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Joegoslavië

2 De opdeling van Joegoslavië (1990-1999) in acht verschillende staatjes is de grootste misdaad die de NAVO-landen de laatste tijd begaan heeft. Het is een misdaad tegen de akkoorden van Helsinki; het is een misdaad tegen het Volkerenrecht en een misdaad tegen de Mensenrechten. Het is etnisch zuiveren met bommem.

Over vijf tot tien jaar zullen de inwoners van Nederland (en Europa en de VS) en de media er achter komen dat ze in de val zijn gelopen en belazerd.

Rik Min
Enschede

di. 11.05.1999



Van: "R Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: zondag 23 september 2007 23:44
Onderwerp: Media Disinformation on the War in Yugoslavia: The Dayton Peace
Hallo Nico en Neeltje, .

Wij zijn ruim twee weken al terug van vakantie en nu ga ik vrijdag a.s. weer starten met de studie HBO Facility Management, dus het wordt hard werken!
Hoe gaat het met jullie?
Heel veel groetjes van mij en Radica,
Roza

Media Disinformation on the War in Yugoslavia: The Dayton Peace Accords Revisited

by James A. Lucas

Global Research, September 7, 2005

November 21st of this year will be the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords which ended the war in Bosnia, one of 6 republics of Yugoslavia. That U.S.- brokered agreement has been praised because it stopped the killing in Bosnia. While that is true, less well known but vastly more important, is the fact that the U.S. was mainly responsible for starting that war. This connection is somewhat analogous to destroying Iraq and then seeking praise for plans to rebuild it. For that

reason Dayton may want to reassess its link to the Dayton Peace Accords.

Some supporters of the Accords maintain that the war was due to ethnic differences between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. There has indeed been animosity between these groups for many years. But during the 45 years since the end of World War II, until Yugoslavia started to disintegrate in 1990, the various groups were able to live peacefully together. So why did Yugoslavia fall apart, and in particular, what caused the war in Bosnia? That is the question that the rest of this article will address. The secondary roles of other national and international entities will also be mentioned to a lesser extent.

The U.S. subverted the sovereignty of Yugoslavia primarily by using economic muscle and arm-twisting and by direct political and military machinations. Meddling by the U.S. in Yugoslavia led to 20,000 to 60,000 deaths in Bosnia, 1 hundreds of thousands of wounded, millions of refugees and the other horrors and destruction that war brings.

Edicts against Yugoslavia and Bosnia

It is not necessary to resort to any conspiracy theory to show why Yugoslavia dissolved like cream in coffee. All that is needed, as a start, is to refer to public statements, especially when discussing the economic pressures that were foisted on Yugoslavia.

For two decades prior to 1980 Yugoslavia was prospering with its annual GDP growth averaging 6.1 percent. Medical care was free, the literacy rate was about 91 percent and life expectancy was 72 years.² In some ways life may have been better in Yugoslavia than in the U.S.

Then things started to fall apart in 1980 when Yugoslavia began to get into debt to international creditors shortly after the death of its leader, Marshall Tito. Whether the new leaders agreed to these loans due to bribes, threats or some other reasons is not known. To repay these debts Yugoslavia had to agree to debt restructuring agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which increased its foreign debt even more.³ Throughout the 1980s, the IMF prescribed further doses of its bitter economic medicine periodically. Industrial production declined to a negative 10 percent growth rate by 1990.⁴ State revenues that should have gone as transfer payments to the republics and provinces went instead to service the debts of the Yugoslav Federation. The republics were mostly on their own.

The Reagan administration's war on the poor was underway here at home at that time and it was decided to direct this campaign against human welfare also toward communist countries. In 1984 it specifically targeted the Yugoslav economy in a secret memo, NSDD 133, which advocated expanded efforts to promote a "quiet revolution to overthrow Communist governments and parties" while reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into a market-oriented economy.⁵ Thus began Reagan's secret plan for interventions to overthrow Communist states. This illustrates that the demise of communism was probably

• due to some extent to Western connivance and militarism.

In 1989 Ante Markovic, prime minister of Yugoslavia, in order to pay off the loans, launched a program of privatizing or shutting down state industry, cutting back on social programs and subsidies and freezing wages. These are the same types of actions that have been taken by the IMF and the World Bank against other nations in the last two or three decades as a part of the "developed" nations international war on the poor. The standard of living declined 18.1 percent between January and October 1990. This downturn raised unemployment to 20 percent and thus increased tensions between the republics. Markovic, visiting Washington, told President George H. Bush that rising tensions among nationalities would be a consequence of his austerity/privatization plan.⁶

Then the U.S. came down like a sledgehammer again on Yugoslavia when on November 5, 1990 Congress passed the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513. A section of this law, without previous warning, cut off all aid, credits and loans from the U.S. to Yugoslavia within 6 months. Also, the law demanded separate elections in each of the republics that made up Yugoslavia, requiring State Department approval of election procedures and results before aid to the separate republics would be resumed. In February 1991 the Council of Europe also demanded that Yugoslavia hold multi-party elections or face an economic blockade.⁷

Three weeks after the U.S. Congress passed this dictatorial law a CIA report leaked to the media predicted that Yugoslavia would disintegrate into civil

- war, possibly within the next year and thus essentially agreeing with the warning made earlier by Markovic.⁸ By 1991, the new government had acquired a debt of \$31 billion. Unemployment was over a million and inflation was 200 percent.⁹

The Yugoslav federal government was unable to pay the enormous interest on its foreign debt or even to arrange the purchase of raw materials for its industry. Credit collapsed and recriminations broke out on all sides. At this time there was no civil war or any secession yet. By 1992 Serbs, wherever they lived in Yugoslavia, had become demonized by the international community because of their alleged human rights abuses. The European Community (EC) in 1991 threatened a withdrawal of \$1 billion in scheduled aid and a cut off of economic relations with Yugoslavia if it did not accept mediation for peaceful purposes. This meant that Yugoslavia was not being allowed the option of military force to maintain its national cohesion, a prerogative that virtually no other country would willingly relinquish.¹⁰

- Delirious with power, since the U.S. was now the only remaining superpower, the Pentagon in 1992 proclaimed its imperial hegemony over the world in its "Defense Planning Guide." According to the New York Times of May 8 1992, this document asserts that the only possible course for the U.S. to pursue is complete world domination, and it adds that no other country has the right to aspire to the role of leadership, even as a regional power.¹¹

On May 30, 1992 the UN Security Council, in its not infrequent role as a puppet of the U.S., voted to impose

- a sanctions blockade on the remainder of the Yugoslav Federation - Serbia and Montenegro - even though the World Court ruled that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not the aggressor in the conflict in Bosnia. The purpose of the sanctions was to prevent the movement of arms from Serbia to Serbs in Bosnia.¹² Also among the restrictions ordered by UN Resolution 757 was an international ban on all exports to and imports from Yugoslavia, an international ban on all foreign investment and commercial contacts with Yugoslavia and a freeze by all countries of Yugoslavia's assets.¹³

On the same day that the blockade was imposed President George H. Bush declared a national state of emergency, saying that "the grave events in Serbia and Montenegro constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, economy and foreign policy of the U.S."¹⁴ A gross exaggeration indeed, considering the relative economic and military might of the two nations. The search for a pretext to intervene was obvious.

One effect of the sanctions was that state companies could no longer be competitive on the world market, and therefore multinational corporations could buy them at low prices. Less than a month after the UN resolution was passed hundreds of thousands of workers had their wages reduced or received no wages.¹⁵ The U.S. Sixth Fleet enforced the blockade starting in 1992 and by 1996 74,000 ships had been halted.¹⁶ On June 25, 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia and by mid-1992 Yugoslavia was reduced to Serbia and Montenegro

By October 1993 medical care had deteriorated and the

- effects were devastating. 90 percent of the country's domestic drug production stopped. A six-year-old boy had leukemia but free medicines were no longer available. The first of 8 necessary treatments cost \$812, more than twice the combined monthly salaries of his parents. Hospitals had to give unscreened blood transfusions. Medications for psychiatric patients ran out.

The average daily intake of calories had fallen by 28 percent compared to 1990 and 1.5 million people were classified as undernourished. The death rate in the capital, Belgrade, increased from 79 to 977 per 100,000 in the same period.¹⁷ Two months later over 60 percent of the country's work force was unemployed and the average monthly income had dropped from \$500 to \$15.¹⁸

In September 1994, the UN blockade - which had previously covered Serbia and Montenegro - was extended to cover only that part of Bosnia under Bosnian Serb control. According to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, Yugoslavia in 1994 had over 3.7 million refugees, the largest refugee population in the world. 44 percent were Muslim, 36 percent were Serbs and 20 percent were Croats.¹⁹

U.S. Intervention in Bosnia

The first indication that U.S. policy would soon be implemented by concrete military intervention in Bosnia was when George Kenney of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Michael J. Dugan, a retired

- AF general and former Air Force Chief of Staff, outlined a blueprint in 1992 for what they called "Operation Balkan Storm."

They said -

*"a win in the Balkans would establish U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world in a way that operation Desert Storm never could."*²⁰

Outside military intervention in Bosnia started in 1992 when NATO, a surrogate of the U.S., sent a group of about 100 personnel to Bosnia where they established a military headquarters at Kiseljak, close to Sarajevo. A NATO diplomat at the time said in the Intelligence Digest of October 16, 1992 that this operation was "a very cautious first step and we are definitely not making much noise about it. But it could be the start of something bigger..You could argue that NATO now has a foot in the door."²¹

According to Warren Zimmerman, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia during the Reagan and Bush administrations, NATO domination of Bosnia was essential. At stake, he said in 1995, is NATO's capability of "expanding" into Eastern Europe. If a NATO occupation of Bosnia fails, according to Zimmerman, *"not only will NATO's expansion look ludicrous but serious roles for NATO anywhere else will be hard to imagine."*²²

The U.S. also offered advice to the Bosnian military. On

April 30, 1994 the Washington Post reported that General John Shalikashvili, chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, had gone to Sarajevo to meet with Bosnian military leaders. Ret. U.S. Army Gen. Williams E. Odom, a long time Pentagon insider, was the head of the U.S. government's biggest spy agency - the ultra-secret National Security Agency during the Reagan Administration. In an opinion-page piece in the New York Times in 1995, Odom indicated that the occupation of Bosnia was part of a plan for military and political domination of Europe and the former Soviet Union through NATO.²³

The Bosnian Army was also being helped by other U.S. military advisors, including Gen. John Sewall and Gen. John Galvin, the former NATO Supreme Commander, according to Foreign Affairs of September, October 1995. The entire Bosnian army wore U.S. military uniforms provided by U.S. military contractors.²⁴

A UN Security Council Resolution adopted on September 25, 1991 imposed a complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to all parts of the former Yugoslavia.²⁵ This was an attempt to prevent a bonfire from becoming a forest fire. But since the U.S. wanted the Serbs to lose, it decided in November 1994 to pour gasoline on the fire by unilaterally ending its support of the UN Security Council's arms embargo.²⁶

The New York Times of June 24, 1994 described the new supplies, including heavy weapons, flooding into Bosnia since the U.S. organized the Croatian-Bosnian alliance."²⁷ General Charles Boyd said that the arms embargo for the region was almost nonexistent and that the U.S. insures a regular flow of arms to the Bosnian

Army.²⁸ The Pentagon sent in Special Forces to train the Bosnian military. Also, the U.S. actively participated in the war during 1992-95 as the guiding component of NATO, increasingly using air power against Bosnian and Croatian Serbs as well as against anti-Izetbegovic Muslim forces.

Complex War in Bosnia

The war in Bosnia was complex. There were several opposing Muslim groups and the U.S. chose to support the faction led by Aleja Izetbegovic. Mainly it was the Croats and Muslims, supported by the U.S., against the Serbs. But at times the fight was between Croats and Muslims.

The Bosnian War was even more complicated than that. The most popular Muslim leader was Fikret Abdic who opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia. Izetbegovic, supported by the U.S., forced Abdic out of the Bosnian Government. In the spring of 1995 he was sent into exile. He then led an army allied with the Bosnian Serbs and they opposed the Izetbegovic forces.²⁹ Ret. U.S. Air Force General Charles G. Boyd, deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command from 1992 to 1995 wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1995 that Abdic's government in Bihac was "one of the few examples of successful multi-ethnic cooperation in the Balkans" Abdic was a member of the Bosnian collective presidency, He outpolled Izetbegovic in national elections and had been expelled from the government when Sarajevo (Izetbegovic's headquarters) rejected an internationally

- brokered peace agreement."30

The elected Bosnian Muslim government in Tuzla in 1994 claimed that the U.S. supervised rewrite of the Bosnian constitution gave power only to the right wing forces of Izetbegovic's Party for Democratic Action and Franjo Tudjman's Democratic Union. A Bosnian Muslim group in the northwest Bihac area led by Abdic in 1994 declared its autonomy from the U.S.- backed government based in Sarajevo. **In retaliation, the Izetbegovic government launched a military attack against these Muslim forces that wanted peace with their Serbian and Croatian neighbors.** The U.S organized this attack on an elected Muslim Bosnian government. As reported in November 1994 in Britain in such newspapers as the Guardian, the Observer and the Independent, as well as in newspapers in France and Germany, six U.S. generals took part in planning the offensive in June of that year, an attack that violated the cease-fire.

The Izetbegovic government's U.S.- backed offensive in 1994 was at first successful in the Bihac region. But the Bosnian Serbs, in alliance with Serbs in Croatia and Bosnian Muslim forces led by Abdic, reorganized and began a counterattack. U.S. bombers under NATO command then came to Izetbegovic's defense.³¹

In April 1994 the Washington Post cited two senior UN officials, a general and a civilian, who blamed the U.S. "for the continuation of the war in Bosnia, because it has given the Muslim-led Bosnian government the false impression that Washington's military support was on the way."³²

Demonization of the Serbs

The U.S. opposed the Serbs in Bosnia who became known as fascists and supported the Croats and the Muslims. A considerable portion of world public opinion believed the accusations that the Serbs had committed human rights violations in Bosnia's civil war. Serbs were charged with operating concentration camps similar to those of the Germans in WWII, engaging in mass rapes of Muslim women, violating "safe areas" during the war, deliberately attacking civilians in Sarajevo and conducting mass murder in Srebrenica. Some have claimed that similar charges against Muslims and Croats have been ignored by the world community, but that subject will not be addressed to any great degree here. So, in general, only charges against the Serbs will be examined below.

Concentration camps

Remember how a public relations firm incited a furor in 1991 in the U.S. by fabricating a story about Iraqi soldiers killing babies in 1991? According to the story they killed newborns by pulling the plugs on incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals. Something similar happened in Bosnia. In 1993 a representative of a public relations firm was interviewed on French TV. He bragged about his service to governments in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo and how he used a file of 200 key people to

- create public opinion. "Speed is vital. it is the first assertion that really counts. All denials are entirely ineffective." He said that after Newsday in June 1992 came out with an article on Serb camps. ".We outwitted three big Jewish organizations. In August, we suggested that they publish an advertisement in the New York Times and organize demonstrations outside the UN."

"When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of the [Muslim] Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content such as "ethnic cleansing", "concentration camps" etc., which evoke images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz."33

Rape

The Serbs also were accused of systematic rape as a part of an organized Serb governmental policy. **In 1992 and 1993 three news reports claimed that members of the Bosnian Serb army raped 20,000 to 100,000 Muslim women.** Ms. magazine ran a story that accused Bosnian Serb forces of raping in order to produce pornographic films. But according to findings by Helsinki Watch and Human Rights Watch no such films were ever found.34

In January 1993 a report authorized by the European Community estimated that 20,000 Muslim women had been raped as part of a Serb strategy of conquest, but a dissenting member of the investigative team said that

- the estimate of 20,000 victims was based on actual interviews with only four victims - two women and two men. The report had been based on information from the Croatian Ministry of Health. 35

Among other reports, Newsweek reported on up to 50,000 women having been raped in Bosnia. A contributor to the article said that figure was an extrapolation on interviews with 28 women - multiplying each rape by a factor that takes into account historical underreporting of rape.³⁶

Rape in war is not uncommon and charges of it are a part of war propaganda, and the potential for it exists in most armies. Determining the accuracy of reports is not always easy.

Safe Areas

Serbs were condemned for violations of "safe areas" which were six Bosnian government towns surrounded by Serb held territory. They were, in reality, staging areas for U.S. backed Bosnian army offensives against the Bosnian Serb forces.

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali confirmed this in a report to the UN Security Council on May 30, 1995 in which he said that **"The Bosnian Serb Forces reaction to offensives launched by the [U.S. backed Bosnian] government arms from safe areas have generally been to respond against military targets within those areas."**³⁷

Sarajevo

In 1992 in Sarajevo, Bosnia an explosion occurred killing 14 people who were in a food line. Several weeks later an investigation showed the impossibility of a mortar shell causing such an explosion.³⁸

On Feb 5, 1994 an open-air market in Sarajevo was attacked and 68 people died. It was called a Serb atrocity. A UN analysis of the crater showed, however that the Izetbegovic forces were responsible for the explosion. Later, the UN released a crater analysis of another shell that exploded and found the same result.

The following year there was another market place explosion in Sarajevo that killed 37 people. This was the pretext for 4,000 U.S.- NATO air sorties to be carried out. David Binder in the New York Times quotes four different military sources disputing the immediate UN report that blamed the Bosnian Serbs for the explosion. A Russian artillery officer went on tv in Sarajevo and said that the probability of hitting a street less than thirty feet wide from Serb artillery positions one to two miles away was one in one million.

A Canadian specialist told Binder that the fuse of the mortar shell recovered from the marketplace crater "*had not come from a mortar tube at all.*" Two anonymous U.S. officials said that based on the trajectory, the shallowness of the crater, and the absence of any high-pitched whistle, the shell was either fired from very close range or dropped from a nearby roof into the crowd.³⁹

- In the winter of 1993-94, Croat forces shelled the Bosnian city of Mostar far more heavily than the capital Sarajevo was shelled by the Serbs, but the latter received much more publicity.⁴⁰

Srebrenica

A slaughter of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serbs was alleged to have occurred between July 14 and July 17, 1995 in or near the town of Srebrenica. On November 5, 2003 the Bosnian Serb government, while not stating the number who died, admitted responsibility for this massacre.

Skepticism about that admission is well warranted, however since that government is subject to great pressure from the U.S. installed colonial administration over Bosnia. Milosevic in his current war crimes trial is being accused of being responsible for this slaughter, sometimes referred to as genocide.^{41,42}

However, Milosevic was the leader of the Yugoslavian government and not the Bosnian Serbs.

Krajina

Serbs were also the victims of a mass killing. In early August

1995 in Croatia, the Croats caused between 200,000 and 700,000 new refugees, virtually the entire population of Krajina, by expelling Serbs from Croatia. The toll of civilian dead and missing among Serbs in Krajina was over 2,500.⁴³

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, said that the crushing military offensive was "to our advantage." The preparation of the Croatian forces for the onslaught was a classic CIA operation according to the London Independent.^{43a} The London Times said the region was teeming with former U.S. generals.^{43b}

The Clinton administration's support for the invasion was an important factor in creating this nightmare. The previous month, Warren Christopher and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel met with Croatian diplomat Miomir Zuzul in London. During this meeting, Christopher gave his approval for Croatian military action against Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina. Two days later, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, also approved Croatia's invasion plan.

Stipe Mesic, a prominent Croatian politician, stated that Croatian

President Franjo Tudjman "***received the go-ahead from the U.S.***"

Croatian assembly deputy Mate Mestrovic also claimed that the "***United States gave us the green light to do whatever had to be done.***"⁴⁴

CIA intervention

Five British papers in 1994 were quoted as showing U.S. involvement in Bosnia including that of the CIA. Media in France, Germany and Italy also carried exposes of large scale CIA involvement in the widening war in Bosnia. Coverage included information on tactical operation, sharing satellite information and controlling local air traffic.

Units of both the Croatian and Bosnian armies were reportedly trained in the U.S. and within that region.

U.S. forces based in Bosnia provided assistance in building airstrips and organizing large weapons shipments through Croatia to the Bosnian forces.⁴⁵

Earlier Peace Plans Proposed

Prior to the Dayton Peace Accords the U.S. refused to accept two peace plans which were reportedly very similar to the one adopted at Dayton. Many lives would have been saved if one of these plans had been adopted.

On March 18-19, 1992 in an attempt to prevent civil war in Bosnia, the Cutileiro Plan was signed by Izetbegovic, but almost immediately he reversed himself and rejected it after the U.S. sabotaged the plan by saying that it was prepared to recognize Bosnia as an independent country.

On March 22nd the civil war widened to Bosnia.

On April 6, 1992 the U.S. and the European Community recognized the

Izetbegovic government as the legitimate government of Bosnia. A civil war lasting three years followed.⁴⁶

The second plan was the Vance-Owen plan signed in May 1993. Owen has publicly stated that Washington undermined the agreement after it was negotiated.⁴⁷ In this context it is helpful to recall the words of the U.S. Pentagon's Defense Planning Guide mentioned earlier:

"We must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO."

Dayton Peace Accords

Prior to the signing of the accords, in August and September 1995 NATO launched a massive air war against the positions of the Bosnian Serbs who, for the first time in the war, suffered major defeats and territorial losses.⁴⁸ The accords were signed in late November 1995. The major outcome was that Bosnia was divided into two parts, one Muslim-Croatian and the other Serbian.

Almost immediately after the signing Presidential Determination 96-7 was signed by President Clinton, suspending the sanctions enacted earlier by the U.S. Treasury. **However Yugoslav assets "previously blocked remain blocked."** The

national "emergency" declared in Executive Order 12808, it said, shall remain in effect." Even though the U.S. got the agreement it wanted it still kept one foot on its prostrate victim's neck.

The Bosnian government estimated that reconstruction costs would reach \$47 billion and it is inconceivable that it can raise that sum in the foreseeable future.⁴⁹

Democracy

Besides the claim that the Dayton Peace Accords stopped the killing, it is also maintained that it lays out a path to democracy in Bosnia. This is not the reality of the situation.

Actually, Bosnia is subservient under a colonial arrangement, since a High Representative has full executive powers in all civilian affairs. The IMF is empowered to appoint and run the Bosnian Central Bank in this artificially fabricated state. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development directs the restructuring of the public sector and it sells off assets of the state and society. Newsweek accurately described the Dayton Accords as "less a peace agreement than a declaration of surrender" and that U.S. - led NATO forces "will have nearly colonial powers."⁵⁰

In 1998 NATO intervened in municipal elections and threatened to destroy any radio or television station or newspaper that criticizes NATO's presence in Bosnia. NATO commanders have overruled decisions by Serbia's High Court and have overturned the very parliament whose election they presided over. General Wesley Clark

- announced that NATO troops would use lethal force against Serbians who throw stones at the occupying troops.⁵¹

Carlos Westendorp, former High Representative, exercised his powers in 1999 by removing from office Nicolas Poplasen, the newly elected president from the Republika Srpska. Poplasen's support for the absorption by Serbia of this Serbian part of Bosnia placed him in Westendorp's crosshairs. "Westendorp once told a Bosnian periodical that if Bosnia's elected officials cannot "agree about some decisions, for example the passports, the license plates, the flags. I will stop this process of indefinite discussions."⁵²

David Chandler, author of "Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton," on October 20, 2004 wrote that "the international powers of the administration, under the Office of the High Representative, have been vastly increased. As far the engagement of the people of Bosnia or the elected representatives is concerned, little has changed in the ten years since the Dayton agreement was signed. The Bosnian public has been excluded from the transition process."⁵³

Conclusions

Our government has engaged in so many wars in the last 10 years it is hard for Americans to devote enough time to understanding what caused all of them. Hopefully, this account, while it does not cover all the factors pertaining to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, will partially fill that gap.

The pattern used to destabilize Yugoslavia has been used before and will be used again unless we learn about the various ways we are sucked into supporting wars.

The war in Bosnia is yet another example of the futility of war as a way of solving problems. Additionally, it illustrates how conflict and war escalate and that there is a need for peaceful ways to solve disagreements. This war also shows how the sources of conflict are often simmering and escalating out of public view long before they erupt onto public consciousness. This is particularly true in view of the expanding imperialist reach of our corporate-controlled government.

While no American blood was spilled during the Bosnian War, the degradation and trauma heaped upon the people of Bosnia and Yugoslavia should be remembered, especially the next time someone asks, after a new terrorist attack against us,

"Why do they hate us?"

James A. Lucas is a retired social worker in Dayton, Ohio who is active in anti-war and anti-imperialist endeavors. Currently he is a member of the September 11th Coalition, Dayton Peace Action, Dayton Pledge of Resistance, Veterans for Peace and is focusing at this time primarily on ending the occupation of Iraq.

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What are the origins of the US role in the Balkans? Why was Albania of strategic importance for NATO? Why did US policy support Albania and Albanian separatists in the former Yugoslavia? Why did the US support Greater Albania in Kosovo and Western Macedonia?

The CIA and Greater Albania: The Origins of the US Role in the Balkans

By Carl K. Savich

Introduction: The Missing Link

Why did the US support the separatist and terrorist so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK in Shqip), which sought to create an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo based on ethnicity? Why did the US sponsor a criminal and illegal separatist movement that sought to ethnically cleanse non-Albanians and create an independent state of Kosova? Why was the US supporting and sponsoring the re-establishment of a fascist-Nazi Greater Albania that Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini had initially created?

When did the US begin to play a role in Kosovo? Did the US role in Kosovo begin with the arming and training of the KLA terrorist group which began a separatist war for the creation of a Greater Albania in 1998? Did the US role in Kosovo begin in 1989 when the Yugoslavian government curtailed Albanian control and domination of the province because Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians were being murdered and driven out of the province? Did US involvement in Kosovo begin with the death of Yugoslav Communist leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980? Did it begin in 1981 following Albanian riots in Kosovo that sought to create an ethnically pure Albanian Kosova "Republic"? Did US support for the terrorist KLA emerge sui generis in 1998 as a response to the alleged genocide and ethnic cleansing perpetrated against Albanians by the Slobodan Milosevic regime? What is the missing link or connection between the Greater Albania created by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini and US support for the KLA/UCK?

The recruitment of the former Nazi-fascist members of the Balli Kombetar by the CIA and MI6 in 1948 in order to engineer a regime change in Albania provides the origins and roots for US involvement in Kosovo and the creation of a Greater Albania or Ethnic Albania. The Balli Kombetar had been an ultra-nationalist, right-wing Greater Albania movement that had been created specifically to retain Kosovo as part of a Greater Albania. The issue of Kosovo and a Greater Albania was central to the Balli Kombetar movement. Operation Valuable/Fiend established the US government and CIA connections to the former Nazi/fascist leaders of Greater Albania, the Balli Kombetar, who are the forebears and precursors of the KLA Movement. Operation Valuable/Fiend by the CIA and MI6 provides the missing link between the Greater Albania of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini and the Greater Albania created by the US, NATO and EU in the 1990s.

Regime Change in Albania

The first major paramilitary operation by the CIA in the Cold War took place in Albania. The secret CIA operation was conducted in conjunction with British MI6 and was known by the codename

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Midhat Frasheri, the founder and leader of the Nazi/fascist Balli Kombetar.

Operation Valuable, or as BG/FIEND by the CIA. The operation was conceived by British intelligence to depose the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha. It was one of the first attempts at "regime change" during the Cold War in the "denied areas" or "captive nations".

There were several reasons why the UK sought to achieve a regime change in Tirana. It was meant as a "rollback" action, to deprive the Soviet Union of a client state. Strategically, Britain sought to deny the USSR naval bases on the Adriatic coast, which threatened British and US control of the Mediterranean. Britain was a naval power and securing sea lanes was of paramount concern. The operation was to consist of inserting UK and US trained commandos into Albania to organize guerrilla groups who would mount a coup that

would overthrow Enver Hoxha. For the CIA, it would be "a clinical experiment to see whether large roll-back operations would be feasible elsewhere."

Direct British and American involvement in Albania and the Balkans began with their support of anti-German and anti-Italian resistance and guerrilla groups during World War II. The goal was to undermine the German and Italian occupations. This necessitated supporting Communist resistance groups. In Albania, the US and UK supported the Communist movement headed by Enver Hoxha. Why did the US and UK support Communist groups which were determined to set-up Communist regimes? The policy was: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Winston Churchill stated that the only criteria of support was whether the guerrillas were killing German soldiers.

During the war, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) had armed and advised Enver Hoxha and his guerrilla forces. Now they were determined to overthrow the very regime they had put into power. The first British SOE liaison officers sent into Albania were Lt. Col. David Smiley and Neil "Billy" McLean. Along with Julian Amery, Alan Hare, Peter Kemp, John Hibberdine, and Tony Neel, they were known as "the musketeers", who backed the Balli Kombetar. They all were right-wing, upper echelon apparatchiks of the British Empire who disdained any progressive or democratic movement. In their own words, they detested anyone or anything that smacked of "progressive ideas." It was natural that they were the principal backers of the ultra-nationalist, right-wing Balli Kombetar movement.

Ironically and quixotically, they were forced to arm and support the Communist LNC Movement and Enver Hoxha. This was an absurd result. But the game was all about power. British and American intelligence operations in the Balkans make sense on the rationale that they were based on realpolitik, or power politics. The US and UK objective was to obtain pliant puppets and satellites and stooges in the Balkans. During the war, it was only the Communist forces that were perceived as fighting the German and Italian occupation forces. Part of this misperception was due to Communist sympathizers and double-agents such as H.A.R. "Kim" Philby who consciously and purposefully sought to create this image of the Communist resistance as the only genuine resistance against the Germans. So absurdly the US and UK were forced to support the very Communists that they later would attempt to overthrow through regime change. It was a short-term marriage of convenience necessitated by the fact that the major enemy that the US and UK faced at the time was Germany. It was a matter of priority.



Mustafa Merlika-Kruja,

The US even sent aid and weapons to a Communist country. Following the 1948 split between Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav government requested through CIA channels that the US provide arms to Yugoslavia, fearing an invasion by the USSR. Frank Lindsay, the Office of Policy Co-ordination (OPC) deputy to Frank Wisner, recalled: "Tito was the man for the West to back... We sent him five shiploads of weapons."

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the Prime Minister of the fascist Italian-sponsored Greater Albania, 1941-43.

The US and UK were also determined to keep the Communist guerrillas in Greece from taking power. Operation Valuable/Fiend was also a diversionary operation meant to deny bases for Greek Communist insurgents and to divert Soviet or Communist resources away from Greece.

In Italy, the first successful CIA operation was to sabotage the national elections in 1948 where the Communists were favored to win. The US and UK supported 'democracy' only when it meant that anti- or non-Communists would win.

A primary concern for both the British and US governments was the presence of Soviet advisers and potential Soviet naval and submarine bases on the Albanian coast. For Britain, always a colonial and imperialist sea power, securing sea lanes to British colonies, such as India, was paramount. Soviet submarines and destroyers in the Albanian port of Valona threatened British control of the Mediterranean, an important sea route to India, the largest British colony, and to the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle East. Albania under Hoxha established close ties with the Soviet Union and neighboring Yugoslavia following the war. There were even plans to form a Balkan federation which would have included Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Soviet advisers were reported to have arrived in Albania at this time.

Outright military clashes between Albanian and British forces began on October 22, 1946 when two British navy destroyers, Saumarez and Volafge, were damaged by mines in the three-mile-wide Corfu channel. The British destroyers sustained heavy damage while 43 men on board the vessels were killed. Britain retaliated by retaining ten million pounds of gold which the Albanian government had deposited in the Bank of England during the war. In April, 1946, the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled against Albania, but the Albanian government refused to accept the judgment. There was unrelenting hostility between Albania and the UK that preceded the launch of Operation Valuable.



Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the first director of the CIA, 1947-50.

Operation Valuable/Fiend

British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin approved the MI6 operation to overthrow the Hoxha regime in February, 1949. The chief of MI6, Stewart Menzies, was not enthusiastic about the paramilitary operation but saw it as a way to appease the former SOE "stinks and bangs people." The Albanian regime change was a rollback operation meant to "detach" Albania, a "captive nation", from the Soviet bloc. Strategically, the UK and US objective was to establish a strategic presence on the Balkan peninsula. The British wanted the US to finance the operation and to provide bases. Senior British intelligence officer William Hayter, who chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), came to Washington in March with a group of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) members and Foreign Office staff that included Gladwyn Jebb, Earl Jellicoe, and Peter Dwyer of MI6 and a Balkans specialist. They met with Robert Joyce of the US State Department's

Policy and Planning Staff (PPS) and Frank Wisner, who was the head of the Office of Policy Co-ordination (OPC), which was administered by the CIA. Wisner had been an attorney who had represented the financial interests of wealthy Albanian refugees who had been members of the Nazi-fascist collaborative group, the Balli Kombetar. So there had also been a monetary connection between US intelligence and the former Nazi/fascist Albanian Balli Kombetar members.

The strategic goal was to establish a foothold on the Balkan peninsula. Before this could occur, the Soviet-backed Hoxha regime had to be overthrown.

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According to Wisner, the Albanian operation was to be "a clinical experiment to see whether larger rollback operations would be feasible elsewhere." Amery revealed that the British planned to recruit Balli Kombetar insurgents in the regime change against the Hoxha government. He outlined his plans for the proposed operation to the military commander of the Balli Kombetar, Abas Ermenji.

On May 20, 1949, Harold Perkins, the director of the Special Operations Branch, Neil McLean and Ermenji flew to Rome to meet with Midhat Frasheri, the wartime leader and founder of the Nazi/fascist Balli Kombetar, to discuss the operation. Frasheri was supportive of the operation. Amery believed that "clandestine operations directed at Hoxha would lead to a major uprising" the success of which would "depend on the million odd Albanians living in the Yugoslav Kosovo region." So Kosovo was always crucial to the planners and organizers of Operation Valuable/Fiend.

Recruiting Albanian Nazis and Fascists

The recruitment for Operation Valuable/Fiend consisted of 40 per cent from the Balli Kombetar, 40 percent from the monarchist Legalite or Legaliteti, and the rest from other Albanian factions. Midhat Frasheri (1880-1949) was a founder and leader of the Balli Kombetar (National Front). He was a known Nazi and fascist collaborator committed to creating a Greater Albania that would include Kosovo-Metohija. He initially fled to Turkey after the war to escape war crimes charges and prosecution as a Nazi-fascist collaborator, then moved to Italy. He later settled as a refugee in London. He was brought to New York City by the US to lead the émigré Albanians. He died suddenly, however, on October 3, 1949 of a heart attack at the Lexington Hotel in New York.

Frasheri had initially approached the US Ambassador in Rome in 1947 proposing to bring 50 Albanian former pro-Nazi, pro-fascist refugee leaders to the US to allegedly combat Albanian Communist infiltrators in the United States. That same year, the Hoxha regime had made a request to the Italian government that Albanian collaborators and war criminals be extradited to Albania. Many of the Albanian BK leaders were interned in Italian camps at the time. Fearing extradition, Frasheri sought US help.

The plan was initially rejected by the US State Department because many on Frasheri's list of 50 were on a 1948 publication by the Albanian government which identified them as major Nazi-fascist collaborators and war criminals. The State Department held that it did "not believe it would be appropriate" to allow the BK entry into the US because it would "sooner or later occasion embarrassment to this Government." These BK members "had collaborated with the Germans and Italians in the war."

The way the US government got around these restrictions was by creating "private organizations" and "fronts" which would provide "plausible deniability" because official sanction and connections could be concealed. The privatization ploy was effective in organizing former Nazi and fascist war criminals by the US and UK governments during the Cold War. It was part of a larger US government scheme known as Bloodstone which recruited "collaborators" and "war criminals" for covert operations, "émigré liberation projects". Carmel Offie was one of the major organizers. Hasan Dosti was brought to the US in April, 1949, although he lacked a passport. Dosti was to set up an Albanian National Committee in Exile. On May 12, Robert Joyce obtained a passport for Midhat Frasheri to enter the US based on the rationale that it was in the "national interest". So Frasheri was granted a US visa, due to the efforts of Robert Joyce, the US State Department liaison with the CIA.

Frasheri brought with him Mustafa Merlika-Kruja, the former fascist premier of Greater Albania from 1941 to 1943 who advocated the genocide of the Kosovo Serbs, Hasan Dosti, a Justice Minister in the fascist regime, and Kosovar Muslim Xhafer Deva, who had been instrumental in the creation of the Nazi Skanderbeg SS Division that systematically murdered Kosovo Serbs and which had rounded up Kosovo Jews who

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Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of MI6.

were subsequently murdered in the gas ovens at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. The Kosovar Deva was directly responsible for the deportation of the Jews and their subsequent deaths. These former Albanian Nazis and fascists established the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Albania. Among other things, this group recruited Albanian refugees who were sent on failed infiltration missions in Albania. The British double agent Kim Philby oversaw Operation Valuable/Fiend and kept the Soviets and the Hoxha regime apprised of the clandestine operations. Many of these Albanian recruits were captured and tried as spies and imprisoned or executed by the Communist Enver Hoxha regime.

One person's war criminal is another person's freedom fighter. This is clearly exemplified by the US and UK position on alleged Albanian war criminals and collaborators such as those of the Balli Kombetar. Enver Hoxha recalled making

official requests that Albanian war criminals and collaborators be turned over for trial, but the US and UK refused his requests:

We made official requests to the British and American governments for the extradition of war criminals, not only Albanians, but also Italians and Germans, who had stained their hands with blood in Albania and were now under their jurisdiction. Contrary to the declarations and the joint commitments of the allies during the war and the decisions which were taken later on this question, they turned a deaf ear and did not hand them over to us. On the contrary, they kept the chiefs in luxury hotels, while they trained their 'fighting men' in Rome, Munich, London, Athens and elsewhere.

Xhafer Deva, who was from Kosovo, had been the Kosovar Albanian Muslim Minister of the Interior under the Italian fascist-sponsored Greater Albania. Deva lived in the United States after the war. He died in 1978 in Palo Alto, California. Hasan Dosti had been the Minister of Justice in the Italian-sponsored Greater Albania regime. He lived in Los Angeles, California in 1988. Mustafa Merlika-Kruja had been the Albanian premier of Greater Albania from 1941 to 1943. He died in 1958 in New York. Rexhep Mitrovica was an Albanian official in the Nazi German-sponsored Greater Albanian government in July 10, 1944, when Germany had re-occupied Kosovo and Albania..

The number of Jews killed in Greater Albania during the Holocaust is estimated at 591. Albanians played a major role in the Holocaust. Many of the leaders the CIA and MI6 recruited for Operation Valuable/Fiend were directly involved in the murder of the Jews of Greater Albania.

The Balli Kombetar (BK) or National Front was founded and led by the former Albanian diplomat Midhat Frasheri and Abas Ermneji. The BK was set up essentially to retain Kosovo as part of Albania after the war. This was the defining platform of the BK Movement, the annexation of Kosovo. The BK was a right-wing, ultra-nationalist Greater Albania movement, which was anti-monarchist and thus regarded as "republican". This became a propaganda selling point for the former BK members after the war by their American and British spook handlers/minders. The BK was made up primarily of Tosks with their main area of support in the Valona region of southern Albania. Unlike the Communist National Liberation Movement headed by Enver Hoxha and the Zogist monarchist Legalite Movement headed by Abas Kupa established in November, 1943, the Balli Kombetar was unique in that its platform consisted of retaining Kosovo as part of the Axis-created Greater Albania.



Kosovar Albanian Nazis with a swastika flag in Pec, 1944.

The war-time collaboration of the Balli Kombetar with the German and Italian forces was well-documented. In a December 17, 1943 SOE report, Brig. E.M. "Trotsky" Davies acknowledged that the Balli Kombetar and the Zogist groups "are co-operating with Germans, who are exploiting them with arms in large quantities, setting them to guard main roads, police towns, and lead patrols thus freeing the German troops." He further noted that the Balli Kombetar had consistently refused to fight the German occupation forces: "I consider the Allies' attitude should be made public forthwith, showing quislings, traitors and non-resisters to Germans will receive appropriate punitive treatment from the Allies in due course." The musketeers themselves conceded that the BK nationalist "collaborate with the Germans." Three weeks after making his report, Davies was ambushed by a pro-Nazi BK group in Albania. Moreover, the German emissary in Tirana had acknowledged that there had been "direct collaboration with the BK."

In the July 1944 R and A report L38836 by the OSS on Albania entitled "Political and Internal Conditions", it was stated that "Xhafer Deva, Rexhep Mitrovic and Midhat Frasheri are with the Germans....Anti-semitic measures are being adopted now. A captured SS document "revealed that Deva had been responsible for the deportation of 'Jews, Communists and partisans' to extermination camps as well as for punitive raids by the SS Skanderbeg Division. The small mountain territory had few Jews, so relatively few were captured and killed." Christopher Simpson, in *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War*, noted that relatively few Jews were captured and killed but "not for lack of trying by the Balli Kombetar organization and the Albanian SS" which had orchestrated "a series of anti-semitic purges that rounded up about 800 people, the majority of whom were deported and murdered." At the Wannsee Conference, the Germans listed only 200 Jews in Albania. Moreover, the Italian occupation was chiefly responsible for the so-called rescue of Albanian Jews by their intervention. Deva was also accused of responsibility for "the Tirana massacre" which occurred on February 4, 1944, carried out by the German Gestapo "in collaboration with the Albanian gendarmerie." By the summer of 1944, units of the Balli Kombetar were "integrated into the German command."

When the Germans occupied Kosovo and Albania following the Italian

surrender in 1943, they lacked the manpower to control Greater Albania. What the Germans relied on was "political conciliation," that is, gaining Albanian support for the German occupation by promising them fulfillment of their Greater Albania illusions by ensuring them that Kosovo would be part of a Greater Albania. The Germans appealed "to the type of Albanian nationalist and republican represented in the Balli Kombetar." The German forces created a Regency Council to govern Greater Albania, which consisted of Lef Nosi, Anton Harapi, and the pre-war Prime Minister Mehdi Frasheri, the brother of Midhat Frasheri, the leader of the BK. The German occupation forces also created an Albanian army which was under the leadership of General Prenk Previsi and a gendarmerie under Xhafer Deva, the Minister of the Interior from Kosovo. The German occupation authorities also sponsored the creation of the Second League of Prizren and put Deva in charge of it as the president. The Germans expanded the Kosovo Albanian four armed battalions in the SS Division Skanderbeg in 1944, which fought against the Communist LNC, the Yugoslav partisans, and systematically murdered Kosovo Serbs and which rounded up Kosovo Jews who were subsequently murdered.

Pixie insertions

Midhat Frasheri was "the lynchpin" of the plan to send commandos into Albania. The Committee for Free Albania included several collaborators, and alleged war criminals. James McCarger, the first US commander of Operation Fiend, was dissatisfied that Hasan Dosti was part of this group. Dosti had been the Justice Minister of the fascist Italian-sponsored Greater Albania. McCarger stated: "I and several others screamed bloody murder on this. I said, you can't use somebody with that background, it's a blot on everybody's escutcheon." Dosti was accompanied by "a bevy of Hitler-era stooges" which included the Kosovar Muslim Xhafer Deva "who used the SS Skanderbeg Division in a massacre of Albanian partisans" and to round up Kosovo Jews who were murdered in the concentration camps. There were "voluminous files" in the possession of the US government that documented Deva's Nazi past. Nevertheless, these objections were dismissed by the US and these former Nazi-fascist Albanian leaders would play a major role in Cold War operations by the CIA. A US intelligence official maintained that Deva was a "pure patriot" and a "person of uncompromising personal honor." It was held that hiring and training such Nazi collaborators was in the US national interest. There were thus Nazis and there were Nazis. Some former Nazis were of much greater service to the US in the Cold War so their Nazi past was spin doctored away as if by magic.


The National Security Act of July 27, 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The President Harry Truman Administration created the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) as the successor to the war-time Office of Special Operations (OSS), which Truman had disbanded in 1945. The CIA was known as the Central Intelligence Group initially when it was headed first by Rear Admiral Sidney Souers and then by Hoyt Vandenberg. Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter headed the CIA from 1947 to 1950, he was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The CIA was set up specifically as a tool in the Cold War, an independent agency that reported to the President and was overseen by Congressional panels.

In September, 1949, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin came to Washington to discuss Operation Valuable/Fiend with US government officials. The CIA released a report that concluded that "a purely internal Albanian uprising at this time is not indicated, and, if undertaken, would have little chance of success." The CIA asserted that the Hoxha regime had a 65,000 man regular army and a security force of 15,000. There were intelligence reports that there were 1,500 Soviet "advisers" and 4,000 "technicians" in Albania helping to train the Albanian army. NATO was concerned that the USSR was building a submarine base at Valona. On September 6, 1949, when NATO met for the first time in Washington, Bevin proposed that "a counter-revolution" be launched in Albania. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was in agreement. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to use Valona as a potential forward naval base for NATO to establish US control of the Mediterranean. NATO, established as a defensive military alliance of the North Atlantic region, was now committed to launching offensive covert operations against a sovereign nation in the Balkans. NATO member countries agreed to support the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania and to eliminate Soviet influence in the Mediterranean region. Bevin wanted to place King Zog on the throne as

the leader of Albania once Hoxha was overthrown.

On October 3, 1949, the first group of 20 Albanian commandos, known as the "pixies" by SIS, were landed on the Albanian coastline south of Valona, which was the former territory of the Balli Kombetar. This was the start of Operation Valuable/Fiend. The pixies had been brought across the Corfu channel on a British vessel, Stormie Seas. British intelligence officials had trained the Albanians since July on Malta. Albanian government security forces interdicted the commandos, killing four and forcing the others to flee south to Greece.

The US became directly involved in the pixie insertions in 1950. The US recruitment of the OPC commandos was disguised by creating "labor battalions" under US Army command in Germany. Carmel Offie set up Company 400 with the help of Lawrence de Neufville, a CIA "special adviser". The Albanian recruits were assembled in July, 1950 by Major Caush Ali Bashom, a member of the Balli Kombetar. A Radio Free Albania was set up as well to broadcast CIA propaganda into Albania. In August, 1950, the US air dropped propaganda leaflets over Korca. On November 19, the US airdropped 9 Albanian commandos by parachute drops into Albania. They were either captured or escaped into Yugoslavia. The Sigurimi, the Soviet-trained Albanian secret police, was able to anticipate the landings and to interdict the commandos.



A Nazi march by Kosovar Albanians with swastika banners in Greater Albania.

By 1952, the CIA had taken over all the intelligence operations of the British in the Balkans. On July 23, 1951, the US air dropped 12 commandos in Albania. Six were killed immediately, four were surrounded and burned to death in a house, and two were captured. The operation was a complete disaster. Abas Ermenji did not want to witness any more of his Balli Kombetar followers to take "another tumble through the meat grinder" and so discouraged any more missions. Wisner, nevertheless, sought to continue the pixie incursions, having the support of CIA Deputy Director Allen Dulles. The CIA airdropped Hamit Matjani, the Tiger, in 1952, who was killed during this operation, his 16th mission. Dulles stated: "At least we're getting the experience we need for the next war."

Up to 200 agents would be killed during the operation with an estimated additional several thousand Albanian civilians killed in reprisal. Abas Ermenji stated: "Our 'allies' wanted to make use of Albania as a guinea-pig, without caring about the human losses, for an absurd enterprise that was condemned to failure." Halil Nerguti stated: "We were used as an experiment. We were a small part of a big game, pawns that could be sacrificed." There is no question that the CIA and MI6 used the operation as a small-scale exercise in regime change. The stakes were small. Failure would not be noticed. John H. Richardson, the CIA Director of the South-East Division, terminated Operation Fiend and by 1954 the Company 400 was disbanded and the training facilities

in Heidelberg, Germany shut down, as well as the CIA base on the Greek island. The remaining Albanians were resettled in the US, UK, and the Commonwealth countries.

The CIA financed a new Albanian Committee of the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) which was controlled by the Political Committee, made up of former members of the Balli Kombetar, who dominated this organization for much of the 1950s. The ACEN was headed by Nuci Kota, Zog's military commander, who had led the Free Albania Committee and had founded the Albanian National Committee. The former Nazi-fascist wartime collaborator Hasan Dosti was a key figure in ACEN. Gratian Yatsevich, the new commander of Operation Fiend, inserted Albanian members of the Catholic Independenza group, many of whom had collaborated with the fascist Italian regime, into the Free Albania Committee.

During Operation Valuable/Fiend, the US and UK disregarded Albanian's sovereignty, engaged in subversion, subterfuge, interference in the affairs of an independent nation, and sought to implement a regime change, which was an act of war and aggression. And this was what CIA propaganda said was "the free world".

Conclusion: Balli Kombetar and KLA

Operation Valuable/Fiend and the recruitment of former Albanian Nazis and fascists from Albania proper and Kosovo provides the missing link between the Greater Albania created by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini and the Balli Kombetar and the KLA/UCK Movement supported by Joseph DiGuardi, Thomas Lantos, Robert Dole, Joseph Biden, Richard Holbrooke, and Madeleine Albright. The recruitment of the Nazi-fascist Greater Albania Balli Kombetar by the CIA and MI6 and Operation Valuable/Fiend are the origins and the roots of US involvement in Albania/Kosovo. It was inevitable that US foreign policy would focus on Kosovo. The fascist foreign minister of Italy Count Galeazzo Ciano, who was the architect of the fascist greater Albania from 1939-1943, saw Kosovo as a knife aimed at the back of Yugoslavia. When Germany occupied Kosovo and Albania, their occupation policy focused on the creation of a Greater Albania with their support of the Second League of Prizren and their sanction of the genocide of Kosovo Serbs and Jews. Similarly, US foreign policy during the Cold War focused on using Kosovo as a knife to extort, blackmail, and pressure Yugoslavia, or as a way to destroy the Communist Yugoslavia. Like Nazi Germany, the US and the NATO countries used Kosovo as a way to destroy Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was the only obstacle to the NATO takeover of eastern Europe. Kosovo provided the means by which to establish NATO control and occupation of Europe. The KLA/UCK terrorist/separatist group provided the vehicle by which to achieve NATO control. The KLA was the successor to the Balli Kombetar. Operation Valuable/Fiend thus is the missing link between the fascist Greater Albania created in World War II and the US support of Greater Albania during and after the Cold War. Operation Valuable/Fiend provided the modus operandi or MO. This was how the US allowed the former Croatian Ustasha/Roman Catholic alleged war criminals to escape through Italy and the Vatican, through the "ratlines" established by Croatian Roman Catholic priest Father Krunoslav Draganovic. This was how the powerful ultra-nationalist and neo-Ustasha separatist lobby was created in the US with the backing of US Roman Catholic groups. The objective was always the same. The US and Britain sought to control the Balkans and eastern Europe through NATO. The game was always about power. Human rights, humanitarianism, genocide, and ethnic cleansing had nothing to do with it.

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Sagittarius

Van: "Jonathan Widell"
Aan: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: zondag 24 oktober 2004 20:17
Onderwerp: Serbianna
Dear Mr Steijnen,

Thanks for the two Dutch articles.

I got my article "The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Premature State Recognition" published on www.serbianna.com. The McGill Law Journal unfortunately turned it down, because they "have too many good articles", and since I didn't want to lose any time, I decided to make a comeback on the Internet. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for encouraging me to get something published. My "Strange and Bitter Fruit", which I sent to you in the spring, should yield enough material for a year.

Best regards,
Jonathan

Sagittarius

Van: "R. Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Misha Gavrilovic" <mishag1@cwcom.net>; "Ksenija Sigulinski" <lizamia@zonnet.nl>; "Nico & Neeltje Steijnen" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>; "Branka Obradovic" <b.obradovic@aon.at>
Verzonden: donderdag 5 augustus 2004 23:02
Onderwerp: Periodic report of the Special Rapporteur on.htm

CONTENTS (cont')**IV. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA**

- A. The right to free elections
- B. Freedom of expression and the media
- C. Security of the person
- D. Legal guarantees for human rights protection
- E. Kosovo - Police abuse, torture and arbitrary detention
- F. Kosovo - Return of asylum-seekers
- G. Kosovo - Education
- H. Conclusions and recommendations

V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Annex: Programme of meetings of the Special Rapporteur

IV. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

124. Human rights concerns in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of 1996 were dominated by events surrounding the holding of federal and municipal elections in Serbia. Long-standing concerns about freedom of expression and the virtual lack of independent media, the right to free elections, and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or to ill-treatment and torture intensified. A high level of violations especially of the right to personal security were reported from Kosovo. The Special Rapporteur would like to emphasize, however, her satisfaction at the cooperation which she and the staff of the Belgrade office of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights have received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [[back to the contents](#)]

A. The right to free elections

125. On 3 November 1996 elections were held to the Federal Parliament. The ruling parties in Serbia (the Socialist Party of Serbia and its coalition partners) and in Montenegro (the Democratic Party of Socialists) gained a broad majority in the Federal Chamber. Whereas these elections were not contested, the second round of municipal elections held in Serbia on 17 November 1996 sparked widespread and persistent protests by thousands of peaceful demonstrators in major cities, including the largest in Belgrade since 1991. Demonstrators voiced discontent with what they and many international observers saw as the Government's blatant manipulation of election results. Specifically, the Government annulled results in Belgrade and 14 other major cities won by the opposition coalition Zajedno (Together).* (* As the present report went to press in January 1997, the Special Rapporteur received information that election commissions in Belgrade and Nis had recognized Zajedno's victories in the 17 November elections. The Special Rapporteur will provide her observations concerning these and other more recent developments in a separate communications to the Commission on Human Rights.)

126. The Government first acknowledged the opposition's gains, but suddenly reversed its position. Electoral commissions dominated by the ruling party overturned election results on vague grounds, and municipal courts, as well as the Serbian and Federal Supreme Courts, swiftly upheld the annulments. In an unprecedented move, however, five Supreme Court judges disassociated themselves from colleagues who supported these decisions. The dissenters stated that their colleagues had "brought into question the honour

- and dignity of [the] profession and the reputation of the judiciary in total". According to one Supreme Court judge, the court "unfortunately did not have the strength or the courage to acknowledge what belongs to the electorate on the basis of election results".

127. With legal avenues for redress exhausted, opposition leaders called on demonstrators in the streets to remain peaceful. In the first days of the protests a few demonstrators broke windows of pro-Government media buildings by throwing stones, but the large-scale demonstrations which followed for many weeks remained virtually entirely peaceful. The Government, for its part, gave assurances in the first week of December 1996 that it would refrain from using force against the demonstrators, and the Special Rapporteur notes that the police, with rare exceptions, indeed did so.

128. On 13 December 1996, the Government invited the OSCE to establish the facts about the election results. An OSCE delegation led by Mr. Felipe González visited Belgrade in late December and concluded that the opposition coalition had indeed won the local elections in 14 major towns, including for the Belgrade City Council. The Government's immediate response was to accept a small part of the report's findings, but it failed to acknowledge the opposition's electoral victories in most of the contested major cities, and notably in the Belgrade City Council. By year's end the Government had announced only a partial opposition election victory in Serbia's second largest town, Nis. With many important election results remaining contested, large-scale demonstrations by the opposition and students continued throughout Serbia into the early days of 1997.

B. Freedom of expression and the media

129. The Government-controlled media virtually ignored the massive demonstrations. On 26 November 1996, for example, in their sixth day the demonstrations in Belgrade involved for the first time an estimated 100,000 people. However, State-owned television Radio Television Serbia (RTS), which is for many citizens the only source of news, continued to make no mention of events in the capital. The leading news story that day was President Milosevic's reception of a delegation of Greek youth. The few independent media reporting on the demonstrations came under strong pressure to cease coverage of the events, and in some cases were prevented from doing so altogether. Many people were thus deprived of their right to receive information and ideas from different points of view, as provided for by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

130. Radio B-92, well known for its long history of independent broadcasting, was first jammed and then, on 3 December 1996, taken off the air altogether. Radio Index suffered the same fate. Widespread national and international protests followed, and broadcasting was allowed to resume two days later. Officially, a claim was made that Radio B-92's disruption had been due to "abundant rainfall in the last two days". However, Radio Boom 93, a local radio station from Pozarevac, which was also suspended the same day, was not allowed to resume broadcasts.

131. Print media also came under strong pressure. According to information received by the Special Rapporteur the independent newspaper Blic, which reported extensively on the demonstrations, was apparently first pressured by a State-run printing firm to cut its press run by 75 per cent. Its editor and several journalists resigned in protest, although they returned a week later after a new printer had been found. Dozens of journalists from the pro-Government paper Politika published a letter saying that their reports of the opposition rallies had been censored and replaced by those of the official news agency Tanjug, which virtually ignored the rallies. Some of these journalists were put on paid leave, while others were re-assigned to the cultural pages.

132. Particularly fierce attacks on the opposition, meanwhile, were broadcast by the State-controlled electronic media. In its prime-time news on 1 December 1996, RTS carried a statement by Mr. Dragan Tomic, the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament and a member of the ruling SPS party. He called the demonstrators "pro-fascists" and compared the demonstrations to tactics which Hitler employed to gain power. Vecernje Novosti, the pro-Government newspaper with the largest circulation, called the actions of the demonstrators "terrorism", though they had been virtually entirely peaceful. Such statements could easily have provoked hatred and fostered hostility against peaceful demonstrators. In a letter to President Milosevic on 6 December 1996 the Special Rapporteur wrote that such statements should not be tolerated, and she

urged the Government to ensure that article 50 of the Federal Constitution, prohibiting incitement to hostility or violence, be strictly enforced. In a statement on 9 December 1996 the Special Rapporteur summarized her concerns as expressed to the President of Serbia and said she was disturbed by the temporary closure of the three radio stations. She stressed that people have a right to receive information and ideas from different points of view and urged the Government to enable all media to operate in genuine conditions of freedom and fairness.

133. During the demonstrations dozens of participants were arrested for their expressive activities in Belgrade. According to the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 32 demonstrators had been arrested by 2 December 1996, 10 of whom were charged with criminal offences while 22 others faced lesser charges. By mid-December the opposition was reporting that about 100 arrests had been made. Many arrested demonstrators were promptly sentenced to short terms of imprisonment of between seven days and one month. They included persons convicted of petty offences such as throwing eggs or yoghurt at Government and government media buildings, which actions had led to the demonstrations acquiring the name "the yellow revolution".

134. The Special Rapporteur in her letter of 6 December 1996 requested details of these arrests and the grounds on which 32 persons had been convicted. She expressed concern that the defendants included persons who had expressed their views in a peaceful manner. She observed that activities of a symbolic nature, provided they did not result in damage to property, could be a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression. The Special Rapporteur questioned whether the punishment of imprisonment was proportional to the offences allegedly committed. She had not received a response to her letter as of mid-January 1997.

C. Security of the person

135. Allegations of torture and ill-treatment were common throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during this period. In Belgrade, police brutality became an issue when Mr. Dejan Bulatovic was arrested and beaten by police immediately after carrying an image of President Milosevic in prison uniform during demonstrations on 5 December. He required medical treatment in hospital. Lawyers visiting him in prison six days after his arrest noted visible injuries on his head. He served a 25-day prison sentence, following conviction for a law and order offence which was apparently based entirely on a statement which he contends was extracted from him by force. Notwithstanding provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring courts not to convict a person solely on the basis of an admission, an appeals court held that his statement alone was sufficient ground for conviction. In a letter to the Serbian Minister of Justice on 13 December 1996, the Special Rapporteur requested a prompt and impartial investigation of the allegation of wrongful conviction, urging that Mr. Bulatovic be released from prison pending the inquiry. She stressed that international human rights standards prohibit statements extracted under torture from being admitted in evidence.

136. None of these proposed steps, however, was taken. On 8 January 1997 the Special Rapporteur received a detailed response from the Minister of Justice, advising her that specialist medical examinations of Mr. Bulatovic carried out during his imprisonment found that his vital organs were functioning normally, but that he had swellings on his head and nose, and a haematoma under his right eye. Unfortunately, the Government offered no explanation as to how these injuries had been inflicted, nor whether an inquiry into allegations that the police were responsible would be conducted. The Special Rapporteur was informed only that the judge found "no sign that Mr. Bulatovic had given his statement out of fear or under force, nor had there been any motive for self-accusation".

137. The most serious violence during the demonstrations occurred in late December. On 24 December 1996 government supporters staged their first counter-rally in the capital and clashed with opposition supporters and police. Mr. Ivan Lazovic, a member of an opposition party, was shot by a man walking in a column of government supporters, but survived. One man was arrested on charges of attempted murder. Mr. Predrag Starcevic, another opposition supporter, died in hospital after being attacked by unidentified perpetrators on returning home from the demonstrations. The post-mortem examination concluded that his death was caused by physical injuries, and that earlier claims that he might have died from heart trouble were untrue.

138. Special plain-clothes police units of the Ministry of Interior were blamed for beatings of scores of demonstrators, including journalists and the leader of an independent trade union on 27 December 1996. Other police reportedly failed to intervene in these incidents.
139. In an incident on 17 October 1996 preceding the election-related demonstrations, Mr. Brkic, a journalist for the opposition paper Srpska Rec, was taken away by plain-clothes agents identifying themselves as officers of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, shortly after he wrote reports alleging criminal activities by the police and commenting on alleged activities of a member of the President's family. He was severely beaten outside Belgrade by 14 men who it is believed belonged to the State Security Division, subjected to near suffocation and a mock execution, and was later admitted to hospital with multiple broken ribs. Staff from the Belgrade office of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights who interviewed him two weeks later noted visible injuries on his body and received a medical report which was consistent with the allegations of torture. Mr. Brkic said that he was able to identify seven of his alleged attackers.
140. The Special Rapporteur wrote to Serbia's Minister of the Interior on 4 November 1996 requesting a prompt investigation and asked whether those responsible would be brought to justice. No response has so far been received. She also asked whether press reports attributing to the then Minister of Information, Mr. Aleksandar Tijanic, a statement that he would have preferred to beat Mr. Brkic himself were correct. She observed that, if true, such an attitude showed gross disrespect for basic human rights.
141. Police responsible for such abuses have generally remained above the law. Yugoslav law obliges the public prosecutor to act when it is probable that a criminal offence has been committed. If no such action is taken, or if proceedings are dropped, the injured party can initiate a prosecution. However, it appears extremely difficult to put this provision into effect. A recent report published by the Humanitarian Law Centre, a local NGO, on law enforcement practices in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lists specific cases demonstrating that victims are often deprived of their right to prosecute police because prosecutors fail to act on evidence of police abuse put before them, or because they or the courts fail to give timely notice to the complainant that their complaint has been dismissed. Such notice is a prerequisite for initiating private prosecutions within the time-limits set by law.
142. In the province of Kosovo, staff of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights confirmed that prosecutions against police personnel are very rare, although information was received from the head of the Public Security Police of two convictions of police for abuses. One policeman was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for the death of an arrested man who was in custody in Prizren in 1993, while another was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in 1995 for an incident of abuse in Kosovo Mitrovica. No other similar convictions have since been reported.
143. The Special Rapporteur believes that the incidence of police abuse could be substantially reduced if lawyers were granted prompt access to all arrested persons and if laws requiring that arrested persons be informed of their right to consult a lawyer were properly enforced. Local lawyers have informed the Belgrade office of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights that several persons arrested during the recent demonstrations were not informed of their right to consult a lawyer and were denied counsel during their trials. Human rights officers interviewed one demonstrator, Mr. Dragan Petrovic, after his release from prison. He said that he asked for a lawyer during his trial but that the judge, who sentenced him to seven days' imprisonment for spraying slogans on a pro-Government media office building, replied that since he was only tried for a petty offence "there is no need for a lawyer".
144. Lawyers acting for several demonstrators reported that they were first denied, then eventually granted access to their clients to discuss appeals on grounds of alleged procedural irregularities. However, in several cases they were not allowed to consult with their clients in private, as international human rights standards require. For example, lawyers meeting Mr. Bulatovic in prison to discuss his appeal were obliged to do so in the presence of a government official. The Special Rapporteur requested President Milosevic, in her letter of 6 December 1996, to order an investigation into reports that lawyers were denied access to arrested demonstrators, and urged that prompt access by lawyers be invariably guaranteed.

D. Legal guarantees for human rights protection

145. In response to questions raised by the Special Rapporteur during meetings with government officials on 7 October 1996, she was informed that a new Criminal Code for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in preparation and will replace the two existing Criminal Codes of Serbia and Montenegro. The Special Rapporteur has been pleased to note that the draft new Criminal Code no longer provides for capital punishment, thus strengthening the protection of the right to life.

146. The Special Rapporteur also welcomes the fact that article 196 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, permitting police to detain a person in exceptional circumstances, will be deleted from the draft Code. She is concerned about current provisions of that article which permit persons to be detained for up to 72 hours without judicial supervision or access to a lawyer, in apparent contravention of article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

E. Kosovo - Police abuse, torture and arbitrary detention

147. The Special Rapporteur has continued to receive reports of widespread human rights violations attributed to Serbian police forces in Kosovo. These accounts follow a familiar pattern of arbitrary arrests, severe ill-treatment or torture and violent house searches, often targeted against political activists or persons working in so-called "parallel institutions" of Kosovo Albanians. While such cases have been reported throughout the region, in the last months of 1996 these abuses appear to have been particularly common in and around the towns of Podujevo, Stimlje and Vucitrn.

148. The Special Rapporteur was especially disturbed to learn that Mr. Feriz Blakcori, a 34-year-old teacher from Pristina, had died on 10 December 1996, allegedly as a consequence of torture in police custody. The day before, police had reportedly raided the house of the Blakcori family in Pristina in connection with an arms search. Mr. Blakcori was brought to a police station in Pristina, where he was allegedly tortured, and was later transferred to Pristina Hospital where he died. According to the hospital's letter of discharge, he had been admitted in a state of serious traumatic shock with contusions on his head and body and bruises on his buttocks and the left side of his back. The diagnosis appears to be consistent with the allegations of torture. In a letter of 16 December 1996, the Special Rapporteur urgently requested the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia to order an impartial investigation into this alarming incident, and to inform her of the results of the inquiry.

149. In November 1996, the Belgrade office of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights conducted a mission to Pristina and Prizren and interviewed 12 persons, 11 of whom alleged having been subjected to ill-treatment or torture by police authorities in Kosovo. It should be noted that several of these persons wished for their identities to remain confidential, fearing repercussions from the police. Most of the persons interviewed further stated that they had not taken legal action against those responsible for their torture and ill-treatment, either because they could not afford to engage a lawyer, or because they were distrustful of the authorities and thus regarded any such attempt to achieve justice as futile. The following two testimonies, if verified, indicate clear violations of the right to freedom from torture or ill-treatment and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. They relate to police raids carried out in connection with the investigation of the murder on 25 October 1996 of Mr. Milos Nikolic, a police officer in Surkish village near Podujevo.

150. On 31 October 1996, the police reportedly raided the home of Mr. Osman Lugaliu, 73 years old, in the village of Surkish. The police entered the house without presenting a warrant or saying why they had come, and allegedly started beating and kicking Mr. Lugaliu in front of his family. The police took him to the police station in Podujevo, where he was subjected to more beatings on the soles of his feet, his legs and his hands. After several hours of beatings and interrogations he was released without any charges made against him. Mr. Lugaliu had to seek medical care for the injuries he suffered in the police station. The Special Rapporteur has received a medical statement on Mr. Lugaliu's injuries, which is consistent with the allegations of ill-treatment.

151. In the second incident, on 25 October 1996 at around midnight, police broke into the house of Mr. Ibrahim Fazliu, a 50-year-old bus driver, in Surkish village without presenting any warrant or court

order. Mr. Fazliu, his 16-year-old son and three of his brothers were taken to the police station in Podujevo in a truck carrying some 30 other persons who had been rounded up in the village. Outside the police station in Podujevo, Mr. Fazliu was severely beaten and kicked by two police officers who apparently continued the ill-treatment even after he had lost consciousness. However, he told HC/CHR staff that a senior police officer intervened to halt the beating. When he regained consciousness he was taken into the police station and questioned about the murder of the police officer, Mr. Nikolic. After a short interrogation, Mr. Fazliu was allowed to leave. He was treated for his injuries at a private clinic and at the public hospital in Pristina. A statement issued by the Pristina hospital on Mr. Fazliu's injuries supports the allegations of ill-treatment.

152. On 16 December 1996, the Special Rapporteur submitted detailed information on the above incidents and two other similar cases to the Minister of the Interior of Serbia, requesting the Ministry urgently to investigate the allegations and inform her about any results. The Special Rapporteur noted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and as such is obliged under article 12 to undertake prompt and impartial investigations of alleged acts of torture.

153. On 16 October 1996 two men, Mr. Avni Nura and Mr. Besim Ramaj, were reportedly arrested by the police on the road between Lubovec and Galice. However, officials refused to acknowledge their detention for 16 days. On 2 November they were brought before an investigative judge on charges of "terrorist activities", but without the presence of a lawyer. The two men were allegedly beaten during the 16 days they spent in incommunicado detention and as a result reportedly sustained injuries requiring medical attention. However, it appears that they were denied access to medical care, despite repeated requests by the men themselves and by their lawyer. The lawyer further complained that the investigative judge prevented him from discussing any case-related matters with his clients.

F. Kosovo - Return of asylum-seekers

154. Staff of the HC/CHR interviewed two Kosovo Albanian men who were returned to Kosovo in September 1996, after their applications for political asylum were rejected by Germany. Both of the men alleged that they had been physically ill-treated and harassed by the Serbian police upon their return to Kosovo. One of the asylum-seekers, Mr. Xhafer Bardiqi, stated that following his return to Kosovo on 14 September 1996, he was summoned to police headquarters in Glogovac, where he was beaten on his hands, face and chest by police officials using truncheons. After two hours of severe ill-treatment, he passed out. When he regained consciousness, he was interrogated about his stay in Germany. After several hours of questioning and beatings, he was released and told that he would be called to further interrogations. Mr. Bardiqi had to seek medical care for the injuries he sustained as a result of the ill-treatment.

155. A number of European Governments have in recent months expressed their intention to return asylum-seekers and other persons without legal residence to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The vast majority of the persons who would be affected by these planned return programmes originate from Kosovo, and many of them left the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in order to avoid being drafted into the Yugoslav Army, or because of their political views on the Kosovo situation. On the basis of information presently available, it is difficult to determine whether the testimonies referred to above reflect isolated incidents or are representative of the general behaviour and policy of the authorities toward returnees. However, in view of the seriousness of these allegations and the overall situation in Kosovo, it is evident that any planned return programme for rejected asylum-seekers to that region should include appropriate safeguards to ensure their security and fair treatment upon return.

G. Kosovo - Education

156. In her report of 25 October 1996 on the situation of minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur took note of the agreement on the normalization of education in Kosovo signed by President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova on 1 September 1996, and expressed her concern about the apparent lack of progress in implementation of the accord. The agreement has been widely seen as a possible opening for a more comprehensive solution of the Kosovo situation. Both sides have now appointed their representatives to the commission whose task it is to implement the agreement, but the body has held no

meetings so far. It is worth noting that the document does not define terms, conditions or dates for its implementation, which has led to disputes regarding the way to bring the process forward.

157. A major obstacle to progress appears to be a disagreement regarding the presence of a third party in the next phase of the talks: while the Albanian side insists on the participation of a third party as a mediator in the process, the Serbian Government appears to regard implementation of the agreement as an internal matter not warranting any foreign involvement. Another contentious issue is the question of the curricula to be followed in the schools. The Serbian side insists on the reintegration of the Albanian students into the national scheme and educational programmes, as defined by the Serbian Ministry of Education. The Albanian delegation, however, maintains that the curricula developed and approved by the Kosovo Albanian "parallel" educational authorities should remain in force, and that access to the school buildings is the only issue up for discussion. Terms and conditions for the admission of Albanian students, particularly to the University in Pristina, appear to be another open issue.

H. Conclusions and recommendations

158. The Special Rapporteur considers it of paramount importance that human rights be upheld in the present critical situation where many thousands of people persistently seek to exercise their right to peaceful assembly and to freedom of expression, as occurred following the November 1996 municipal elections. She is seriously concerned that standards for free and fair elections provided for by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were not met in those elections, in which evidence suggested that existing mechanisms to check preliminary election results were abused in favour of the ruling party.

159. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should take appropriate and prompt action to rectify the situation presented by the contested elections, notably by implementing the conclusions of the investigation conducted by the OSCE which found that the opposition coalition had won the elections in Belgrade and other major Serbian cities.

160. There is a virtually total lack of independent electronic media in the country to provide fair and balanced reporting. Print media engaged in such reporting have been subjected to pressure. The right to freedom of expression should be effectively protected, and media should be able to operate in conditions of genuine freedom and fairness. The Government should give assurances that it will not take action, as it regrettably did during the demonstrations in late 1996, against any electronic or print media which provide news which might be seen as critical of the Government.

161. The lack of independent electronic media with nationwide coverage should be addressed in the period preceding the 1997 republican elections in Serbia. In order to ensure that all citizens are effectively guaranteed the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds, the Government should consider permitting a genuinely independent television channel to operate nationwide.

162. The Government should also consider inviting or permitting international observers to monitor the forthcoming republican elections.

163. Considering the hostile nature of statements which were broadcast on State television in respect of peaceful demonstrators, the Government should ensure that prompt action is taken against any persons or institutions which violate constitutional provisions prohibiting incitement to hostility and violence.

164. All allegations of ill-treatment or torture, of which some of the most serious come from Kosovo, should be promptly investigated by an impartial authority. The Government may consider establishing an independent control or supervisory mechanism to that end, and reviewing whether police training methods incorporate relevant international human rights standards regarding the use of force. Judges should be obliged to promptly verify allegations of ill-treatment or torture and to order immediate relief.

165. The Government should ensure that no persons are convicted on the basis of statements extracted by torture or by other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as has apparently recently happened. Those responsible for committing such acts should be brought to justice.

166. The Government should review relevant legal provisions to ensure that all arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choice. Judges should be reminded that they are obliged to inform arrested persons of the right to consult a lawyer. All relevant authorities should be instructed to ensure that lawyers are able to communicate freely and in confidence with their clients, and that consultations may be within sight, but not within hearing, of law enforcement officials.

167. The Special Rapporteur is deeply disturbed by continuing reports of serious and widespread human rights violations by Serb police forces in Kosovo, including torture and ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. She urgently calls on the competent authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to put an end to these abuses by implementing the measures recommended above throughout the Federal Republic, including in Kosovo.

168. Rejected asylum-seekers and other persons who are returned to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must be able to do so without fear of repercussions and persecution. Governments considering returning such persons to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should take appropriate measures, including legal guarantees and follow-up mechanisms, to allow these persons to return to their homes in safety and dignity.

169. Disputes over technical details and political considerations should not be allowed to block the implementation of the September 1996 agreement on the normalization of education in Kosovo. The process must be guided by the needs of the students in Kosovo, and both sides should show flexibility and readiness to cooperate in order to find a lasting solution to this problem.

170. On the question of Sandzak, discussed at length in her two previous reports (see especially E/CN.4/1997/8, paras. 75-92), the Special Rapporteur will provide an update in her next communication to the Commission on Human Rights.

171. The Special Rapporteur notes that, so far, the Government has not reacted to most of the recommendations which she made in her previous report to strengthen legal and other guarantees for human rights protection in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including her recommendation that the Government ratify the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. She wishes to focus again on the specific recommendations she has made and requests the Government to give serious consideration to their implementation.

V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

172. The situation in the territory of the Special Rapporteur's mandate has improved since the fifty-second session of the Commission on Human Rights. Nevertheless, serious human rights violations continue to occur. The crucial prerequisite for improved human rights protection is support for the restoration of civil society. Efforts should concentrate on the creation and strengthening of relevant institutions and mechanisms at both the national and local levels.

173. The healing of society in the territory of the former Yugoslavia demands that alleged grave violations of humanitarian law be fully and fairly reviewed before the International Criminal Tribunal. The Special Rapporteur has been deeply disappointed by the lack of cooperation of most governmental authorities in the region with the Tribunal, and she calls on them to change these policies immediately.

174. While maintaining her call for continued economic assistance to the countries in her mandate for their reconstruction, the Special Rapporteur believes that local authorities must be kept aware that such assistance (to be distinguished from emergency humanitarian aid) depends expressly on their demonstrated respect for the principles of international human rights.

175. The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned by the phenomenon referred to in previous reports, which she has called "silent emergencies". Orphaned children, victims of rape, mentally handicapped residents of forgotten institutions - many people are suffering in silence in the former Yugoslavia who deserve the attention and assistance of the international community. The families of missing persons are

among this group, and resources should be found to meet their needs, to perform the difficult work of identifying the dead in mass graves, to determine finally the fate of those who have gone missing during five years of war. Authorities throughout the territory must receive additional technical support for the task of identifying human remains.

176. Religious leaders have a special responsibility to contribute to the moral rebirth of communities torn apart by war. The Special Rapporteur has been impressed by the calls of some religious leaders for forgiveness and learning to live together again. She asks all religious leaders in the territory to exercise their unique leadership role by delivering a clear message of reconciliation, not recrimination.

177. Important elections will be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1997. While primary responsibility for ensuring their fairness rests with national and local authorities, the international community should also be invited to assist with fully qualified and well-prepared monitoring missions.

178. Independent media are central to the process of democratization. The Special Rapporteur looks for increased freedom of expression in the coming months, and she calls on all Governments to ensure broader access to the mass media for opposition voices, especially in connection with the upcoming elections.

179. Children represent the future of society in the former Yugoslavia and the hope of transcending past tragedy. Their feelings and dreams may be seen in the pictures they make, in drawings and paintings which have captured the attention of the Special Rapporteur in her visits to the territory. The Special Rapporteur is bringing together these pictures for an exhibition she is organizing to be shown in Finland and, she hopes, other locations. All possible initiatives to support the aspirations of children, including projects for human rights education and for bringing children from different communities together, should be generously supported by local and international authorities for the sake of the region's future.

180. The effective implementation of the Special Rapporteur's mandate requires frequent missions to the territory as well as the maintenance of a strong field presence. In this regard the Special Rapporteur welcomes last year's statement of the Commission on Human Rights urging the Secretary-General, from within existing resources, to make all necessary resources available for the Special Rapporteur to carry out her mandate successfully, including by providing her with adequate field staff (resolution 1996/71, para. 46). At the same time she urges Member States to continue to support her activities and those of the Human Rights Field Operation of the High Commissioner/Centre for Human Rights with generous voluntary contributions.

181. In reference to the Commission's request to the Special Rapporteur to continue to compile an overview of the human rights situation since 1991, she will present at the Commission's next session a plan for such an overview along with its financial implications.

182. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Commission on Human Rights extend her mandate for the coming year. Developments during this time will be critical for the advancement of human rights in the countries to which she has devoted her attention. Their situations are profoundly interrelated, and the policies of their Governments will continue to have important effects not only within but outside their borders. It would be the goal of the Special Rapporteur to continue to use the exceptional independence afforded by her mandate to make observations which others may hesitate to adopt, but which hopefully may contribute to genuine respect for human rights throughout the region.

Annex

PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR

Mission of 2-7 May 1996

2 May 1996

Sagittarius

Van: "R. Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje Steijnen" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>; "Branka Obradovic" <b.obradovic@aon.at>; "Ksenija Sigulinski" <lizamia@zonnet.nl>; "Misha Gavrilovic" <mishag1@cwcom.net>
Verzonden: donderdag 5 augustus 2004 22:53
Onderwerp: Ninth Anniversary of Storm Military Operation in Krajina
 Beta News Agency, Belgrade
 August 4, 2004

Daily News Survey

Ninth Anniversary of Storm Military Operation in Krajina

BELGRADE, Aug. 3, 2004 (BETA) - Aug. 4 marked the ninth anniversary of Croatia's military blitzkrieg, codenamed Operation Storm, against Serb-populated Krajina, resulting in the mass exodus of 200,000 Serbs from Croatia.

Operation Storm was launched on Aug. 4, 1995. Over 138,000 Croatian soldiers, police and Croatian Defense Council forces (the army of the Bosnian Croats) invaded Banija, Lika, Kordun and northern Dalmatia (former Republika Srpska Krajina). Serb forces numbered only 31,000 and resistance was quickly broken.

A day later, Croatian troops entered the abandoned capital Knin, triumphantly raising the Croatian flag. Almost the entire Serb population of Krajina fled to Serbia.

According to unofficial reports (precise information is unavailable), over 1,805 persons went missing during the operation. The Croatian Helsinki Human Rights Commission says that over 700 civilians were killed in the operation. The Vertias documentary center says 1,960 people were either killed or went missing, of which 1,205 were civilians.

As for the number of returnees to Croatia, figures vary. Ahead of the upcoming anniversary, Republican Refugees Commissioner Dragisa Dabetic told the Belgrade press that some 50,000 people had returned to Croatia, of which 17,500 had applied for home rebuilding. The UNHCR has registered 70,000 returnees, while the Croatian authorities claim that as many as 130,000 Serb refugees have returned to their homes in Croatia.

On July 26, 2001 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted retired Croatian Gen. Ante Gotovina, commander of the Storm Operation, for atrocities committed during Storm. The general is still at large. In March, generals Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac were also indicted for war crimes committed during the operation. Both generals surrendered to the court.

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Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-johnson@lineone.net>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:>
Verzonden: dinsdag 3 augustus 2004 19:14
Onderwerp: CDSM: Extract from Soldiers of Good Fortune - Barry
 Please find below an extract from the article 'Soldiers of Good Fortune' by Barry Yeoman. The full article deals with the increasing use of private military companies. (Thanks to JugoInfo for forwarding this).
 The extract is relevant to Yugoslavia.

If required the full article can be found at:
<http://www.barryyeoman.com/articles/soldiersfortune.html>

Soldiers of Good Fortune

They fly helicopters, guard military bases, and provide reconnaissance. They're private military companies—and they're replacing U.S. soldiers in the war on terrorism.

By Barry Yeoman

EXTRACT BEGINS.

Private military companies also played an unheralded role in the Balkans. After the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations placed an embargo on providing military assistance to either Serbia or Croatia. Some in the State Department, however, wanted to counter the dominance of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic by strengthening Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, a self-proclaimed Aryan supremacist. Private military companies once again provided the answer. In 1994, the State Department issued a license to MPRI (Military Professional Resources Inc) to provide military training to the Croatian army. "It allowed the United States to exert a good deal of political heft while reserving its official stance of not being involved," says Avant, the international-affairs expert at George Washington University.

MPRI insists that it provided no combat training to Croatian troops, saying it merely instructed the country's military in how to operate in a Western-style democracy under civilian control. But according to independent reports, the company taught basic infantry tactics to Croatian soldiers and explained how to coordinate assaults. In August 1995, after the training ended, the Croatian army launched Operation Storm, a U.S.-style military operation designed to take back the disputed Krajina region from the Serbs. The four-day assault was a bloody episode of ethnic cleansing. Croatian graduates of MPRI's training carried out summary executions and indiscriminately shelled civilians, leaving hundreds dead and more than 150,000 homeless. Afterward, the Croatians expressed their gratitude for MPRI's help. "They lecture us on tactics and big war operations," one officer told The Observer of London, "which is why we needed them for Operation Storm."

SUCH INCIDENTS POINT TO the greatest danger underlying the increasing push to privatize war. Soldiers who disobey orders or violate standards of

act can be court-martialed and incarcerated; their supervisors can be assigned or forced to retire. Private companies, by contrast, are able to operate in almost complete secrecy, with little accountability to civilian or military authorities. Consider the case of two DynCorp employees who exposed a sex-trafficking scandal in Bosnia, where the company was assisting the American military with peacekeeping operations during the late 1990s. According to court documents, DynCorp employees bought and sold local Bosnian girls, some as young as 13, for use as sex slaves, often confiscating the passports of victims so they couldn't escape. The men were not subjected to local or U.S. criminal charges; DynCorp simply whisked them home—and fired the two whistleblowers.

EXTRACT ENDS.

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Sagittarius

Van: "Jonathan Widell"
Aan: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: zaterdag 24 juli 2004 3:44
Bijlage: Premature recognition.doc
Onderwerp: The paper on the premature recognition
Dear Mr Steijnen,

You don't have to doubt your qualifications. It is from you that I got the idea of narrowing down the paper to the subject of premature recognition. What you said about your conversations with the Yugoslav representatives on the status of Yugoslavia in the ICJ gave me the idea to go to the trunk of the tree, namely the premature recognition, and the paper is largely a result of that.

I am very sorry that the paper isn't more polished. I haven't read it through since I finished it on Wednesday, so I will rewrite large parts of it anyway. I would be very grateful if you could submit any corrections or criticisms within the next two weeks. I am trying to get the stuff published pretty soon after the Sloba trial starts again in fall.

Yours sincerely,
Jonathan Widell

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Sagittarius

Van: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Aan: "Jonathan Widell"
Verzonden: dinsdag 27 juli 2004 15:46
Onderwerp: Re: Sovereignty and other issues
 Beste Jonathan,

Natuurlijk ben ik me er bij de lezing van je concept-artikel van bewust geweest dat een aantal zaken 'tongue in cheek' waren geschreven. Ik daar toch voor willen waarschuwen; als iedereen dit constant blijft doen, horen we alleen de bekende geluiden. En wordt de discussie geen stap verder gebracht. Waarom niet gewoon in je artikel verwerken DAT resolutie 1244(1999) niet alleen 'preposterous' was, maar in een aantal opzichten ook gewoon volkenrechtelijk onrechtmatig?

Dat ook handelingen van de Veiligheidsraad in principe volkenrechtelijk onrechtmatig kunnen zijn, volgt alleen al uit het Handvest van de VN (stellen dat de VN-Veiligheidsraad moet handelen in overeenstemming met doelstellingen en beginselen van de VN, i.e.: in overeenstemming met vereisten van internationaal recht, (art. 24 lid 2 Charter) impliceert ipso facto dat het ook denkbaar is dat de Veiligheidsraad dit, op een gegeven moment, NIET zou doen). DAT de Veiligheidsraad soms in strijd met het internationaal recht handelt wordt ook PRAKTISCH erkend, b.v. door Amnesty International. Zie b.v. het AI-document van 1 mei 2003 'International Criminal Court - The unlawful attempt by the Security Council to give US citizens permanent impunity from international justice'.

Natuurlijk ligt enigerlei analyse dat (ook) de Veiligheidsraad jegens Joegoslavië onrechtmatig zou hebben gehandeld niet gemakkelijk in de markt. Maar dat betekent niet dat het niet zo langzamerhand tijd wordt om deze notie toch maar eens uitdrukkelijk te expliciteren.

Het lijkt me interessant als je in je artikel ook eens precies zou ontrafelen hoe ambigue de Algemene Vergadering van de VN zich opgesteld heeft rond de kwestie van het ontnemen van het lidmaatschap aan Jugoslavië. En het gehele plaatje daarin zou betrekken. En zou (durven) eindigen met (opnieuw) een rechtmatigheids-oordeel over dit handelen van de Alg. Vergadering.

Natuurlijk is het waar dat Milosevic 'pretty far' ging in het kader van de Dayton Akkoorden om een einde te maken aan de oorlogshandelingen in Bosnië. Hij is daar zelfs trots op en laat zich daar ook op voorstaan. Zo heeft hij mij persoonlijk verzekerd. "Aan dat bloedvergieten moest koste wat het kost een einde worden gemaakt", aldus Milosevic..

En ik blijf erbij dat zijn ondertekening van Dayton niks te doen had met wat voor erkenning van het ICTY dan ook. Net zo min als bijv. Veiligheidsraadsresoluties die voorborduren op de feitelijkheid van de bezetting van Palestina betekenen dat die bezetting daarmee alsnog wordt gelegitimeerd. En net zomin als nu praktische regelingen maken voor de situatie in Irak betekent dat de Amerikaans/Britse agressie daarmee alsnog zou worden gelegitimeerd.

Dat je je van die (door anti-Milosevic adepten veelvuldig gepropageerde) opvatting de spreekbuis maakt, lijkt me een stap te ver in het spreken 'in somebody else's voice'!

hartelijke groeten,

Nico Steijnen

— Original Message —

From: Jonathan Widell

To: Sagittarius

Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 11:54 PM

Subject: Sovereignty and other issues

Dear Mr Steijnen,

Your comments are excellent and absolutely pertinent. Thank you.

I should have been more careful to indicate that some of the things I wrote were meant to be spoken in somebody else's voice (which is the scholarly way of saying that I wrote tongue in cheek). However, you have raised so many interesting points that I can't resist the temptation of following up on some of them.

As to sovereignty, one should bear in mind that the solution of the UN Security Council to the flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of FRY in 1999 was simple: denial. It pretended that the problem did not exist. The preamble of the famous UNSC resolution 1244(1999) reiterates the holy formula: "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the

27-7-04

region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2."

To show how preposterous this resolution was, one has to bear in mind that the bombings went on for a few days after the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council. In fact, the air operations were not ended until Yugoslavia started implementing the Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement on June 10, 1999!

Another issue that to me seems to be linked with sovereignty is the effective expulsion from international organizations. In today's world the fact is that sovereignty entails full membership in international organizations. That is bound to muddle the picture further.

UN General Assembly resolution 47/1 was explicitly not a decision to expel Yugoslavia from the UN, which is clear from the statement by the British representative appended to the resolution, but that was exactly what it amounted to in the end.

Other international organizations followed suit. The European Council introduced the "consensus minus one" rule, which made it possible to throw FRY out of the organization.

So technically FRY retained its sovereignty intact, but as long as it had to stay outside the international organizations, we have a case of curious sort of "negative violation of sovereignty".

Also, I wrote that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY should have come to an end at the end of the Bosnian war. That was the original intent of the ICTY basic documents, as was borne out in the Secretary-General's report.

Was everyone agreed that the Dayton Accords marked the end of the war in former Yugoslavia and, by implication, that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY should have ended? Oh, yes.

As a matter of fact, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted in his Remarks at the Initialing of the Balkan Proximity Peace Talks Agreement, which now form part of the accords: "After three weeks of intensive negotiations here in Dayton, the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia have agreed to end the war in the former Yugoslavia."

Milosevic said the same: "Due to the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Dayton, this day will enter into the history as the date of the end of the war in the area of the former Yugoslavia." Nobody protested.

However, that did not prevent the UN Security Council from beating a dead horse. It included the following statement in the preamble of resolution 1244(1999): "Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."

As to Milosevic recognizing ICTY's jurisdiction, Milosevic's signature in the Dayton Accords has been taken to mean that he recognized the jurisdiction of ICTY. Bearing in mind what was said above, the understanding was that the jurisdiction of the tribunal would end at Dayton.

Whatever the truth in that, one has to admit that Milosevic went pretty far to appease NATO at Dayton. In his letter, which is reproduced in Annex IA of the Accords (Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) he wrote as follows:

"On behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I wish to assure you that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall take all necessary steps, consistent with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the Republika Srpska fully respects and complies with commitments to NATO, including in particular access and status of forces, as set forth in the aforementioned Agreements."

Maybe a more pertinent issue is this. Now that Montenegro and Serbia have been forced to follow separate roads, isn't it likely that similar recognition issues are bound to resurface, if and when both republics become independent?

For instance, what will happen to the case against NATO at the ICJ? Will the plaintiff, i.e. Yugoslavia, have withered away when the ICJ finally makes up its mind as to whether it has jurisdiction in the case, which could mean that there would be no case any more?

Best regards,
Jonathan Widell

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Sagittarius

Van: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Aan: "Jonathan Widell"
Verzonden: zondag 25 juli 2004 22:30
Onderwerp: premature recognition
Beste Jonathan,

Nog even terugkomend op de fabel dat staatssoevereiniteit aan slijtage onderhevig zou zijn, omdat er steeds meer inbreuken zouden gelden op die soevereiniteit.

We horen dit verhaal vooral als wij (de machtige staten in de wereld), inbreuken op de soevereiniteit van de niet-machtige staten in de wereld zoeken te rechtvaardigen en te onderbouwen.

Het is natuurlijk zeker waar dat in het interstatelijke verkeer steeds meer beperkingen op de soevereiniteit worden aangebracht. Maar indien deze inbreuken nader worden bezien, dan blijkt het altijd te gaan om vrijwillige, op verdragsbasis aangebrachte beperkingen. En natuurlijk is het juist een onderdeel van de soevereiniteit van een staat dat die staat daarop die beperkingen kan accepteren die het wenselijk en toelaatbaar acht.

Wat de machtige(n) (staten) echter bedoelen als ze het hebben over de reeds bestaande inbreuken op de soevereiniteit, die steeds talrijker zijn geworden de laatste decennia, is het suggereren dat die inbreuken NIET op vrijwillige basis tot stand zouden zijn gekomen.

De daarmee verbonden boodschap is dan: wij machtige(n) (staten) hoeven met de soevereiniteit van de niet-machtige staten geen rekening te houden, want soevereiniteit is toch al een in hoge mate uitgehold begrip.

Zo ook dus de Joegoslavische staatssoevereiniteit aan de vooravond van de opsplitsing van het oude Joegoslavië. De premature erkenning vormde een grove schending van de territoriale onschendbaarheid en de integriteit van Joegoslavië, en daarmee van de Joegoslavische soevereiniteit. Het was, voor zover ik nu zonder verder onderzoek even aanneem, een inbreuk op de accorden van Helsinki, waarin die territoriale onschendbaarheid en nog eens uitdrukkelijk was uitgesproken. En een inbreuk op de UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention van 1965, waarin alle vormen van directe en indirecte intervenentie die 'the sovereign personality' en 'the integrity of their national territory' kunnen bedreigen, nog eens expliciet worden verboden. Bovendien een inbreuk op de UN Declaration on International Law Principles van 1970, waarin nog eens uitdrukkelijk wordt gestipuleerd dat geen enkele staat, dus ook de EU, 'has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER, in the internal or external affairs of any other State'.

Dit is allemaal duidelijk genoeg.

Zolang Joegoslavië niet instemde met de afscheiding, zolang niet onmiskenbaar en onweerlegbaar aan alle vereisten voor onafhankelijkheidsverklaring door de betrokken Sloveense, kroatische en Bosnische entiteiten was voldaan, vormde de premature erkenning door de EU en de VS onmiskenbaar een zodanige schending.

beste groeten,

Nico Steijnen

PREMATURE RECOGNITION OF STATES AND THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

Jonathan Widell

July 21, 2004

1. INTRODUCTION

There are many explanations for the break-up of Yugoslavia. The Milosevic trial has the advantage of making the disintegration revolve around Milosevic, although the trial shifts the focus almost too conveniently away from the part that the Western states had to play in it.

This article discusses the relation of the premature recognition of the former Yugoslav republics and the wars that ensued on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the legal mechanisms that have been set up to address the problems caused by the wars. The paper suggests that the wars were largely due to the premature recognition of the former Yugoslav republics. Because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lost the "recognition war", it has borne a lot of the blame, even though it only adhered to the classical doctrine concerning recognition.

2. PREMATURE RECOGNITION

According to the classical doctrine of international law, premature recognition of a State is an infringement of another State's sovereignty and hence a violation of international law. However, this traditional view has succumbed to considerable modification over the past decades. Since the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany in December 1992, the premature recognition has not only been condoned but the States that have perpetrated it have presumed the moral right to punish the State whose rights the premature recognition violated in the first place. More often than not, this reversal of rules has the blessing of the international organizations. When Yugoslavia refused to

recognize Slovenia and Croatia and hence refused to submit an application for membership in the UN, it was excluded from the General Assembly of the United Nations. As the later cases pending at the International Court of Justice have born out, it was also excluded from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, because that exclusion from the activities of the General Assembly was interpreted very broadly. Yugoslavia, or the rump-Yugoslavia, as it was called, regarded itself as the only successor state of the former Yugoslavia, so it thought it did not have to submit a separate application for the membership of the UN. In fact, since Yugoslavia was one of the founding members of the UN, Yugoslavia had never submitted an application for membership.

Not going on?
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this?
was was de
legale
status
provision?

The refusal to allow the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to participate in the activities of the General Assembly had far-reaching consequences. It is not quite clear why that decision was necessary. The UN has many members that have not recognized each other, like the Arab States and Israel. To mend the rupture in the international legal system caused by the exclusion of Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was founded in 1993. Of course, the ICTY did not have the same mandate as the ICJ. However, the differences should not blind one to the fact that part of the function of the ICTY was to fill the legal void left by the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the General Assembly, and hence from the international community, and eventually from the International Court of Justice.

?

Despite its divergent affirmations, the ICTY has played a key role in the design of the political map of the Balkans. In very many cases, the accused have been leaders of the entities that emerged on the territories of the newly recognized States. Of course, if the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was suspect, then the unilateral declarations of independence by the various ethnic entities on their territories should have been all the more suspect. On the other hand, if the premature recognition was suspect, then those who perpetrated it should have been in no position to fell judgment on the State that was destroyed by the premature recognition.

?

of violation of

The result is that the consequences of the premature recognition are not borne by the State that perpetrated the premature recognition but by the State whose sovereignty the premature recognition has violated. To justify this break with classic doctrine a rather peculiar logic is needed: the sovereignty of the State that has been prematurely recognized is actually violated by the State which tries to address the violation of its own sovereignty that the premature recognition entails. To tilt the balance in favour of the prematurely recognized State, its population is depicted as the victim of large-scale human rights violations by the old sovereign State, which means that the crimes perpetrated by its population are condoned and the crimes perpetrated by the military of the old sovereign State are exaggerated.

The reason that is routinely presented in favour of the modifications of the doctrine of premature recognition is the emergence of international criminal law. The retardation of international criminal law is normally attributed to the persistence of the Cold War and more in particular to the fixation that the Communist States had with the doctrine of State sovereignty.

NOT JUST

3. COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC

This rather rough sketch can be refined as follows. The emergence of international criminal law is attributed to the relaxation of some rules of international law, like the inviolability of State sovereignty. The historical reason for the reassessment of the inviolability of State sovereignty was the collapse of the Communist bloc. To help the democratic forces in the Communist states, the Western powers could not be handicapped by the doctrine of State sovereignty. The more or less overt interference in the affairs of a sovereign State had often the effect of disintegrating the monolithic Communist state.

This is what happened in the former Soviet Union. The former republics of the Soviet Union had in many cases the fortune of being former independent States. The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) had been independent before the Second World

War, whereas many other Soviet Republics, like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, were Soviet constructions.

An opposite development took place in Germany, where East Germany was reunited with West Germany. In spite of the reunification of West Germany and East Germany, Germany actually relinquished large parts of its pre-WWII territory of Eastern Prussia, which had been divided between the Soviet Union (the Kaliningrad region) and Poland.

Nowhere was the disintegration as painful as in the former Yugoslavia. None of the former republics had been independent before, with the exception of the two republics that actually state in the federation, Montenegro and Serbia. Croatia had been a Nazi puppet state in WWII, when it was called the Independent State of Croatia.

It was the opposite movements of integration and disintegration that provided the momentum for the break-up of former Yugoslavia. In its reunification fever, Germany was eager to reinstate many of the units that provided its economic hinterland before the Second World War. The hurried recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany were part of the overall process to bring Eastern Europe more in line with the German interests.

Germany's European partners were much more reserved in regard to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The European Community had shortly before declared that it would not support the independence of the breakaway republics. However, the support of Great Britain could be bought in the overall process of Maastricht Treaty that would lead to the transformation of the European Community into the European Union. In return of the recognition of the Yugoslav breakaway republics, Germany promised its support for the British need to opt out of the European monetary system.

4. CROATIA

In order to understand the chain reaction that was unleashed by the premature recognition, we have to bear in mind the peculiar population structure of former Yugoslavia. The Serbs were the most populous nation. The problem was that about a quarter of the Serbs lived outside Serbia, and in its drive to create new nation states along the borders of the Yugoslav republics, the international community ignored the position of the Serbs outside Serbia.

Even if the republics had been named according to the major nations of Yugoslavia, they were by no means nationally coherent wholes. Nor had they ever been. When Yugoslavia was originally founded in December 1918 with the name "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," one of its constituent parts, the area that is now divided between Slovenia and Croatia, was called the State of Slovenes, Croats and Slovenes (which was founded only about a month before, on October 29, 1918). As the name suggests, the Serbs constituted a considerable portion of the population of the state. They inhabited the areas that Western propaganda managed to present as Serb conquests in the wars in the 1990's, the most significant of those areas being the Krajina region.

The history of the Serb population in the Krajina region reaches as far back as that of the Krajina region itself. Austria established it in 1527 as a bulwark against the expanding Turkish Empire and populated it in part by Serbs that fled the Turks from Bosnia. This, incidentally, shows that the Serb population of Bosnia goes even further back in history.

During the Second World War, Tito came to power. The structure of socialist Yugoslavia was defined by the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), in which Tito played a key role. The AVNOJ was convened for the first time in Bihac in 1942. Its lasting achievement was dividing the State into constituent republics. The republics have kept the borders even after their independence.

The international community also played a decisive role in conserving those borders in line with the *uti possidetis* principle, which dictates that the administrative borders of a disintegrating state should be preserved by the newly independent states. It could fall back on the judgment of 22 December 1986 by the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), which said that of the *uti possidetis* principle that

the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. (ICJ 1986: ¶ 20).

The *uti possidetis* principle occupied the central role in the breakup of Yugoslavia. The frontiers of the breakaway republics was one of the issues discussed by the Arbitration Committee of the European Union on Yugoslavia's dissolution (the so-called Badinter Committee). One of the questions put to the Commission was: "Can the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?" The dissolution of Yugoslavia was not a post-colonial situation, as in Burkina Faso, but Committee considered in Opinion No. 3 that the internal Yugoslav borders should remain in force. That had also been the decision taken by Tito when he constructed the map of Yugoslavia. He was of the conviction that an attempt to separate the Serb areas from the rest of Croatia would result in a war.

The opinions of the Badinter Committee were apparently loyal to Tito's design of Yugoslavia. There was one major difference: the AVNOJ determined that despite the design of republics, Yugoslavia was a federation of its constituent nations, not of separate republics. Even if the nations had the right of self-determination even under the Yugoslav constitution, the breakup of the federal state should have been negotiated between the

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constituent nations. That was also the position of the SFRY. It should be noted however that the Muslims were not recognized as a separate nation at the time of the AVNOJ. The Badinter Committee tried to mitigate this contradiction by stressing in its Opinion No. 2 that the minority rights of the Serbs in Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be guaranteed by international law. The Badinter Committee also referred to the draft Convention of 4 November 1991, which was accepted by these republics.

Croatia was pressured by the international community to enact a Constitutional Law Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights and Freedoms of National and Ethnic Communities and Minorities in 1991. It expressly stated that the Republic of Croatia was to encourage universal development of national and ethnic groups or minorities (Art. 3) and that it was to assist the development of the relations between national and ethnic communities or minorities with the people in their parent country in order to promote their national, cultural and linguistic development (Art.4). Ethnic and national communities or minorities were to have the right to self-organization and association in order to realize their national or other rights Art.4 (2). Ethnic and national communities or minorities were entitled to cultural autonomy (Art. 5).¹

However, even by the admission of the Badinter Committee, the recognition of these republics would have been too hasty. That did not keep Germany from recognizing them the following month.

It was probably with these internationally recognized rights in mind that the Serbs declared three different Serbian Autonomous Districts (SAOs) in late April 1991: one in Krajina, one in Western Slavonia and one in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. After December 19, 1991, the SAO Krajina became known as the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), and on February 26, 1992, the rest of the Serbian Autonomous Districts joined it. The Serbs also declared independent states or areas in the cities of Dubrovnik and

¹ <http://www.unisa.edu.au/lavskis/zagar/constprov/croatia.htm>

Zagreb.² For instance, the ICTY has indicted Milan Babic and Milan Martić, who were leaders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The UN hastened to the Serbs' rescue in Croatia but ended up being attacked by the Croatian forces. One contemporary source describes the activities of the UN as follows:

UNPROFOR is deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. The UNPAs are areas in which *Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population* and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict. There are three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina.³

Later the UNPROFOR mandate was enlarged to include support for the Yugoslav National Army:

On 30 June 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 762 (1992), authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the 'pink zones' - certain areas of Croatia *controlled by the JNA and populated by then largely by Serbs*, but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries.⁴

However, the Croatian forces interfered with the UN mission:

On 22 January 1993, *the Croatian Army launched an offensive* in a number of locations in the southern part of UNPROFOR's Sector South and the adjacent pink zones'. The Croatian Government stated that it took this action out of

² Case No. IT-95-11, the Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Martić, amended indictment, para. 4.

³ *United Nations Protection Force* at URL http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor_un.html

impatience with the *slow progress of negotiations* in respect of various economic facilities in and adjacent to the UNPAs and 'pink zones'.⁵

It would be an understatement to say that Croatia did not abide by the Constitutional Law. Operation Storm on August 4-7, 1995 put an end to the Republic of Serb Krajina. In fact, about half a million Serbs had been driven from Croatia by the end of 1995, although it must be said that the intense fighting in Croatia drove about as many Croats from their homes. The US played an important role in the success of the operation. The Pentagon had contracted Military Professional Resources, Inc (MPRI) to support the Croatian forces, which explains the negative publicity the Serb entities have received afterwards.

These autonomous entities have received a lot of negative publicity thanks to the ICTY, and it is in fact easy to forget that they had the blessing of the international community when they were constituted. The ICTY prosecution has tried to attribute the birth of these entities to the Greater Serbia ideology, which is hard to reconcile with the support that they enjoyed at the time in the international community.

5. BOSNIA

The Badinter Commission had even greater reservations concerning Bosnia. However, the recognition of Bosnia followed soon after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For instance, the US Secretaries of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Warren Christopher criticized the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the EU, but the US eventually followed suit in April 1992. The US recognized Bosnia on April 5, 1992.

Bosnia was originally divided among the Muslim (Bosnian), Serb and Croat populations in the Cutilheiro Plan (Lisbon Agreement), named after the Portuguese special

⁴ *United Nations Protection Force* at URL http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor_un.html

⁵ *United Nations Protection Force* at URL http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor_un.html

representative of the European Community, José Cutilheiro. The plan envisaged the division of Bosnia in ethnic cantons. All parties signed it on March 18, 1992. The later withdrawal from the plan by the Bosnians has been attributed to the influence of Warren Zimmerman, who was the US ambassador in Belgrade at the time. The US did not want to send the wrong signal to the former Soviet republics which had managed to break away along the administrative borders, according to the *uti possidetis* principle. The division of Bosnia in ethnic cantons would have opened the door to ethnic divisions in all breakaway republics the world over.⁶

The failure of the Cutilheiro Plan did not stop the international community nurturing the same approach in the subsequent peace proposals. It should be borne in mind that the Cutilheiro Plan was not a peace plan. It preceded the Bosnian war, which should raise grave concerns about the wisdom of having it rejected by the Bosnians. There were three failed peace plans after the Cutilheiro Plan. They did not alter the original plan considerably, although the later plans favored federation and confederation instead of cantonization.

First, the Vance-Owen Plan of January 2, 1993 envisaged the division of Bosnia in 10 provinces, nine of which were ethnically defined, allotting three provinces to each nation. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who is now one of the most sought-after men in the world, signed the Vance-Owen Plan on May 2, 1993, as he had signed the Cutilheiro Plan more than a year before. However, 96% of the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan in a referendum held on May 15 and 16, 1992.

Second, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan followed on August 20, 1993. It would have allotted 52% of the Bosnian territory to the Serbs. This time the plan was rejected by the Croats and the Muslims.

⁶ Professor Nikolaos A. Stavrou, *Bosnia 101* at <http://www.srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/bosnia101.html>

Third, the Contact Group Plan of July 5, 1994 would have allotted 49% of the territory to the Serbs and the rest to the Muslims and the Croats. However, the Bosnian Serbs rejected this plan in a referendum held on August 27 and 28, 1994. The Contact Group consisted of the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, France, Great-Britain and Germany.

However, when peace was finally reached in the Dayton Accords, the Serbs did get an autonomous area of their own, Republika Srpska. The Muslims were given less territory in the Dayton Accords than in the Lisbon Agreement, as the former Ambassador of Canada to Belgrade James Bisset has noted.⁷

It would seem that all the peace plans suffered from the same basic defect. Even if the Serbs made up only about 30% of the population of Bosnia, they were allotted approximately half of the territory of Bosnia. However, it should be borne in mind that the Serb population lives mainly on the countryside where the density of the population is considerably lower than in the cities, where the Croats and (for historical reasons) especially the Muslims populations are concentrated. In other words, if all the Serb-dominated areas had been allotted to the Serbs, Croats and Muslims would have kept little else than the cities.

6. PROBLEMS OF SUCCESSION

The regime in Belgrade refused to recognize Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. However, it did adopt a new constitution in April 1992 to reflect the dissolution of the old Socialist Federal Republic. Serbia and Montenegro were now the only republics left in the federation.

The Federal Republic communicated to the Secretary-General of the UN on April 27, 1992 that it would "strictly abide by all the commitments that the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally" (UN doc. A/46/915). It refused to apply

⁷ <http://www.deltax.net/bissett/western/bosnia.htm>

for UN membership, because it considered itself the only legitimate successor state of the former Yugoslavia.

The organs of the United Nations stated that Yugoslavia's claim to continue automatically the membership of the former Yugoslavia "has not generally been accepted" and decided that the new Yugoslavia "should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly" (Security Council resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 and General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992). On the other hand, the "considered view" of the United Nations Secretariat regarding the practical consequences of these decisions was, among other things, that Yugoslavia's *membership* in the Organization was "neither terminated nor suspended", that Yugoslav missions at United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to function, receive and circulate documents, etc. (United Nations doc. A/47/485 (1992)).⁸

In its judgment in the genocide case *Bosnia v. Yugoslavia* of 1996, the International Court of Justice stated that "resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the FRY's right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute. Nor did it affect the position of the FRY in relation to the Genocide Convention."

Both of these conclusions of the ICJ have been refuted by later developments. It was the ICJ itself that limited the Yugoslav recognition of its jurisdiction in 1999 during the Kosovo bombing so narrowly as not to extend to the beginning of the bombing. If the Yugoslav recognition did not cover the period from the beginning of the year 1999, how could the Court conclude in 1996 that the Yugoslav non-recognition of the Court did not affect the Yugoslav right to be a party to a dispute before the Court?

Secondly, Yugoslavia acceded to the Genocide Convention in 2001. Croatia presented the following objection to the accession on May 18, 2001:

⁸ Dissenting Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin at para. 14.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia objects to the deposition of the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, due to the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is already bound by the Convention since its emergence as one of the five equal successor states to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is ironic that Croatian government put its finger on the problem that had the potential of dealing a severe blow to its own case before the International Court of Justice. Croatia instituted the proceedings in a genocide case against Yugoslavia before the Court, encouraged as it was by the decision of the ICJ in the Bosnian genocide case. Now Croatia points out that the UN acts contrary to the logic of the decision of the ICJ. It is very easy to argue that the ICJ should not have had jurisdiction in the Bosnia case. Croatia reacts to the accession of Yugoslavia to the Genocide Convention, but even more pertinently, similar criticisms can be leveled in relation to the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the General Assembly.

Sagittarius

Van: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
 Aan: "Jonathan Widell"
 Verzonden: vrijdag 16 juli 2004 15:51
 Onderwerp: Re: Yugoslav membership in the UN
 Beste Jonathan,

Ik ben erg benieuwd naar je artikel over het opbreken van de staat Joegoslavië. Met name naar je visie op het werk van de Badinter Commission, de rol van de Commission on Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Parliament concerning relations between the EC and the republics of the former Yugoslavia en de ook bij de erkenning van Slovenië, Kroatië en Bosnië gehanteerde Declaration on the 'guidelines for recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union'. Ik hoop dat jij de beschikking hebt over de teksten hiervan. Ikzelf heb tot nu toe geen tijd gehad om hier achteraan te gaan.

In elk geval heb ik, in menig krities commentaar, vernomen dat de EU duidelijk en onmiskenbaar primair politieke argumenten voor volkenrechtelijke heeft proberen te verkopen om de de afscheiding van Slovenië en Kroatië - en later ook Bosnië - te kunnen erkennen.

Literatuur waar ik in dit verband nog wel eens kennis van zou willen nemen is 'Barbara Delcourt, Olivier Corten, "(Ex-)Yugoslavie: droit international, politique et ideologies, Bruxelles; Bruylant, 1998," verschillende Declarations van de Europese Unie, waaronder de 'Declaration of July 5, 1991, Bull. CE, 7/8-1991, p. 117, Declaration of August 2, 1991, Ibid, p. 122, Declaration of August 28, 1991, p. 126 en Bull. CE, 11-1991, pp 74-76 and pp 97-98, de Declaration on the "guidelines for recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union", Brussels, December 16, 1991, Revue générale de droit international public, 1992/1, p. 261.

Vuorts zou ik wel eens willen kijken in : Theodore Christakis, Le droit à l'autodétermination en dehors des situations de décolonisation, Paris: "La pratique des Etats et le droit international relativement à la sécession unilatérale, en in A.Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A legal Reappraisal, A Grotius Publication, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp 317-334, Theodore Christakis, L'UNO, le Chapitre VII et la crise yougoslavie, CEDIN-Paris I en artikelen in Le Monde met statements van R. Dumas van December 17, 1991 en January 16, 1992 over het recht van afscheiding, alsmede wat er op dit punt geschreven staat in de Summary of World Broadcast, BBC, EE/1267, January 1, 1992, Ci/1 en in Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLIII, February 5, 1992, pp 21-26, waarin argumenten worden gegeven voor het gebruik van geweld om de territoriale integriteit te verdedigen.

Deze vindplaatsen had nog klaarliggen voor een nader onderzoek naar de rechtmatigheid van de afscheidingen van Kroatië en Slovenië.

In dit verband schijnt de Joegoslavische Constitutie uit die tijd wel het recht op afscheiding te erkennen, maar dit dan niet gekoppeld aan de deelrepublieken, maar gekoppeld aan wat in die grondwet als 'naties' wordt gedefinieerd.

Natuurlijk is dit alles van buitengewoon belang in het licht van de constante aantijgingen dat Milosevic ("de Serven") zich schuldig zouden hebben gemaakt aan agressie-acties tegen de afgescheiden staten.

Eraan toegekomen om dit systematisch te verwerken ben ik tot op heden dus niet. Ik vestig daarom mijn hoop op jou!

Overigens lijkt me niet juist jouw stelling dat als de FRY (eerder) erkend zou zijn door de VN, daarmee ook gelijk sprake zou zijn geweest van erkenning van de rechtsmacht van het ICJ door de FRY. Die rechtsmacht moet immers expliciet erkend worden!

hertelijke groeten,

In October 1991 Britain's Lord Carrington called the leaders of the Yugoslav republics to a meeting in The Hague, Netherlands. The discussions within the EU at this time revolved around three possible outcomes to the Yugoslav 'problem'. 1) For its structure to stay as it was. 2) For certain republics to secede. 3) Complete dismantling.

7-7-2004

Unusually no agenda was supplied to the Yugoslav delegation prior to their attendance. Once at the meeting the delegation was surprised to encounter not only Carrington but also all the foreign ministers of the EU. They were told that there was to be discussions on only one of the possible options, namely, the complete dismantling of Yugoslavia.

The EU ministers all spoke in favour of this option, as did the majority of the heads of the republics. With unanimous agreement at this point for his proposal Carrington turned to listen to the last speaker, Slobodan Milosevic. Mr Milosevic rose to his feet and said, and I paraphrase, "Gentlemen, you did not contribute to the creation of Yugoslavia, you did not contribute to the building of Yugoslavia, and you have no right to call for its dismantling. I can not agree to this over the heads of the people of Yugoslavia and now I am returning home." With this he picked up his papers, turned and walked out of the meeting.

This reinforced the European powers belief that in order to destroy the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia they would also have to destroy Slobodan Milosevic.

Thus the name Milosevic became synonymous with the name and existence of Yugoslavia.

Mr Milosevic understood very well that small, economically weak mini-states could only ever be mere vassals under the control of the major powers. What was being negotiated away at Carrington's meeting was any real meaning of sovereignty and independence.

A revealing anecdote to the above meeting is the role played at this time by the United States.

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Pagina 2 van 4

According to British Foreign Office sources the Americans had told the Europeans that the EU should take the initiative in this period and that the US would play a secondary role and merely follow whatever decisions the EU made.

The Europeans were to find out later that at the same time as the US was proposing this line they were simultaneously funding and arming the Bosnian Muslims.

It is sometimes extremely difficult to ascertain which is the more corrupt, deceitful and criminal body, the EU or the US government.

~~Yugoslavia, and now I am returning~~
the people of Yugoslavia and now I am returning
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Sagittarius

Van: "R Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
 Aan: "Misa Gavrilovic" <mishag1@cwcom.net>; "Klaus Hartmann" <klaus.hartmann@user.ecore.net>; "Meindert Stelling" <meindert.stelling@planet.nl>; "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
 Verzonden: donderdag 10 juni 2004 23:42
 Onderwerp: Fw: Mystery of the market massacre, by Eve-Ann Prentice

— Original Message —

From: [nebojsa](#)
 To: R Despotovic
 Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 12:41 PM
 Subject: Mystery of the market massacre, by Eve-Ann Prentice

THE TIMES (UK), Tuesday, March 28, 2000 FEATURES

Mystery of the market massacre

by Eve-Ann Prentice

SIXTY-EIGHT people died and more than 200 were injured when a single shell exploded in a small Sarajevo market. The ghastly scenes were filmed and a horrified world was left in no doubt that the Serbs were to blame. The slaughter brought deeper American involvement in the Balkans, with the formation of the US-led Contact Group and an American-negotiated alliance between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.

The massacre also ultimately paved the way for American airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions in late summer, 1995. Furthermore, the killing brought about a deal whereby the Serbs pulled back their heavy guns from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and the Muslims reluctantly signed a ceasefire. The easing of the siege, and the relief for the people of Sarajevo, was a notable achievement.

To this day no one knows who fired the deadly mortar round on Markale market in February 1994. Survivors and witnesses said they heard no characteristic whistle of an approaching missile; this later led to suggestions that a bomb had been placed under a stall. A Western diplomat who was in Sarajevo at the time told me in 1999 that he was convinced the bombing was perpetrated by the Muslim-led Government. The Muslims were sure that the Serbs would be blamed and hoped that outrage at the carnage would lead to airstrikes against their foes and increase pressure for a lifting of the arms embargo that was in place against all the warring sides. Britain and France were vehemently opposed to lifting the embargo, although America had shown signs of wanting to arm the Muslims.

"On the morning of the explosion some people were told that it was not a good day to go to the market," the Western diplomat said. "There was also no shelling from the Serb positions that day, and the injuries were mainly from the waist down, as if a bomb had exploded in situ." The diplomat said that another sign that the Muslim-led Government had been responsible was that government media with cameras were on the scene "within seconds", as if poised in advance to record the full horror of the carnage to gain as much world impact as possible.

The suggestion that the Muslims shelled their own people began to be discussed by diplomats, politicians and a few journalists after the UN's investigation into the massacre concluded that no one could be sure whence the shell had come. But most people recoiled at the idea of such self-inflicted mutilation. The majority of the world's press and politicians accepted the instant suggestion that the Serbs were responsible; questions were not encouraged and the general view was that the end justified the means: the siege of Sarajevo was eased. But blaming the Serbs without proof set a precedent, and the process of demonising them took deeper root.

<http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wctb/wctb12.shtml>

Deze e-mail is door E-mail Virus Scan van Het Net gecontroleerd op virussen. Zie voor meer informatie: <http://www.hetnet.nl/evs/>

 Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-johnson@lineone.net>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:>
Verzonden: donderdag 3 juni 2004 20:40
Onderwerp: CDSM: The Yugoslavian Fairy Tale - George Szamuely 28th May

The Yugoslavian Fairy Tale

By George Szamuely | May 28, 2004

Editor: Erik Leaver, Policy and Outreach Director, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)
 Foreign Policy In Focus

www.fpif.org

It is always fascinating to watch the eagerness with which so-called progressives unquestioningly accept an official history full of virtuous U.S. officials and villainous savages trying the patience of the peaceful, law-abiding Great Powers. Case in point: the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and Stacy Sullivan's recent account of them in Foreign Policy In Focus

(<http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402milosevic.html>). The actual sequence of events that caused those wars is very different from the reporting of the establishment media and, unfortunately, much of the progressive media. According to this story, the wars of the past decade were all started by the Serbs, who sought to destroy Yugoslavia and turn it into a mono-ethnic Greater Serbia.

The West, well-meaning and indecisive as ever, stood by unwilling to intervene as the Serbs went on their rampage to carve out lands belonging to the other nations of Yugoslavia and drive out all non-Serbs. Not until the United States was finally moved to act to bring the Serbs to heel was peace and independence possible. And, thanks to the efforts of the United States, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia came into being to ensure that there would be no impunity for Serb leaders and their campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Today, tribunal judges supposedly toil away on behalf of the war crimes' victims, painstakingly trying to balance judicial fairness against the need to ensure that such things never happen again.

The problem is that not one part of this fairy tale is true. The wars in Yugoslavia started with the electoral triumph of anti-Communist nationalists in Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia in the country's first multiparty elections in 1990. Slovenia and Croatia, with encouragement from abroad, particularly Germany and the United States, pushed for independence right away, in violation of the constitution of Yugoslavia. Serbia's position, in accord both with the Yugoslav constitution and with democratic aspirations, was that the constituent nations of Yugoslavia could neither be forced to stay nor forced to leave Yugoslavia against their will.

Deconstructing Yugoslav History

The so-called international community's unseemly and irresponsible recognition of independent Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was not only flagrant interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, it violated innumerable international treaties such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Montevideo Convention and the United Nations Charter.

Sabotage of peace plans, bad faith negotiations and a yearning to resort to force characterized U.S. policy in Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. On May 30, 1992, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a report commending the government of Yugoslavia for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Bosnia and criticizing Croatia for its refusal to withdraw its armed forces, the U.S. sought to suppress this report and to push the United Nations to impose sanctions against Yugoslavia, though not Croatia. Every proposal put forward by the E.U., like the Vance-Owen plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan was sabotaged by Washington as it egged on its proxies, Bosnia's Muslims, to reject everything on the table in favor of the absurd and unrealistic option of a unitary state of the three ethnic groups—something that the United States had insisted couldn't possibly work at the Yugoslav federal level.

During this time, the United States was secretly arranging air drops of weapons to Bosnia's Muslims, in violation of the United Nations arms embargo, as well as facilitating the flow of arms and mujahedin fanatics into Bosnia from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the United States, Great Britain and Germany were arming and training the Kosovo Liberation Army. The objective was to instigate terror and mayhem so as to provoke a reaction from the Yugoslav authorities that could then be designated a humanitarian crisis and used as a pretext for the armed attack that the Clinton administration had been seeking to launch for years. However, the Serbs were no fools and they refused to be provoked. Consequently, two further frauds were needed. First, there were the alleged killings at Racak. And then there were the bogus settlement negotiations at Rambouillet.

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>2.
Contribution to Anti-NATO Conference, 28/02/2004, Istanbul

Bulgarian Communist Party - Georgi Dimitrov

By Ivan Predov
Member of The Central Committee

Enlargement of NATO – A New Challenge To Balkan Nations

To better understand the deep ethnical conflict in the Balkans, one must place them in the large-scale international context, which gives them their real meaning. While waving the banner of "Democracy and Human Rights" all over the world, capital today takes openly mafia and criminal aspects. The bloody conflicts on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are typical products of contemporary imperialism.

Imperialism maintains its power by dividing those, who are submitted to its dictatorship. The bourgeoisie seeks to divide working people on ethnical, national and religious bases. Therefore, NATO command made use of the remnants of the fascists in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania.

However, not only the ex-fascists have been involved in supporting the aggression on the Balkans. The new arising political forces in the ex-socialist countries from the right to the "left" wing parties gave their support to the plans of NATO enlargement, close to the borders of Russia.

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However, let us have no illusions – the direct aggression against Yugoslavia five years ago turned into a permanent indirect aggression against all the nations of our region, against all the working people of the Balkans. And now, ** the last war in the Balkans – that in Macedonia – it must be clear to everyone, that ** a military exit is possible from that region. Even now, after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the plans for further aggression against other countries, the Balkans will remain to be a central front for NATO. An international military presence to guarantee peace here must be seen, in the coming decades, as something "natural", as it was for NATO to have troops in Western Germany during the cold war age.

The multinationals, by the help of the new local comprador bourgeoisie in order to impose their dictatorship, have destroyed all the remnants of the structures of the socialist society in our region. And it is no wonder that the international NATO occupation of parts of Yugoslavia territory has been coupled with the agreements and open support of the governments of the rest of the Balkan countries. When NATO destroyed the bridges, connecting Vojvodina with the rest of Yugoslavia, Hungary made it clear that it wishes to annex that province, which is an integral part of Yugoslavia.

Bulgarian reactionary government allowed NATO forces to use unlimitedly the territory, the air space and parts of Bulgaria for the aggression against Yugoslavia, better to say – against the people of Yugoslavia. (Year ago they so placed the airport of Burgas at US Air Forces' disposal for the purposes of the aggression against Iraq.) Why did that happen at all? Was it because of our evil** Balkan mentality! I would answer – yes! It happened because of evil** mentality! But not because of the bad mentality of the people of the Balkans. It happened because of the bad character of Balkan bourgeoisie. For example – Bulgarian upper crust both from right and "left" fractions (Bulgarian Socialist Party) is striving to join NATO, and they approve unlimited use of facilities for all NATO operation in the region. It

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The highly developed big imperialist countries tend to maintain their economic dictatorship of dominant capital in the Balkans through open military aggression. The leading role in this case plays NATO. As an aggressive military organization, it has always been, and still is a repressive force, covering practically the whole world.

Twenty countries have been drawn into the aggression, and the occupation of large parts of former Yugoslavia. That is not an accidental fact. Western monopoly capitalists have profited substantially from the policies, they have carried out in the ex-socialist Balkan countries. Specific examples of these policies are the deregulation and liberalization, the privatization, the large-scale redistribution of the wealth and, as a result – the mass unemployment, pursued the right wing governments and enforced by the opportunist "left" wing forces. For example, everything in Bulgaria is submitted to the interests of the Western monopolies and their political servants in the country.

On the other side – the international corporations earned billions of dollars from the military adventure in the Balkans. But the looming war economy is giving enormous profits for the big business, first of all, in the USA. As the bombing of Yugoslavia started five years ago, the stock market took off and jumped 10 percent in early May 1999. At that time the Dow-Jones index, which had studied** below 10000 points for some time, not only reached 10000, but zoomed past 11000 points.

According to the economic analyses at that time of profits had been expected to stagnate or even decline in the first quarter of 1999 but for more than 100 large corporations they actually increased by 18 percent compared to the same period in 1998. For the stockholders and the high brass of the mega corporations the 13 billion dollars pays big dividends and wreaks uncounted billions of "collateral damage" to Yugoslavia's economy. Now we know what was the basic motivation for the "humanitarian" aggression against Yugoslavia.

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looks as if it is not difficult to answer the question about the behavior of the Bulgarian government. Bulgaria is an aspirant for NATO and EU members, because both these clubs bring many different benefits.

The question is –benefits for whom? It is sure –the benefits are not for the working people of Bulgaria. Such a behavior benefits the newly created Bulgarian bourgeoisie. That new** exploitative class is afraid to lose its privileged position in the restored capitalist society.

The new bourgeoisie in Bulgaria is unable to prevent alone its own class interests. That is why that new class expects that NATO, as a military class organization, will ensure its position in the society. And that is why the new Bulgarian bourgeoisie is apt to give anything that NATO prominent officials want to have. And no doubt –that is the case with every Balkan bourgeois government, especially with these, which are striving to join NATO now.

The real extent, to which the political upper crust in Bulgaria is pursuing the agenda, set by the new comprador bourgeoisie, is most clearly indicated by its long-term economic and financial strategy. The most powerful section of Bulgarian new exploitative class represented by the "red oligarchy" supports Bulgarian integration –first of all in NATO and then in the EU. They believe –the integration in NATO will make capitalism irreversible in Bulgaria. That position of the new bourgeoisie in Bulgaria is expectable and explainable. The case will be simple, if it concerns only the comprador upper crust. But the case turns complicated in concern to the behavior of the working class.

Right-wing ideology retains a powerful hold of the large sections of the new proletarians in Bulgaria. No doubt, it is a direct result of the collapse of socialism in our country and an effect of the unceasing massive anticommunist propaganda realized by all kinds of mass media for almost 15 years. A very important reason for the still weak influence of the communists upon the working class is the fact that a large number of the prominent persons of the ex-socialist state have transformed into new big bourgeoisie.

The working class and the potentially progressive section of petty owners still allow themselves to remain passive victims of the capitalist exploitation. The opportunists of all kinds, mainly the Bulgarian Socialist Party, are increasingly accommodating themselves to the interests of the new capitalist class by choosing the road of class collaboration and they are aided and abetted by bourgeoisie mass media, whose role is to stupefy people's minds.

Nevertheless, in spite of all these unfavorable circumstance the results of the sociological inquiries even now show that more than *** percent of Bulgarians reject integration of the country to NATO. But, no matter of this clear answer of the public opinion, the political upper crust of Bulgaria is maintaining that as if there is consent about it in the society. It is true –consent exists, but only among the reactionary circles and their servants –opportunists in Bulgaria. That collaboration is not something new or unknown. And it is due to all sections of social life. For example –the priority, given to controlling inflation and social and welfare expenditure rather than to promoting full employment and better social benefits and public services in Bulgaria is fully in accordance with the interests of big business, represented by the IMF.

The restriction policy is realized by the Monetary Board of the International Monetary Fund –the main financial instrument of the global imperialism. Bulgaria is now under its absolute control. The question is: Is it possible, in such situation, to overcome the dominance of the global monetary institution over our countries?

If we, the people of each country, struggle alone against it, the answer

is -No

If the Balkan people led by the communists opposed to it the answer is
-Yes

There is something very important to be noticed: on the Northern part of the Mediterranean there are three peninsulas -the Iberian, the Apennine, and the Balkan. They have almost the same amount of population: approximately 70 million inhabitants each. The area they occupy is almost the same too.

But on the Iberian peninsula there are two states and three nations; on the Apennines -one state and one nation. On the Balkans ten states and ten nations are situated besides the minorities, spread all over the area. No doubt -it is one of the most important prerequisites for our weakness. Nevertheless it is not the most important one. The pivotal cause for our weakness is the fact of the domination of the comprador bourgeoisie and the corrupted political upper crust in our country. It is most evident now -during the continuing hidden NATO aggression against us - the people of the Balkans. Such are some of the aspects of the contemporary situation in the Balkans. The counter strategy to NATO aggression is not an easy one on the Capital is, as things stand, much better organized on International level than the working people are.

A coordinated resistance of Balkan peoples is not only essential. It is of a superior importance. The cooperation among all parties, ecological and all other movements is the top priority of today, in the beginning of the new century.

End

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... the last war in the Balkans - that in Macedonia -it must be clear to everyone, that ** a military exit is possible from that region. Even now, after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the plans for further aggression against other countries, the Balkans will remain to be a central front for NATO. An international military presence to guarantee peace here must be seen, in the coming decades, as something "natural", as it was for NATO to have troops in Western Germany during the cold war age.

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On the Ruins of Yugoslavia

The Militarism of German Foreign Policy and the Dismantling of a State

By CATHRIN SCHÜTZ

In the shadow of new wars, the memory of the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is more and more fading into oblivion. Those who hoped for an inquiry about this first war in which the Federal Republic of Germany militarily participated are faced with silence. In Germany as in other countries, the US-American filmmaker and author Michael Moore, who takes a stand against Bush's belligerent policy in Iraq and who supported General Wesley Clark in his Presidential pre-election campaign, is highly celebrated. Clark, who in his function as NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe led the bombing of Yugoslavia, was the "anti-War Candidate", as Moore told his leftist audience.

"Collateral damage," including the bombing of civilians in Varvarin, bodies mutilated by cluster bombs in Nis, employees killed in the bombing of the RTS television station and the Chinese embassy, as well as the "humanitarian" military intervention as such, faced little opposition in the NATO countries -- with the exception of Greece. Even the "left" walked into the human-rights trap and supported -- although not unanimously -- the attack on the "Belgrade regime".

This first direct participation of Germany in an illegal war of aggression after World War II fundamentally changed German foreign policy: since then (and not since 9/11), wars are seen as a legitimate means of politics. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder himself admitted to being surprised by "how little it has been recognized that the decision for war meant a fundamental change in Germany's foreign and security policy."

The German Army, the Bundeswehr, has been transformed into a global intervention force in order to defend Germany even at the Hindukush, as Minister of Defence Peter Struck outlined in his Defence Policy Rules. "This is not about unduly giving room to military logic, but not to put this aspect of foreign politics under a taboo, as it was done for so long", Schröder said in late 2001.

The first steps in this direction were already undertaken by the then-governing Christian Democrats, CDU/CSU, in their 1992 Defense Rules. In the period prior to the "humanitarian" war against Yugoslavia they had yet to acquaint the public with what those really meant.

"I just think it is wrong to connect the moral too quickly with questions of war and peace without taking the aspect of national interest into consideration. () For the future I predict a considerable danger that the government, the ruling parties and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will search for or create causes to eliminate the barriers which are still in the way of a reunified German foreign policy. Humanitarian issues serve as a vehicle."(1) "(German) military operations must not take place where German troops carried out their devastating actions in World War II. I would be glad, if those who advocate it would not always hide behind human rights to enforce this position", stated Joseph Fischer -- in 1994.(2)

Since the NATO war of 1999 for him these principles belong to the past. He clarified that he is not carrying out "Green" foreign policy but "German".(3) The war against Yugoslavia opened the door for following and future wars. The bombs were still falling on Yugoslavia when NATO passed its new strategic concept, which proclaimed its right to engage in offensive "out-of-area" operations. While breaches of international law were part of a public debate during the aggression on Yugoslavia and had to be hidden under a humanitarian carpet, legal aspects seem to count less and less in the continuing "War on Terror".

Germany didn't "slip into" the war

To understand developments in German foreign policy, one should not confine the view to the military peak of the aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, in which Germany - according to General ret. Heinz Loquai - by no means "slipped into" the role of an allied power, but appeared to be the first country focusing on a military solution as early as spring of 1998.(4)

Yugoslavia was essential for the emancipation of German foreign policy and that change dates back to 1991.

The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 was the first massive appearance of the Federal Republic of Germany on the international stage. Despite all warnings the government of Kohl/Genscher stood forth and thwarted any negotiated solutions that could have prevented the bloody civil wars in which Yugoslavia fell apart. "Regardless of all celebrated declarations to stand for peace and to refrain from striving for power", given by Germany just one year before in the so-called "Two-Plus-Four"-treaty, "the Federal Republic of Germany interfered massively in the internal affairs of one of the states of the Anti-Hitler-Coalition. Germany, reunified and strong, stepped on the international stage and for the first time since World War II openly pursued great power politics -- in the Balkans, where it had already wreaked great mischief twice in this century.(5)

There was an "Independent State of Croatia" once before, in 1941 as a creation of Hitler and Mussolini, supported by the Roman Catholic Church and led by the fascist Ustasha. Half a century later, an independent Croatia was again established through the influence of Germany and the Vatican. Croatia was governed by Franjo Tudjman's party, which openly revived the politics of the Ustasha who had committed some of the most horrible acts of genocide in the 20th Century under their fascist leader Ante Pavelic, murdering hundreds of thousands of Serbs.(6) To this day, the crimes of the Ustasha are among

the least recognized crimes of World War II. Were Serbian survivors and their descendants not the only ones to remember this part of history, the German policy of recognition as well as the presentation of the Croatian conflict in the media could not have happened nor gone unchallenged as it did.

Kurt Köpruner, a businessman who travelled to Yugoslavia many times in the 1990's and was thus an eye-witness to that tragedy, concluded from heated debates on the impending disintegration of the country end-1990 in Croatia: "If it really comes to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, this cannot possibly happen without horrible bloodshed and hundreds of thousands of deaths". (7) He began to realise why this was the common view when he read about the course of World War II in the Balkans. For the first time, he learned about mass slaughters by the Ustasha, Muslim and Albanian SS divisions.

Tudjman, who became President in the first Croatian multi-party-election in 1990 and who led the country into independence with the help of Germany in 1991, had in 1989 already played down the Holocaust in general and the Ustasha crimes against Serbs at the death camp of Jasenovac in particular. Under Tudjman's rule a revival of Ustasha symbols and ideals took place. A new constitution did not contain a single word regarding the rights of Serbs living in Croatia. Terror against Serbs started, "systematically and controlled from the top". In masses, they were dismissed from work, and "messages urging them to leave the country were stuck on the doors of Serb houses." (8) In a referendum -- declared as illegal by Tudjman -- the Croatian Serbs voted to remain in Yugoslavia.

Months before German recognition and the outbreak of the war, on May 2nd, 1991, the "Dalmatian Kristallnacht" took place. (9) Supported by the local police, 2,000 Croats destroyed 116 Serbian shops and houses in Zadar in an action lasting several hours. On October 16th, 1991 the "Night of the Long Knives" followed, with more than hundred Serb civilians tortured and executed. (10) The Western media remained silent. Only the New York Times reported in December 1993: "The government of Croatia has forced thousands of its opponents from their homes and from the country, according to the new Zagreb office of Human Rights. The actions have been directed mostly against Serbs, but also against Croats opposing the politics of President Tudjman. Since 1991, the Croatian authorities have blown up or razed tens of thousands of mostly Serb houses, but also houses of Croats. ... Whole families were killed. All in all, about 280,000 Croatian Serbs have fled the country." According to Susan Woodward, the Croatian government had already expelled all Serbs that were under their control by 1993. (11) One should wonder whether this was the "democracy, that the Serbs, as indigenous people, living in one-third of communist Tito-created Croatia, had to accept", asked the New York Times and added in April 1997: "Did the West become so sick as to allow Croatian fascism to live its afterlife?"

How much the Croatian people really supported Tudjman's policy, foreseeing the bloodshed, remains unclear. At least the referendum on independence should not be used to measure the support since it was quite the opposite of the "clear and overwhelming will of the Croatian people", as Westerners celebrated it. The voters were considerably pressed to make the right choice in the ballot. (12)

The distorted image of Serb expansion

Germany's recognition of Croatia should be questioned not only in the light of the political powers it brought to the fore, but also from a legal point of view. While the majority of international law experts agree that Slovenia's secession was an execution of the peoples' right to self-determination, it is considered illegal in Croatia and Bosnia, where a main part of the Serbs outside Serbia have been living for centuries in coherent areas.(13)

Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly pointed out this problem. He did not oppose the right to self-determination, but he demanded this right for all peoples. "He pointed out that there are more than six hundred thousand Serbs living in Croatia, who represent the clear majority of the population in some areas of Krajina and Slavonia. The right to self-determination would have to be acknowledged to them as well. The existing borders between the Yugoslav republics were mere administrative borders."(14)

Serbia showed a willingness to negotiate new borders and warned all parties not to confront others with a *fait accompli* -- as happened short thereafter due to German recognition -- which would lead to an out of control escalation. To give up their historical ground was an impossible demand for the Serbs. They "said good-bye to Slovenia. They would also have let Croatia go without the Krajina. Since it was the will of the Krajina Serbs, Belgrade intended to tie the Krajina to the motherland. But Croatia and later Bosnia wanted to take historical Serbian areas into independence."(15)

Charles Boyd, former Deputy Commander in Chief of the US European Command, in 1995 opposed "the popular image of this war (as) one of unrelenting Serb expansion" in Foreign Affairs: "Much of what Zagreb calls the occupied territories is in fact land held by Serbs for more than three centuries. The same is true of most Serb land in Bosnia, what the Western media frequently refers to as the 70 percent of was Bosnia seized by rebel Serbs. In short, the Serbs are not trying to conquer new territory, but merely to hold on to what was already theirs."

The Milosevic administration demanded the right of self-determination for the Serbs as well and warned of a repetition of the crimes of World War II. "When the Croats declared independence, they did not give the Serbs in their own country -- and there are 600,000 of them -- any guarantees whatsoever. It was therefore understandable that for this reason the Serbs were very worried. First of all, if we bear in mind the villainy of the Ustasas during World War II", Lord Carrington stated. But when a settlement for the Krajina and Slavonia question was just about to be achieved, "the European Community decided end-1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia received what it wanted, Slovenia as well, and they had no longer a desire to go on with the peace conference. Hans Dietrich Genscher wanted international recognition for Slovenia and Croatia. Practically all the others opposed it."(16)

But the fears that arose in the minds of the Serbs were ignored and depicted as an aggressive plan for "Greater Serbia".(17)

Soon, foreign states started to interfere in the conflict. German military

instructors were serving in Croatia, and the Bundeswehr participated in air control missions and the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia. Illegal arms deliveries to Slovenia and Croatia followed, partly carried out through the German secret service.(18) The US opposed the Serbs and supported the Croats and Bosnian Muslims. "Finally, the NATO powers supported Croatian nationalism, and in 1995 Tudjman's army, trained by US commanders and illegally equipped by the 'International Community', was in a position to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs which had begun with the help of the Nazis in 1941."(19) According to the distinguished military journal "Jane's Defence Weekly", the so-called "Operation Storm", the most brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in the time of Yugoslavia's destruction, had been planned and executed not only by the Croat Ante Gotovina but also by the Kosovo Albanian Agim Ceku who later became head of the KLA.

In the case of Bosnia, it was the US that pressed for diplomatic recognition. Again, the conflict was depicted as the result of Serb aggression. But former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger defined the conflict as a three-sided civil war and not an invasion being waged against a sovereign state. "Croatia and Serbia support their compatriots in Bosnia. The most irresponsible mistake in the current Bosnian tragedy was the international recognition of the Bosnian state under the authority of the Muslims. Blindly following the precedent of Germany's premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the international community created all the former Yugoslav republics as independent states."(20)

The NATO operation in Macedonia, where Albanian rebels operating out of Kosovo intensified their fighting in 2001, was highly disputed in Germany. A "decision against the deployment of the Bundeswehr would have been an important and valuable step towards a change in German politics and would not have lacked its meaning for future European politics and even the position of the US", Knut Mertens of the Green Party said.(21) But on August 30th, 2001 the German Parliament approved the operation called "Essential Harvest", which was not a peaceful arms collecting mission, but clearly meant as military intervention by NATO and the Bundeswehr respectively.(22)

Although the Social Democrat Gernot Erler promoted the deployment of German soldiers by affirming that it would only be temporary, the parliament eventually approved the following operation "Amber Fox" on September 27th, 2001. Almost invisible to the German public, Germany took over the lead of the NATO mandate in Macedonia in the shadow of 9/11.

Who is responsible for the Kosovo violence?

Following the NATO aggression of 1999 German troops were deployed in Kosovo under the auspice of KFOR. As NATO and the UN stand by, it is not only organized crime that is flourishing. In a continuous and planned campaign and its massive recent escalation, Kosovo is being ethnically cleansed of all non-Albanians.

Despite official announcements to disarm the KLA and restore a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, it is mainly the US and Germany that have financed the ongoing terror in Kosovo after the NATO aggression by supporting the Kosovo Protection Corps. All other countries had withdrawn their support for the

...rps which is manned by former KLA fighters after evidence had emerged that they were responsible for murders and violent attacks.(23) Following a 1999 Executive Order by the US President, the KLA was trained in terrorist tactics, obviously inspired by the idea to instigate a new crisis in case President Milosevic would win the elections.(24)

Whether foreign powers directly backed the recent coordinated acts of violence and expulsion or just stood by, in any case they share responsibility. In the same way already predominant in 1998 both sides are held accountable for the terrorist violence of the Albanian fighters who have always stood for an "ethnically pure Kosova". In an absurd distortion of the facts, the UN Security Council "called on all communities in Kosovo to stop all acts of violence" ú as seen in 1998.

Anyway the restoration of a multi-ethnic Kosovo ever since has been one of the fairy-tales only believed by those who thought that NATO had intervened for "humanitarian reasons" in 1999.

Cathrin Schütz, born 1971, studied political science at J.W.-Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main. She is a contributing writer for the German daily *junge Welt*. She is author of the book "Die NATO-Intervention in Jugoslawien. Hintergründe, Nebenwirkungen und Folgen", published in 2003 with a preface of Member of German Parliament Willy Wimmer by Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag, Vienna.

The article was published in a slightly shortened version on March 26th 2004 in the German daily *Neues Deutschland*

Footnotes

1. "Die Woche", 12-30-1994
2. Fischer as quoted in: Horst-Eberhard Richter, "IPPNW zum Jugoslawienkrieg", www.nato-tribunal.de
3. Cf. "Stern", 03-24-1999
4. Cf. Heinz Loquai, "Weichenstellungen für einen Krieg", Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, pp44-45
5. Ralph Hartmann, "Die ehrlichen Makler", Dietz, Berlin 1999, p13
6. After World War II Pavelic fled to Argentina via Rome and died in a German hospital in Madrid in 1954, having been personally blessed by Pope Pius XII. Until today the genocide of the Serbs committed by Croats has been neither condemned adequately nor seriously studied. At the opening celebration of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, history was perverted: not the Serbs, but the Croats were invited. That and further information are following the work of Diana Johnstone, "Fool's Crusade, Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions", Monthly Review Press, New York 2002
7. Kurt Köpruner, "Reisen in das Land der Kriege", Espresso, Berlin 2001, p27
8. Malte Olschewski, "Von den Karawanken bis zum Kosovo. Die geheime Geschichte der Kriege in Jugoslawien", Braumüller, Vienna 2000, p34
9. Köpruner, pp44, Olschewski, p34
10. Cf. Olschewski, p38
11. The other part, living in Krajina and other parts of Croatia that were not controlled by Tudjman, was expelled in Operation Storm in 1995 with the support of the US government.
12. Cf. Köpruner, pp51-53

13. Cf. Olschewski, p14
14. Köpruner, p31
15. Olschewski, p14
16. "Profil", 12-01-1993
17. To this day there has been no proof for the allegation that Slobodan Milosevic planned to create a Greater Serbia. Ralph Hartmann shows that Milosevic's Kosovo Polje Speech could only be used as evidence for his "aggressive" and "nationalistic" line by quoting out of context to change the meaning
18. Cf. Olschewski, p78,80
19. The US involvement in Operation Storm was openly mentioned in a hearing of the US Congress on 02-28-2002. Cf. "The U. N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice of Show of Justice?", Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress
20. Washington Post, 05-17-1993
21. Knut Mertens, "Neues NATO-Protectorat oder ehrliche Friedenspolitik?", "Zeit-Fragen", 08-20-2001, p1
22. Cf. Tobias Pflüger, "Krieg, und zwar richtig", "junge Welt", 08-23-2001
23. Cf. Interview with Member of Congress Dennis Kucinich by Cathrin Schütz, "Wird Sanktionspolitik bald beendet?", "junge Welt", 10-07-2000.
24. Cf. Dennis Kucinich, "What I learnt from the War", The Progressive, August 1999

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Van: "R Despotovic" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Dolf Loth" <loh@hesasd.nl>; "Zdenko Tomanovic" <zdenkot@eunet.yu>;
 <speerpunt@wxs.nl>; "Slavoljub Zika Ivanovic" <smed.palanka@web.de>; "Sara Flounders"
 <iacenter@iacenter.org>; "Ratko Nikolic" <r.nikolic@chello.nl>; "Mila Aleckovic Nikolic"
 <anmila@ptt.yu>; "Michel COLLON" <michel.collon@skynet.be>; "Marrie Kardol"
 <mkardol@mac.com>; "Gordana Milanovic-Kovacevic" <gordana.m-k@t-online.de>; "Civikov
 Germinal" <civikov@wanadoo.nl>; "Christina Grbic" <ssicc@planet.nl>; "Cathrin Schuetzl"
 <CSchuetzl1@aol.com>; "Beogradski formu za svet ravnopravnih" <beoforum@verat.net>;
 "Andy Wilcoxson" <andywilcoxson@comcast.net>; "Nebojsa Joveljic" <nebojsa@xtra.co.nz>;
 "Predrag Vitkovic" <p_vitko@hotmail.com>; "Paul Davidson" <p.davidson@btinternet.com>;
 "Mrs. Jela Jovanovic" <nerajov@eunet.yu>; "Misa Ognjanovic"
 <misaognjanovic@yahoo.com>; "Misa Gavrilovic" <mishag1@cwcom.net>; "Ljiljana Verner"
 <ljverner@aol.com>; "hde_tollenaere" <hde_tollenaere@zonnet.nl>;
 <hans.hupkes@planet.nl>; "Meindert Stelling" <meindert.stelling@planet.nl>; "Nico & Neeltje"
 <sagitar@hetnet.nl>; "Branka Obradovic" <b.obradovic@aon.at>; "Branka Novakovic"
 <richardenbeba@pi.net>; "Ksenija Sigulinski" <lizamia@zonnet.nl>; "DIRECT DRAGAN
 DIRECT" <classic2direct@yahoo.com>
Verzonden: maandag 12 april 2004 0:42
Onderwerp: Peticija
[Index] ~ Intro: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Eng\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#)
 Read petition: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#) [\[Ger\]](#) ~ Sign petition: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Eng\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#) [\[Rus\]](#)

WE ARE ASHAMED AND WE REQUEST

**To Her Majesty Queen ELIZABETH II,
 The Queen of a number of Commonwealth realms,
 including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand
 and Canada and the Head of the Commonwealth, a
 voluntary association of 53 independent countries.**

**Messieurs: Bertie AHERN, T. D., Taoiseach, Presidency of the European
 Council, European Parliament, Kofi A. ANNAN, Secretary-General of the
 United Nations, George BUSH, President of the United States of America,
 His Majesty King Juan CARLOS I of Spain, Jacques CHIRAC, President of
 the French Republic, Carlo Azeglio CIAMPI, President of Italy, Pat COX,
 President of the European Parliament, H. E. Julian Robert HUNTE,
 President, Fifty-eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, Hu JINTAO,
 President of the People's Republic of China, Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen
 (A.P.J.) Abdul KALAM, President of India, Vladimir PUTIN, President of the
 Russian Federation, Johannes RAU, Federal President of the F. R.
 Germany, and European Council Presidency: all members Federal
 Parliament of the Russian Federation: all members, National Assembly of
 the French Republic: all members, National People's Congress of China: all
 members, Parliament of the F. R. Germany — German Bundestag: all
 members, Parliament of India: all members, Parliament of Italy — Camera
 dei Deputati: all members, Parliament of Italy — Senato della Repubblica:
 all members, United Kingdom Parliament — House of Lords: all members,
 United Kingdom Parliament — House of Commons: all members, UN**

General Assembly: all members, UN Security Council: all members, United States House of Representatives: all US Representatives, United States Senate: all US Senators.

Cc: The Presidents and the Assemblies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Srpska and the Federal Republic State Community of Serbia and Montenegro.

Your Majesties
Queen Elizabeth II and King Juan Carlos I

Your Excellencies Messieurs
AHERN, ANNAN, BUSH, CHIRAC, COX, HUNTE, JINTAO, PUTIN AND SCHRÖDER,

and dear Ladies and Gentlemen
Members of the UN General Assembly and of the UN Security Council,
Members of the European Council Presidency,
Members of the national Assemblies/Parliaments,
USA Representatives and Senators.

We kindly ask you to read this public document and act accordingly for humanity, justice and liberty.

WE ARE ASHAMED FOR THE TERROR AGAINST THE SERBS

We, the signatories of this document who are the legal and legitimate citizens of the occidental countries where we live (shown in our addresses, if not stated otherwise): Canada, countries of the European Community or the United States of America, we are ashamed for the lies on the Serbs, for the use of the lies to justify unjustifiable ignorance of both equal human and national rights of the Serbs, and for the terror against the Serbs.

The lies on the Serbs have been supported, forcefully distributed, continuously since 1988, or even created by the occidental media and/or governments, in particular by the Clinton Government of the USA, such as the following that contradict shamefully the truth:

- The false claim that the Republics of ex-SFR Yugoslavia had a legitimate right for their secessions.

The legitimate right for self-determination including separation was given exclusively to Yugoslav nations, and not to Yugoslav Republics. This is clearly expressed by the first sentence of the Constitution of ex-SFRY. The occidental countries anti-constitutionally and forcefully recognised the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia from ex-SFRY. This forced the Serbs to defend their lives, rights and properties in their ancestral land. The Serbs have had the equal right for self-determination including separation as all other Yugoslav nations, which is clearly expressed also by the UN Charter (Paragraph 2 of the Article 1 of the UN Chapter). The occidental Governments recognised the rights and the results of the referendums of all Yugoslav nations except those of Serbs.

- The false claim that the Serbs started the wars in Slovenia and Croatia.

The Serbs did not start any war in ex-SFR Yugoslavia, but they were forced to defend themselves in Croatia. Majority of the federal army soldiers and officers in the federal Yugoslav Army in Slovenia were not Serbs. The majority of the federal Yugoslav Army leaders were not Serbs. Besides, Serbs were not majority in the

Presidency of ex-SFRY. The last President of Yugoslav Presidency was not Serb. The federal Prime Minister was not Serb. The Republic of Croatia eliminated the status of the Serbs as one of two constitutive nations from the Constitution, which was recognised to the Serbs in the Constitution of the former Socialist Republic Croatia. Moreover, the Republic of Croatia rejected to recognise either the autonomy of the Serbs in Krayina and Slavoniya or the result of their referendum. Such changes and increasing campaign against the Serbs, which forced them to remind themselves of their history in the Hitler established Nazi Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War, pressed them to defend themselves and their rights in Krayina and Slavoniya — the parts of Croatia inhabited by the Serbs for at least last six centuries. The accusation was false also due to the following facts:

- it was the Croatian paramilitary unit that started fighting against the Serbs in Krayina and Slavonia in order to prevent Serbs in their endeavours to realise their equal human and national rights and to implement the result of their constitutional referendum,
- the Serbs became constitutionally one of national minorities in the Republic of Croatia,
- the Serbs were forced to accept the treatment as minority in their ancestral land where their number was inherently reduced due to the genocidal torture by the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War,
- the Serbs in Krayina and Slavoniya were pressed to separate from Yugoslavia against the result of their referendum, and
- several hundreds of thousands of Serbs were expelled from their ancestral land Krayina and Slavoniya during the well prepared and actually supported by the Clinton USA Government military offensive "Storm" for the ethnic cleansing (1995).

- The false claim that the Serbs were aggressor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Serbs were severely forced to defend themselves, their rights and their heritage. Bosnia and Herzegovina have been a part of the ancestral land of the Serbs, who were one of three constitutive nations of S. R. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs were inhabiting more than 73% and were possessing and defending through centuries more than 62% of the land being their family heritage private property for ever. The accusation was false also due to the following facts:

- it was a Muslim group that killed the groom's father Mr. Nikola Gardovitch and wounded another their cousin at Serbian wedding in Sarajevo, (beginning of 1992),
- it was a Croatian paramilitary unit that entered Bosnia and massacred Serbs in Bosanski Brod its Mayor (1992),
- the Croatian paramilitary unit continued the next day jointly with a Muslim paramilitary unit to fire Serbian village Siyekovats together with its inhabitants,
- it was the further escalation of the atrocities committed against Serbs when Muslim paramilitary units massacred more than thousand two hundred of innocent civil Serbs around Srebrenitsa, Skelani, Militchi and Bratunats in Bosnia,
- it was the series of these events which forced Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend themselves military in order to escape the repetition of the destiny that their parents had passed under the Hitler Nazi occupation during the Second World War,
- the Serbs were forced to suffer in silence for Muslim killing of more than thousand innocent Serbs on orthodox Christmas in the village Kravitse (7 January 1993) and in burnt several villages: mainly women and children since the men were on the front,
- the Serbs were forced to be silent when they were falsely accused that they had organised concentration camps in Bosnia, which should have been proved by showing a falsified photo,
- the Serbs were forced to suffer also in silence for video cassettes showing Muslim commander Naser Orić holding heads of Serbs, or showing him killing Serbs, which were circulating at that time in Bosnia in order to please those who were financing Mujahedeens' participation in the war.

- The false accusation against the Serbs that they committed bombing of civilians at the Sarajevo market Markale.

The Serbs did not commit that crime. This fact has become well known, but still shamefully hidden from the occidental nations.

- The false accusation against the Serbs that they committed massacre of

7-8 thousands of innocent Muslims in Srebrenitsa.

Such massacre did not take place. The truth has been severely forbidden to be publicised in the occidental media.

The above false accusations against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were world-wide used to justify unjustifiable bombing of Republic of Srpska (1995) and to enforce their demonisation.

- False accusation against the Serbs that Albanians had lost their human rights, that they were tortured and subjected to genocide.

This contradicts the truth that Albanian immigrants into Serbia enjoyed the human rights equal to or even greater than what immigrants have had in occidental countries and that Albanian terrorist were torturing Serbs for decades.

- The Serbs were exposed to the fascist Great Albania inhuman occupation in the South West part of Serbia — in the Serbian cradle Kosovo and Metohiya, which is their ancestral land, during the Second World War. This resulted in a more than hundred fifty thousands of expelled autochthon Serbs and more than hundred thousands of Albanian Nazi protected newcomers.
- The Serbs were forbidden by the communist Government of Josip Broz Tito to help the expelled autochthon people to return to their homes and properties in Kosovo and Metohiya after the Second World War.
- Serbia was admitting after 1948, by understanding the suffering of the Albanian people under Stalinist dictatorship of Enver Hoja, hundreds of thousands of Albanian immigrants to Kosovo and Metohiya.
- Serbia was enabling the Albanian immigrants to live in freedom, with equal political rights and employment opportunities, full social and health security, cheap good apartments, and free of charge scholarship for education in their native language.
- The Serbs had to observe silently and to suffer from the continued terror after the Second World War of those Albanians who were forcing Serbian families to leave their houses and properties in order to get ethnically clean Albanian region and then to separate Kosovo and Metohiya from the other part of Serbia.
- The artificially granted autonomy to Kosovo and Metohiya was changed legally and legitimately by the valid decision of its Assembly (1989).

- The false accusation against the Serbs that they committed the massacre of innocent civil Albanians in Racak (1999).

Such a massacre did not ever happen. This false accusation, together with the former false accusations that Albanian people did not enjoy human, social and political rights in Serbia, was used as the reason and justification to start unjustifiably bombing the people of Serbia and Montenegro (1999).

- The false accusation against the Serbs for the exodus of the Albanian people.

It started only on the third day of the NATO bombardment as its consequence. This lie was used not only to demonise further the Serbs but also to justify the continuous bombing of the people of Serbia through 78 days and nights altogether.

- False information that the UN forces are liberating troops in Kosovo and Metohiya.

The Serbs have been forbidden to defend themselves and they have been subjected to the recovered Hitler-like fascist occupation in their ancestral land. The Albanian terrorists, partially organised by Mujahedeens and instructed by Bin Laden, who came freely to fight in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia - Kosovo and Metohiya, partially instructed by the USA military experts, have become protected, sometimes even supported, by KFOR. In the presence of the so called international peacekeeping forces, the Serbs have been expelled almost completely (more than two hundred fifty thousands) from Kosovo and Metohiya. Their ancient invaluable and internationally appreciated monuments, monasteries, as well as private properties, have been

destroyed in the presence of the international UN troops. The innocent civil Serbs (more than three thousands only after the NATO bombardment 1999) have been massacred every day in the presence of the international UN troops.

- Hidden information that more than 7 thousands children were killed in Yugoslavia's Civil Wars, twice as many as Croat and Muslim children combined. Tragedy for all three nations.

The lies on the Serbs were used to justify unjustifiable:

- treatment of the Serbs as the aggressor,
- eight years long exhaustive sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro,
- the propaganda against the Serbs and the world-wide their demonisation,
- expulsion of Serbs from Krayina and Slavoniya,
- the reduction of the land belonging to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 64% to 49%,
- the Clinton USA Government led bombing of the Serbs in Republic of Srpska,
- the unacceptable reduction of human and national rights of the Serbs in all parts of ex-SFR Yugoslavia,
- the Clinton USA Government led NATO bombing of Serbia and Montenegro,
- the continuous escalation of the Hitler-like Albanian fascistic occupation of Kosovo and Metohiya and crimes under the protection of KFOR against the autochthon Serbs,
- occupation of the Serbs and their Governments by preventing them to recover freely and democratically their liberty, independence and statehood, which is expressed by dictates to, and even by blackmailing, their Governments in Republic Srpska, Serbia and Montenegro.

- The fully unjustifiable, nothing provoked, NATO bombings (1995 and 1999) with the depleted uranium sowed the continuous everyday death in Republic Srpska and Serbia.

WE REQUEST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR THE SERBS

In order to ensure the equal rights guaranteed to all Yugoslav nations by both the Constitution of ex-SFRY and the UN Charter, in order to enable all people on the territory of ex-SFRY to live in freedom and peace, in order to permit good relationships among the Yugoslav nations, minorities and their neighbours, in order to help their peaceful developments; in order to help the UN and the whole international community to accept and support an honest effective long term solution in the sense of the UN Charter for the political and national problems in Yugoslavia, we, all the signatories, refer to our rights guaranteed by the same documents and we submit the following peaceful and human

REQUEST

to you to accept, support and enable the effective achievement of the following:

1. Truthful informing of the occidental nations about all Yugoslav peoples, naturally including the Serbs, hence, the interruption of the unjustifiable demonisation of the Serbs.
2. The full appreciation, recognition and implementation of the equal rights of the Serbs, such as of all other Yugoslav nations, for self-determination including separation.
3. The protected and materially supported peaceful return and safe resettlement of all the expelled persons and families to their homes and properties in ex-SFRY (in Krayina, Slavoniya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the South West part of Serbia — Kosovo and Metohiya, and in Macedonia) in the next six months, if they wished to return.
4. The complete and strict application of the Dayton Agreement so that every deviation, distortion or ignorance of its full and rigorous implementation should be immediately stopped.
5. The complete and strict application of the UN Charter and the UN Resolution 1244 so that every deviation, distortion or ignorance of their full and rigorous implementation should be immediately stopped. Hence, the immediate interruption of the ignorance of the sovereignty of the Republic of

- Serbia over its whole territory that includes Kosovo and Metohiya, and the continuation of the legal and legitimate recognition of its complete sovereignty.
6. The Government of Serbia should re-establish the complete state sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia over its South West part — Kosovo and Metohiya in the next four months.
 7. All foreigners who do not have and who do not get permission of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of the Government of the Republic of Srpska should leave their territories peacefully and safely in the next four months. Foreigners are those who are not their legal and legitimate citizens.
 8. All foreigners who do not have and who do not get permission of the Governments of the Republic of Serbia or of the Government of the Republic of Montenegro should leave their territories peacefully and safely in the next four months. Foreigners are those who are not their legal and legitimate citizens.
 9. All the foreign military troops should leave peacefully and safely the territory of Bosnia and in the next six months.
 10. All the foreign military troops should leave peacefully and safely the South West part of Serbia — Kosovo and Metohiya — in the next six months. This includes naturally all Albanian military troops (former "UCK" i. e. "ALA") and police units that are not legally and legitimately recognised by the Government of R. Serbia.
 11. The equal right of Bosnyaks, Croats and Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska to decide in free national referendums whether to stay in the states in which they are now or to unite with their neighbouring national parts in the new states.

With hope that you will kindly consider and accept our Request, we, the signatories, remain yours respectfully.

~~On behalf of all signatories signed and will be sent by~~
On behalf of all signatories sent and will be sent again by
Lyubomir T. Gruyitch
E-mail: lyubomir_gruyitch@freeserbs.org
~~E-mail: lyubomir_gruyitch@yahoo.com~~

[Sign the petition] [All signatories] [Index]

Petition open date: March 06, 2004
~~Deadline: March 18, 2004.~~
Petition is available for signing til we collect 10,000 signatures.
Today: April 12, 2004
Current status: *Available for signing.*

[\[This petition Index page\]](#)

[\[Index\]](#) ~ Intro: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Eng\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#)
Read petition: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#) [\[Ger\]](#) ~ Sign petition: [\[Srp cyr\]](#) [\[Srp lat\]](#) [\[Eng\]](#) [\[Fra\]](#) [\[Rus\]](#)

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Project Coordinator: [Dragutin Mladich <g@freeserbs.org>](mailto:Dragutin.Mladich@g@freeserbs.org)
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Kroatië succesvol etnisch gezuiverd

Van de redactie

Jul 2002

De resultaten van de nationale volkstelling voor 2001 tonen hoe succesvol de etnische zuivering in Kroatië is geweest: bijna 90 procent van de bevolking heeft de Kroatische nationaliteit. Het Kroatische aandeel in de bevolking bedroeg in de telling van 1991 nog 77 procent.

Serviërs, die voor het begin van de burgeroorlog in voormalig Joegoslavië 12 procent van de bevolking uitmaakten, vertegenwoordigen nu nog amper 4,5 procent van een populatie van 4,4 miljoen.

In Kroatië woonden in maart 2001 nog 201.631 Serviërs, tegenover 600.000 in 1991. In dat jaar verklaarde Kroatië, met actieve steun van Duitsland en het Vaticaan, zich onafhankelijk. Onmiddellijk werd de confrontatie gezocht met de in Kroatië woonachtige Serviërs en de Federale Republiek Joegoslavië. Er kwam een grondwet die de Serviërs tot tweederangs burgers maakte en de oude symbolen van het fascistische Kroatië werden uit de kast gehaald. De niet-Kroaten, met name de Serviërs, werden weer geconfronteerd met de gruwelijke moordpartijen van de Kroatische fascisten in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, die de Duitse fascisten menigmaal overtroffen bij hun misdaden.

Het land kreeg op clandestiene wijze omvangrijke wapenleveranties van Duitsland, die o.a. de arsenalen van het leger van de voormalige DDR leeghaalden. Het Kroatische leger veroverde in augustus 1995 met ondersteuning van de NAVO de Krajina, waar Serviërs 90 procent van de bevolking uitmaakten. Zo'n 250.000 Serviërs werden toen in één week

uit hun woonplaatsen gedreven, richting Servië. Zo'n twintigduizend Servische huizen gingen toen volgens internationale waarnemers in vlammen op en twaalfhonderd Servische burgers werden gedood in de nasleep van een militaire operatie. De etnische zuivering vond niet enkel plaats in de Krajina. Ook de Servische minderheid in de steden werden door Kroatische nationalisten lastiggevalen en weggepest.

De politieke reacties op de nieuwe Kroatische bevolkingsstatistiek variëren van onverschilligheid tot de uitspraak van een nationalistisch parlementslid dat verklaart dat 'dit het beste nieuws in jaren is'.

Kritiek

De enige kritische reacties zijn afkomstig van de mensenrechtenorganisaties en van de overblijvende Kroatische Serviërs. Milorad Pupovac, leider van de Servische Nationale Raad in Kroatië, vindt dat alle partijen zich aan de nieuwe realiteit moeten aanpassen en dat de Serviërs in Kroatië een betere behandeling verdienen. 'We willen dat de Servische minderheid gereïntegreerd wordt in de Kroatische maatschappij. Helaas is dat nog een onmogelijke zaak.' Pupovac wijst erop dat Kroatië de enige voormalige Joegoslavische republiek is zonder een behoor-

lijke minderheidswet. De goedkeuring van de wet was al beloofd voor mei 2000. De hervormingsgezinde partijen, die de nationalisten versloegen in 2000, beloofden bij hun aantreden dat de minderheden een betere bescherming zouden genieten, maar er is weinig vooruitgang geboekt.

De Kroatische kieswet kent een drempel van 5 procent voor de vertegenwoordiging in het lokale bestuur. De Raad van Europa heeft Kroatië al op de vingers getikt omdat die drempel te hoog is. Met hun 4,5 procent kunnen de Kroatische Serviërs een politieke vertegenwoordiging op gemeentelijk niveau vergeten. De Servische minderheid vreest dat als de kiesdrempel wordt toegepast op nationaal niveau, ze dezelfde nominale vertegenwoordiging krijgt als de 19.000-koppige Italiaanse gemeenschap.

In vrijwel alle landen die zich van de Federale Republiek Joegoslavië hebben afgescheiden, dan wel - zoals in het geval van Kosovo - door NAVO-ingrijpen zijn bezet, heeft etnische zuivering. Alleen in Servië, dat meer dan een miljoen vluchtelingen vanuit alle etnische groepen heeft opgevangen, is dit niet gebeurd. Daar leven nog ruim twintig verschillende volken bij elkaar.

Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-johnson@lineone.net>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:>
Verzonden: woensdag 14 april 2004 0:31
Onderwerp: CDSM:Fw: Kosovo "Freedom Fighters" Financed By Organised Crime by Michel Chossudovsky

To compliment our recent articles about US/KLA connections we are distributing this earlier article by Professor Michel Chossudovsky. IJ.

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 > <http://www.transnational.org/features/crimefinanced.html>
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 > Kosovo "Freedom Fighters" Financed By Organised Crime
 >
 > Michel Chossudovsky
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> Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping mission, NATO's ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes far beyond the breach of international law. While Slobodan Milosevic is demonised, portrayed as a remorseless dictator, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is upheld as a self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the rights of ethnic Albanians. The truth of the matter is that the KLA is sustained by organised crime with the tacit approval of the United States and its allies.

>
 > Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion has been carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics trade has played a crucial role in "financing the conflict" in Kosovo in accordance with Western economic, strategic and military objectives. Amply documented by European police files, acknowledged by numerous studies, the links of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to criminal syndicates in Albania, Turkey and the European Union have been known to Western governments and intelligence agencies since the mid-1990s.

>
 > "...The financing of the Kosovo guerilla war poses critical questions and it sorely test claims of an "ethical" foreign policy. Should the West back a guerilla army that appears to partly financed by organised crime." 1

>
 > While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police Organization based in the Hague) was "preparing a report for European interior and justice ministers on a connection between the KLA and Albanian drug gangs."2 In the meantime, the rebel army has been skilfully heralded by the global media (in the months preceding the NATO bombings) as broadly representative of the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

>
 > With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter") appointed as chief negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become the de facto helmsman of the peace process on behalf of the ethnic Albanian majority and this despite its links to the drug trade. The West was relying on its KLA puppets to

er-stamp an agreement which would have transformed Kosovo into an occupied territory under Western Administration.

> Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia, had described the KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher Hill, America's chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet agreement "has also been a strong critic of the KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs."³ Moreover, barely a few two months before Rambouillet, the US State Department had acknowledged (based on reports from the US Observer Mission) the role of the KLA in terrorising and uprooting ethnic Albanians:

> "...the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the police, ... KLA representatives had threatened to kill villagers and burn their homes if they did not join the KLA [a process which has continued since the NATO bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment has reached such intensity that residents of six villages in the Stimlje region are "ready to flee." ⁴

> While backing a "freedom movement" with links to the drug trade, the West seems also intent in bypassing the civilian Kosovo Democratic League and its leader Ibrahim Rugova who has called for an end to the bombings and expressed his desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Yugoslav authorities.⁵ It is worth recalling that a few days before his March 31st Press Conference, Rugova had been reported by the KLA (alongside three other leaders including Fehmi Agani) to have been killed by the Serbs.

> Covert Financing of "Freedom Fighters"

> Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo is similar to other CIA covert operations in Central America, Haiti and Afghanistan where "freedom fighters" were financed through the laundering of drug money. Since the onslaught of the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies have developed a complex relationship to the illegal narcotics trade. In case after case, drug money laundered in the international banking system has financed covert operations.

> According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing was established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army in Laos was funded by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's military strategy against the combined forces of the neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.⁶

> The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been replicated in Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising curve of cocaine imports to the US", wrote journalist John Dinges "followed almost exactly the flow of US arms and military advisers to Central America".⁷

> The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided covert support, were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics into Southern Florida. And as revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) scandals, there was strong evidence that covert operations were funded through the laundering of drug money. "Dirty money" recycled through the banking system—often through an anonymous shell company—became "covert money," used to finance various rebel groups and guerilla movements including the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan

madeen. According to a 1991 Time Magazine report:

"Because the US wanted to supply the mujahadeen rebels in Afghanistan with stinger missiles and other military hardware it needed the full cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, the CIA operation in Islamabad was one of the largest US intelligence stations in the World. If BCCI is such an embarrassment to the US that forthright investigations are not being pursued it has a lot to do with the blind eye the US turned to the heroin trafficking in Pakistan', said a US intelligence officer.⁸

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> America and Germany join Hands

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> Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands in establishing their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Their intelligence agencies have also collaborated. According to intelligence analyst John Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo rebel army was established as a joint endeavour between the CIA and Germany's Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which previously played a key role in installing a right wing nationalist government under Franjo Tudjman in Croatia).⁹ The task to create and finance the KLA was initially given to Germany: "They used German uniforms, East German weapons and were financed, in part, with drug money".¹⁰ According to Whitley, the CIA was, subsequently instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.¹¹

>

> The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with Bonn's intent to expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans. Prior to the onset of the civil war in Bosnia, Germany and its Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had actively supported secession; it had "forced the pace of international diplomacy" and pressured its Western allies to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. According to the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both Germany and the US favoured (although not officially) the formation of a "Greater Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia.¹² According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free hand among its allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa."¹³

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> Islamic Fundamentalism in Support of the KLA

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> Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in triggering nationalist liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo with the ultimate purpose of destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter objective was also carried out "by turning a blind eye" to the influx of mercenaries and financial support from Islamic fundamentalist organisations.¹⁴

>

> Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Koweit had been fighting in Bosnia.¹⁵ And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen mercenaries from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo. German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.¹⁶

>

> According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support from Islamic countries to the KLA had been channelled through the former Albanian chief of the National Information Service (NIS), Bashkim Gazidede.¹⁷

"Gazidede, reportedly a devout Moslem who fled Albania in March of last year

], is presently [1998] being investigated for his contacts with Islamic terrorist organizations."18

> The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters" are the rugged mountainous borders of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. Albania is also a key point of transit of the Balkans drug route which supplies Western Europe with grade four heroin. 75% of the heroin entering Western Europe is from Turkey. And a large part of drug shipments originating in Turkey transits through the Balkans. According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), "it is estimated that 4-6 metric tons of heroin leave each month from Turkey having [through the Balkans] as destination Western Europe."19 A recent intelligence report by Germany's Federal Criminal Agency suggests that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the most prominent group in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer countries."20

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> The Laundering of Dirty Money

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> In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans narcotics trade need friends in high places. Smuggling rings with alleged links to the Turkish State are said to control the trafficking of heroin through the Balkans "cooperating closely with other groups with which they have political or religious ties" including criminal groups in Albanian and Kosovo.21 In this new global financial environment, powerful undercover political lobbies connected to organized crime cultivate links to prominent political figures and officials of the military and intelligence establishment.

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> The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder large amounts of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the smuggling operations per se, powerful banking interests in Turkey but mainly those in financial centres in Western Europe discretely collect fat commissions in a multibillion dollar money laundering operation. These interests have high stakes in ensuring a safe passage of drug shipments into Western European markets.

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> The Albanian Connection

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> Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started at the beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power, headed by President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy and cross border trade had unfolded. A triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics had developed largely as a result of the embargo imposed by the international community on Serbia and Montenegro and the blockade enforced by Greece against Macedonia.

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> Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into bankruptcy following the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed on Belgrade in 1990. The embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians and Serbs were driven into abysmal poverty. Economic collapse created an environment which fostered the progress of illicit trade. In Kosovo, the rate of unemployment increased to a staggering 70 percent (according to Western sources).

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> Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering ethnic

sons. Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out of their Teens" from an impoverished population, were drafted into the ranks of the KLA...22

> In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since 1992 had created conditions which favoured the criminalisation of State institutions. Drug money was also laundered in the Albanian pyramids (ponzi schemes) which mushroomed during the government of former President Sali Berisha (1992-1997).²³ These shady investment funds were an integral part of the economic reforms inflicted by Western creditors on Albania.

> Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to the Italian mafia) had become the new economic elites, often associated with Western business interests. In turn the financial proceeds of the trade in drugs and arms were recycled towards other illicit activities (and vice versa) including a vast prostitution racket between Albania and Italy. Albanian criminal groups operating in Milan, "have become so powerful running prostitution rackets that they have even taken over the Calabrians in strength and influence."²⁴

> The application of "strong economic medicine" under the guidance of the Washington based Bretton Woods institutions had contributed to wrecking Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the Albanian economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European transnationals to carefully position themselves. Several Western oil companies including Occidental, Shell and British Petroleum had their eyes rivetted on Albania's abundant and unexplored oil-deposits. Western investors were also gawking Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel and platinum... The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the background on behalf of German mining interests. ²⁵

> Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have been involved in the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the architect of the agreement with Germany's Preussag (handing over control over Albania's chrome mines) against the competing bid of the US led consortium of Macalloy Inc. in association with Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).²⁶

> Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into the privatisation programmes leading to the acquisition of State assets by the mafias. In Albania, the privatisation programme had led virtually overnight to the development of a property owning class firmly committed to the "free market". In Northern Albania, this class was associated with the Guegue "families" linked to the Democratic Party.

> Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of Sali Berisha (1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid" VEFA Holdings had been set up by the Guegue "families" of Northern Albania with the support of Western banking interests. VEFA was under investigation in Italy in 1997 for its ties to the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large amounts of dirty money.²⁷

> According to one press report (based on intelligence sources), senior members of the Albanian government during the Presidency of Sali Berisha including cabinet members and members of the secret police SHIK were alleged to be involved in drugs trafficking and illegal arms trading into Kosovo:

The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband cigarettes are believed to have been handled by a company run openly by Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...). In the course of 1996 Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged] to have used his office to facilitate the transport of arms, oil and contraband cigarettes. (...) Drugs barons from Kosovo (...) operate in Albania with impunity, and much of the transportation of heroin and other drugs across Albania, from Macedonia and Greece en route to Italy, is believed to be organised by Shik, the state security police (...). Intelligence agents are convinced the chain of command in the rackets goes all the way to the top and have had no hesitation in naming ministers in their reports.²⁸

> The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite the presence since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops at the Albanian-Macedonian border with a mandate to enforce the embargo. The West had turned a blind eye. The revenues from oil and narcotics were used to finance the purchase of arms (often in terms of direct barter): "Deliveries of oil to Macedonia (skirting the Greek embargo [in 1993-4] can be used to cover heroin, as do deliveries of kalachnikov rifles to Albanian 'brothers' in Kosovo".²⁹

> The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed links with Italy's crime syndicates.³⁰ In turn, the latter played a key role in smuggling arms across the Adriatic into the Albanian ports of Dures and Valona. At the outset in 1992, the weapons channelled into Kosovo were largely small arms including Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK machine-guns, 12.7 calibre heavy machine-guns, etc.

> The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to rapidly develop a force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the KLA has acquired more sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft and antiarmor rockets. According to Belgrade, some of the funds have come directly from the CIA "funnelled through a so-called 'Government of Kosovo' based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its Washington office employs the public-relations firm of Ruder Finn--notorious for its slanders of the Belgrade government".³¹

> The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment which enables it to receive NATO satellite information concerning the movement of the Yugoslav Army. The KLA training camp in Albania is said to "concentrate on heavy weapons training - rocket propelled grenades, medium caliber cannons, tanks and transporter use, as well as on communications, and command and control". (According to Yugoslav government sources.³²

> These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army were consistent with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly, there has been a "deafening silence" of the international media regarding the Kosovo arms-drugs trade. In the words of a 1994 Report of the Geopolitical Drug Watch: "the trafficking [of drugs and arms] is basically being judged on its geostrategic implications (...) In Kosovo, drugs and weapons trafficking is fuelling geopolitical hopes and fears"...³³

> The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior to the signing of the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered an unwholesome "marriage of convenience" with the mafia. "Freedom fighters" were put in place, the narcotics trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the

"Kosovo conflict" with the ultimate objective of destabilising the Belgrade government and fully recolonising the Balkans. The destruction of an entire country is the outcome. Western governments which participated in the NATO operation bear a heavy burden of responsibility in the deaths of civilians, the impoverishment of both the ethnic Albanian and Serbian populations and the plight of those who were brutally uprooted from towns and villages in Kosovo as a result of the bombings.

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- > Michel Chossudovsky
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- > Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of The Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third World Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997.
- >
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> Department of Economics,
> University of Ottawa,
> Ottawa, K1N6N5
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AUSSENPOLITIK IM SPIEGEL DER ZERSCHLAGUNG EINES STAATES

Von Cathrin Schütz*

Im Zuge neuer Kriege gerät das Gedenken an den Angriff auf die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien in Vergessenheit. Die Aufarbeitung des ersten Krieges, an dem die Bundesrepublik Deutschland militärisch teilnahm, ist in weite Ferne gerückt. Auch in Deutschland erntet der US-Amerikaner Michael Moore, der sich gegen Bushs Kriegspolitik im Irak stellt und General Wesley Clarks Kandidatur im Präsidentschaftswahlkampf unterstützte, viel Beifall. Clark, als NATO-Oberkommandierender für Europa ein Hauptverantwortlicher für die Bombardierung Jugoslawiens, sei der "Anti-Kriegskandidat", erklärt Moore seinen Anhängern aus dem linken Spektrum.

"Kollateralschäden" wie die Bombardierung von Zivilisten in Varvarin, von Splitterbomben durchsiebte Körper in Nis, vom Bombenhagel auf das Gebäude von Radio-TV Serbien getötete Journalisten und Angestellten der chinesischen Botschaft stießen, ganz wie die "humanitäre" Militärintervention selbst, mit Ausnahme Griechenlands in der Bevölkerung der NATO-Staaten auf geringen Widerstand. Auch das linke Spektrum ließ sich von den Argumenten über Humanität und Menschenrechte vereinnahmen und unterstützte - wenn auch nicht einstimmig den militärischen - Kampf gegen das "Belgrader Regime".

Die erste direkte deutsche Teilnahme an einem noch dazu völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg veränderte die deutsche Außenpolitik maßgeblich: Kriege sind seitdem - nicht erst seit dem "11. September" - wieder legitimes Mittel der Politik. Kanzler Schröder selbst wunderte sich, "wie wenig wahrgenommen worden ist, dass die Entscheidung zum Krieg eine fundamentale Veränderung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet hat."

Die Bundeswehr wird zur globalen Interventionsarmee ausgebaut, um, so Minister Peter Strucks verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Deutschland auch am Hindukusch zu verteidigen. "Es geht ja nicht darum, dem Militärischen einen unverdienten Raum zu geben, sondern diesen Aspekt der Außenpolitik nicht zu tabuisieren, was lange gemacht wurde", so Schröder Ende 2001.

Diese Entwicklung war schon 1992 in den Richtlinien von CDU/CSU vorgezeichnet. Nur war sie damals, vor dem "humanitären" Krieg gegen Jugoslawien, der Öffentlichkeit noch nicht in aller Klarheit zu vermitteln.

"Ich finde es nur falsch, die Moral im Kurzschluß mit Fragen von Krieg und Frieden zu verbinden, ohne das Moment des nationalen Interesses zu berücksichtigen. ... Für die Zukunft sehe ich die erhebliche Gefahr, dass die Bundesregierung, Koalition und Generalität ... Anlässe suchen oder Anlässe schaffen werden, um die Barrieren abzuräumen, die es gegenüber der Außenpolitik des vereinigten Deutschland noch gibt. Als Vehikel dienen dabei die Menschenrechts- und die Humanitätsfragen." (1) "Wo deutsche Soldaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg gewütet haben, darf es keine Einsätze geben. Ich wäre froh, wenn die, die das wollen, sich nicht wenigstens andauernd hinter der Humanität verstecken würden, um eben diese Position durchzusetzen", so Joseph Fischer - im Jahr 1994. (2)

Spätestens seit dem NATO-Krieg von 1999 gehören diese Grundsätze für ihn zur

Geschichte. Er stellte dann auch klar, dass er keine grüne Außenpolitik mache, sondern deutsche. (3) Der Krieg gegen Jugoslawien war der Türöffner für nachfolgende und bevorstehende Kriege. Noch während des Bombardements verabschiedete die NATO ein neues Strategiekonzept, das ihr das Recht zu offensiven "out-of-area" Einsätzen gibt. Wurde der Völkerrechtsbruch im Krieg gegen Jugoslawien noch thematisiert und mühsam unter den humanitären Teppich gekehrt, spielen solche Überlegungen im andauernden Krieg gegen den Terror schon fast keine Rolle mehr.

Die Bundesrepublik ist nicht "hineingeschlittert"

Um die Entwicklung bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik zu verstehen, sollte der Blick nicht auf den militärischen Höhepunkt der Aggression gegen Jugoslawien von 1999 beschränkt bleiben, in die Deutschland, folgt man General a.D. Heinz Loquai, keinesfalls als Bündnismitglied "hineingeschlittert" ist, sondern bereits im Frühjahr 1998 als erstes Land zu einer militärischen Lösung zu tendieren schien. (4) Jugoslawien war für eine Emanzipation bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik entscheidend und deren Beginn ist 1991 zu verzeichnen.

Die Anerkennung von Slowenien und Kroatien im Dezember 1991 stellte ein erstes massives außenpolitisches Auftreten der BRD dar. Im Alleingang preschte die Regierung Kohl/Genscher trotz aller Warnungen auf der internationalen Bühne hervor und vereitelte Verhandlungslösungen, die die blutigen Bürgerkriege im auseinander brechenden Jugoslawien hätten verhindern können. "Ungeachtet aller feierlichen Erklärungen über Friedensverantwortung und Verzicht auf Machtstreben", von der deutschen Regierung gerade ein Jahr zuvor im Rahmen des "Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrages" abgegeben, "mischte sich die Bundesrepublik massiv in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines der Staaten der Antihitlerkoalition ein. Deutschland, einig und wieder erstarkt, betrat die außenpolitische Bühne und betrieb erstmals nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wieder offen Großmachtpolitik - auf dem Balkan, wo es schon zweimal in diesem Jahrhundert angetreten war und schlimmes Unheil angerichtet hatte." (5)

Einen "Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien" gab es schon einmal, 1941 als Schöpfung Hitlers und Mussolinis, gestützt von der katholischen Kirche und geführt von der faschistischen Ustascha. Ein halbes Jahrhundert später wurde erneut ein unabhängiges Kroatien unter dem Einfluß Deutschlands und des Vatikans geschaffen, regiert von der Partei Franjo Tudjman, die sich offen an der Politik der Ustascha orientierte, die unter dem faschistischen Führer Ante Pavelic einen der schrecklichsten Völkermorde des 20. Jahrhundert begangen hatten, dem hunderttausende Serben zum Opfer fielen. (6) Die Greueltaten der Ustascha gehören bis heute zu den am wenigsten beachteten Verbrechen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Wäre die Erinnerung daran nicht nur in den Köpfen der serbischen Überlebenden und Nachkommen verhaftet, hätte die deutsche Anerkennungspolitik wie auch die mediale Darstellung des Konfliktes in Kroatien nicht so unwidersprochen von statten gehen können.

Kurt Köpruner, als Geschäftsmann in den 1990ern viele Male im zerfallenden Jugoslawien und Augenzeuge der Tragödie, erfuhr aus der hitzigen Debatte um den drohenden Zerfall des Landes in Kroatien Ende 1990: "Sollte es wirklich zu einer Auflösung Jugoslawiens kommen, würde das unmöglich ohne schreckliche Gemetzel abgehen, mit hunderttausenden Toten". (7) Warum diese

Überzeugung vorherrschte, dämmerte ihm, als er gelesen hat, wie der Zweite Weltkrieg am Balkan verlaufen ist. Er erfuhr zum ersten mal von Massenschlächtereinen der Ustascha, muslimischen und albanischen SS-Divisionen.

Tudjman, der in den ersten Mehrparteienwahlen in Kroatien im Frühjahr 1990 die Präsidentschaft gewann und das Land 1991 mit Hilfe Deutschlands in die Unabhängigkeit führte, verharmloste schon 1989 den Holocaust im allgemeinen und die Ustascha-Verbrechen an Serben im Vernichtungslager Jasenovac im speziellen.

Unter Tudjman kam es zu einer Wiedereinführung der Ustascha-Symbole und -Ideale. Eine neue Verfassung erwähnte die Rechte von kroatischen Serben mit keinem Wort. Ein "systematisch und von oben gesteuerter" Terror gegen die Serben in Kroatien setze ein. Es kam zu Massenentlassungen, "Aufforderungen zum Verlassen des Landes wurden an die Häuser der Serben geklebt." (8) In der von Tudjman als illegal erklärten Volksbefragung entschieden sich die kroatischen Serben für den Verbleib in Jugoslawien.

Monate vor Anerkennung und Kriegausbruch kam es am 2. Mai 1991 zur "Dalmatinischen Reichskristallnacht". Mit Hilfe der ortsansässigen Polizei zerstörten 2.000 Kroaten in einer mehrstündigen Aktion 116 serbische Geschäfte und Häuser in Zadar. (9) Am 16. Oktober 1991 folgte die "Nacht der langen Messer", in der über 100 serbische Zivilisten gefoltert und exekutiert wurden. (10) Die westlichen Medien schwiegen. Im Dezember 1993 hieß es einzig in der New York Times: "Nach einer Meldung des neuen Zagreber Menschenrechtsbüros hat die Regierung von Kroatien tausende ihrer Gegner zum Verlassen ihrer Häuser und des Landes gezwungen. Die Taten sind hauptsächlich gegen Serben gerichtet, aber auch gegen Kroaten, die sich in der Opposition zur Politik des Präsidenten Tudjman befinden. Seit 1991 haben die kroatischen Behörden zehntausende Häuser hauptsächlich von Serben, aber auch Häuser von Kroaten in die Luft gesprengt... Ganze Familien wurden getötet. Insgesamt sind etwa 280.000 kroatische Serben aus dem Land geflohen." Nach Susan Woodward hatte die kroatische Regierung schon 1993 alle Serben vertrieben, die unter ihrer Kontrolle standen. (11) Es sei zu fragen, ob "das die Demokratie ist, die die Serben, als einheimisches Volk, die ein Drittel des von Tito geschaffenen kommunistischen Kroatien bewohnten, akzeptieren sollten?", so die NYT, die im April 1997 ergänzte: "Ist der Westen inzwischen so krank geworden, dass er dem kroatischen Faschismus ein Leben nach dem Tod erlaubt?"

In wie weit das kroatische Volk, auch in Vorahnung des Blutvergießens, die Politik Tudjmans getragen hat, bleibt offen. Die Volksabstimmung der Kroaten über die Unabhängigkeit kann jedenfalls nicht als Maßstab gelten, war sie doch alles andere als der im Westen gefeierte "eindeutige und überwältigende Wille des kroatischen Volkes". Auf die Wähler wurde erheblicher Druck ausgeübt, um das Kreuz an der richtigen Stelle zu setzen. (12)

Das Zerrbild von der serbischen Expansion

Die deutsche Anerkennung ist nicht nur hinsichtlich der kroatischen Kräfte, die damit gestärkt wurden, zu hinterfragen. Auch aus rechtlicher Sicht ergeben sich Einwände. Völkerrechtsexperten sind sich mehrheitlich einig, daß die Sezession von Slowenien ein Vollzug des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes der

Völker war. In Kroatien und Bosnien, wo ein Großteil aller nicht in Serbien lebenden Serben seit Jahrhunderten in geschlossenen Gebieten siedelte, war sie jedoch völkerrechtswidrig. (13)

Slobodan Milosevic machte wiederholt auf die Problematik aufmerksam. Er stellte sich nicht gegen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht, sondern forderte das Recht für jedes Volk ein. "Er wies auf die über sechshunderttausend in Kroatien lebenden Serben, die in einzelnen Regionen Slawoniens und der Krajina klar die Bevölkerungsmehrheit stellten. Auch diesen müsse das Selbstbestimmungsrecht zugestanden werden. Die bisherigen Republiksgrenzen in Jugoslawien ... seien reine Verwaltungsgrenzen." (14)

Serbien zeigte sich um die Verhandlung der Grenzen bereit und warnte davor, dass eine Partei - wie dann durch die deutsche Anerkennung geschehen - vollendete Tatsachen schaffe, die eine unkontrollierbare Eskalation bedeuten würde. Von den Serben wurde mit der Aufgabe ihrer historischen Gebiete Unmögliches gefordert. Die Serben "haben Slowenien verabschiedet. Sie hätten auch Kroatien ohne die Krajina entlassen. Da es der Wille der dort lebenden Serben war, wollte Belgrad die Krajina an das Mutterland binden. Kroatien und später Bosnien aber wollten historische serbische Gebiete in die Unabhängigkeit mitnehmen." (15)

Charles Boyd, stellvertretender Oberbefehlshaber der US-Streitkräfte in Europa, stellte sich 1995 in Foreign Affairs gegen das "landläufige Bild dieses Krieges als einer unerbittlichen serbischen Expansion." Ein großer Teil von dem, was die Kroaten die "besetzten Gebiete" nennen, sei Land, das den Serben seit mehr als drei Jahrhunderten gehöre. "Dasselbe gilt für die meisten serbischen Gebiete in Bosnien, von denen die westlichen Medien häufig als den 70 Prozent Bosniens sprechen, die von rebellischen Serben eingenommen sind. Kurz, die Serben versuchten nicht, neues Territorium zu erobern, sondern lediglich an dem festzuhalten, was ihnen bereits gehörte."

Die Milosevic-Regierung forderte das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung auch für die serbische Bevölkerung und warnte vor einer Wiederholung der Verbrechen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. "Als die Kroaten ihre Unabhängigkeit verkündeten, gaben sie den Serben in ihrem eigenen Gebiet - und es gibt 600.000 von ihnen - keinerlei Garantien. Es war deshalb verständlich, dass die Serben sehr besorgt waren. Vor allen Dingen, wenn wir uns an die Verbrechen der Ustascha während des zweiten Weltkriegs erinnern", so Lord Carrington. Doch als man einer Lösung für das Krajina- und Slawonienproblem nahe stand, "beschloß die Europäische Gemeinschaft Ende des Jahres 1991, Slowenien und Kroatien anzuerkennen. Kroatien bekam was es wollte, Slowenien ebenso, und sie hatten kein Interesse mehr an der Fortsetzung der Friedenskonferenz. Hans Dietrich Genscher wollte internationale Anerkennung für Slowenien und Kroatien. Praktisch alle anderen lehnten dies ab." (16)

Doch die Ängste, die bei Serben erwachten, wurden ignoriert und als aggressives "Großserbien"-Projekt dargestellt. (17)

Fremde Staaten begannen schnell, sich in den Konflikt einzumischen. Deutsche Militärinstrukteure waren in Kroatien tätig und die Bundeswehr nahm an Luftraumüberwachungen und der Schnellen Eingreiftruppe in Bosnien teil. Illegale deutsche Waffenlieferungen erfolgten, teils über den deutschen Geheimdienst, an Slowenien und Kroatien. (18) Die USA stellten sich gegen Serben und unterstützte Kroaten und Bosnische Muslime. "Schließlich haben

die NATO-Mächte den kroatischen Nationalismus unterstützt und 1995 konnte Tudjman's Armee, ausgebildet von den US-Offizieren und illegal von der »internationalen Gemeinschaft« aufgerüstet, die ethnische Säuberung der Krajina-Serben erfolgreich beenden, die 1941 mit der Unterstützung der Nazis begonnen hatte." (19) Die so genannte "Operation Sturm", die brutalste Kampagne ethnischer Säuberung im auseinander brechenden Jugoslawien, wurde neben dem Kroaten Ante Gotovina laut dem etablierten Militärjournal Jane's Defense vom späteren kosovo-albanischen UCK-Führer Agim Ceku geplant und durchgeführt.

Im Falle Bosniens waren es die USA, die zur Anerkennung drängten. Wieder wurde der Konflikt als Ergebnis einer serbischen Aggression bezeichnet. Doch der frühere US-Außenminister Henry Kissinger definierte den Konflikt als einen von drei Seiten geführten Bürgerkrieg und keine Invasion, die gegen einen souveränen Staat von einem Nachbarstaat geführt wird. "Kroatien und Serbien unterstützen ihre Landsleute in Bosnien. Der am wenigsten zu verantwortende Fehler in der gegenwärtigen bosnischen Tragödie war die internationale Anerkennung des bosnischen Staates unter der Führung der Moslems. Deutschland gab ein Beispiel mit der vorzeitigen Anerkennung von Slowenien und Kroatien, und nach diesem Vorbild schuf die internationale Gemeinschaft alle neu gegründeten Staaten im Gebiet des früheren Jugoslawiens." (20)

Der NATO-Einsatz in Mazedonien, wo 2001 der Kampf aus dem Kosovo heraus operierender albanischer Rebellen eskalierte, war in Deutschland umstritten. Die "Entscheidung gegen einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr wäre ein wichtiger und äußerst wertvoller Schritt hin zu einer Wende in der deutschen Politik und bliebe nicht ohne Bedeutung für die zukünftige Politik in Europa und selbst das Verhalten der USA", so Knut Mertens von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (21) Der Bundestag jedoch hat dem Einsatz "Essential Harvest", bei dem es nicht um friedliches Waffeneinsammeln, sondern einen klaren Kampfeinsatz der NATO bzw. Bundeswehr ging, am 30.8.2001 zugestimmt. (22)

Obwohl Gernot Erler (SPD) bei seiner Werbung für den Einsatz deutscher Soldaten dessen zeitliche Begrenzung beteuerte, wurde die Nachfolgeoperation "Amber Fox" vom Bundestag am 27.9.2001 beschlossen. Nahezu unbemerkt übernahm Deutschland im Schatten des 11. September die Leitung des NATO-Mandats in Mazedonien.

Wer verantwortet die Gewalt im Kosovo?

Dem NATO-Krieg von 1999 war die Stationierung deutscher Truppen im Kosovo im Rahmen der KFOR gefolgt. Unter dem tolerierenden Auge von NATO und UNO gedeiht nicht nur die organisierte Kriminalität. Dauerhaft, geplant und eben wieder massiv eskalierend geht die ethnische Säuberung des Kosovo von allen Nicht-Albanern von statten.

Entgegen den offiziellen Bekundungen, die UCK zu entwaffnen und ein multikulturelles Kosovo wiederherzustellen, haben vor allem die USA und die BRD durch die Unterstützung des Kosovo-Schutzkorps den Terror im Kosovo nach dem NATO-Krieg finanziert. Alle anderen Länder hatten die Unterstützung des aus ehemaligen UCK-Kämpfern gebildeten Korps eingestellt, nachdem bewiesen war, dass Morde und Gewalttaten auf ihr Konto gingen. (23) Hintergrund der in einem Erlass des US-Präsidenten von 1999 formulierten Anweisung, die UCK

in terroristischen Taktiken auszubilden, war offenbar der Gedanke, etwa im Falle eines Wahlgewinns von Milosevic mit ihrer Hilfe eine neue Krise entzünden zu können. (24)

Ob die aktuellen koordinierten Gewalt- und Verteilungsakte von ausländischen Kräften gestützt werden oder nicht, sie haben diese Gewalt mit zu verantworten. In der schon 1998 vorherrschenden Praxis wird die terroristische Gewalt der albanischen Kämpfer, die von je her für ein "ethnisch reines Kosova" eintreten, beiden Seiten zugeschrieben. Auch jetzt fordert der UNO-Sicherheitsrat in absurder Verdrehung der Gegebenheiten "die serbische und die kosovo-albanische Seite auf, ihre Gewalt einzustellen".

Die Wiederherstellung eines multikulturellen Kosovo gehörte lange schon zu den Märchen, die nur jene glaubten, die da meinten, die NATO habe 1999 aus "humanitären Gründen" interveniert.

* Von Cathrin Schütz erschien Ende 2003 das Buch "Die NATO-Intervention in Jugoslawien. Hintergründe, Nebenwirkungen und Folgen" beim Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag in Wien

Anmerkungen:

(1) Die Woche, 30.12.1994

(2) Fischer zit. in: Horst-Eberhard Richter, IPPNW zum Jugoslawienkrieg, <http://www.nato-tribunal.de/>

(3) Vgl. Stern, 24.3.1999

(4) Vgl. Heinz Loquai, Weichenstellungen für einen Krieg, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, S. 44f.

(5) Ralph Hartmann, Die ehrlichen Makler, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1999, S. 13

(6) Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg floh Pavelic über Rom nach Argentinien und starb 1954 in einem deutschen Krankenhaus in Madrid, nachdem ihm Papst Pius XII den persönlichen Segen erteilt hatte. Der kroatische Völkermord an den Serben wurde bis heute weder angemessen verurteilt noch ernsthaft studiert. Bei der Eröffnung des Holocaust-Museums in Washington wurde die Geschichte pervertiert: die Kroaten waren als US-Verbündete eingeladen, die Serben nicht. Diese und folgende Darstellungen beziehen sich in weiten Teilen auf die Ausführungen von Diana Johnstone, Fool's Crusade, Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, Monthly Review Press, New York 2002

(7) Kurt Köpruner, Reisen in das Land der Kriege, Espresso, Berlin 2001, S. 27

(8) Malte Olschewski, Von den Karawanken bis zum Kosovo. Die geheime Geschichte der Kriege in Jugoslawien, Braumüller, Wien 2000, S. 34

(9) Köpruner, S. 42ff.; Olschewski, S. 34

(10) Vgl. Olschewski, S. 38

(11) Die andere Hälfte befand sich in der Krajina und in Teilen Kroatiens,

die nicht unter Tudjmans Kontrolle standen. Diese wurden 1995 in der Operation Sturm mit der Unterstützung der US-Regierung vertrieben.

(12) Vgl. Köpruner, S. 51ff.

(13) Vgl. Olschewski, S. 14

(14) Köpruner, S. 31

(15) Olschewski, S. 14

(16) Profil, 1. Dezember 1993

(17) Das angebliche Ziel Milosevics, ein Großserbien zu errichten, bleibt bis heute seiner Beweise schuldig. Wie Ralph Hartmann aufzeigt, kann Milosevics "Amselfeld-Rede" nur dann zum Beweis seiner "aggressiven", "nationalistischen" Linie hervorgezogen werden, wenn sie durch Kürzungen Sinn entstellt wird.

(18) Vgl. u.a. Olschewski, S. 78, 80

(19) Die Verwicklung der USA in die Operation wurden am 28.2.2002 im US-Kongreß offen angesprochen. Vgl. "The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of Justice?", Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress

(20) Washington Post, 17. Mai 1993

(21) Knut Mertens, Neues NATO-Protektorat oder ehrliche Friedenspolitik?, Zeit-Fragen, 20. August 2001, 9. Jg., Nr. 33, S. 1

(22) Vgl. Tobias Pflüger, Krieg, und zwar richtig, junge Welt, 23.8.2001

(23) Vgl. Interview mit dem US-Kongreßabgeordneten Dennis Kucinich von Cathrin Schütz, Wird Sanktionspolitik bald beendet? Interview mit Dennis Kucinich, junge Welt, 7.10.2000.

(24) Vgl. Dennis Kucinich, What I learnt from the War, The Progressive, August 1999

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Sagittarius


Van: "Ruza" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: dinsdag 16 maart 2004 0:18
Onderwerp: Fw: Canadians to testify against Croat

— Original Message —

From: nebojsa
To: Ruza
Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 12:18 PM
Subject: Canadians to testify against Croat officers

- > Canadians to testify against Croat officers: War-crime suspects
- >
- > surrender to UN court at The Hague
- >
- > SOURCE: The Ottawa Citizen
- > BYLINE: Steven Edwards
- > DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS
- >
- > BODY:
- > UNITED NATIONS - Two Canadian generals are expected to be called as key
- > witnesses against a pair of Croatian officers who surrendered themselves
- > to the United Nations war crimes court in The Hague yesterday.
- >
- > Iyan Cermak and Mladen Markac, both generals, denied any wrongdoing
- > during military sweeps against Croatia's Serbs that included massive shelling
- >
- > of civilian areas in and around the Serb-filled town of Knin in 1995.
- >
- > But a different version of events emerged from retired Canadian
- > Maj.-Gen. Alain Forand and Brig.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, who were commanders in a
- > United Nations force charged with monitoring a ceasefire in Croatia. They were
- >
- > there when the Croatian army launched Operation Storm to crush minority Serb
- > resistance to the country's independence from Yugoslavia.
- >
- > "Cermak boasted to me he was the master planner of all the artillery
- > bombardment," Maj.-Gen. Forand said in a telephone interview.
- >
- > Maj.-Gen. Forand was in charge of the UN's Sector South, which included Knin.
- >
- > "They knew well they were hitting civilian targets because the shelling
- > was so accurate they never hit our camp. The closest -- a dud -- fell
- > about 10 metres away, and all other shells were at least 300 to 400 metres
- > away."
- >
- > Croatian President Franjo Tudjman appointed Gen. Cermak commander of the
- > Knin garrison in August 1995, the month Operation Storm began. He had
- > appointed Mr. Markac commander of Croatia's "Special Police" a year earlier.
- > "After
- > they retook the sector, I wrote to Cermak to complain about the looting, and
- > the burning of houses, and about civilians being shot in the head. But he
- > did nothing," Maj.-Gen. Forand said.
- >

- > Gen. Cermak, 54, and Mr. Markac, 48, are accused of the murder of
- > civilians, plunder, damage and outright destruction of Serb property. Their
- > surrender marks the first act of compliance with the UN's International
- > Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since a new government took
- > office in December.
- >
- > Co-operation with The Hague is a key condition of Zagreb's bid to start
- > European Union entry talks next year. Croatia's national anthem was played as
- > 200 war veterans and friends
- > gave the Croat generals an emotional send-off at Zagreb airport yesterday. "I
- > feel it is my duty to prove that I am innocent and that the charge is absurd
- > and unjust," said Gen. Cermak.
- >
- > Gen. Cermak and Gen. Markac are expected to plead not guilty today
- > before being released pending trial. Operation Storm's overall commander, Gen.
- >
- > Ante Gotovina, remains at large.
- >
- > The UN court, accused since its launch in 1993 of being inefficient,
- > took until last month to indict the pair. UN investigators lost transcripts
- > of their 1996 and 1997 interviews with Maj.-Gen. Forand, and had to return
- > to Canada to repeat the process in 1999.
- >>
- > "I thought if this is the calibre of people that they send, I am not very
- > impressed," Maj.-Gen. Forand said.
- >
- > The investigators also interviewed Brig.-Gen. Leslie, a colonel in 1995
- > who recently led Canadian forces in Afghanistan.
- >
- > The charges reflect both men's testimony.
- >
- > Croatia launched Operation Storm after the mainly Serb population of
- > Krajina, where Knin is located, voted overwhelmingly in a referendum for
- > integration with Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia.
- >
- > The military sweep resulted in the expulsion of 200,000 Serbs from their
- > homes.
- >
- > Maj.-Gen. Forand reflected the common Serb complaint that the fate of the
- > Krajinan Serbs is one of the forgotten stories of "ethnic cleansing" in
- > the Balkan wars of the 1990s. "No one seemed to care about the Croatian
- > Serbs because the international (community) had already depicted Serbs as the
- > bad guys for what was happening elsewhere" in the Balkans, he said.
- >
- > The indictment says the two accused "had a duty to restore ... order," but
- > instead oversaw the murder of "at least 150 Krajinan Serbs," and
- > subjected other Serbs to "inhumane treatment, humiliation and degradation by
- > Croatian forces that beat and assaulted them."
- >
- > Croatian forces also "systematically ... destroyed villages, homes,
- > outbuildings and barns belonging to Krajina Serbs, killed their livestock
- > and spoiled their wells."
- >
- > Brig.-Gen. Leslie told UN investigators Knin contained a handful of
- > military targets, but only about 250 of the 3,000 shells fired at the city



Oud-premier Kok stond gisteren voor de Haagse rechtbank, waar hij zich moest verantwoorden voor NAVO-bombardementen in 1999 in de Joegoslavische steden Belgrado en Niš. Daarbij

vonden tientallen burgers de dood. Kok zei, dat Nederland niet verantwoordelijk was, omdat aan de luchtaanvallen geen Nederlandse vliegtuigen deelnamen. Kok en oud-minister Van Aartsen

(Buitenlandse Zaken) werden gisteren gehoord in de door slachtoffers en nabestaanden aangespannen zaak. Zij eisen schadevergoeding en smartengeld. (Foto GPD)

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- > military targets, but only about 250 of the 3,000 shells fired at the city

Sagittarius

Van: "R" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Jan Beentjes" <jbeentjes@mac.com>; <hans.hupkes@planet.nl>; "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: dinsdag 24 februari 2004 3:42
Onderwerp: Fw: - Ljudska prava - Fw: Important new web pages on NWO in the Balkans

— Original Message —

From: vesna mijailovic
To: srbija_medjuslujivama@yahoogroups.com
Cc: svetska_zavera@yahoogroups.com; serbianforum@yahoogroups.com; ljudska_prava@yahoogroups.com; srpski_svet@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2004 9:22 AM
Subject: - Ljudska prava - Fw: Important new web pages on NWO in the Balkans

Dear friend,

Please forward:

At Serbian Network (<http://srpska-mreza.com>) we worked very hard last few months and added quite a few pages. From now on one would be able to see what new pages were added by going to "What's New?" page at:
<http://srpska-mreza.com/whats-new.html>

The page is accessible from the home page.

Among (relatively) new pages we recommend you read:

1) In one of many such incidents, Croat Nazis known as Ustashe use knives to butcher more than 2,000 Serbs inside Serbian Orthodox church!!! It happened in Serbian area of Krajina in August 1941. Only one Serb survived. The survivor, Mr. Ljubo Jednak, talks for the camera. Typical for a Serb, Mr. Jednak is ready to forgive... but in 1995 he has to run again to save his neck from new Croat Nazis who are, this time, supported by the U.S. The transcript of this important documentary can be found at our page:

<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/Glina-intro.html>

2) Clinton Administration secretly armed and trained Al Qaeda in Bosnia in early and mid 1990's. How this "DEVIL'S TRIANGLE" (Mujahedin fanatics + Clinton Administration + Bosnian Islam fundamentalists) functioned is not a secret any more. We point to BBC documentary, U.S. Republican Policy Committee Report and other sources. The study (not completely finished yet) starts at:

<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/DevilTriangle.html>

3.A) "The tale of Bosnia towns" tells about the horrible injustice the West committed on the Serbian people. Take a look at the case of Northern Bosnia town of Odzak, for example. There the Serbs suffered tremendously - but were able to liberate the area from Croat new-Nazi occupation. Despite this Serbian success, the area was, at Dayton, taken away from the Serbs and given to Croat control. This is in order to make, for the Serbs crucial, Northern Corridor more narrow. The pages start on:
<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/Odzak-1.html>

The story of Odzak is a part of an official United Nations document. It explains what new Ustasas did to the Serbs in the area. This public document was available to anyone interested - but of course the Western media (and the Hague Tribunal) were not interested.

3.B) The Western racism against the Serbian people is even more evident in the case of mass

ughter of Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian town of Mrkonjic Grad. The pages start at:
<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/Mrkonjic-1.html>

Mrkonjic Grad is in middle of nowhere (in Central-West Bosnia) and is the only land given back to the Serbs as result of Dayton agreement. Thus, this was the only place where the Serbs could see - first hand - what happened with the Serbian population that fell to Croat-Ustashi hands. Some 181 people were exhumed right away. These people were tortured and murdered - Nazi style. Many of them were old (even very old). The Serbian forensic experts invited Western experts to participate in the investigation. The Westerners came and left. No word about this - the largest discovered mass grave in entire Bosnia - in the Western press.

We remind the reader that 181 is a number larger than 22+68+33 which are the numbers of victims in all Sarajevo staged atrocities ("breadline" + "Markale Market #1" + "Markale Market #2").

The only way to explain the silence about Mrkonjic Grad is a simple, blunt racism of the Western press toward the Serbian people.

Please read Mrkonjic Grad analysis. We would love to know your first impressions.

4) Other pages we would like you to take a peek at is recently revisited page on "Sarajevo Bread-line massacre" which is at:

<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/breadline.html>

The most important part of that story is the one how UN Secretary General wrote a report showing that the Serbs (those who were not born in Bosnia) are withdrawing - in respect of then new UN resolution demanding that Yugoslav Federal Army leave Bosnia. At the same time the Croats were drafting troops in Croatia proper and flooding Bosnia. (The report is at: http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/bbg_report.html)... But someone (an Austrian) STOLE THE REPORT - all with perfect timing so Yugoslavia got imposed Draconian sanctions which, among other things, were to cost many lives of the most helpless - young and old and ill - in Belgrade and Serbia. That the report was stolen was a short note. It is at: <http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/stolen-UN-report.html>

5) Take also a look at page about Bratunac, a sister town to Srebrenica. This is where Serbs who were bombed out of Sarajevo found refuge. There they died, like flies - result of NATO's use of Depleted Uranium... British journalist Rober Fisk wrote an article about it for the Independent. The title was: "I See 300 Graves That Could Bear the Headstone: 'Died of Depleted Uranium'" The page is at:

<http://srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/Bratunac-deaths.html>

Please, take a look and feel free to send us your response.

And, again, please feel free to forward to whoever is interested in knowing the facts of what American New World Order has done in the Balkans.

Best regards.

izlazak sa liste, posaljite prazno pismo na:
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10 Aug 2002


DE TWENTSCHE COURANT
Tubantia

W·E·E·K·E·N·D

Als geheim agent redde Predrag Radulovic ruim 15.000 moslims en Kroaten het leven. Dat was des te opmerkelijker, omdat Radulovic zelf een Serviër is. Nu, tien jaar na de oorlog, heeft hij zelf hulp nodig. Hij is zijn leven in de Republika Srbska, waar hij doorgaat voor een verrader, niet langer zeker.



Predrag Radulovic: 'Ik voelde dat ik iets moest doen om de tragedie af te wenden.'



Radulovic bevrijdde honderden mensen uit kampen. In totaal leidde hij in twee jaar 123 bevrijdingen.

De Bosnische Oscar Schindler

Serviër Radulovic redde levens van duizenden moslims en Kroaten

Door Cees van Zweeden

Toen Bosnië zich tien jaar geleden opmaakte voor de oorlog, was Predrag Radulovic (50) een der eersten die besefte hoe vuil die oorlog zou worden. Als officier van de geheime dienst, standplaats Oost-Bosnië, kende hij de regio als geen ander. 'De mensen die zich aansloten bij de paramilitaire organisaties waren ordinaire criminelen', zegt hij. 'Hun doel was te moorden en te stelen. Ze zagen de oorlog als een gelegenheid om puissant rijk te worden.' Radulovic had de veiligheidsdienst kunnen verlaten, maar hij besloot te blijven. 'Ik voelde dat ik iets moest doen om de tragedie af te wenden', zegt hij. 'Als geheim agent wist ik wie er van de oorlog zouden profiteren, en wie hun slachtoffers werden. Ik kon misschien iets voor die slachtoffers betekenen. Kon ik mezelf ooit nog in de spiegel zien als ik weg ging?'

Als hij een decennium later in de spiegel kijkt, ziet hij een held. Radulovic, een etnische Serviër, redde tijdens de oorlog de levens van 15.000 moslims en Kroaten. Maar de Bosni-

sche Oscar Schindler (de man die in de Tweede Wereldoorlog vele joden redde) loopt zelf gevaar. Zeven keer was hij in de Republika Srpska, het Servische deel van Bosnië, mikpunt van een aanslag op zijn leven. 'Sommige steden zijn erg onveilig geworden voor mij', zegt Radulovic, die ook vreesde voor de levens van zijn vrouw en beide dochters. 'In Doboj zou ik de nacht niet overleven.' Toen de oorlog uitbrak werden Radulovic' bange vermoedens onmiddellijk bewaarheid. In Testic (Oost-Bosnië) begon de Servische paramilitaire organisatie MICE, op grote schaal te moorden en plunderen. Zestig moslims en Kroaten werden in juli 1992 vermoord, ruim zeshonderd anderen gevangen gezet. Radulovic formeerde een gewapende eenheid van ruim dertig vrijwilligers, allen leden van de inlichtingendienst. 'Driehonderd gevangenen zaten vast in het voetbalstadion van Testic, bewaakt door tien paramilitairen. We overvielen ze in hun slaap, om half vijf 's ochtends. Ze gaven zich zonder slag of stoot over. Bij een gevecht dat later die ochtend

uitbrak met een grotere paramilitaire eenheid verloor Radulovic een van zijn mannen, maar uiteindelijk gaf ook die eenheid zich gewonnen. 'Ze hadden zich verschanst in hotel Kardial', zegt hij. 'Het gevecht duurde uren; later werden 12.000 hulzen gevonden. Ze gaven zich pas over nadat ik hen had bedreigd met de inzet van tanks.'

Na de afsplitsing van Bosnië van de Joegoslavische Federatie was Radulovic formeel in dienst van de inlichtingendienst van de Republika Srpska. Later zou hij het land worden uitgewerkt door Radovan Karadzic, de leider van de Bosnische Serviërs. Maar in het begin van de oorlog genoot hij nog diens steun. 'Mijn superieuren wisten waar ik mee bezig was, en ze legden me geen strobreed in de weg. Sterker, mijn directe bazen Nedeljko Kesic en Stojan Zupljanin verschaften me auto's en wapens. Bij sommige operaties, zoals het vuurgevecht rond hotel Kardial, werden we zelfs bijgestaan door een eenheid van het leger van de Republika Srpska, ongeveer driehonderd man.'

Nadat hij de paramilitaire bende in Testic had opgevoerd en haar leiders gearresteerd, vond Radulovic de oorlogsbuit. 'We troffen twee miljoen mark aan, honderd televisietoestellen, 88 videorecorders, anderhalve kilo goud, tien kilo zilver, driehonderd nieuwe leren jassen, 58.000 kristallen glazen en tien espressomachines', zegt hij. 'Dat was wat de paramilitairen in drie dagen uit de huizen hadden geroofd van minder dan achthonderd gedetineerde en vermoorde mensen.'

Radulovic ging door met zijn semi-clandestiene operaties tot 1994, toen hij in de kofferbak van een auto de Republika Srpska uitvluchtte. In twee jaar tijds had hij 123 bevrijdingsacties geleid. 'In de meeste gevallen redden we minder dan tien mensen tegelijk, maar soms ook honderden. In 1992 bevrijdden we in de buurt van Stanari 360 moslims die al voor het vuurpeloton stonden.' Sommige operaties vonden plaats in opdracht van Karadzic, die weinig op had met de paramilitaire organisaties die moorden en verkrachtend



ik iets moest

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FOTO'S GPD

snische Oscar Schindler

edde levens van duizenden moslims en Kroaten

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door het land trokken. 'Hij gaf mij persoonlijk bevel prof. dr. Hamzo Mujagic, vice-voorzitter van de SDA (de partij van moslimleider Izetbegovic), te bevrijden. Mujagic woont nu in Amerika.' Niet alle reddingsacties waren spectaculaire overvallen op concentratiekampen, zegt Radulovic. In veel gevallen waarschuwde hij eenvoudigweg mensen voor nakende etnische zuiveringen. 'Die mensen zijn me nog dankbaar', zegt hij. 'Vorige maand kreeg ik bezoek van twee Kroatische gezinnen die ik tijdens de oorlog op tijd Banja Luka (hoofdstad van de Republika Srpska-red) had uitgekreken.'

Maar onder Serviërs oogste hij slechts hoon. In 1992 stelde hij een aantal gevangen paramilitairen ten toon op een marktplein in Teslic en sprak tot de toegestroomde mensen: 'Willen jullie echt dat deze criminelen als helden de geschiedenis in gaan?' Daarop stapte een vrouw uit de menigte naar voren, spuugde hem op het gezicht en beet hem toe; 'jij zult als verrader de geschiedenis in gaan.'

Ze kreeg gelijk. Zeven jaar na het einde van de oorlog is Radulovic bang, en er is niemand die hem helpt. In Banja Luka reed hij met zijn auto in een hinderlaag en werd met automatisch geweervuur beschoten. In Teslic verongelukte hij bijna, nadat iemand 's nachts de schroeven van zijn wielen had losgedraaid. In Bijelina miste een scherpshutter hem op een haar, toen de kogel tussen hem en zijn bijrijder door ging. Zijn huisje van veertig vierkante meter in Banja Luka werd platgebrand, zodat hij nu ook financieel een wrak is.

Radulovic is niet geliefd onder Kroaten en moslims. Nadat hij van het Haagse oorlogstribunaal toestemming had gekregen als advocaat op te treden, presenteerde hij enkele maanden geleden een dossier over zijn misdrijven in de omgeving van Bosanski Brod. 'Een van de documenten is een decreet van een hoge Kroatische officier, waarin deze zijn mannen toestemming geeft Servische meisjes vanaf zeven jaar te verkrachten', zegt hij.

Maar door Serviërs wordt hij gehaat. Drie jaar geleden publiceerde Zeljko Kopanja, hoofdredacteur van het tijdschrift Nezavisne Novine, een interview met Radulovic. Dat had hij beter niet kunnen doen. Luttel dagen later werd zijn auto opgeblazen. De hoofdredacteur moet nu door het leven zonder benen.

Radulovic telt niet meer het aantal telefonische bedreigingen en beledigingen. Wat hem echter steekt is de houding van de autoriteiten in de huidige Republika Srpska, die op papier pro-westers en liberaal zijn. Vorig jaar werd hij geweigerd als lid van de orde van advocaten, en ook de schrijversbond hield hem buiten (Radulovic heeft zes dichtbundels op zijn naam staan). 'Het stadsbestuur van Banja Luka weigerde mij zelfs een bouwvergunning om mijn platgebrande huisje weer op te bouwen.' Dat is niet het enige. Vorig jaar werd hij in Doboj voor het gerecht gesleept op beschuldiging van het slaan van criminele paramilitairen. Hij moest door zwaar bewapende militairen van de NAVO naar het gerechtsgedebouw worden geëscorteerd. Het liefste zou hij met zijn vrouw en beide dochters vertrekken, bijvoorbeeld naar Nederland. Maar Radulovic weigert om politiek asiel te vragen. 'Dat zou betekenen dat ik mijn Bosnische paspoort kwijt raak, en niet meer kan terugkeren naar de Republika Srpska', zegt hij. 'En dat is een genoegdoening dat ik de autoriteiten niet gun. Ik heb mijn vrienden en familie hier en wil niet van hen vreemd worden.'

Zoals Radulovic zich niet zijn land laat ontneemen, laat hij zich ook niet van zijn humor beroven. 'Ik werd laatst door een politieman aangehouden bij een controle. Hij zag tussen mijn papieren de lidmaatschapskaart van de communistische partij, die ik als een soort relikwie bewaar. Hij lachte en zei: 'Ik wist niet dat er nog communisten bestonden.' Ik antwoordde: 'Ik lachte toch ook niet toen ik werd aangehouden door een aap in uniform.'



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Kosovo War

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The neutrality of this page is disputed.

The term **Kosovo War** or **Kosovo Conflict** is often used to describe two sequential armed conflicts (a civil war followed by an international war) in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohia (*Kosova* in Albanian), part of the former Yugoslavia. The conflict evolved in three distinct stages following several decades of occasionally violent clashes between Serbs and Albanians in the province:

1. **1989-96**: Curtailment of Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia, accompanied by alleged large-scale repression of Albanians by Serbian security forces and growing tension between Serbs and Albanians in the province.
2. **1996-99**: Guerrilla conflict between Albanian separatists and the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces, which Albanians characterised as a national liberation struggle and Serbs saw as terrorism.
3. **1999**: War between Yugoslavia and the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization](#) between [March 24](#) and [June 10, 1999](#), during which NATO heavily bombed Yugoslav targets and military units, Albanian guerrillas continued to attack Serbs and Serbian/Yugoslav forces conducted widespread [ethnic cleansing](#) of the Albanian population of Kosovo.

Table of contents [hide]

- 1 Origins of the conflict
 - 1.1 Kosovo in Titoist Yugoslavia (1945-1986)
 - 1.2 Kosovo and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic (1986-1990)
 - 1.3 Kosovo under Serbian rule (1990-1996)
 - 1.4 The slide to war (1996-1998)
 - 1.5 Racak and the Rambouillet Conference (January-March 1999)
- 2 The NATO bombing campaign
- 3 Reaction to the war
- 4 Consequences of the war
- 5 War crimes
- 6 Military and political consequences
- 7 External links

Origins of the conflict

Kosovo in Titoist Yugoslavia (1945-1986)

[Serbs](#) and [Albanians](#) had both long regarded [Kosovo](#) as their own historical space. For Serbs, it was the center of their culture [1] as well as

the site of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which resulted in a catastrophic defeat of Serbia at the hands of the invading Ottomans (traditionally interpreted as Serbia's sacrifice for Christianity).

Tensions between the two communities had been simmering throughout the 20th century and had occasionally erupted into major violence, particularly during the First Balkan War, World War I and World War II. The Communist government of Josip Broz Tito systematically repressed nationalist manifestations throughout Yugoslavia, seeking to ensure that no Yugoslav republic or nationality gained dominance over the others. In particular, the power of Serbia - the largest and most populous republic - was diluted by the establishment of autonomous governments in the province of Vojvodina in the north of Serbia and Kosovo in the south. Kosovo's borders did not precisely match the areas of ethnic Albanian settlement in Yugoslavia (significant numbers of Albanians were left in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia proper, while the far north of Kosovo remained largely ethnic Serbian). Nonetheless, most of its inhabitants following 1945 were ethnic Albanians.

Kosovo's formal autonomy, established under the 1945 Yugoslav constitution, initially meant relatively little in practice. Tito's secret police cracked down hard on nationalists. In 1956, a number of Albanians were put on trial in Kosovo on charges of espionage and subversion. The threat of separatism was in fact minimal, as the few underground groups aiming for union with Albania were politically insignificant. Their long-term impact was substantial, though, as some - particularly the Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unity, founded by Adem Demaci - were much later to form the political core of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Demaci himself was imprisoned in 1964 along with many of his followers.

Yugoslavia underwent a period of economic and political crisis in 1968, as a massive government program of economic reform widened the gap between the rich north and poor south of the country. Student demonstrations and riots in Belgrade in June 1968 spread to Kosovo in November the same year, but were put down by the Yugoslav security forces. However, some of the students' demands - particularly for real representative powers for Albanians on both Serbian and Yugoslav state bodies, and better recognition of the Albanian language - were conceded by Tito. Pristina University was established as an independent institution in 1970, ending a long period when the institution had been run as an outpost of Belgrade University. The Albanianisation of education in Kosovo was hampered by the lack of Albanian-language educational materials in Yugoslavia, so an agreement was struck with Albania itself to supply textbooks.

In 1974, Kosovo's political status was improved still further when a new Yugoslav constitution granted an expanded set of political rights. Along with Vojvodina, it gained many of the powers of a fully-fledged republic: a seat on the federal presidency and its own assembly, police force and national bank. Power was still exercised by the Communist Party, but it was now devolved mainly to ethnic Albanian communists.

Tito's death on May 4, 1980 ushered in a long period of political instability, worsened by growing economic crisis and nationalist unrest.

The first major outbreak occurred in Kosovo's main city, Pristina, in March 1981 when Albanian students rioted over poor food in their university canteen. This seemingly trivial dispute rapidly spread throughout Kosovo and took on the character of a national revolt, with massive popular demonstrations in many Kosovar towns. The protesters demanded that Kosovo should become the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. However, this was politically unacceptable to Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia. Some Serbs (and possibly some Albanian nationalists as well) saw the demands as being a prelude to a "Greater Albania" which could encompass parts of Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo itself. The Communist Yugoslav presidency quelled the disturbances by sending in riot police and the army and proclaiming a state of emergency, although it did not repeal the province's autonomy as some Serbian Communists demanded. The Yugoslav press reported that about 11 people had been killed (although others claimed a death toll as high as 1,000) and another 4,200 were imprisoned.

Kosovo's Communist Party also suffered purges, with several key figures (including its president) expelled. Hardliners instituted a fierce crackdown on nationalism of all kinds, Albanian and Serbian alike. Kosovo endured a heavy secret police presence throughout most of the 1980s that ruthlessly suppressed any unauthorised nationalist manifestations, both Albanian and Serbian. According to a report quoted by Mark Thompson, as many as 580,000 inhabitants of Kosovo were arrested, interrogated, interned or reprimanded. Thousands of these lost their jobs or were expelled from their educational establishments. It was notable, given Kosovo's later history, that this repression was masterminded by Albanians, not Serbs.

During this time, tension between the Albanian and Serbian communities continued to escalate. In 1969, the Serbian Orthodox Church had ordered its clergy to compile data on the ongoing problems of Serbs in Kosovo, seeking to pressure the government in Belgrade to do more to (as they saw it) protect the Serbian faithful. In February 1982, a group of priests from Serbia proper petitioned their bishops to ask "why the Serbian Church is silent" and why it did not campaign against "the destruction, arson and sacrilege of the holy shrines of Kosovo." Such concerns did attract interest in Belgrade. Stories appeared from time to time in the Belgrade media claiming that Serbs and Montenegrins were being persecuted, although few appear to have been reliably substantiated. Nonetheless, there was a genuine perception among Serbian nationalists in particular that Serbs were being driven out of Kosovo, with some claiming that Serbs were being subjected to "genocide" by Albanians.

Yugoslavia's census returns suggested that there was not in fact a great Serbian exodus from Kosovo. It was certainly true that many Serbs and Montenegrins had been expelled from Kosovo during World War II, but between the 1940s and 1990s their numbers had remained relatively constant at somewhere between 200,000 and 260,000. Their proportion of the population, however, changed significantly. It stood at 27.5% in 1948, 13.9% in 1981 and 10.9% in 1991, according to the census results. A major factor in this was the extremely high Albanian birthrate. The population of Kosovo thus grew overall, but most of the increase was accounted for by Albanians, not Serbs.

An additional factor was the worsening state of Kosovo's economy, which made the province a poor choice for Serbs seeking work. Albanians naturally tended to favour other Albanians when filling jobs, not that there were many jobs to go round. Kosovo was by some way the poorest part of Yugoslavia: in 1979 the average per capita income was \$795, compared with the national average of \$2,635 (and \$5,315 in Slovenia).

The province's poverty eventually became a major political issue not just in Serbia but in Yugoslavia as a whole. Despite economic problems throughout Yugoslavia, the other republics were still required to contribute to a "Solidarity Fund" for the poor southern parts of the country at a rate said to exceed a million dollars a day. The fund made little visible differences to Kosovo, not least because much of it was diverted to corrupt party officials or squandered on white elephants such as a huge football stadium in Pristina. Such grotesque waste was, not surprisingly, unpopular among the other republics and attracted resentment.

Kosovo and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic (1986-1990)

Yugoslavia's political decay following Tito's death was caused by many factors, not just the obvious issue of ethnicity: economic, political, constitutional and even personal issues divided the republics' leaders. In Kosovo, however, these issues manifested themselves mainly in the form of growing ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanians. An increasingly poisonous atmosphere led to wild rumours being traded and otherwise trivial incidents being blown out of all proportion.

It was against this tense background that sixteen prominent members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU, from its Serbian initials) began work in June 1985 on a document that was eventually leaked to the public in September 1986. The SANU Memorandum, as it has become known, was hugely controversial - even incendiary - and has come to be seen by many as the manifesto of the disastrous "Greater Serbia" project of the 1990s. It focused on the political difficulties facing Serbs in Yugoslavia, pointing to Tito's deliberate hobbling of Serbia's power and the difficulties faced by Serbs outside Serbia proper. This would have been controversial at the best of times, but the authors used such strong language in making their case that they virtually invited accusations of promoting Serbian supremacism.

The Memorandum paid special attention to Kosovo, arguing that the province's Serbs were being subjected to "physical, political, legal and cultural genocide" in an "open and total war" that had been ongoing since the spring of 1981. It claimed that Kosovo's status in 1986 was a worse historical defeat for the Serbs than any event since liberation from the Ottomans in 1804, thus ranking it above such catastrophes as the Nazi occupation or the First World War occupation of Serbia by the Austro-Hungarians. The Memorandum's authors claimed that 200,000 Serbs had moved out of the province over the previous twenty years and warned that there would soon be none left "unless things change radically." The remedy, according to the Memorandum, was for "genuine security and unambiguous equality for all peoples living in Kosovo and Metohija [to be] established" and "objective and permanent conditions for the return of the expelled [Serbian] nation [to be] created." It concluded that "Serbia

must not be passive and wait and see what the others will say, as it has done so often in the past."

The SANU Memorandum met with many different reactions. The Albanians saw it as a call for Serbian supremacism at a local level. Other Yugoslav nationalities - notably the Slovenes and Croats - saw an threat in the call for a more assertive Serbia. Serbs themselves were divided: many welcomed it, while the Communist old guard strongly attacked its message. One of those who initially denounced it was a Serbian Communist Party official named Slobodan Milosevic. He soon realised that Serbian popular feeling on the Kosovo issue could be used to boost his own personal power.

In April 1987, Milosevic attended a huge rally of Serbs held to mark the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje. He seized the moment to declare to his audience that "Nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you." This was a reference not only to the anti-nationalist repression of the (Albanian-dominated) Kosovo police but also implicitly to Serbia's perceived inferior position within Yugoslavia. His declaration made him a nationalist hero within Serbia virtually overnight. He used his newfound prestige to push aside his mentor and longstanding friend, Ivan Stambolic, and become President of Serbia.

Kosovo presented a significant obstacle for Milosevic's ambitions both within Serbia and in Yugoslavia as a whole. The Serbian Assembly could not approve any republic-wide laws without the approval of its two provincial Assemblies. In Vojvodina which was mostly Serb-populated, this did not present a problem. However, the Albanian-led Communist Party in Kosovo (led after 1986 by Azem Vllasi) took a more assertive position towards the Serbian government and could be expected to put up strong opposition to any moves to reassert Serbian authority over Kosovo. The province could also help to block Milosevic at the federal level. Under the decentralized 1974 Constitution which was adopted by Tito, the Yugoslav Federal Presidency had eight members, six from the republics and two from the Serbian autonomous provinces including Kosovo. This meant that Serbia's vote was equal to Kosovo's - it could easily be outvoted by the other republics. The obvious solution was to ensure that Serbia controlled Kosovo's federal representation.

For two years from 1987, Milosevic's government stoked Serbian fears of an alliance of Albanians, Slovenes and Croats conspiring against the Serbian people. Lurid claims to that effect were aired on Belgrade television (and were responded to just as lurid a fashion by the state television services of the other republics). More ominously, Milosevic took steps to rein in Kosovo's political leadership. In November 1988, Kosovo's president Azem Vllasi was arrested and the province's communist leadership was dismissed en masse. In March 1989, Milosevic announced an "anti-bureaucratic revolution" in Kosovo and Vojvodina, curtailing their autonomy and imposing a curfew and a state of emergency in Kosovo. This was met with violent demonstrations, resulting in 24 deaths (including two policemen) when rock-throwing protesters were met with gunfire from Serbian security forces. Milosevic and his government maintained that the constitutional changes were necessary to protect Kosovo's remaining Serbs against harassment from the Albanian

majority.

Kosovo under Serbian rule (1990-1996)

Milosevic took the process of retrenchment a stage further in 1990 when he abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Crucially, though, he did *not* abolish their two seats on the Federal Presidency. This therefore gave Serbia three out of eight votes on the Presidency, four when Montenegro (which was closely allied to Serbia) was counted. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia thus had to maintain an uneasy alliance to prevent Milosevic from driving through constitutional changes. Serbia's political changes were ratified in a 5 July 1990 referendum across the entire republic of Serbia, including Kosovo; although most Albanians voted against it, the result was a foregone conclusion given the much greater population of Serbia proper.

The impact on Kosovo was drastic. The extinction of its constitutional powers was accompanied by the abolition of its political institutions, with its assembly and government being formally disbanded. As most of Kosovo's industry was state-owned, the changes brought a wholesale change of corporate cadres. Technically, few were sacked outright: their companies required them to sign loyalty pledges, which most Albanians would not or could not sign, although some did and remained employed in Serbian state companies right up to 1999. Most state-employed Albanians were thus replaced by Serbs, with an estimated 115,000 Albanians losing their jobs.

Albanian cultural autonomy was also drastically reduced. The only Albanian-language newspaper, *Rilindja*, was banned and TV and radio broadcasts in Albanian ceased. Pristina University, seen as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, was purged: 800 lecturers at Pristina University were sacked and 22,500 of the 23,000 students expelled. Some 40,000 Serbian troops and police replaced the original Albanian-run security forces. A punitive regime was imposed that was harshly condemned as a "police state" by the outside world and likened by some to South Africa's recently abandoned policy of apartheid. Poverty and unemployment reached catastrophic levels, with about 80% of Kosovo's population becoming unemployed. As many as a third of adult male Albanians chose to go abroad (particularly to Germany) to find work and support their families back home with hard currency rather than increasingly worthless Yugoslav dinars.

With Kosovo's Communist Party effectively broken up by Milosevic's crackdown, the position of dominant Albanian political party passed to the Democratic League of Kosovo, led by the writer Ibrahim Rugova. It responded to the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by pursuing a policy of peaceful resistance. Rugova took the very practical line that armed resistance would be futile given Serbia's military strength and would lead only to a bloodbath in the province. He called on the Albanian populace to boycott the Yugoslav and Serbian states by not participating in any elections, by ignoring the military draft (compulsory in Yugoslavia) and most important by not paying any taxes or duties to the State. He also called for the creation of parallel Albanian schools, clinics and hospitals. In September 1991, the shadow Kosovo Assembly organized a

referendum on independence for Kosovo. Despite widespread harassment by Serbian security forces, the referendum achieved a reported 90% turnout and a 98% vote - nearly a million votes in all - which approved the creation of an independent "Republic of Kosovo". In May 1992, a second referendum elected Rugova as President of Kosovo. The Serbian government declared that both referendums were illegal and their results null and void.

The slide to war (1996-1998)

Rugova's policy of passive resistance succeeded in keeping Kosovo quiet during the bloody wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia during the early 1990s. However, this came at the cost of increasing frustration and stagnation among the population of Kosovo. The status of Kosovo was not addressed by the 1995 Dayton Accords which had ended the war in Bosnia, and Rugova's pleas for a United Nations peacekeeping force for Kosovo had fallen on deaf ears. Milosevic was still in place, having engineered his promotion to the presidency of the rump Yugoslavia (now consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro).

Continuing Serbian repression had radicalised many Albanians, some of whom decided that only armed resistance would effect a change in the situation. On April 22, 1996, four attacks on Serbian civilians and security personnel were carried out virtually simultaneously in several parts of Kosovo. A hitherto unknown organisation calling itself the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) subsequently claimed responsibility. The nature of the KLA was at first highly mysterious; Rugova suggested that it was a setup by the Serbian secret police to justify increased repression of the Albanians (which duly occurred in the wake of the shootings). In reality it was a small, mainly clan-based but not very well organised group of radicalised Albanians, many of whom came from the Drenica region of western Kosovo. Its strategy was extremely simple and remained constant right up until the outbreak of war in 1999: to provoke the Serbian security forces into committing reprisals which in turn would boost support for the KLA and, crucially, force NATO to step in to end the bloodshed.

Most Albanians saw the KLA as legitimate "freedom fighters" whilst the Serbian government called them terrorists. Some Albanian exiles chose to support the KLA with money and weapons. Bujar Bukoshi, shadow Prime Minister in exile (in Zurich, Switzerland), created a group called AFRK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo) which was reported to have been disbanded and absorbed by the KLA in 1998. The response of outside powers was ambivalent: in February, 1998, the United States' Special Representative to Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, denounced the KLA as a terrorist organization but neither the United States nor most other powers made any serious effort to stop money or weapons being channeled into Kosovo. There was a widespread belief that the Dayton Accords had settled the Yugoslav nightmare once and for all and many Western politicians were reluctant to open yet another Yugoslav can of worms. A six-nation "Contact Group" was established in January 1997 to coordinate international policy on Kosovo, bringing together Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States. The group was unable to agree on anything much and nothing significant was done to alleviate the growing conflict.

The situation was worsened in late 1997 after Albania collapsed into anarchy following the fall of President Sali Berisha. Military stockpiles were looted with impunity by criminal gangs, with much of the hardware ending up in western Kosovo and so boosting the growing KLA arsenal. The conflict soon took on the character of a guerrilla war, although it was still largely confined to western Kosovo. Against the KLA, the Serbian authorities deployed the regular Serbian police and the heavily armed paramilitary police of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), which had already acquired an unpleasant reputation for brutality. It also emerged that militia were becoming involved, under the control of the secret police and the ultra-nationalist gangster Arkan, who had been elected to the Serbian Assembly by the Kosovo Serbs in December 1992. The predictable result was that the two sides embarked on a cycle of bloody attacks followed by bloody reprisals.

By the summer of 1998, the violence had left hundreds dead and driven possibly as many 300,000 people from their homes. Refugee Albanians were fleeing into Macedonia, threatening the fragile unity of that country. This presented a potentially catastrophic strategic dilemma for NATO and the European Union: if civil war broke out in Macedonia between that country's Slavs and Albanians, the security interests of all four of its neighbours, Serbia, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. All four countries had potential territorial claims on Macedonia and Turkey had also made known its interest in protecting the interest of its former subjects, the Albanians. The overspill from a war in Kosovo thus directly threatened the whole of the southern Balkans and presented a major strategic threat to NATO and the EU. Both organisations, plus the United States and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided that something had to be done.

The international community sought to end the fighting, persuade the KLA to drop its bid for independence and convince Milosevic to permit NATO peacekeeping troops to enter Kosovo. They only succeeded in the first objective and then only partially: a ceasefire was brokered commencing from October 25, 1998. A large contingent of unarmed OSCE peace monitors moved into Kosovo. Their inadequacy was evident from the start. They were cruelly nicknamed the "clockwork oranges" in reference to their brightly coloured vehicles (in English, a "clockwork orange" signifies a useless object.) The ceasefire broke down within a matter of weeks and fighting resumed in December 1998.

Racak and the Rambouillet Conference (January-March 1999)

KLA attacks and Serbian reprisals continued throughout the winter of 1998-99, culminating on January 15, 1999 with the mass killing of 45 Albanians in the village of Racak during a joint operation by the Serbian police and Yugoslav army. (See the separate article on the Racak incident.) The incident was immediately condemned as a massacre by the international community and the United Nations Security Council, and later became the basis of one of the charges of war crimes leveled against Milosevic and his top officials. The details of what happened at Racak are still somewhat controversial. Serbian sources claimed that the Albanians had died in battle but ICTY war crimes prosecutors were able to present a strong case at Milosevic's subsequent war crimes trial that the victims had

in fact been murdered. Although the war crimes tribunal has not yet ruled on the issue, it is fair to say that the massacre explanation is generally accepted internationally.

It was decided that the conflict could only be settled by introducing a proper military peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO, to forcibly restrain the two sides. A carefully coordinated set of diplomatic initiatives was announced simultaneously on January 30, 1999:

- NATO issued a statement announcing that it was prepared to launch air strikes against Yugoslav targets "to compel compliance with the demands of the international community and [to achieve] a political settlement". While this was most obviously a threat to the Milosevic government, it also included a coded threat to the Albanians: any decision would depend on the "position and actions of the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all Kosovo Albanian armed elements in and around Kosovo." In effect, NATO was saying to the Serbs "make peace or we'll bomb you" and to the Albanians "make peace or we'll abandon you to the Serbs."
- The Contact Group issued a set of "non-negotiable principles"

Jenny Ligtenberg
Krijtmolen 3
1703 NJ Heerhugowaard.
tel./fax 072-5740273.

HH.W.08/10/02.

Ut fiat Justitia!

Judge May,

Last week I saw the discussion between Stepe Mesic, your witness (friend from America) and Mr. Milosevic (his victim).

I don't know but the past fifty years the World, even Justitia, seem to be injured by a virus blow over by The White House Administration. The virus called: lies, intrigues, corruption, planned scenaria (Srebrenica, Racak, Rambouillet, the three attacks on Sarajevo etc.) the collaboration with fascists and islam-fundamentalists with the aim to destroy Serbia. (to ensure the controle of the Russian border not only but also about oil and the richdom of minerals).

It takes a definite epidemical form with the result that every lie, intrigue etc. becomes 'the very truth' when clear consciuos get lost and liars start believing their own smurdy lies. America thinks to be The Mondial Lord, acting and manipulating the world without any mandate. But America mis-uses his might! They preach democracy, peace and security but sow death and misery all over the world, starting with lies!! (Vietnam, Irak, Somalie, the worst the story of the deportation of the whole population from the Chagos isles, Indian Ocean to build military bases. American bases of course! They can't listen nor discuss. Their aim? To become the hegemony in the world like Hitler wanted! They learned from 'him'.

The preparing, 1948, and wilful destroying former Yugoslavia:

Ut fiat Justitia!

Stepe Mesic is a liar! He feels himself strong by the support of America and...the Hague Tribunal.

For a long time before the war (after the Federation 1974) he co-operated with the CIA, FBI and BND. He met Genscher, Kohl, visited the USA. When he became President of the SFRY, (by desire for might and support from abroad) he infiltrated CIA agents into the Government. Stepe Mesic did (mis)-use this position to offer his services to Germans and Americans, walked the legal and official way but also the illegal and un-official one to reach by collaboration the secession of Croatia and break up Yugoslavia. (Take NOTE of it Mr. May!)

Stjepan Stipe Mesic boasted: how HE brokes Yugoslavia.

His notorious characteristics: his obscene, mean tongue and his same obscene talent to justify even the most sordid political means by clear goals. FOEI! But, just Papa Bush wanted!!

Tudjman rehabilitated him (1973) after beeing sentence to prison by Tito for instigation. Ustasha/fascist Tudjman was accused as a war criminal. He died, Susak died but Stepe Mesic his contribution for crimes against Moslims as well to Serbs has been the same. At any case for the crime against Peace to provoke the bloodshed in former Yugoslavia. Why so selective?? The same is going to be happen to Biljana Plavsic?? The woman much

more fanatic than Dr. Karadzic who violated the rules of the VN time after time?? Westendorp violated the Dayton accords by acting as a thief in the night 17/18 Januar 1998! Banja Luka. Stepe Mesic is a big liar!

The sovereign leader of Serbia didn't declare no one country the war not even mis-uses the Krajina Serbs to make war as Stepe Mesic suggested. The screenplay started already short after WOII! At the EU-Top in Maastricht 1990 maffia Kohl continued pressed all members of the EU to sign for the secession of Croatia. And all those 'intellects' at last did!

At Borowo Selo ustasha/fascist Susak throw three ambrusto rockets, April 1991. The 'planned' war could start. The story of the Krajina people is an other one than Stepe Mesic accused Milosevic for. His favoured Ustasha plundered and burned down their properties, many innocent citizens got murdered.

6 April 1992 under the pressure of German and America, it was EU commissioner v. den Broek who signed the death-sentence of million innocent Croats, Moslims and Serbs by recognising islam fundametalist Izetbegovic as Leader in Bosnia. (No one normal inhabitant of Yugoslavia did ask for war!) Lord Carrington in an interview: the war is pressed on Serbia.

Stepe Mesic is a big liar!

Elected as President of SFRY he already let know the world: I will be the LAST President of the SFRY.

Conclusion: so he was well abreast of the preparing to break up Yugoslavia and the secession across Croatia?

Stepe Mesic is a big liar!

He accuses Mr. Milosevic for using 'sarin gas' during the war. No where I found or hear about this pertinent lie of him.

Easy with only 'friends' around to blame people. Thats what I mean with: his notorious characteristics.

Stepe Mesic is a big liar!

He, was the President but told the Tribunal that Mr. Milosevic uses the money of the National Bank for the JNA.

Perhaps he suffers from a short memory. After June 1991 the lockage was already in Slovenia.

Stepe Mesic accuses Mr. Milosevic for a coup d'etat but forget to tell that he was the betrayer by subversive activities and violated the Constitution of Yugoslavia.

What else can a President of a sovereign country do than defense his country, its inhabitants?

Who destroyed their economy right before the war started?

5 Nov. 1990 Bush sr. decreeted: 'The 1991 Foreign Operation Law 101-513' which paralysed the whole trade and money businesses according Yugoslavia. Germany followed him.

27 Nov. 1990 The New-York Times predicted: the consequences of this execution order will end into a big bloodshed. 1990????

Stepe Mesic is a real criminal:

The purpose of propaganda at Dubrovnik was from a very low really criminal standard, ripe for a trial to the culprit!

Dubrovnik attacked by Serbs and burned down, TV news told. But the reallity: Stepe Mesic himself set in fire thousand or more automobiles OUTSIDE the haven of Dubrovnik to deceive the public opinion!! Who destroyed Mostar totally for sure? Ustasha!

Further I asked myself how Mr. Vladimiroff can tell the Dutch audience: Mr. Milosevic cannot win this trial?

Why then this 'swallow up' trial? And he is the one who has to controle your 'manipulations?'

Nico Steywer

Jenny Ligtenberg
Krijtmoen 3
1703 NJ Heerhugowaard
tel./fax 072-5740273

Heerhugowaard 21/02/03.

v.Aartsen.

Klasse!! Eindelijk verdeeldheid binnen de NAVO, dat in de afgelopen jaren onder het juk van het Pandemonium Washington zich overeind moest houden, omdat zij steeds meer ZONDER Mandaat uitrukte, bijgevolg de VN tot op het bot heeft uitgehold.

Het NHD 11/02 jl. 'n interview met v.Aartsen:
'Met mijn neus bovenop Kosovo'...was deze slimme (sluwe) jongen wellicht op de hoogte v.d. aanwezigheid van Al-Qaeda eenheden met de steun van Osama bin Laden en de KLA=UCK-terroristen allen gesteund door VS ? DE autocraat intussen v.d. NAVO toch? Bovendien de VN aan 't uithollen was door ZONDER mandaat v. dit Orgaan stapje voor stapje de Hegemonie veroverde? In Bosnie en Kosovo b.v. waren de bondgenoten v. Clinton en het MPRI/Pentagon: Ustasha=SSers v.Tudjman, islamfundamentalisten v.Izetbegovic en kornuiten Osama-bin-Laden met de Taliban, Iranese, Pakistani e.a.? DAAR, zat 'IK met m'n neus bovenop' om DIE waarheid op 'n dag aan het voorgelogen publiek bekend te maken! Zonder mandaat, WEL geoorloofd wil/mag ik de waarheid zeggen. Clinton verhoogde het milit.budget met 70%, het Pentagon zocht 'mogelijke nieuwe vijanden' voor de 'nieuwe-wereld-WAN-orde' w.o. Irak/N-Korea/Cuba/Libie/Soedan/Syrie/Iran, anno 1997 ??

'En toen de bombardementen kwamen.....' Vergat dit heerschap te vertellen dat deze verricht werden ZONDER mandaat v.d. VN nadat Jana Korbelt alias Albright MET OPZET Rambouillet had laten mislukken. Het bloed van de 2000 burgerslachtoffers zal blijven stinken aan de handen v. JULIE, terroristen v.d. NAVO! Aangeklaagd door Amnesty International bij het J.T. Door Del-ponte in de doofpot gestopt: er waren geen strafbare feiten gepleegd....Slechts 2000 burgerslachtoffers ZONDER mandaat van 't leven beroofd. Onbelangrijk toch op onze beschafde planeet? De leugens die Shea becommentarieerde zijn in 'n interview door Michel Collon, schrijver van Blufpoker, vastgelegd en.... door Shea zelf bevestigd! (interview is op video vastgelegd.)

De hoogstandjes van Wesley Clark en Generaal Michael Jackson: Beiden afzonderlijk ooit betrokken bij eerdere schandalen, lieten zich in Kosovo niet onbetuigd en, lagen regelmatig met elkaar in de clinch!

NAVO opperbevelhebber Clark gaf de engelse en franse troepen opdracht om de Russen aan te vallen voordat zij kans kregen Slatina, de luchthaven te bezetten. Jackson, aangeklaagd voor zijn bemoeienissen met 'Bloody Sunday' in Ierland, verbood dit ten stelligste. Het conflict werd op hoog niveau via politieke kanalen uitgevochten. Clark zou het jaar daarop (afgezet) vervangen worden. Hij had admiraal Ellis ondanks, toch opdracht gegeven de landingsbanen te gaan bezetten. Deze wees dit voor-

stel af. De diepste crisis binnen de Navo werd 'gesust.' Naast de conflicten Clark-Pentagon werd Clark gezien als de politieke generaal van Jana Körbel alias Albright, eveneens voorstander van een agressief optreden (met of zonder leugens, liever MET) tegen de door haar gehate Serviërs. Zij stond achter het idee van Clark om zijn leugenachtig 'verzonnen verhaal' van de Racak-moord meteen aan te grijpen om Servie plat te bombarderen. Doch Clark kwam in conflict met Min.v.Defensie Cohen. Er moest eerst een leugenachtig scenario bedacht worden (voor 't publiek) OM te bombarderen. Dat werd de intrige Rambouillet. ZO gevaarlijk en gemeen zit Jana in elkaar, waarschijnlijk gefrustreerd door haar verleden. De slachtoffers WEL AF-hankelijk van 'haar duivelse inborst' Zij had de supervisie (Rob de Wijk) Feitelijk moet men medelijden hebben met: 'het drama Jana.' De VS en 't Pentagon die hiervan profiteren=misbruik maken schaar ik onder de noemer: Criminelen.

Kortom de Russen bezetten de luchthaven Slatina op 11 en 12 Juni 1999 nog voor de NAVO kans kreeg hen te ontzetten. Een dikke streep door Clinton zijn rekening doch criminele Machthebbers weten altijd raad. Van Hongarij en Roemenie, onschuldige slachtoffers van deze oorlog, arm en kansloos, eiste DICTATOR Clinton hun luchtruim af te sluiten voor de Russen onder bedreiging van 'humane' sancties: intrekken van IMF leningen. En aldus werkt het hol van vandalen in Washington. Alles moet in stand blijven tot aan 'handjeklap en duistere afspraken maken' bij 't (Monster vlgs P.de Waart) Joegosl.Tribunaal toe. Bij de Top in Sarajevo beweerde Clinton met droge ogen: 'De Joegoslavische grenzen moeten blijven zoals vastgelegd in Resolutie 1244' Wat rest? De rijkdommen zijn reeds verdeeld, Kamp Bondsteel staat gereed (om Irak aan te vallen), van de 300.000 Serviërs zijn slechts 50.000 of minder over. Aldus gaan criminele, oorlogzuchtige machthebbers met ONS, het volk van de hele wereld om. Door het ene na het andere verdrag te schenden zoals nu weer Resolutie 1244.

50 Jaren bestaan v.d. NAVO heeft 20 miljoen oorlogsslachtoffers en talloze ontheemden opgeleverd voor de eigenbelangen v.d. VS. 'God bless America', vrede en veiligheid ver zoek in de wereld door de brandjes die Amerika uitlokt/sticht. En de hebzucht is bij lange nog niet ten einde! Heerlijk gevoel HOE de wereld, vooral in de VS. in opstand komt TEGEN de arrogantie en hoogmoed v.h. Witte Huis/Pentagon. 11 September is het volk wakker geschud en de bedriegerijen v. het Pandemonium Washington ontdekt! Het beste jongetje v.d. klas mag een vriendinnetje in de VS hebben, wil nog niet zeggen mee te moeten werken met haar duivelse ideeën, leugens en intriges. Of, je moet van hetzelfde kaliber zijn.

Nogmaals 11 September heeft in Amerika velen wakker geschud en zijn erachter gekomen dat op de hele wereld 'MENSEN' wonen die dezelfde Rechten en Plichten hebben, kortom als Wereldburger zich moeten gedragen en niet de stelling ophouden: 'Bei uns ist alles viel besser' want dat riekt naar fascisme. Oltmans heeft gelijk, een oudere buurman onthulde in 1948 hetzelfde nadat G.B.J.Hilterman op radio uitlegde HOE de Koude Oorlog was ontstaan. Dat 't Witte Huis fascistische politiek bedrijft, demo-

kratie predikt en zoals Hitler naar de hegemonie streeft.

3

Na Dayton heb ik een studie v.d. oorlog in v.h. Joegoslavië gemaakt waartoe Blauwhelmen onwetend mij toe aangezet hebben. Elke keer wanneer ik naar Nederland ging moedigden zij mij aan: Jenny schrijven en praten. Zij kotsten op de ustasha en het islamfundamentalistische regiem Izetbegovic in Sarajevo; meer op Clinton die islamfundamentalisten MISBRUIKTE om Safe Aereas tot Amerik.milit.bolwerken om te toveren. De grote leugen Srebrenica 'verzon!!' Osama bin Laden 'n Bosnisch paspoort bezat!

Ik heb 50 jaren NAVO bestudeerd, nergens 'Vrede en Veiligheid voor alle volkeren' gevonden doch het tegendeel ervan. Zelfs 20 miljoen oorlogsslachtoffers en nog meer ontheemden in de annalen op kan schrijven. Foei!!

De NAVO=AMERIKA stelt dat zij intervenueert om de Mensenrechten (nooit door hen ondertekend) te verdedigen maar intussen duizenden slachtoffers maakt, zich om volkeren niet bekommert WEL hun rijkdommen. Valse voorwendsels! Het kapitalisme voedt zich met oorlog en ellende in de wereld dank zij NAVO=dus...Amerika. De Navo totaal verdeeld: Kosovo MOEST uitgevochten worden al zij het met leugens, intriges en bedrog om 't gezicht van Amerika te redden. Opperbevelhebber Clark negeerde de argwaan van enkele lidstaten om het bestaan v.d. NAVO niet op het spel te zetten. Volgens experts.

Drie maanden na het 'succes (?) Kosovo' laaide de irritaties en verwijten binnen de NAVO lidstaten weer op zodat de 'roep in Europa om zich van het NAVO-JUK te bevrijden' harder ging klinken. (Suddeutsche Zeitung 17 Aug.1999.)

Amerika is onbetrouwbaar! Dat is wat wereldwijd 16 Februari te horen was TEGEN een oorlog in Irak! Saddam is een dictator, Bush kan hem een hand geven. Zijn gedram is zijn 'macht', zijn hebzucht zal zich uiten door TERREUR. Oorlog.

De wereld PIKT dit niet!! Amerika roept haat, agressie en terreur op. Overal om ons heen zien wij het op ons afkomen in de vorm van de misdaad.

Amerikaanse Militairen zo vol goede moed en eerbij, jonge knullen nog, gerecruteerd door 'n drillmethode gelijk de Hitlerjugend, passeerden de revue de afgelopen week bij TV2 na hun diensten (?) aan het front.

Kapot geslagen door de ervaringen, ziek van alle smerig wapentuig, mentaal voorgoed levenslang, in het kwadraat.

Een uitspraak van Anatole France begin vorige eeuw:
'Zij denken te sterven voor het Vaderland maar in werkelijkheid sterven zij voor de industrieën.'

Een appèl op uw geweten bieden absoluut de volgende boeken:
Blufpoker, Michel Collon.

Van Yalta tot Vietnam, David Horowitz.

Van Hiroshima tot Sarajevo, Wies Jaspers/Pierre Pierrart.

Pyrrusoverwinning Kosovo, Rob de Wijk, Clingendaal.

cc: Tweede Kamer en Regering
Clingendaal
Tijdschriften en Kranten

Dagboek

21-10-1914
Gruwelen



Servië, 21 augustus 1914

De Servische commandant van de Drina-divisie verkoos een commissie om naar deze gruwelen een onderzoek in te stellen (Oostenrijkse troepen, die veel Kroaten telden, hadden op terugtocht door Servië talrijke burgers vermoord, red.). Het onderzoek betrof het gebied tussen Zaflaka en Breziak. Per auto ging het door het geteisterde land. De bevolking woont

er zeer verspreid, meest in kleine gehuchten van enkele boerderijen om een kroegje heen; van een stuk of wat woningen om het huis van een pope.

Al spoedig vonden wij zestien lijken liggen van mensen, met touwen aan elkaar gebonden, die ieder drie tot viermaal doorschoten waren, de armen en beenen gebroken, de schedels stukgeslagen. Er was een Oostenrijkse majoor krijgsgevangen gemaakt, dien de bevolking vooral schuldig stelde aan de wreedheid zijner troepen. De commissie hoorde hem, majoor Josef Balzarick. Zij nam hem mee naar een kleine weide, waar de lijken der met geweerkolven en bajonetten vermoorde grijsaards, vrouwen en kinderen over elkaar lagen, jonge wezentjes met afgekapte armen, en nog gruwzamer verminkt.

De majoor ontkende schuld. Maar toen hij later naar het hoofdkwartier werd vervoerd met een Servischen majoor in het rijtuig, en hij als gemeen soldaat op den bok, toen heeft hij kans gezien zich met cyaankali te vergiftigen.

Elders vond de commissie de lijken van vier mensen, doodgeslagen liggen. Een trouwe hond, nog aan een touw, dat zijn meester vasthield in de verstijfde hand, was middeendoor gehakt. Uit een versch graf dolven zij vijf lijken op, twee zonder wonden, die den indruk maakten van levend te zijn begraven. Verder weer vond zij op een hoop lijkjes van zestig à zeventig kinderen, verbrand in een school. En zoo zag de commissie nog veel meer.

Dat het hier een wraakneming op de nederlaag betrof, bleek wel uit de opschriften in 't Servisch op de huisdeuren, zooals ik noteerde aan 't totaal leeggehaalde huis van een pope: 'Mooie herinnering aan de strafexpeditie van het Oostenrijksche leger, 15 augustus. Servië verwoest, het Oostenrijksche leger leve!'

A. van Tienhoven

A. van Tienhoven, Nederlandse arts, werkte tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog als vrijwilliger op de Balkan. In 1915 publiceerde M. Brusse 'De gruwelen van den oorlog in Servië. Het dagboek van den oorlogschirurg Dr. A. van Tienhoven', waaruit bovenstaand ingekort fragment afkomstig is, evenals Van Tienhovens foto.



U S v The World Breaking international law New world order

Experts on US Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy Aims in Yugoslavia

The United States, the Law, and the people of the world

1. Globalisation

"For globalisation to work, America cannot be afraid to act like the almighty super power that it is. The hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonald-Douglas, the designer of the F-15, and the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technology is called the United States' Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps." - Thomas Friedman, New York Times, 28 March, 1999.

2. Bear in mind that the greatest untapped **oil reserves** in the world are located in the former Soviet Republics bordering the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

2. The war in Kosovo

"This is about America's energy security. It's also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don't share our values. We are trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. We would like to see them reliant on Western commercial and political interests. We've made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it's important that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right." - US Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson

3. **"Stated US policy goals regarding energy resources in this region include fostering the independence of the new states and their ties to the West, breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes, encouraging the construction of East/West pipelines that do not transit Iran and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the central Asian economies." - Doug Bereutter, Chairman, US House Committee on International Relations** at a hearing on the strategic importance of the Caspian region.

4. Need for military Resources

"Central Asian resources may revert back to the control of Russia or to a Russian led alliance. This would be a nightmare situation. We had better wake up to the dangers or one day the certainties on which we base our prosperity will be certainties no more. The potential prize in oil and gas riches in the Caspian sea, valued up to 4 trillion

dollars, would give Russia both wealth and strategic dominance. The potential economic rewards of Caspian energy will draw in their train Western military forces to protect our investment if necessary." **Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor of US News and World Report, May 1999.**

5. Sole Global Super Power

"America's emergence as the sole global superpower now makes an integrated and comprehensive strategy for Eurasia imperative. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world's most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that the country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. In Eurasia the immediate task is to ensure that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the United States or even diminish its decisive role. An enlarged NATO will serve the short term and long term interests of US policy." **Zbigniew Brezinski, 1997, former national security chief under President Carter .**

6. A British View of American Motives in Kosovo

"How have you swallowed the CIA-funded propaganda that demonises the Serbs? Are you not familiar with the duplicity and intimidation of the United States foreign policy? That Ambassador Walker, in charge of monitoring forces in Bosnia [Kosovo?], was financing the contras? Have you no recall of that 'Free World' crap that embraced Batista, Noriega, Syngman Rhee, Bao Dai, Lee Van Thieu and Sukarno?" - **The late Alan Clarke, Conservative MP, former Minister of Defence, 27 March 1999, House of Commons.** He said the real causes of the war were "considerations of oil brokerage, the 'Seven Sisters' and projected pipeline routes."

U S v The World Breaking international law New world order



Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Targets" <redactie@targets.org>; "Hans Hupkes" <hans.hupkes@planet.nl>; "Speerpunt" <speerpunt@wxs.nl>; "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: woensdag 23 juli 2003 0:38
Onderwerp: Fw: [www.ANTIC.org] Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia?

----- Original Message -----

From: Miroslav Antic <miroslav@antic.org>
 To: <SerbianNewsNetwork@Yahoogroups.com>; ARCHIVE <archive@jab.org>; Balkan News <BalkanNews@Yahoogroups.com>; NATO <ANTINATO@topica.com>; News Antic <news@antic.org>; <news@siem.net>; <sorabia@Yahoogroups.com>
 Cc: <sin@antic.org>; <globalobserver@Yahoogroups.com>; <targets-news@Yahoogroups.com>
 Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2003 12:10 AM
 Subject: [www.ANTIC.org] Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia?

>
 > What's Left
 > July 21, 2003
 >
 > Was the US behind the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing in
 > Yugoslavia?
 >
 >
 > By Stephen Gowans
 >
 > It was one of those peeks into what really happened that are occasionally
 > glimpsed long after anyone cares, like finding out after the invasion of
 > Iraq that the US and Britain had already begun aerial operations to pick
 > apart Iraq's defenses long before the invasion had begun, at a time both
 > countries were denying they had already made a decision to go to war
 > ("U.S.
 > Moved Early for Air Supremacy: Airstrips on Iraqi Defenses Began Long
 > Before
 > Invasion, General Says," The Washington Post, July 20, 2003). Those who
 > saw
 > the news reports may have raised their eyebrows, but the reports were too
 > obscure to have flitted, even briefly, across the consciousness of most
 > (even ardent) newspaper readers. The secret, though technically out,
 > remained a secret, lost in the deluge of other news, bereft of any urgency
 > for being about an event that had happened months before.
 >
 > So who's going to care about something that happened almost eight years
 > ago?
 >
 >
 > "In early August 1995," writes researcher Gregory Elich, "the Croatian
 > invasion of Serbian Krajina precipitated the worst refugee crisis of the
 > Yugoslav civil war. Within days, more than two hundred thousand Serbs,
 > virtually the entire population of Krajina, fled their homes, and 14,000

- > Serbian civilians lost their lives." ("The invasion of Serbian Krajina,"
- > NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition, International Action Center,
- > New York, 1998.)
- >
- > This was Operation Storm, "the largest single act of ethnic cleansing of
- > the
- > Yugoslav civil war," according to Even Dyer, a journalist with CBC Radio.
- > "And yet not one person has been arrested and brought before the
- > International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia" ("Croatian
- > atrocities being forgotten: Cdn. Officers," CBC News, July 21, 2003.)
- >
- > The popular mythology about the Yugoslav civil war is that it was the
- > Serbs,
- > led by Slobodan Milosevic, who embarked on a program of ethnic cleansing
- > to
- > create a greater Serbia. Milosevic is on trial at the Hague Tribunal,
- > facing
- > genocide charges.
- >
- > So it should strike a dissonant chord that:
- >
- > the single greatest act of ethnic cleansing does not have the Serb's
- > signature on it (they were the victims); and
- > the Hague Tribunal, which professes to be impartial, has done nothing to
- > bring the authors of the atrocity to book.
- > The Tribunal says the evidence is circumstantial, but senior Canadian
- > soldiers, including
- > a general who commanded peacekeeping forces in the area of Operation
- > Storm,
- > say they suspect the real reason for the Tribunal's inaction is that
- > Western
- > governments were in the background pulling the strings.
- > For example, Argentina provided artillery to the Croats, despite a UN
- > embargo on supplying materiel and even though their own troops were in
- > Croatia as peacekeepers.
- >
- > And a private US military contractor, Military Professional Resources Inc
- > (MPRI), headed by a former US Army Chief of Staff, likely planned the
- > operation.
- >
- > Canada's Major-General Andrew Leslie says he doubts the Croats could have
- > pulled off Operation Storm themselves. "That was done by people who really
- > knew what they were doing."
- >
- > Leslie's colleague, Major-General Alain Fourand, agrees. He says he
- > suspects
- > it was MPRI that was behind the operation.
- >
- > The MPRI Web site, according to CBC news, "points to an article in which
- > the
- > Croatian government praised the job MPRI has done for it."
- >
- > There is much that is misunderstood about the Yugoslav civil war, and the
- > Hague Tribunal.

- >
- > For one, the Croats were a lot closer to the image of Nazis than the Serbs
- > were, though it was Serbs who were portrayed, for propaganda reasons, as
- > successors of Hitler's fascists. After the breakaway Croat republic
- > violently seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, Franjo Tudjman, the country's
- > president, began to resurrect symbols of Croatia's Nazi puppet state past.
- > According to Elich, "the Croatian fascist(s) murdered as many as one
- million
- > Serbs, Jews and Romani" during WWII.
- >
- > And the Tribunal is funded in part by billionaire financier George Soros,
- > who has a long history of underwriting programs to destabilize countries
- > whose markets are closed, or partly closed, to Western investment. Once a
- > renitent government is ousted, and a Western friendly regime is installed,
- > Soros swoops in to buy up state assets at fire sale prices. Soros is said
- to
- > have his eyes on the massive Trepca mining complex in Kosovo, worth an
- > estimated \$5 billion. The Hungarian émigré spent \$100 million to oust
- > Milosevic, who presided over a largely socially owned economy ("The
- > billionaire trader has become Eastern Europe's uncrowned king and the
- > prophet of an 'open society.' But open to what?" New Statesman, June 2,
- > 2003.)
- >
- > The US and Germany began supporting secessionist forces in Yugoslavia
- after
- > the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union, when the Yugoslav
- > federation refused to be brought wholly into the Western orbit. Former
- > Communist countries were undergoing a spate of privatization. But,
- according
- > to Neil Clark, "Over 700,000 Yugoslav enterprises remained in social
- > ownership and most were still controlled by employee-management
- committees,
- > with only 5% of capital privately owned." ("The quisling of Belgrade," The
- > Guardian (UK), March 14, 2003.) The West aligned itself with Alija
- > Izetbegovic in Bosnia, who wanted to makeover the multi-ethnic republic as
- > an Islamic religious state, though Bosnia had a large non-Muslim,
- including
- > Serb, population. And Tudjman, the West's favorite in Croatia, reeked to
- > heaven of fascism and anti-Serb fanaticism. But both were useful as
- > instruments to tear apart the federation and deliver it, piece by piece,
- > into the hands of the West, and its corporate sector.
- >
- > Later, secessionist in Kosovo would be encouraged, trained, and bankrolled
- > by the West, sparking a civil war that furnished NATO with a pretext to
- > launch a "humanitarian" war, and ultimately, the ouster of Milosevic,
- > working through its proxy, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.
- >
- > The atrocities of August 1995 are now largely forgotten in the West, and
- > while they seem to be old news, they do shed light of recurrent patterns
- > that can be glimpsed today. The West's penchant for precipitating crises
- > that can be used as pretexts for intervention in countries that seek to
- > pursue an independent course hasn't abated. And it's all too common for
- > victims of Western-backed aggressions to be portrayed as the aggressors
- > themselves. North Korea, for example, is now widely understood to be a
- > hostile nation, even though it is the US that shows every indication of

> being hell-bent on resuming a war with the impoverished country it has
never
> entirely renounced. Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe, part of a complement of
nations
> George W. Bush has designated "captive nations," along with North Korea
> ("Bush blacklists Zimbabwe, Cuba," news24.com, July 19, 2003) are
portrayed
> as brutal, repressive, regimes, though the reason they're demonized has
> everything to do with their inhospitable orientation to the global
> capitalist economy dominated by the United States.
>
> That too was the Serb's offense, in the eyes of the West, which is why
there
> ever was an Operation Storm, why there's a Star Chamber at the Hague, and
> why MPRI won't soon be facing war crimes charges.
>
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Van: "RD" <despot@tiscali.nl>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje"
Verzonden: maandag 16 juni 2003 1:49
Onderwerp: CNN...

CNN, which is run by Jews, showed the world dead Serbs as Croats killed by Serbs, then threatened to sue CompuSerb for exposing the lie



This image appears on page 4 of "Crimes of the State of Croatia '91" published by the Military Museum, Belgrade. Image was obtained from the autopsy files of Dr. Zoran Stankovic who did more than 11,000 autopsies on Serb victims. He identified these victims as Serbians, killed in November, 1991 in Borovo Naselje, murdered by the Croatian National Guard Corps. His

files were presented to the Haugue Tribunal.



Serbian family killed by the Croatian forces during the withdrawal to the Borovo Naselje, November 19, 1991. Identification: Radosav Pavic (red top), Zoran Pavlovic, Zorica Pavlovic, Nada Pavlovic and Milojka Pavlovic at 74 Nikole Demonje Street. See 50% reduced Reuter's photo with victims' identification. On CNN's Impact special on Arkan on June 1, 1997 by

Christiane Amanpour, dead Serbs in photos above were shown as Croats killed by Arkan. See CNN's demand for CompuSerb's retraction of truth.

The Serbian Defense League
exposing chauvinism, racism and hate
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