijst van Srebrenica hebben nochtans later meegedaan aan de verkiezingen. De moslimstrijders trokken zich daags voor verovering van de enclave terug. Doorgestoken kaart? De commissie-Bakker ging aan zulke cruciale vragen voorbij.

Commissie-Bakker

Goran Trkulja

Het onderzoek van de commissie-Bakker over Srebrenica doet me terugdenken aan het toneelstuk 'Srebrenica' dat ik in de zomer van 1996 in een Amsterdams theater zag. „Dat gaat over hen,” zei een landgenoot na de première.

Daarmee bedoelde hij dat wij, Bosniaken en Bosnische Serviërs, ons eigen stuk over Srebrenica nog moesten schrijven. Want Srebrenica is een tragedie over de Bosnische Serviërs en Bosnische moslims en over de genocide die daar vermoedelijk is gepleegd. Terwijl 'Srebrenica' in dat Amsterdamse theater ging over het schuldgevoel van Nederlanders.

De Commissie-Bakker onderzocht de politieke houding van de Kamer en het kabinet met betrokken politici en ambtenaren voor, tijdens en na de val

van Srebrenica in juli 1995. Heeft Den Haag politieke fouten gemaakt en zo ja waren die fouten te voorkomen? Doel van dat onderzoek is soortgelijke fouten te vermijden bij een volgende vredesmissie waaraan Nederlandse soldaten deelnemen. Wat er in Srebrenica in die paar dagen van juli 1995 echt gebeurde en waarom, daar gaat het onderzoek-Bakker niet over. Hoeveel mensen zijn omgekomen, hoeveel van hen zijn geëxecuteerd, waar de lijken zijn, wie er schuldig was, hoe de rollen bij die tragedie verdeeld waren. Juist de antwoorden op die vragen zijn voor de Bosniërs van cruciaal belang. Zowel Bosniërs en Bosniaken (moslims) als de Serviërs en Kroaten moeten de waarheid over de oorlog weten om elkaar vervolgens excuses te kunnen aanbieden en vergiffenis te verlenen.

Voor Nederlanders is de waarheid over Srebrenica belangrijk omdat het duidelijk kan maken wat de rol van Dutchbat daar echt was. Wat konden de Dutchbatters daar wel en wat konden ze niet doen of wat had er beter gedaan kunnen worden en wat hadden ze moeten laten. Het zou heel interessant zijn om een kijkje te nemen in de berichten die de Dutchbatters aan het VN-hoofdkwartier in Bosnië hebben gestuurd over de situatie ter plaatse en hoe het VN-bestuur daarop reageerde.

Tot vandaag is er niet definitief bekend hoeveel mensen in juli 1995 in Srebrenica zijn omgekomen. Het aantal van zo'n achttien duizend namen op de lijst die het Rode Kruis na de val van de enclave samenstelde, is inmiddels ge-

zakt naar zeventien duizend en de forensische experts van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal hebben bij Srebrenica tot nu toe iets meer dan tweeduizend doden gevonden. Waar zijn de andere vijf of zes duizend lijken? Enkele Servische media hebben gemeld dat meer dan tweeduizend mannen, die als vermist in Srebrenica worden beschouwd, hun stem hadden uitgebracht bij de verkiezingen in Bosnië. Die geruchten zijn niet bevestigd, maar de twijfel is gezaaid. Het gebruik van aantallen slachtoffers voor politieke doelen is een praktijk die ook uit voormalig Joegoslavië bekend is. Zo zouden de Kroatische ustasja's, de Kroaten die in de Tweede Oorlog samenwerkten met de Duitsers, in het concentratiekamp Jasenovac tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog meer dan 700.000 Serviërs, zigeuners en Joden hebben gedood. Dat was het officiële Joegoslavische cijfer.

Waar zijn al die duizenden lijken van Srebrenica?

De vorig jaar overleden Kroatische president Tudjman heeft dat getal teruggebracht naar 'slechts' 25 á 30 duizend. De waarheid ligt waarschijnlijk ergens in het midden. Dat voorbeeld noemde Senad Pecanin, de hoofdredacteur van het Bosnische tijdschrift *Dani*, tijdens een discussie over Srebrenica in verband met het aantal slachtoffers dat daar is gevallen. *Dani*, dat in Sarajevo verschijnt, sprak ook grote twijfel uit over de rol van Bosnische moslimleiders bij de val van Srebrenica: de strijders van Naser Oric, de bevelhebber van de moslimeenheden in Srebrenica, hadden de enclave ruim op tijd verlaten en zo kon Mladic er bijna wandelend binnenkomen. Het dilemma dat erdoor ontstond is: was de val van Srebrenica misschien gepland door de moslim SDA-partij met als doel de interventie van de NAVO tegen de Bosnische Serviërs af te roepen? Of was er,

misschien, een geheime deal gesloten tussen de Bosnische Serviërs en Bosniaken over de ruil van Srebrenica-gebied voor enkele gemeentes in Sarajevo? Was Naser Oric door zijn bevelhebbers opgeroepen de enclave te verlaten zodat Mladic daar alleen de ouderen, vrouwen en kinderen aantrof? Dat de moslimpartijtop niet had gerekend met de wraakzuchtige Servische militairen was slechts een onjuiste politieke voorspelling, maar de schuld daarvoor gaat toch naar de andere kant: naar de VN, en dus Dutchbat?

Dat zijn de vragen die Bosniërs beantwoord moeten krijgen. Zolang daar twijfel over bestaat en de waarheid buiten bereik blijft, kunnen de Serviërs en moslims geen begin maken met de normalisatie van hun betrekkingen. Nederlandse militairen zijn daar lang geweest. Als waarnemers hebben ze ook heel wat gezien. Met het openbaar maken van hun kennis, kunnen ze een belangrijke bijlage leveren aan het schrijven van moderne geschiedenis in en van Bosnië. Een veel belangrijker kwestie dan de commissie-Bakker kan oplossen.

De Nederlanders zijn er evenwel niet alleen als waarnemer geweest. Zij waren ook handelend en dus verantwoordelijk. Daarom is het niet alleen voor ons Bosniërs, maar ook voor de Nederlanders belangrijk de feiten van de gebeurtenissen in Bosnië te kennen. Dat verliezen de Nederlanders uit het oog.

Goran Trkulja is journalist afkomstig uit Bosnië

van holst en steijnen

From: Ruza <despot@wish.net>
To: Speerpunt <speerpunt@wxs.nl>; Global Reflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>; Hans Hupkes <hans.hupkes@planet.nl>; Nico & Neeltje steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: vrijdag 10 mei 2002 17:44
Subject: Over Srebrenica

Srebrenica

ISTINA - May 10, 2002 20:48 (*.sympatico.ca)

Ovaj tekst je iz knjige "To kill a nation" od Michael Parenti-ja (strana 89)

During the course of special documentary "Srebrenica" aired on PBS in 1999 and again in early 2000, Bill Moyers stated more than once that 7,414 Bosnian Muslims were executed by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica area. One might wonder how such chaotic was could offer up such a precise figure. Moyers filmed several busloads of Muslim women and children who could not account for their men. The latter had been separated from their families by Bosnian Serb militia and reportedly walked up into the hills and shot. "Thousands of boys and men were killed", Moyers concludes. Thousands? "Hundreds were killed in a village nearby," he adds - though he gives no indication of having visited the nearby village nor does he offer an interview from anyone from that village. None of the Muslim women he filmed reported any rapes - or at least Moyers makes no mention of it.

In only one instance does Moyers allow the suggestion that atrocities have been committed by Muslims as well as Serbs. This comes when he interviews Muslim militia leader who says, "both sides respected the Geneva convention and both sides sometimes did not respect the Geneva convention."

Toward the end of the hour long program Moyers makes a startling but quickly passing admission: "To date, physicians have identified just 70 bodies." To explain the vast discrepancy between 70 and 7,414, he asserts - as a statement of settled fact - that the Serbs reburied many bodies in secondary graves to conceal them. Moyers gives no details as to how, where and when the Serbs could have buried and then again located, disinterred, and reburied the other 7,344 bodies in the midst of a difficult and chaotic military campaign - without being detected. Nor does he explain why the initial sites showing evidence of many disinterred graves, could not be found, nor why secondary mass graves were so impossible to locate. When it came to hiding bodies, what did the Serbs know the second time that they kept forgetting to do the first time?

Een doofpot bij de landmacht? Absoluut onjuist

De landmacht heeft alles gedaan om feiten over Srebrenica boven tafel te krijgen. Oud-bevelhebber Van Baal wijst suggesties over een doofpot van de hand.

Door onze redacteurs STEVEN DERIX en FLORIS VAN STRAATEN
DEN HAAG, 19 NOV. En generaal Van Baal had zich nog zo goed voorbereid. Honderdnegen vragen had hij doorgenomen met het Instituut voor Militaire Geschiedenis en de Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst. Maar één vraag had hij niet verwacht van de parlementaire enquêtecommissie die de val van Srebrenica onderzoekt: de vraag naar zijn eigen terugtreden als bevelhebber van de landmacht.

Op 15 april van dit jaar moest Ad van Baal bij toenmalig Defensie-minister De Grave komen. Het NI-OD-rapport over Srebrenica was net verschenen, met een voor de Koninklijke Landmacht onmeestuurbare conclusie: er was sprake van 'onwil' bij de landmachttop om de mi-

nister goed te informeren. In een volgens Van Baal „open en vertrouwelijk” gesprek adviseerde De Grave zijn bevelhebber zich 'te beraden' op zijn positie. Maar Van Baal trok daaruit niet de conclusie dat hij op moest stappen. „De minister zei dat hij mij zou steunen zo lang hij kon.”

„Maar een minister die zegt dat je je moet beraden op je positie, dat is toch wat anders dan steunen”, vroeg gisteren de verbaasde commissievoorzitter Bakker. „De minister zei: beraad je op de ontstane situatie.”

„Maar dat betekent toch dat de minister twijfelt of je kunt blijven?” „Dat heeft hij niet gezegd.” De volgende dag, het kabinet was al gevallen, moest Van Baal toch het onvermijdelijke onder ogen zien en trad hij terug. En daar is hij nog steeds buitengewoon verbitterd over, zo bleek gisteren tijdens zijn verhoor. Van Baal nam openlijk afstand van de conclusies van het NI-OD over een vermeende 'doofpot' bij de landmacht. De constatering dat er sprake was van onwil bij de landmachttop noemde hij gisteren „absoluut onjuist, niet onderbouwd, zeer suggestief

en buitengewoon kwetsend”. Het gebruik van het woord 'landmachttop' was volgens Van Baal, die in 1995 plaatsvervangend bevelhebber was, een welbewuste „vergroving om te voorkomen dat je man en paard moet noemen”. De beschuldiging van 'onwil' moet „van tafel”, aldus de getergde oud-bevelhebber. „Absoluut!”

Volgens Van Baal heeft de landmacht misschien fouten gemaakt, maar heeft zij alles in het werk gesteld om alle informatie boven water te krijgen. Tijdens zijn verhoor bleef een aantal zaken echter onduidelijk. Waarom werd bijvoorbeeld afgesproken dat de gespreksverslagen van de grote debriefing in Assen in het najaar van 1995 'vertrouwelijk' zouden blijven? Dat was, zo zei Van Baal, omdat de ervaring leerde dat vertrouwelijke gesprekken de meeste informatie opleverden.

Maar waarom verdwenen de verslagen daarna in de kluis van de inlichtingendienst van de landmacht? En waarom werd het uittreksel van de gesprekken, het geanonimiseerde 'feitenrelaas', niet als bijlage aan het later zo fel bekritiseerde Debriefingsrapport toege-

voegd? „Dat zou ons een heleboel ellende hebben bespaard”, gaf Van Baal toe. Bakker: „Als je wilt dat er zoveel mogelijk informatie boven water komt en de informatie is vervolgens niet toegankelijk, dat

PARLEMENTAIRE
ENQUÊTE



SREBRENICA

wringt toch?” Van Baal had er niet direct een antwoord op. Net zomin als op de vraag waarom het feitenrelaas niet werd nagelopen op mogelijk strafbare feiten, door Dutchbat-militairen begaan in de tijd dat zij in de Bosnische enclave waren gestationeerd. Zo was er verwarring over de vraag of een Nederlands YPR-pantservoertuig, bij de aftocht uit een observatiepost

op 11 juli 1995, onderweg over moslims was heengereden.

Uitgebreid stond de commissie tijdens het bijna vijf uur durende verhoor van Dutchbat-commandant Karremans, dat gistermorgen om tien uur begon, stil bij de lotgevallen van de vluchtelingen na de val van Srebrenica op 11 juli. Toen generaal Nicolai vanuit het VN-hoofdkwartier in Sarajevo op 12 juli Karremans waarschuwde dat vooral de moslimmannen gevaar liepen door de Bosnisch-Servische verovering, zei deze: „Het gaat maar om een handjevol mannen.” Het NI-OD-rapport kwam tot de slotsom dat zich enkele honderden moslimmannen op en rond de Dutchbat-compound in Potocari hebben bevonden, van wie de meesten om het leven kwamen.

Commissielid Mosterd (CDA) hield Karremans voor dat hij zich meer om de mannen had moeten bekommeren, gelet op enkele signalen die hij had gekregen, onder meer van zijn eigen mannen. Zo bereikte hem het bericht dat er negen lijken in de buurt lagen. „Er zijn een heleboel mensen geweest die dingen hebben gezien die ik zelf niet heb gezien”, zei Karre-

mans. Vorige week getuigde toenmalig luitenant Rutten voor de enquêtecommissie: „Ik zei: je kunt de dood ruiken.”

Achteraf gezien, erkende Karremans aan het einde van zijn verhoor, was het beter geweest de moslimmannen in Potocari te houden. In werkelijkheid zijn ze in bussen van de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Mladić afgevoerd, om vervolgens te worden geëxecuteerd. Het scheiden van de moslimmannen van de vrouwen, kinderen en oude mannen was „een heikel punt” geweest, vond ook Karremans. Als de afvoer van de vluchtelingen niet zo snel was gegaan, had hij nog aandacht kunnen vestigen op de mannen, zo zei hij. „Nu kon dat niet meer.”

Karremans besteedde dat hijzelf voor vervoer had kunnen zorgen of dat Mladić hem daarom in eerste instantie zou hebben verzocht. Nadat Mladić eerst terloops over bussen voor de vluchtelingen had gesproken, zei hij bij hun derde gesprek volgens Karremans: „Wij leveren de bussen, jij de diesel.”

• WWW.NRC.NL: dossier Srebrenica

Morgen verhoord: Jan Pronk

Morgen verhoort de enquêtecommissie onder anderen oud-minister Jan Pronk, die in juli 1995 als eerste Nederlandse bewindsman na de val van Srebrenica sprak van genocide.

Na Pronk, die om 15.45 uur aantreedt, volgt oud-premier Ruud Lubbers, onder wiens leiding Nederland bij de vredesoperatie in de Bosnische enclave betrokken raakte.

Morgenochtend is echter eerst de beurt aan een drietal toenmalige ambtelijke medewerkers van het ministerie van Defensie, te weten Bert Kreemers (plaatsvervangend directeur voorlichting), Jacques de Winter (directeur algemene beleidszaken) en Dirk Barth (secretaris-generaal).

Ook verschijnt generaal Gerard Bastiaans, die in Zagreb de leiding had over de eerste voorlopige debriefing van de Dutchbat-militairen, voor de commissie.

De enquêtecommissie ziet noodgedwongen af van een ver-



Oud-minister Jan Pronk.
(Foto Roel Rozenburg)

hoor van de toenmalige chef-defensiestaf, generaal Van den Breemen. Deze is door ziekte niet in staat voor de commissie te komen. De commissie heeft hem wel een reeks schriftelijke vragen doen toekomen, die hij inmiddels heeft beantwoord.

10-12-94

APRIL 1943 zoverenwiste dat
de Com enclau geëemilueend
zon werden

VOOR DE ANVULTE van Mladic
was er sprake en bevestiging
zoudt op de omgeving

En wech na de culten Srebenica
verleide Mladic tegen Krenars of een
mury en Krenars of by de enclau
met ongenue van helles ad een niet
bevestiging en wech op de
omgeving was, dat by de niet
verpult van helles

Krenars zegt hierin in Novan van Ederles 1994:
dat by dit neent "we want dit would be"

Er is ge redeem Mladic met te cyler. Althant
was by daar duidelijk want de. Althant
de de confutatie met Krenars by by de wech
we dat by niet niet heeft gehoudt in de omgeving
redunende. Bovendien by Mladic op cyler
rede on in dit oppeit althant te rege de by
meende. By geant in de bevestiging en de
luyde van Srebenica.

zien die zouden moeten bewijzen dat de Serviers na het veroveren van Srebrenica op grote schaal misdaden hebben gepleegd tegen de moslim burgerbevolking. Slechts drie van de acht foto's werden openbaar gemaakt. De anderen waren geheim, waaronder de foto's van mensen die waren samengeschoot op een voetbalveld.

De New York Times schreef: "Volgens een Amerikaanse regeringsvertegenwoordiger die de foto's had gezien, toonden deze honderden, wellicht zelfs duizenden moslim mannen en jongens op een veld nabij een voetbalstadion, ongeveer acht kilometer van Srebrenica. Een opname van een paar dagen later toont een groot gebied waar de aarde kort geleden is omgewoeld, met dezelfde kenmerken als reeds bekende massagraven bij het stadion, dat nu leeg is."

Het commentaar van de anonieme Amerikaan die inzage had in de geheime foto's roept de volgende vragen op: als ze de personen niet precies hebben kunnen tellen om vast te stellen of het om honderden dan wel duizenden personen gaat, hoe kan dan worden vastgesteld dat het hierbij gaat om moslim mannen en jongens? Waarom geen Servische vrouwen en meisjes? Kennelijk zagen de leden van de Veiligheidsraad iets heel anders op de foto's. De New York Times volgde de gebeurtenissen in de Veiligheidsraad en meldde: "De foto's tonen een aantal velden bij Novo Kasaba, in de buurt van Srebrenica, waar kennelijk Bosnische moslim families waren samengegroeid."

Slechts een detail? Werden deze vrouwen en kinderen voorbereid op een busrocht naar Tuzla? Is dat de reden waarom de foto's niet in de openbaarheid kwamen?

Verdreven

De fotoreportage van Madeleine Albright viel samen met de grootste operatie van etnische zuiveringen van de gehele oorlog in Joegoslavië: meer dan 250 duizend Serviers werden door de Kroaten uit de Krajina van huis en haard verdreven of vermoord, met actieve Amerikaanse hulp.

Om de aandacht van deze mensenrechtenschendingen, die door een bondgenoot werden gepleegd, af te leiden en om te voorkomen dat de Veiligheidsraad sancties tegen Kroatie zou instellen, beschuldigde de Amerikaanse regering de Serviers van nog meer afschuwelijke misdaden.

De aantijging dat de Serviers 'genocide' plegen, rechtvaardigt alle misdrijven die tegen welke Servier dan ook worden gepleegd. Dat werd opnieuw bewezen tijdens de NAVO-agressie tegen Joegoslavië in 1999.

Alle relevante dossiers met betrekking tot Srebrenica zijn als 'geheim' geclassificeerd voor de komende dertig tot vijftig jaar en liggen opgeslagen in het hoofdkwartier van de Verenigde Naties in New York.

Zelfs het Joegoslavië-tribunaal heeft geen toegang tot deze informatie. Dit is gebuurd op verzoek van drie permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad die hun gegevens geheim willen houden, namelijk Engeland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten.

Er is geen enkele rechtvaardiging voor het geheim houden van 'misdaden tegen de menselijkheid', per definitie zijn deze dossiers eigendom van de gehele mensheid. De vraag rijst of deze landen bewijs voor misdaden achter houden of het bewijs dat er geen misdaden zijn gepleegd?


Een schuldig

In het streven naar afscheiding, zoals Slovenië en Kroatie al eerder deden, stond de moslim regering voor een probleem: de moslims hadden geen meerderheid onder de bevolking, controleerden een beperkt territorium en misten de militaire kracht om hierin verandering te brengen.

De islamitische partij (SDA) van president Izet-begovic zette daarom een campagne in om de internationale publieke opinie te beïnvloeden. Ze wilde druk uitoefenen op de Verenigde Staten en de andere NAVO-landen om hulp te bieden. Time Magazine schreef op 17 augustus 1992: "Bosnische moslims vechten op hetzelfde rauwe niveau als hun tegenstanders en zijn even schuldig aan barbarij. Zij overdriven de gruweldaden van de

De kwesste Srebrenica smeuft als een vechtpand in de vaderlandse politiek. Hoewel de beschuldiging over de massamoord als een vaststaand gegeven wordt herhaald, zonder deze met bewijzen te staven, weigeren de politici in Den Haag beduidend om de zaak tot op de bodem uit te zoeken. Zelfs niet, nadat in de Duitse pers de Nederlandse soldaten met de nazis in de Tweede Wereldoorlog zijn vergeleken.

Waarom mag de waarheid over Srebrenica niet boven tafel komen. Wat moet verborgen blijven in geheime documenten, die zelfs voor het Joegoslavië Tribunaal niet toegankelijk zijn. Het bewijs van een massamoord, met de Nederlandse troepen als toeschouwers, of het bewijs dat dit juist niet heeft plaatsgevonden en de aanklacht op de Servische leiders Karadzic en Mladic op een mythe berust.



De fotoreportage van Madeleine Albright viel samen met de grootste operatie van etnische zuiveringen van de gehele oorlog in Joegoslavië: meer dan 250 duizend Serviers werden door de Kroaten uit de Krajina van huis en haard verdreven of vermoord, met actieve Amerikaanse hulp

Serviers om sympathie en steun te krijgen."

Op dat moment hadden de politieke leiders van de NAVO nog niet de beslissing genomen om Sarajevo in de oorlog te steunen. Het bondgenootschap worstelde nog met de beslissing over de nieuwe taken van de NAVO, na de opheffing van het Warschaupact en de ineenstorting van de Sovjet-Unie. Voor die krachten die buiten het grondgebied van de NAVO wilden ingrijpen, buiten de Verenigde Naties om, kwam de roep om hulp van de regering in Sarajevo precies op tijd. Volgens 'overlevenden' van de zogenaamde massamoord heeft Izetbegovic al begin 1993 tegenover een delegatie uit Srebrenica verklaard dat hij had begrepen dat een NAVO-ingrijpen mogelijk was, maar alleen als de Serviers Srebrenica zouden innemen en tenminste vijfduizend mensen zouden vernemen. Toen de NAVO besloot tot ingrijpen, kreeg zij de volledige steun van de media die klakkeloos alles wat Sarajevo verklaarde, overbracht.

Opggravingen

In november 1995, toen de aanklacht tegen de Bosnisch-Servische leiders werd opgesteld, was het vanwege de ijzige kou niet mogelijk om opgravingen naar bewijzen te doen. Toen het voorjaar van 1996 nadert, en de Amerikaanse regering nog steeds niet met duidelijke bewijzen was gekomen, werden het tribunaal en de toenmalige aanklager Richard Goldstone buitengewoon nerveus.

In januari 1996 verklaarde Goldstone dat "het

opgraven van de lijken noodzakelijk was om de identiteit en de tijd en oorzaak van overlijden te kunnen vaststellen om zo de bewijsvoering te onderbouwen." Wat hij verklaarde zou als een waarschuwing moeten worden opgevat. Als het tribunaal zou functioneren als een rechtbank, dan zou de meest logische stap zijn om eerst vast te stellen of er een misdaad is gepleegd en niet eerst een aanklacht te formuleren en dan pas naar bewijzen te zoeken!

Te weinig lijken

De opgravingen begonnen in het voorjaar van 1996. Aan het einde van het jaar, nadat de stoffelijke overblijfselen van hen die duidelijk in gevecht of op de vlucht waren gedood waren vastgesteld, begonnen de onderzoekers van het tribunaal zich af te vragen waar alle lijken waren gebleven.

In november 1996 bericht de Sunday Times: "Van de duizenden mannen en jongens die in de veilige gebieden van de VN door de Bosnisch-Servische troepen zijn geëxecuteerd, zijn er slechts een paar honderd opgegraven (minder dan tien procent van de zeventien duizend vermoorde moslims). Van de opgegraven lichamen werden geen forensische details bekend gemaakt over de tijd, oorzaak en omstandigheden van hun dood."

In het voorjaar van 1998 meldt het persbureau Reuters dat er na twee jaar graven in de omgeving van Srebrenica nog vijftien stoffelijke resten zijn gevonden. Het wordt duidelijk dat het tribunaal over onvoldoende lichamen en kogels beschikt

om de aanklacht te staven. Tenzij we moeten geloven dat de Serviers met één kogel vijf mensen hebben vermoord.

Met een vooruitziende blik merkte Madeleine Albright al tijdens het laten zien van de foto's in de Veiligheidsraad op dat 'we de Bosnische Serviers scherp in de gaten houden, mochten zij proberen bewijzen van hun misdaden uit te wissen'.

Opgelost

Verklaringen voor het tekort aan lijken werden gezocht en gevonden. De Sunday Times nam het citaat over en speculeerde dat de lichamen waren opgelost in een uiterst giftige vloeistof van natriumhydroxide, dat "met gemak menselijk vlees oplost en nagenoeg geen sporen achterlaat". Tegelijkertijd deed ook een andere verklaring haar intrede. De Serviers, die proberen om alle sporen van de genocide uit te wissen, hebben de lichamen simpelweg opgegraven en ergens anders opnieuw begraven. Deze verklaring heeft een belangrijk voordeel: zij verklaart waarom er geen overblijfselen worden gevonden. Nadat is echter, dat het moeilijk aanemelijk te maken is dat er duizenden stoffelijke resten worden opgegraven onder het toezicht oog van Albright's spionagesatellieten.

George Pumpley is persmedewerker van de Bondsraadsfractie van de POS

De massaslachting van actieve leden van de Democratische Fronten werd op een neutrale wijze door de Bosnisch-Servische troepen na de val van Srebrenica in juli 1995 zouden zijn vermoord, wordt niet alleen omschreven als een oorlogsmisdad, maar is ook algemeen aanvaard als voorbeeld van een systematisch elimineren van een volk.

De Verenigde Naties zijn in diskrediet gebracht vanwege 'het machtoos toeliefen terwijl er geen nood is plaatsvond'. De journalistieke nauwkeurigheid is ten prooi gevallen aan propaganda. En de media, die verweven zijn met heersende economische en militaire krachten, hanteren een dubbele moraal van selectief toegespeelde 'mensenrechten', waardoor complete volken gecriminaliseerd zijn.

Vooraf in Duitsland had Strebentica een bijzondere weekklank. Hier lag de kans om het stigma van de misdaden uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog uit te wissen. Deze misdaden uit de nazi-tijd werden door de geciviliseerde wereld na de oorlog als reden voor de geciviliseerde wereld gezien. Strebentica met Auschwitz vergelijkt bleek een comfortabele manier om de misdaden van de nazi's te bagateliseren.

De beschuldiging dat de Serviërs - een traditioneel viand - genocide pleegden, is door Duitse politici ter linker en ter rechter zijde dankbaar aangegrepen. Het biedt Duitsland de mogelijkheid om de historische verantwoordelijkheid voor de dood van 1,6 miljoen Joegoslaven die het slachtoffer werden van de nazis tijdens de bezetting van Joegoslavië in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, te vergeeten.

Het feit dat de Duitse oorlogsmisdaden in Joegoslavië in de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot op de dag van vandaag in de Duitse Bondsrepubliek niet zijn bestraft, terwijl Duitse rechters wel vonnissen uitspreken inzake oorlogsmisdaden in Bosnië, getuigt van arrogantie.

Die alles is mogelijk gemaakt door een enorme propagandacampagne over een massamoord die nog bewezen moet worden. Vervolgens moet deze massamoord dienen als bewijs voor een 'genocide', die ook nog bewezen moet worden.

De laatste weerhield de Duitse minister van Defensie, Rüdiger Scharping, er niet van om zijn eigen versie naar buiten te brengen, waarbij hij alleen van mening verschilt over de aantallen. Scharping verklaarde dat er tussen achtduizend en dertigduizend mensen waren omgebracht en kwam verder met het ongelooflijke verhaal dat de troepen van de VN-weddeomacht, aan kettingen gebonden, werden gedwongen toe te kijken.

Verkrachting moet 'systematische massavernietiging' worden. Oorlogsgraven worden 'massagraven'. En moord met voorbedachte rade wordt 'genocide'.

Speurwerk
Het aantal personen dat in Srebrenica zou zijn geëxecuteerd, kan van belang zijn om vast te stellen of het gaat om een aanklacht wegens 'genocide' of 'oorlogsmisdaden'. In september 1998 werden er volgens de VN-vluchtelingenorganisatie UNHCR 7076 mensen als vermist beschouwd. Na intensief speurwerk werden slechts 480 lichamen gevonden. Het is interessant te vermelden dat het Rode Kruis in november 1999 nog steeds spreekt van 7333 vermisten en 2000 lijken.

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Het Internationale Rode Kruis heeft gevraagd om zo spoedig mogelijk toegang te krijgen tot alle arrestanten (tot nu toe was het slechts mogelijk om tweehonderd gevangenen te bezoeken), en om details over mogelijke doden. Het Internationale Rode Kruis heeft ook de autoriteiten van Bosnië-Herzegovina benaderd met het verzoek om informatie over de vijfduizend personen die uit Srebrenica zijn gewild en waarvan sommigen Centraal-Bosnië hebben weten te bereiken.

Op 15 september 1995 komt de New York Times met andere getaligen: "Ongeveer achttien moslim mannen uit Srebrenica, de eerste van de twee door de Verenigde Naties aangezonden 'veilige gebieden' die in juli onder de voet zijn gelopen door de Bosnisch-Servische troepen, worden vermist, aldus het Rode Kruis. Onder de vermisten bevinden zich drieduizend mensen, vooral mannen, die door de Serviers zijn geaarsd. Na de val van Srebrenica heeft het Rode Kruis een lijst van tienduizend namen van vermiste personen samengesteld, aldus Jessica Barry, een woordvoerder. Naast deze gearresteerde personen zijn vijfduizend mensen 'simpelweg verdwenen', vertelde zij".

In de week na de inname van Srebrenica (18 juli 1995) berichtte de New York Times: "Tussen drie- en vierduizend Bosnische moslims, die door VN-functionarissen als verniet waren opgegeven na de val van Srebrenica, zijn er in geslaagd zich door de vijandelijke lijnes naar het gebied van de Bosnische regering te begeven. De groep, waaronder gewonden, glijpte door de Servische lijnes en trok ongeveer vijftig kilometer door de bossen naar een veilig gebied."

Op 2 augustus 1995 voegt de Britse Times de volgende bevestiging toe: "Duzenden van de vermiste bosnische moslim soldaten van Srebrenica die centraal staan in rapporten over mogelijke massa-executies door de Serviers, zijn in veilig-

heid ten noordoosten van Tuzla. Het in de gaten houden van de veilige aftocht van moslim soldaten, als ook burgers uit Srebrenica, is voor de Verenigde Naties en het Rode Kruis een ware nachtmerrie gebleken."

Het Rode Kruis in Genève verklaarde dat zij voor de eerste keer gisteren via bronnen heeft vernomen dat ongeveer tweeduizend Bosnische regeringstroepen zich in een gebied ten noorden van Tuzla bevonden. Zij waren er in geslaagd uit te sluiten dat de troepen de Bosnische Republiek te ontkomen zonder hun families te informeren, aldus een woordvoerder, die er aan toevoegde dat het niet mogelijk was om de rapporten te controleren omdat de Bosnische regering weliswaar de Rode Kruis tot het gebied toe te laten.

Twee weken voordat de vertegenwoordiger van het Rode Kruis, Angelo Gnaedinger en Jessica Barry, hun aantallen aan de pers bekend maakten, gaf een andere woordvoerder van het Internationale Rode Kruis, Pierre Geulhier, een belangrijk detail vrij. In een interview in de Junge Welt van 8 augustus 1995 zei hij: 'Alles bij elkaar komen er aan ongeveer tienduizend vermisten (uit Strebreva)'. Maar sommigen kunnen ook dubbel geteld zijn. Voordat we klaar zijn (met het uitzoeken van de dubbel getelde personen) kunnen we geen exacte informatie geven. Ons werk wordt ver-

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**Verwijzing
Oostenrijk
niet toere**

programma van de FPO: "Ho-
grip gelijchheid niet in de zin v
lijfwaardigheid, maar letterlijk
kunnen vrijheid en gelijchheid
samenhangen", verduidelijkt d

Volkskapitalisme

De FPO wil een nieuwe Derde Weg. Daarvoor verstaat de partij de neoliberaale theorie, gekoppeld aan autoritaire maatschappij, de Markt de centrale component. Belangrijkste onderdeel is een vrije maatschappij is voor de FPO het privé-eigendom.

door het ver-
kenningen is nu
alle andere han-
deld er op de socia-
l. Het sociale kli-
proportionele
gebruikt om de
houdingen in

“De erkenning van het p
gendom is voor de FPO een
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De politiek dient zich niet sta

bepeken tot het beschermen van bestaande eigendommen, maar ze ook voor zorgen dat elk in door zijn eigen prestaties eigendomsplan van Margaret Thatcher

aan Haider richt-
in op de 'onge-
van de instaan-
van nivellering
van heerschappij-
komen tot een volkschap
de Britse premier de
de kleine burgerij mobiliseerde
dende in staat was om social
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probleem een basis te leggen
capaciteit van een verdergand

sen die vandaag naar Sarajevo werden geëvacueerd voor medische behandeling. (...) Zij verklaarden dat zij niet slecht zijn behandeld door de Servische troepen."

Is het niet vreemd dat de moslim verdedigers van Zepa hun gewonde kameraden achterlieten en dat de vijfzijdigzond soldaten uit Stebrenica hun vrouwen en kinderen overlieten aan een vijand met een reputatie van sadisten en verkrachters die erop uit zijn om 'genocide' te plegen? Of wisten ze dat er eigenlijk niets te vrezen viel?

De Servische troepen hebben de gewonde moslim strijders gevacueerd tot achter de moslim-linies naar hun (moslim) ziekenhuis in Sarajevo. Is dit een leger dat vergeleken kan worden met de nazi's?

Het grote publiek wordt door de media nog steeds in de waan gelaten als zou er in Srebrenica een massamoord hebben plaatsgevonden. Ook de betrokkenen in Srebrenica werden in het ongewisse gelaten, getuige de vele demonstraties van vrouwen die van de regering izetbevestigde ophefvering eisten over het lot van hun familieleden, die naar hun volle overtuiging nog in leven waren.

De geloofwaardigheid van het onderzoek hangt niet alleen af van de manier waarop de gegevens zijn verzameld, maar ook van de manier waarop ze worden geïnterpreteerd. Het is belangrijk om te weten dat de resultaten van een onderzoek vaak anders kunnen uitvallen als je dezelfde vragen stelt op een andere manier.

De geloofwaardigheid van bedrog hangt niet alleen af van handhaving van de illusie dat het waar is. Ook moet verhindert worden dat bewijzen aan het licht komen dat het vals is. Zowel de vijftiende eeuw als de zeventiende eeuw hebben weten te bereiken dat zij zich hebben weten terug te trekken als de afhandelaar hiermee niet uit zijn verbeelding kon worden verdreven.

Het idee banen, waarmee weer het systeem

Verwijzing naar Oostenrijks neofascisme niet toereikend

wordt op die manier omgevormd tot een strijd voor vrijheid.

'Geldknarzen' is de vijand van de vrijheid' staat er geschreven in het programma van de PPO. "Hoe je de zaak ook bekijkt, beschouw je het begrip gelijkheid niet in de zin van gelijkwaardigheid, maar letterlijk, dan kunnen vrijheid en gelijkheid niet samengaan", verduidelijkt de. Gernulf Stix, een van de theorieci van de PPO.

Verblijfsvergunningen voor weekenden die niet uit de Europese Unie afkomstig zijn, moeten worden afgegeven op basis van de behoeften per seizoen, zodat een eventueel ontstaan tussen vraag en aanbod op de Oostenrijkse arbeidsmarkt. Feitelijk komt het meer op het uitbuiten van rechtelozen die een reserveleger vormen voor de Oostenrijkse economie.

Maar vooral wordt met de buiten-

De FPO wil een nieuwe Dertde Re toename de rechts-indicialisme public. Daironder verstaat zij een neolibérale theorie, gekoppeld aan een autoritaire maatschappij, waarin de Markt de centrale component vormt. Belangrijkste onderdeel van een vrije maatschappij is voor de FPO het privé-eigendom.

De sociaal-democraten re- dragen. Op de opkomst van Haider met het overnemen van reactionaire slogans in een poging hem overbodig te maken, zoals zij het zelf omspreken. Op deze wijze heeft de SPÖ er in belangrijke mate toe bijgedragen

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"De erkenning van het privé-eigendom is voor de FPÖ een basisvoorwaarde van elke vrije maatschappij. Wij willen zoveel mogelijk eigendom op zoveel mogelijk verschillende manieren, ook in het bijzonder de productiemiddelen, in privé-handen en wel in grote aantallen. De politiek dient zich niet slechts te beperken tot het beschermen van de bestaande eigendommen, maar moet er ook voor zorgen dat elk individu door zijn eigen prestaties eigendom kan verwerven."

Dit idee doet strak denken aan het plan van Margaret Thatcher om te komen tot een volkscapitalisme, waarmee de Britse premier delen van de kleine burgerij mobiliseerde en zodoende in staat was om sociale maatregelen te torpederen. Ook de FPÖ probeert een basis te leggen voor acceptatie van een verdergaande ratio-

tuigen.

Milosevic: Frankrijk zat achter Srebrenica

(Van onze redactie buit land)
AMSTERDAM - Slobodan Milosevic, die al maanden zegt dat niet hij maar de Navo-leiders terecht zouden moeten staan, schuift ook de schuld voor het drama van Srebrenica in de schoenen van zijn tegenstanders. Het was de Franse geheime dienst die achter de massaslachting zat, zei Milosevic gisteren voor het Joegoslavië-tribunaal.

De Fransen lieten 'extremistische huurlingen' het vuile werk doen, waarna de wereld de Serviërs deze 'verzonnen genocide' aanrekende. Vervolgens werd deze 'waaninnige misdaad' door de Navo gebruikt als voorwendsel voor militair ingrijpen, aldus Milosevic.

Volgens de voormalige president van Joegoslavië, die een drie uur durend openingspleidooi hield inzake de aanklachten over Kroatië en Bosnië, vond rond Srebrenica in de zomer van 1995 een ordinaire koehandel plaats tussen de Franse generaal Bernard Janvier en de Bosnische moslim-regering in Sarajevo. De moslim-president Alija Izetbegovic gebruikte Srebrenica om de internationale gemeenschap te chanteren, aldus Milosevic.

Bosnische Serviërs hadden niets te maken met de massa-executies. "Alle informatie wijst erop dat generaal Ratko Mladic hier niets van wist, noch generaal Radislav Krstic," zei Milosevic. "Ik ben ervan overtuigd dat hun militaire eer de executie van mensen nooit zou toegelaten. Ook president Radovan Karadzic heeft mij bezworen dat hij er niets mee te maken had."

Milosevic citeerde het Niod-rapport over de val van Srebrenica om aan te tonen dat de autoriteiten in Belgrado, lees Milosevic zelf, niets te maken hadden met de grootste oorlogsmisdaad in Europa sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog. "Er zijn geen indicaties dat de actie werd ondernomen in samenwerking met Belgrado, noch op het vlak van politiek, noch op het vlak van militaire coördinatie."

De aanklagers van het VN-hof houden Milosevic wel degelijk verantwoordelijk voor genocide op zeven moslimgemeenschappen in Bosnië, waaronder die van Srebrenica. Hij leidde als president een 'criminele organisatie', aldus de aanklagers.

AFM 2000
Srebrenica
Ik heb met veel belangstelling het artikel over Srebrenica gelezen in TARGETS nummer 2 en de reactie in TARGETS nummer 3; ik kan er nog aan toevoegen, dat een Frans boek (P.M. Gallois: 'Le song du pétrole. Bosnie. Essai de Géopolitique', Lausanne 1996, pagina 166/167) duidelijk beschrijft hoe de moslims zijn begonnen met het verdrijven van de Serviërs, die 30 procent van de bevolking aldaar uitmaakten. En bepaald niet op zachtzinnige manier. Het een en ander werd uit de doeken gedaan, door een Engelsman, L.R. Thornton, tolk bij de Blauwhelmen, in het blad 'Time' van 21 juni 1993.
Maar wie weet dat in Nederland?
Hans Wallin
Leidschendam

10-6-2000 Mannen van Srebrenica vochten hevig na val stad 30-6-2000

DEN HAAG - Bosnische moslims die na de val van Srebrenica probeerden naar veilig gebied te ontkomen, hebben tijdens hun vlucht in gevechten tientallen Bosnisch-Servische soldaten gedood, bleek gisteren in een zitting van het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal.

"De belangrijke Bosnisch-Servische officieren onderschatten het aantal van de moslimmensen, en de militaire dreiging die van hen uitging", zei militair analist Richard Butler gisteren in het proces tegen generaal Krstic voor het tribunaal in Den Haag.

De Amerikaan getuigde voor de derde achtereenvolgende dag in het genocideproces tegen de Bosnisch-Servische generaal Krstic.

Butler heeft jarenlang duizenden documenten over Srebrenica bestudeerd: afgeluisterde gesprekken en in beslag genomen bevelen. Dat materiaal laat zien dat de Serviërs versterkingen moesten aanvragen om de duizenden moslimmensen tegen te houden op hun vlucht. Het kwam tot hevige, bittere gevechten, soms man tegen man. De Bosnisch-Servische soldaten kregen opdracht Servische dorpingen op de route van de moslims te beschermen.

De moslims van Srebrenica waren door Dutchbat, in weerwil van VN-resoluties, niet ontwapend. Meteen na de val van de enclave, op 11 juli 1995, luidde het bevel de moslims gevangen te nemen. Een of twee dagen later veranderde dat in: doden.

Laat de duivel het meenemen'

Srebrenica

Abe de Vries

BELGRADO - Net als we zijn flat binnenstappen is Milivoje Ivanisevic aan het bellen met een tolk van het Haagse Joegoslavië-Tribunaal. Ivanisevic (67) is voorzitter van de Vereniging van Serviërs uit Bosnië. Al jaren doet hij onderzoek naar misdaden van moslims. Zijn vereniging heeft lijsten gepubliceerd met de namen van meer dan 1200 Servische slachtoffers in het gebied rond Srebrenica. Onlangs kreeg hij een uitnodiging van het Tribunaal voor een persoonlijk gesprek.

Wat wil het Tribunaal van u?

"Eind deze maand maken we een definitieve afspraak voor een ontmoeting in Zvornik. Ze willen dat ik zoveel mogelijk bewijsmateriaal meebreng over oorlogsmisdaden door moslims in Oost-Bosnië en de Neretva-vallei.

Joegoslavië erkent het Tribunaal niet. Het ziet het gerechtshof als een instrument om politieke druk uit te oefenen. Denkt u daar anders over?

"De staat wijst het Tribunaal af, maar ik ben geen staatsinstelling. Ik leid een zuiver nationaal instituut. Wij houden ons bezig met het lijden van het Servische volk. Voor iedereen die mij om gegevens vraagt sta ik ter beschikking. Misschien zullen ze ermee manipuleren, maar toch voel ik me verplicht wat ik weet naar buiten te brengen. Zodat niemand kan zeggen: ik wist het niet."

Volgens uw vereniging hebben mos-

lims uit Srebrenica van 1992 tot 1995 in het gebied tussen Srebrenica en Zvornik meer dan 1200 Serviërs omgebracht. Hoe komt u aan dat getal?

"Van elk slachtoffer verzamelen we zoveel mogelijk gegevens. Naam, hoe men is omgebracht, op welke plaats, onder welke omstandigheden. Van elke dode proberen we via familie een foto te krijgen. Onze vereniging heeft van iedere gemeente in Bosnië een lijst met Servische slachtoffers. Alleen al in de gemeente Srebrenica zijn tijdens de oorlog 415 Serviërs omgekomen."

Is het moeilijk getuigen te vinden die naar Den Haag willen komen?

"Zo eenvoudig is dat niet. De mensen zien het Tribunaal als een verlengstuk van Amerika en de Navo. Laat de duivel het meenemen, het heeft ons al genoeg kwaad berokkend. Dat zeggen ze. Men gaat ervan uit dat het Tribunaal de moslims steunt. Anderen willen liever niet aan hun ellende worden herinnerd. Toch denk ik zeker dat er mensen zijn die hun verhaal zullen doen."

Srebrenica is een gevoelig thema in Nederland. Volgens het Internationale Rode Kruis zijn na de val van de enclave 8000 mensen vermist. Geveesd wordt dat de Serviërs duizenden mensen in koelen bloede hebben vermoord.

"Ik denk dat het Tribunaal over gegevens beschikt waaruit blijkt dat er veel minder slachtoffers zijn gevallen dan wordt aangenomen. Volgens onze bronnen in Den Haag en New York heeft de VN hierover een geheim rapport aan het Tribunaal gestuurd. Uit uittalingen van de Bosnische



Milivoje Ivanisevic

president Izetbegovic blijkt hetzelfde. Ik ga uit van twee- tot drieduizend slachtoffers, inclusief vermisten. De meesten zijn omgekomen in gevechten. Of in mijnenvelden."

Hoe kan het dan dat er toch zoveel vermisten geregistreerd staan?

"De lijst van het Rode Kruis is geïmproviseerd. Mensen uit Srebrenica die eerder zijn omgekomen staan er ook op. Net als waarschijnlijk de 900 moslims die na de val in het kamp Slivovica in het Tara-gebergte in Servië gevangen zaten. Ook moslims die in de jaren tachtig naar de mijn in Aleksinac zijn gegaan om te werken staan er op. Bovendien gooiden veel moslims met boter op hun hoofd tijdens de val hun persoonsdocumenten weg, om sporen uit te wissen en valse namen op te kunnen geven."

Weet u wat er vlak na de val op het voetbalveld van Bratunac is gebeurd en in een nabije school?

"Ik was die dag zelf in de stad. Bratunac zat vol vluchtelingen. We hadden niet genoeg politie en militairen. Toen is via de radio iedereen met een wapen opgeroepen te komen. De situatie was erg gespannen. Duizenden moslims, voornamelijk mannen, zijn op het speelveld vastgehouden en anderen in die school. Vermoedelijk is er toen een opstand geweest, over water en voedsel. Sommigen probeerden te vluchten en zijn neergeschoten. De volgende dag is de groep op transport gezet naar moslim-gebied bij Tuzla en naar ons kamp Batkovic bij Bijelina."

U zegt dat 'sommigen' in Bratunac zijn doodgeschoten. Om hoeveel mensen gaat het?

"Dat weet ik niet."

Ook niet ongeveer?

"In ieder geval ging het niet om grote aantallen."

Het Tribunaal beschikt over tientallen getuigenissen van moedwillige slachtpartijen. Er zijn berichten over massa-executies van honderden moslims in velden en scholen bij onder andere Kravica, Nova Kasaba en Konjevic Polje. De Servische troepen trokken niet voor niets Srebrenica binnen met namenlijsten van moslims die ze van misdaden verdachten. Wilt u zeggen dat zulke massamoorden niet hebben plaatsgehad?

"Waarschijnlijk zijn er massa-executies geweest. Maar hoeveel mensen echt op die manier zijn vermoord, en waar? Ik weet het niet."

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Vergeleken by de INITIAL INDICTMENT van

28 maart 2003 is de enige

wijziging de schrapping van

de plundering/vernietiging

van Rupovo Bro

Klasovica Municipa-

lity (was par. 30)

op 10 juni 1992

IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before:

Judge Carmel Agius

Judge Hans Henrik Brydenholt

Judge Albin Eser

Registrar:

Mr. Hans Holthuis

Date filed:

1 October 2004

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

NASER ORIC

SECOND AMENDED INDICTMENT

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Jan Wubben

Counsel for the Accused

Ms. Vasvija Vidovic

Mr. John Jones

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

NASER ORIC

Case No. IT-03-68 PT

SECOND AMENDED INDICTMENT

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter: Statute of the Tribunal) charges:

NASER ORIC

With VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF

WAR, as set forth below:

THE ACCUSED

1. **Naser ORIC**, son of Dzermal and Hata (née MUSTAFIC), was born on 3 March 1967 in Potocari, municipality of Srebrenica, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter: Bosnia and Herzegovina).
2. **Naser ORIC** was attached to the special unit for atomic and chemical defence of the Yugoslav People's Army (hereafter: JNA) during his mandatory service in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter: FRY) during 1985 and 1986. He left the JNA with the rank of Corporal.
3. **Naser ORIC** is a former police officer. In 1988, he completed a six month training course in Zemun and served in Savski Venac in Belgrade as a trainee policeman. As a member of the police unit for special actions, he had courses for two more years. In 1990, **Naser ORIC** was deployed to Kosovo as a member of a police unit for special actions of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. Thereafter, he returned to Belgrade. On 5 August 1991, he was transferred to a Police Station in Ilidza, on the outskirts of Sarajevo. In late 1991, **Naser ORIC** was moved to the Police Station in Srebrenica and on 8 April 1992 was made the Police Chief of the Potocari Police sub-station.
4. On 17 April 1992, the Potocari Territorial Defence (hereafter: TO) was established and **Naser ORIC** became its Commander. The command area of the Potocari TO encompassed the local commune areas of Potocari, Likari, Caus, Zalazje and Azlica.
5. On 20 May 1992, the Srebrenica Municipal TO Staff was formed and Naser Oric was appointed Commander. On 27 June 1992, Sefer HALILOVIC, Chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter: ABiH) officially confirmed **Naser ORIC** as the Commander of the Srebrenica TO Headquarters (hereafter: HQ). **Naser ORIC** commanded all units subordinated to the Srebrenica TO HQ. On 8 August 1992, **Naser ORIC's** position as Commander of the Srebrenica TO HQ was re-confirmed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 3 September 1992, the Srebrenica TO HQ was re-named the HQ Srebrenica Armed Forces. **Naser ORIC** remained the Commander.
6. **Naser ORIC** became a member of the War Presidency in Srebrenica upon its creation on 1 July 1992. He was appointed in his capacity as Commander of the Srebrenica TO HQ.
7. **Naser ORIC's** command was further extended when he was appointed the Commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the Sub-Region Srebrenica in early November 1992. His command encompassed the geographical regions of several municipalities, namely: Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Zvornik in Eastern Bosnia.
8. On 1 January 1994, all units under the command of **Naser ORIC** were named the 8th Operative Group Srebrenica HQ of the ABiH.
9. On 12 July 1994, **Naser ORIC** was promoted to the rank of Brigadier.
10. In early 1995, the 8th Operative Group Srebrenica HQ was re-named the ABiH 2nd Corps 28th

Division. **Naser ORIC** remained its Commander until he left the ABiH in August 1995.

11. Sometime before 1 March 1994, **Naser ORIC** was awarded the "Golden Lily", the highest award given by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the ABiH. On 15 April 1993, **Naser ORIC** received a Certificate of Merit, again from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the ABiH.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal

12. **Naser ORIC**, is individually responsible, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, for the crimes of wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages not justified by military necessity and plunder of property as alleged in this indictment. Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any acts or omissions set forth in this indictment. **Naser ORIC's** continued failure to take reasonable measures to prevent wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages and to punish the perpetrators who committed such crimes, as well as his active involvement in the attacks during which such wanton destruction was caused, instigated the commission of the crimes and aided and abetted the perpetrators of these crimes.

Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal

13. **Naser ORIC** was bound by the ABiH Disciplinary Regulations, in particular those gazetted on 13 August 1992 to implement the rules relating to the investigation of war crimes.
14. Following the common practice of the ABiH to use a variety of regulations and instructions of the former JNA, **Naser ORIC** by virtue of his authority and duties as a Commander, was, *inter alia*, responsible for the preparation, direction and implementation of combat activities. **Naser ORIC** also exercised his authority as a Commander by negotiating and being actively involved in the exchange of Serb detainees.
15. At all times relevant to the charges in this indictment, by virtue of his position and authority as Commander, **Naser ORIC** commanded all units that were operating within his area of responsibility. This includes all units involved in combat activities in the municipalities of Srebrenica and Bratunac, in particular the combat activities in Ratkovici on 21 and 27 June 1992, Jezestica on 8 August 1992, Fakovici on 5 October 1992, Bjelovac between 14 and 19 December 1992 and Kravica on 7 and 8 January 1993 and all units including the Military Police involved in the detention and custody of Serb individuals in Srebrenica.
16. **Naser ORIC** demonstrated both *de jure* and *de facto* command and control in military matters in a manner consistent with the exercise of superior authority, by issuing orders, instructions and directives to the units, by ensuring the implementation of these orders, instructions and directives and bearing full responsibility for their implementation.
17. **Naser ORIC** exercised effective control over his subordinates.
18. **Naser ORIC**, whilst holding the positions set out in this indictment is criminally responsible as a superior for the acts of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. Accordingly, **Naser ORIC** is criminally responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal for all crimes charged in this indictment.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

19. All acts and omissions alleged in this indictment occurred between 10 June 1992 and 20 March 1993 on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed conflict existed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21. At all times relevant to this indictment, **Naser ORIC** was required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols thereto. Furthermore, **Naser ORIC** was responsible for ensuring those military units under his command and control respected and applied these rules of international law. Moreover, **Naser ORIC** was obliged by superior order, namely the order of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 23 August 1992, to initiate proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals under his command and control who had violated the international laws of war.

CHARGES

COUNTS 1-2 (MURDER AND CRUEL TREATMENT)

22. Between 24 September 1992 and 20 March 1993, members of the Military Police under the command and control of **Naser ORIC** detained several Serb individuals in the Srebrenica Police Station and in the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal Building.
23. These detainees were subjected to physical abuse, serious suffering and serious injury to body and health, and inhumane treatment by the guards and / or by others with the support of the guards. In some instances, prisoners were beaten to death. Physical abuse included beatings by various objects including wooden sticks, wooden poles, steel pipes, metal bars, baseball bats, rifle butts, bare fists, kicking with boots and forced teeth extractions with rusty pliers. These beatings and physical abuse caused severe pain and injuries such as fractured bones, severe injuries to limbs and broken teeth. On numerous occasions, detainees were beaten into a state of unconsciousness. They were confined in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.
24. Cruel treatment:
 - a. Between 24 September 1992 and 16 October 1992, the following Serb individuals were detained under conditions described as in paragraph 23, at the Srebrenica Police Station:
 - i. Nedeljko RADIC, born 15 July 1951, was assaulted with various objects including wooden poles and iron bars. He was punched and kicked all over his body. He was beaten about the head with an iron bar. His teeth were forcibly extracted using rusty pliers. A soldier urinated into his injured mouth and he was forced to swallow the urine. He bled from his mouth and his nose. His teeth were broken and his ribs were fractured.
 - ii. Slavoljub ZIKIC called Drago, born 18 May 1935, was punched with fists and kicked with boots. He was also beaten with rifle butts. In some instances, he was beaten into a state of unconsciousness. His ribs were fractured and his teeth in his upper jaw were broken. One of his shoulders was broken. As a consequence of the beatings, his hearing and vision are badly impaired.

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- iii. Zoran BRANKOVIC, born in 1975, Nevenko BUBANJ called Slavenko, date of birth unknown and Veselin SARAC, born 17 November 1938, were punched and kicked all over their bodies. They were beaten with various objects including wooden poles and iron bars.
- b. Between 15 December 1992 and 20 March 1993, the following Serb individuals were first detained in the Srebrenica Police Station and later transferred to the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal Building. They were detained under the conditions described in paragraph 23:
 - i. Ilija IVANOVIC, born 1 February 1962, was beaten with bare fists, wooden poles, metal bars, baseball bats and kicked with boots. He was stabbed with knives. He was beaten all over his body. His ribs were fractured; his teeth, his nose and his cheekbone were broken. His head was smashed against the metal bars on the door and on concrete walls. On numerous occasions, as a result of these beatings, he fell into a state of unconsciousness.
 - ii. Ratko NIKOLIC, born 12 July 1945, (a Serb civilian), was subjected to severe beatings. He was beaten with wooden poles, baseball bats, and metal bars. He was kicked and punched and stabbed with knives. As a result of these beatings his ribs were fractured and on numerous occasions he fell into a state of unconsciousness.
 - iii. Rado PEJIC called Miso, born 27 March 1956, (a Serb civilian), was subjected to severe beatings. He was beaten with wooden sticks, wooden poles, baseball bats, metal bars and rifle butts. He was punched and kicked and beaten all over his body. On numerous occasions, he was beaten into a state of unconsciousness. As a result of the beatings and inhumane treatment he lost such a significant portion of his body weight that he was unable to walk and had to be exchanged on a stretcher.
 - iv. Stanko MITROVIC called Cane, date of birth unknown, Miloje OBRADOVIC, date of birth unknown and Mile TRIFUNOVIC, born in 1920, (all Serb civilians), were subjected to severe beatings. They were beaten with wooden sticks, wooden poles, baseball bats, metal bars and rifle butts. They were kicked and punched and beaten all over their bodies. On numerous occasions, they were beaten into a state of unconsciousness.

25. Killings:

- a. On or about 25 September 1992, Dragutin KUKIC, born 12 May 1934, a Serb, who was detained in the Srebrenica Police Station under the conditions described in paragraph 23, was beaten to death.
 - b. Between 6 February and 20 March 1993, the following Serb individuals, who were detained in the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal Building under the conditions described in paragraph 23, were killed: Jakov DOKIC, born in 1972, Dragan ILIC, born in 1975, Milisav MILOVANOVIC called Mico, born in 1950, Kostadin POPOVIC, born 20 September 1947, Branko SEKULIC, born 1 January 1967 and Bogdan ZIVANOVIC, born 14 October 1930.
26. Naser ORIC from about September 1992 to August 1995 knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to plan, prepare or execute the imprisonment, killing and/or cruel treatment of Serbs detained at the Srebrenica Police Station and the building behind the Srebrenica Municipal Building, or had done so, and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions Naser ORIC committed:

COUNT 1: MURDER, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable

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under Articles 3 and 7 (3) of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions.

COUNT 2: CRUEL TREATMENT, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions.

**COUNTS 3-6
(WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS OR VILLAGES, NOT JUSTIFIED BY
MILITARY NECESSITY, PLUNDER OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY)**

27. During the period May 1992 to February 1993, Muslim armed units engaged in various military operations against the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter: VRS) forces in Eastern Bosnia. In the course of such operations, Muslim armed units in the Municipalities of Bratunac, Srebrenica and Skelani, burnt and otherwise destroyed and plundered a minimum of fifty predominantly Serb villages and hamlets. As a result, thousands of Serb individuals fled the area.
28. Between 10 June 1992 and 8 January 1993, units under the command and control of **Naser ORIC**, engaged in various combat activities against VRS forces in Eastern Bosnia.
29. In the course of such combat activities, Bosnian Serb buildings, dwellings, and other property in predominantly Serb villages, were burnt and destroyed as detailed in paragraphs 30 to 35.
30. On 21 and 27 June 1992, the village of Ratkovici including the surrounding hamlets of Bradjevina, Ducici, and Gornji Ratkovici were attacked. The Srebrenica TO, Osmace TO, Kragljivoda TO, Skenderovici TO and Biljeg TO participated in this attack.
31. On 8 August 1992, the village of Jezestica and the hamlet of Bozici were attacked. The Potocari TO, Suceška TO, Skenderovici TO and Osmace TO participated in this attack.
32. On 5 October 1992, the village of Fakovici including the surrounding hamlets of Radijevici and Divovici, were attacked. The Potocari TO, Osmace TO, Suceška TO, Company Stari Grad, Skenderovici TO and Kragljivoda TO participated in this attack. **Naser ORIC** commanded and partook in the attack.
33. Between 14 and 19 December 1992, the village of Bjelovac and the adjoining hamlet of Sikirici were attacked. Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Sub-Region Srebrenica, Company Stari Grad, Company Srebrenica from Independent Battalion Srebrenica, Brigade Potocari, Brigade Suceška, Brigade "3 Maj" Kragljivoda, Independent Battalion Osmace, Company Puzmulici of the Srebrenica Independent Battalion, Independent Battalion Skenderovici, 114th East Bosnian Brigade, Independent Battalion Voljavica, Independent Battalion Biljeg, 1st Cerani Detachment, Company Kazani from Independent Battalion Srebrenica and Independent Battalion "5 Juli" Tokoljaci participated in this attack. **Naser ORIC** commanded and partook in the attack.
34. On 7 and 8 January 1993, the village of Kravica and two nearby villages, Siljkovici and Jezestica, were attacked. The Company Stari Grad, Brigade Potocari, Brigade Suceška, Brigade "3 Maj" Kragljivoda, Independent Battalion Osmace, Company Puzmulici of the Srebrenica Independent Battalion, 6th Detachment Kamenica, 114th East Bosnian Brigade, Independent Battalion Voljavica, Independent Battalion Biljeg, and 1st Cerani Detachment participated in this attack. **Naser ORIC** commanded and partook in the attack.
35. In the course of these attacks in Eastern Bosnia between 10 June 1992 and 8 January 1993, units under the command and control of **Naser ORIC** plundered Bosnian Serb property, namely cattle, furniture and television sets. In addition, Bosnian Serb property including buildings and dwellings were

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unlawfully destroyed. These incidents of plunder and unlawful and wanton destruction not justified by military necessity, include the following villages and hamlets on or about the dates indicated:

- Ratkovici (Srebrenica Municipality) June 1992
- Bradjevinina (Srebrenica Municipality) June 1992
- Ducici (Srebrenica Municipality) June 1992
- Gornji Ratkovici (Srebrenica Municipality) June 1992
- Jezestica (Bratunac Municipality) August 1992
- Bozici (Bratunac Municipality) August 1992
- Fakovici (Bratunac Municipality) October 1992
- Radijevici (Bratunac Municipality) October 1992
- Divovici (Bratunac Municipality) October 1992
- Bjelovac (Bratunac Municipality) December 1992
- Sikirici (Bratunac Municipality) December 1992
- Kravica (Bratunac Municipality) January 1993
- Jezestica (Bratunac Municipality) January 1993
- Siljkovici (Bratunac Municipality) January 1993

36. **Naser ORIC** from about June 1992 to August 1995, knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit such wanton destruction and plunder or had done so, in the specified villages and hamlets on or about the dates indicated above, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions **Naser ORIC** committed:

COUNT 3: WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS OR VILLAGES, NOT JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3(b) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 4: PLUNDER OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3(e) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

37. In addition, **Naser ORIC** implemented a strategy of wanton destruction to achieve his objectives. Accordingly, he did not make any or sufficient orders to prevent such wanton destruction and plunder of property. **Naser ORIC** failed to address the issue of wanton destruction and plunder at the debriefings of operations. He personally took part in the attacks in **Fakovici** (5 October 1992), **Bjelovac** (between 14 and 19 December 1992) and **Kravica** and **Jezestica** (7 and 8 January 1993). **Naser ORIC** continuously failed to make any or sufficient orders to prevent wanton destruction and plunder of property. These acts and omissions, instigated the commission of the crimes and aided and abetted the perpetrators to commit such unlawful and wanton destruction not justified by military necessity and plunder in the attacks in **Fakovici** (5 October 1992), **Bjelovac** (between 14 and 19 December 1992) and

By these acts and omissions **Naser ORIC** committed:

COUNT 5: WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS OR VILLAGES, NOT JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3(b) and 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNT 6: PLUNDER OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3(e) and 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

David Tolbert
Deputy Prosecutor

Dated this 1st day of October 2004
At The Hague
The Netherlands

ANNEX

ADDITIONAL HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL FACTS

1. The events alleged in this indictment took place against the background of the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter: SFRY).
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on 3 March 1992. The European Community recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992. On 22 May 1992, the United Nations admitted Bosnia and Herzegovina as a member State.
3. With the disintegration of the SFRY, a cadre staff consisting of former JNA officers began to prepare for the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 8 April 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina transformed the existing Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina TO into the TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 15 April 1992, the new TO Staff ordered the creation of the Main TO HQ, which acquired full command and control over existing units.
4. On 8 April 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed an "Immediate Threat of War".
5. On 20 May 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed the Decree on the Armed Forces of Bosnia.
6. On 20 June 1992, a "State of War" was declared by the Presidency.
7. On 18 August 1992, the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina made a "Decision on the establishment of the ABiH Corps". The document outlined the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into five military areas of responsibility known as Corps and defined the municipalities which fell within each Corps.

8. One such Corps was the 2nd Corps with its HQ in Tuzla. The following municipalities were listed under the ABiH 2nd Corps area of responsibility: Banovici, Bijeljina, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Bratunac, Brcko, Derventa, Doboj, Gracanica, Gradacac, Kalesija, Kladanj, Lopare, Lukavac, Maglaj, Modrica, Odzak, Orasje, Srebrenica, Srebrenik, Sekovici, Teslic, Tesanj, Tuzla, Ugljevik, Vlasenica, Zvornik and Zivinice.
9. On 23 August 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an order on the adoption of the "Rules of the International Laws of War by the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina". This order came into force on 5 September 1992. The order stipulated the following:
 - a) All unit commanders and individual members of the Armed Forces were responsible for putting the rules into practice;
 - b) Senior officers were to take steps prescribed in the rules against anyone who breached the laws;
 - c) All members of the Armed Forces were to undergo training in order to familiarise themselves with the rules;
- a. The planning and preparation of military actions by the Armed Forces were to comply with the rules and laws.
1. On 12 September 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina was proclaimed. On 16 September 1991, the Assembly of the Association of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina proclaimed the Autonomous Region of Krajina. By 21 November 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Regions (hereafter: SAO) and Autonomous Regions consisted of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the SAO Herzegovina, the SAO Romanija/Birac, the SAO Semberija, and the SAO Northern Bosnia.
2. On 15 October 1991, at the meeting of the SDS Party Council, a decision was made to form a separate assembly entitled the "Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to secure Serb interests.
3. On 24 October 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, dominated by the SDS, decided to conduct a "Plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in order to decide whether to stay in the common state of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, the Autonomous Region of Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.
4. On 9 and 10 November 1991, the Bosnian Serbs held the plebiscite. The results overwhelmingly showed that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to stay in Yugoslavia.
5. On 11 December 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian People made a request to the JNA to protect with all available means as "integral parts of the State of Yugoslavia" the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the plebiscite of the Serbian people and other citizens on remaining in a joint Yugoslav state had been conducted.
6. On 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a declaration on the Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The territory of that Republic was declared to include "the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War II", and it was declared to be a part of the Federal Yugoslav state. On 12 August 1992, the name of the Bosnian Serb Republic was changed to Republika Srpska.

From 29 February to 2 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina held a referendum on independence. At the urging of the SDS, the majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote. The referendum resulted in a pro-independence majority.

8. On 27 March 1992, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally proclaimed in Pale.
9. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began to seize physical control of the municipalities that had been declared part of the "Serbian State".
10. On 27 April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new FRY and declared it the successor state of the SFRY.
11. On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to create the VRS, effectively transforming the JNA units remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina into commands of the new army. The JNA, which had been re-named the Yugoslav Army during the SFRY's reconstitution as the FRY in April 1992, continued to have strong links with the VRS. It provided critical combat, financial and logistical support to military operations carried out by the VRS against the non-Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sagittarius

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Verzonden: vrijdag 15 juli 2005 2:26
Onderwerp: Fuzzy Math and "Genocide"
 Fuzzy Math and "Genocide"

ANTIC.org-SNN
 Thu, 14 Jul 2005 13:58:52 -0700

Fuzzy Math and "Genocide"

I should have noted this Monday, when I first read the [article](#), but was so overwhelmed by the sheer volume of articles about Srebrenica - the vast majority repeating exactly the same tired propaganda - that I haven't got around to it. But this article, in the London *Sunday Times*, was somewhat different - not just because it admitted there was a history of massacres on *both* sides in Srebrenica, or that Serbs and Muslims in the area still very much hate each other, or even that most of the dead came from a *military* column, and were therefore not "civilians." What caught my eye was the "factoid" at the end, "How a safe haven turned into hell." Look carefully at the numbers.

July 11:

- 5,000 Muslim refugees enter base at Potocari, 20,000 more wait in fields outside. 10,000-15,000 others flee through forest
- Mladic enters Srebrenica
- Dutch at Potocari surrender weapons and stand by as Serbs separate Muslim men and women.
- Killings of the men begin

July 12: Serbs bus 23,000 women and children out of Potocari

- Escaping column in the forest ambushed

July 13: Dutch expel 5,000 Muslims from base at Serb request. Men are executed

July 13-20: Large-scale executions continue

- No man of military age handed by Dutch to Serbs is seen alive again

So, we have 25,000 people in Srebrenica, and another 10-15,000 fleeing through the woods (35-40,000 altogether). Earlier in the article, it is said that "fewer than 4,000" of the "10,000-strong column" survived the trek to Tuzla. Adding the 6000 that didn't and the 2,000 that were assumingly killed in Potocari - because Serbs evacuated 23,000 Muslims - and you get the official figure of 8,000.

However, all of a sudden it is claimed that the 5000 hiding in Potocari were *not* among the evacuees, but were seized from the Dutch camp two days later, and more men were allegedly killed at this point. But where did those extra 3000 evacuated Muslims come from? Everything becomes painfully unclear when one considers that the number of officially registered survivors in August 1995 was just north of 35,000, and the ICTY - which claims "genocide" - estimated the population in Srebrenica at 37,000. What is going on here?

Without a doubt, thousands of people died in Eastern Bosnia during the 1992-1995 war, Muslims and Serbs alike, at each other's hand. Some would say that quibbling about numbers misses the big picture. But this kind of fuzzy math deliberately creates a distorted picture of what happened, of "genocide" where there wasn't any, turning battles into "massacres" and soldiers into civilians for the purpose of political propaganda.

This isn't a debate about the numbers of Jews, Slavs and Roma murdered in Nazi concentration camps, however the Srebrenica genocide industry seeks to make that parallel. With the Nazis, one has the books, speeches, orders, structures, organization... a mountain of evidence pointing to genocidal intent before numbers even come into consideration. With Srebrenica, there is *nothing* but the magical number, "8000 men and boys," accompanied with the phrase "Europe's worst atrocity since World War Two" in the attempt to make the Nazi analogy. Yet the numbers don't add up, and the claim of "genocide" in Srebrenica rests solely on the repeated assertions in the media that it took place.

http://www.antiwar.com/blog/comments.php?id=2219_0_1_0_C

Sagittarius

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Verzonden: woensdag 13 juli 2005 1:21
Onderwerp: Fw: [JUGOINFO] <http://www.srebrenica->

----- Original Message -----

From: "Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia" <jugocoord@tiscali.it>
To: <jugoinfo@yahoogroups.com>; <crj-mailinglist@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2005 11:53 AM
Subject: [JUGOINFO] <http://www.srebrenica-report.com/>

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/>

Srebrenica And the Politics of War Crimes

Findings of the Srebrenica Research Group into the allegations of events and the background leading up to them, in Srebrenica, Bosnia & Herzegovina, in 1995.

Website established July 1995, maintained and organized by the Srebrenica Research Group

Overview

* The Politics of the Srebrenica Massacre
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/politics.htm>
 by Edward S. Herman, Z-mag

* "Srebrenica and the Politics of War Crimes"
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/defense.htm>
 by George Bogdanich, Defense and Foreign Affairs Special Reports

Selections from the Report

* Foreword
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/foreword.htm>
 by Philip Corwin former UN Civilian Affair Coordinator

* Prelude to the Capture of Srebrenica
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/prelude.htm>
 by George Bogdanich

* The Numbers Game
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/numbers.htm>
 by Jonathan Rooper, former BBC Reporter

* The ICTY calls it 'Genocide'
<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/icty.htm>

by Michael Mandel

* The UK Press on Srebrenica

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/UK-press.htm>

by Philip Hammond

CONCLUSIONS of the Srebrenica Research Group

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/conclusions.htm>

(Released July 11, 2005)

Articles related to Srebrenica

* Muslim leader says Srebrenica was "sacrificed"

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/sacrificed.htm>

Slobodna Bosna, July 14, 1996

* Was Srebrenica a Hoax?

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/hoax.htm>

by Carlos Martins Branco, former United Nations Military Observer in Bosnia

* "Making Peace with the Guilty"

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/peace.htm>

by General Charles Boyd

* Nasir Oric - Srebrenica's Tough Guy

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/Oric.htm>

By John Pomfret, Washington Post Foreign Service

* Fearsome Muslim warlord

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/Oric2.htm>

by Bill Schiller, Toronto Star

UN Documents

ON WAR CRIMES

AND CRIMES AND GENOCIDE IN EASTERN BOSNIA

(COMMUNES OF BRATUNAC, SKELANI AND SREBRENICA)

UN Security Council, 2 June 1993

* Introduction - Pages 1 - 21 of the document.

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-1.pdf>

* Victims - Pages 22 - 40 of the document.

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-2.pdf>

* Massacres - pp. 41 - 51

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-3.pdf>

* Perpetrators - pp. 52 - 80

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-4.pdf>

* Statements (Part 1) - pp. 81 - 104

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-5.pdf>

* Statements (Part 2) - pp. 105 - 132

<http://www.srebrenica-report.com/docs/UN-1993-6.pdf>

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Last revised: July 11, 2005

ALLE RADICI DELLA TRAGEDIA JUGOSLAVA:

RATLINES - La guerra della Chiesa contro il comunismo

<http://www.cnj.it/documentazione/ratlines.htm>

THE PAVELIC PAPERS

<http://www.pavelicpapers.com/>

THE DRAZA MIHAILOVIC TRIAL (1946)

<http://trial-mihailovic-1946.chiffonrouge.org>

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---> Archivio/Arhiv:

<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/messages>

<http://www.domeus.it/circles/jugoinfo>

--> Per iscriversi [o per cancellarsi] / Upisivanje [brisanje]:
jugoinfo-[un]subscribe@yahoogroups.com

---> EMAIL: jugocoord(a)tiscali.it

---> C.N.J.: DOCUMENTO COSTITUTIVO / OSNIVACKI DOKUMENT:

http://www.cnj.it/documentazione/documento_costitutivo.htm

Link utili di Yahoo! Gruppi

<*> Per andare all'homepage del gruppo vai alla pagina:

<http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/jugoinfo/>

<*> Per annullare l'iscrizione al gruppo scrivi a:

jugoinfo-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> L'utilizzo da parte tua di Yahoo! Gruppi è soggetto alle:

Sagittarius

Van: "R Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico Varkevisser" <nico.v@slobodan-milosevic.org>; "Nico en Neeltje" <nico.s@slobodan-milosevic.org>
Verzonden: woensdag 13 juli 2005 1:17
Onderwerp: Fw: Srebrenica Muslims Remembered, the Rest Silenced

----- Original Message -----

From: "Darkita" <peter.darka@skynet.be>
 To: <minja@vlada.ca>; <kumasi@wanadoo.es>; <antic.miroslav@gmail.com>;
 <milan.kasic@3web.net>; <r_rozoff@yahoo.com>; <despot@tiscali.nl>;
 <i-johnson@lineone.net>; <lennart_palm@spray.se>; <michel.collon@skynet.be>;
 <MMennard@aol.com>; <piotr.bein@imag.net>; <artel@tehnicom.net>;
 <cdeliso@balkananalysis.com>; <mzupan@EUnet.yu>; <espritdecorp@idirect.com>;
 <espritdecorp@idirect.com>; <stig@absolutok.net>;
 <info@freebobbyfischer.net>; <jpmaher@neiu.edu>;
 <lyubomir_gruyitch@yahoo.com>; <info@serbianunity.net>; <koba@fastmail.ca>;
 <lbranka@tiscali.co.uk>
 Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2005 5:22 PM
 Subject: FW: Srebrenica Muslims Remembered, the Rest Silenced

-----Original Message-----

From: - T F F - PressInfo - [mailto:TFF@transnational.org]
 Sent: 12 July 2005 13:53
 To: TFF PressInfo 222
 Subject: Srebrenica Muslims Remembered, the Rest Silenced

New PressInfo on TFF's site from July 11, 2005

TFF PressInfo 222

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SREBRENICA MUSLIMS REMEMBERED, THE REST SILENCED

There is every reason to commemorate the massacre by Serb soldiers on innocent Muslim civilians in Srebrenica ten years ago today. But unless it is considered acceptable to quantify crimes and politically misuse human suffering, there is no plausible reason to forget or silence other cases of massacres, ethnic cleansing and terror bombings in which other innocent people lost their lives.

Today's coverage of the Srebrenica massacre proves that mainstream media have learned nothing

e 1990. By Jan Oberg.

This article ends with a series of links to homespaces with UN and government reports, personal accounts and analyses. They offer a bit more of the complexity and the many possible interpretations. Their content must be known to get the larger picture of what happened in Srebrenica. Some give a Serb view, most don't. These links are as easily available to you as they are to any journalist around the globe. Ask yourself - and the mainstream media - why their interesting content is never referred to.

- The only truth there is is the one we put together ourselves by using as many and as different sources we can. And apply sound judgement in the face of the - ongoing - media war, ends Jan Oberg

Read the analysis and browse the link section here
http://www.transnational.org/pressinf/2005/pi222_Srebrenica.html

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<mailto:unsubscribe-pressinfo@transnational.org>

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TFF

Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
Transnationella Stiftelsen för Freds- och Framtidsforskning
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<http://www.transnational.org/sitemap.html>
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