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MARKO LOPUSINA

WAR, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPES

THE ROLE OF THE CIA
AND THE NEWS MEDIA
IN THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

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"Americans are by and large very decent and well-meaning people, and as such they are extremely easy to manipulate in support for noble-sounding causes abroad... Images are everything. If you show them a skull on the gravesite, you can tell them that 10 people were killed, or 100, or 10,000. They'll believe anything... The level of healthy skepticism, so natural in other countries in the context of perceiving information from dominant and/or official media outlets, is extremely low in the U.S... Americans are fun to work with."

U.S. Public Relations professional, on condition of anonymity

"Let's have a real air war. The idea that people are still holding rock concerts in Belgrade, or going out for Sunday merry-go-round rides, while their fellow Serbs are "cleansing" Kosovo, is outrageous. It should be lights out in Belgrade: Every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war related factory has to be targeted. Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian nation (the Serbs certainly think so), and the stakes have to be very clear: Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too."

Thomas Friedman, New York Times columnist, The New York Times, April 23, 1999

"If NATO is not able to wear down this Milosevic in the next few weeks, I believe that we have to go in there and drop leaflets on Belgrade and other cities and say, "Listen, you guys have got to move because we're now going to come in and we're going just level your country. The whole

infrastructure is going... Any target is OK. ... there would be nothing moving – no cars, no trains, nothing.”

Bill O'Reilly, Commentator, Fox News Channel, April 26, 1999

PROLOGUE

Speaking at the U.S. Congress on the occasion of being appointed Secretary of State in fall 1996, Madeline Albright uttered words that at the expiration of the twentieth century characterized the relationship of the USA toward the rest of the world in a cold political manner: “For America, there are no constant enemies, but rather unchanging principles. These principles are founded on law, human dignity and freedom, not only for some, but for all people.” This declaration came as a chilling suggestion that anyone who did not respect those principles would do so contrary to the rules set by the US in the theater of the international politics in the post-cold war period. By consistently refusing to play by the rules established on the fly by superpowers in the game of the breakup of Yugoslavia throughout the 90's, Yugoslavia became such a great threat to the U.S. that it, as President Bill Clinton claimed, “endangered the security” of America. This crystallized American attitude toward Yugoslavia destroyed all Serbian illusions they had about the one-time alliance and everlasting friendship. The Serbs understood, albeit late, that in politics there is neither love nor affinity, but only interests.

As the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia concluded with the *de facto* occupation of the Serbian province, a grim assessment came from an unexpected source. Mikhail Gorbachev, whose reforms ravaged the Soviet Union it was not ready for, and resulted in the demise of the Russian military power, thus allowing for the US to assert itself as a sole superpower, lamented in the July 16, 1999 Boston Globe op-ed piece that the “[Kosovo] war provided evidence that the United States, which plays a commanding role in NATO, is willing not only disregard the norms of the international law, but also to impose on the world its own agenda in international relations and, in fact, to be guided in these relations solely by its own “national interests,” taking the United Nations into account only if UN decisions and actions serve US interests.”

By the end of the twentieth century the United States is, by the acknowledgment of the official Washington, the single true superpower and the real leader of the world. Its domination is reflected in economic, political and military influence in the regions which the U.S. considered important participants in world events. Those were Europe, Russia and the Islamic countries. Somewhere in the space between these influences lied Yugoslavia, which has officially had

diplomatic relations with America for more than a century. Unofficially, however, these relations were rather sporadic prior to World War II, and afterwards they were albeit continuous, yet often dramatic. From the American side, collaboration with Belgrade, with King Peter II, Tito, and Milosevic arched over these five decades, from Wilson's isolationism through Roosevelt's and Truman's alliance to Reagan's open anti-communism and Clinton's interventionism. For forty years Americans were publicly declaring support for a stable and independent Yugoslavia, as a kind of buffer zone between two blocs. With the fall of Communism and the demise of the bipolar balance of powers the U.S. made clear to Belgrade that it no longer had the same interest in Yugoslavia that it had during the Cold War.

By this time the picture received by the government from the intelligence network, and often magnified by the lenses of the news media, affected the US policy in the Balkans, or the lack thereof. The news media became a factor of utmost importance, as the US Balkan policy throughout the 90s evidenced, leading to a curious dynamics of mutually reinforcing trinity of three factors: gathering information via intelligence channels; disseminating it through media, at the same time allowing the media to play a key role in political decision making. The preamble of the latter has crystallized by the early 1992: the Serbs were aggressors, and Moslems and Croats victims of the new war in the Balkans. This position was prepared in part by the Bush administration, in a public relations effort to get an upper hand against Clinton on the subject of US policy in Bosnia, by dramatizing the conflict. After the defeat of Bush, this ready-to-wear foreign policy couture was picked up by a diplomatically inexperienced Bill Clinton, who held the Yugoslavia, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, in political and economic isolation with an external wall of sanctions.

Reflecting the recognition of the growing importance of the news media in the process, Professor Dennison Rusinow of Pittsburgh, a reviewer of many CIA reports on the Balkans and Yugoslavia, whose texts are found in press materials of the intelligence corps of the U.S. claims that the CIA is only one of the agencies and institutions which influence the shaping of official, semi-official and unofficial American policy, and is in no way decisive. The CIA as a large institution must, because of its enormous budget, says Prof. Rusinow "produce strong statements and predictions, which has also been the case with the report about the disintegration of Yugoslavia." American media customarily report the U.S. government refuting such reports of the CIA and DIA, thereby showing their differences of position. Professor Dennison Rusinow concludes that there is no need to overemphasize the influence of one governmental organization, like the intelligence corps, on creating state policies.

The activity of the American intelligence services, and with them the CIA, has always been, - says an expert of special wars, Dusan Vilic, - a mirror image of the official policy of America toward our country. That's why the activity of the CIA toward the Yugoslavia has always been either well hidden or as much as possible legalized. The primary goal of the CIA was to assess the internal political situation in Yugoslavia and its the international position. Along with that the aim has been to foresee the further development of our country, and the possibilities for the greatest possible influence of the U.S. on those processes from the standpoint of political, economic and military intervention and the long-term geopolitical goals of the U.S. in the region. Consistent with its general ideological and political position toward socialism and communism, the ultimate goal of America itself was then a change in the social and political system of the SFRY. More precisely -- the destruction of the communist system of government. To that end, the West, with the U.S. as the

leading power, always insisted on lending direct and covert support to the bearers of nationalism, but also reforming ideas in the wing of Maspok (Mass Movement) and liberalism, and then to dissidents and human rights activists of all stripes. Later on, they aided Albanian secessionism, and Slovenian and Croatian republicanism. That support was given publicly, politically or secretly, through intelligence channels.

THREE PERIODS OF ESPIONAGE

The U.S. and its relationship toward Yugoslavia in the sphere of the intelligence war can be divided into three periods. The first, according to Dr. Obren Djordjevic, a leading expert on the issues of national security in Yugoslavia and author of *The Lexicon of Security*, consists of the postwar period and is characterized by open hostility of American intelligence services toward the National Liberation Movement (NOP). This determined the operating methods of American intelligence services. At the time of the establishing the Kingdom of Yugoslavia America had very little intelligence influence on the Balkans and Yugoslavia. Only with the outbreak of Second World War and the entry of the U.S. into that worldwide armed conflict, did American military, as well as political interest begin to manifest itself in Yugoslavia. Even then it was aimed more to reducing the influence of the English and French, and secondarily of the Italians and Soviets, and less to the goal of American domination of the Balkans.

In the beginning of the World War II America was aiding the Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic, but still undertook some activities, which were then in opposition to the fundamental policy of the U.S. The negotiations of Col. Dowell, the chief of the American military mission at the Chetnik headquarters, as well as contacts with deserting Chetniks in Serbia after the war, testify to the efforts of American intelligence to offer, at any price, support to anti-Communist forces, that is resistance to the new ruling power in Yugoslavia -- asserts Dr. Obren Djordjevic.

Vojislav Pavlovic, a Belgrade historian, studying classified historical documents discovered that American intelligence services from fall of 1943 had established a network of their own intelligence agents in the Command of the Royal Yugoslav Army as well as the general staff of the Yugoslav army. The first American intelligence agent near Tito, in 1943, according to Dr. Pavlovic was officer Robert Weil. The Partisans, agent Weil wrote, were "a military formation under the control of the communists," while the Chetniks in official reports are "the anti-fascist formation which in September and December clashed with the occupiers."

"Liberated Partisan territories do not exist, that is a space which the German occupiers can seize when they wish. The Partisans do not defend those territories with fortified lines of a front. The guerrilla movement is moving toward the regions for which the Germans do not have a great interest. The Partisan movement has clear political goals -- and that is seizing power, which assumes the destruction of the opposing resistance movement of Chetniks, and compromises with the Western allies to the extent that is necessary to obtain international support"-- wrote Robert Weil in his analytical report.

In the summer of 1948, a secret conference of the representative of the Holy See and America was held in the Vatican about carrying out "Plan X" for opposing the spread of communism to the West. Participating in that conference were Pope Pius XII with 12 cardinals, American

Cardinal Spellman, Monsignor Fulton Sheen, and Myron Taylor, special delegate of the White House. UPI first reported the news about "Plan X" for "USA offering effective help to underground movements of anti-Communist nature in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe" and with the goal to "smash communism where it has already come to power!" The plan was proposed by Stiles Bridges, considered and adopted by the State Department. The author of "Plan X" was John Foster Dulles of the CIA, who proposed to the American government "that all means be used to develop espionage, organizations of political intelligence, military branch offices, the recruiting of agents, formation of underground political organizations, terrorism and sabotage, as well as the coordination of anti-Communist activities in communist countries. Various categories of refugees, the so-called displaced persons, give the State Department possibilities to recruit agents and terrorists for destructive actions in Eastern Europe. With "Plan X" Communism was designated to the bogeyman of the current world, against which the U.S. decided decisively to battle along with its war allies, and even its very recent enemies. In mid-June 1948 in Frankfurt on Main, American General Chamberlain, bureau chief of intelligence of the general staff in the Pentagon, spoke at a conference with his British and German colleagues about the need to implement "Plan X." This plan included in its grip the new Yugoslav state (FNRJ, Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija).

Before the end of the war, American intelligence centers, the Office of Strategic Services -- OSS, then housed in CIC, the counter-intelligence organizations for the protection of American troops in Trieste and Austria, began to develop active intelligence activities toward the FNRJ. The behavior of American diplomats in Belgrade who at that time were collaborating with colleagues from Italy and Austria, was similar.

The second period begins during the intensive campaign of 1948 of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia -- writes Dr. Djordjevic. -- The U.S., through its agents, wanted, first to confirm whether it really was about a conflict between Tito's and Stalin's communists, and secondly, when they were convinced that the conflict was real, to stand on the side of Yugoslavia. To that end, in intelligence work and in the CIA itself, they abandoned crude methods, secret actions and handled more work legally, either through the embassy or via scientific cooperation between the two countries.

The third period began after Tito's death, during the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. By then the Yugoslavia lost the role of the Trojan horse in the Eastern Bloc - the buffer zone between capitalism and communism. America, through its diplomats and intelligence agents, then for the first time made an analytical study and assessment entitled "Where is SFRY Going after Tito." Ambassador John Scanlon wrote about this in his dispatch to Washington: "Our analysis indicates that the system of rotating management will probably survive another five years. The Russians are not planning an invasion of Yugoslavia, nor will there be a civil war in the SFRY in the near future. After a period of five years, it will become evident that Yugoslavia does not have another Tito, and because of that the system will not survive. Yugoslavia is entering into a phase in which totally new relations will emerge among republics. We cannot foresee all that will happen, but there is no need for us to interfere, except to seek from everyone that they resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. We must be very careful that we do not take sides."

When the U.S. was confronted with the disintegration of the SFRY at the end of the '80's and beginning of the '90's, it formulated a position, first regarding it as a crisis on European soil, that needed to be resolved by the Old World. After that, as Dr. Ranko Petkovic writes, the situation

was attempted to be horseshoed into a "democratic process". The interest of America was to enable democratization, or in other words, to undercut the activities of the JNA (Yugoslav National Army), the instrument of the communist rule, and to support the republics that were breaking away from Yugoslavia. By the assessment of the JNA and General Veljko Kadijevic, external forces wanted to destroy the existing system in the SFRY in two ways. First, instantly, as in Poland and Hungary, while risking disintegration of the state of Yugoslavia. Secondly, with the slower penetration of Western ideology into the country, while preserving of the unity of the federal state. Dr. Borisav Jovic in his memoirs testifies that the JNA in the end of 1989 assessed that the West, and more exactly America, would go with the second variation of the destruction of Yugoslav communism. The reason was fear of the Russians, and their support of Serbia, in Moscow's desire to guard its access to Montenegrin ports on the Adriatic Sea.

The aggressiveness of the American secret service against Yugoslavia always depended on the aggressiveness of the foreign policy of the White House. To the degree that George Bush, once himself director of the CIA, was inconsistent and indecisive in his position toward Yugoslavia as for whether it should be preserved, Bill Clinton, a sworn opponent of the CIA, was for direct intervention in resolving the crisis on the soil of the former Yugoslavia. The Clinton Administration sought open support from Europe and Russia for interventionism in the Balkans in 1994, and formed a negotiation team with Richard Holbrooke, who brought all three warring parties to sign the Dayton agreement in December 1995. For Clinton, the American entry in the Balkans, and more exactly in the former Yugoslavia, represented, in the estimation of Dr. Ranko Petkovic, one more diplomatic-political score before new presidential elections in the U.S., and secondly, a reflection of the real power of America to rule the world.

Yugoslavia in and of itself was not for long a direct target of interest for the CIA; but after the development of a separatist process in Kosovo and the rise of nationalism in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia at the end of the '80's, special intelligence studies and analyses were conducted on the situation in SFRY. One of these CIA studies was reported by *The New York Times* in 1990 as a warning to the American, the world and Yugoslav public. The CIA report predicted that the SFRY would disintegrate in 18 months: "American intelligence service foresees the breakup of SFRY, most probably in the following 18 months and considers a civil war in this multi-national Balkan country very likely. The Yugoslav experiment has failed, the country is disintegrating economically, which will be accompanied by ethnic conflict and unrest, which could lead to civil war. The formal breakdown is expected in 1991, as it has already come to an economic blockade of Serbia against goods from other republics and to a boycott by the republics to pay for the maintenance of the federal JNA." This CIA study was reported in the newspapers by David Binder, a Washington correspondent, who later during the war found himself unwelcome to report on the Yugoslav conflict. The report triggered the justified remarks of many Yugoslavs that the U.S. and CIA knew all about the imminent war in the Balkans. The question was only who would they support in that conflict?

The spirit of Yalta and the Cold War came to life at the end of the '80's in international relations. The war in Yugoslavia was in fact a settlement of the great powers about their political spheres of influence in the Balkans. The Americans entered rather easily into the Balkans in 1993 and 1994, so that in 1996 and 1997, they did not want to leave at all, especially since by then Washington viewed the U.S. as the only true world leader at the end of the 20th century. Penetration

into the Balkans for America represented entry into the European, and especially the former Moscow zone of influence, - a step padded by the policies of Ronald Reagan, who on the wake of his presidency saw the US as the only stabilizing force in the world.. The Americans failed to comprehend why the Old World was not enthusiastic about accompanying the U.S. in their offensive policy of creating a New World Order. The euphoria with which Americans followed the American military invasion of Iraq was unfathomable for Europeans. The general public in the U.S. , just as during the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, was simply delighted in the destruction of military, and even civil structures, and in the deaths of innocent Iraqis. For Americans in the 90s, referred to in March 1999 by a TV commentator as the "post-Seinfeld and pre-Star Wars 2 generation" it was just one more new computer war game, one more assertion that Americans are the real rulers of the world.

Yugoslavia felt the new winds directly for the first time in mid-November 1990, when with one undiplomatic act, Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, representative of the U.S. in SFRY, warned Budimir Loncar, then minister of foreign affairs, that the CIA analysis concludes that it would "come" to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and to an attempt to preserve it by means of a military coup." This was in fact a message for the presidency of SFRY that America knows what is being prepared in Belgrade, with additional false restraint from Zimmerman that neither he nor "the State Department agree with the assessment of the CIA." On Republic Day 1990 with Boro Jovic, Zimmerman was interested in whether the JNA would intervene in Slovenia if it tried to secede. When the president answered in the negative, Zimmerman sent his report that same evening to the CIA and White House. At the same time in the Security Council of the UN, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in the name of the U.S. conveyed to the Slovenes that they could secede, since the Americans were "more interested in democratization than in the unity of Yugoslavia."

On December 4, 1990, American representatives and experts of the CIA and FBI came to an agreement with Hungarians in Budapest on tactics of support for those who secede and tactics of attack and pressure on Belgrade and Serbia. Budapest became then a center of the CIA and FBI for illegal arming of Croatia. In case of complications in the process of secession, the Hungarians received the task to stir up their national minority in Vojvodina, just enough to cause damage to Serbia. The results of the first multi-party election in Serbia were awaited. When news of Slobodan Milosevic's victory reached the U.S., official Washington turned against the Serbs and Serbia. The CIA's response was: "With the victory of Milosevic, our scenario is becoming a reality, about the disintegration of SFRY and the civil war in Yugoslavia -- which no longer exists, but still exists. The question is no longer asked whether it is necessary to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia, but rather how to avoid it provoking great instability in the Balkans and in Europe. It is time that American policy of support to the unity and territorial integrity of SFRY be updated, which has not been done since the time of the Cold War." In Borisav Jovic's translation of this position, the U.S. publicly announced that the real American policy is the support of the disintegration of SFRY. The nation who elected Milosevic is to be blamed for all that, or Milosevic himself, for having run at all for president of Serbia. Americans gave support to the new democracies, even though the CIA in its reports and analyses clearly wrote that in the former Yugoslavia there was no existing power capable of leading that process peacefully and able to defeat the communists. Supporting the bogus "democratization" in this way led to dismemberment of SFRY, and opened the door for U.S. entry into the Balkans, as well as to American pressure on Serbs, ultimately escalating into the war over Kosovo.

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SHAPING AGGRESSIVE POLICY

The aggressive foreign policy of the U.S. toward Yugoslavia, or rather of Bill Clinton toward the Balkans and Yugoslavia in the course of 1992 was a byproduct and a consequence of the presidential election campaign in America. Thus, for instance, the term "ethnic cleansing" contrary to common understanding, was not coined by Serbs to refer to the forced removal of a different ethnic group, - a notion pounded throughout the 90s in Western media. The term "ethnic cleansing" was invented by the US State Department in the summer of 1992 under the auspices of James Baker III, then in charge of Bush's reelection campaign, after which the term took off, became a buzzword for the Balkan policy and now it has a life of its own, being falsely attributed to Milosevic. The battle encouraging the Croat war effort, wanted to accelerate resolving the Yugoslav crisis, bringing it to an end, even by force, and at the same time squeeze Bob Dole from the Congressional podium and television screen. Bill Clinton wanted to present himself to the American public and especially to voters as a peace-maker, consistent with his biography, in an attempt to portray Dole as a war monger. Later on, by giving the Croats the green light to a military invasion on Republika Srpska Krajina in August of 1995, and the larger towns of Republika Srpska President Clinton made Dole's suggestion on removing the embargo on importing arms absurd. Thus, inflaming the war in the Balkans from the Washington side was carried out in a questionable legal manner - an American specialty for sure, so that at the same time it looked like impudence and refusal to obey by Zagreb. With that, Clinton was left with the possibility to publicly criticize General Franjo Tudjman, and to again, publicly to intercede in support of peace before the entire world. All of that was a consequence of aggressive American policy of domination in international relations, which Dragos Kalajic called simply the American evil.

At the beginning of 1990, General Veljko Kadijevic delivered a JNA assessment to Borisav Jovic, indicating that after Lawrence Eagleberger's visit to Yugoslavia, the U.S. had finally decided to destroy the Serbian leadership, as the only communist leadership in Yugoslavia in CIA assessment. In CIA analyses, the critical point through which Serbian leadership and Serbia could be destroyed was Kosovo, human rights of the Albanian minorities, and the violations of civil rights in the province. With that, according to JNA, the CIA and official Washington gave priority to destroying communist rule in SFRY over the question of the integrity of Yugoslavia. It also determined the CIA strategy -- if the U.S. does not succeed in destroying communism in an integrated way, it will go with shattering the SFRY, dismembering it part by part. This turning point in relation to the unity of Yugoslavia was made in America, in Kadijevic's estimation, and was based on the conclusion that the Russian danger was reduced, as was Russian interest in access to the Adriatic Sea, as incentive to protect the Serbs. This Washington strategy to be implemented, the CIA infiltrated all significant Yugoslav institutions, including the State Security Corps of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and the presidency of the SFRY itself, according to Counter-intelligence Corps of the Yugoslav National Army. Aware of the strong influence of foreign countries and their secret services, General Veljko Kadijevic suggested to Borisav Jovic, the highest ranking official of Yugoslavia, that they carry out a campaign to uncover the influences of the CIA and BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) on SFRY. Preparations for that action were taken at the Federal Ministry of National Defense, the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Federal Ministry of External Affairs. A group of seven inspectors of state security was created, who boycotted this counter-

intelligence action, claiming that "they had no legal protection." Branko Tintor, then head of diplomatic intelligence services, simply responded that his intelligence people from SID working abroad had not noticed any Western attempt aimed at the breakup of Yugoslavia. The inspectors of SDB SSUP protected the interests of their own republics, and not those of the SFRY.

The primary political and military umbrella for American initiatives in the Balkans was NATO, already for 20 years under the US leadership. The Western military alliance concluded in mid-1991 when the JNA moved to intervene in Slovenia, that Yugoslavia was one of the key focus points of war in Europe, and therefore the SFRY is the problem of the Old World, and not only of the Balkans. It was therefore decided that every activity of the JNA be prevented, that NATO prevent Yugoslav crisis from bursting into flames, and that it is necessary to "take political-economic measures in order to reduce the crisis." The one who should have taken those measures was Ante Markovic, the Yugoslav prime minister, who also believed that in Yugoslavia there was no room for JNA intervention, and that the Yugoslav army must not participate in any such event, since it would always end up on someone's side. In the interpretation of Borisav Jovic, president of Yugoslavia, as he told Slobodan Milosevic in summer 1991, that meant Ante Markovic would not preserve SFRY with the help of the JNA, but do so with the help of NATO powers. Our army will be kept in the barracks, since it is communist, and must be opposed. Thus Ante Markovic's position in 1991 echoed the aspirations of the U.S. and NATO, and not Yugoslavia.

Borisav Jovic spoke about that in early 1992 with Lawrence Eagleberger, the former ambassador and U.S. Secretary of State, in Washington. At that time Eagleberger diplomatically betrayed Jovic and the Yugoslav public, as he declared that America would not support the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, and stressed that the U.S. would not in any case become directly engaged in resolving the Yugoslav crisis. The American media responded to that statement with a caricature in which Lawrence Eagleberger was portrayed as a corrupt official, who worked for the Serbs, since he had a financial stake in representing the "Yugo America" project. Later Eagleberger took back a portion of his statement, and told Jovic that he did not know what the definitive position of the U.S. would be regarding the recognition of individual Yugoslav republics. That position, of course, accelerated in its own way the media bombarding of Dubrovnik, the battles around Vukovar, and the spreading the war into Bosnia and Hercegovina. It is impossible that the White House and CIA did not know anything about that. The staged massacres of Muslim civilians in Sarajevo provided the much needed pretext for America to enter the war against Yugoslavia and the Serbs in the Balkans, claims American professor Ronald Hatchet:

"America, that is the CIA and DIA, became involved in the Yugoslav crisis more significantly during 1994. To me, it's all about unconstitutional declaration of war by the U.S. against the Serbs, about the illegal, undeclared war that Bill Clinton is carrying out in the Balkans. The American public knows little about the U.S.'s unofficial entry into the war in Bosnia, since we Americans have not had any human loss there, which would upset American public opinion. The U.S. entered into Bosnia in 1994 the moment they understood that Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim government could not win that war alone. Washington then decided through the CIA and DIA to illegally arm the Muslim and Croatian army, to train their officers and units for war against the army of General Ratko Mladic. That entire secret operation was paid for by the Islamic world. The CIA possesses evidence that the Americans trained Moslem snipers how to shoot and kill their own people, and blame it on Serbs. This training was conducted by General Laurie Friedman, officer of a

special forces unit, with the army in Somalia. The CIA and DIA are the government's professional secret corps which do what the U.S. president orders. When I was working in the U.S. government several years ago, in the Middle East in 1981, I remember that the DIA provided the Iraqis with our secret data about Iran, so that the war would unfold for a time to the benefit of Iraq. So that I am certain that we did similar things in the former Yugoslavia to the benefit of Moslems and Croats. The Croats themselves admitted to me that there were about 2,000 American advisers in Zagreb. A long ago, in 1976, I served in Zagreb, and Croats who knew me in 1995 invited me to work as a military adviser. They offered me pay of \$100,000 for six months work with Croatian and Moslem officers. I turned down the offer because I didn't want to participate in one more secret American war." - said Dr. Ronald Hatchet, director of the Center for International Studies of St. Thomas University in Houston, and former officer of American military security.

FATAL FRIENDS

So begins the fourth period of the most direct intervention of the CIA and DIA in internal political events on the soil of the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Salajdzic publicly acknowledged that he was a sympathizer of the American government, while the Croatian politician, Stipe Mesic at one time bragged that he personally took all documents about the JNA which existed in Zagreb to the Pentagon and DIA. Janez Drnovsek, former president of SFRY prided himself that he had had secret conversations with Washington emissaries. These CIA and DIA missions culminated with the official entry of the representatives of these American secret corps in Bosnia, characteristic of one more international guarantee of the peace concluded in Dayton and Paris. In Tuzla there is now a headquarters of civil and military American intelligence, formed under the sponsorship of the CIA in order to conduct a program for peace, which is only a U.S. cover for public espionage on Serbs, Croats and Moslems. Before Tuzla, Americans formed their espionage centers for Yugoslavia in Germany (Frankfurt), Austria (Vienna), Slovenia (Ljubljana), Croatia (Brac, Vis and Split), Albania (Drac), Bulgaria (Sofia), Macedonia (Skopje, Krivolek), and Hungary (Budapest). In Bosnia itself, intelligence centers already existed in Sarajevo, and were established in Kiseljak and Tuzla. In Zagreb, the main American center for espionage was Zagreb and the U.S. embassy, and Ambassador Peter Galbraith personally participated in the U.S. secret operations in Croatia and in Bosnia, such as allowing secret Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia via Zagreb. Roger George, CIA representative for Europe and retired Pentagon general, managed the formation of these centers, while then CIA director James Woolsey personally oversaw them. Italy was the only one of our neighbors to refuse the CIA and DIA offer to use Italian airports to send off "music", unmanned spy aircraft and airplanes with satellite equipment, so that the CIA and DIA could follow undisturbed the movements of Serb, Croat, Moslem and Yugoslav armies on the ground in the former Yugoslavia.

The entrance of the CIA and DIA into Bosnia, into the Balkans provoked a reaction from Western Europe, who decided to form the Intelligence Corps of the European Union, in order to counter the American domination on the Old Continent. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, as well as Montenegro and Republika Srpska, and even the Serbian population abroad, however, remained unprotected from the U.S. In the face of the official termination of UN sanctions by the superpowers toward Yugoslavia, the U.S. maintained its "external wall" of embargo toward Serbia and Montenegro, to in that way punish and blackmail the Yugoslavia. The charge d'affaires

Richard Miles spoke openly about this at the beginning of 1997 in the middle of Belgrade. He simply dictated what the U.S. expected Yugoslavia must do in order to be a free country:

"As long as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) does not fulfill certain conditions, it will not be permitted the following: to participate in the work of the United Nations and other international organizations, to join the IMF, World Bank or other international financial institutions, to normalize its bilateral relationship with the United States. First of all, we are seeking improvement of the situation in Kosovo. Second, we insist on the complete cooperation of the Serbian government in finding and arresting all of those suspected of committing war crimes, in order that they be taken to trial at The Hague. Permit us to notice that four suspected persons, including the so-called "Vukovar Three" who stand accused by The Hague, are today walking free in Serbia and Montenegro. Third, we are seeking progress in resolving the question of state succession with the other republics of the former Yugoslavia. But for the resolution of these problems, the United States is very interested in the process of democratization in this country, which also includes the opening of the media. Because of the great interest which the crisis in Serbia has called forth in the United States and because we believe that democratic changes in Serbia are in the interest of the stability in the region, the American administration and Congress are especially interested in the development of democratic institutions in Serbia and Montenegro in the course of the following months"-- said Richard Miles.

America, in the '90's, used all means, as well as its secret corps, CIA, DIA, FBI and NSA, to pressure and drive the ruling powers in Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Serbia and the Yugoslavia to concessions. These pressures went so far as to directly threaten Dr. Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, and Zeljko Raznatovic (Arkan) with their arrest on Serbian territories and being taken to The Hague. That kind of plan, according to *The Washington Post*, was discussed for Slobodan Milosevic himself. Obrad Kesic, M.A., interpreted this as an attempt by the West to separate a relatively poor and problem-ridden Serbia and Yugoslavia from a wealthier and more orderly Europe. The pressures and agreements were, Kesic believed, necessary in order to draw a "sanitary corridor" between the rich and poor, and between hard-core and "democratized" communists. Since the corridor was located right on Serbian land, those Serbs, according to Kesic unavoidably became the "enemies" of the powerful and wealthy. And those who are America's enemies cannot expect favor from this policeman of the world.

CHAPTER 6 THE END OF "RIJEKA QUARTET"

In late 1960s and during 1970s, the trade in armament and military equipment was flourishing. Intelligence operations of large agencies such as CIA, DIA, KGB, BND and others got involved in it. These agencies' intelligence operations and secret activities across the world went hand-in-hand with weapons sales and recruitment of people at the highest levels within the state administration. Since, they found this work profitable and masked the unpopular spying activity successfully. In this period, a spy group was discovered in our regions, in Rijeka, which was popularly dubbed "Rijeka Quartet".

The initial discovery of the "Rijeka Quartet's" spying activities in Yugoslavia was made by KOS and SDB almost accidentally, after a failed action in exporting weapons and military equipment (NVO) to the Middle East by "Kontrana" company, through Yugoslav firms

"Jugo-sped" and "Intereuropa". The entire NVO cargo was seized in Aden (Yemen) and the reconstruction of the event revealed that U.S. citizens of Yugoslav origin Nenad Tomic and Michael Sedmak had for quite a while been involved both in the NVO export and in intelligence activities planned and carried out from the territories of Italy, Austria and Germany. They had formed intelligence points in Gorizia, Trieste, Rome, Vienna, Essen, Munich, Mainz, Koeln, Frankfurt, Bonn, military mission of the U.S. embassy in Belgrade and U.S. consulate in Zagreb.

More sophisticated analyses showed that the U.S. intelligence agency successfully masked their activities in our regions by trading operations of the "Kontrana" company which, via ports in Rijeka, Ploce, and the Belgrade airport re-exported or exported NVO to troubled spots in the Middle East and some African countries; that they had established solid foundations for operations in East European countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and DDR; that after the failed NVO delivery to the United Arab Emirates via Yemen (due to the seizure in Aden), a temporary halt followed but that channels for trade and espionage were considerably branched and deep and that they would soon be revitalized and renewed in an appropriate moment,

Simultaneously, evaluations of the expected intelligence activities of the "Rijeka Quartet" proved to be valid. For a while, Tomic and Sedmak did not appear in Rijeka and "Kontrana" did not pay its financial dues to "Intereuropa". Attempts were made to hush the case by showing everything as a business loss ... When Tomic and Sedmak estimated that they had managed to do so, they suddenly appeared in Yugoslavia, and State Security Agency waited for them in the ambush. They were both arrested in Ljubljana on September 23rd, 1974, and taken to the detention prison in Rijeka.

Based on the six-month long investigation, their statements and admissions, their spying activity for the CIA and the offence based on article 105, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SFRJ Criminal Code was fully proven. During the investigation a lot of data was gathered which graphically showed a planned and well organized intelligence activity of the U.S. agency which got into the weapons trade, and biographical data on the main participants showed that they were not laymen but rather well-prepared and trained intelligence agents for special tasks and carrying out classic espionage.

The main roles in the "Rijeka Quartet" and their broader network were played by: Nenad Tomic, Michael Sedmak, Vladimir Maji and Bruno Klapcic. However, the subversive activities they were involved in encompassed a broad range of people both in Yugoslavia and abroad. Therefore, let us first describe the main players and then their "spider web" and sophisticated spying and undermining activities against Yugoslavia and other countries from our territory.

Tomic Nenad, born in Belgrade in 1932, father's name Zdravko, mother's name Rut, nee Streko, permanently residing in Idar Oberstein, West Germany, of Serbian origin, citizen of SFRJ, West Germany and the USA, married, father of two children. His father Zdravko Tomic was accredited reporter of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with the embassy in Berlin. Living in Berlin, he married a German, Rut, and had Nenad. Shortly before the war,

Zdravko was expelled from Germany as an intelligence suspect. When old Yugoslavia capitulated, he fled to Cairo with the government in exile; he spent the war years in Cairo supporting Nedic and Draza Mihailovic. Upon the end of the Second World War he moved to Paris, and then to the U.S. Upon his arrival to the U.S. he appeared as a weapons trader together with a few agents of the U.S. intelligence agency. For a while, he worked at the "Kontrana" company (headquartered in New York) and in the past few years he taught languages at the American University in Madison.

His wife Rut worked for Gestapo in Belgrade (the head office of which was the Army House building) during the war. She sent her son Nenad to a Nazi school, of half-military type, in Berlin. When Nazi troops withdrew from our country, she also fled to Germany. She was accepted by Americans who used her in their Germany-based intelligence institutions as a connoisseur of the Nazi intelligence service and their activities in the Balkans. She worked in a few U.S. intelligence centers in Germany. Due to her war-time exposure on the Nazi side, her husband Zdravko severed relations with her during the war already and divorced her. He married French Esther in the U.S. and had two sons with her, Nenad's half-brothers, the older of whom took part in the Vietnam war as an officer in the U.S. army.

When the Second World War ended, the mother transferred Nenad from Berlin to Yugoslavia, to his uncle Todor Tomic. Since he could not get a place in a boarding school in Belgrade, he stayed in Negotin where he completed high school. He could not speak Serbocroatian well, so he had to repeat the first grade. After high school, he enrolled in the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade, and when he was in his third year he was indicted for the participation in demonstrations and enemy activities (based on Art. 118 of Criminal Code) and sentenced to a year in high-security prison. Upon the release, he worked as a correspondence clerk in Belgrade-based "Progres" company for a short time. However, upon his father's advice, he applied for the German citizenship and moved from Belgrade to Germany in 1957, with the German passport. During his high-school years and career at "Progres", he established relations with a number of people, many of whom would later appear as his business and other ties used for intelligence activities.

In Germany, he studied law for a while, and then, in 1960, did the military service in the Eighth U.S. Army in Bad Kreuznach (West Germany). He was trained for a military policeman, and then transferred to the counter-intelligence service as a lieutenant. For a while he served in the U.S. base in Essen. A few years before he got into the CIA (in 1964), he had worked in the Department for Special Operations Abroad - supplying weapons to pro-American forces in Asia and Africa.

Who were participants in the weapons trade in the cooperation with the U.S. intelligence agents discovered in the "Rijeka Quartet"?

A member of the "Rijeka Quartet" Sedmak Michael was born in Shebeugan, WI, in 1916, a U.S. citizen, parents of Yugoslav origin (His father was Slovenian, born in Trieste surroundings, and his mother Croatian, born in Kerestinc) who emigrated to the U.S. before the First World War. He spent most of his life as a U.S. Army officer across the world. He retired in the rank of colonel. He studied at the Faculty of Economics in Washington and graduated only in 1955.

By the end of 1941 he completed a year long infantry school and advanced to the rank of officer, when he joined the U.S. Army. During the war he was a member of the 27th U.S. division at the Pacific warfield and remained there until 1944. Because of inflicted wounds he required treatment and reconvalescence in the U.S. until the end of the war. After the war, he was transferred to Italy, to the 88th U.S. division stationed in Gorizia. Owing to his partial knowledge of Croatian, he was appointed the liaison officer between this U.S. division and Yugoslav military mission in Gorizia. When the 88th U.S. division returned to the U.S., Sedmak stayed in Italy upon his own request. He was transferred to the U.S. forces headquarters in Italy in Rome. His knowledge of our language got prominent again and he served in a mobile group for questioning refugees from East European countries and Yugoslavia. Some Yugoslav emigrants also worked with him.

Besides, he was handling tasks of the investigation officer in U.S. camps in Italy (near Naples, in Ferm near Ancona, and near Piza), which housed mostly ustashas, chetniks and Russian emigrants. Sedmak's task was to discover war criminals among them and give recommendations for moving refugees to overseas countries. He already closely cooperated with top levels of the U.S. intelligence agency and was allegedly searching for the ustasha leader Ante Pavelic.

In 1947 Sedmak started working in the refugee organization IRO in camps in Trieste, Bari, Trani, Barlet, Bologna, Naples and Milan. Working with refugees in Trieste, he met Vera Milic from Belgrade and married her. Somewhat later he went to the U.S. with his wife and lived there until the Korean war broke up. In 1952 he applied as a volunteer for U.S. troops in Korea. However, due to consequences of his being wounded in the Second World War he was not accepted to the operative unit but to the "Civil organization", thanks to his experience in working with refugees. He worked on the establishment of prisoners' camps, and was later on appointed commander of all camps in Korea. He remained on this position after the war ended, until 1955. Besides, Sedmak was involved, in Korea, in containing guerilla and liberation movement in the U.S. army background. Later on he found a job in the State Department and lived in the U.S. with his wife, and a few years later got transferred to the U.S. consulate general in Dusseldorf (Germany) as a refugee administrator.

Between 1957 and 1962 he performed the tasks of the head of refugee camp in Solingen in Germany, and a number of emigrants from our country passed through his hands. He would question them in detail, give evaluations and recommendations to the intelligence departments in the U.S., who in turn would assign them to the U.S. accessory units or involve into agent network or other propaganda institutions. Sedmak retired from this position. He remained to live in Dusseldorf, as the owner of "Florida" bar, where he hired Yugoslav emigrants he had met in refugee camps. He met Nenad Tomic and in 1964 they started joint activities of the U.S. intelligence service towards Yugoslavia.

Vladimir Majic, born in Belgrade in 1937, father's name Milos (born near Sinj), permanently residing in Munich, Croatian by nationality but emphasized his Serbian national feeling, citizen of the SFRJ, film producer.

After high school he got a job as assistant cameraman at "Avala-film" in Belgrade. Through Lepa Milic (Sedmak's wife Vera's sister) he met Sedmak during his stay at the Milics' in Belgrade in 1955. Majic used this acquaintance and the relationship with Lepa Milic, who lived in Dusseldorf, to emigrate from the country: during a group of Belgrade citizens' trip to Germany, he requested the political asylum there. He had already been known by an attempt to cross the border illegally, but had not been charged since he was underage at the time. Sedmak helped him to get necessary documents and guarantees for the political asylum. Sedmak hired him for his bar "Florida" in Dusseldorf, as a supervisor. When the bar went out of business he moved to Essen, where he was received by Tomic, who involved him into the business of weapons shipping within "Kontrana". With the help of Tomic, Sedmak, and their bosses, Majic specialized in the intelligence work in the film area. He got involved in the circle of well-known film workers in West Germany, but based on the information provided by Tomic, Majic was ready to penetrate film circles in Yugoslavia.

Film Career

He achieved results in the film career with dizzying speed. He put out films in "his own" direction and established himself at a few well-known European festivals, where he was awarded first prizes. He got in touch with well-known film workers from our country, paying the most attention to the authors of "film noir", who were anathemized in Yugoslavia at the time. He gained insight into political developments and polarization in film circles, gathered information, extolled these authors' potentials abroad and promoted Western orientation and their film school. He invited many of them to Germany and let them use "his" offices in Essen, which used to be owned by the "Kontrana" company. It was established that these premises, as well as Majic's alleged apartment in Munich, were equally used by Tomic, Sedmak, and other members of their spy network.

Majic's wife Danja Antonovic is a reporter of "Deutsche Welle" radio-station in Koln, which was covering for the intelligence and propaganda activities of the most reactionary circles in the West. She is a daughter of chetnik major Antonovic, was born in Belgrade where she graduated from languages department at the Faculty of Philology. She is suspected for intelligence work and together with her husband maintained contacts with individuals who were either tried for their enemy activities or had emigrated from the country: Zlatko Lipovsak from Zagreb, a reporter and announcer at the same radio-station and his girlfriend Sasa Brnelic, who had been prominent in the "Mass-movement" and fled the country after the 21st session of the Presidency of CK SKJ in 1972.

Vladimir Majic was arrested three months after Tomic and Sedmak, in the moment when he reached Yugoslavia not knowing that the other two had already been detained.

Another member of the "Rijeka Quartet" was Bruno Klapcic, born in Pula in 1931; his father's name was Ivan and mother's name - Katarina Stefani. He was Croatian by nationality although he pointed out that he was Italian (his Croatoserbain was quite poor), citizen of the SFRJ, married with Karin Jakob from East Germany, permanently residing in

Bohum (Germany), broker by profession. Before the arrest (together with V.Majic), he showed up in the role of sales rep of a Bohem-based West German company. He completed elementary and secondary industrial school in Pula.

After the war he worked as a correspondent to "La Voce" newspaper from Koper. In 1952 he illegally fled to Italy, and after a while contacted our trade delegation in Trieste and offered his services to the Public Security Agency in Pula. It was soon discovered that he had been "thrown in as a double" by Anglo-American intelligence agencies from Trieste. It became particularly apparent during the Trieste crisis in 1953 when Klapcic, ordered by Anglo-American operative?? Rex in Trieste and Italian intelligence agency, illegally crossed the border between Yugoslavia and Italy in order to gather information of deployment and movements of our troops. He was arrested and a map of the region was found in his possession. He was interrogated in Pula, but due to circumstances, the investigation did not ultimately establish his dual intelligence role.

He was released and stayed in Pula until 1956, when he fled to Italy illegally again. Once there, he got in touch with the Italian intelligence agency since SDB obtained a letter by Klapcic addressed to Merklin Vitir, a technician at the "Uljanik" shipyard in Pula, where Klapcic tried to talk the latter into the cooperation with the Italian intelligence agency. In the letter, Klapcic also gave Merklin instructions on gathering economic and military data in favor of the Italian intelligence agency.

After his stay in Trieste, Klapcic moved to Torino, and then to Milan, where he found a job at the Milan Fair. In Italy he got a 25-month sentence for blackmailing. He served the sentence in the refugee camp "Farfa Sabina" near Rome. While in the camp, a Yugoslav intern acquainted him with some ustasha emigrants, one of them being the notorious Krunoslav Draganovic. Upon the release mediated by Draganovic in 1960, he went to work in West Germany.

In West Germany he worked at "Krupp" in Essen. He handled various jobs, mostly correspondence in Italian and Spanish. It was there that he met participants of the spy group, Tomic, Majic and their associates. Since 1965 he was hired by Hamburg-based "Berena" company to organize the sales network in Italy.

In early 1970s Klapcic contacted our diplomatic representatives in order to resolve his citizenship and obtain the passport, which he managed to do. He started coming to Pula, where he got in touch with companies "Arena" and "Gio"; however, he did not carry out a single contract with these companies although he travelled from Germany to Pula once a month on average and stayed there for quite a while. He established contacts with his acquaintances in Pula, who included former members of government. It should be noted that Klapcic's connection with Tomic's network was noticed quite late through V.Majic and his film ties, which is one of the reasons why documentation could not be gathered for Klapcic to be sentenced (based on Art.105 of the SFRJ Criminal Code) and after the detention he was released.

The complex field of weapons trade in the U.S. is handled and coordinated through CIA's Department for Special Operations and their points for special military operations and world terrorist organizations. In order to perform such tasks, the CIA - as the only agency authorized for subversive activities abroad by U.S. President and Congress - recruits experts from the military intelligence agency, DIA. Since it is not a matter of legal sales of weapons to certain governments, movements

etc., but rather of illegal procurement in order to arm given opposition and separatist movements of pro-American orientation, the activities are carried out by conspirative methods.

In tracking the operations of the "Rijeka Quartet" KOS discovered a lot of different materials, mostly correspondence between the trader-intelligence agency and companies, primarily in Europe and the U.S. Most of these companies are registered in their respective countries for activity which is officially and legally allowed, but the essence of their existence is to disguise secret intelligence operation.

A great number of foreign companies selling weapons and military equipment started operations immediately after the Second World War under the sponsorship of foreign intelligence services. One of the best known among them was American "International Armament Corporation", or briefly "Interarms Co."

"Interarms Co." was a company that included CIA's agents for secret operations abroad. They were buying and selling weapons and military equipment throughout the world, including East European countries. Its head office was in Monte Carlo, and its largest warehouse in London, and included a maintenance and repair shop. It also had warehouses in U.S. army bases in West Germany. Indeed, it is an association of a few international groups and agencies that were "independently" involved in the purchases and sales of weapons and military equipment. The available data doubtlessly indicate that the company was headed by CIA's intelligence agents, which was described in memoirs authored by the U.S. intelligence agency agents. The company was headed by Samuel (Cummings), a well-known intelligence agent who spent a few years on Indochine warfields supplying subversion troops of the Saigon regime with up-to-date armament. His headquarters was in Monte Carlo. It is known that his associates had branches across the world.

And they were: Peter C. Bir, who was showing up in the correspondence with Nenad Tomic and Michael Sedmak, weapons traders in Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries as the director of "Interarms" London branch, from which he shipped weapons to rebels in certain regions of Asia and Africa supported by Americans. Also Hank Warton, residing in Miami, FL, a former U.S. pilot, specialist for African operations; as a Polish Jew who requested political asylum in the West after the Second World War, he gained reputation in the weapons trade and cooperation with Israeli intelligence agency, and he served as a liaison with MOSAD.

Peter Dunk (junior) is also one of them: a weapons trader, he took part in direct supplies of weapons to Africa and Asia through CIA agents and Yugoslavia. He is a son of Peter Dunk (senior), who was the head of the U.S. intelligence center in the Netherlands, headquartered in Amsterdam, in 1970s. Another one is Peter Bilie: born in Los Angeles, he was the captain of a torpedo during the Second World War. He is of Bielorussian origin (Bilic). For as long as 10 years, his activities were linked to Peter Dunk and CIA agents who stayed in Rijeka - Tomic and Sedmak. Through his brother Bob, he had direct ties with Pentagon, i.e. colonel Kus who, as the second secretary of state, was in charge of selling American weapons to countries in the U.S. interest spheres. It was through Kus that Bilie, Dunk, Tomic and others were in charge of selling weapons to Ethiopia. Kus' associates included Tomic's father Zdravko (his American name was Andre), who looked after the paper work since he got hired in the head office of the "Kontrana" company in New York, after the war.

Eastern Ties

In their secret weapons trade, Americans also cooperated with former Nazis and communists from Eastern Europe. Weapons traders also included Tony Duval: he lived in Hamburg and was responsible for special operations of tracking and arming illegal emigrant and terrorist groups in Europe. During the Second World War he was a pilot in Canadian-American troops in England. For some time after the war, he was an intelligence agent with the British intelligence agency (Mi-5) but later on he moved to the U.S. intelligence agency and specialized for tracking terrorist organisations from socialist countries in Western Europe. This job allowed him to travel to East European countries, and he was also visiting Yugoslavia. His name is also mentioned under the alias "Alan Baker", a merchant, who armed the well-known ustasha group "Phoenix" thrown into Yugoslavia in 1972 (19 terrorists led by Andric brothers). According to a reliable source, Duval bought a certain quantity of our weapons in Belgrade and delivered it to the African state of Togo. Duval himself was amazed that Yugoslav state weapons delivery to Togo could be entrusted to him and that we did not know that he maintained ties with well-known ustasha leader Dr. Branko Jelic in Berlin, under whose order he was supplying arms to ustasha terrorists. Together with colonel Cummings he was visiting former "Yugoimport" in Belgrade, where he was purchasing our weapons.

Besides the described weapons traders at "Interarms", the U.S. intelligence agency was also using former Nazi officers, such as Springer Ernest Wilhelm, Schroeder Herman, Otto Schluster, Ingversen Karl - Christian, Otto Skorцени, Dirks Bjorn, Linhauser Gunther and others. Springer and Schroeder were weapons manufacturers and traders, both from Bad Segeberg near Hamburg, where they had stores as well. They were direct ties in Cummings activities, as well as those by Tomic and Sedmak in the "Kontrana" company. Otto Scorцени, notorious Nazi colonel who carried out the action of saving Mussolini during the Second World War, lived in Madrid, and worked as a weapons trader from there. The U.S. intelligence agency worked directly with him in supplying weapons to some African countries (Ibo tribe in Nigeria). Gunther Linhauser is a German citizen, the "owner" of a few ships for weapons transport, but officially he was the owner of a company involved in book sales. He took part in selling arms to Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurd separatist movement in Iraq.

"Kontrana" was a company headquartered in New York. Ever since its establishment, it employed Andre Tomic, the father of the American agent Nenad Buric, who in turn was in Yugoslavia. In 1962, the company set up a branch with the same name in Essen, Germany. It was registered as "G. m. B. H." (Gesellschaft mit Beschänkter Haftung), and procurement of domestic appliances was listed as its major activity, although they were never involved in it. The company members and co-owners were: Nenad Tomic, Peter Dunk, Peter Bilie (New York), Michael Sedmak (since 1964), Andree Tomic (New York) and his wife Esther. To German authorities, Nenad Tomic was represented as the legal person, which was understandable since he had German citizenship and could speak German fluently, and this is what the U.S. intelligence agency had in mind when establishing the company. The company had other employees and free-lancers, who had varied business and other relations. Thus, Sedmak himself pointed out that he never understood how many people were employed, where they were and what relations were among them.

Nenad Tomic and his team were oriented towards procuring arms from east-European countries. He thus imported 89K system from the CSSR and old military equipment for Samuel Cummings' needs,

who in turn placed them to other regions through his channels. As a well-known intelligence agent, Cummings was afraid to make contracts in CSSR and other East-European countries himself, and rather used Tomic for this purpose.

One action that "Kontrana" worked on was supplying weapons to Pakistan during their war with India about Kashmir. "Kontrana" was to supply F-86D jet planes. Tomic and Sedmak had talks with Iranian general Aliviki about the planes re-export to Pakistan. They also talked to senator Chaborto from Praetoria about the same issue. The delivery was not made since, as Tomic estimated, Soviets required that Americans should stay away from the war. The CIA forbade the delivery, although they had flying-ready planes at their disposal in the North American plant in Los Angeles. Instead, the job was performed by the German intelligence agency - BND - though West Germany army pilots. The de-conspired jobs worsened the prospects for "Kontrana's" survival in Germany. The West German authorities used taxes to make the company close their business, and Tomic even ended up in jail. However, thanks to the CIA's connections, the company showed up after a while under the new name, "Tomic and Company". The company members included Tomic's most immediate family and all former members of "Kontrana". Its field of activity was advertising, publishing of tourist books, and representation of various air companies: Davis-Agency (transportation of NATO troops for the U.S. and back), "Moder Air Inc." from Berlin, "Satur Airways Inc.", Air-lift Int. Capitol Air Ways", "Continental Airways" "Yugoturs Gmbh" from Frankfurt, and advertising department of Skopje Radiotelevision. Besides, Tomic organized the vacation of U.S. Army officers in Dubrovnik and other parts of our country. He also had a few meetings with Television Skopje representatives (in Zagreb and in Skopje) about advertising for some Macedonian products; Vladimir Majic was also involved in this field and even shot a film about Macedonian mastica (type of brandy) in Macedonia.

Tomic's company soon gave up the advertising and tourism business and returned to the weapons trade. In 1971 they came in touch with Arabian trader Sayd Ganem from Aden. A few years before, in Prague, Tomic had met Soviet colonel Svetozar Kazalo, who was involved in the weapons trade on behalf of the KGB.

"Inar" is a Lichtenstein-based (Vadusua) company with Bulgarian state interests in the weapons trade. The main representative of this company was Rudi Ardnt, former Nazi officer from Berlin, and he allowed Tomic to obtain greater quantities of weapons from Bulgaria, through a Koljanov in Sofia; the weapons were shipped by sea (from Varna), or by air (from Sofia) to U.S. agents in Aden and Katar. Buyers were members of the pro-Nasser organization in South and North Yemen, through which Americans were trying to penetrate into United Arab Emirates.

"Omnipol" from Prague (military enterprise for weapons sales in the CSSR) cooperated with Tomic in weapons export to the Middle East countries. The first shipments were delivered to Mustafa Barzani, Kurds leader in Iraq.

Thus, a great number of fictitious companies and secret network of weapons traders allowed operations of the U.S. intelligence agency abroad and deliveries of weapons to pro-American forces throughout the world. This illegal trade was going on despite the embargo on weapons and involved meddling into internal affairs of certain countries. A great number of traders involved in this

business made the discovery and identification more difficult, since many of them operated under aliases.

Coups d'etat

The "Rijeka Quartet" affair showed that the West German intelligence agency was the extension of the U.S. political interests. USSR's contacts with Makarios were kept strictly confidential. Svetozar Kazal was to deliver the weapons. He got in touch with the "Tomic and Company" firm, whose bosses and the CIA approved the arrangement, and the preparations ensued. Kazal made arrangements for Prague-based "Omnipol" to be the supplier, and "Intereuropa", Rijeka branch - freight-forwarder. Tomic only had to get in touch with appropriate companies and persons in Yugoslavia in order to obtain necessary transit and other permits. He actually only got in touch with people he had used before and through whom he used to obtain these documents. According to Comic's deposition, Kazal did not know the true essence of his relationship with the U.S. intelligence agency and that is how this plan for the Soviet infiltration to Cyprus was discovered. In order to prevent the weapons deliveries and Soviet infiltration to Cyprus, according to Tomic, the CIA sped up Makarios' dethronement?? and EOK's appointment for president, which ruined the plan for Soviet arms delivery.

U.S. intelligence centers and points in Germany are situated in military districts, with the U.S. embassy in Bonn and companies operating with American capital. There are a few military districts of the stationed U.S. troops, with centers in Frankfurt n/M, Munchen, Essen, Visbaden, and Bad Kreuznah. The Bad Kreuznak military district includes American bases in Idar Oberstein, Baumholder, Bad Kreuznah, Hanau, Pirmansens, and Kaiserslautern. Each district has the same composition of military, police, counter-intelligence, and intelligence forces, the numbers differing only depending on the base location, importance, and size. They are headed by the executive officer of a military district.

The CIA is also represented in these military district. The head of each is assisted by one, two or more CIA officers (from major to colonel), and in some cases the head himself is a CIA member. Besides tasks from his basic activity, he also performs special tasks given by CIA. CIA's officers in districts are specialized in the areas specific for the particular location. In Vietnam, heads were CIA members from political and terror departments, but were not reporting to this department although their rank and titles were lower (N.B. THIS DOES NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE BUT THIS IS WHAT IS WRITTEN) All CIA agents had strong educational and professional background, although they had varying military ranks. Actually, their rank is of formal nature, since they are given salaries accoring to the tasks they perform (they receive salaries according to the so-called "G" ranks, from G-1 to G-9, which correspond to ranks from standard-bearer to colonel). CIA agents have broad authorities in a given region, given by the U.S. government. Their reports are the major orientation to the U.S. government for the policy implementation.

Besides CIA's permanent operatives from military intelligence centers, there are "flying" agents working for the needs of U.S. capital invested in Germany. They are experts in an industry and permanently work on informing the head office for investors' needs ("Eco", "General Motors", "Ford", "Ici", "Dupont"). This kind of intelligence operatives secures the interests of the U.S. capital in certain countries. Since the U.S. own 40-50% capital in about 100 thousand capital societies

across Germany, several "flying" operatives are being sent to spots where the situation is critical and where the invested capital is at stake. They work on establishing contacts with banks, companies, government, military, political parties, etc.

Within the "Rijeka Quartet" spying activities, a certain number of CIA's operatives was identified who worked towards Yugoslavia from the German territory. These are: Frank E. Kash, minister - councillor to the U.S. embassy in Bonn, as the head of the CIA center; colonel Miller, an employee in the embassy in Bonn; a "Jimmy", a major from the Baumholder base (near Idar Oberstein), who was in President Nixon's suite until the Watergate affair; colonel "Malisha", whose parents are of Yugoslav origin (Croatian coast) was not identified; and standard-bearer Cox from Bad Kreuzmah base; John Williams, CIA's head in Oberursel (Taunus); major Vilenci Dana from Visbaden; colonels Parmer and Wells from Baumholder and Bad Kreuzmah respectively; two young unidentified CIA's officers from Frankfurt that Tomic tried to get in touch with our consulate. Besides, Tomic's and Sedmak's spying activities involved some agents outside Germany, such as: Gillespie from the U.S. consulate general in Trieste, Ernest Santo from Rome, i.e. Trieste.

Intelligence agent "Jimmy" took part in the actions of "Rijeka Quartet" spying group related to gathering waybills of the transport and transit of weapons in East European countries and Yugoslavia. Tomic and Sedmak had a few meetings in the officers' club of the U.S. base in Baumholder. At one of the meetings with Sedmak, "Jimmy" put a special emphasis on the up-to-datedness of intelligence data remarking that the documentation should be delivered before delivering the weapons to Arab ports. At one of the meetings with agent Miller (colonel) in Bonn, Tomic spoke of further obtaining waybills from agents in Yugoslavia. Actually, he explained that his agent refused to carry the documents alone and did not want to send them in the mail. Miller then approved sending waybills through the military attache of the U.S. embassy to Belgrade, which was done a few times. In the intelligence activities in Yugoslavia, CIA and DIA closely cooperated with "Jimmy" and colonel John Williams (from Oberursel). For a few years, Sedmak was providing Williams with political information on Yugoslavia in the so-called "post-Tito period", which was not sufficiently clarified since the U.S. embassy to Belgrade prevented it by protests and pressure.

Facts are inexorable and clearly indicate that "Rijeka Quartet" and their secret network was involved in distinctive subversive activities against Yugoslavia and that they were involved in coups d'etats on Cyprus when Makarios was overturned, and in Ethiopia against tsar Haile Selasije; by these they wanted to disgrace Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country. However, there are many details that were not elaborated on although we believe that even without it, the discovery of the "Rijeka Quartet" graphically shows what was the American intelligence agency, whether it was CIA or DIA, doing in Yugoslav regions, or from Yugoslav regions towards third countries.

Strike on the Tsar

By the U.S. order, Nenad Tomic from Belgrade was to prepare dethronement of the Ethiopian tsar Haile Selasije. Based on the plans by American and Ethiopian military intelligence service, the coup d'etat in Ethiopia and the tsar's dethronement were to take place as early as in October 1973, but the plan was postponed due to Arab-Israel war.

According to Nenad Tomic's deposition, the American side of the coup included Frank E. Kash, CIA's head for Europe in Bonn; colonel Miller, an employee of the embassy in Bonn; a Welch, U.S. consul to Asmara (Eritreia) and a few people from the U.S. embassy in Adis Abeba and forces from the Cangenj Station base. The Israeli side included the Cangenj Station intelligence group and a certain number of traders "incorporated" in this region. From the Ethiopian side, the main role was played by colonel Solomon Kasdir and his troop.

Colonel Tzagaje, as the chief of Eritrean military intelligence agency, was monitoring developments in the "Liberation Movement of Eritreia" (ELF), shipping weapons to that part of Ethiopia, and had broader tasks related to Somalia. The colonel, head of the Navy service, was in charge of counter-intelligence protection of the entire African coast of the Red Sea and had intelligence tasks in South and North Yemen. Since Tzagaje was also appointed commander of all garnisons in this part of the country, he could without any doubt prepare all plans in Eritreia. Major Heidi was added to the U.S. intelligence agency for monitoring Soviet infiltration in South and North Yemen, and he cooperated with Tomic and Sedmak in this respect. Colonel Girma had special tasks for tracking the tsar's contacts with foreign statesmen, particularly those from East-European and non-aligned countries. In the tsar's dethronement, he had the task to personally arrest him and transport him to a military base in the south of Ethiopia.

Besides the already described ones, Tomic also performed other tasks from joint actions of AOS and their agency within Ethiopian military intelligence agency, which were directed towards the main tasks - dethronement of tsar Haile Selasije. Instructed by Kadir, Tomic got in touch with Eritrean Liberation Front - ELF and sultan Ali Mirah, a combination mediated by tsar's former minister Solomon. Solomon was former finance minister in Ethiopia, replaced after the first attempted coup (1970), but he still enjoyed the tsar's trust. He settled in Milan, where he had an export-import company, and was in charge of the transactions with the tsar's money and gold abroad. The connection with Solomon was established through Ethiopian girl T. Negushi, U.S. intelligence agent "incorporated" in an air carrier in Rome. Tomic and Negushi visited Solomon in Milan and Tomic was speaking as a weapons trader interested in using this channel to reach Eritrean Liberation Front and sultan himself.

Solomon entrusted him with a letter to his brother, who was close to sultan, as a fighter in the Eritrean movement. Through this combination, Tomic was successful with sultan, won his confidence, and orders of weapons ensued. One of the first successful actions of collecting arms for ELF on sultan's behalf went towards the Soviet Union. It was the procurement of 10,000 automatic guns and five million bullets. Through his intermediaries, sultan Ali Mirah obtained approval for such an arrangement, and his "person of confidence" Tomic appeared as the arms supplier, having obtained exclusive rights to transport the arms through Yugoslavia.

Tomic was implementing this plan by gradual involvement of some Yugoslav companies in the project ("Jugosped", JAT), which was disgracing for our country. Through Tomic and "his company", the weapons intended for ELF and sultan Ali Mirah ended up in the warehouses of Ethiopian, i.e. American intelligence agency; as a Yugoslav citizen, Tomic remained clean and Ethiopian citizens were accused for "channel crack". In this way the CIA and their agents in the Ethiopian army were tracking the infiltration of Soviets in this region and sales of their weapons to certain forces, as well as gathering other information on ELF's plans and actions.

Without detailed description of these combinations, the executive of which was Tomic, it is evident that "Jugosped" had made two deliveries, and only the third one was discovered at the Samara airport by tsar's customs officers. Tomic and Sedmak were thus discovered as weapons procurers to the Erithrean separatist movement. There was a possibility of complications between Yugoslavia and Ethiopia, since two Yugoslav enterprises, "Jugosped" and JAT took part in this. However, colonel Kadir made a combination, aided by Tomic and the CIA, and took steps to prevent such an incident.

In order to satisfy Ethiopian official circles and laws, Tomic and Sedmak were formally arrested. With this decision (combination) Kadir avoided the possibility of the discovery of Tomic's and Sedmak's ties with the U.S. intelligence agency and Ethiopian military intelligence agency and CIA's broader plans. On this occasion, Tomic was formally "recruited" for work in favor of Ethiopian intelligence agency and thus released from prison. Sedmak was released together with him and went on with his intelligence work through Welch. On the other hand, colonel Kadir took steps towards Yugoslavia and informed our ambassador to Adis Abeba on the involvement by Yugoslav citizen Tomic in the discovery of the channel for shipping and selling weapons to the "Erithrean Liberation Movement".

Tomic himself tried to establish a contact with SDB bodies through employees of our embassy to Adis Abeba, and later on through our consulate general in Frankfurt on the Maine, which he formally addressed in order to obtain citizenship and actually tried to impose himself offering undefined intelligence services on the activities of Yugoslav enemy emigration in Germany and in the West.

It should be pointed out that Tomic and his "Rijeka Quartet" were gathering information on the traffic and transit of weapons through our country and delivered it to various persons connected to the U.S. intelligence agency. Thus some waybills ended up with CIA's branch in Ethiopia, and they received their tasks from American-Israeli intelligence circles in Asmara. In January and February 1972, during their stay in Ethiopia, Tomic and Sedmak visited the American-Israeli base where the tasks were agreed upon. They spoke about plans for total tracking of armament shipped to Arab and other non-aligned countries in Africa, from ports in socialist countries (Varna, Odessa, Gdansk, Rijeka, Ploce).

Worsening of relations in the so-called troubled spots in the world and breaking out of local wars, such as conflicts in Afganistan, after Soviet intervention in 1979, then the war between Iran and Iraq and long-lasting "neither war nor peace" state in Arab-Israel relations, civil war in southeastern Asia (Campucia, that followed the Vietnam war), Nicaragua conflict and political and social change in Latin America, crisis in the south of Africa, long crisis and unrest in Poland and other East European countries (that started in the summer of 1980), and finally the war in the Persian Gulf for the liberation of Kuwait (1991), Yugoslav crisis and disintegration proceses in the former USSR - affected the proliferation of weapons and military equipment exports that are hard to control. This work is most frequently done illegally and involves the intelligence service. This business is headed by big powers as a way of getting rid of generationally outdated weapons, and - on the other hand - generating profits for financing new research projects for manufacturing improved or modernization of the existing weapons.

According to "Military Review" no. 7/1971, the USA used weapons exports and other ways to take part in over 50 local wars across the world between 1954 and 1971. The USSR was involved in these conflicts in the same way. In his book "Politics and Nuclear Weapons" Henry Kissinger says: "Local wars and conflicts at troubled spots are nothing but indirect conflicts between the USSR and the USA, where one side often gets more directly involved against the other if they managed (by the done-deal policy) to be faster than the opponent" (Vietnam, Afganistan, CSSR).

Spy Trial

Americans tried to represent the secret search in Rijeka as a minor incident. What did the question about Tito mean? When Tomic and Sedmak were arrested, general Samuel Wilson, then deputy director of the CIA, came for a private visit to Belgrade. In the conversation with our citizens, he mentioned the U.S. intelligence activities towards our country and used the conversation to launch a version about the recently arrested spies. He explained that a Yugoslav citizen (meaning Tomic) offered to an American agent in Bonn the possibility to get hold of plans for Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia, but that the American agent referred the spy (as described by Wilson) to the U.S. embassy in Bonn.

It was evident that U.S. officials tried to diminish the value of their contacts with Tomic through legends and pulling wool over people's eyes, in order to deny the possibility that he was an active CIA member. On this occasion, Wilson gave excuses for such an action by the American agent in Bonn, who had apparently already suffered certain consequences, since it was a "Dirty stuff" that U.S. official circles denounce.

It was followed by activities of other U.S. representatives, especially by Richard McKoy, U.S. consul in the consulate general in Zagreb. In order to bring the investigation and trial to this group of American spies to the crisis, the consul gave instructions to a Zagreb lawyer, who was to defend Sedmak. Consul Melroy requested the denial of everything Sedmak had said during the investigation, since he was allegedly not able to express himself accurately, and requested an official interpreter for English. The consul also established contacts with the Bureau for Consular Affairs of the Croatian Assembly's Executive Council in order to obtain the permit to visit Sedmak in prison, and tried to use this channel to obtain the indictment and the possibility for the U.S. consular representative to be present at secret trial. However, the consul was granted only a visit to Sedmak in prison, and in the conversation he had with Sedmak he tried to assess the framework of the investigation, details on the number of people arrested, investigators etc. Finally he asked Sedmak if he had been questioned about "the plan for President Tito", and Sedmak replied that he had not. This detail has not been clarified, but evidently points to what this spying group was involved in in Yugoslavia.

Since the trial was pronounced to be secret, U.S. diplomatic representatives tried to be present during the pre-trial. The Zagreb consul did not choose methods and means to obtain certain knowledge. When he could not persuade the lawyer to give him daily reports from the trial, he tried to achieve it by crude attacks and blackmail. He required from the lawyer to report to him, otherwise he would not get his honorarium. This behaviour by the American representative made the lawyer give up Sedmak's defence immediately before the trial, although he had already become quite familiar with the essence of the defendant's offence. In other words, although the consul knew that the process was

secret and that the lawyer would commit an offence by granting his requests, he did not refrain from primitive blackmail. The consul also tried to develop closer ties with the investigation judge from Rijeka, inviting him for a visit to Zagreb, and promising him an attractive arrangement for a visit to the U.S. He took similar steps towards the president of the District Court in Rijeka, but did not succeed - at least at the time ...

The activities of American diplomats and other representatives in Yugoslavia were at peak at the trial itself, and became even broader after it. Thus, in the conversation with an employee of our embassy in Washington, a State Department official (previously the consul with the embassy in Belgrade), admits again that a spying group "Rijeka Quartet" had committed an offence which would be punishable in any country, but believes that - in the interest of Yugoslav-American bilateral relations - this should not be used in media to inflame anti-American sentiment in Yugoslavia.

Investigational judges to "Rijeka Quartet" confirmed the existence of the cooperation and synchronization between CIA's and BND's activities towards the USSR in East European countries and in Yugoslavia, through numerous and varied institutions stationed in Berlin and West Germany, some of which were founded by Americans themselves. Some notable examples include "Institut für Ostereurope kunde" from West Berlin, "Deutsche Atlatische Gesellschaft", "Kommission für die Erforschung der Agrar und Wirtschaftsergebnisse des Europäischen Ostens" headquartered in Frankfurt and many others.

Within the known cooperation between CIA and BND in using refugee camps for intelligence purposes, agent Tomic had notable tasks. First of all, he made the basic selection of people interesting for further questioning and intelligence combinations. A major role in this was also played by Michael Sedmak, who was showing up as a specialist for Italian refugee camps since 1945 and established the reputation in Korea and West Germany. His role was particularly important in the San Saba camp in Trieste, and later on in German camp Solingen, where he implemented strict policy in accordance with CIA's intentions towards the USSR, East European countries and Yugoslavia. As proven American agents, both of them were remarkable experts for circumstances among our political emigration, but revealed few data and little information about it during the investigation. Based on the conversation between Sedmak and Zagreb consul, it is evident that something was being done on implementing tasks from the "plan after the so-called Day", but this remained unclarified probably by request of higher instances and broader interests not to aggravate bilateral relations between the USA and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it was already said that the U.S. side, at its highest level, made efforts to represent the "Rijeka Quartet" affair as a minor incident.

The information was proven that Tomic and Sedmak, instructed by the CIA, worked on the identification of ustasha-terrorists who appeared in West Germany in the middle of 1974 at their colleague's Gunther Lainhauser and some other people known by their terrorist activities towards the SFRJ. It was the time when Americans were spearheading anti-fascist campaign on the international level and when the struggle against terrorist was a priority of the American intelligence agency.

Tomic's opinion on the motives of certain Yugoslavs' emigration and their sincerity was very important for obtaining asylum in Germany. Yugoslav emigrants that were assessed by the CIA as

motivated by political reasons were deployed to various tasks: intelligence and other education, work in U.S. units in military bases in Baumholder, Kaizerlautern, Prismausens, Bad Kreuznah.

Regardless of his reticence in the investigation, Tomic gave a number of useful data. He avoided broader elaborations, but what he gave was useful and proved earlier knowledge. These were data related to the sources and channels through which our enemy emigration was being armed. He claimed that American agent Tony Duval was in charge, within the CIA, of tracking the armament of emigrant organizations in Europe, that he had had contacts with Dr. Branko Jelic from Berlin, the leader of the "Croatian People's Board", and that he knew that Duval had been arming terrorists who were liquidated in Yugoslavia in 1972.

Tanks Have Not Sunk

Having in mind the size of the country and the population number, many believe that Israel has the most powerful intelligence agency in the world. It is well equipped and educated in the USA, and the staff is recruited from the officer part of the Israeli military (it is also complemented with agents of Jewish origin from other countries, primarily from the U.S.). Besides, based on the agreement on strategic partnership between the USA and Israel, Israeli intelligence agency was complemented by a certain number of CIA officers for cooperation and joint actions.

Israeli intelligence agency tasks result from the goals of Israeli policy, which means that MOSAD is directed towards the infiltration into Palestinian and other Arab organizations, various institutions etc.; carrying out terrorist and other subversive actions towards Palestinian commandos and leaders of their organizations; gathering information on military and economic potential of countries they are in conflict with; gathering information on political and other turmoils among Arab leaders and prominent individuals; gathering information on the inflow of strategic materials to Arab countries; infiltration to international student and other organizations of Palestinian and other Arab students and tracking of their political and subversive activities; gathering information of political, economic, and military nature for the needs of CIA and other official U.S. agencies in countries Americans are interested in, through agents in various Jewish Zionist and similar organizations.

Besides the tasks resulting from total tracking of Palestinian and other factors at the international level, major thrusts by this agency were registered in the attempts to infiltrate among Arab students in Yugoslavia, and on a broader level of direct organization and gathering of intelligence information of political, military and miscellaneous nature. However, the enemy activity of this agency is far more intensive in the tracking of war/military potential being shipped to Arab countries from or via Yugoslavia. The "Rijeka Quartet" and their agents network were also involved in this.

We cannot say for certain when the conjunction between CIA and MOSAD in gathering information from our country started, but depositions collected in the "Rijeka Quartet" investigation point to 1967, although the data on it were collected much later. It has been established that, in January and February 1972, Tomic attended the meeting of CIA and MOSAD representatives in the base near Asmara, where long-term plans for systematic coverage of these issues, including our country, were discussed and made. The discussion also concerned possibilities for carrying out subversive and other actions on vessels shipping weapons to countries in conflict with Israel. Intelligence positions were to be created in five ports of the socialist countries: Odessa, Varna,

Gdina, Rijeka and Ploce. In the investigation, Tomic said that CIA's agent from Tel Aviv insisted on the up-to-date data, i.e. on data related to shipments before vessels leave given ports and to all countries that have proven to be Israel enemies in any way.

After the meeting, Tomic and Sedmak started the establishment of intelligence network in our country. Major "Jimmy" from Baumholder U.S. base put Tomic in touch with MOSAD agents in the Israel embassy to Bonn, first with Jacques and then with others. Tomic had a few contacts with Jacques, until the latter put him in touch with Israeli agent Hans. Contacts with Hans started with a meeting in Koln, and continued later on in the Israeli embassy building itself. Hans was giving accurate instructions and required photocopies of waybills - such documents contain all accurate camouflaged data that interested them (types and quantity of weapons and others) on shipments of weapons from East European countries and Yugoslavia to Arab countries, with the emphasis on Rijeka, Ploce and Odessa; photocopies of contracts on shipments from the Soviet Union and CSSR to Egypt and Syria.

One of the actions towards our country that MOSAD was preparing in conjunction with CIA was the plan to sink a vessel which was transporting tanks from Rijeka to an Arab country, but the action was thwarted. The action was prepared by agents Hans and Tomic, who appeared under alias "Clemenso from Brussels", Sedmak, Gonter Lajnhauer and others. According to this plan, Tomic was to get in touch with Rijeka freight forwarder "Intereuropa" (which he did by phoning from Ljubljana before he was arrested) in order to negotiate the shipment of tanks to Arab countries, by vessels he would find, with the most convenient payment method. Sedmak was to participate in certain parts of this action, and Lajnhauer had already started to prepare "Ina" vessel (owned by the CIA). Before Tomic's and Sedmak's departure for Ljubljana (in the second half of September 1974) Lajnhauer went to Bremen, where this ship was docked.

American and Israeli agents from the base also trained Ethiopian army and their military intelligence service. A portion of Ethiopian military leaders completed military academies and varied professional training in U.S. and English bases in West Germany (Visbaden), England and the USA (Virginia). A group of our officers of the Ethiopian military intelligence agency managed to take the leadership in the service after the attempted coup d'etat (during Haile Selasije's visit to some Latin American countries). A few agency officers, led by colonel Solomon Kadir, discovered a group of conspirators working with the U.S., and Israeli intelligence agencies. Since the conspirators' group appeared as an independent factor, without contacts with the existing pro-American intelligence work in Ethiopia, U.S. order-givers used the discovery of the conspiracy to strengthen their positions with the tsar himself. Kadir informed the tsar about it right away, and the tsar authorized him to contain the conspiracy. The conspirators were publicly executed in Adis Abeba. Kadir thus secured tsar's confidence and became the chief of state security and the grey eminence in the implementation of American plans in Ethiopia and, later on, in overthrowing the tsar and his regime.

Upon assuming such a responsible position in the country (leader of military and state security), Kadir reorganizes intelligence agencies and puts his people at the most responsible positions. More precisely, Mariam Girma, lieutenant colonel, became Kadir's deputy; colonel Taj - chief of the Navy's intelligence agency; colonel Tzagaje was appointed the chief of Erithrea military intelligence agency, and major Hajudu received special assignments. After the reorganization of the intelligence

service, Kadir obtains total control over events in Ethiopia and thus gets everything ready to start the game of overthrowing the tsar and his regime.

The main participant in this affair, Nenad Tomic, lived as a retired teacher in Visbaden in early 1990s. His version of the entire case was a bit different:

"..I was a DIA officer and made a mistake in trying to work for CIA and reveal the double game played by colonel Ragib Merdzagic from KOS JNA, once the chief of Croatian SDB, in procuring weapons for new NDH in 1974. The colonel asked me to put him in touch with the CIA, and he was also in touch with colonel Dilespie from the DIA. We met secretly in the U.S. consulate in Trieste. Sedmak was advised on it. According to the plans by Croatian leadership, but also by general Franjo Herljevic, Dane Cuic, and colonel Ragib Merdzagic himself, the separation and establishment of new NDH was to take place with the help of CIA and DIA. Colonel Merdzagic received dollar fees from both U.S. agencies for this plan. I reported all this to the DIA head office, since I believed it was too early for Croatia to separate from the SFRJ. The JNA was strong, and it was best proven by the fact that KOS had destroyed ustasha terrorists on the Radusa in 1972.

After my report, CIA and DIA conducted an investigation on colonel Ragib Merdzagic and discovered that his plans were false, and that he had completely different plans. While Sedmak and I were sitting in prison, the colonel was shipping weapons from CSSR to Croatia, under the control of BND and with the knowledge of Klaus Kinkel, chief of German secret police. Croatians ordered and bought all these weapons via Beirut. Colonel Merdzagic's right hand was ship captain Aleksandar Markovic, the brother of that Paris gangster Stevica Markovic, and his spouse Ljiljana Markovic. In 1968, the captain was suspended for theft on the ship and then sentenced to two years in prison. Since he was working for Croatians and Germans, as well as for colonel Merdzagic, he organized smuggling of weapons through his phantom companies in Trieste. His main employers in Zagreb were Djodan and Perica Juric. Aleksandar Markovic was also the main witness against me. That is why he spent only two years in prison, and I spent ten.

The plan for breaking up Yugoslavia was made in Germany. The U.S., actually CIA and DIA, were not opposed, since for them it was only a way to come closer to Moscow. While I was in prison, my uncle finance minister Todor Tomic did nothing to spare me the prison term. He even did not intervene when the report by SDB and KOS SFRJ "Rijeka Quartet" started being published in newspapers, in order to disgrace me upon my release from prison, when I started working as a reporter in the West. Fortunately, there are people in Yugoslavia, especially in Yugoslav diplomacy, who know that I have always been a Serbian patriot and a victim of German and Croatian conspiracy..."

CHAPTER 7 THE NEW KOSOVO BATTLE

After a nearly three-week suspense in Rambouillet, the exhausted Contact Group eased its grip on participants, and its representatives retreated, wiping the egg off their faces, and trying to put the most positive spin on their utter failure to reach a "deal." The "deal" was a stillborn idea for those knowing the true motives behind the simultaneously aggressive and protection-seeking

blamed for the violence that inevitably will follow. Consistency and common sense are instruments of strategic thinking, and the U.S. would take the blame for not having any, rather than reveal its covert interest in an independent Kosovo. The double standard implicit in U.S. policy replays the blunder of the U.S. turning a blind eye on the government crackdown on the Kurdish separatist movement, which claimed close to 37,000 lives in Turkey in the last 17 years, and on East Timor. *A propos* East Timor: human rights organizations monitoring the East Timor situation oppose Holbrooke's nomination as U.S. Ambassador in the UN because of his record of lobbying the Congress some 20 years ago for arms sales to the Indonesian government at the height of the East Timor massacres. The situation claimed over 200,000 dead since 1975. Would it be the same "peace broker", who leaves no stone unturned over the "human rights abuses" in Kosovo? While loudly congratulating Turkey on the occasion of capturing Ocalan, the PKK leader, in its overall effort to crack down on separatist Kurds, Washington threatens to bomb Belgrade with Tomahawk missiles as punishment for Serbs doing the very same thing: curbing armed irredentism. However, this contradictory U.S. stance is easier to comprehend within the framework of the real lifting done by the U.S. behind the smokescreen of the "lack of strategy." After all, in the real world, there are no principles, only geopolitical interests.

(Nurey)

It is widely held that there is no clear and long-term U.S. strategy in the region, and that the U.S. threat is not part of a larger strategic vision for the Balkans--an irritant for the European members of NATO. Instead, the threat is tempting to be perceived as adolescent ego-damaged vindictiveness of a powerful, yet infantile bully from across the Atlantic, whose dictates have been repeatedly rejected by one of the local players, thus challenging its authority, "credibility," and "resolve" and turning a small-scale internal conflict into a global ego-contest overnight. As we write this, the U.S. administration publicly worries that retracting on NATO threats to bomb Serbia will be a sign of weakness and thus spoil the festive mood at celebrating NATO's 50-year anniversary in April. What a dilemma, indeed! The prevailing view is that the U.S., moved by its angry desire to subdue Yugoslavia, vacillating between using a stick and a thicker stick, not bound by any disciplined strategic thinking or long-term vision, does not know what to do next. Washington is angry for a good reason: it had to realize that Milosevic has what Madeline Albright in one of her unrelated yet public speeches referred to as "huevos." To what extent the "penis-envy" factor motivates the anti-Serbian stance of Ms. Albright, nicknamed "The Mad Bomber" in NATO circles is not our desk, and, in truth, the real situation appears to be more complex. Having said that, it still needs to be pointed out that America's unhealthy, near-anal obsession with Serbia has clear egomaniac underpinnings: experiencing more defiance from Yugoslavia than it was prepared for, the U.S. has abandoned the world of international norms and law and shifted the focus to punishing Serbia whenever possible, forcing her to her knees, and making her accept the will of the "international community," NATO, OSCE, Contact Group, Kosovo Verification Mission, or whatever other ad hoc entity is at hand to disguise the U.S. geopolitical aspirations in the region. Aspirations, one may ask? Well, yes.

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The October "ceasefire" was a de facto NATO maneuver aiding the Kosovo Liberation Army in retaking key positions throughout Kosovo, easing the flow of money and heavy weaponry from across the Albanian border, and providing the KLA with yet another chance to establish an infrastructure that may bolster its claim to legitimacy in future negotiations, such as the one in Rambouillet. Thus far the KLA seemed to be not ready either to come up with representative and united leadership, or to accept a cease-fire with NATO ground-troops on NATO terms, followed by

Albanian, and resolutely defiant Serbian stances: on U.S. side the real name of the game was to squeeze NATO's foot in Kosovo's door, with everything else being quite secondary. The Albanian side, while hoping to have the Serbs bombed, at the same time wanted NATO to get the hot chestnut for the KLA on the ground, as well as to secure the magic word "referendum" as part of a "deal." The Albanian desire to end up with all the marbles ran contrary to the rules of the U.S.-imposed game, the masters of which, being in denial, still attempted to preserve an appearance of some degree of impartiality. In this dishonest game of the U.S. and the Albanians trying to use each other to achieve their respective goals at Serbia's expense, the division among the Albanians came as a surprise and an ugly wake-up call for All Those Who Always Know Best. After the fist deadline for NATO bombardment passed, the Albanian delegation apparently lost its nerve, and the "deal", instead of being zoomed through as promised in neat Contact Group charts and manuals, simply fell apart. We are now back to square one until March 15. The unexpected splash of obsession with and the unusual U.S. zeal about Kosovo was hard to comprehend for regular consumers of mass media. What is going on, indeed?

When the U.S. forced Serbia to withdraw its army and security forces from Kosovo last October at gunpoint, as part of a "cease-fire" between the government forces and the armed Albanian irredentists hell-bent on wresting this ancient part of Serbia away, those familiar with the history of the Balkans and the local geopolitical dynamics knew that the temporary lull was nothing more than a prelude to renewed fighting that will be bloodier than ever. In media reporting of the simmering conflict over the last year several crucial factors have been overlooked, though, or have simply gone unreported, and the thumb-sucking public, used by now to the notion of evil Serbs and suffering-yet-noble everybody else was thus deprived of a healthy dose of reality.

The ultimatum issued by the Contact Group to the warring parties on January 29, 1999 in London was, in fact an admission that the West never had even the pretense of impartiality throughout the series of recent Balkan wars in general, and in Kosovo in particular. While readying to bomb the Serbs, it hinted that the punishment for the KLA "may be" imposing a blockade on the large-scale weapon smuggling network via Albania proper, and even sealing off its border with Kosovo, or worse yet, the West "may tell the Kosovo Albanians that it is no longer interested in their cause." Reasonable people may ask why wasn't the Western blockade imposed on the vast weapon-smuggling network a year ago, thus preventing the escalation of hostilities that the West is allegedly so concerned about. But therein lies the answer to so many questions about the U.S. role in Kosovo.

To a logical mind, the U.S. posture on Kosovo in the context of its anti-Serbian stance is both self-contradictory and self-defeating. The media, with fierce anti-Serbian rhetoric, echoes the concern that the violence will spill into the neighboring countries of Macedonia and Greece if it is not stopped. This view defies common sense, though, for it ignores the reality that at the root of the violence is the radical Albanian drive to tear Kosovo from Serbia, not the Serbian response aiming to protect the territorial integrity of what was left from Yugoslavia since 1991. While the idea of "greater Serbia," falsely attributed to Milosevic, remains fixed in the inflamed imaginations of the soundbite masters in the Western media, the threat of a Greater Albania looms larger. If one is consistent in following the logic of the above argument, the U.S. would support, not punish, the Serbian crackdown on the terrorist practices of KLA, as the only way of dissuading the Kosovo Albanians from grabbing foreign land. After all, if Albanians in Macedonia and Greece whose appetites are fueled by the U.S. in Kosovo, aggressively exploit the situation, no Serbs can be

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blamed for the violence that inevitably will follow. Consistency and common sense are instruments of strategic thinking, and the U.S. would take the blame for not having any, rather than reveal its covert interest in an independent Kosovo. The double standard implicit in U.S. policy replays the blunder of the U.S. turning a blind eye on the government crackdown on the Kurdish separatist movement, which claimed close to 37,000 lives in Turkey in the last 17 years, and on East Timor. *A propos* East Timor: human rights organizations monitoring the East Timor situation oppose Holbrooke's nomination as U.S. Ambassador in the UN because of his record of lobbying the Congress some 20 years ago for arms sales to the Indonesian government at the height of the East Timor massacres. The situation claimed over 200,000 dead since 1975. Would it be the same "peace broker", who leaves no stone unturned over the "human rights abuses" in Kosovo? While loudly congratulating Turkey on the occasion of capturing Ocalan, the PKK leader, in its overall effort to crack down on separatist Kurds, Washington threatens to bomb Belgrade with Tomahawk missiles as punishment for Serbs doing the very same thing: curbing armed irredentism. However, this contradictory U.S. stance is easier to comprehend within the framework of the real lifting done by the U.S. behind the smokescreen of the "lack of strategy." After all, in the real world, there are no principles, only geopolitical interests.

(NWS)

It is widely held that there is no clear and long-term U.S. strategy in the region, and that the U.S. threat is not part of a larger strategic vision for the Balkans--an irritant for the European members of NATO. Instead, the threat is tempting to be perceived as adolescent ego-damaged vindictiveness of a powerful, yet infantile bully from across the Atlantic, whose dictates have been repeatedly rejected by one of the local players, thus challenging its authority, "credibility," and "resolve" and turning a small-scale internal conflict into a global ego-contest overnight. As we write this, the U.S. administration publicly worries that retracting on NATO threats to bomb Serbia will be a sign of weakness and thus spoil the festive mood at celebrating NATO's 50-year anniversary in April. What a dilemma, indeed! The prevailing view is that the U.S., moved by its angry desire to subdue Yugoslavia, vacillating between using a stick and a thicker stick, not bound by any disciplined strategic thinking or long-term vision, does not know what to do next. Washington is angry for a good reason: it had to realize that Milosevic has what Madeline Albright in one of her unrelated yet public speeches referred to as "huevos." To what extent the "penis-envy" factor motivates the anti-Serbian stance of Ms. Albright, nicknamed "The Mad Bomber" in NATO circles is not our desk, and, in truth, the real situation appears to be more complex. Having said that, it still needs to be pointed out that America's unhealthy, near-anal obsession with Serbia has clear egomaniac underpinnings: experiencing more defiance from Yugoslavia than it was prepared for, the U.S. has abandoned the world of international norms and law and shifted the focus to punishing Serbia whenever possible, forcing her to her knees, and making her accept the will of the "international community," NATO, OSCE, Contact Group, Kosovo Verification Mission, or whatever other ad hoc entity is at hand to disguise the U.S. geopolitical aspirations in the region. Aspirations, one may ask? Well, yes.

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The October "ceasefire" was a de facto NATO maneuver aiding the Kosovo Liberation Army in retaking key positions throughout Kosovo, easing the flow of money and heavy weaponry from across the Albanian border, and providing the KLA with yet another chance to establish an infrastructure that may bolster its claim to legitimacy in future negotiations, such as the one in Rambouillet. Thus far the KLA seemed to be not ready either to come up with representative and united leadership, or to accept a cease-fire with NATO ground-troops on NATO terms, followed by

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three years of autonomy. The latter was essentially designed to buy time for the KLA, providing a transition period for full independence--a scenario concocted for Kosovo by the "Contact Group" without bothering to consult either side in the conflict, and contrary to the claim that the U.S. is not supportive of the independence drive. Apparently, in Washington's view, Kosovo is not yet ripe for full independence, and the ground for the full-scale U.S. support has not yet been prepared--neither in its public-relations advance work or in receptivity among allies. The public relations angle of the maneuver is clearly to make the impression that there *is no* strategy. As told to Michael Ignatieff by Richrad Holbrooke during one of his "peace brokering" missions in the region, reported in the January 11, 1999 issue of *The New Yorker*, "diplomacy was not like chess, . . . it was more like jazz--a constant improvisation on a theme." However, the facts on the ground are telling a different story.

As we write this, one month after the Racak "massacre" was blamed roundly on the Serbian forces, the February 15, 1999 issue of *Newsweek* reports that among the private firms subcontracted by the U.S. government to provide mercenaries in Kosovo is DynCorp., a Reston, VA firm. *Newsweek*, notes tongue-in-cheek, that its calls to the firm were not returned. The skillful timing of the "massacre" that occurred one day after Ms. Albright indicated that the U.S. is ready to put a new round of pressure on Serbia attests to professional intelligence (no pun intended) coordination on the part of the KLA, involving the valuable public relations component that served NATO so well in imposing ultimatums on, and bombing of Serbia after the notorious "marketplace shelling" in Sarajevo in February 1994 and August 1995, respectively. The role of the Izetbegovic government in masterminding and carrying out the massacre of its own people in coordination with Western military intelligence for political and public relations benefit is an open secret in diplomatic, U.N. (ADP, June 6, 1996) and NATO circles, although bringing it up is considered to be something of a rather poor taste, and of no class whatsoever. As for Racak, apart from the expected "coverage" by the representatives of pack-journalism, the French *Le Figaro*, whose reporting was perhaps the only one based on the AP videotape recording the Racak operation in its entirety, was one of very few papers that had serious reservations about the official version, pointing out the virtual technical impossibility of executing civilians by the Serbian police during the offensive. The bodies were "discovered" next morning by the KLA who returned to the village after the Serbian police had departed, that is after having a whole night at KLA's disposal. *Le Figaro's* assumptions that the massacre brought to the attention of the OSCE mission chief William Walker by the KLA on January 16, was staged to provoke a NATO intervention -- something that is desired by the KLA above all -- are proving to be true. Referring to the official version, on January 20, 1999 *Le Figaro* wrote that "the most disturbing fact is that the pictures filmed by the AP TV journalists -- which *Le Figaro* was shown yesterday -- radically contradict that version. . . . Watching from below, next to the mosque, the AP journalists understood that the KLA guerrillas, encircled, were trying desperately to break out. A score of them in fact succeeded, as the police themselves admitted. What really happened? During the night, could the KLA have gathered the bodies, in fact killed by Serb bullets, to set up a scene of cold-blooded massacre? A disturbing fact: Saturday morning the journalists found only very few cartridges around the ditch where the massacre supposedly took place." *Le Monde* echoed the suspicion on January 21: "And yet questions remain. How could the Serb police have gathered a group of men and led them calmly toward the execution site while they were constantly under fire from KLA fighters? . . . Why so few cartridges around the corpses, so little blood in the hollow road where 23 people are supposed to have been shot at close range with several bullets in the head? Rather, weren't the bodies of the Albanians killed in combat by the Serb police gathered into the ditch to create a horror scene which was sure to have an appalling effect on public

RACAK

opinion?" Provocations as pretext for validating scheduled offensives are part of European military history, as the cases of Gleiwitz, Freiburg, and Kosice (Kassa) attest during World War II. Yet, apart from the troubling question of why would the U.S. support an organization whose field operatives mutilate the bodies of their own dead to achieve political ends, a more revolting question arises: did the U.S. have any part in it?

In an uncharacteristically emotional way, Mr. Walker blamed the Serbian security forces for the terrible crime in Racak. His expulsion from Serbia was received with universal outrage in the U.S., notwithstanding the fact that any diplomat would have been expelled from any other country for publicly blaming the government of the host country for a crime before any investigation was launched. But then again, therein lies the so precious public relations factor in the current war against Yugoslavia. The bodies of the victims haven't made it to the morgue yet, when the ever-vigilant Ms. Arbour of the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal made a botched attempt to enter the country without a visa to "investigate" the matter with predictable outcome. In the zeal of the moment, it seems to have escaped both her and the general public that she had no more jurisdiction to investigate the case then say, a UN-appointed Chinese judge would have had investigating the death of the Branch Davidians in Waco, perished as a result of the attack by the U.S. government forces. The emotional reaction of Mr. Walker unleashed the investigative spirit of Bob Djurdjevic, free-lance journalist extraordinaire, who was the only one to remind us in one of his regular email messages, that it was the same William Walker, who, as the U.S. ambassador to Salvador ten years ago, was trying to find excuses for the execution of the six Jesuite priests along with their caretaker and her daughter by the CIA-trained Salvadoran army. Mr. Walker in fact defended Col. Rene Emilio Ponce, the Salvadoran army chief of staff, calling the killing a "management control problem." Mr. Djurdjevic quotes Don North, a U.S. journalist who covered Salvador ten years ago, and whose comments on the matter were published in *The Consortium*, a Virginia-based media organization dedicated to honest journalism and accurate reporting. What could possibly be behind Mr. Walker's drastic change of attitude in the "massacre" department?

Now that the U.S. public relations firms on enemy's payroll, private companies providing mercenaries and training to the KLA, and media organizations paving the way to the NATO intervention are sweating in the same trenches across the frontline, the question that has been tormenting the Serbian public is whether the CIA has been behind the Albanian unrest in Kosovo during recent decades. The answer lies in a closer look at the rationale behind the drastic change in U.S. attitudes toward Yugoslavia in the late '80s. The Balkan part of the strategic geopolitical design of the New World Order announced by George Bush was aimed initially at breaking up Yugoslavia, whose previously valued neutrality became an obstacle in the post-cold war era, and led to creating new allies and client states in the Balkans. Until the late 80's, the U.S. was publicly declaring support for a stable and independent Yugoslavia. For the West, the country had been a reliable buffer zone between the two blocs for forty years. However, after the downfall of bipolarism, the U.S. made clear to Belgrade that the U.S. no longer had the same interest in Yugoslavia that it had had during the Cold War.

Sources close to the Yugoslav State Security Service and Military Counterintelligence claim that the U.S. interest in Kosovo goes back at least a decade. Zdravko Mustac, chief of Yugoslav secret police, openly voiced it in his report to the President in February 1990, when he realized that the US had already lined up behind Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. The CIA also had a role in brewing the violent

unrest in Kosovo, alleges Dr. Petar Knezevic, retired chief of the Military Counterintelligence. After the development of a separatist process in Kosovo and after the rise of nationalism in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia at the end of the '80's, special intelligence studies and analyses were conducted on the situation in SFRY. Consistent with its general ideological and political position toward socialism and communism, the ultimate goal of America itself was then a change in the socio-political system of Yugoslavia. More precisely--the destruction of the communist system of government. To that end, the West, with the U.S. as the leading power, always insisted on giving direct support to nationalist factions, to dissidents and humanitarians of all kinds. Later on, the U.S. aided Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian war efforts, including illegal military support and training. There is sufficient evidence that the current civil war in Kosovo is only a continuation of this kind of activity from abroad. The 1995 CIA study "Toward All-inclusive Peace in the South Balkans," in analyzing the situation in Kosovo, foresaw the violent termination of the sovereignty of Serbia in this "Albanian area." Thus, the name of the game became Albanian secessionism. The question of whom to support in this round of the Balkan bloodletting has never been a dilemma for the U.S.

Arms From Abroad

Much of the information on Western intelligence activity in Kosovo before and during the current conflict is ignored by the U.S. media, but it surely has been happening with the knowledge of the CIA and tacit approval of the U.S. government. As for the suggestion that the Contact Group, including Germany, "may" impose a blockade on arms shipments, consider this: Last year heralded the first evidence that German secret services have been aiding the Albanian separatist movement going back to the 1980s, including training and equipping the terrorist network. Note well: the self-styled government of the "Republic of Kosovo" is based in Germany, home to nearly 40,000 Albanians from Kosovo. As reported by the Lord Byron Foundation for the Balkan Studies, the founding of the armed wing of the KLA coincided with the appointment of Hansjörg Geiger as the new head of the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) in 1996. According to the report, one of the largest regional stations of the BND is set up in Tirana, and the BND agents, in close cooperation with Shik, the Albanian secret service, were in charge of selecting recruits for the KLA command structure from among tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanians living in Albania. The report names the BND Rome bureau as providing intelligence back-up, including recruitment work in Trieste and Bari, two of the main entry points to Italy for Albanian refugees. The German Militärabschirmdienst (MAD), the military intelligence arm, and special commando units were involved in training and the provision of uniforms and communications equipment. KLA fighters are donning Bundeswehr jackets with identifiable German insignia. Training has been subsidized through an Albanian foundation known as "The Fatherland's Call," with branches in Dusseldorf, Bonn, Stockholm, Bern and other European capitals. As reported by the Lord Byron Foundation, the above findings were corroborated in a recent German television documentary program, Monitor (19:00 GMT, September 24, 1998, carried by ARD in Munich). According to the report, the network's team of investigators, Jo Angerer and Volker Happe, have unearthed a wealth of data proving the link between the KLA and German intelligence services. Their report opened with news of a shipment of arms seized while being smuggled into Kosovo from Albania. It included hi-tech Armburst anti-tank grenade launchers developed by the German company MBB for the Bundeswehr, built in Singapore under German license. The report, as quoted by the Lord Byron Foundation, added that the Albanian rebels were also using radio communications and military monitoring equipment of German origin. The ARD television report confirmed that immediately after the Communist regime in Tirana collapsed, the

BND resident in Tirana was involved in "several illegal arms supplies" arranged by the MAD headquarters in Cologne. A former MAD official said that the arms supplies were ordered "by the very top" and that the operation is still being treated as strictly confidential. Contrary to the expected Federal Defense Ministry denials, BND and MAD sources confirmed that members of both MAD and the Bundeswehr's school for communications in Bad Ems visited Tirana on several occasions to arrange deliveries and training. Apart from violating both German and international law, it clearly touches a raw nerve in Serbs, for the last time Albanians were equipped and trained by Germany was when they served in the bestial Waffen SS Skanderbeg Division, one of several Muslim SS forces in the Balkans set up by Hitler, including the Waffen SS Handjar Division, recruited from Bosnian Muslims. None of the above has yet caught the attention of the U.S. media, which prides itself at being "investigative" and "groundbreaking".

In December last year, the *New York Times* reported that an official from the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohia was astonished when a group of Albanian terrorists showed to him a powerful American sniper rifle which can blow off a head at the distance of a mile. Neither the "official", nor the *New York Times* pushed any further. Instead, A. Apostolovski reports in Yugoslav *Politika*, on February 4, 1999, that the Albanian terrorists receive arms from all sides, through many ways and it is pure luck that the Serbian army and police forces mostly intercept the largest deliveries. One of the last interceptions was successful. On the main road Kosovska Mitrovica - Pristina, near the village of Supkovac, police captured a large quantity of arms, ammunition and military equipment, hidden in a long vehicle of Macedonian plates. According to the police report, they captured 100 automatic rifles, several thousand rounds of difference caliber, large number of mines for hand launchers and uniforms with insignia of the terrorist KLA organization. In addition to Chinese-made, police captured rifles made in other countries. According to the inspected documents, the arms and ammunition arrived in Kosmet through Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation. This is not the first time, the arms are transported to Kosmet from these countries. At the end of 1998, the Croatian police captured a lethal arsenal worth about \$1 million. The arms was discovered in Sibenik, and originated from Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation. The contingent captured in the Sibenik port contained 500 stingers, one to two thousand 20 mm shells, three "Strela" (Arrows) missiles, large quantity of rocket launchers, several ground-to-air missiles, whole stocks of rifles of American, Yugoslav, Croatian and Argentinean make and about one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition of all calibers. The arms was packed in 20 containers and camouflaged as "timber" delivery. The Italian police discovered the truck full of arms and explosives for the Albanian terrorists in the port of Ancona, The consignment consisted large quantity of anti-tank weapons, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, heading and aiming device systems, and TNT explosive. The truck arrived from Split, and should have been loaded onto "Venice express" ferry whose destination was the Albanian port of Durres.

After the riots in Albania in 1997, when the army stocks were completely demolished, tons of arms was found on the "free market", and their destination became Kosovo and Metohia. Summing up the results of the activities of the border units of the Third Yugoslav Army and police, and analyzing the procedures in securing and protection of the Yugoslav-Albanian border, head of the Pristina Corps of the Yugoslav Army, major-general Vladimir Lazarevic stated on December 24, 1998, that only in 1998, they captured over 60 tons of different weapons and equipment intended to be delivered to the members of so-called KLA. They captured 2,000 pieces of all sorts of automatic weapons, 190 mortars, hand launchers and hand-held cannons, and about 650,000 rounds of different caliber.

Almost at every incident on the Yugoslav-Albanian border caused by the Albanian gangs, border guards capture large quantities of arms loaded on horses or mules which are traditional transportation means of the arms smugglers. There is another channel of smuggling arms. It is the Macedonian border with Yugoslavia and Albania which is poorly guarded. The Macedonian officials are also skeptical towards their border guards, assuming that smuggling is being carried out under the protection of the Albanian parties in Macedonia. Those parties openly support the independence of Kosovo. The arms are usually loaded onto mules or carried on foot over the mountains in the vicinity of the Albanian villages of Spas, Klobosi, Resari and Baniste. They are within the 15 km zone by the Macedonian border which is without control. A high Macedonian official said to the Reuters agency that everybody, even the UN troops, knew what was going on, but nobody wanted to annoy the smugglers. The convoys go over Sara Mountain to Yugoslavia, and within a day they reach Albanian villages in Kosovo and Metohia. The way from Albania to Macedonia is easy. Slopes are mild and patrols of the Macedonian Army frequently turn their heads away

However, the north of Yugoslavia is not immune to arms smugglers and terrorists' collaborators. On January 7, 1999, police from Subotica arrested a group of three men, which had been smuggling military equipment from Macedonia to Yugoslavia for a long time. They had been doing it through so-called "green line." Salih Ahmet from Podujevo, Darko Benes from Subotica and Jozo Banovic from Gornji Bradici, tried to supply to Albanian separatists and terrorists with 188 NATO military camouflage jackets with thermal lining, then 31 pair of water-proof military camouflage trousers, 164 military sweaters, 224 thermal linings for trousers, and large quantity of other military equipment.

The Clandestine Connection

To what extent are the Western intelligence services in general, and CIA in particular behind coordinating hostile Albanian emigration, its centers in Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and of its outposts in Ljubljana and Zagreb, still remains to be answered in full. However, the files of the Yugoslav State Security and Military Counterintelligence already provide some answers about the U.S. involvement in supporting various anti-Yugoslav forces during and after the Tito era.

With the changes of political circumstances in the country, the external forces switched their "toy soldiers," to use professional intelligence jargon. When the Chetnik movement showed its greatest strength and power, immediately after the 1945 liberation, the intelligence services enthusiastically supported it, first the English, French, and then the Americans. When Croatian nationalists raised their heads in the '60s and '70s and pressed for the creation of a new Croatia, Ustasha emigrants commenced massively with their terrorism. The early -80s, were marked with student demonstrations, civil unrest and rebellion in Kosovo. At that point Albanian nationalism was brought into the game against Yugoslavia, employing both political incitement and armed insurgence. From 1981 to 1988, according to the data of Radoslav Gacinovic of the State Security Service, 4,825 people were charged with inciting political unrest in Kosovo: 3,748 Albanians, 751 Serbs, and 110 Montenegrins. There were 6,379 anti-Yugoslav leaflets distributed, and the "Kosovo - Republic" slogan appeared 14,725 times in public places. 1,220 people were sentenced for political crimes, and 3,068 Albanians were punished for other violations. Since the causes of terrorist activities against Yugoslavia are multi-layered, it would be an exaggeration to attribute all of them to only the CIA or other intelligence services. With regard to Kosovo, the most frequently mentioned intelligence service is Sigurimi - the Communist secret police from Tirana, and Shik - as its successor. By exaggerating the role of the Sigurimi and the CIA, the Yugoslav state hid its own responsibility for allowing saboteur activities and armed rebellion to take place. The weaker our federation was, the stronger the nationalist and emigrant forces became, backed by outside help.

Before directly intervening to resolve the Albanian question in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the U. S., as the self-described greatest world power, sympathized with and occasionally lent visible support to Albanian nationalists. According to Nikola Milovanovic of the State Security Service, various emigrant organizations originating

from Albanian and Yugoslav refugees and deserters have been working from abroad against Yugoslavia for many years. The organizations, in Milovanovic's opinion, were in part remnants of factions created by wartime occupiers, animated as well by a newer wave of nationalism, organized on the military, intelligence and political models of the West. The first direct contacts the Albanian emigrants and nationalists had with the CIA, DIA and FBI were at the end of the 1960's and 1970's in Europe, and in the U. S. itself, through Ustasha organizations, which tried to draw them into their anti-Communist and anti-Yugoslav networks. One such organization was "Beslidia Shiptare," headed by Emin Fazliu, living in West Germany. His real name was Emil Kastrioti, son of a well-known Balist, a member of an Albanian fascist organization during WWII. Fazliu, according to his personal file at the State Security Service of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, disguised the activities of his organization by branding it a "cultural and artistic society"--an obvious front, although it was clear to both the Yugoslav and German authorities that this was a militant Albanian organization. Emil Fazliu, alias Kastrioti, following his collaboration with Ustasha operative Stjepan Bilandic, organized several deadly raids on Yugoslav offices in Western Europe. His collaborators were Vebi Ibrahim, Hisen Celaj, Isuf Lucaj, and Alimani Hodza. Emin Fazliu maintained his connection with Albanian emigrés in the U. S. through Redzep Krasnici, president of the "National Committee Free Albania," and a CIA agent. His task in America during the '70s was to strengthen collaboration with Croatian fighters for a free Croatia in the US.

The Enver Hadri Story

The case of Enver Hadri is instructive in gauging the involvement of the U.S. government and CIA in the activities of the hostile Albanian emigration. According to details from KOS JNA (Counter-Intelligence Service, Yugoslav People's Army) sources, Enver Hadri was generally known as president of the "Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo." According to State Security Service, Hadri was considered a spy and organizer of terrorist actions, and the profile highlights in his personal file refer to him as "very influential among Albanians in Western Europe... With strong connections in institutes and among individuals unfriendly to Yugoslavia... Among collaborators very authoritative. Collaborator of CIA, Sigurimi and other intelligence services... Subordinates fear him, and based on some intelligence information it is believed that he is inclined to very drastic methods in resolving conflicts...".

Hadri began his political involvement at Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo in 1968. Two years later, he joined an illegal political organization at the invitation of Anton Stavri, captain of the Albanian army, previously imprisoned for terrorist activities directed from Tirana, who was introduced to Hadri by Hajdin Mulici. The latter and Anton Stavri met in prison. Captain Stavri, however, received amnesty in 1962, so he and the other Albanian intelligence officers were released, and he was returned to Albania via Zagreb. With the arrival of Cpt. Stavri in Pec, Hajdin Mulici got the offer of his life: participating in activity aimed at uniting Kosovo with Albania. Stavri suggested to Mulici the creation of an underground organization in Pec that Tirana would support. Stavri had already found like-minded people in Prizren and Skoplje. The first person to whom Mulici proposed joining the organization was in fact Enver Hadri, whose erudition had

fascinated Stavri. But the promised help from Tirana did not come. In the meantime, the organization was discovered by the Yugoslav Counter-Intelligence Service. Some members were quickly arrested, while Enver Hadri succeeded in escaping abroad, to Brussels. On trial, Anton Stavri received a seven-year imprisonment sentence, and Hajdin Mulici six.

Hadri's choice of Brussels as his residence was not coincidental. Being also the political capital of NATO, the Belgian capital offered a certain security. At that time, the majority of Albanian émigrés had gathered in the Belgian capital. These included Albanians who had left Kosovo and Albania after the Second World War due to their past political activity or political convictions. Upon arrival in Belgium Enver Hadri immediately established contact with two other Albanian patriots, Jusuf Selenica and Muharem Barjaktari. Hadri at the same time collaborated with all political groups forced to flee from Albania, as well as with those close to the regime in Tirana. In the mid-'70s, Enver Hadri with the help of the CIA established an organization called The Albanian National Resistance Committee and began to publish a newspaper, "Zeri i Kosoves," in Albanian, French and Flemish. He was the first Albanian to introduce the Kosovo Albanian question in any form into the European parliament in 1978. At that time he was the head of the delegation of Albanians engaged in talks with influential members of the parliament; it was also the first time that support was sought for Republic status for Kosovo. After Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, Hadri's activity was connected to the first protest gatherings in the West: in Brussels on April 11, 1981, where demands for a Kosovo republic were pressed. Together with his best friend, Agim Radonici, Hadri gave his first interview for the Belgian *Standard*. Having realized that it would be incomparably easier to reach key institutions and individuals in Europe through an organization that intercedes on behalf of human rights, Enver Hadri renamed his Albanian National Resistance Committee, changing it to The Kosovo Human Rights Protection Committee, with headquarters in Brussels. It turned out that this assessment was entirely correct, and his work on Albanian matters became more effective than earlier: in 1989 he was even received by Jacques Delors.

Hadri's Committee has three other members: Behara Redzepe, Gani Azemi, and Resat Sahiti, later joined by Fitam Pogarusa. They organized a visit for the delegation of the European Parliament to Kosovo in May 1989, when in Pristina's Grand Hotel the parliamentarians met with Ibrahim Rugova and Redzep Cosja. One of the European parliamentarians spelled out Hadri's name on a piece of paper to Cosja, indicating who had sent them to Kosovo. Enver Hadri, as a CIA man, had valuable contacts in the West; Ms. Hana Ebeling, employed in the European parliament was one of them. The SDB assumes that Ms. Ebeling provided Enver Hadri with a great deal of important information and documents from the European parliament, which Hadri later successfully exploited to achieve his ends. Ever since 1973 when he settled in Belgium, Enver Hadri had been a thorn in the eye of Yugoslav authorities and especially of the SFRJ secret police.

Enver Hadri was murdered in Brussels in 1990 on his way to a meeting with acquaintances from the European Parliament, who were to receive a list of 36 Albanians

killed during demonstrations in Kosovo in January and February 1990. His murder resulted in the arrest of Darko Acanin, a Yugoslav citizen, in Greece in 1995, suspected of participating in planning and carrying out his murder. Albanian circles claimed that Hadri's execution was ordered by Stane Dolanc, former minister of Yugoslav police, politically responsible for the security of Yugoslavia. The claim was later confirmed by the statement of former inspector of the State Security Service of Yugoslavia, Bozidar Spasic.

All parties agree in one assessment: his life dream was an independent Kosovo. While some may consider that a totally legitimate right, others will regard it as undermining the sovereignty of an existing state. Enver Hadri's spouse, Ajsa, an Albanian from Pec with four children, two sons and two daughters, still lives in Brussels. Neither she nor her children from Enver Hadri are involved in politics.

The Geneva Coalition

By 1986 when the Albanian mission to the UN opened in Geneva, it was already one of the centers of anti-Yugoslav activities of Albanian emigrants, along with New York. There centers are run by Zef Camaj, a professor and former journalist from Tuzi near Titograd, who in the U.S. hosts the Albanian Radio Hour and the organization named National Movement for Kosovo Republic, along with Dzafer Satri, who poses in Switzerland as a champion for human rights of Albanians. Camaj studied political science in Belgrade, worked as editor at the Albanian Service of Radio Titograd, and taught sociology. His political activity was launched through municipal organs in Sekurici and Tuzi. When he defected to the U.S., he immediately received political asylum and, later, citizenship.

The CIA drew the largest numbers of its agents from among Albanian emigres in the U.S. and Canada--the greatest concentration of immigrant Albanians in the New World. There, Albanians from Albania, Kosovo, and Metohija freely engaged in anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian activities. This happened despite the fact that Albania did not at the time have official diplomatic relations with the U.S., and some of them were at the same time Sigurimi agents, like Baskim Pitarka and Justin Papajordze, heads of the Albanian mission to the UN in New York and Geneva, and former officials of Sigurimi. In February 1988, KUD "Siptari" (Detroit) launched a radio hour called Voice of Albanians. The program was established by members of hostile Albanian emigration (Enverovci, or followers of Enver), with the support of the Albanian mission to the UN. In October 1987, members of ANE (a branch of "Free Albania") held a gathering in New York, where members of the Albanian mission to the UN were among those in attendance listening to anti-Yugoslav speeches.

The first high-ranking defector was Ali Krueziju, a Yugoslav diplomat and an ethnic Albanian, who was sent to New York as member of the Yugoslav mission to the UN. He was recruited to work for Albania and for the CIA and eventually sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for espionage. The second defection to the CIA was by Yugoslav Consul Selim Sereraj, also an ethnic Albanian diplomatic intelligence operative

of the SSIP SID (Yugoslav Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Office of Information and Documentation), responsible for following the work of Chetnik emigrants (Serbian Anti-Communist Monarchists) on the American continent. To that end he frequently traveled officially to the U.S. and Canada. Having been appointed as Yugoslav consul in Toronto, he carried out his diplomatic espionage responsibilities for four months. In early 1979, Seferaj took political asylum due to the "persecution of my compatriots in Kosmet" (Kosovo-Metohija), and switched to the CIA, providing the Americans with the entire Yugoslav diplomatic agency network in North and South America. The analysis at SDB SSUP showed that Selim Seferaj was recruited to work for the Americans while still in Yugoslavia, more precisely in Kosovo.

According to Boza Spasic, SDB SSUP inspector who worked in the Department for Yugoslav Political Emigration, "Selim Seferaj was my colleague, an intelligence officer. We received special training at SDB SSUP for intelligence work within the Yugoslav political emigration. Some 70 attendees took that course, including one other Albanian, Abdula Parapastica, who, like Seferaj, later switched sides. SDB Yugoslavia conducted that intelligence course at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since so many of our diplomatic intelligence officers were from SID. Our turncoat Seferaj handed the CIA all the data he received in the Office of Information and Documentation at SSIP about Yugoslav émigrés suspected of working for the Americans. In that way, the CIA obtained the names of its own spies who were "cracked" in Yugoslavia and needed protection."

According to SDB SSUP data, there are about 70,000 Albanians in the U.S., half of them from former Yugoslavia, mostly concentrated in New York and Detroit. In New York alone they had three radio programs--Voice of Free Albanians, Voice of the Homeland and Voice of Malesija (the Albanian name for Montenegro (!). In U. S. branches of Albanian emigrant organizations from Yugoslavia and Europe, with approximately 3,000 politically active Albanians participated in their work and their anti-Yugoslav activities, among them Albanians from Serbia and from Montenegro, known as Malisori--Prof. Franjo Dedlukaj, and Deto Sinistaj. The latter, representative of Albanians Catholics and director of the Albanian radio in New York, was so active in the battle against Yugoslavia that he was personally received and decorated by Albanian president Ramiz Alija. Albanian guests at anti-Yugoslav gatherings and demonstrations included Ljeka Ljuljcuraj, delegate of the Montenegrin parliament, Toma Berisaj, a retired colonel of the Yugoslav Army, and Derd Dokaj, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Koha*," says Spasic.

The first open clash between Yugoslavia and the U.S. over the Albanian issue was in 1986 on the matter of Prof. Petar Ivezaj of Detroit. With his wife Judy and two other Americans of Yugoslav descent, Vjeroljub Radivojevic and Gradimir Hadzic of California, he was arrested on Yugoslav soil, charged with espionage and organizing anti-Yugoslav demonstrations in Washington. Radivojevic and Hadzic were immediately released, while Petar Ivezaj was held in jail and, in an urgent proceeding, sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Ivezaj, an Albanian born in Montenegro, emigrated from Yugoslavia in 1976 with a Yugoslav passport and citizenship. He had been a member of an Albanian-American student association for 30 years. As a result of his arrest and

consequent sentencing, Rep. William Broomfield, member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, and Gus Jatron, President of the Subcommittee for Human Rights proposed that the U.S. government cease commercial contact with Yugoslavia. Threatening sanctions, the U.S. succeeded in working out the release of Petar Ivezaj, who left for Detroit with his wife seven days later. In the following years, especially in 1988, there were at least three organized anti-Yugoslav demonstrations and anti-Serb gathering per year in the U.S.

One of the CIA bases for Yugoslavia has been in Istanbul, a center of Albanian and Muslim emigration descending from Kosovo, Metohia, and Sandzak. Inspectors of SDB Yugoslavia, for example, have a file on Dem Ali Pozar, a Kosovo outlaw and Balist war criminal, who is listed not only as American intelligence services agent, but also a collaborator of Sigurimi, the Albanian Communist secret service. After the Albanian unrest in Kosovo and Metohija in 1968, Pozar visited Tirana, where he was received at a top government level. Albanian leaders arranged for him that year to visit some Western countries as a member of their delegation, and Pozar established new agency connections and centers. At the Albanian embassy in Vienna, he had a meeting with Dr. Branko Jelic, then president of the Hrvatski narodni odbor (Croatian National Committee), an Ustasha organization from Munich. The developing collaboration between the Albanian and Ustasha emigration in the West was nurtured by the CIA. The CIA and Sigurimi had one more common double agent in Hiseni Trpeza, a criminal and emigrant from 1945, and leader of the Prizren League from America, who fled to the U.S. through Greece. There was also Ljuan Gasija, leader of Kosovar Alliance in America. Both organizations had branches in Yugoslavia, or more accurately in Skoplje, led by Medzid Haki Afus and Kemal Iskender. During the 1968 demonstrations, Trpeza arrived in Turkey from the U.S. to organize and coordinate joint activities of Albanian emigrants from Istanbul and New York.

Trpeza is quoted as having told both groups: "When a Great Albania is in question, our goals are the same - the destruction of Yugoslavia, and so you are needed to realize the great dream of Enver Hodza - the creation of Great Albania!" Working with Hiseni Trpeza and Ljuan Gasi to revive Albanian emigration in America and to connect them with Ustasha were Redzep Krasnici, Mark Gecaj, Tahir Krnjaja, Dod Boga, Bek Alija and Ahmet Zerka. They worked actively as CIA collaborators with Dr. Mate Mestrovic, Krunoslav Masina and Miroslav Gala, representatives of the Hrvatsko narodno vijece (Croatian National Council) in New York. Marko Dorkmarkovic, for example, had the task of finding Viljem Cecelja in Austria, and to come to agreement with him and other Ustasha leaders representing Albanian emigrants on the creation of a united anti-Yugoslav emigrant bloc in America. Later on, as the ideological opposition between Albanian and Croatian emigrants limited their collaboration to joint demonstrations, the effort switched to lobbying for the Albanian cause by the Americans themselves. This, in turn, brings to focus both the source of financing the Kosovo cause by Albanians in the West, and the legality of such efforts.

Dirty Money

On January 28, 1999 Slobodan Aleksendric reported in Yugoslav *Politika* that the more the situation in Kosovo becomes clearer to the world, the world seems to understand it less. I also may be an intentional, tactical misunderstanding by design, aimed at concealing something that could adversely affect the part of world opinion openly sympathetic to Kosovo Albanians. It is hard to explain the fact that citizens of Albania, one of the most chaotic state in Europe today "rule" the streets of Milan, Geneva, Vienna, London, Prague or Budapest, being mafiosi of new generation often more ruthless than the worst Sicilian clans.

Unlike their counterparts in the U.S., the European Media view the Kosovo matter through sobering lenses, and, having the integrity to call things by their names, share with their readers the information regarding the sources financing the armed Albanian separatism from abroad. Large numbers of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija — who have falsely claimed the right to asylum in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Belgium — have the assignment of providing the resources necessary to achieve separatist goals. Criminal activities such as arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and prostitution networks run by Albanians in West European countries provide tremendous material basis for separatist politics. *Corriere Della Sera* wrote on March 6, 1998, that Albanians from Kosovo who live in Switzerland, Germany, and the USA and are involved in illegal activities - mainly drug smuggling, thus providing the basic source of financing terrorist activities.

It is no longer a secret that Albanian criminals have taken over European underground along with their compatriots from Kosovo and Metohia. The Western European press is full of news and stories about the vicious, expanding Albanian underground organization, but European police, along with Interpol seem helpless. The latest police discovery of mafiosi - Kosovo Albanians, made public after almost a year of investigation came from Milan. As Italian newspapers reported in early January, it was determined that the heroin market in Lombardy is controlled entirely by Kosovo Albanians who don't even bother to launder money in Italy but transfer it directly to Kosovo and Metohia to the so-called KLA and partly to Switzerland to finance the armament of KLA. After the press conference held by police and legal representatives in Milan regarding the discovery of the Kosovo Albanians criminal organization, a headline appeared in Rome's *La Repubblica* of January 19: "Heroin sold in Milan Serves to Finance Kosovo Liberation Army".

Italian police officials said that in the course of the investigation they tapped phones of several Kosovo Albanian criminals. They found out that many of them referred to some Albanian politicians living in Pristina. In another words, mafiosi were directly connected to some Albanian leaders on Kosovo, which has never really been a secret. The world actually knows about this but leaves it to local police to deal with mafiosi avoiding to point to their mentors from Pristina who are the direct financial beneficiaries of criminal activities.

The latest discovery in Italy is just a drop in the ocean. The Albanian organized crime rules the streets of Geneva, and in Hungary, as György Hollós, head for the narcotics in

KBI said last year, the Albanian criminals control 80 percent of the heroin market in the country. It is no different in Czech Republic where last year police broke an Albanian narco gang, arresting 16 people that were hiding 40 thousand doses of heroin worth some 300,000 DM.

However, the activities of Albanian Mafia are not limited to drugs only. Financially strengthened by smuggling drugs that arrive to Europe from Turkey, Albanian Mafia started to smuggle weapons, cars, people, minors and lately, as the British weekly *The Observer* reports, - human organs. The Albanian and Italian Mafia, as this weekly reports, developed a wide underground web by which they transfer Albanian boys and girls to Europe and sell them. In hospitals too they have secret channels for selling human organs, mainly of children up to age 12. Prices for children and newborns, says *The Observer* are not known, but prices for human organs are: heart costs some 350,000 DM, lungs 100,000, while kidneys are negotiable, claims the London weekly.

Meanwhile, in the U.S. *The New York Times* reported in the end of 1998, how the Kosmet Albanians in America were collecting money to purchase arms for the terrorists, all of that under approval of the American State Department. The leading American daily wrote that such an activity was not banned by the American laws, as long as the U.S. State Department does not list KLA as terrorist organization. One of the Albanians in charge for collecting money from Albanian emigrants, acknowledged that they had collected the fantastic sum of \$100 million from Kosovo Albanians in New York, Detroit, Chicago and Boston, to finance armed insurrection. The actions for the transportation of arms to Albania were coordinated from the U.S.

Back in Europe, according to a broadcast of the German radio station *Deutsche Welle* on April 3, 1998, the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Macedonia reported on "organized arms smuggling from Albania to Kosovo and Macedonia that started at the beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party of Albania headed by Sali Berisa came to power." The report mentioned that Sali Berisa armed convoys of Albanian terrorists for war on Kosmet, and part of the weapons intended for Kosovo remained in the western part of Macedonia. Military analysts state that most of the weapons originated in Albanian Army storehouses, but were not returned after the disturbances in that country in 1997. The armaments involved are infantry weapons that can be transported easily and inconspicuously. *Deutsche Welle* also cited information about the financial services of Albanian emigrant circles, including the Albanian narcotics Mafia on the Zurich-Brussels-New York route. Military experts claim that, in addition to the transport of weapons across Sar Mountain, organized paramilitary groups of Albanians who were trained in centers near the Albanian cities of Elbasan and Kuks also used that border crossing.

The Hungarian newspaper *Magyar Hirlap* wrote on November 15, 1997, that Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija control almost the entire heroin market in Hungary. According to the newspaper, they send part of that money to separatists fighting for "Greater Albania.". Albanian terrorists are trained in military camps in Albania and Turkey, as well as in other Islamic countries. On March 7, 1998, the Italian newspaper //

Manifesto reported, that terrorism in Kosovo is "imported from Albania" and that hundreds of young Albanians from Kosovo were trained for guerilla actions in a special military camp in Albania. On March 5, 1998, *La Repubblica* similarly reported on a top-secret base of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army in Albania, where terrorists are trained by Iranian instructors. The Associated Press report published by *The Sunday Times* and consequently, *The Boston Globe* reported in November 1998 that "a network run by Saudi exile Osama Bin Laden sent units to fight in the Serbian province of Kosovo... terrorists had infiltrated other parts of Europe." The man who is allegedly responsible for the African embassy bombings, and is wanted to the extent of having launched American missile attacks on two sovereign nations, runs a terrorist base in Albania, also a U.S. protégé. Ending up inadvertently in the same league with its Most Wanted testifies either to a satanically designed international conspiracy of unseen proportions, or sheer incompetence and stupidity of the US in foreign policy matters.

Osama Bin Laden

But while the Saudi money finances the terrorist network, the funds raised "legally" in the U.S. find other application as well.

Joe, the Albanian Lobbyist

The scope of the Albanian lobby's influence on U.S. politicians remains largely unreported. Michael Ignatieff's mentioning of Albanian cabbies and restaurateurs buttonholing Holbrooke in New York to berate him for talking to Milosevic may add human interest to his report in *The New Yorker*, but there is more to the interaction between the Albanian diaspora and U.S. politicians than meets his eye. The powerful Albanian criminal organizations in Western Europe and the U.S., so familiar to the FBI, not only provide the primary cash supply for the KLA via Albania proper, but are also instrumental in influencing U.S. politicians by means of campaign contributions through the Albanian lobby. The role of the latter in the U.S. is well known to those blessed with inquisitive minds, as is the influence of individual congressmen, who today still invest their authority in this conflict, stirring up unrest and imposing demands on the position of national minorities beyond the standards of international law. Among the beneficiaries are such big guns as Bob Dole, who refused to meet with the representatives of the Serbian minority while touring Kosovo a few years back, Tom Lantos, a vocal critic of Yugoslavia, and Joseph Dioguardi, an American of Albanian descent and a U.S. representative for the idea of a Great Albania. Strategically criticizing communist countries on human rights issues, Dioguardi attacked Yugoslavia for the first time in June 1986. His proposal to bring a resolution condemning Yugoslavia for violation of human rights of Albanians was then rejected by Congress. A year later, though, when he had won 55 congressmen over to his idea, Dioguardi succeeded in passing a condemnation of Yugoslavia. A similar move was then executed by two senators, Bob Dole and Paul Simon. In order to get official support from Albania for these proposals (and at the suggestion of Baskim Pitarka) an American-Albanian League of Citizens for the Protection of Human Rights was formed, with Joe Dioguardi as its first president. Backed by a generous \$1.2 million contribution by the Albanian lobby, Dioguardi succeeded in the late '80s pushing through a vote for a panel discussion in Congress on human rights of Albanians in the Balkans, and first of all in Yugoslavia. This heralded

the start of an internationalization of the Albanian problem in Kosovo, and the creation of a new round of American pressure on the Yugoslav leadership. The local conflict thus turned global.

After the Kosovo issue was introduced in the Congress, representatives of the organization called Albanian Youth of Kosovo in the Free World from New York presented a "Memorandum on the Persecution of the Albanian Population in Yugoslavia" to both the American president Ronald Reagan and to Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the UN. This organization was formed in America in 1977, with Arif Malcici as its first leader. This would be the first joint venture between Albania and the U.S., as Col. Milorad Boskovic of the State Security Services remarked in his intelligence report. A similar memorandum was also received by George Bush, following which American congressmen and senators received authorization from Washington to make a political visit to Kosovo. On that trip, the CIA carried out verification of both security and information on the Albanians. This action of the U.S. was accompanied by clear worsening of diplomatic relations between Washington and Belgrade.

The pinnacle of Dioguardi's campaign against Yugoslavia was his visit to Kosovo in 1989. Then Rep. Joseph Dioguardi came to Pristina as a special emissary of the Commission for Human Rights of the American Congress, and as leader of the American-Albanian League of Citizens. His fellow traveler was Rep. Tom Lantos, an American of Hungarian descent. Both of them informed the American media before traveling to Yugoslavia that their host would be Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, whom Dioguardi and Lantos in their remarks hailed as a "great leader of the imperiled Albanian people in Yugoslavia."

Bob Dole in Kosovo

The extent to which Dr. Ibrahim Rugova been a front man for the U.S. became clear several years later when he received as guests Joe Dioguardi, Sen. Bob Dole, and Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, the same U.S. representative who midwived Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia, and who talked Alija Izegbetovic into reneging his position on the already signed Lisbon Accord in March 1992, thus jump-starting the three-year Bosnian war. Dioguardi visited Kosovo for the second time in May 1990. Then his hosts were Ibrahim Rugova and Zekerija Cana. Who in the American administration has been defending Albanians, and why? Warren Zimmerman responds in his 1966 memoirs, *Origins of a Catastrophe*:

"... as Yugoslavia careened toward destruction, the role of the U.S. Congress bulked even larger. The Yugoslav crisis showed Congress at its best and at its worst. Its laser-like focus on Kosovo was an inspiration to the unfortunate Albanians there... Even on Kosovo the valuable congressional pressure was finally carried too far... Individual

members of Congress were often pressured by ethnic constituents. Representative Joe Dioguardi (Democrat of New York) was himself an Albanian-American who had sounded an early alarm about Milosevic's assaults against Albanian rights in Kosovo. Even after he had lost his reelection bid, Dioguardi wielded considerable influence as leader of the Albanian lobby. He worked closely with Representative Tom Lantos (Democrat of California), a Hungarian-American who had made himself a genuine expert on the Balkans. The principal champion of the Kosovo Albanians in the Senate was Sen. Robert Dole . . . The contradictions of trying to conduct a congressional foreign policy by resolutions and amendments culminated in the so-called Nickles Amendment, which was passed in November 1990 and took effect six months later. Don Nickles (Republican of Oklahoma) had been with Dole on the visit to Kosovo in August 1990 and had been understandably appalled by what he had seen. His amendment, which became law over the opposition of the Bush administration, prohibited economic assistance to Yugoslavia unless Serbia ceased its human rights abuses in Kosovo. The legislation affected only \$5 million of assistance; in any case, Secretary Baker invoked his discretionary authority to prevent its taking effect. Nevertheless, the amendment did damage to a rational U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia."

Zimmerman, then Ambassador of the U.S. in Yugoslavia makes the growing preference for Albanian separatism already in 1990 clear in his memoirs:

" . . . I worked hard to convince Rugova to take his party into the Serbian elections of 1990, arguing that rejecting elections would not help his democratic credentials. . . . I stressed that it was possible for the Albanians to advance their cause in a hostile political environment. Rugova was intransigent. He made it clear that he would not last a single day as Albanian leader if he took such a step. . . . Kosovo Albanians would never (again) recognize Serbian authority. It was clear that Milosevic's strong-arm approach was pushing the Albanians onto a path of no return toward complete independence from Serbia. By December 1990 there were few Kosovo Albanians who didn't insist either on an independent Kosovo or on a Kosovo linked with Albania, where the democratization process was beginning. . . . "

Two facts speak to the extent of Ibrahim Rugova's connection with America. First, on the request of the Albanians, an American Information Center was opened in Pristina, which the Yugoslav authorities immediately characterized as one more post for Washington and the CIA in Kosovo and Metohija. Second, in mid-1997, Rugova intended to schedule a referendum for the Albanian parliament, but America expressly and publicly prohibited it. Ibrahim Rugova listened, justifying it by scheduling the referendum for fall. In August 1996, the American Information Center opened in Pristina, as well as a Research Center at Center, officially confirming the presence of the U.S. in the province among the Albanians. By 1994, individual associations and commissions in Serbia, Kosovo, and Metohia were predicting that the U.S. would strengthen its presence in these regions. The 1995 Dayton agreement included a clause on Kosovo, thus introducing the issue on the Balkan scene of operations. We face the results of the above efforts now.

Conclusion

Finally but not lastly, there is the Milosevic factor. U.S. politicians and media during the Bosnian war developed a habit of cursing him as the source of all evils in the Balkans, a practice that has taken root to such an extent that any Balkan event would be hard to account for without blaming everything on Sloba. Indeed he is irreplaceable to the U.S. view: Milosevic has become a party the U.S. could not "improvise" without, instrumental, and willing player in validating the anti-Serbian policies of the U.S. in the Balkans. The U.S. could have replaced him any time, if they had wanted to—the Zajedno movement in 1996 expected American support in vain, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church denounced him, and the leadership of the Federal Army made it clear that they would not support Milosevic in case of a popular uprising—but Washington waited with shifting eyes and sweaty palms until the budding possibility of opposition self-destructed. The U.S. already had a partner in Belgrade, who was, and is willing to play the bad guy in exchange for being allowed to stay in power. The U.S. needs Sloba tied to the whipping pole, because without him Washington would be in a real trouble: its policies in the Balkans would be exposed what they really are: an angry, unprincipled, and bigoted anti-Serbian crusade.

Apart from daily national headlines about crying and fleeing Albanian women and children, the public-relations effort validating the fight for independence also includes references to the statistical composition of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The U.S. reports that focus on the much-cited 90% of ethnic Albanian populace, suggesting that such a high proportion of Albanians somehow warrants independence, do not, however, take their consideration of the demographic statistics any further. The fact that the Kosovo Albanians have one the highest birthrates in the world (an average 6.16 children per couple), causing their population to have nearly tripled since the 1938 census is, as a rule, shyly omitted. The 1961 census put the Albanian population at 67%, the 1971 one at 73.8%, the 1981 one at 77.5%. The current rate is 86.5%. U.S. supporters who ground their sympathy in the Albanian idea of seceding based on population pressure want to be exempt from the principles they are so eager to impose on others; they may face similar demands in California, Florida, Arizona and New Mexico within a generation. Who knows, by then the U.N. may mandate withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Southern California, and order Chinese troops to move in to monitor the American compliance with the efforts of the "international community" aiming at the reunification of Southern California with Mexico.

If there are vital U.S. interests in Kosovo, as the President Clinton says, the Americans are yet to hear about them. They must be spelled out clearly, for the majority of Americans until very recently had no idea where Kosovo was. In fact, the CBS Radio World News reported on February 25, 1999 the results of a poll conducted among Americans. According to the poll, 50% of Americans still do not know where to find Kosovo on a map, but 54% favor sending U.S. troops there. Those who are familiar with all the facts in the Balkans should know Washington yet again bets on a wrong horse, following its remarkable instinct for choosing the worst possible option from those available. Albania, a country that made no transition from a medieval society ruled by

how
by "well"

clans to hard-core Stalinism from debilitating effects of which it has barely recovered, a country that has been looted and savaged by its own people beyond being governable, and a country whose citizens do everything possible to *get out* of it and settle abroad while championing land grab in Kosovo is hardly ready for the 20th century, let alone the 21st. If not much else, the Greater Albania, that will have incorporated Kosovo with American help, may do however, as a giant NATO base and another Balkan banana republic serving the geo-strategic interests of the U.S. in the Adriatic-Mediterranean region, as another foothold in the Balkans linking its troops already deployed in Bosnia and Macedonia.

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great
Albania

Those Who Always Know Best should pause and reflect on the words of Susan L. Woodward in her book, *Balkan Tragedy* – an excellent and sober analysis of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia between 1991-1993:

“Western intervention in the Yugoslav crisis aimed at mediation and crisis management. Instead, it provided the irreversible turning point in its escalation toward nationalist extremism and war... Nationalist party leaders ... who ruled in shaky coalitions formed out of political expediency... were promoted by EC, CSCE, and UN negotiators to the status of statesmen... Western powers were making war over territory inevitable... the fight for international opinion had been and would continue to be as important as the fight on the ground.”

The presentation of the Serbs as universal villains in the U.S. media has reached its peak: there is nowhere more to go, and the cycle is closed. Soon the carefully built false public image will start to crumble, and eventually will collapse under the weight of its own phoniness. Things will be called by their names again, and the world will see that Yugoslavia has been duly resisting UN or NATO jurisdiction superimposed upon her law and order, given such urgent domestic crises as the dangers of terrorism and the threat to the nation aided and directed from abroad. Yugoslavia is not a no-man's land: it has a functioning constitution and criminal code, as well as a federal army that took an oath to protect the country's borders. The U.S. threat to bomb Serbian installations in Kosovo and even Serbia proper *de jure* constitutes an unprecedented and flagrant violation of the Helsinki Accord with regard to respecting the territorial integrity of sovereign European countries, and of the established international norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, including the Charter of the United Nations, and Article 1 of the NATO Treaty, which commits NATO itself to upholding the U.N. Until the "international community," including the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal, starts to apply a consistent measuring stick to all regional conflicts, such as those in Turkey, Haiti, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mexico, Colombia, Indonesia, etc., its stance toward Yugoslavia will remain what it truly is: a political tool aimed at subduing the country by rudely intervening in her internal affairs.

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CHAPTER 8 MOLES IN THE PRESIDENCY OF SFRJ

In 1989, enemies of Yugoslavia already started getting organized. It was already the time when even some of the high-ranking Yugoslav officials were publicly flirting with the U.S., going to Washington for consultations, and leading confidential talks with Americans in the heart of Yugoslavia. The SSUP's SDB staff were ordered to record Yugoslav officials' secret contacts with foreign diplomats, politicians, and informants. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the destruction of the SFRJ, neither the SDB of the SSUP nor the KOS of the JNA have never publicized the names of people who betrayed Yugoslavia. Dr. Petar Knežević lists, as collaborators with the U.S. embassy and CIA, Ante Marković, Josip Vrhovec, Budimir Lončar, Dr. Haris Silajdžić, Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, Dimitrij Rupel, Gojko Ču'ak, Branko Salaj, Ivan Milas, Perica Jurija, Stipe Mesia. After all, Borisav Jović himself mentions that, in the SFRJ, only Budimir Lončar was advised by ambassador Zimmermann, in mid-November 1990, that CIA had made the analysis of Yugoslavia, i.e. of its imminent breakup and a possible military coup as a way of preventing it. Already in early December 1990, Jović received the information that CIA had set up an expert team in Budapest, and that they were working on plans for destroying the SFRJ, together with the FBI and Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. The plan was put into operation, Borisav Jović testifies, after Milošević's election victory, since Washington and the CIA decided that Yugoslavia "could not exist any longer". According to intelligence colonels Dr. Boško Todorović and Du'an Vilić, the Center for Information and Reporting of the SIV was recording all telephone conversations, including those led by Prime Minister Ante Marković. One of these tapes, Todorović and Vilić say, includes the conversation between Ante Marković and Croatian premier Josip Gregorić. It took place in September 1991. Gregorić advised Yugoslav prime minister that Croatian leadership had made the decision to withdraw all their staff from the federation, and then chase JNA out of Croatia.

Творење

"It is not what we agreed to do at Tuđman's. Budimir Lončar will revise SSIP's present views in the U.N. in favour of Croatia. He is about to go to New York. And the thing with the army should not be rushed either. One should take away from them as much as possible, and then expel them. I am staying here until all this ends in favour of Croatia," Ante Marković replied.

Budimir Leka Lončar, as well as Josip Vrhovec, two former ministers of the SFRJ, were actively involved in breaking up the second Yugoslavia and the creation of new Croatia, as diplomats and informants. While Budimir Lončar got a job in the U.N. and went to Indonesia, Josip Vrhovec retired. For both of them SID and SDB had records that they had had contacts with foreign intelligence agencies. Lončar with Americans and British, Vrhovec with Americans. It was primarily owing to them that both SSIP and SSUP turned into centers of Croatian and Serbian coalition in the heart of Belgrade in the 1980s. Budimir Leka Lončar was born in the village of Preko near Zadar, on April 1st, 1924. He completed high school and joined partisans in 1942, and a year later became a member of the KPJ. After liberation, all until 1949, Lončar was wearing the JNA uniform, and then joined diplomacy. He was the consul general in New York, head of the Department of Intelligence Analysis and Planning in the DSIP, advisor and deputy minister, ambassador to Indonesia and Germany. And, finally, the twelfth post-war Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs. He took over this office on February 4th, 1988,

since Raif Dizdareviæ left diplomacy before time in order to become a member of the Presidency of SFRJ. The nominees for the new minister included Marko Orlandiæ from Montenegro, Ignjac Golob or Stane Dolanc from Slovenia, and @ivan Berisavljeviæ from Vojvodina. In this maze of republic and provincial keys for the top position in Yugoslav diplomacy, the Presidency of SFRJ and the Presidency of CK SKJ - wishing to avoid a conflict among Montenegro, Slovenia and Vojvodina - simply decided that the deputy, Budimir Leka Lonèar, should become the minister.

It was the time of cracks in Yugoslav federation, when new saviors were elected, all of them Croats, prime ministers Milka Planinc, Branko Mikuliæ, and Ante Markoviæ. It was in their governments that Lonèar was the minister of foreign affairs, since he managed, owing to his diplomatic experience and knowledge, to lead Yugoslavia through Europe and the world, although he was witnessing the sinking of the Eastern Bloc. On the domestic level, he was reproached for not getting politically involved as a reformist-to-be, with Ante Markoviæ, but rather remaining an inveterate communist, and, internationally, for allowing Europe's interference and mediation in resolving Yugoslav crisis. Indeed, De Mikelis, Chaisson, and Gensher brought to Yugoslavia Owen, Carrington, Rose, and then Clinton. Although bound to protect Yugoslav interests, minister Budimir Lonèar protected the interest of the West to the point that in some instances he was a courier of the U.S., their ambassador, and the CIA. Of his own accord, without the consent by the Presidency of the SFRJ, for instance, Lonèar initiated the discussion about Yugoslavia in the U.N. Security Council, which was followed by the condemnation of official Belgrade. And then by punishment in the form of economic blockade and sanctions. Cognizant of his negligence, Budimir Lonèar submitted his irrevocable resignation on December 11th, 1991 and left Belgrade.

"Leka was popular as a diplomat, but suspected as an intelligence agent. Indeed, SDB had "indicative information" that Budimir Lonèar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was working for the CIA. They needed to gather evidence for this. My colleagues from the Second Administration were gathering all his dispatches, and followed him on his business trips. One policemen was going as a bodyguard, the other as a counterintelligence agent supposed to protect Lonèar's and our state and diplomatic mail. However, Leka would go for a trip, finish all official talks, and send SDB inspectors back to Belgrade. It happened in the U.S., it also happened in Japan. From Tokyo, e.g., Minister Budimir Lonèar went to London and spent two days there. Where was he, who was he with, why was he there? SDB of Yugoslavia, which had to know that as a part of their job, could not find it out. Upon his return from London, Minister Lonèar had a secret meeting with Prime Minister Ante Markoviæ at Topèider. They were talking for as long as four hours. There is, however, a lot of photo and sound documentation of this event in the SSUP's SDB, because they were shadowed. Police Minister Petar Graèanin had a few official discussions with Leka about these, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs never admitted to anything, says Bo¾a Spasiæ, former inspector with Yugoslav SDB.

Belgrade press accused Lonèar of taking with him, as an experienced intelligence agent, suitcases of confidential and secret SID documents when he left SSIP. He had already made use of this documentation, together with Zdravko Musiæ, the first intelligence

agent in the SFRJ, to put pressure on Bogiæ Bogiæviæ. Actually, the press claimed, and nobody denounced it, that before the series of sessions of the SFRJ Presidency on the fate of Yugoslav federation, Budimir Lonèar and Zdravko Musiæ suggested to the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bogiæ Bogiæviæ that he should think twice about how he would vote - for federation or for secession. To help him with the decision Lonèar and Musiæ showed to Bogiæviæ secretly taken photographs where Bogiæ was seen in embarrassing love-making positions. Faced with threats that the photos would be published in press, Bogiæ Bogiæviæ voted for the breakup of the SFRJ, i.e. against the motion that the JNA should intervene and save SFRJ from the secession of primarily Slovenia and Croatia.

Spy doings by Josip Vrhovec

While Stane Dolanc was the minister of Yugoslav police already, in early 1980s, these three diplomats - Budimir Lonèar, Josip Vrhovec, and Zdenko Svete, were shadowed and bugged by the staff of SSUP's SDB. Since, however, nothing had been officially done against them in counterintelligence and political terms in late 1980s, it was easy to merely state that SSUP heads were, actually, double spies. One of them, Josip Vrhovec, was even publicly blamed both in Belgrade, and in Pula and Zagreb. Here is what a former SSUP inspector and now lawyer Neboj'a Pavloviæ says about these suspicions:

"In 1981, as a SSUP employee, I met a Yugoslav expert who was working in "Nekerman" in Germany. It was the R&D center of German intelligence, something similar to our Security Institute. In 1979, this expert received from one of his German colleagues a twenty-page material in Serbian, containing the full description of the status of each JNA agent. The German asked him to translate about thirty words from there, begging him not to say a word about it to anybody. One footnote said that the material for BND from CIA was forwarded by Josip Vrhovec. Naturally, our man photocopied the material but it was not until two years later that he dared take it out of Germany. I received the material and got in touch with Nedeljko Bo'koviæ, the head of the military security sector in the JNA at the time. Upon reviewing it, he told me, "One comes across such a thing once in fifty years." The material was forwarded to Croatian Police Minister Pavlo Ga¾ai, an honest man and a communist, who was about to arrest Josip Vrhovec. Somehow or other, however, this rumour reached Ante Markoviæ, then Croatian premier, and Ga¾ai was ousted. Later on, the case was revived in Belgrade, but Zdravko Musiæ hushed up Josip Vrhovec' treason. I believe that there were powerful tails of Croatian lobby in Belgrade, and that they played a major role in the disintegration of these Yugoslav regions.

Pavloviæ, however, says nothing about the activities of Yugoslav SDB which, in these years, got the help of Belgrade masters of breaking into apartments and safety boxes and got hold of two cases of Josip Vrhovec' confidential papers. The papers were taken stealthily from Vrhovec' apartment in Zagreb, and brought to Belgrade. The papers revealed not only that Josip Vrhovec was a CIA's agent, but also that he was an active participant in numerous discussions in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Bonn, and Washington, D.C. about destroying Yugoslavia. The group of guys from Belgrade specially recruited for

secret collaboration with Americans, Zlatko Sagaj, Vladimir Ssajnoviæ, Hubert Po¾arnik, Rajko Pirnat, Jo¾e Urankar and, most of all, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rupel's task was to internationalize the issue of Slovenia's secession and its independence, and find as many allies for the idea as possible. According to Yugoslav SDB's records, Dr. Janez Drnov'ek had his first contact with Americans as early as in 1987, when he was at the Ambassador John Scanlon's reception. The next year, he was already collaborating with Lloy George, economic advisor of the U.S. Embassy to Belgrade, who became both his house and his presidential friend. Through him, he met advisors Ben Floyd and Joseph Presley and then, inevitably, the new ambassador Warren Zimmermann. KOS JNA shadowed Janez Drnov'ek through a singer, who was his house friend. Her primary task was to improve the image of the first man of Yugoslavia, who was suspected of having homosexual inclinations, and needed a girlfriend to prove his heterosexual life. The information he provided to Americans included the datum that the JNA intended to dispossess Slovenian TO of their armament, in order to prevent Slovenians' from arming themselves and a potential armed conflict with the army. In accordance with the suggestions by the U.S. and Drnov'ek himself, this decision made by the federal leadership did not bind Ljubljana, and they armed their citizens.

The peak of spying activity of Janez Drnov'ek and, later on, of Ante Markoviæ as well, was the prevention of the JNA's military intervention; i.e. they sent the JNA to Slovenia without ammunition and bullets in their guns. After 1981 and events in Kosovo, when the army also intervened without live ammunition, this was the second instance of manipulating the army, who lost forty conscripts and soldiers, and withdrew from Slovenia, defeated, in October 1991. Warren Zimmermann says about the event:

TOZNOV'EK?
"As I said, I do not consider the war in Slovenia a serious conflict. It was a media war that Slovenes provokes, waged and won. I still claim that the only purpose of this war was - to shed a bit of blood with a lot of racket, in order to draw a psychological line between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Kuèan really strived to achieve the Western-type democracy, but for me, it cannot be their excuse for the way they undermined Markoviæ and made the self-centered decision to leave Yugoslavia regardless of what would happen to others. I believe that Kuèan, and particularly Drnov'ek, were aware of what tragedy could result from Slovenia's unilateral secession, and I have reasons to believe that they were searching for a compromise solution - for the temporary delay of this decision. Others within Slovenian leadership, Janez Jan'a in particular, did not want to delay the secession, regardless of the terrible price which was to be paid by others. They actually wanted the confrontation with the JNA, they wanted a small public relation war, since they knew they could win it easily and thus speed up the secession course.

At that time, there were about seventy American DIA officers and CIA agents in Ljubljana, mostly covered by diplomatic status and reporters' passes. Janez Drnov'ek became the prime minister of Slovenia, but remained an American guy, since he requested Washington's blessing for all his key decisions. The first decision he made was Slovenia's agreement to enter the Partnership for Peace and NATO. The second was the

been in the U.S. "not as a *Vjesnik* correspondent but as a spy, first for KGB and Stevo Krajačić, and later on for CIA". This allegation was then corroborated by the fact that Josip Vrhovec had left for the U.S. as early as in 1969, but had not been writing as a reporter and correspondent for full six months, since he had been "on a CIA course". Vrhovec explained, to the *Vjesnik* management, this absence of any activity as a sick leave after a minor surgery. Later on, upon becoming the minister, Josip Vrhovec used to go to Washington for a few weeks, to report on the circumstances in Yugoslavia, particularly on those in Kosovo and Metohija. Vladimir Dedijer, the greatest Yugoslav publicist, accused Vrhovec for the raid of Croatian secret police into his house in Istria, and for the theft of his archives which, in turn, prevented the publication of data on this Yugoslav minister and agent. In a letter to Tanjug, of spring 1990, Josip Vrhovec denounced Dedijer's claims that he possessed the records of the KOS JNA about his spying activities, but it did not convince Yugoslav public of his innocence. On the contrary, the SDB of SSUP then launched, through Belgrade press, the story of Josip Vrhovec' intervention, while minister, against the arrest and trial to Leka Ljuljđuraj and colonel Toma Beri'a, CIA's collaborators, who represented Albanian lobby from the U.S. in the SFRJ or, more precisely, in Montenegro.

According to KOS JNA's records, Minister Josip Vrhovec used his position in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to approve Jacques Cousteau's underseas explorations around the isles of Lastovo and Vis. The explorations were prevented by Jere Grubić, the head of the military counterintelligence agency, who said straight to Josip Vrhovec' face that Jacques Cousteau was an American spy and could not be allowed to come near our military bases on the Vis and Lastovo with his submarines. Indeed, prior to that, in 1978, Cousteau had spent some time in the Adriatic Sea as an unofficial visitor. When JNA's navy warned him that he had to observe the international protocol on navigation, Jacques Cousteau requested from the federal government the permit for underseas exploration in the zones of the islands of Mljet, Vis, and Lastovo. In a special report, experts of KOS JNA presented the government with the fact that Cousteau had been working for the U.S. CIA ever since the Second World War, and that his exploration would be a threat to the security of SFRJ, and JNA in particular. The government therefore rejected Jacques Cousteau's request, but he re-appeared in the Adriatic Sea only a few months later. This time, and not accidentally, his host was Josip Vrhovec, who tried to allow Jacques Cousteau to record military positions of our navy on the Mljet, Vis and Lastovo bypassing JNA and the government of SFRJ.

In the early 1990s, the most Yugoslav public's complaints of the open wheeler-dealer activities pertained to Janez Drnovšek, the youngest president of the Presidency of the SFRJ. Indeed, Belgrade suspected Drnovšek of working for Americans, since in the course of his presidency he had too many official and private meetings with American diplomats and envoys, too many even for the first man of the state. A similar suspicion was also associated with Dimitrij Rupel, who once even openly admitted to having had talks with CIA bosses in Athens. The same went for Jože Smole, President of Slovenian SSRN and a federal official, who started working for the CIA in India, while he was the press attaché in Yugoslav embassy. This datum was revealed by Josip Kopinič, to his biographer Vjekoslav Cenečić. In Ljubljana itself, Slovenian media also blamed, for

consent to form, in 1997, new Slovenian government after the model approved by Washington itself.

American Patriot

Some of former Yugoslav high-ranking officials were thus publicly bragging of their collaboration with Americans, and so it happened that even Stipe Mesia, the last president of the collective leadership of the SFRJ, and later on General Martin Čepelj, the first man of the Croatian army, admitted to taking plans for the armed fight within the country directly to Pentagon and the CIA, respectively. In his interview to *Slobodna Dalmacija* of December 1995, Stipe Mesia admitted to his espionage:

“In 1991, I found out from a Croatian army general, that the JNA was manufacturing ‘sarin’ poison gas near Mostar, and they they were cooperating with Iraqis on the production of a new rocket launcher. I used the opportunity to make some circles of American administration acquainted with the whole case, and soon afterwards they took care of my transportation to the U.S.A., where I delivered the records to the authorized Pentagon personnel. As the Yugoslav president, I believed that such an activity by the JNA represented a threat not only for this region but also a broader one - for the entire international community. And since it was evident that the war was about to break out, one could presume, in 1991, that potential use of these gases could bring about a disaster in Croatia. Americans must have made use of the information I delivered them and warned Serbia, through certain channels, to stop the production of the poison gas!

Such treason and espionage was a logical consequence of the need by anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian bloc within the SFRJ to seek and find their allies, as opposed to Serbs and Serbian leadership, who entered the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia alone, without a single ally. Naturally, seasoned counterintelligence agents would say that such an alliance was also the result of the fact that Americans, CIA above all, had had their people in the Presidency of SFRJ and the Presidency of CK SKJ for a long time already. The first among them was Stjepan Stipe Mesia, Croatian representative in the collective leadership of the SFRJ. A man who, in 1991, boasted “how he broke Yugoslavia apart” across Croatia. He also published it in a book with the same title:

“At midnight of May 15th-16th, 1991, I was expected to take over the office of the President of Presidency of SFRJ from Borisav Jovia. The evening session was interrupted a few times, mostly upon requests by Tupurkovski and Bogiaevia, who were trying to sew up the open seams. Judging by the reactions of Western diplomacy, their dogged insistence on the “united Yugoslavia” had been considerably loosened - it became clear to the world who wanted what in Yugoslavia and from Yugoslavia. I was far more attentive in listening to the reactions from the West, but from Washington as well, and on May 20th, 1991 Ante Markovia received a telephone call from President Bush. Markovia talked to him from his residence in the Ušakova Street, late at night. Only the federal secretary Budimir Loncar and Ante’s foreign policy advisor were present. Markovia was assuring his distant collocutor that the “Parliament and government were operating normally”. Bush said that he supported the federal government, being

convinced that they would work on further democratic transformation of the country ... However, relevant American figures were at times claiming that they should lean upon Serbia ("ally in two wars..."), and the next minute you could hear that Serbia "presented a major obstacle to peaceful resolution of the crisis". Bush' administration was quietly trying to direct the aid by supporting democratic forces in the Yugoslav unity and to prevent Serbian resistance.

In his memoirs, however, Mesiaë does not fully reveal his role in breaking up the SFRJ, but lays the blame for this process on another American man in Yugoslav top, i.e. on Prime Minister Ante Markovicia and on Serbian president Slobodan Milo'evicia. He spoke about himself when he testified in the Hague, in the spring of 1996:

"I was born in Orahovica, in 1934. I completed secondary school in Po³/₄ega. I graduated from the Faculty of Law in Zagreb in 1961, and in 1963 passed the bar exam. In 1966, I was elected into the Assembly, as the only opposition sandidate. According to the Constitution, an independent candidate could be elected provided that 100 persons signed a petition at court. I was the only one who dared to do so, and I was elected. Then, in 1971, the "Croatian spring" took place, and I was ousted from the office of the president of Orahovica municipality. In 1971, I was tried for nationalism, and sentenced to two years and two months in jail, which I served in Stara Gradi'ka. The Supreme Court lessened the sentence to a year, after my appeal. After that, I worked for the Architectural Studio, a consulting firm where I handled legal and commercial tasks. When my director retired, I took over his position and was the director until 1990. I could not work as a lawyer since nobody who had been sentenced to prison could work as a lawyer.

In 1989, I took part in the establishment of HDZ, and I was their secretary general. In 1990, I became the premier of the Republic of Croatia within the SFRJ. In the fall of 1990, I moved to Belgrade, where I became vice-president, and then the President of the Presidency of SFRJ. At the time, laws and Constitution of the SFRJ were still in force. My responsibilities included presiding over the collective presidency, and I was also the commander of armed forces.

Mesiaë was a member of SKH for as long as seventeen years. His prison sentence in the SFRJ was his political credit which he pledged to Dr. Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian Democratic Union in 1992. In return, Tuđman rehabilitated him by appointing him Croatian premier. Even then, Stipe Mesiaë was well-known as a man with "filthy tongue" and inborn talent to justify even the most sordid political means by luminant goals. From his seat of Croatian premier he was delegated, according to the system of sending to the federation the worst staff possible, for a member of the Presidency of SFRJ, where he was appointed the first man of Yugoslavia by close voting results. Stipe Mesiaë was able to use this position to offer his services, first to Germans and then to Americans, in close collaboration on the secession of Croatia and breakup of SFRJ. In doing so, Mesiaë was taking both legal and official, and also illegal and unofficial avenues to reach, as he himself writes in his memoirs, the foreign factor.

"In the spring of 1990, in spite of the hard American efforts against the Croatian interest, and exactly for this reason, I wanted a dialogue with the owner of the largest Wyoming range, American Secretary of State James Baker the Third. Since last year, since I entered the Presidency, Baker has been invited to Yugoslavia a few times, and the invitation has been permanently open since April. Baker the Third came with his wife Susan and three close associates Margaret Tattwieler, Dennis Ross, and James Dobbis, as well as with promises that the "U.S.A. will never recognise any unilateral action by any of the republics". I was not unwilling to talk to Baker, but nobody suggested such a discussion. He found representatives of the federal government sufficient: "The first thing to do is to introduce Mr. Mesiaë to the Constitutional function." It must be born in mind that the U.S. exerted decisive influence on Europe as well. Besides, Baker came to Yugoslavia with the OSCE members' mandate: "The U.S.A. thus speak to the international community saying that Yugoslavia should not break up!" In Belgrade, Baker advocated constitutional establishment of the Presidency, but was leaning upon the federal government, and far more on Serbia than on Croatia. Baker's two-day long talks thus came down only to two federation representatives - Markoviaë and Lonëar - and separate meetings with the six republic leaders. To Markoviaë, Baker expressed his full support and promised that "he would do his best to materialize the support in financial terms as well"; to republic presidents, he explained "how crucial the preservation of Yugoslavia was from the standpoint of security in Europe," Stipe Mesiaë recalls.

As soon as he was appointed President of SFRJ, Stipe Mesiaë went on canvassing for the secession of Croatia. He personally phoned all European political leaders and then, in the fall of 1991, went for a private visit to the U.S.A., intending to meet, unofficially, American senators and congressmen. Apart from them, Stipe Mesiaë managed to meet Lawrence Eagleburger, James Baker's deputy at the time, but did not manage to see President George Bush. Mesiaë advised his American friends of Serbian use of poison gases and, most of all, of the danger threatening SFRJ from the JNA and Slobodan Milo'eviaë. The President of SFRJ Presidency was thus the first to publicly accuse the President of Serbia of actually commanding over Yugoslav army, of being the aggressor and, in order to alarm Americans even more, he was the first to compare Milo'eviaë to Sadam Hussein. Stipe Mesiaë repeated these allegations to Zagreb journalists, but also to *Free Europe* reporters, upon his return.

"It is clear who commands over Yugoslav army, it is Milo'eviaë, definitely. It is a matter of continuous, daily, even hourly link to the military top. The so-called military top represents nothing more but Milo'eviaë's lawyers. They are holding on to Milo'eviaë because, to them, he represents the continuation of communism. And that is why they think that it is better to be with Milo'eviaë than with some Dra'koviaë or anybody else in Serbia. I claim that Slobodan Milo'eviaë and his regime are now more dangerous for the world peace than Sadam Hussein. I became convinced that relevant people and institutions in the world are aware of this danger."

In order to show to the world public how dangerous Serbs, Milo'eviaë and JNA were, Stipe Mesiaë, as the President of Yugoslavia, personally visited Dubrovnik during the staged shelling of this "pearl of tourism in the Adriatic". Mesiaë also took with him a

suite of entertainers, including the popular singer Tereza Kesovija. This secret action by Stipe Mesia in the style of great spies was performed under the coded name "Shark's Smile". From the ship, he personally phoned Admiral Stane Brovet in Belgrade and told him, as the supreme commander and in front of foreign reporters, to "stop the shelling of Dubrovnik". Afterwards, the bragging Mesia said that he had not only stopped the "attack of Yugo-soldiers on Dubrovnik" but that he had also smuggled, on his ship, weapons for mobilized Croatian nationalists. The whole action of "saving Dubrovnik", as Mesia admits, made the effect insofar as both the European Union and Van der Bruck "changed their views on the survival of Yugoslavia and announced the possibility of loose association, but it is only republics who can decide about it."

Such a decision by Europeans, confirmed at the Meeting in the Hague, was the reason, Mesia claims, for which Janez Drnovsek, Slovenian representative in the federation, treated him with dinner in a motel near Ljubljana upon his return to Yugoslavia. The dinner was paid for in just-printed tollars. Owing to the affections for and ties with Americans, the two of them were close associates:

"I made friends with Drnovsek while we were in the Presidency of SFRJ. Our views on the world are fairly similar. We felt the danger coming from Serbs, we knew that they planned to bring a member of the Presidency to their side, in order for Serbian bloc to have five votes. We insisted that representatives of the JNA be excluded from the session. Bogia Bogiaevia and Vasil Tupurkovski were not aware of all these although, e.g., General Kadjevia threatened Tupurkovski that he would make him a head shorter. When Drnovsek returned from Belgrade to Ljubljana, he set up the "Faros" foundation, which was involved in promoting democratic processes and market-driven relations. It was a non-profit organisation gathering democratically oriented people and market-oriented business people, said Stipe Mesia, who actually intended to join Drnovsek's foundation.

Betting on Ante

Today, when the U.S. impact on Balkan events became direct and open, it is clear that official Washington was only too concerned about who would come to lead Yugoslavia and who would lead the process, first of saving and then of extinguishing SFRJ. Americans therefore placed their bets on Stipe Mesia, Ante Markovia, and Janez Drnovsek. Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Belgrade, speaks openly about his cooperation with Yugoslav prime minister in his memoirs, first published in Zagreb:

"In the seething cauldron of ethnic rivalries, Yugoslavia needed a leader who could deal with the growing economic crisis and at the same time appeal to Yugoslavs to stay together and build a democratic society. Amazingly, a man who represented all these qualities found himself the new prime minister of Yugoslavia in March 1989. Ante Markovia, a man of great ability and determination, had been voted into office by the Yugoslav parliament with a mandate to curb the runaway inflation and institute a radical economic reform. Milovan Djilas, the famous dissident and political seer, called him Yugoslavia's first modern statesman. Markovia was impossible to dislike. A good-

looking silver-haired man in his mid-sixties, he radiated good humour and ebullience. He laughed easily - not a trait of Slavic officials and certainly not of Yugoslav communists. He had a can-do attitude and an unbounded conviction that he could overcome what was now universally called "the Yugoslav crisis". A man of large ego, he saw himself as a messiah for Yugoslavia. After he became Yugoslav prime minister, his dynamism and supreme self-confidence impressed visiting Westerners. The financier-philanthropist George Soros, a shrewd judge of Eastern European politicians, told me after a visit to Belgrade that Markoviæ was one of the most remarkable leaders he had met.

What Markoviæ wanted most of all was support from the West. He saw the United States as the key country. He wanted to visit Washington to meet President Bush. He wanted clear statements of American support for his programs. And above all he wanted money. How much? "Well," he said with his infectious smile, "I'm playing a big game, and it requires big money. I think four billion dollars would be a good start to help a reform that's going further than anything in eastern Europe." Swallowing hard, I told him I'd report his request to Washington. I knew what the answer would be. U.S. policy on Eastern Europe was heavily focused on Poland and Hungary, countries that were moving on the reform path faster than Yugoslavia and without the baggage of divisive nationalism. Yugoslavia would be seen as a poor risk and therefore a low priority. Markoviæ got his trip to Washington in October 1989. I had lobbied hard for it," writes Zimmermann.

With the support of Eagleburger and European Bureau of the State Department, the White House agreed to a meeting with President Bush. He then had meetings with Secretary of State James Baker, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, Treasury Secretary Brady, and Commerce Secretary Mosbacher, as well as a visit to Congress and a trip to New York for talks with bankers and businessmen. U.S. President repeated his strong support to Yugoslav independence, unity and sovereignty, welcomed Markoviæ's determination to implement reforms which were to establish market-driven economy and build up democratic pluralism.

All Zimmermann's Men

Warren Zimmermann was the last U.S. ambassador to the SFRJ, with an unfinished mandate, and a participant and witness of key events in the destruction of Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1996 he turned his notes and analyses into the book *Sources of Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers*. In it, he writes that a CIA's report of late 1990 predicted the "bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia within the next eighteen months". In an interview, Zimmermann comments on this statement:

"We took this report very seriously in the Belgrade embassy. Probably because the same gloomy conclusions had also been reached by our analysis department, months before the CIA's report. By the end of 1990 we had no more illusions. We knew that Yugoslavia, if it did not survive, would disappear in the ocean of blood. Our priority therefore was the attempt to find a democratic solution for the survival of Yugoslavia - I underline - a democratic solution. And this means that we considered the preservation of territorial

integrity and democratization as mutually complementing elements which had no chances to survive without one another. We knew that, if we took unity without democracy - e.g. "unity" by Serbian definition, or in the way in which the JNA would implement it - that there would be no place for democracy in it. In the long run, the country integrity could not be preserved in this way either. On the other hand, we were convinced that the separation of Slovenia and Croatia at that moment was not the right solution for the promotion of democratic principles since this would, regardless of good intentions, lead to war, and war and its consequences had never favoured democratic atmosphere. And this is what actually happened. Yugoslavia was broken apart in the name of democracy and self-determination, and it is very questionable whether it brought about the realization of full democracy except, partly, in Slovenia and, to a smaller degree, in Macedonia. Upon my arrival to Belgrade, I had no doubts about the fact that Serbia needed Yugoslavia only to achieve hegemony, and that it was the main reason for their brutal attacks on Slovenian and Croatian leaderships. It was clear to us that such "unity" had no prospects. In the same time, as I said, we knew that the other option, the breakup of Yugoslavia without the overview of the real political context, led to a bloody and uncertain war. We therefore supported Ante Markoviæ's option, which we considered as an attempt to establish principles of Western democracy and Western standards of human rights within Yugoslav borders. At the time, Markoviæ was our ideal of the interweaving between principle of democracy and that of territorial integrity. We were supporting him, openly and without delay.

From the Belgrade embassy and then Zagreb consulate, we were sending reports of the same kind in 1989 and 1990: Markoviæ should be supported as the only solution for maintaining democratic Yugoslavia and preventing the war. Late in 1990, and particularly early in 1991, unfortunately, we had to state that Markoviæ did not manage to get the support of key centers of power in the country and after that our reports looked more like war chronicles and less like analyses of current events. We were not contradicting Washington in this respect. Bush' administration shared our views but could not observe the timing we had suggested. When Baker came to Belgrade in the late spring of 1991 and met with republic leaders of the time, it was already too late to do anything.

In his memoirs, Borisav Joviæ, a former president of the Presidency of SFRJ, admitted to have recorded the following, after his conversation with General Veljko Kadijeviæ which took place as early as in 1990: "The military estimates that, after Eagleburger's visit to Yugoslavia, the U.S. have finally decided to overthrow Serbian leadership as - according to their evaluations - the only communist one in Yugoslavia. The critical point through which they want to overthrow it is Kosovo. They give priority to the destruction of the governing communists in Yugoslavia over its integrity. Thus, if they do not manage to destroy communism as a whole, they will go for breaking Yugoslavia apart by "conquering" piece by piece. Such a turnabout with respect to Yugoslav integrity is based on the reduced danger from Soviet interest in the access to the Adriatic Sea. [Americans are present in all relevant Yugoslav institutions, including the SDB and the Presidency of SFRJ itself. That is how they get information and act!"]

Slovenia and Croatia managed to get armed with the help of BND and CIA, as Western press openly said in 1997. Initially, while light weaponry was coming in, Belgrade tolerated it, in order to have a motive for armed intervention. In the meantime, instead of Kalashnikovs, cannons, rocket launchers, and even tanks started arriving to Zagreb and Ljubljana and, later on, to Sarajevo as well. In spite of the U.N. ban, weapons were sent to Slovenia and Croatia from the direction of Vienna and Budapest, while all Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, kept quiet about it.

Two committees of the SFRJ Assembly - that of defense and that of interior - repeatedly discussed the illegal weapons imports, but did not have complete records. The only thing they could decide at one of the sessions (on March 12th, 1992) came down to the statement that it was necessary to take all measures to prevent further weapons imports to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, and Kosovo and Metohija, where intentions were observed to expand the conflicts on the Yugoslav soil. The reliable cooperation in the illegal weaponry imports confirms that this lucrative business involved the topmost republic leaderships in Slovenia, Croatia, and other secessionist republics. Slovenian leadership secretly imported armament from abroad through Sandy Grubelič's privately-owned "Trade" company, Kopar-based "Intereurope", and privately owned firms in Switzerland and Italy, which was written about in Italian press (*Trieste oggi*). A significant role in this respect was played by Slovenian ministers of defense and the interior, Janez Janša and Igor Bavčar. The roles played by Janša and Bavčar were also important in the later stage of weaponry imports from Austria and Germany, whereby a secret channel was established through Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alois Mock, who gained DM 18 million profit from this transaction.

Martin Čepelj's Swindles

The scope of the illegal weaponry imports to Croatia and arming of paramilitary formations surpassed what had been seen in Slovenia. After the election victory in the spring of 1990, the HDZ leadership started importing weapons for paramilitary formations through international trading companies "Astra", "Ina", "Voæar", and other offices abroad. After the Soviet troops' withdrawal, Hungary used the opportunity to get hold of hard currency, among other things, by exporting machine-guns AK-47, "Kalashnikovs", RPG-7 weapons for antitank combat, ammunition and other arms (36,000 guns).

By shadowing General Martin Čepelj, KOS JNA found out that Croatian leadership was the most directly involved in the acquisition of armament from abroad, and in the illegal imports from Hungary and other countries, as well as that the U.S. officials had promised to arm Croatian armed formations, which numbered 100,000 people, with varied military technology and weapons. In the U.S. directly, it was Ivan Kapetanović, Marko Belinac, and Željko Vusir who tried to do this job. Japanese *Mainichi* daily wrote, as early as in 1991, that the U.S.A. had sold US\$ 540 million worth of weapons. The weapons were shipped by sea, from the Lebanese port of Yuni to Rijeka. This work for Croatia was done by American people Gojko Ču'ak, Branko Salaj, and Martin Čepelj.

It is well-known that Ču'ak and Salaj were emigrants, foreign spies who had been given the offices of ministers for emigration and defense, respectively, in Franjo Tuđman's state. Branko Salaj fled Yugoslavia to Sweden, in 1952, and married a general's daughter there. Some ten years later, having completed a CIA course for special illegal organisations, he set up the so-called Croatian League. Together with Dr. Mato Me'troviæ, he headed the league which gathered seven ustasha societies with 3,000 members in the U.S. and Europe. Branko Salaj appeared in Croatia in 1991 as the head of such a league, and supported Franjo Tuđman. Gojko Ču'ak had emigrated to Canada, where he lived as a successful businessman and Croatian nationalist for twenty years. He organized protests against the SFRJ. When he came to Zagreb, he brought Tuđman a great amount of weapons with American recommendations, and therefore obtained the position of the minister of defense.

The revelation and documented presentation of this fact did not lead to major reaction in the West, nor to the condemnation by the international public and community, which is another proof that it was a well-elaborated scenarion and the "international collusion" against Yugoslavia, as was claimed by French reporters. The same reactions and the minimization of the illegal weaponry imports to Croatia awaited other affairs, such as: (1) capturing of the Uganda plane "Boing 707" (Congo) with 19 tons of weapons, when the Canadian and Yugoslav citizen Anton Kika' was arrested, (2) capturing of three groups of weapon traders in the u.S.A. who were caught red-handed while they were purchasing weapons intending to export them to Croatia, (3) discovery of weapon purchases in over 16 countries and attempts to illegally export them to Croatia, (4) attempts to buy Soviet-manufactured combat helicopters sitting in Hungary.

The inefficiency of the measures taken by the security forces in the country is the result of treason and sabotage in the implementation of decisions made at the federal level. Federal government had already been broken up and did not know what was going on in the republics. Federal customs administration was sabotaging decisions because it was headed, for over ten years, by Zvonko Po'èiæ, who had changed a few prime ministers (Milka Planinc, Branko Mikuliiæ, Ante Markoviiæ) and was acutally the secessionist leadership's man in this federal agency. He formally ordered the inspection of indicated trucks and trailers, but had previously warned Croatian republic leadership of the security forces' knowledge, and therefore the inspection failed to find the illegally imported weapons. Besides, Po'èiæ had been discredited as early as in 1971, when he was the manager of Rijeka custom house, due to irregularities in his work and active membership in the so-called maspok.

Naturally, the greates enigma in this business is money used to purchase these weapons. It was "laundered money" that CIA earns from narcotic sales, or even receives from suspicious sources such as "black web" of an Abu-Dhabi based bank and through the so-called Vatican connection maintained by Stjepan Mesiiæ via secret channels in Paris. When press published records that Vatican had promised US\$ 4 billion aid to the Republic of Croatia, Holy Chair denounced this news. Later on, foreign press (*Guardian*) wrote that Croatia had imported from France a considerable amount of weapons - 2000 'milan' PTRs, 1000 'mistral' PARs, and 100,000 machine guns, which were paid for

through the Vatican connection in Paris. Payments for the armament purchased abroad were most frequently made through "Deutsch Bank", "Die Kartner Sparcasse", Croatian-German Bank in Zagreb, "Banco Popolare di Verona", and Italian citizen Alberto Mareheti, as well as through "Dresdener Bank", "Deutsch Bank", a few banks in Switzerland, and "Ljubljanska banka" in Hamburg. The transactions involved CIA, DIA (Pentagon's Intelligence Agency), and NSC (U.S. Council of National Security), Washington, D.C.-based First American Shareholders' Bank managed by Clark Clifford, former U.S. Defense Secretary, National Bank of Georgia, and "Enzino" Independent Bank of California. The transactions were coordinated by Vanja Kalođera, ambassador to Kuwait and close friend and best man of Ante Markoviæ, the former federal prime minister. It is symptomatic that Ante Markoviæ spent some time in Abu Dhabi after his resignation, and that the delivery of Yugoslav tanks to Kuwait was paid for through this bank. It is also suspicious that after this dirty job, former Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic and General Martin Čepelj, both American collaborators, took shelter in Austria.

Martin Čepelj's Game

Martin Čepelj was the commander of the Fifth (Zagreb Military District from 1985 to 1989, and became Croatian minister of defense in 1990. When the war in Croatia broke out, he was appointed, in his 68 year of age, the commander of the People's Guard Forces, popular as 'zenge'. Čepelj had already then had a prepared plan for the struggle against the JNA. According to Čepelj's data, which were delivered to Pentagon, the JNA had, in Croatia, 30,000 soldiers organized in six battalions, with 650 tanks, 52 armored cars, 1100 mortars, 24 rocket launchers, 500 cannons, 41 planes, 36 helicopters, 15 rocket and torpedo vessels. And about 250,000 pieces of light arms in the warehouses of Croatian TO. And in whole Yugoslavia, Čepelj claimed, the JNA had 1000 tanks, 5000 cannons, and 300 combat planes. In 1991, Croatia had about 30,000 members of militia and ZNG, as well as 30,000 mobilized members of the People's Defense. The plan provided for the attacks, by Croatian militia, on JNA barracks and warehouses in Croatia and seizing their weapons, with only 900 casualties in the planned struggles. Since the plan had been elaborated at the DIA, only Stipe Mesia supported it in front of Tuđman. Germans, who were supporting the leaders, were obviously against such an action against Yugoslav army. Croatians themselves admit that Čepelj was the man who coordinated the secret armament of the Croatian army, although he was a member of the reformed Communist League of Croatia in 1990.

KOS JNA made a film about this armament, which was broadcast in order to provoke reactions in Yugoslav public, but instead of Yugoslav revolt the only thing that happened was that Martin Čepelj was moved from Zagreb and hidden in Austria, until the storm calmed down. General Aleksandar Aca Vasiljeviæ, head of KOS JNA, missed two opportunities to arrest Čepelj. The first time in the field, in an ambush, while trucks loaded with weapons were passing by, and the second time in the heart of Zagreb, when they arranged an 'official conversation' in a coffee shop. The only thing General Vasiljeviæ managed to do on that occasion was to tape his conversation with General Čepelj.

When in December 1990, KOS, i.e. the Supreme Command Staff advised the Presidency of SFRJ on the illegal weaponry imports to Croatia, and on their readiness to arrest the main participants in this dirty business in Osijek, Split, and Zagreb, President Stipe Mesia and Prime Minister Ante Markovica simultaneously let Franjo Tuđman, Martin Čepelj and a few foreign diplomats and informants know about it. The military minister, General Veljko Kadijević, withdrew the arrest order, for reasons known only to himself, and made a deal with the Presidency of SFRJ, i.e. its secessionist majority, about disbanding secret armies in the country. And when the decision was made on disarming paramilitary formations, the same Mesia's Presidency, as the supreme commander, was not consistent in the implementation of their own decision, and General Kadijević, the first man of the army, which also presented the source of greatest fear for secessionists, failed to give the order. He resigned and retired, without being held responsible for any of his mistakes, but justifying his acts, in his memoirs, by the accusation that politicians were to blame for everything. In his interviews of 1995, General Martin Čepelj admitted that it was General Veljko Kadijević himself who had saved his life, but pointed out that KOS had nevertheless tried to abduct him three times, in the heart of Croatia. Since Colonel Aleksandar Vasiljević did not manage to do it, it was decided that Čepelj should be removed. This task was to be done by sniper Miodrag Aleksić, but due to the strong General's security, he did not get the opportunity to shoot Martin Čepelj.

In Zagreb itself, the whole action resulted only in Franjo Tuđman's distrust for General Martin Čepelj. Suspecting him of being KOS' general agent, leader Dr. Franjo Tuđman, himself a former JNA general, expelled Martin Čepelj from Croatia for a year. The zenga commander fled to Austria across Slovenia with forged passport issued to Karl Zelenbrza, and in a BMW car with, also, forged licence plates. He borrowed the name from a friend from Stari Gradec near Virovitica, and the car from Varaždin. He accomplished the entire feat with the help of Josip Manolić, former head of Croatian police. Čepelj spent a few weeks hiding on the Bled, then crossed over to Ausburgh, and then went to Vienna. In Zagreb, it was announced that now already former defense minister was on vacation. Čepelj's first idea was to flee to Canada, and then to the U.S.A., but Gojko Ču'ak did not manage to provide him with a visa for Canada in Belgrade. It was for this reason that Čepelj hid in Austria. In order to protect himself from Tuđman's persecution, Čepelj took with him, to Austria, about twenty-five secret documents of ZNG, and hid them in three vaults, ready to deliver them to Americans in case that something unexpected happens to him. From Vienna, he advised, of this intention, General Anton Tus personally, the commander of the Supreme Headquarters of the Croatian Army. In the same time, General Martin Čepelj went on coordinating the secret weapon imports to Croatia, from Austria. Under the false name of Karl Zelenbrz, General Martin Čepelj was hidden with Austrians in Ausburgh, and finally with Germans in Munich. From there, he returned to Zagreb safe and sound in 1992. Such an outcome threw KOS to their knees, their operatives Dragi'a Jovanović and Bo'ko Mihajlović to Croatian prison and death, and Vladimir Jagar and Aleksandar Vasiljević to retirement.

CHAPTER 9
YANKEES DEFEAT SERBS

When American ambassador Peter Gilbraith appeared on an ustasha tank during Croatian conquering of West Slavonia and massacre over thousands of Serbs in 1995, it became universally clear that Washington had finally made a deal with Dr. Franjo Tudjman. The military alliance between the U.S. and Croatia was mediated by Germany, who gave three thousand military experts for the "Storm" operation in Krajina. Americans gave their retired generals and military intelligence agents. The air and electronic support was provided by NATO. In this way, the U.S.A. joined the war against Serbs in the Republic of Sprska Krajina in 1995.

"American government was happy that they easily managed to help Croatians chase Serbs out of Krajina. And that it all went without a single casualty on the American side, since they did not have to airdrop a single soldier on the Bosnian soil and expose him to life-threatening danger. Through conversations with Washington congressmen and staff from the U.S. government, I found out that the U.S. government was enthusiastic about Serbia's acceptance of Krajina Serbs' defeat without actual promises of lifting sanctions by the West. The rumour in the U.S. capital says that the sanctions will not be lifted unless East Slavonia is returned to Croatian control, and whole Bosnia under Muslim control. They even require the solution of the Kosovo and Vojvodina issues before lifting sanctions. American media are full of photos of Croatian tanks and soldiers celebrating the victory, while there are few of those showing Serbian refugees - told me Danijela Sremac, the best known Serbian woman in the U.S., in the fall of 1995.

While celebrating the victory over the Krajina people in 1995, Croatian president Franjo Tudjman publicly stated that the time had come for Croatia, and he himself, to become the major "factors on the Balkans". By giving Croatia the role of the guard of Balkans, the U.S.A. opted for an ally who would consistently fulfill American wishes. In the same time it allowed, with German consent, American direct influence on the Balkans and their control over this crossroads of the European South, against the will of Great Britain, European Union, France, Italy and Russia. The new great Croatia was to become a counterpart for Great Serbia, i.e. for Russian and British influence on the Balkans, Washington believes. Croatia was pushed into fighting American battles with Europe. It is presumed that strong Croatia would be a counterweight for Serbia, and would establish peace in the region. European analysts say that the Croatian military and political strengthening of 1990s was supported by both American and German secret aid. American and German goal was to use Croatia as an ally and return the spirit of Yalta to the Balkans, and set up the border between the rich West and poor East, between capitalism and reformed socialism, on the Drina. This would again throw Serbia, i.e. SRJ to the embrace of Moscow who, being aware of this fact, attempts to establish direct cooperation with Belgrade, take diplomatic and political initiative and arouse the interest of the rest of Europe in entering the process of resolving Yugoslav crisis.

Free-spirited Croatian intellectuals, like Slavko Goldstajn, publicly, in the press, wrote about the newly-formed cooperation between the U.S. and Croatia: "During the past two

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years, the U.S. were certainly the most significant Croatian ally, and now they may already be the only one."

All until early 1990s Croatia and its new leader Dr. Franjo Tudjman were treated like bad allies by CIA and DIA. American spies were therefore coming to Croatia disguised as diplomats or peacemakers, or UNPROFOR staff. Croatian counterintelligence agency once spotted them even among drivers, there were eleven of them in total. For decades already, American secret service agencies had had a file on Franjo Tudjman, as a Croatian nationalist and dissident, who was giving lectures to Croatian refugees and political emigrants across the U.S. and Canada. CIA also had the documentation about Croatia itself, same as they do for all the world countries. CIA's press material shows that in the Bureau of Balkan Affairs, the Republic of Croatia is statistically represented on seven pages: "Croatia, situated in the southeast of Europe, between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, bordering on the Adriatic Sea. The total area of 56,538 square kilometers; according to the July 1995 census has 4,665,821 inhabitants, 76.5 percent of whom are Catholics, 11.1 percent Orthodox, 1.2 percent Slavic Muslims, and 0.4 percent Protestants." Besides, CIA provides reporters and Internet users with Croatian maps: political, physical, ethnic, those of energy resources and minerals.

Some information on Franjo Tudjman was also provided to CIA by Warren Zimmermann, who had served in the Croatian capital before coming to Belgrade. Asked, on an occasion, what he thought about the new Croatian chief, Zimmermann compared Croatian and Serbian presidents and said:

"As a person, Tudjman vacillated between being grandiose and narrow-minded all the time. He was very fond of being a grand-style host, offering a few kinds of wine, even during working lunches. His passion for showing off was driving him to write pompous speeches for himself and devise ceremonies where he would always play the main role in his glamorous uniform. As a former general, he was unusually unsusceptible for team work, agreements, or planning. His preparations were sloppy compared to Milosevic's, who was always very well prepared. Contrary to Milosevic, who was driven by the desire for control, Tudjman was obsessed by Croatian nationalism. His loyalty for Croatia was of the most narrow-minded type and he never showed too much understanding for, nor interest in, democratic values. Under his leadership, Serbs' rights were gravely violated. Serbs were ousted from jobs, they were required to sign declarations of loyalty, and were experiencing attacks on their homes and property. I was sitting at Tudjman's table, at dinners, a few times and listening to his ministers slandering Serbs in the most racist expressions. He never joined them, but did not stop them either. Also, he suppressed the journalism independence perhaps even more than Milosevic himself. Contrary to solitary Milosevic, Tudjman surrounded himself with assistants. However, he rarely gave them the opportunity to say anything, and due to his fickle temper, he probably set the Balkan record in laying off high-ranking politicians. He expressed militant nationalism in a way in which the slier Millosevic would never allow himself to do. What saved Tudjman, and what distinguished him from Millosevic, was his sincere desire to be considered a Western-type politician. His inborn intollerance, and the intollerance of his party, help to

explain why so many Serbs in Croatia rejected the Croatian rule and why in former Yugoslavia Serbs and Croats are still enemies," Zimmermann concluded.

Thus, in 1995, there was the consent in the White House that, in the military and geopolitical sense, Croatia had played a positive role in the last stage of the war in BiH and preservation of the prolonged truce. The man who "covered" Croatia on behalf of Washington, and for CIA and DIA, was Ambassador Peter Galbraith himself. A son of the famous economist John Kenneth Galbraith, he became the first American ambassador to independent Croatia on June 24th, 1993. It was not a new field for him. In the course of his fourteen-year long service as an advisor to the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, Galbraith was making career by helping the oppressed, using brave stratagem in order to incite the United States to action. In March 1991, he travelled across north Iraq with Kurdish rebels who had risen against President Sadam Hussein after the Persian Gulf war. He took video camera with him, so that the testimonies he recorded when the rebellion was quenched helped the United States to take steps against Iraqi Kurds. During the first year of his mandate, he only rarely received instructions from Washington on the U.S. policy in this region. "The officials of the Zagreb embassy were saying that they were 'left it to themselves'. But not for long. He is remembered as a diplomat who climbed a Croatian tank, and as a man who illegally imported arms, first to Croatia and then to Bosnia, where it was received by Richard Holbruck. Even the U.S. Congress discussed this in 1994. And this affair lasted till the end of Clinton's presidential inauguration in January 1997.

Peter Galbraith's Mission

On Thanksgiving Day in 1992, Peter Galbraith, then a member of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, started from Germany, with Senator Daniel Patrick Moenichan, for Sarajevo, which was beseiged by Serbian forces. Galbraith set to this trip in spite of Pentagon's ban, but in agreement with some CIA officials: "Both in the Senate and as an ambassador, I was acting strictly within the framework of U.S. policy, and as ambassador, completely in accordance with the instructions I had received." According to Moenichan, he and Galbraith started from Germany to Sarajevo by a C-130 transport plane. When the plane was over Austria, Pentagon ordered it to land in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, and suggested that the senator should not to go to Bosnia. Galbraith outwitted the Defense Ministry. The next day, he and Moenichan flew to Sarajevo in a Canadian Air Force plane. At the meeting with French General Philip Morion, the commander of the United Nations in Sarajevo, Galbraith did not beat around the bush: how to get Iranian weapons to Muslims? The answer was - across Croatia. All until 1994 the deliveries were moving illegally, and then Franjo Tudjman himself asked Washington the permission for Croatia to smuggle arms for Muslims.

Richard Holbrooke, who replaced Oxmann on the position of the Deputy Secretary of State for Europe in July 1994, discussed this idea at a meeting with Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic, in September the same year. On that occasion, Holbrooke and Silajdzic agreed that the United States would win over their Muslim allies for new arms deliveries, provided that Bosnia stop asking the U.S. Congress to unilaterally lift the

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Zagreb and Sarajevo and started organizing secret operations of their own. A group of Muslim arms dealers was captured in Rijeka in 1996.

Despite everything, the White House managed to clean themselves of all their sins, which was not a big surprise for Washington. Since, the overall operation of secret armament was performed by the National Security Agency - NSA, headed by people closest to Clinton, beyond CIA and DIA. Actually, when CIA's spying satellites discovered the operation, the director James Woolsey, who did not know what was going on, got upset and took the evidence straight to the White House. "Woolsey met with Anthony Lake, who already knew of the quoted decision, but engaged the White House legal advisor of the time to resolve this matter. I delivered the materials to the Intelligence Oversight Board for investigational purposes. The Board consists of four members who do not work for any particular intelligence agency, and have all been appointed by Clinton. This case is very, very delicate and strictly confidential," said Abner Mikwa, then former legal advisor to the White House, who formally submitted the case to the Intelligence Oversight Board in 1994. In November 1994, a quiet six-month long investigation by the Intelligence Oversight Board ensued, which was to determine if the U.S. administration had carried out a secret operation without advising intelligence supervisory committees in Washington about it.

Anthony Harrington, a Washington prosecutor who both has his private practice and serves as the Head of the Intelligence Oversight Board, stated that the Board had started their strictly confidential investigation in November 1994. He investigated whether or not the administration had been involved in an illegal secret operation by not revealing "Presidential discoveries" in written form - it is a confidential report which the law required to be filled in order to explain the purpose of the operation - and by not having advised the Intelligence Oversight Board in Congress about it. The record of the investigation conducted by the Intelligence Oversight Board was carefully guarded. Harrington said that the results had been submitted only to Clinton, Mikwa, and "highest-ranking" officials of the CIA and State Department. Harrington stated that, in May 1995, after consultation with Mikwa, the Board decided that no U.S. law had been violated. The administration acts did not represent a secret operation by legal definition of the term, and the law therefore did not require "discoveries" or reporting to the Congress. "We did not find that U.S. officials had directly aided arms deliveries or participated in them," Harrington said. The Intelligence Oversight Board decided that the law gave freedom for U.S. diplomats to implement secret diplomacy exempt from Congress' strict supervision.

U.S. media and politicians called this the initial stage of the "Iran-Bosnia scandal", or perhaps, the "democrats' silence". The fact that Clinton's administration had silently permitted Teheran mullahs to arm Bosnians through Croatia in 1994 - and violated not one, but a few political positions of their own, which they were advocating with such determination. The fact that the armament represented direct violation of the U.N. arms embargo was not actually big news; what was new were efforts made by the White House to keep their role a secret, such a secret that it was unknown even to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When Bill Clinton won presidential elections in the fall of 1996, the Republicans requested another Congress inquiry into the Iranian arms

smuggling to Bosnia through Croatia. In order to hush it up, Clinton sacrificed his new nominee for the CIA director, then his security advisor Anthony Lake.

Another event that arose suspicion about the role of Clinton's administration in providing arms to Bosnian and Croatian armies, and into the role of the ambassador himself, was Peter Galbraith's participation at the Split Conference in July 1995, where Muslims and Croats planned summer offensives against Serbs. Galbraith was present at the meeting, but U.S. CIA and DIA officials denied, in Congress, that the ambassador had taken part in the offensive planning. When the truce had been established, Galbraith and special U.S. envoy Charles Redman also advocated a peace agreement between Muslims and Croats, former allies who started a war with each other. The agreement blazed the trail for a new alliance against Serbs. And for the third time, when the Srebrenica case was opened, the main role was played exactly by Ambassador Peter Galbraith, although Croatian media claim that the role of his wife, Dr. Tona Bringe, was actually more important. Indeed, this Norwegian lady had made six visits to Bosnia, in order to collect materials for her Ph.D. thesis "To be a Muslim in Bosnian way". And then she came across data on ethnic changes among Srebrenica inhabitants, where 30,000 Muslims had lived before the Serbian offensive. Doctor Bringe - Galbraith reported this finding to the CIA, who forwarded it to Warren Christopher and Bill Clinton who, in turn, made a good use of them in the media attack on Serbs and in the internationalization of the Muslim issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In early July 1994, Serbs conquered Srebrenica. Over 30,000 people were expelled and rumours about massacres started. However, the U.N., NATO, and the U.S. were ashamed of leaving Muslims in the lurch. All reports on massacres were therefore hushed up. The U.S. took aerial photos and registered all massacres, but the CIA kept all evidence to themselves. When stories of Croatian massacres started in August and September, everything changed. U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Madelaine Albright presented evidence on Serbian massacres and mass graves in Eastern Bosnia. "It was simply the climax," a U.N. diplomat stated for U.S. media. "We begged Americans to give us evidence of Srebrenica massacres, but they would not do so. They wanted to use the documentation in their own interest, in the moment when accusations against Croats became too factual. It was a matter of CIA's well-planned advertising campaign aimed at diverting attention away from Croatian ethnic cleansing."

Who Killed Yugoslavia?

In 1994, world media, for instance, published an allegedly Tadjman's map of divided Balkans, i.e. of Bosnia and Slavonia divided to Croatian and Serbian parts. According to this picture, drawn on a London table napkin, all regions west of the river Bosna would go to new Croatia, and everything to the east of it to Serbian countries. In the same time, it means that the spheres of Western and Eastern interest would shift from the river Drina to the river Bosna, which should, presumably, satisfy the Serbian side, because they would get more than were given by Yalta. The map was another reflection of what was also being prepared in the U.S., or CIA in particular, as a media and intelligence trick. Nikola Kostic, a Milwaukee lawyer, comments upon it as follows:

"The goal of such a map promotion is, firstly, to impose on the public and on the political establishment a different approach to resolving Yugoslav issue. To make them consider abrupt cutting of this Bosnian knot, to introduce Serbs into the game in a different way. And the second goal is to justify the present Croatian military conquests by the so-called division on the river Bosna. If there were such a plan, and if Serbs accepted it, why is then this division being made in such a cruel and bloody way, by expelling and killing Serb people from Krajina, by attacks on Trebinje and Baranja? Nobody knows for certain, not even me, what kind of peace plan is now offered by Americans to the warring parties in Bosnia and Krajina. Americans, Germans, and Russians are simply racing to establish peace, based on some division of Yugoslav territories of their own, and for their own, not Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim, interests. For this purpose, Americans are using Croats, NATO, even U.N. In Krajina, Croatian army killed and wounded about a dozen of "blue helmets", pulled down U.N. army checking points, virtually declared war to the United Nations, without any reaction by U.S., Germany, France, not even Russia. Why? Because by attacking Serbs and "blue helmets" on the Balkans, Croatian army is performing some of their tasks as well!

In order to contribute to the strengthening of Croatia, and weakening of Serbia, Americans directly influenced two major processes - return of Kninska Krajina nad East Slavonia to Croatia. In the first case, their trump card was General Martin Spigelj, and in the second - General Jacques Klein. Obrad Kesic, M.A., a Washington political analyst, says the following about the U.S. decision to launch political and military attacks on Serbs:

"The die was cast with the fall of Knin! Up till then nobody was convinced that Serbia would not get involved and there were no guarantees that the war would not escalate. Before the fall of Knin, there was an influential group in Pentagon that claimed that the war was over and that Serbs had won, but the fall of Srpska Krajina encouraged a groupation that believed that the U.S. had to intervene on moral grounds, "since Serbs were committing horrible misdoings", and that the U.S. were the only power that could punish them for such atrocities and bring the end in these regions by their intervention. The fall of Knin made them realize that Serbs were not invincible and that the U.S. could tie their "moral interests" to the reality in the field, the reality being that Croatia had become a mid-size?? power in this region."

In the fall of 1996, the Serbian Unity Congress in Milwaukee saw the first showing of a film dealing with the issue of Serbian presentation to the world public. The film is entitled "Who killed Yugoslavia - and other media swindles". The author is Djordje Bogdanic, a Chicago journalist, who had been actively involved in collecting evidence of anti-Serbian media swindles for a year already. The 90-minute long film actually shows how the West, aided by CIA, DIA, and their media, first stirred up a quarrel among Yugoslav republics, breakup of SFRJ, and then set off the intervention by international military forces on the Balkans. Using statements by a few U.N. officials, U.S. government, and reporters for respectable world media, Bogdanic shows that Western diplomats used media to spread alarming news about circumstances in former

Yugoslavia, mostly about the alleged Serbian aggression on Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which later on became their alibi for taking political and military actions against Serbs. In the film, this is described by Lord Peter Carrington, George Kenny, former Head of the Yugoslav Department in the U.S. government, Sir David Henney, British representative in the U.N., and UNPROFOR commanders Lewis Mackenzie and Michael Rose, reporters Nora Beloff, David Binder, Nick Goving, Gregory Copley, David Hackworth, researchers Ted Carpenter of Cato Institute, Susan Woodward of Brookings Institute, writer Peter Handke, and many others.

As Djordje Bogdanic revealed with his shots, which present General Martin Spigelj and Officer Mario Bursik from Zagreb as crown witnesses, it is evident that the "Storm" operation was organized and carried out under the direct command of Pentagon, i.e. the U.S. government. Braggart General Martin Spigelj speaks in camera that, as early as in 1992, he personally took all military information about Serbian army in Krajina, Bosnia and Yugoslavia to the U.S. and submitted them to heads of CIA and DIA. Besides, Spigelj relayed to Americans his estimate that the JNA, i.e. Serbs, would fight against foreign meddling into Yugoslav crisis. He then quoted General Veljko Kadijevic's statement of 1989, when the first man of JNA said: "We will fight openly against the West, Vatican, and CIA, and will beat them with arms, if necessary!" By Dr. Franjo Tudjman's decision, General Martin Spigelj was replaced by a civilian, emigrant Gojko Susak from Canada, who was proclaimed the official deputy of the Defense Minister as early as in 1991, while he still was the Emigration Minister. Resenting his replacement, General Martin Spigelj subsequently wrote, in his memoirs of 1995, that he had started suspecting Gojko Susak of being a CIA spy right away, since he would find him secretly reviewing the minister's strictly confidential papers, and since he used to go to Vienna, for secret meetings with U.S. arms dealers and their associates. The commentary to such testimonies from the film "Who Killed Yugoslavia" given by Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Croatia, was sarcastic: "You see how America taught democracy to Croatian army!"

Mysterious General Susak

Herzegovinian emigrant Gojko Susak, as an American guy, was the person whose task was to implement U.S. military strategy in Croatia. It seems that Tudjman had to accept it, since his "sponsor", Germany, tacitly allowed American entrance into Zagreb political and military waters. It was strange insofar as Gojko Susak had no professional qualifications to be appointed first the Emigration Minister and then Croatian Defense Minister. Tudjman was obviously eager to satisfy the U.S. request, and to use Susak as his link to Croatian emigration, that invested millions of dollars into the new independent state of Croatia. Gojko Susak was born on April 16th, 1945 in Siroki Brijeg, Herzegovina. He completed secondary technical school in Listica, and then registered at the College of Industrial Education in Rijeka. Since he was not a man of learning, he married a village girl named Marica Strsljen, from the Risik village on the isle of Krk, in 1965. They led a hard, poor life, since Rijeka was an expensive city, and Gojko unskilful for a good job. The marriage lasted only two years, until 1967, when the young couple

got a daughter. The next year, allegedly because he refused to go to the military service, Gojko Susak emigrated from Yugoslavia.

From Herzegovina, he fled to Canada, to his brothers Branko and Mile Susak, who lived and worked in Ottawa. The third brother, Janko Susak, stayed in Listica, since he was employed as military and civil defense administrator in the municipality. In Canada, the brothers found Gojko a teaching job in the school for children of Croatian emigrants. In May 1973, Gojko Susak married for the second time, this time with Djurdjica Gojmerac, pizza seller, who bore him two children. At that time, both of them were members of the local board of "Stjepan Radic" Croatian People's Council, although Gojko himself was a member of rightist "Otpor" for a while. Susak made his political career among Canadian ustashas under the sponsorship of the old informant Colonel Salko Goldovski. As the reputation of the Canadian pizza-store owner in the Croatian parish in Ottawa grew, his positions also multiplied, in Croatian school, in "Jadran" soccer club, in the church choir, and in 1986 he officially became a member of the Supervisory Committee of the Croatian Emigrants' Schools in USA and Canada. This organization, which is a component of Croatian Brotherhood, was actually an American association for "covering and controlling" Croatian emigrants to the U.S. It was there that Gojko Susak was recruited to work for the CIA, since being an official, he had the opportunity to tour all Croatian colonies in the U.S. and Canada. Late in 1986, *Zajednicar* emigrants' paper openly featured Gojko Susak as a man of greatest trust in Croatian emigration, and as a patriot entrusted with the task of organizing welcome to the then Croatian dissident and nationalist Dr. Franjo Tudjman in America. In the early stages of political pluralism in Croatia, in 1990, Gojko Susak was among the first emigrants to join HDZ. Also, in 1990, as a special envoy, as he himself boasted, of 50,000 Canadian Croats, he was present at the First HDZ Assembly in Croatia, where Susak was elected a member of Central Committee of the Croatian Democratic Party.

The money, some thirty million dollars, which Susak brought from emigration to HDZ and Franjo Tudjman for secret purchases of arms and political support which was so strong that it could overshadow all other Croatian emigrants, even Dr. Mato Mestrovic, was the reason for the new Croatian president's appointing this pizza-store owner from Ottawa the first Croatian Emigration Minister. The second reason were Susak's ties with CIA and U.S. administration, who "led", i.e. imposed him upon Tudjman as Croatian Defense Minister. In this office, Susak replaced Martin Spegelj, himself a pro-American man, who had proven to be too irrational for the implementation of new American military and political plans in Croatia and Bosnia. How strong a player Susak was for the U.S. can be seen by the fact that upon his appointment as the first man of Croatian defense, his wife Djurdja, Canadian pizza seller, with the background of trained social worker, was appointed the deputy to Miroslav Tudjman, the head of the Croatian secret service agency of the Department of National Defense. And his friend Ivan Milas, an emigrant from Vienna, became the deputy defense minister. Apart from his wife Djurdja, Gojko Susak found jobs in the Croatian army for eleven of his close relatives and his buddies, who became generals and Guard commanders. In this way, the Susak family, i.e. CIA, got into the position where they could control Croatian army and Military Intelligence Agency, but also the National Intelligence Agency in Croatia.

Gojko Susak's appointment as Defense Minister brought about the reorganization of Croatian army; its high officers were going to the U.S. for additional training, and U.S. instructors were coming to Zagreb. In the meantime, in the fall of 1995, Susak supplanted General Antun Tus from the Supreme Headquarters of the Croatian army, as a JNA man, which made the U.S. *Janes Intelligence Review* feature him as the creator of new Croatian army. Polls in Zagreb showed that, upon the replacement of Antun Tus, Susak was proclaimed to be a very good defense minister. As Stipe Mesic testified in 1996, Gojko Susak acted upon Pentagon instructions and carried out the Croatian army's raid into Bosnia, and then organized the attack on Kninska Krajina. All these operations were conducted through consultations with Clinton's first man, ambassador Peter Galbraith in Zagreb. Susak himself spoke about it at an Assembly session in the spring of 1995: "I called ambassador Peter Galbraith. I presented what Croatia planned to do. You heard yourself that Krajina Serbs and Serbs from Bosnia had attacked the Bihac region and that they were threatening TO Karlovac. You learned that it was for this reason that Bill Clinton convened the session of the U.N. Security Council. We received the written reply from Washington saying that they understood us, but asking us to give them another chance to try to arrange something through U.N., through NATO. However, our combat readiness now equals Serbian. We have U.S. guarantees that, if we are forced to intervene militarily, they will have understanding for our military operations and that they will protect Croatia from potential sanctions, through their veto power in the U.N. However, in order to keep their promise, Americans are looking for certain understanding from our part. Gentlemen, what we are doing today, regardless of the arms embargo, we are signing the agreement on military cooperation with the U.S.A." Gojko Susak pompously announced.

This agreement made official the military cooperation between the U.S.A. and Croatia against Serbs in BiH, in the Republic of Srpska Krajina and, therefore, in the SRJ. This was the beginning of the implementation of the "Storm" operation which, apart from the attack on Knin, was to spread in a later stage, to Serbian positions in East Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem. The operation was cancelled at the eleventh hour, due to international public outcry at Serb exodus from Kninska Krajina. American generals who came to Zagreb were already preparing Croatian army for the attack on Knin early in 1995. The involvement with this operation reminded General Carl Vuono of the day when he graduated from West Point and got a silver ring, which marked him as a member of selected circle of officers of the U.S. armed forces for life. General Vuono arrived to Croatia as vice-president and general manager and member of the board of privately-owned "Military Professional Resources Incorporated", which had signed the cooperation contract with Croatian Defense Ministry in 1994. Apart from already mentioned General Carl Vuono, the company Board of Directors consisted of thirteen more retired high-ranking U.S. officers. Retired general Frederick Kroezen is the president and one of founders of MPRI. In his 40-year long military career, he had travelled the road from the commander of well-known and most-risky U.S. unit of the 82nd airdrop division, which had also been deployed in Bosnia, to the commander of U.S. ground forces and member of the joint command. Admiral Huntington Hardisty, also a member of the company Board of Directors was the first commanding man of the U.S. forces in the Pacific. Other

members of the Board of Directors and special advisors to Franjo Tudjman, U.S. retired generals and admirals, had been, at a time, on high commanding positions and members of combat missions of the U.S. army.

Mate Granic, Croatian minister of foreign affairs, happy about Serbian defeat, also publicly said in Krajina that the "Storm" operation had been prepared by U.S. Pentagon. U.S. officers were included in Croatian army ranks, even the Croatian defense minister Gojko Susak admitted it. These are undercover officers of the regular U.S. forces who act discreetly, and retired colonels, who openly admit to their mission. One of the retired colonels said that their goal was to "make this peasant army as efficient as possible". Military experts claim that Croatia really could not select better teachers. "Military Professional Resources Incorporated" is one of the best known world companies involved in military counselling. This is best proven by the names of retired generals and admirals managing it. Besides the abovementioned General Carl Vuono, the company Board of Directors includes thirteen other retired high officials whose experience and knowledge could be desired by any army in the world. Retired General Frederick Kroezen is the president and one of the founders of MPRI. Other members of the Board of Directors have no less experience on high commanding positions and in combat missions. MPRI carefully selects high officers from all branches of the U.S. armed forces. The company employs only cherry-picked elite of people who made U.S. army a leader among the world's armed forces. Officers, except for those who do not reach the very top of the military or political hierarchy, are forced by law to leave the U.S. army and retire. In their prime, full of knowledge and experience, they frequently decide to found a military consulting firm like MPR.

Under the leadership of retired general Richard Griffiths, born in Idaho in 1939, a veteran with 28-year long experience in the U.S. army, a few month long training for Croats was organized. Griffiths, who has a journalist degree, completed the U.S. School of General Staff and Commanding, and Military Warfare School. He served in Vietnam and in Europe, where, between 1989 and 1991, he was a high officer in the U.S. army's intelligence ranks or, more precisely, the assistant to the U.S. army commander in Europe for intelligence affairs headquartered in Frankfurt. The first course in organization and according to the MPRI's curriculum, ended in 1995 by awarding diplomas at Zagreb Military Academy, but some Western sources state that Croatia was also receiving other forms of aid. A military analyst, a member of the MRPI board of directors, particularly points out the name of the former chief of the U.S. Army Command of Special Operations, presently a member of the MPRI Board, James Lindsey. "He is certainly the greatest expert in special operations, and he has just retired, after 38 years of military service. He was the commander of the 18th airdrop corps, 82th airdrop division from Fort Bredge. For a few years, he was the officer in the troupes for special purposes and advisor for parachute operations in the South Vietnam army and one of the major strategists in the "Just Cause" operation in Panama," he explains. Among other things, Lindsey was awarded numerous recognitions and was an expert in low-intensity conflicts, the kind of war Croatian army has been encountering since signing the truce.

One of vice-presidents, Harry Edward Soister, responsible for public relations, was replying to our questions about MPRI's operation in Zagreb in few, typically military words. Moreover, he clearly warned that his people in Zagreb were not willing to grant interviews. Soister is another personality with impressive resume and prominent positions in the intelligence community of the U.S. army. A holder of Ranger's Badge, Parachuter's Badge, and Purple Heart, Soister was appointed assistant commander of the U.S. army intelligence services in January 1982, and became director of DIA, military intelligence agency, by the end of 1988. He was retired in the rank of general, in 1991, and has been working for MPRI ever since.

Beltway Bandits

Washington insiders call such companies, in American slang, "Beltway bandits", according to a district of the U.S. capital which houses the most of such firms, and since they make illegal use of the state-of-the-art technology they have at their disposal, and of the expertise they gained in the army. MPRI, which operates in Croatia, is a relatively small company headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, with about a hundred permanently employed staff. The operations are defined by the Board of Directors, a body numbering about a dozen members. They provide services in military training, education, professional improvement, developing defense concepts, offer various doctrines, operational analyses and electronic simulations, including the so-called war-gaming - computer-based elaborations of military operations. Computer companies have, on their lists, names of over 2000 various military professionals, who can offer all kinds of services to MPRI's clients at any time. Over 75 percent of MPRI staff have topnotch military education, and almost a half have Ph.D. degrees, including combat experience. All specialties are included, from staff generals to tank commanders and intelligence officers.

The company operations include two fields: defense and international. On the long list of MPRI clients, Croatia found itself in the company of prominent U.S. military institutions, such as State Department, Offices of the Defense Minister and Joint Staff, offices of all branches of the U.S. armed forces and educational institutions, including the U.S. Military Warfare Academy. Croatia officially uses services of the second package, or more precisely of the program named "Democratization of the Eastern countries' armies", and is the only one of the former socialist countries doing so with the State Department's approval.

The program is made up in such a way as to help countries like Croatia in the process of transition to democratic society. Within this program, Croatian army receives direct MPRI's support in order to be able to carry out tasks of national security and defense within democratic framework. It is achieved by educating present and future HV officers and civilian staff of the Defense Ministry. Highly-educated U.S. military professionals are engaged for this purpose, who have prepared an extensive study and estimate of the content of Croatian military and civilian education and schooling, including the training curriculum and staff selection. Based on the results of these estimates, they started

developing a model of civilian and military contents of education and training for active and reserve officers and civilian employees of the Defense Ministry.

Besides, MPRI has developed the education curriculum, with models for special and regular courses. Also, they have coordinated a program according to which HV officers and Defense Ministry employees will attend selected lectures at "George Marshall" European Center of Security Studies in the German city of Garmisch, and then take part in education programs at post-secondary military schools in the United States.

Spy Nest on the Brac

As early as in 1993, CIA and U.S. Defense Ministry also made an agreement with Albania on setting up a military base. Spying planes take off from Albania and fly over Croatia and Bosnia, where together with spy satellites they observe all military movements in BiH, Serbia and Montenegro. This information was given to the world media by Pentagon. Croatian military sources stated that, since that time, Croats had allowed Americans the access to bases on the islands near Croatian coast. From one of these bases, U.S. transport planes were sending arms to Muslims in Bihac and Gorazde in 1995. The largest base of U.S. spy planes in Croatia is still located on the island of Bracc. Its use is also regulated by the agreement signed by generals Perry and Susak. This base was set up, according to Colonel Ron Morse, for the purpose of carrying out the "View from Attic" secret operation. The operation goal was the air intelligence support to NATO sorties towards Sarajevo and over entire Bosnia. The Brac was selected as airport, since it already had an airport for tourist planes. And since it is situated in the middle of the Adriatic Sea, thus providing the shortest route to terrains for secret shots in BiH and Yugoslavia. In order to equip the airport for spy plane takeoffs and landings, CIA sent about twenty engineers and technicians to the Brac.

U.S. reporters who were on the Brac recorded that the airport hosted planes of "Gnat-750", "Bootlegger RG-8a" and "Hercules C-130". The first two pilotless aircrafts are strategic reconnaissance types, which can fly from Rome to Plovdiv, for the total of 55 hours, at up to 7500 meters above ground. The "Gnat-750" aircraft was constructed at the CIA for secret recordings of desired grounds and facilities. For instance, Americans used it to make video-recordings of Dr. Radovan Karadzic's abode on the Pale and of who entered and who exited it. The second aircraft, "Bootlegger" is a motor two-seater, and in the U.S. it is mostly used to find secret narco-mafia ships in the south of the country.

CIA's intelligence center on the Brac was constructed within the UNPROFIR communications network headquartered in Zagreb. The center of this network employed 600 people, whose task was to keep satellite and electronic links with UNPROFOR headquarters in Skopje (Macedonia), Belgrade (Yugoslavia), Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Beli Manastir, Pakrac, Knin, Topusko (Croatia), and New York (USA). It also served as a connecting point for regular lines with NATO commands in Brussels and Naples, and U.N. centers in New York and Geneva. Each of these centers, both the CIA's one on the Brac and the UNPROFOR's in Zagreb, also employed about two hundred Croatian intelligence officers, who had previously completed special training in the U.S.

One of them, for instance, was Zeljko Maglova, the commander of the 73rd navy police. The training was done at the Military Navy Academy in Monterrey, California, and the main lecturer was Dr. Donald Abbenheim.

A brief report by the Office of Croatian President, of late 1996, says that Dr. Franjo Tudjman appointed Ivan Brzovic and Miljenko Bukovac deputies of the Minister of the Interior, and that Brzovic has thus become the Head of the Department of the Protection of Constitutional System, and Smiljan Reljic, formerly deputy minister of the interior and the head of the Department of the Protection of Constitutional System, was appointed the head of the UNS supervisory office. It was also published that Stjepan Bakula, formerly Head of the UNS supervisory office, had been appointed the head of the UNS Intelligence Academy. During his time in this office, Stipe Bakula both developed close relationship with Zarko Pesa, and gained a great professional respect by the first Croatian spy, Miroslav Tudjman. These appointments, however, revealed to the Croatian public, late in 1996, the secret of opening the First Intelligence Academy in Zagreb. At the time, there was no curriculum which would serve as the basis for the education at the UNS Intelligence Academy. The entire Academy framework, curricula and professional improvement plans, Zagreb press wrote, were to be developed in the cooperation with U.S. military experts.

Actually, after the model of the educational program for Croatian army officers, which was written and is being carried out in cooperation with MPRI, a similar agreement will be signed with a U.S. company, CIA or DIA, experienced in intelligence work and in educating experts for these activities. The crucial part of the program - which, besides the introductory segment related to geostrategic and political position of Croatia and all threats against its independence, was to include qualifying people for establishing and discovering illegal intelligence and terrorist networks, studies into contemporary methods of psychological and media warfare, use and (counter)intelligence analysis of all available public data from newspapers, public appearances, etc. It is a basic program which would last, for each participant, for three months. The participants would be all those who are involved in intelligence and counterintelligence work in any state agency or in an agency specifically designed for this purpose. Based on this elementary program, specialist education would be pursued further, lasting from three to ten or more months.

The school operation will most likely be organized at one of two localities in Zagreb which are being under serious consideration. One is the former barracks at Kuniscak, specifically furnished for the needs of UNS and HS, and equipped with a few dozens of cameras monitoring all activities around it, and high-quality lectures can be held in completely re-furnished premises. The second is at the Tuskanec, in a former police hotel which is now owned by the Defense Ministry. Besides the education of intelligence staff, the establishment of the Intelligence Academy, i.e. the emergence of staff educated at the Croatian intelligence school, will eliminate the need for intelligence workers from former units who received their education for intelligence and counterintelligence activities at courses in Zagreb, Security Institute at Belgrade-based Banjica, as well as at courses organized by the JNA's Counterintelligence Agency (KOS) in Pancevo.

Judging by Bill Clinton's words, the U.S. were the greatest, if not the only warrant of peace in Croatia, Bosnia and its closer surroundings in mid 1990s. Abiding by its diplomacy principles, such as dominance and interventionism??, official Washington has taken the right, through the U.N., to directly select and send their people to troubled regions in former Yugoslavia. Thus the White House and Bill Clinton, for instance, sent to Erdut and Sremsko-baranjska region their administrator, a historian, diplomat, and informant Jacques Paul Klein. In his youth, he studied and got his master degree in history and political sciences. In 1971, Klein was a diplomat by profession when he joined the Operational center of the U.S. Secretary of State. From there, he was appointed advisor at the U.S. Consulate general in Bremen. In mid 1970s, Jacques Paul Klein returns to State Department, to Washington, to the office of political advisor to the Department of Southern Europe. When the U.S. established diplomatic relations with Eastern Germany, in 1970s, Klein goes to Berlin to the position of advisor to the U.S. Embassy, and from there, in 1977, he is transferred to the position of political employee in Bonn. He married Margaret Gretchne, with whom he had son Christian and daughter Mai.

American Peacemakers

Since there is no advancement in the U.S. diplomacy without additional education, Jacques Paul Klein completed studies at the National Military College of the USA in 1979. He then became a professional officer and military intelligence agent. For a while, in early 1980s, he worked as an analyst in the cabinet of the general manager of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the U.S. capital. In 1982 he is transferred to the U.S. Defense Ministry, as the advisor to the State Secretary of Air Force, and then as the director in the Bureau of Military and Political Affairs. From there, he retired as major general in the Department of Strategic Technology, but was engaged again in 1989, as deputy subsecretary of international affairs in U.S. Air Force. From this position, Jacques Paul Klein returns to the U.S. government in 1990, to the position of advisor to director general of personnel and military staff education, where he remained all until 1993.

Jacques Paul Klein was reactivated in 1994, since State Department engaged him as political advisor to the commander of U.S. forces in Europe. Jacques Paul Klein went to the Old Continent with the triple Medal for Merit by State Department, Bronze Star and Legion of Honor with Cluster's figure. Today, Klein is an officially retired major general of the U.S. Air Force in reserve with the command of the Military Air Force Academy of the U.S. It was from there that Bhutros Gali deployed him to Erdut, to the position of "governor" of Sremsko-baranjska region. He was not the first, nor the last U.S. officer sent by the U.S. to a territory of former Yugoslavia to establish order in his own way. During the first multi-party and Serbian elections in East Slavonia, in the spring of 1997, administrator Jacques Klein was more inclined towards Zagreb and Croatians than to Vukovar and Serbs. He showed it by bringing Franjo Tudjman to Vukovar, and then by treacherous capture and arrest of Slabko Dokmanovic, whom Klein extradited to the Hague as a war criminal, in early July 1997. According to the testimony by Serbian officials from Vukovar, the U.S. governor was also willing to set up a trap for General Ratko Mladic, Zeljko Raznjatovic, and Goran Hadzic, who fled to Serbia for this reason.

Besides General Klein, both Croatian elections and Serb arrests in Croatia were controlled, in spring 1997, by U.S. ambassador Peter Galbraith, who was also supposed to be a warrant of the implementation of American democracy on the Balkans. Galbraith himself admitted it in an interview to "Globus" of 1994, since what he stated there came to pass later on:

"The key to all our problems on the Balkans and former Yugoslavia is in Belgrade. After all, we persisted in our sanctions to SRJ, due to its role in the aggression on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although it is clear that Serbia caused the most problems, there are some questions that Croatia could solve as well. I therefore see political future of these regions as a process which will develop in stages. In the first one, Serbia, under sanctions and pressures, should recognise all the states of former Yugoslavia within their international borders. Serbs in the regions protected by the U.N. will then realize that there is no "Great Serbia" and that they will not be an independent state, but will have to find a peaceful solution in agreement with Croatian authorities. This leads us to the second stage - negotiations between Croatia and local Serbian authorities. It should be mentioned here that if an agreement is reached between Croatia and Serbs in UNPRA regions, it is almost certain that it will include a great degree of autonomy for Serbs. The third step in this process should be a firm legal guarantee by Croatia that Serbs will have all rights as other Croatian citizens!

In the summer of 1997, such U.S. program was actually implemented on the territory of former Yugoslavia, with major and sharp remarks by Bill Clinton to President Dr. Franjo Tudjman about his hedging of the agreed Zagreb's treatment of Serbs in Croatia. Presumably in order to show the extent of U.S. loyalty to Croatia, which officially reproached Washington for depriving them of their political support, ambassador Peter Galbraith openly admitted that the U.S. "allowed Croatia to get Krajina back". In return, Dr. Franjo Tudjman promised Warren Christopher and Bill Clinton to return all Serbs to Croatia. Obviously personally satisfied with the U.S. scenario for the solution of Yugoslav crisis and Croatia-Serbia relations being more or less implemented, although to the detriment of Slavonian Serbs, and with remarks from the White House, Peter Galbraith publicly declared in Vukovar: "Mr. Tudjman is a politician who, like the rest, works to achieve as much as possible for his state and citizens. He is a democrat!"

CHAPTER 10 DIA IS SEARCHING FOR KARADZIC

After war adventures in Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, Americans recently, in 1993, got a chance to militarily intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inability of Europe to stop the civil war on the territory of former SFRJ, which after Slovenia and Croatia flared up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a motive for OUN and NATO to send their joint units of international joined forces into this region.

"However, the decision to intervene in Bosnia was heavily influenced by Srebrenica, which President Clinton considered worth taking a certain action about. Srebrenica became the key motive in the American foreign politics in Bosnia, even more so due to the frustration which had been growing for years, primarily among those in the administration who believed that the United Nations were incapable of taking the responsibility of keeping peace in Bosnia, and sometimes even supported Serbian goals to a certain extent. After Srebrenica, U.S. diplomatic and political circles were openly saying that the UN had lost their credibility in this region and that the United States should overtake the initiative. The story about mass crimes in Srebrenica relentlessly pressed President Clinton to decide to enter Bosnia directly, according to the claims of U.S. analyst Obrad Kesic. Obrad Kesic's, M.A. life and professional biography is related to Serbian lands and the Balkans. Being of Bosnian origin himself, he is still actively involved in the analyses of political situation in former Yugoslavia. Kesic completed the studies of international politics in the U.S. state of Illinois. However, his work led him to Washington, where he was hired as a government expert for Balkan affairs. Today, he is one of the managers of the Center for East European programs, and therefore knowledgeable in the U.S. foreign politics and strategy of the new world order.

The U.S.A. being the leader in the Western Military Alliance for the past several decades, it was completely logical that they should take the leadership of UNPROFOR forces in the regions of former Yugoslavia. Under the slogan of making and stabilizing of the peace, which best suited Bill Clinton in a political sense, the U.S. President has, since 1994, also been deploying both the best units and the best officers for the job. Fifty-seven year old general George Joulwan, born in Pennsylvania, was appointed the commander-in-chief of the European NATO forces, and the person responsible for the "Operation Mutual Enterprise". In early 1960s, he graduated from the Military Academy in New York, then took his master degree in political sciences at the Loyola University in the State of Illinois, in order to graduate from the Academy of General Staff in 1971. Seven years later, he completed the Military School of the USA, which qualified him to enter the U.S. military establishment. As a second lieutenant he served in Europe, and raised the Berlin Wall in Germany. And as a troop commander, he participated in the Vietnam war, where he advanced from the staff officer up to the deputy staff commander 101st airdrop division in 1972. He was wounded in battles twice. Joulwan was a special military assistant to President Richard Nixon, then assistant to the deputy commander of the U.S. Army General Staff. After that, he was the commander of the U.S. forces in Germany, where he was demolishing the Berlin Wall, and the commander of the U.S. Army Fifth Corps in Europe, in Belgium. He was the chief of staff in the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. He was decorated with the American Silver Star and with the French Legion of Honor. Since October 1995, when he succeeded John Shalikavilli on the position of the eleventh in succession NATO Supreme Commander, General John Joulwan took on the command over 60,000 members of the Western Alliance forces in Monse, who were to keep peace in Bosnia and in the Balkans for a year. General George Joulwan personally ordered the movement of IFOR forces to Bosnia, and decided that the U.S. Army was to be based in its central part, in Tuzla.

Americans also supplied Admiral Leighton Smith, on the position of the commander of NATO South Wing in Naples, who gave orders for bombing Serbian positions in Bosnia in 1995. He was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the multinational forces for the implementation of peace agreement - IFOR, owing to his experience in the Balkans. He is the U.S. officer who coordinated the rescue operation of the U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady, who was downed near Banja Luka. Besides some forty marines from the "K-Searg" aircraft carrier, this operation used the "Tomahawk" cruising missile as a threat to disobedient Serbs. Admiral Leighton Smith is 56 years old, was born in Alabama, where he started his military career as a pilot on aircraft carriers. He participated in the Korean War. In recent years he has been dealing with U.S. military strategy, with the idea of harmonizing operations of marine, air and land forces of the USA. The Serbian side reproaches him for his present role of a peacekeeper in Bosnia, while the Muslim party criticizes him for visiting the Serbian leadership on Pale at all. In spite of apparent personal animosity, admiral Leighton Smith, as the IFOR commander, bravely declares that all three parties in Bosnia are willing to cooperate with him.

Generals for Rent

William Nash, former Commander of the First Armored Division, was appointed Commander of the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was born in Tucson, AZ, in the family of cavalry officers, in 1943. For some time he studied chemistry but abandoned it and completed the Military Academy of West Point instead. He was in the Vietnam War as the commander of tank brigade, while in the Gulf War he led the Third armoured division. In the meantime, he served in Germany, where he became a military expert on the Red Army and the Soviet Union. He is known as a commander who does not shun war danger and problems of organization and command. Like General George Joulwan, General William Nash also has a modern approach to warfare, which he never separates from the promotion of the U.S. army in the media. Personally, he makes efforts to arrange the travel of U.S. reporters together with U.S. soldiers.

Major roles in Bosnia were also played by the DIA Major General Montgomery Meigs, and brigade general Reginald Clemens. The former is Texan. After twenty-seven year long experience in the U.S. army he was actually a veteran when he was appointed the deputy commander of the First Division in 1996. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1967 and from there he went first to Germany and then to Vietnam. In the meantime, he completed special training in the British army, University of Wisconsin, and became a member of the administration at West Point. In 1980s, he also completed the Military College and took over the command over the special unit of U.S. "devils". With this unit, he conducted operations in the Middle East, and took part in the "Desert Storm". It was with such experience that he came to Bosnia. The latter is from North Carolina; he went through similar military schools, but served in the 13th corps as an artillery officer. He was in Vietnam and on the Hawaii. He came to Central Europe as deputy commander of U.S. ground forces based in Germany. From there, he went to Bosnia. Both General Meigs and General Clemens were awarded high U.S. decorations for military merits, which is a proof of their being exceptional professionals.

In order to secure success in his military-political and electoral campaign in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia, American president Bill Clinton also made a point of sending his Defense Minister William Perry among warring Muslims, Croats and Serbs. On December 4th, 1995, U.S. Secretary of State signed the order to deploy three thousand U.S. soldiers from the base in Germany, via Hungary, to Bosnia. He personally oversaw the training of over 10,000 Americans in Hoenfeltz and Granfenver bases in the south of Germany. They made dummies of Tuzla and surrounding villages, so that U.S. soldiers could practice patrolling on Bosnian terrains. Minister Perry personally assessed that Americans were ready and ordered their entry to Bosnia, and came, via Sarajevo, for a visit to Admiral Leighton Smith and U.S. army, on January 3rd, 1996. Previously, in Hungary, he had negotiated the transport of the rest of U.S. soldiers, in two hundred railway cars, which was the official beginning of American silent occupation of Bosnia.

Besides active professionals, the USA also sent a group of retired admirals, generals and colonels, as their aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily to their true allies, Muslims. During 1996, indeed, the U.S. offered Bosnia the "Equip and Train" program for the creation of federal army, in order to achieve the balance of forces on the Balkans. To avoid open involvement by CIA and DIA, Washington called tenders which were to engage a privately-owned company instead of the federal government. However, as newspapers wrote, everybody in the U.S. knows that who wants to rent a general should contact the "Military Professional Resources (MPRI) Inc., headquartered in a red-brick building in Alexandria, VA. This corporation has been in business for eight years and has about US\$12 million annual profit. As their corporate brochure says, MPRI is "the greatest corporation of military experts in the world". It employs about 160 people, and has some 2,000 retired generals, admirals, and other officers at disposal. The most prominent officers include retired general with four stars, Carl Vuono, who was the army commander in the "Desert Storm" operation and now oversees business expansion across Atlantic. "Carl Vuono and Butch Saint are mercenaries and work for money," said Charles Boyd, a recently retired air force general with four stars, who was Pentagon's man number two in charge of Europe until July 1995. "They did an excellent job for Croats and I have no doubt that they will do the same in Bosnia."

Based on the contract between this company and the Federation government in Sarajevo, U.S. generals Vernon Lewis, Carl Vuono, Carl Stiner, Richard Trefry, Frederick Kreusen, Crosbie Butch Saint, and Admiral Huntington Hardisty arrived to Bosnia. The inspection visit was short, and generals Crosbie Butch Saint and Carl Vuono, as well as General William Boys became responsible for immediate cooperation with the Federation Army. General Crosbie Butch Saint used to be deputy commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College of the U.S. armed forces in Fort Levenwort, and later on, the commander of U.S. Seventh Army and deputy supreme commander of NATO. General Crosbie Butch Saint was born in West Point, NY. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1958, from the Army General Staff College in 1969, and from the Warfare School of U.S. army in 1984. A year before he obtained a degree in international relations at "American University". General Saint served in Vietnam on two occasions, within the First Cavalry and First Armored Division, as well as in the 23rd infantry division. Later

on, he was transferred to Europe where he was performing commanding tasks in U.S. Army staffs in Germany. He was awarded highest American war decorations including the Silver Star and Legion of Honor. Crosbie Butch Saint is a typical American soldier, offensive-inclined.

Admiral Huntington Hardisty was the chief of staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the chief of the Group for Nuclear Planning in Pentagon. He was born in Atlanta, GA. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1952, and obtained a degree in international relations at Harvard, in 1953. In the same time, he became a naval pilot. He served on aircraft carriers "Oriskani", "Midway", "Randolph", "Enterprise", "Roosevelt", "Kennedy", "America", and "Kitty Hawk". He also flew F-4s and in Vietnam. Later on, he was a director of numerous military agencies for military support to foreign countries and for naval development planning. He was, thus, an excellent naval pilot and commander of the combat group of aircraft carriers, chief operation officer of the Pacific Fleet and, later on, the chief of staff of the fleet. He was awarded the highest military decorations; he is married with Sally Yves and has two sons, John and Robert. His extensive knowledge and experience in military planning was probably the reason why he was chosen to represent the MPRI company in Bosnia.

Harry Soyster, formerly the chief of military intelligence agency in charge of MPRI operations, is the only official who speaks about his corporation to the U.S. public. During 1995, MPRI sent 15 of their people to Croatia - a group led by retired two-star general Richard Griffith. They trained Croats how to set up armed forces in democratic system, and another contract was signed recently on the reorganization of the Croatian Defense Ministry. As Japanese reporters testify from Sarajevo, Americans were instructors to Muslim snipers who were killing Serbian civilians in the BiH capital. Besides, during 1996, MPRI was overseeing the cargo which was to be transported from Sarajevo to Bosnian Serbs, in accordance with the State Department contract. It was a part of the international peace mission. "Muslims need training at the company level, then training in battalion command and such things," said retired general Harry Soyster. "It can be done quickly."

The U.S.A. took part in the secret arming of Bosnian Muslims while they believed that Alija's army could be American "gun fodder". It was no secret that Americans wanted to lift the arms embargo in 1995, so that Muslims could officially arm themselves. It was actually an American pledge to the Arabic world where they drew oil and natural gas from, since natural gas is supposed to be the fuel of the future in 2000. Americans were doing it in two ways. First, agents of CIA and DiA, civilian and military secret services, used brokers in Slovenia and Austria to buy arms from different sources. A few million dollars a year are given for this purpose. The secret was discovered as early as in 1994, when a French "Avax" spotted three "Hercules C-130" over Tuzla. They were accompanied by six hunters which, judging by radar signals, were F-18s from the U.S. Air Force fleet. While answering questions by foreign reporters, Americans, French, British, and other participants of the "No-Fly" operation swore that they had had no aircrafts in the air. This incident was put away together with innumerable other U.N.

Without uniform, he did not at all resemble a military person. Essentially, Richard Holbrooke says about him, Drew was an impressive highbrow who happened to specialize in military intelligence activities. During the previous four years he had worked in the NATO headquarters primarily on Bosnian issues, but this was his first visit to the region.

Holbrooke was not fortunate with his intelligence team, since Frasure got killed in a traffic accident. Warren Christopher thereupon selected another NSA and DIA team for Richard Holbrooke. According to Holbrooke, it included Christopher Hill, a State Department official in charge of the Balkans, passionate and debate-prone; brigade general Donald Kerick, an ever-composed intelligence officer who represented the National Security Council; James Pardew, the chief of Pentagon Balkan Task Force, who would introduce diligent scepticism in each unstudied assumption; and Robert Owens, a renowned Washington lawyer.

By the end of 1993, Pentagon sent, to Muslim army, their special military envoy General John Sewall. At the time, this general was only the deputy director of the U.S. Institute of Strategic Studies. He had previously spent thirty-three years in the U.S. Army and participated in the interventions in Panama and Iran. In Vietnam, General Sewall commanded over the Ninth Infantry Division, and in Germany, over the Third Armoured Division, which came to Bosnia. General John Sewall's task was to reorganize the Muslim and Croatian army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prepare it for the final duel with Serbs. Main advocates of the engagement of retired U.S. officers were James Pardew, Pentagon representative at Dayton talks who travelled to Sarajevo in order to encourage Bosnian government to contract MPRI, and Richard Holbrooke, Deputy Secretary of State, who was the main mediator in reaching the Dayton accord. It was for this reason that U.S. administration turned to this company to seek help in Bosnia.

"Consequent to the Dayton accord, we will not be able to leave Bosnia unless Bosnian army is well-armed and ready to defend themselves," said about it Senator Joseph Byden, a democrat from Delaware. "This will secure a return ticket for Americans. It is Bosnian Serbs who are the problem. They oppose the intention by the U.S. - who in accordance with the agreement should be a neutral party - to make any step towards strengthening Bosnian army. The U.S. are therefore concerned about Serbs' possible attack on their troops if they started training and arming Muslims. Clinton's administration took the obligation that U.S. troops will play no active parts in the further arming of Muslims.

In Pentagon's secret report of 1995, the General Staff of the U.S. army listed everything needed by the Bosnian government. The study concludes that the advantage enjoyed by Bosnian Serbs could be eliminated if the Muslim-Croatian federation is equipped with about 500 tanks and about the same number of artillery weapons and armored vehicles," claimed DIA officials from Pentagon familiar with this project. Besides, Muslims needed anti-tank and anti-mortar weapons, then light arms and basic gear, such as boots and ammunition. The report states that Bosnian forces need training more than armament, especially when it comes to tactical combat of mid-size units numbering a few hundred

papers and was not discussed further, although it was universally clear that the aircrafts were transporting arms, for Muslims at that time.

Richard Holbrooke in Action

In the very beginning of the Bosnian war, U.S. intelligence agents and navigators arrived there through NATO's staff in Kiseljak. Today, press reporters remember that, at that time, Richard Holbrooke was also seen in Bosnia; today, Holbrooke is the advocate of the U.S. bulldozer-democracy, but was then disguised by the International Red Cross I.D. Richard Holbrooke writes about it himself in his biographic annals:

"In 1992, when Bosnia was on the verge of disaster, I visited this region twice, as a private individual and on behalf of the International Rescue Committee," Holbrooke writes. "On my second trip, in December, I returned to Sarajevo by crossing Serbian lines in a Danish APC. Sarajevo, which was no more a fascinating mix of Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox cultures, turned into true hell. When I finally reached the city, I ran into an old friend of mine, John F. Burns of *New York Times* and asked him if we could visit Princip's footprints on a sidewalk. Impossible, he said laughing; they have been destroyed by Bosnian Muslims and Croats. However, the spirit of the fanatical Serbian nationalism underlying these footprints and the inscription on the wall was still alive - and murderously so. I had spent a year as the ambassador to Germany when President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked me, in the summer of 1994, to return to Washington in order to become deputy secretary of state for Europe and Canada. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, advised me that difficulties with our status in Bosnia had led to this change of tasks. The first ten months I spent in Washington were filled with new disasters on the Bosnian front," spitefully estimates Richard Holbrooke.

Members of Holbrooke's team included four people representing different parts of the national security administration. Bob Frasure was the first U.S. ambassador to Estonia, a fifty-three year old with rough face, a cynical professional diplomat who loved his job even though he never stopped grunting about it. By the end of 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher who had high appreciation of Frasure's unusual combination of cool detachment and fiery loyalty, gave him another task by appointing him the main negotiator for Bosnia. Bob had incredible amount of energy, as well as a good sense of strategy. His reports on talks with Slobodan Milosevic, Holbrooke himself writes, were favourite reading owing to their terseness and humour. Joe Kruzel, a fifty-year old, was well-known by his ability of associating theoretical and practical. He spent his university days at the Air Force Academy in the U.S., and took his Ph.D. degree at Harvard. Colonel General Wesley Clark, who represented the Supreme Command, had a complex position in Holbrooke's team. Formerly a cadet of the West Point Military Academy, Rhodes scholar from Arkansas and decorated veteran of the Vietnam War, he was one of the U.S. army officers whose career took the fastest turn upwards. At the age of fifty, with three stars on his shoulders, Clark was facing the turning point of his career: this task in Bosnia was to bring him the fourth star, which he actually received at the end of his mandate. Samuel Nelson Drew, a forty-seven-year old Air Force Colonel, a member of the National Security Council, he was a man who gave the impression of being serious.

soldiers. Alija Izetbegovic thus obtained US\$ 100 million worth of weapons, as well as the equipment for Sarajevo provided for in the Act of Expenses for 1996.

Secret Agent Haris

The main advocate of Sarajevo military cooperation with Washington in the U.S. was Muslim emigrant Muhamed Sacirbegovic, who became Sacirbej. Besides the BiH ambassador to the U.N., Nedžad Hadžimuslić, the ambassador to European Union, was also close to Americans. And back at home, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the closest to the USA was the high official of the time, Haris Silajdžić, whom SDB of Yugoslavia had suspected of being a CIA agent. Apart from him, Muslim press was also accusing Nijaz Duraković and Abdulah Sidran. In Republika Srpska, the U.S. placed their bets on the Social Democrat Milorad Dodik and Liberal Zivanović. The former Muslim prime minister, Haris Silajdžić, even openly acknowledged his fondness of the U.S. government. Haris Silajdžić was recruited by the CIA during his studies in Libya. He graduated in Benghazi, in 1971, on the Islamic issue, and obtained master's degree on the Albanian issue, with the paper entitled "Albanian National Movement in the press of Bosnia and Herzegovina", in 1977. For a few years, he worked at the Institute of Kosovo History, by the side of his mentor, academician Ali Hadri from Pristina. Later on, he went to the Faculty of Humanities, Department of Oriental Studies, where he took his Ph.D. with the thesis "U.S. Position on Albania in the Period 1912-1939", in 1979. In early 1980s, Dr. Haris Silajdžić goes to the U.S. for a nine-month long business trip. From there, upon his return to Yugoslavia, he goes to Libya again, where he lectures at Moammar Al Gaddafi universities. From Libya, he returns to Sarajevo and joins SDA in late 1980s. In post-Yugoslav Bosnia, Dr. Haris Silajdžić was given the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then that of Prime Minister, thanks to Washington support. The U.S. planned that, in the summer of 1996, Haris Silajdžić should also become the president of new Bosnian federation; however, he was defeated by Alija Izetbegović's Islamic lobby, literally with a rod. Americans themselves wrote that, in Sarajevo, it was only Silajdžić that enjoyed the White House trust. After all, even the Secretary of State Warren Christopher claimed, in Sarajevo, that BiH had a future as a country of European democracy and close partner of the U.S.A. Within such a framework, the U.S. would, it was no secret, love to see Silajdžić as an influential personality on the Bosnian political stage. He was therefore dubbed the "Favourite American Muslim".

In September 1994, Prime Minister Silajdžić resigned as a member of the Executive Board and Vice-President of SDA, stating reasons in his letter to Alija Izetbegović. It was actually his attempt to distance himself from Izetbegović and his Islamic fundamentalism. Silajdžić himself had difficulties accepting Alija Izetbegović's leadership position. It was for this reason that he was raising the issue of his status and his position in the distribution of power. Prime Minister's resignation led to the crisis in the Government and the third major schism in the SDA. Silajdžić's conflict with the SDA started at the moment when he realized that he would not be the major successor to Izetbegović's political heritage. He resigned in the eve of voting on amendment to the modification of the part of Constitution related to the election of future president of the Republic. With

Silajdzic, the U.S.A. lost their man at the top of SDA and Muslim Bosnia, but not their positions in Sarajevo. Silajdzic had been brought to the Prime Minister office by circles representing the opposition to SDA. Muslim media described him as "capable, democratic, modern, and charming representative to the world". Silajdzic was a victim of the religious, fundamentalistic totalitarianism in the leading party of RBiH, the prevailing stream which opposed modernism and "entering Europe and contemporary democratic trends". That which is not to the U.S. taste as being too close to Iran.

As a Washington man, Silajdzic was obediently fulfilling all CIA requirements, from the need to raise media racket by spreading lies about Serbs, to calling for the U.S. military intervention. When Haris Silajdzic visited the Washington-based Center of Strategic and International Studies, in 1994, he accused Americans of not helping him enough:

"Gentlemen, you are not neutral. It seems to me that we in Bosnia are practically left to our own fate. That is how we have been shut within Bosnian borders with the fourth largest army in Europe. They imposed arms embargo on those who have, and on those who do not have guns, and named them two sides. And so, there is one side that shoots and one side that dies - they are the same. Thus, there is a side that dug 115 mass gravesites in Bosnia and Croatia with 5,000 to 3000 dead in each. These are not my figures, these are the figures provided by the U.N. and Human Rights Watch. Thus, the side doing this, committing large-scale crimes and the side that is the victim - are the same. It is also not my figure that at least 20,000 women have been raped in Bosnia and Croatia. Thus the rapists and the raped are - two sides. We have Sarajevo, a city besieged for three years already, so that both the besiegers and the besieged are two sides! It is success for those who have planned this concept, the concept of containing the war within our borders: "Let them fight between themselves! Let them exhaust each other, you know, the warrior tribes," "It is a 500-year old war!" Unfortunately, I am hearing it from the White House: "They have been fighting for 500 years over there!" I am sorry, but the history says otherwise. I am not American, and I therefore think that it is a matter of whether Americans can come to grips with the new political, social, and economic dynamism in the world. Isolating and isolation is sometimes a sign of weakness and admission of the inability to resolve problems such is Bosnia. We have said: "The arms embargo is a death sentence. If we had obeyed you, we would not be alive today!"

Americans even openly declared to Muslims that Silajdzic was their mainstay. Thus the *Free Europe* radio reported from Prague, on February 6th, 1996:

"During his official visit to Sarajevo, Warren Christopher met citizen Haris Silajdzic. The 'citizen' attribute is used on purpose, since Silajdzic is not a member of any state or party body any more, not even a member of any party. This visit was recorded only by foreign agencies. It is clear to everybody that this meeting has a great political weight and can be interpreted in two ways: as a sign of future support to Haris Silajdzic, or the warning to him for having resigned. When Silajdzic resigned in August 1995, the U.S. were sending their support to him, and clear signals to the current government that Washington would not be glad seeing Silajdzic withdraw. This time, the U.S. administration, at least publicly, remained completely passive. There are opinions that Clinton's administration

had been advised in advance of Bosnian Prime Minister's withdrawal and that they had welcomed this move, which is associated with the forthcoming elections in Bosnia.

For the West, Silajdzic was a metaphor for modern politician and the leader of European stream, and Izetbegovic - the leader of conservative and religious stream. What Christopher promised Haris Silajdzic is still a secret. It is also not known what report Silajdzic submitted to Madeleine Albright when she visited Sarajevo in the spring of 1997. However, the very fact that they met is a sufficient sign of whom Americans bet on and the U.S. message on what sort of Bosnia they want.

This and such mission by the U.S., and therefore by secret services CIA and DIA, reached its climax with the official entry of these U.S. intelligence agencies to Bosnia, in the capacity of still another international warrantor of the peace made in Dayton and Paris. Thus in Tuzla today, there is a staff of U.S. civil and military informants, set up under the CIA patronage in order to implement the peace program, which is only the U.S. alibi for public spying of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Before Tuzla, Americans used to set up their spying centers for Yugoslavia in Germany (Frankfurt), Austria (Vienna), Slovenia (Ljubljana), Croatia (Brac, Vis, and Split), Albania (Drac), Bulgaria (Sofia), in Macedonia (Skopje), and in Hungary (Budapest). The organization of these centers was coordinated by Roger George, CIA's commissioner for Europe and retired Pentagon general, while they were controlled by director James Woolsey personally.

Murder in Sarajevo

CIA had their man in Bosnian secret police as well; however, Muslims found him out and liquidated him. Nedžad Ugljen, the second man in the Bosnian Intelligence Agency, was murdered in September 1996. He was shot in the back while he was getting out of his car. The assassin then finished him off with a shot in his mouth, and then fled. His death alarmed all members of the Western intelligence agencies that have their people in Sarajevo. Ugljen's murder caused concern even in the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Hague, since this Bosnian informant was the official link between the Tribunal and the Bosnian government. He was responsible for protecting the witnesses whom the Hague tribunal investigators wanted to talk to. Ugljen was also the liaison officer of the Bosnian Intelligence Agency in contacts with the CIA bureau in Sarajevo. Some Bosnian officials believe that he had become too close to Americans and revealed some uncomfortable secrets related to war crimes, including plans for manufacturing bombshells stuffed with poison gases. On the other hand, Americans were concerned about Ugljen's contacts with Iranians, whose increasing influence in Bosnia was an anathema for Washington. They believe that Ugljen was involved in operations related to the terrorist training center managed by Iranians in Fojnica, which was raided by NATO forces in the spring of this year. They arrested three Iranian officials and seized the bomb-assembling equipment and ice-cream cones made of plastic explosives.

Some also believe that Ugljen's murder is to be blamed on Bosnian government, or even the Investigation and Documentation Agency, Ugljen's personal intelligence organization founded in January 1996, by the order of Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic. The

agency was actually founded by Americans in order to allow CIA to officially and legally act both in Sarajevo and in entire Dayton-made Bosnia. Nedžad Ugljen was also the manager of the CIA's branch in Bosnia. However, as a person with ties to Americans, Muslims, Iranians and, some claim, even KOS JNA's officers, Ugljen was well aware of the danger his life was in. It was for this reason that he asked to be evacuated from Sarajevo last summer. He changed his mind eventually, however. He started carrying "Heckler and Koch" automatic rifle and shaved his moustache. This, however, did not save his life. Nedžad Ugljen was murdered in Sarajevo, on September 26th, 1996, but his death is still the object of interest by intelligence agencies world-wide. Not without reason, since Nedžad Ugljen was officially the deputy of Kemal Ademović, the chief of Muslim secret police, and unofficially the first man at the AID. Ugljen was the liaison between politicians and criminals. He even used the Party of Democratic Action, the ruling Muslim party, for smuggling arms, exhortations and money laundering. Some European diplomats believe that Muslim Agency for Investigation and Documentation is behind the widespread attempts of daunting the opposition political leaders. This agency allegedly organized the attack on former prime minister Haris Silajdzic, who was injured in June 1996 during the presidential election campaign. It was a way for Islamic lobby to temporarily politically disable the main American man, Haris Silajdzic, who personally welcomed Madeleine Allbright in Sarajevo, in May 1997. Besides, Nedžad Ugljen was a man who knew a lot about Sarajevo underground, particularly about the illegal transactions with arms, narcotics, and Serbian prisoners, but also about politicians who were dealing with them.

Both sides, politicians and criminals, had their reasons for Nedžad Ugljen's death. The strongest among them was that they suspected Ugljen of working for the Counterintelligence Agency of former Yugoslav army, since he himself had been an undercover policeman of the SSUP of SFRJ. Nedžad Ugljen was born in Mostar, in 1952. He was married, was the father of two children, and in the SFRJ he was employed at SDB of BiH as the chief of Mostar Secret Police. When national divisions started to grow in Herzegovina, in 1991, he left Mostar and moved to Sarajevo, where he got the job of inspector of the Special Police with the newly-formed MUP BiH. It was then that he also started his private business, by importing and dealing cigarettes, which allowed him to make money, open a restaurant, which in turn opened him the door to the police and political top of Bosnia. In May 1992, Nedžad Ugljen was transferred to the State Security Department of the MUP BiH, chiefed by Alija Delimustafić. Being Alija Izetbegović's trump card, it was not long before he became the undersecretary of white-collar crimes unit in the secret police of BiH and directly led the "Trebević" operation against his colleagues involved in black market, bribery and corruption. Nedžad Ugljen thus managed to supplant from MUP BiH even Alija Delimustafić himself, as well as Bakir Izetbegović, Bakir Alispahić, Munir Alibabić, and many other undersecretaries. Early in 1994, when SDB of MUP BiH changed the name to the Agency of Investigation and Documentation, its undersecretary Ugljen was promoted to deputy chief of AID and the leader of the team for President Alija Izetbegović's personal security, which used the alias "Pearl". He was believed to be the first policeman of Alija Izetbegović. So powerful Nedžad Ugljen was dangerous for his environment which, it seems, found reasons and ways to get rid of him forever.

Each of these, although controversial theories of his death are permeated with the idea of Ugljen being killed in a conflict where Bosnians are pawns in a game of broader proportions. According to this version of his death, the deputy chief of the Agency for Investigation and Documentation, i.e. of secret Muslim police, Ugljen, was killed by Americans as a sign of reprisal for the murder of an U.S. agent last summer. The second reason is, Sarajevo rumour goes, the fact that neither Washington nor Zagreb approved of the operations by the AID secret police and Ugljen himself, because they had control over political partners in the Dayton-made Bosnia and strengthened the power of Muslim nationalists gathered around Alija Izetbegovic. However, in spite of the American pressure on Izetbegovic and AID due to their "Iranian connection", which resulted in the ousting of the secret police chief Bakir Alispahic and his replacement with Kemo Ademovic, AID was surviving as SDA's "parallel" and secret police, which contravenes the Dayton accord. And Nedžad Ugljen was surviving as the first intelligence agent of Bosnia, and as an associate of both CIA and Iranian intelligence agency. And the third reason, or more accurately the answer to the question why Americans, i.e. CIA would have done it in the middle of Sarajevo is the alleged breaking of the connection that the Muslim secret police AID had with the Iranian secret service through Nedžad Ugljen.

According to the latest version of Nedžad Ugljen's death, it is supposed that it was actually the hand of Iranian jihad that killed him. As a matter of fact, over the last few months, the deputy chief of Alija Izetbegovic's secret police had the task of collecting evidence for the U.N. Tribunal of War Crimes about Islamic zealots who were killing Serbs and Croats across Bosnia. Ugljen, officially the second man of Muslim intelligence service, was also the liaison officer between the U.N. Tribunal and the Bosnian government. Iranian intelligence service was accusing Ugljen of disclosing to the U.S. their terrorist training center in Fojnica last year. Also, of disclosing hiding places and accomplices of a few mujahadeens who were hiding in Sarajevo and Zenica after the U.S. request for their expelling from Bosnia. Considering him their informant who had betrayed the Islamic holy war, official Teheran ordered the liquidation of Nedžad Ugljen. The task was entrusted, as world press agencies report today, to Mohammed Pur-Saleh, a high-ranking official of the Iranian secret service, who was seen in Sarajevo a few days before Ugljen's assassination in 1996.

Anxious about the success of their peace mission, but also about strengthening of the Islamic union between Sarajevo and Teheran, Americans were making intelligence-based threats and attempted to control all secret operations by Islamic fundamentalists. This is how the Zenica case was born. Actually, as early as in 1995, members of the U.S. army special forces started a military investigation of possible ammunition manufacturing in the former steelworks plant in Zenica. The operation was coordinated by senior warrant officer Tom Savage, deputy commander of the U.S. army special forces, the elite "green berets", that were stationed in one part of the huge facility. At the time, the plant complex and its surroundings also hosted soldiers of Turkish army, Bosnian army, and international mercenary forces a.k.a. as mujahadeens. The mujahadeens headquarters was situated immediately next to the plant, not far from the Bosnian army's checkpoint. The poorly armed Bosnian army was joined, early in the war, by 2000 mujahadeens, who saw

the Bosnian war as a part of broader Islamic "holy war - jihad". Most mujahadeens served in the Seventh Muslim Brigade, stationed right in Zenica. The rest set up outcast groups. It was them that Americans were scared of, since they could also attack U.S. targets in Bosnia. The Dayton accord provided that all foreign soldiers leave Bosnia by January 19th, 1996. CIA reports were saying that mujahadeens had remained there. Their presence in Zenica showed the U.S. inability??? to tame Izetbegovic and his Iranian friends.

It was for this reason that the U.S. aid to Muslims was dependent upon the obligation, by Bosnia and Herzegovina, to cut their ties to Iran, particularly to the Iranian intelligence agency. Then, in 1996, the first-class precedent took place - based on CIA's data, all U.S. papers published the news that Alija Izetbegovic was an Iran's man. Unofficially, however, things were a bit different. The White House allowed Iranian mujahadeens to set up footholds in Europe, via arm supply routes, and allowed the presence of Iranian and Afganistani military advisors in Bosnia. Federation Vice-President Ejup Ganic once publicly confirmed to *Time* reporters that Bosnia had been receiving arms from Iran, through channels that were bypassing no-fly zones. "Give us your arms and we will not turn to another side," Ganic told Americans.

Kiseljak Base

It was the beginning of the period of the most direct interfering by CIA, DIA and NSA into interior political affairs in former Yugoslav regions. As described by Americans themselves, "entire Bosnia is covered by spy networks of all world secret services. The U.S.A have their huge intelligence carpet in Bosnia". The carpet was made up of field agents, dispersed across Bosnia, dispatchers for NATO planes guidance, analysts of military and political affairs staying in European bases, as well as pilots in reconaissance aircrafts and cameras in pilotless aircrafts of "Predator" and "Avax" types. The first group of intelligence agents of CIA and DIA, U.S. civil and military intelligence agencies, was set up in Kiseljak in 1993 as an integral part of UNPROFOR forces. The first contingent of these peacekeepers also included about four hundred Americans. They all arrived from Rhine-Main base in Germany, where they were organized within DIA or, more accurately, the G-2 Special Task department and G-5 Department of Military Information. They were accomodated in "Dalmacija" hotel, but also in Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Bratunac. Their first task was safe implementation of "Clementine" operation, i.e. bringing and distribution of 75,000 "blue helmets".

John E. Shray, DIA's lieutenant colonel, was one of U.S. intelligence officers who arrived to Kiseljak. He had previously served in U.S. bases in Korea and Germany, as the officer with the Special Operations Command in Fort Bragg, NC. He was then with the famous 101st Air Raid Division in Fort Campbell, KY, in the U.S. Central Command, and in McDill base in Florida. He took part in the "Desert Storm". And he spent six months in Bosnia. In his report to DIA, Lieutenant Colonel Shray then wrote:

"It is a civil war within a civil war, although Muslims are inclined to present the conflict as Serbian aggression. These are concoctions and exaggerated stories. Generally, Muslims

have an advantage - numerous infantry. Their infantry is the most powerful part of the army and numbers almost 140,000 people, so that the ratio to the Republika Srpska army is 2:1 in Muslims' favour. Although it is organized in corps and brigades, Muslim army is capable only of limited operations up to the battalion level. Muslim infantry has bled exactly because they were forced into offensive operations aimed at conquests of land. On the other hand, the RS army cannot afford big casualties. The Muslim claim that they have capable leadership is their gravest military deception. Muslim officers are conferred ranks not according to ability and experience but rather through political and religious connections. Their attempts, in the summer of 1994, to take the road on the mount of Ozren, for instance, is the best illustrations of their officers' and their army's deficiencies, since they did not manage to achieve the coordination of the attacks by the Third and Second Corps.

After that, by the end of 1994, Lieutenant Colonel John Shray moved on to the U.S. Military Academy of General Staff in Fort Leavenworth, KS. He is the master of international relations, and a specialist for intelligence operations. On a few occasions in the U.S. he has publicly spoken about his observations upon the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the U.S. role on the Muslim side, and against Serbs. He then accused Muslims and their allies of staging sabotages in the "Markale 1" operation of February 5th, 1994, and "Markale 2" of August 28th, 1995, when 66 and 37, respectively, Sarajevo citizens were killed. Lieutenant Colonel John Shray's conscience obviously did not allow him to remain silent.

In the 1990s, Kiseljak became the center of European and U.S. spying operations, since both CIA and DIA reinforced their military contingent of 20,000 soldiers within IFOR with as many as a thousand intelligence agents for security purposes. Americans have also set up the Joint Military and Intelligence Agency in Bosnia, together with NATO. This information was published in French press by Tilleri Charlieux. In order to be able to find their way on the soil of former SFRJ more easily, U.S. intelligence agents got a pocket spy guide entitled "Handbook on Yugoslavia". It contains all relevant geographic, climatic, cultural and military data on former SFRJ, and on Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, as well as a small Serbian dictionary with 300 terms. The book also includes six maps of BiH - political, ethnic, territorial, economic, those of energy and mineral resources. And the introductory warning: "Bosnia and Herzegovina is a former republic of SFRJ, where Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, want to unite in order to create Great Serbia. And Muslims, who have created the Federation of BiH with Washington, D.C. support, have a small enclave around Bihac on Serbian soil. BiH is situated in the southeast of Europe, and borders on the Adriatic Sea and Croatia. According to 1995 data, it has 3.2 million inhabitants, out of them 38% Muslims, 40% Serbs, and 22% Croats. The language is Serbocroatian." A separate chapter in this small intelligence study described the leading personalities of the three warring parties in Bosnia, from Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, Radovan Karadzic, and General Ratko Mladic to Slobodan Milosevic.

The second-largest U.S. intelligence center in BiH was Tuzla, a city which received both eleven thousand U.S. soldiers who arrived to their base by the end of 1996, and about two

and a half thousand agents of the civilian Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, and military Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA. They are grouped in five operational units. The first one, numbering about six hundred agents, works on collecting information about the situation in Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croatian Federation, about relations among the three entities, about activities by political parties and officials. In 1996, the U.S.A. organized elections and allowed Alija Izetbegovic to win. In their Report on Circumstances in BiH of 1994, U.S. intelligence agents wrote briefly:

"Serbs and Muslims are firmly convinced that the U.S. will fully support the concept of BiH as united state. Serbs have therefore selected the war option, in order to keep the conquered territories. Sarajevo expects the lifting of the arms embargo by the end of November, as well as the first cargos, which they expect to be brought by Americans. The Muslims' army top expects a stronger NATO's support from the air over entire Bosnia particularly if Serbs start the offensive the first. Belgrade is willing to help Republika Srpska if it gets into a crisis, and therefore keeps supporting General Ratko Mladic's army. BiH political leadership hopes for U.S. direct strike on Serbia, in case the offensive against Muslims continues, and in case of violent suppression of riots in Sandzak and Kosovo. We estimate the conflict between Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic to be a "public theatre", the goal of which is lifting the sanctions on/over SRJ and Republika Srpska. Alija Izetbegovic plans to set up the largest army on the Balkans like a counterbalance to Serbs and Yugoslav Army. He therefore encourages the cooperation with Arabic-Islamic states and thus exerts pressure on the West to come to his aid.

The second group of U.S. observers, including about eighty spies, monitors activities by Russian, Islamic, German, British, French, Yugoslav and Croatian intelligence agents in Bosnia. Their primary task is tapping Serbian phone and radio links. CIA's and DIA's tapping station was stationed in the village of Porebrice. It was made up of about a hundred seismic, infrared, and magnetic sensors, antennas and relays connected to computers for decoding recorded conversations and messages. This station was managed by Melissa Patrick, chief of the intelligence unit of the U.S. First Armored Division. In the summer of 1995, for instance, this center recorded, first, the conversation between Colonel Sevic with Colonel Nikolic, both of the Republika Srpska Army. And then, on August 4th, 1995, it also recorded the conversation between Mirko Krajisnik and Colonel Dragan Djokic from the VRS General Staff in Han Pijesak. Here is a part of this tapped conversation:

Djokic: "Yes, sir!"

Krajisnik: "Mirko Krajisnik, Kulina told me that you were inquiring about any messages related to twice a hundred?"

Djokic: "Is that what you are asking for?"

Krajisnik: "We made a request because of the plan we made and verified at all levels of the municipality, to buy it, because we cannot make it without it...I don't want to mention ranks, but I met Brkic and Djukic, and they said it could be arranged. Well, now I'm wondering how one can arrange it?"

Djokic: "Was it General who told you so?"

Krajisnik: "No, it was Grubesa, lieutenant colonel in the Air Force administration..."
Djokic: "O.K., then go straight to "Krusik" and make a deal...But, is it for your brigade?"
Krajisnik: "No, it is for Sarajevsko-romanijski corps, to be directed towards the city, 'cause it's a strategic spot in our zone!"
Djokic: "O.K., O.K., you don't have to pay, use this money to buy gas, or whatever you need."
Krajisnik: "O.K., Mister Colonel, good luck, take care, have a nice day!"
Djokic: "Good-bye!"

The third group of CIA and DIA agents is in Bosnia to investigate the activities of "Dayton enemies" nationalists on all three sides, Serbian paramilitary, especially "Holy warriors" - mujahadeens, as well as by Croatian thugs and Mostar terrorists. DIA prepared a separate report about Serbian army:

Near Sarajevo, Serbian "Romanijski corps" has been deployed. Apart from that one, Serbs have four more corps - 1st Krajiski, Second bosanski, Third istocno-bosanski and Fourth hercegovacki. They are coordinated by the Second Army, headquartered in Han Pijesak. Serbian armed forces in Bosnia amount to the total of 90,000 people, same as Croatian and Muslim side together. They are joined by an indefinite number of "weekend warriors", who take part in combat for plunder, pleasure or beliefs. The Serbian side uses artillery in a guerilla manner. They are scattered across Bosnian hills. They use tanks as artillery, with barrel raised high in the air. They have ten kilometer range, and their fire is being corrected by observers. Serbs have inherited the entire JNA's artillery and they also have advantage in armored vehicles, tanks, and aviation. The war is waged by partisan rules, which are irregular in all respects. It is in accordance with the military guerilla concept from Tito's times - to keep the aggressor's forces up north. And to fight in Bosnian hills, which represent a fortress and which should be defended to the last breath. The mountaneous terrain helps defenders, Serbs, since regular Muslim forces cannot develop its force. The attack on this kind of terrain does not require only the usual 3:1 advantage, but rather twelve soldiers on one enemy. It is that why that Serbian guerillas are defending themselves so skillfully. The present war in Bosnia is being waged by twenty-soldier groups, on about a dozen square kilometer areas. For this reason they escape control by our reconaissance, intelligence agents, even commands. Serbs are better armed and do not spare ammunition. We have not observed movements of army units from Serbia into Bosnia, but it can be presumed that Serbia is "pouring additional" soldiers, spare parts, and ammunition. The Han Pijesak headquarters also receives frequent orders from Belgrade.

Eagle, Get Back to Us

The fourth team of U.S. intelligence agents in Bosnia, made up of a thousand people, is in charge of psychological-advertising activities among civilian population. The separation of warring parties, protection of communications, ensuring deliveries of humanitarian aid to the population, disarming illegal army formations, tapping and spying - is only a

partial list of U.S. soldiers' tasks in Bosnia, claims Alexander Znamensky, military analyst of *Krasnaya zvezda* review from Moscow, in his analysis of the U.S. role on the Balkans. Armed forces of the U.S.A and other Western countries define such activities by the term "operations other than war"(OOTW). This is being used parallelly with the term "low-intensity conflicts", and frequently instead of the latter. Western experts believe that one of the key elements of such operations are "psychological operations". PsO increase the efficiency of U.S. forces' activities and significantly decrease casualties among population and civilians. In this respect, it would be interesting to quote the statement by General Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Zinney, commander of the First Expedition Unit of U.S. naval infantry: "Today, I am more involved in psychological operations and contacts with civilian population than in firing systems and manoeuvres." According to Znamensky U.S. soldiers had the same views on psychological operations in Somalia and Iraqi Kurdistan during the "Desert Storm" operation, on Haiti, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Each U.S. army soldier within the "Eagle" operational group has to know fundamental goals and tasks of his presence on the BiH territory: the U.S.A. want to help Balkan nations to end longlasting hardships and suffering; U.S. forces are very well prepared and determined to ward off any armed attack, and are firm in their decision to establish peace in the Balkans; U.S. forces advocate human methods in resolving the Bosnian problem and are convinced that U.S. people support their Balkan mission; U.S. forces are made up of well prepared soldiers who have, at their disposal, everything that is necessary for the implementation of the given task, adequate combat technology and armament; U.S. army serves as a warrant of peace and stability in Europe; any of the warring parties that allows themselves to test U.S. forces' determination will make an incorrigible mistake. PsO bodies pay a great attention to work with local and foreign communications media. Today, there are about 1000 reporters constantly present in the responsibility zone of the "Eagle" operational group, including representatives of leading U.S. and European media. Each of them is being worked with on an individual basis. Moreover, U.S. army soldiers received accurate instructions about their rights and duties with respect to press. For instance, they were told to respond to questions briefly and succinctly, to explain the issue from the viewpoint of their unit and to always keep in mind that all the information is being taped. The soldier should know who he is granting the interview to and with what goal in mind his words will be used later on. It is suggested to U.S. soldiers that they should always think about their reply and keep in mind operational security. In this way, the conduct of U.S. soldiers within the "Eagle" operational group in their relations to the press is limited by the firm framework defined by experts in psychological operations, in accordance with the U.S. strategic policy in the region and the actual operational situation.

The analysis of the activities by U.S. experts in psychological operations lends itself to a few conclusions. First, regardless of certain difficulties in the creation of united Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically the Muslim-Croatian Federation, incomplete plans of arms hand-over and prisoner exchange, as well as the presence of mercenaries-mujahadeens on the Balkans who fight on the Muslim side, peace is being successfully preserved on the territory of former Yugoslavia, greatly owing to the efforts by psychological operations

experts. Secondly, the powerful PsO apparatus deployed so as to allow IFOR forces operation enables operational response to developments, and changes in the direction of communications and psychological operations. A year after their work began, Americans gradually started preparing the public sentiment that the implementation of peace operation in Bosnia will require more than a year, as was provided for by the Dayton accord. Thirdly, in former Yugoslavia, Russia almost does not have any true leverage of influencing public sentiment, which is the results of CIA's and DIA's carefully planned "psychological operation". Croats and Muslims have definitely entered the sphere of the political and cultural influence by the U.S.A. Even Serbs are forced to look towards the West more and more frequently. Not only because they are pressured into doing so by the postwar circumstances in the industry, but also - to a degree - due to forceful pressure exerted upon them by psychological operations experts.

Canards

The U.S. had the sixth, and potentially the most efficient intelligence agency both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and across former Yugoslavia, in their correspondent reporter network. Reporters, same as other public figures, were introduced to espionage as a patriotic task, by Allen Dalls, director of CIA, as early as in 1950s. They were officially released from this obligation by director John Deutch, who stated, in 1995, that "CIA shall not use services of reporters and priests"! Some U.S. reporters from Yugoslav regions, naturally not all, were acting as agents, most frequently in two cases - as a source of misinformation, and as fake witnesses of concocted events. The reasons for such reporters' behavior were explained to me by Tom Cuprisin, reporter for the U.S. *Milwaukee Journal*:

" Until mid-1994, neither the U.S. political top nor broader public had clear views on the Yugoslav crisis. Who is whose enemy over there, who supports whom. It seems a bit strange to you, but I am admitting openly that the U.S. diplomacy is the worst organized part of the administration. As you, Serbs, however, kept shelling Sarajevo, and then took Srebrenica and Zepa, conquered seventy percent of the BiH territory, President Bill Clinton decided not only to support the weaker party, Muslims, but also to strike Serbian positions. All Americans believe that something had to be done in Bosnia. And the U.S. got involved in the Bosnian war not for Bill Clinton to get voters in the next elections, since he had not got any after the Haiti intervention either, but rather because of the moral and political responsibility that the U.S.A. have, as the world ruler and guardian of peace on Earth! You Serbs were too strong. You were holding half Croatia and seventy percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And you did not show any desire for peace. The politics led by Pale was wrong. Radovan Karadzic's and Ratko Mladic's biggest failure was the frenzied seige of Sarajevo, which therefore became a synonym for Muslim suffering in Bosnia. And it was not long before this symbol got transformed into the nasty story about Serbs. And since Bosnian Serbs had an attitude towards foreign reporters, both Western politicians and Western reporters decided that you were their worst enemies. Although they were winners on the battlefield, Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Krajina lost a big part of their authority in the Westerners' minds, due to their defeat in the media war. It was the first and biggest Serbian failure in this war."

The strategy of the U.S. media war against Serbs was devised and coordinated by State Department and CIA Directorate. This strategy went so far in its requirements for the media coverage of the Balkans, and of Bosnia in particular, that it planned the founding of the *Free Balkan* radio, after the model of *Free Europe*, which had been under the CIA's patronage for decades. The U.S. media, CNN above all, which turned the world into a global village, were mostly anti-Serbian. This is proven by the case of Roy Gutman, *Newsday* correspondent. Actually, when Serbs captured British mercenary Allan Robert Lofthouse on the Majevica, in February 1993, he admitted, to Serbian counterintelligence people, that he had had satellite link with an American reporter throughout the war. It was Roy Gutman, formerly the "Reuter's" correspondent from Belgrade, and then *Newsday* correspondent from Zagreb and Sarajevo. According to Lofthouse, this American confessed to him that he was a CIA spy, and that he was registered under the code-name "2-IC". He sent his first report as a war correspondent in 1991, when he was reporting on the alleged Serbian shelling of Dubrovnik from Herceg Novi, as if he had been on the scene. And later on, about Serbian massacres and rapes in Bosnia. He was receiving the information about these events from the Islamic religious association, American-Turkish Women Association, Dr. Arif Tanovic, Tuzla television director, and mercenary Allan Robert Lofthouse.

The second captive, U.S. reporter David Rhode, was expelled from Republika Srpska late in 1995, since he, as a *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent from Boston, had been using CIA's data in order to reach the spot where Muslims had allegedly been killed in Srebrenica. Rhode was born on August 7th, 1967 in the family of Harvey and Carrol Rhode in Hartford, KY. He was always where "America was defending their national interests: on Cuba, in Syria, in the USSR, in Estonia, in Bosnia," his parents were saying about David's reporter job. The U.S. reporter came to Republika Srpska from Zagreb, with forged documents and without the accreditation. His predecessor, correspondent Jonathan Lunday, was expelled from Pale since he was caught sending his information to CIA. In Srebrenica, David Rhode found "blood on walls and scattered papers of the missing people", but not mass gravesites he had been searching for by DIA officers' order. Since he was presented as a Serbian victim in the U.S., David Rhode received the Pulitzer Price in 1995, for his stories about unfound gravesites in Srebrenica.

In his war diary, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Shray wrote that famous reporters Christianne Amanpour and Peter Jennings had also accepted Muslim propaganda as the only truth and published anti-Serbian stories from Bosnia. While reporting from Gorazde, Shray writes, Amanpour and Jennings were saying that "Serbs are destroying the city, house by house", intentionally ignoring the truth that Muslims had mined the city, and then fled leaving their co-citizens without protection and handing Gorazde over without fight. By Lieutenant Colonel Shray's estimate, these CNN reporters did their most important job in Bosnia when they started the attack on General Michael Rose, whom they publicly accused of "liking Serbs". General Rose was also publicly accused of giving Gorazde over to Serbs, since he "did not want to defend a Muslim city". After a vehement media campaign, the British general left Sarajevo disgraced.

"Over the past three years, U.S. media did a terrific job by supporting the negative image of Serbs and Serbia, to the point that in many cases it helped to achieve political results that play a tremendous role in inflicting lethal wounds to Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Srbia. If such U.S. policy of punishing Serbs does not change, they will attain their goal of destroying a country and demoralizing a nation," wrote the Doctor of History Norma von Ragenfeld for the *Unity Herald* magazine of San Francisco-based SUC in 1995. "They would stand by devil himself, provided they are paid to do so. Media recently got the latest opportunity to whip Serbs on the occasion of the end of General Michael Rose' mission as the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, thus using another chance to pledge for military intervention in favor of Bosnian Muslims. As a "rogue" in the Bosnian 1994 scenario, General Rose, who is said to stand by Serbs with all his heart, is one of those who refused to abide by the "Serb punishing" policy, so dear to participants in the U.S. foreign policy, and who argued with Muslims believing that they were equally to blame for the chaotic situation in Bosnia. When General Rose' alleged affinity toward Serbs started leading the water to the media water mill since the spring of 1994, and when facts and figures were again misrepresented, altered, shuffled, and distorted, the peace in Bosnia was dealt yet another heavy blow. I believe that the General Rose case plays a particularly important role in all media campaigns against Serbs. The media which persistently favour Bosnian Muslims and attack Serbs and, besides, keep repeating the biased view on the present conflict in Bosnia, will inevitably strengthen the anti-Serbian view of our U.S. government.

The result of this was that media started playing the main role since the beginning of the war, in April 1992: everybody wanted to see Serbs punished. A truly horrifying event that happened in Sarajevo in mid-1992 resulted in the punishment unrelentingly advocated by the U.S. government and media; a bomb exploded exactly at the spot where people were waiting in line for bread, in Vaso Miskin Street, in Sarajevo downtown; it killed dozens of people and wounded dozens of others. Serbs were accused right away - and by "deliberate" chance, cameras of Bosnian-Muslim television were recording this bloody event and broadcast it to the world right away. Four days later, the United Nations imposed sanctions of so far unseen proportions on Serbia. Even today, two and a half years after this event, many voices can be heard, particularly in the U.S., that Serbs "should be punished".

"For how long more will *New York Times* give space and significance to those such as Anthony Lewis, William Safire (who advocate nothing but bombs against Serbs), Madeleine Albright, Bob Dole, Warren Christopher, Jean Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake and many others who insist upon Serbian guilt, whether because they have "such feeling" (Christopher) about Serbian responsibility, or because it is "highly likely" (President Clinton) that Serbs have committed the crime, " wondered Dr. Norma von Ragenfeld Feldmann. Still, they must have been very disappointed when, late in 1994 and early in 1995, it turned out that American people, in spite of everything, did not stoop before the comprehensive request to "eradicate" Serbs. Even at the peak of Serbian counter-offensive against Muslims in Biha, the polls showed that the majority (67%) of Americans did not support military intervention. Such a view is probably the encouraging echo of Abraham Lincoln's statement that "you can deceive the entire nation for a while;

you can even deceive some people all the time; but you cannot deceive all the people all the time."

AID Mines Markale

When Dayton-made Bosnia was established in 1995, the U.S.A. decided to sponsor the establishment of independent media in BiH instead of the planned *Free Balkans* radio. It was a sufficient proof of how much Americans cared for maintaining control over the media space in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This task was entrusted to a Serb Obrad Kesic, M.A., who did the public opinion poll in his native Bosnia with his team. Perfidious provocations by the Muslim side, in conjunction with sabotages and media hunt, as well as unjustified accusations against Serbs by the U.S.A., U.N. and European Union were the daily routine in the Bosnian war. In its very beginning, in May 1992, the first explosion occurred in Vase Miskina Street in Sarajevo, and killed or wounded about 50 people. After that, the West accused Yugoslavia of "aggression" against Bosnia and imposed economic blockade on Belgrade. In February 1994, a shell blew up in the crowd at Sarajevo Markale farmers market and caused 66 casualties. Regardless of the non-existence of proofs that Serbian side was to blame for this, NATO announced that they were ready for massive air strikes on Serbs. The enormous casualties and destructions were then avoided only thanks to the speedy arrival of the Russian "blue helmets" battalion to Sarajevo and by forced consent of Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy armament from the city. And late in August 1995, in Sarajevo, in a street full of people, another shell blew up that killed and crippled a few dozens people. It was followed by NATO's transition from threats to massive air strikes which killed over a thousand Serbs and destroyed hundreds of industrial facilities of Bosnian Serbs. Same as in the farmers market case, the liability of the Serbian side was not proven, but the West got the opportunity to force their plan for the conflict resolution. As a result, Sarajevo came under the total Muslim control; about 100,000 Serbs were expelled from the city, and thousand Serbs were showered by bombs and murdered. That was written about mean Muslim sabotages and political hushing up by the U.S. and U.N. by Russian, French, British, even some U.S. newspapers. Obrad Kesic, U.S. analyst, has his own opinion about the issue:

"You can be sure that the shelling had been arranged weeks before, and the Markale shell could be just a daily excuse. You can see it if you arrange public statements by the U.S. government chronologically: first, it was said that it was the U.S. response and punishment of Serbs for the Markale massacre. The next day already, the shelling was described as a way to force Serbs again to the negotiating table, and the third day, after the meeting with President Milosevic, this was rejected as well, since Holbrooke declared that shelling had nothing to do with negotiations. After that, a new reason arrived, "that it was intervened militarily since Serbs did not want to demilitarize Sarajevo". Thus in the course of a few days, a few different reasons, but one thing is certain: in spite the popular belief, Markale case was not decisive. And as for whose shell fell onto Markale, and as for the previous breadline tragedy in the Vase Miskina Street, things will clear up eventually."

Crimes at Sarajevo Markale farmers market were also described in the memoirs of French President Francois Mitterrand; he confirmed that Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the U.N. and his envoy Jasushi Akashi, were also convinced of Serbs' innocence but kept silent about it for a while. The memoirs of the late French president Francois Mitterrand became a key for deciphering one of the grimest secrets of the Bosnian war in France and Europe, Paris reporters wrote. Besides, it is not a matter of deciphering, but rather of the direct unmasking of the Muslim secret service in Bosnia which, in order to drag the West into the military intervention against Bosnian Serbs, killed 66 and wounded over 100 their own citizens.

... "A few days ago Boutros Ghali told me that he was convinced that the mortar that had fell on the Sarajevo farmers market was Muslim provocation." These Francois Mitterrands' words are taken from the book *The Farewell Year* by his advisor Laur Adlair, written with the consent and cooperation of Mitterrand himself, and describing the last days of his stay in the Elysee palace. The quotation from the French president's book was extremely useful to French reporter Bernard Walker, who managed to win the lawsuit for the protection of his professional honour.

"I was told that this report by "blue helmets" was placed on the U.N. General Secretary Boutros-Ghali's desk. However, he said that in the circumstances of the time, the paper was too volatile and decided to hide it deep down into his safety box and not to take it out." That is what Bernard Walker wrote. Muslims in France then openly attacked him. An "official investigation" was also organized. It resulted in the conclusion that it was impossible to determine who exactly had fired the shell. This information broadcast at TV F-1 was denounced by absolutely everybody, including the U.N., after which the Muslim "Carton zone" lobby brought up charges. Bernard Walker's defense submitted to the court, as evidence, testimonies by people who had been in Sarajevo, war reporters and diplomats, who confirmed his version of the event. However, the argument that bore the heaviest weight was the quotation from the book "The Farewell Year" by French President Francois Mitterrand.

Intelligence Lieutenant General John E. Shray wondered aloud about it in his diary:

"How did the Muslim government, who is permanently justifying their inability to abide by short-term ceasefires with inadequate communications, so miraculously manage to advise foreign media and in the same time send an ambulance to the scene within two minutes after the crime? Why did tail wings of the shell unexplicably get lost after the explosion? Before they seized some mortars from Serbs, Muslims had been forces to hand-make their mortars and artillery shells, which means that their tail wings had a distinctive shape and would have served as hard evidence against the Muslim side. Having in mind the proximity between "Markale" farmers market and the building of the Presidency of BiH, one could wonder who gave the order for this insane crime - president Alija Izetbegovic or vice-president Ejup Ganic?"

Serbs themselves knew the truth about Markale, but nobody would listen to them, nor trust them, because the season had already been declared open on Serbs in Bosnia. One of

the people who spoke publicly about this international crime at Markale was seasoned policeman Tomo Kovac. This former minister of the interior of Republika Srpska was one of the most important people in Serbian establishment on the other side of the Drina. He graduated from the College of the Interior in Zemun and the Faculty of Security in Skopje. His graduation thesis was entitled "Activities of U.S. intelligence agencies in Sarajevo during the Olympic Games". In the age of 23 already, he became the chief inspector of the State Security in BiH. From there, he goes to public security where he becomes the commander in the Sarajevo municipality of Novi Grad, the largest police division in former Yugoslavia. At one point, General Petar Gracanin proclaimed Tomo Kovac's division to be the best in the SFRJ. During the Bosnian war, Kovac was first the head of the Ilidza division, then deputy police minister of RS and, within the position, he was the commander of the RS police throughout the war. The end of the war found him as the only general of the RS police. In the same time, he is the youngest general on all Serbian lands and the first holder of the Nemanjic decoration. In the course of 1991, Tomo Kovac became the commander of the Ilidza police division, where, "in the multiethnic structure of Bosnian MUP, he got the deputy from Serbia, the newcomer to Bosnia Naser Oric, who was one of Ejup Ganic's compatriots from Sandzak. Oric used to be one of the first people in President Slobodan Milosevic's retinue and, during the war, the commander of Srebrenica defense. Upon Mico Stanisic's appointment as the minister of the interior, late in 1992, Tomo Kovac virtually took on the tasks of the first policeman in Pale, and became the minister after the "September '93" operation in Banjaluka. He stayed in the Ministry until November 1995, a few days before signing of the Bosnian Dayton accord. His ministerial credits include the establishment of the special unit of MUP RS, as well as fighting on all Bosnian battlefields. Tomo Kovac, a former minister and Serbian police general, says the following about AID's activities:

"It is now clear that the Markale case, both the first and the second time, was staged by the Muslim secret service. The man without the arm whose photos were incessantly broadcast on CNN and SKY is Jamakovic, head of KDZ for a Sarajevo municipality. I believe that Markale I and Markale II were most likely directed by Bakir Alispahic, former head of the Public Security Center for Sarajevo, who had been in touch with the most extreme Muslim terrorist organizations such as " Hamas " and the likes, for a number of years before and during the war. It was through him that snipers with nitroglycerin were brought into Sarajevo. We caught one of their convoys on the way to Sarajevo, where his official vehicle, when he was the head of Sarajevo CSB, was transporting those snipers into the city. Together with Srebrenkovic, who came from Zagreb and who was a member of the "Muslim brothers" group together with Alija Izetbegovic, Alispahic was coordinating all terrorist operations across Sarajevo."

Some former KOS JNA's officers recognized their colleagues policemen among the people who investigated the Markale case and gave statements against Serbs. One of them was Jusuf Pusina, the head of Sarajevo public security, former inspector with SUP BiH, who attended the College of the Interior in Zemun in 1976. His assistant was Adnan Srna from "Pretis", otherwise an experts in explosives.

"I know for certain that there are many children in Sarajevo who are being trained as suicide-bombers for jihad. You saw photos of toys filled with explosives. Who is this explosive intended for, for Serbian children from the right or from the left bank of the Drina? Violent battles were fought for Sarajevo for three and a half years. We had a Muslim corps in Sarajevo under siege, and another one behind our back, towards Zenica and Bjelasnica. You know, we were aware that we must not lose Sarajevo militarily in any way. We knew that military fall of Sarajevo would in the same time be the fall of Republika Srpska. When the Dayton accord was finally signed and when we received, in writing, the way Bosnia looked like, at meetings with top people from the RS I advocated the idea of openly telling people from Serbian municipalities the facts, in order to organize their withdrawal and avoid the disaster we are seeing today. I said openly, in Pale, that we had got what we had, but that there was no stepping back now and that we had to obey what the Dayton accord provided for. I saw the crafty manipulation by international mediators who, after Dayton, gave Serbs the false hope that they would be able to keep some of the Serbian territories; they were deceiving them deliberately in order to gain time and prevent Serbs from doing in western parts of Sarajevo the same what Croats did in Mrkonjic grad and Sipovo - take out all manufacturing equipment and burn the rest," Tomo Kovac says.

Srebrenica Swindle

The fifth group of U.S. intelligence agents in Bosnia was gathering evidence about prisoners of war. And particularly about war crimes committed first by Serbs, such as Dr. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and by Croats and Muslims. Through CIA and DIA, Americans were particularly active in discovering war criminals on the Serbian side. They were going so far in this that they were allowed by RDB MUP of Serbia to legally intervene during the search for and capturing Drazen Erdemovic in 1995 and then, in 1997, in capturing Slavko Dokmanovic on the territory of SRJ. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. acknowledged herself that she had been using CIA services in obtaining data on the alleged Serbian massacres over Muslims in Srebrenica. She was waving an "Avacs" photo at the U.N. General Assembly. The identity of stories by U.S. reporter David Rohde, and Washington politician John Shuttuck, showed to Yugoslav public all the power of the information-related collusion existing within the U.S. administration. Actually, David Rohde wrote: "I saw blood on school walls in Srebrenica!" Upon his visit to Bosnia, the U.S. Secretary of State for Human Rights uttered an almost identical sentence: "I saw blood stains and holes from shells in Srebrenica!" As additional evidence of crimes committed over Muslims, both of them, Rohde and Shuttuck, showed a photo, actually a satellite shot, of the alleged mass gravesite in Srebrenica. It was this shot that Madeleine Albright waved across the U.N. building and that is now being shown by all world newspapers and agencies.

By publishing the secret satellite shot of the alleged Muslim mass gravesite in Srebrenica, and by the announcement of establishing the CIA's center for the support to peace in Bosnia, the U.S.A. officially admitted, through their media and politicians, to being involved in the intelligence and spying policy on former Yugoslavia soil.

"The U.S. National Security network in Bosnia gives priority to immediate threats that can endanger USA and IFOR, as well as to help in capturing those who committed war crimes. International Tribunal in the Hague asked the U.S. to help them in gathering satellite shots of potential mass gravesites in Bosnia, which are otherwise being forwarded to State Department from CIA and DIA. The Hague Tribunal can use these shots as evidence for charges and allegations against some persons for war crimes," pointed out Ken Bacon, Pentagon spokesperson, at a press conference late in January 1996.

Bacon did not speak about CIA's and DIA's previous secret missions in Yugoslavia and Bosnia, which were tacitly confirmed by showing the satellite shot of the alleged Muslim mass gravesite in Srebrenica. This shot, same as reporter David Rohde's photo, are the proof even to those who do not believe in the thesis on spy collusions against Serbs, that CIA used this man as their collaborator in Bosnia. Rohde was also a clear threat to General Ratko Mladic himself and to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, since he can be used as a witness at a potential trial in the Hague. Still, all these things are happening although both CIA, in their official report, and John Shuttuck himself in his public appearances, denied, first, that there was evidence on mass murders of Muslims in BiH camps and, secondly, that there are mass Muslim killing fields in Srebrenica. However, all this was already a part of the plan of the U.S. cooperation with the International Hague Tribunal, the political goal of which is to try Serbs. Madeleine Albright herself said the same after her visit to Bosnia:

"Finally, the United States of America were gathering their own information together with the Tribunal. The most part was obtained from public sources, but the U.S. intelligence agency also placed at disposal a great part of confidential information. We also discussed Judge Goldstone's request related to the extent and timely receipt of information. At a meeting with him, high administration officials stated that the intelligence service had given the priority to the support to Tribunal. The U.S.A. will engage additional resources and staff in the review of old files and in order to speed up the delivery of new information.

The U.S. assured Judge Goldstone that they would keep looking for ways to forward all relevant information to the tribunal in the appropriate manner. A few other points related to the information exchange deserve to be noted. The greatest value of the information we supply will be the aid to the investigative bodies in determining which lead should be followed. However, confidential information should not be shared with the public. Early disclosure can endanger witnesses, make it difficult for investigation bodies to find supporting evidence, and encourage offenders to cover their traces. Some may even be ridiculing efforts to prosecute those responsible for such crimes, saying that gathering physical evidence, interrogating suspects and obtaining convincing testimonies is too difficult, that it takes too much time and that it is too costly. However, Clinton's administration believes that difficulties in the Tribunals' work should not hinder it. The mere fact that we cannot guarantee everything does not mean that we should do nothing," Madeleine Albright said.

Owing to CIA and DIA, Srebrenica became a synonym for genocide. However, Srebrenica also denotes a turning point in the Bosnian war. Under the impression of these events, the U.S.A. forced NATO's intervention, which ultimately brought about Dayton's peace accord. Defining Srebrenica as "human disaster" would be an attempt to suppress and tone down things. It was not an inevitable natural disaster. The responsible individuals in the U.N., as well as the Bosnian government, knew that this enclave could not hold on under given circumstances. Still, until the very end, the "safe haven" fiction was adhered to because of the unclean conscience on the one hand, and because of the military and political calculation on the other. This was claimed by Warsaw reporter Danjid Njarzanjski, who wrote in 1996: "Sensational allegations by Bosnian politician: Bosnian government sacrificed Srebrenica today in order to provoke U.N. forces' action against Serbs. In an interview for independent weekly *Slobodna Bosna* this was claimed by Ibran Mustafic, a representative from Srebrenica, who survived the conquest of the town by Bosnian Serbs. According to Mustafic, Bosnian authorities had not done everything they could in order to defend the town, hoping that Serbian conquering of the "U.N. safe haven" would force the world to act. The fall of Srebrenica, however, was not followed by NATO's armed response. It ensued a month and a half later, after the massacre at a Sarajevo square caused by the alleged "Serbian firing".

"Delta" Captures Karadzic

Quoting U.S. and British intelligence sources, James Adams, a *Sunday Times* correspondent, reported in 1996, that U.S. armed forces were already ready to raid Radovan Karadzic's base in Pale, by commando parachuter units. According to the London newspaper, the intelligence support to such an operation, including the distribution of secret agents in the field, had already been provided. U.S. plans included the operation where a special "Delta Force" unit would take part, and U.S. special-operation soldiers would be transported to the target by offensive helicopters. The helicopters would fly very low in order to avoid being spotted by radars. The commandos would land by ropes, eliminate Karadzic's bodyguards, capture the former Serbian leader, and then transport him to the Hague. However, Great Britain did not support the plans. The decision of the preparation for this operation in the U.S., the *Sunday Times* reporter wrote, denotes a dramatic change in the U.S. policy. Pentagon view changed after the latest Richard Holbrooke's tour. President Clinton's special envoy for BiH wanted to tell Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade that a serious Pentagon activity would ensue aimed at capturing Radovan Karadzic. Holbrooke made the agreement with Montenegro that they would receive Karadzic, who finally withdrew from the presidential office but did not agree to leave the country. This agreement, however, faced extensive criticism in the U.S., and Richard Holbrooke's new message was that "Karadzic is not to be trusted".

White House spokesman Mike MacCurry hurried to deny British *Sunday Times* writing about U.S. commando unit "Delta" being ready for the airdrop on Pale, capture and abduction of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The speed of the White House response, as well as London's vehement opposition to indications that such a spectacular operation was indeed in the works, show that Bill Clinton was under strong pressure by

his political allies who were warning him that Republicans would use his indulgence towards Karadzic as a sign of Clinton's weakness in the election campaign. Pentagon is strongly opposed to any adventurous operation, where they are supported by British military establishment. *Sunday Times* Washington correspondent claims that it was exactly for this reason that certain Pentagon circles revealed plans for the use of "Delta" commando unit in Bosnia, in order to prevent it and in order to alert the public.

These special units were led by U.S. colonel Charles Backwhite. He served in the British special commando unit SAS between 1962 and 1963 and, upon his return to the U.S. army, was entrusted with the task of setting up a similar operation. After long preparations, he established the First special operation force detachment "Delta", on November 19th, 1977. It was the "Delta Project" (Detachment B. 52). The basis of "Delta" was made up of the 160th air force group from Fort Campbell, marine and commando team SEAL-6, as well as the 23rd air force. Later on, "Delta" was expanded with the 5th and 7th groups for special warfare and the 4th battalion for psychological warfare. Some 3,000 people had had some experience only in the 5th group in Vietnam, many of whom later became advisors on special operations. Colonel Charles Backwhite, head of the special group that went to Iran and flopped there, accepted the task of rejuvenating the "Delta" group and improving it to the satisfactory level.

Members of the "Delta" group are usually recruited from "Green Berets" and "Rangers" people, and all undergo preliminary, very rigorous tests. Only the initial training for a member of this special unit costs about US\$ 30,000; thus, these are very costly soldiers. It is estimated that, in a broader sense, the unit includes about 150 active fighters and support staff. Operation detachment - companies can be made up of a typical four-men patrol to groups of two, eight, fourteen and sixteen people. There are three types of strike groups: A, B, and C. Type A raid group is made up of two officers and 12 noncommissioned officers of defined specialties: three for combat actions and intelligence, two for mining operation, two experts for U.S. and foreign weapons, one for logistics and two for medical aid. Still, members of the U.S. army special unit, famous "Delta" have no track record of any successful operation. The media alarm around "Delta" preparations for the Bosnia operation was only the result of U.S. temptation to use such a unit when they had it at their disposal anyway.

There were, indeed, some attempts in Republika Srpska, but none of them ended successfully. The operation of July 6th, 1996 was virtually an attempt to enter the underground command of the Republika Srpska army general staff in Crna Rijeka and capture General Ratko Mladic. That morning, actually, a line of U.S. armored and mechanized vehicles, supported by helicopters and a few F-16 aircrafts "hovering" in the air above the scene, started from four directions towards Han Pijesak planning to go to the Crna Rijeka gorge which hides the underground commanding post, built as early as during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the reign of King Alexander, and modified and expanded later on for the needs of the Supreme Commander of SFRJ Armed Forces, Marshall Tito. At the entrance to Han Pijesak, the U.S. brigade commander, Colonel Batista, was first stopped by officers of Republika Srpska army general staff headed by Mladen Gvero. Colonel Batista, escorted by two members of the U.S. military police,

tried to justify his troops movements by the need to make on-site inspection of two suspicious positions of Serbian tanks. A satellite shot had reportedly showed that two Serbian tanks were not in the warehouse but on the position. The Serbian officers' explanation that Americans should take another look at the newest satellite shots and make sure that there were no Serbian tanks there was simply ignored by Colonel Batista, who pointed out that he had "received the order to enter Crna Rijeka and investigate the scene". The commander of the protection regiment of VRS General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sarovic warned the U.S. colonel that "he would not be able to enter Crna Rijeka with his soldiers, and even if he managed to do so by some chance, they would most certainly not get out of Crna Rijeka". Batista ignored this warning as well and went to his "Bradley" infantry combat vehicle accompanied by General Mladen Gvero's farewell: "If you start towards Crna Rijeka, Mr. Colonel, see you in heaven."

During the altercation between Serbian and U.S. officers, people blocked U.S. tanks and armored vehicles, and it was followed by arguing and shoving, swearing, and even spitting. One U.S. "hammer" vehicle was overturned, another was put on fire. Some U.S. soldiers were divested of their rifles and guns. The rifles were later returned, guns "got lost". In the meantime, while the commotion on the access road to Han Pijesak was increasing, an English gentleman arrived from the sky: British General Willey landed in the helicopter wishing to resolve the incident. Having explained to General Gvero that "all this was an American show, but that he still had to check the spots where Serbian tanks had reportedly been spotted, and these are right next to the underground command, so could he have a look at it personally, accompanied by General Gvero?" Naturally, General Gvero agreed, the British general got into the Serbian combat vehicle and started towards Crna Rijeka. The gorge was already engulfed by darkness; besides, it was quite foggy, the road was narrow, bordered on a rumbling mountain river deep below on the one side, and on a dense forest on the other; loud snapping of the trigger could be heard from the forest. The British general did not want to make a fuss about the on-site inspection and beside the first ditch, which could serve as a sort of cover for tanks, he concluded briefly: "O.K., I've seen everything, there are no tanks, I am satisfied, let's go back." While Colonel Batista was awaiting the British general's return locked in his combat vehicle with people jumping on its roof, his two escorts fled into the forest. Since it was dark there, they probably thought that it was better to be among Serbian people after all, so they returned to the road across the slope. The whole circus got the additional element, since crafty local drinks sellers put up stands with brandy and beer by the road right away, knowing that IFOR members had not tasted either for months already. The happening was perfect, since IFOR commanders asked General Gvero to give them armed escort for their return to bases since it was night, for Goodness sake. General Gvero was really merciless: "You came on your own, so return on your own as well."

This event, together with General Ratko Mladic's absolute absence from public life and total military compliance to Dayton provisions by the Serbian side, all these together resulted in the statement by Carl Buildt's assistant, German diplomat Michael Steiner to the Serbian side during their recent conversation in Banjaluka: "It seems that you have managed to keep General Mladic. And you did not even ask for Milosevic!"

Marking the anniversary of the creation of Dayton-made Bosnia, U.S. politicians were truly concerned about their army's destiny on this part of the Balkans. This, in turn, made CIA worried. "Fighting could flare up again in Bosnia if the USA and other international peacekeeping forces withdraw from that country by the end of 1996, as provided for by Clinton's administration's plan," CIA Deputy Director and Director of the military intelligence agency DIA stated in October 1996. John Gennon and General Patrick Hewes - two high-ranking officials in the U.S. intelligence - were speaking in front of the Senate Committee on Intelligence Service. Giving similar assessments of the frail peace in Bosnia, they both predicted that some international forces would have to stay longer, in order to stop Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats from taking to arms again: "Generally speaking, any further U.S. participation is a prerequisite many countries demand in order to remain engaged themselves." Although the CIA's and DIA's testimonies dovetailed with the views by many officials who had been in the field in Bosnia, in October 1996 it contradicted the administration's public rhetorics according to which the existing NATO forces for the accord implementation could withdraw without the risk of the renewed war.

On behalf of CIA, John Gennon publicly admitted that the removal of the ousted Bosnian Serbs leader Dr. Radovan Karadzic was the "fundamental" prerequisite for free and honest national elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in September 1996. "I believe that the intelligence agency estimates that, if Karadzic stays, political environment will hardly be suitable for organizing legitimate elections and the Bosnian union in general." Gennon said it only a week after the main Dayton negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, in the capacity of a special State Department envoy, accepted the agreement based on which Karadzic withdrew from the office of the leader of Bosnian Serbs' political party, stopped appearing in public, but remained in the country. The epilogue is known to the public: what CIA estimated was done. Karadzic withdrew, the elections took place, the so-called Dayton-made Bosnia came to life, and the US decided to keep their troops on the Balkans in 1997 as well, while IFOR forces changed their name to SFOR and also remained in Bosnia. According to U.S. assessments, however, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milosevic, Dayton accord signatories, did not do their best to implement the new Bosnian brotherhood and unity. For this reason, they had to receive a visit from the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a special Bill Clinton's envoy, in May 1997, who threatened them. Izetbegovic and Tudjman with sanctions, and Milosevic even with arresting his famous Serbs and taking them to the Hague. This threat was, in his own way, repeated by General George Joulwan, NATO's commander-in-chief, who at about the same time stated that he was waiting for "the order by U.S. political leadership to arrest Serbian leaders in Republika Srpska." Based on such information, the Muslim lobby in the U.S. offered NATO ten million dollars for Radovan Karadzic's and Ratko Mladic's arrest, within the project "Committee for the Salvation of Peace in Bosnia" headed by professor Michael Sells on the Internet.

Death on the Gradina Lake

On July 4th, 1997, London *Guardian* announced that, following the capture of Slavko Dokmanovic, Karadzic's and Mladic's arrests could take place during the new session of NATO Command, in the fall of 1997. In the same time, *Los Angeles Times* advised the

world public that for six months already CIA and DIA had been making operational plan for arresting Dr. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who were declared to be "major hindrances for the implementation of the Dayton accord and peace in Bosnia" by the White House, through their spokesman Nicholas Burns, in July 1997. Bill Clinton reportedly did not give his consent to the implementation of this plan by CIA and DIA, and "postponed it until an appropriate political moment". At the NATO summit in Madrid, however, the U.S. president was commenting on the current conflict between Dr. Biljana Plavsic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic about the control in Republika Srpska and stated that he believed that "Karadzic and Mladic should be arrested and taken to the Hague". This statement was complemented by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who announced in Madrid that U.S. would ask from NATO the "well-coordinated operation of isolating Dr. Radovan Karadzic". Nicholas Burns, however, was more explicit: "Sooner or later, we shall see Karadzic and Mladic in the Hague!"

Two days later, this Clinton's statement of July 8th, 1997 was followed by a major SFOR's raid in Prijedor, when they killed Simo Drljaca, head of Serbian local police and Serbian camp for Muslims, and arrested and took to the Hague doctor Milan - Mico Kovacevic. This operation had its secret name "Tango". Therein, DIA gave logistic support to SFOR forces or, more precisely, provided the transportation of British special unit and U.S. military police and organized their retreat from Prijedor. By DIA order, the special unit members were transported even by the International Red Cross vehicles. The way in which Simo Drljaca was killed by Americans in the village of Gradina near Prijedor was described, to Belgrade reporters, by his son Sinisa:

"That morning (Thursday, July 10th), I woke up around 9:30. I slept on the lake, in the village of Gradina near Prijedor, where my father, uncle and I were spending the vacation. Uncle invited me for a coffee. We sat at the wooden table, by the lake. When we finished the coffee, we called father to come from the beach and have breakfast. He was in the boat, he had been fishing on the lake before that. Father came and sat down with us. During the breakfast we were all in our bathing drawers. All of a sudden, we were attacked by a group of special-unit soldiers. I think there were about 15 people, who jumped in front of us out of three cars. Two of them were civilians - one in white pants and black shirt, the other in blue T-shirt and uniform. The two of them were carrying guns and motorolas, while the others, uniformed, were armed to their teeth. They ordered uncle and me to lie on the ground, while six soldiers threw themselves to on my father. He shook them off, started running towards the beach, but they overcame him and pressed him on to the ground. That was the last thing I saw clearly, since a uniformed black man pressed the gun to my head, ordered me to put my face into an anthill and not to look up...

I heard two shots and a moan. I turned instinctively and saw blood. Father had, I think, already been dead. I spotted blood on his chest, right in the area of heart (he was lying on his side). One of the two civilians was holding a gun in his hand. He said, in English: "Look what he did to me! Damned fucking bastard! Moron. Freak, freak!" Suddenly, he spoke in Serbian: "Rascal, rascal, lie down! Lie down!"

The soldiers that attacked us on the lake had, on their uniforms, on the left shoulder, U.S. flag. On their chest, on the front pockets, also on the left side, they had their names written, while on the right side the inscription read clearly: "U.S. NAVY. They had U.S. guns M-16 with lenses and flashlights on the barrels. As for the guns, they were carrying "beret 92F". They were speaking in short, brusque sentences that revealed American accent. I understood everything they said - I can speak English very well.

They called a chopper. Father was lifted by four men, two took him by hands, another two by legs. They threw him over the fence. They really threw him, like a sack! Although a stretcher arrived from somewhere, they did not put him on the stretcher, but threw him directly in the chopper labeled with the Red Cross sign. When the chopper took off, they split into two groups. One was keeping watch on me and my uncle, and the other was searching father's car, which was nearby, the trailer we were staying in and the tent. Soon afterwards, they threw us into a chopper as well. They tied our hands with their black, stretching disposable handcuffs and tightened them so hard that our blood could not flow at all. During the flight we were lying on the chopper floor, by the open door. The soldiers did not speak. They had two rifles pointed to my head. One of the soldiers then put his foot on my head. When he got bored with it, he sat on my head. As far as I could see, they had a rifle pointed to my uncle's back, in the area of shoulder blades.

We landed on a glade. The chopper was greeted by an officer, he had two or three stars; he was probably the leader of this operation. They put some papers over our heads, and an interpreter said in Serbian: "These are your indictments, you have been charged with ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina!" I was looking at the indictments. They had no first or last names on them. They had no detail that would indicate that they referred to me and my uncle. After a while, a question followed: "Do you understand the charges?"

"I do," I answered (I do not know what else I could do at the moment).

I noticed that they were getting ready for transport again. Now the officer who I thought was the head of operation got into our chopper. This flight was much longer. At the Tuzla airport we were greeted by another guard team. The guys that had attacked us got into the chopper and flew off. We were left only with the officer who I think was the main guy in this operation. He was approached by a man for whom I later established, by his accent, that he was American. In his hand, he was holding a folder with: "Atlanta" written on it. He addressed the other one, the officer, in English: "Is this the guy?" "This is the guy," was the answer.

Then they took us to a prefabricated house-trailer. There, I recognized doctor Mica Kovacevic, director of the Prijedor hospital. My uncle sat next to him, and I sat beside my uncle. We were told that we were allowed to look only at a blue line on the wall. They warned us that we were not allowed to turn. Whenever one of us swerved his eyes, the soldiers guarding us would put a gun on our head and tell us to watch the line...

"Tango" operation was performed by the order of George Joulwan, the commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Europe and with the consent of William Crouch, also the U.S. commander at SFOR. It was publicly acknowledged then that SFOR and the Hague Tribunal had a secret list of suspected Serbs that were to be arrested, which included Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. The author of this list of suspected Bosnian Serbs was Michael Steiner, Carl Bildt's assistant, so this indictment was dubbed "Steiner's list" by reporters and by people. Simo Drljaca was entered on the list after Dusko Tadic's testimony in the Hague who, during his defense at trial, mentioned Drljaca as one of the Serbs who were the most responsible for crimes in camps of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje, while Dr. Milan - Mica Kovacevic was charged because he had organized reporters' visits to these camps for Muslims. Since, on July 14th, 1997, the Hague Tribunal sentenced Dusko Tadic on twenty years in prison, and Simo Drljaca had previously been killed, Serbian public got the impression that SFOR and NATO, i.e. Americans had sentenced Drljaca to death and executed the sentence themselves, without the Hague Tribunal, with four bullets in the head on the lake of Gradina. Apart from the killed Drljaca and arrested Kovacevic and Dokmanovic, Steiner's secret list included six more names: Milomir Stakic, Prijedor mayor, Velibor Ostojic, Deputy Prime Minister in the RS Government, Vojislav Maksimovic, a SDS official, Zeljko Raznatovic - Arkan, and two men from Croatia, Mladen Naletilic - Tuta and Tomislav Mercep. After Simo Drljaca's murder, SFOR representatives admitted, for the first time, that they had been authorized to arrest genocid suspects for four months already, since the Sintra session, since "they must not sleep peacefully, except in the Hague prison". SFOR received this mandate from the U.N., according to a resolution by the Security Council. U.S. leaders, primarily Bill Clinton and White House spokesman Nicholas Burns, also announced the need to arrest and deliver to the Hague Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. Reportedly, there already is CIA's special plan to this effect. At the end of conversation, we asked lawyer Nikola Kostic, who represents Republika Srpska, whether he believed in such possibility.

"That there is a plan by CIA for Karadzic's and Mladic's arrest, that I believe. That there is Bill Clinton's and White House' decision about the arrest, that I still cannot believe, since I think this operation is only a result of the continuation of media and political war by the U.S. against Serbs. What is it about? The U.S. and Federation BiH have not managed to implement the Dayton accord, since the Muslim-Croatian union neither exists nor works. Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman are to blame for this, but the White House believes that culprits are Serbs, i.e. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. And therefore the USA, NATO and U.N. now blame Serbs for the failure of Dayton accord and Dayton-made Bosnia.

According to the information provided by Belgrade magazine *Danas*, the consent for the hunt for Serbs accused of war crimes was also given by Dr. Biljana Plavsic, President of Republika Srpska. Plavsic allegedly also gave her consent to Madeleine Albright and ministers at the summit in the Portuguese city of Sintra. There were even rumours that Albright asked Plavsic to give Radovan Karadzic the offer to leave Republika Srpska and illegally move to Greece or Russia. According to U.S. sources, CIA and DIA were supporting Biljana Plavsic, since their analyses assessed her as a "major anti-communist

and the only fighter for the implementation of Dayton accord in Republika Srpska". They therefore suggested to the White House to support Biljana Plavsic as an "ally in the implementation of Dayton accord", which Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright really did. The response by the Pale critics of the President of Republika Srpska to such DIA, CIA and USA assessments was that Biljana Plavsic was surrounded by "CIA agents". Some of them were even named, Dr. Milos Prica, chief of staff, otherwise a Chicago physician, and Dr. Aleksandar Pavic, advisor to Biljana Plavsic. Pale police was even ready to offer, to the public, photos of the encounter between advisor Pavic and CIA agents in Republika Srpska. All this information fitted well into rumours, spreading across Belgrade in mid-July 1997, that Slobodan Milosevic had also promised to Madeleine Albright that he would deliver Dr. Radovan Karadzic, but used his conflict with the President of Republika Srpska to lay the blame for Karadzic betrayal on Biljana Plavsic.

NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana commented on the SFOR raid on Serbs only by saying that "SFOR must do their job properly". The operation of capturing Karadzic and Mladic was, for instance, announced in Austrian press for July 17th, 1997, and on CNN as a live broadcast of spectacular airdrop of two thousand American commandos on Bosnian Serbs. Also, the information percolated the world that DIA and SFOR helicopters circled over Han Pijesak daily, ready for airdrop. Even Serbian papers were covering in detail movements of General Ratko Mladic, who was vacationing at Rezevici in Montenegro, and of Radovan Karadzic, who was at his home on the outskirts of Pale. The information about General Mladic's stay in Montenegro made President Momir Bulatovic publicly express his dissatisfaction with his presence, which, in the summer of 1997, clearly indicated the view of Yugoslav high-ranking politicians that General Ratko Mladic, and therefore Dr. Radovan Karadzic as well, are personae non gratae on the territory of SRJ. Military analyst, Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic analyzed such behavior by Montenegrin president and deduced that the Intelligence Agency of Yugoslav army, Serbian state security agency and Vojvodina intelligence agency had all supplied CIA and DIA, i.e. SFOR and NATO, with their information about General Ratko Mladic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic's movements. Such SRJ view probably brought about the depression in former president of Republika Srpska, since a friend of his said that Radovan Karadzic had openly told him, in Pale, in mid-July 1997:

"If they try to arrest me, I will rather commit suicide than languish in their jail in the Hague. Since you can expect nothing short of life sentence from their trial. They sentenced me in advance, even without a trial. They all know I am not guilty, at least not more guilty than those who are chasing me. They need a scapegoat," said Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

In the U.S., Radovan Karadzic's arrest was represented, even by President Bill Clinton himself, as the "defense of U.S. security, and the defense of international ethics". His major advisors on this issue included Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Richard Holbrooke. As David Bydner wrote in a July issue of *Washington Post*, these arrests of Serbs across Republika Srpska were the "reflection of Clinton's overall policy towards former Yugoslavia". The direct consequence of such a view by the U.S. president was the establishment of a special Delta Force unit in the Muslim sector of Bosnia, aimed at??

preparation for Dr. Radovan Karadzic's arrest. On July 20th, eleven SFOR's armored vehicles supported by helicopters surrounded Dr. Radovan Karadzic's house. Pale inhabitants responded with violent words to this show-off of power by Americans, who withdrew about a hundred meter further. During the day, six APCs remained on the road leading to Karadzic's house, with helicopters still flying over it. This military operation in front of Dr. Radovan Karadzic's house, which is protected by a minefield, ensued only a day after a poster of the former president, with messages saying: "He means peace", and "He is freedom" had been pasted in a few cities of Republika Srpska. It was obvious that the U.S. and White House did not think so. Their official view was that Karadzic and Mladic were threatening both the peace and the peace process. His arrest was recommended to SFOR units through official channels, but only in case of "personal encounter and contact".

By the end of July, however, when Clinton advised Senate of his intention to intervene in the Dayton-made Bosnia, U.S. analysts were speaking of further delays in Karadzic's and Mladic's arrests due to high risk and the fear by the U.S. and DIA of repeating the Somalia case, when Americans lost eighteen soldiers in the operation of capturing coup participants. Even media speculated, particularly in Great Britain, that NATO will not engage U.S. Delta for this operation but rather the best anti-terrorist unit in the world - British SAS. The lack of certainty, or more accurately the fact that the operation of capturing Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic was a long-term one and planned both by SFOR and the Hague Tribunal, was also confirmed in an interview by Antonio Cassese, the president of this tribunal himself:

"We are close to resolution. In a year, we will have big fish as well. I myself had to write a sharp letter to Biljana Plavsic for her to deliver to us one of her men so that he can testify in the Hague. The activities have been sped up now, since the NATO mission in Bosnia ends in June 1998. And the Alliance has to achieve some results before the end of its mission. We have been exerting strong pressure on NATO for two years already. I am now convinced that we will have huge turnabouts in the next twelve months, by June 1998 they have to be arrested! It actually was, as London *Guardian* wrote on July 10th, 1997, the public message to the President of Serbia that, by chasing Karadzic and Mladic, the U.S. has actually started hunting him, Slobodan Milosevic.

CHAPTER 11 THE HUNT FOR MILOSEVIC

By the directive number 35 issued by President Bill Clinton, which was signed in 1994 and sent to Director John Deutch, Bosnia and Serbia were given "top priority" in CIA activities. That is why it was as early as in 1995 that the head of CIA John Deutch planned a business trip to Sarajevo, Zagreb, Pale and Belgrade, so that he could personally meet Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, Biljana Plavsic and Slobodan Milosevic. Meetings with presidents of Muslim Bosnia, Croatia, Republika Srpska, and Serbia took place in summer, early in July 1996. His first two talks, those with Izetbegovic and Tudjman respectively were publicized through CIA's information service, while the meetings with Dr. Plavsic and Milosevic remained a secret for the U.S.,

world, and Serbian public. In Pale, the CIA director had talks with Biljana Plavsic, Nikola Koljevic, and Aleksa Buha, in the office which was located only some fifty meters away from the residency of then already persecuted Radovan Karadzic. The meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, however, took place in the building of the Presidency of Serbia, in the Andricev venac neighborhood in Belgrade. The talks about "numerous significant matters" as defined by the CIA's spokesperson began at 10:20 a.m. and went on until 1 p.m. Thereupon, on Saturday, July 6th, 1996 John Deutch had lunch with the head of Serbian secret police Jovica Stanisic and his wife Gordana.

This was not the first encounter by Slobodan Milosevic or Jovica Stanisic with high-ranking officers of CIA and DIA. In the fall of 1995, before the president left for Dayton, the head of the Department of State Security of Serbia spent some time in the U.S. in order to, together with his colleagues, make arrangements about security measures and accomodation for Serbian delegation and those of Slobodan Milosevic himself in the State of Ohio. Besides, Jovica Stanisic had talks about CIA's and FBI's collaboration in training Serbian police forces in Republika Srpska, eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, as well as in Serbia proper. According to some unofficial sources, CIA and FBI participated in the search, capturing, questioning, and transportation to The Hague of people indicted of war crimes - Drazen Erdemovic and Radoslav Kremenovic. Milosevic also helped to arrange their meeting with deputy secretaries of state John Kornblum and John Shattuck in mid-March 1996. On that occasion, they ceremoniously declared that Erdemovic and Kremenovic would "probably be delivered to the Tribunal", and that is what actually happened.

President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic was a target of vivid interest of all U.S. secret services, especially of CIA, ever since his first appearance on the Yugoslav political scene. Former U.S. ambassador John Scanlon met Milosevic when he was the deputy to Lawrence Eagleburger:

"We met then because Slobodan Milosevic was the CEO of "Beobanka". But at the time, we did not see him as a political leader, only as a relatively young bank CEO. We did not have a clue that he would become a future leader of Yugoslavia, nor did we consider anyone to be strong enough to lead Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Milosevic was a banker, friendly, intelligent, spoke fluent English, and was pretty knowledgeable about international banking. I started seriously considering Milosevic a potential leader of this country in 1986 or 1987. Not before then. Moreover, I was greatly surprised when I returned in 1985 and saw that he was no more involved in banking. He was the head of the Municipal Committee, while Ivan Stambolic was the leader of the Party. At the time, there was a long list of people with whom we were on good terms and Milosevic was in the bottom of it. We did not see Milosevic as a leader until as late as 1987. It was then that he started to make his way."

One of the people from whom Americans wanted to cull some information, at the time, was his son-in-law, who was a diplomat in Japan between 1984 and 1996. At the time, Milosevic was the first man of the Municipal Committee of the Communist League of Belgrade. Nikola Misljenovic, born in Zemun, obtained a degree in diplomacy at the

Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade together with Jovica Stanisic, the present chief of Serbian secret police and his wife-to-be Gordana. Misljenovic started his foreign career in Manilla, as the third secretary, between 1977 and 1981. He went to Tokyo as the first secretary. He took with him his wife Marija, daughter of Slobodan Milosevic and Dr. Mira Markovic. They got married in the Municipality of Vracar and went to Japan right away. CIA was more interested in Slobodan Milosevic's son-in-law Nikola Misljenovic than in Marija, his daughter. The CIA agent operating in the U.S. embassy in Tokyo openly approached Yugoslav diplomat Misljenovic and told him that he was interested in "cooperation". He pointed out that CIA had "their people in the Yugoslav top" but that they knew little about Slobodan Milosevic. As a seasoned diplomat, Nikola Misljenovic immediately reported this encounter with the CIA agent to the SDB of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav secret police estimated that it was a case of "classic recruiting of a Belgrade diplomat" and ordered Nikola Misljenovic to return to Belgrade urgently. Thus, it happened that Nikola and Marija, the son-in-law and the daughter of the leader of Belgrade communists Slobodan Milosevic, left Japan and returned to Yugoslavia after two years and five months, in order to avoid troubles with CIA.

Besides the basic biographic data, Slobodan Milosevic's file includes the analysis of the Serbian president's psychological and political character, his conduct, from the manner of speaking and body language to methods of making economic, political, military and internationally significant decisions. Data on Slobodan Milosevic were collected from his acquaintances, friends, even relatives, but also from business partners and associates, then by analyzing newspaper writings, publications and books on the Milosevic family, of electronic reviews, especially TV Belgrade broadcasts, reports by diplomatic corps, U.S. politicians, and business people who had met Milosevic. Among them was the report by ambassador John Scanlon from the U.S. embassy to Belgrade. Here is what the ambassadors says about it:

"We were reporting, to Washington, on Serbian rallies and on the 95% Serbian people support to Slobodan Milosevic. He was trying to decrease the autonomy of two provinces within Serbia, so that initially Serbian people had palpable right to complain and rebel, all until this became too militant, too emotional, with the increase in belligerent nationalism."

CIA also collected data about Milosevic from the files of other foreign intelligence agencies, such as those from Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Italy, Germany, even Russia. CIA analyses, for instance, include data on how many times Milosevic uses words "I" or "if" in his speech or official talks, since it could indicate his determination or hesitation in negotiations. Such portraying at CIA and DIA is a part of these intelligence agencies' routine. It arose from the need to predict the behavior by world leaders and key people in certain troubled regions significant for U.S. interests. For instance, CIA sent a few messages to the last U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann that Slobodan Milosevic did not want to receive him, because he had attended talks with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina. This news made Milosevic so mad that he even swore, CIA agents wrote. U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann never had a nice opinion of Slobodan Milosevic or of Serbia. Perhaps because they were in a permanent conflict, since Zimmermann could not

suppress his desire to intermeddle into Republic of Serbia's internal affairs. The two of them, Zimmermann and Milosevic, did not speak to each other for a long time because of Kosovo. Serbian president was angry because the U.S. ambassador did not show up at Gazimestan in 1989, at the celebration of the six-century anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Zimmermann's no-show brought about the absence of other few important diplomatic representatives of foreign countries to Belgrade. Zimmermann justified his absence with the insulting statement that he "did not approve of nationalistic fairs and feasts", be it the celebration of a great historical battle crucial for the Serbian people in the Balkans. In his memoirs, referencing contacts with Lawrence Eagleburger, the last U.S. ambassador wrote the following about the Serbian president:

"Eagleburger admitted to me a certain trepidation about renewing his acquaintance with Milosevic, whom he had known in the late 1970s, when he was U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia and Milosevic was a banker. "I thought he was a liberal; he talked so convincingly about westernizing Yugoslavia's economy. I just must have been wrong." I don't think Eagleburger was wrong. In his prenationalist phase Milosevic probably did sound like an economic liberal; indeed, he continued to pass himself off as an economic reformer even after Serbian nationalism had pushed economic issues off his agenda. It was his ability to remake - in the modern cliché "reinvent" - himself that made him so impressive. What Eagleburger saw on his return to Yugoslavia was a new color on the skin of the most artful chameleon in the Balkans. Eagleburger expressed concern that Yugoslavia was lurching toward nationalism, separatism, and major violations of human rights. "Why are you blaming Serbia for this? Are you saying that we're the only ones responsible?" asked Milosevic. "My impression is that all of you are responsible," Eagleburger countered. Milosevic challenged Eagleburger's emphasis on human rights. The deputy secretary answered, "The United States has a legitimate commitment to defending human rights. Beyond that we have a right to decide how we use our taxpayers' money or which countries to advise our businesses to invest in. If we choose to give priority to countries with good human rights records, that's our choice to make."

"On political issues, Milosevic argued that a unified Yugoslavia was the only political formation that made it possible for all Serbs to live in one country. His formula for unity was uncompromising - a tight federation with minimal autonomy for the republics. He professed not to have anything against a multiparty system but stressed that it had to operate on a Yugoslav and not a republican basis - "It wouldn't work in Serbia." What emerged was a defense of the preservation of Yugoslavia, but in a rigid mold defined by Serbian interests as defined by Milosevic. He made one comment which was soon to take on ominous overtones: "Serbs live all over Yugoslavia. The unity of Yugoslavia is the only way they can live in one country."

Portrait of the Serbian Leader and Serbian Country

Late in 1996, CIA's communications department circulated the abbreviated biography of Slobodan Milosevic, which could be used internally only by specially accredited reporters. On October 7th, 1996, thanks to our colleagues from the U.S., we obtained this

official note which was labelled as "Lesson on the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic". It says:

Age: 54
Place of birth: Pozarevac, Serbia, 1941
Family: Father, Serbian Orthodox priest, mother - teacher and communist activist - both parents committed suicide
Religion: Serbian Orthodox
Education: Degree in law from the University of Belgrade in 1964
Career: Economist, President of the Bankers' Association in Belgrade, director of "Tehnogas" and Beobanka, leader of the Communist Party of Belgrade 1984 leader of the Communist Party of Serbia
Reputation: At times dubbed "Balkan butcher", since accused of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of war crimes, likes Italian cigars and Scotch
Politics: Former member of SKJ, leading member of the Serbian Socialist Party
Elections: Elected President of Serbia before the breakup of SFRJ in 1989 and re-elected President of Serbia
Goals: Wants international sanctions on Serbia lifted

Serbia and Montenegro

Same as the other former republics of Yugoslavia, Serbia also has its separate file, with special maps, in CIA headquarters. The political map of Serbia, for instance, includes accurately traced borders of Montenegro, but of Vojvodina and Kosovo as well, and cities of Novi Sad, Belgrade, Pristina, and Podgorica. CIA's ethnic map of Serbia includes the structure and distribution of nations and minorities in the republic, in the alphabetical order: Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs, Slovaks. The map of Serbian industry, in turn, includes drawn-in symbols of large industrial facilities, from metallurgy and heavy industry, through oil industry to chemical industry and agriculture in the cities of Subotica, Novi Sad, Pancevo, Smederevo, Belgrade, Kragujevac, Krusevac, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina and Podgorica. CIA also offers to curious Americans four pages of statistical data on Serbia and Montenegro, then the personnel list of leaders of these republics and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro have formally separate and independent states, but these entities are not formally recognized by the U.S., see SFRJ, nor do they have the right to represent the continuity of SFRJ.

Location: Southeastern Europe, access to the Adriatic Sea, between Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Land area: 102,126 square kilometer, somewhat larger than Kentucky; Serbia covers 88,412 km², like Maine; Montenegro area is 13,938 km², somewhat larger than Connecticut.

Length of borders: 2,246 km: with Albania 287 km (114 km Serbia, 173 km Montenegro), with BiH 527 km (312 km Serbia, 215 km Montenegro), with Bulgaria 318 km, with Croatia 241 km in the north, 25 km in the south, with Hungary 151 km, with Macedonia 221 km, with Romania 476 km.

Highest mountain peak: Daravica 2,656m

Resources: oil, gas, antimony, zinc, nickel, gold, pyrite, chrome
Geographic characteristics: control over a major road from Western Europe to Turkey and the Middle East; strategic location towards the Adriatic Sea
Population: total: 10,614,558 (July 1996 census); Montenegro: 635,442; Serbia: 9,979,116; 0.39% growth increment
Ethnic composition: Serbs 63%, Albanians 14%, Montenegrins 6%, Hungarians 4%, others 13%
Religion: Orthodox 65%, Muslims 19%, Roman Catholics 4%, Protestants 1%, others 11%
Language: Serbocroatian 95%, Albanian 5%
Government: Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" unilaterally, but the USA do not recognize its continuity with the SFRJ
Symbol: Serbia - SR; Montenegro - MN
Type of government: republic
Capital: Belgrade
Administrative units: 2 republics; and two autonomous provinces "Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Vojvodina"
National holiday: Vidovdan, June 28th
Statehood day: April 27th, 1992

Hard Nut to Crack

Cyrus Vance' right hand, ambassador Herbert Ocan with spy-like manners, has highly-interesting opinion of Slobodan Milosevic, as described by Duska Jovanic:

"Milosevic is a hard nut to crack. A well-known American saying can be applied to him: "He is a person whose deeds speak louder than words!" Tudjman is also a story for himself - he is interested only in great deeds and, naturally, in Great Croatia. After Tito, Yugoslavia was ruled by republic communist mafias. It was in this sense that Ante Markovic's defeat marked the end of the Yugoslav idea. Americans then turned to Milosevic, they got scared of Seselj and compared to him Milosevic seemed a far more acceptable and reasonable solution. The question asked to the former CIA director, whether Milosevic had become a U.S. agent, received the negative answers by Admiral Stansfield Turner:

"We were, indeed, placing our people in Central and South America as heads of governments in these banana republics. We would never recruit Milosevic, he is too tactless and uncompromising for our taste. He may have been recruited by another agency, such as MI5 or KGB, but certainly not by CIA!"

In Robert Gates' time, Serbian president was officially assessed as an "unpredictable" politician, while John Deutch already described him as a "predictable and stable" collocutor, "in touch with reality". This file and such an assessment were given by CIA to Richard Holbrooke, who was going to Belgrade for negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic, and who managed to agree with the Serbian president about the conditions for making peace in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for signing of the Erdut and

Dayton agreements, i.e. for the return of Krajina and Slavonija to Croatia's auspices. Pentagon and CIA, for instance, directly associated the defeat of Krajina Serbs in the summer of 1995 to Slobodan Milosevic, to Serbia and Yugoslav army, who remained neutral. Such a move by President Slobodan Milosevic clearly shows that he decided to cut all ties to Krajina Serbs and thus leave "Western Serbs" to their fate. With this move, Milosevic also put at risk the internal stability of the country, which will certainly be shaken by the inflow of tens of thousands of refugees, as well as by potential national fury due to the obvious collective humiliation, CIA analysts estimated. The Krajina events made Washington start acting aggressively in Bosnia. Regardless of the fact that the instructions by government institutions and agencies (Pentagon and CIA) increasingly entangled the U.S. into the Bosnian quagmire, the trust in military intervention was growing.

A series of meetings of CIA and DIA directors and President's advisors on security and foreign affairs in Washington that took place in mid-August 1995 resulted in the consensus in the assessment of the Serbian president as follows: 1. Milosevic will never allow visible intervention by Yugoslav army in Bosnia, since it could lead to the direct confrontation between Serbia and the world; 2. At the moment, the morale and defense potential of Bosnian Serbs are at the lowest possible level - and they are not able to defend themselves on a few fronts; 3. Bosnian Serbs will not be able to ward off military pressure by NATO and the pressure from the U.N.; 4. Milosevic desperately wants the sanctions on his country to be lifted and will therefore continue with his agreement about Bosnia if necessary, which will indirectly be in favor of Americans who, in turn, find this situation more suitable than direct negotiations with Bosnian Serbs; 5. The top of Yugoslav army is in utter disarray. Demoralized, as they are at the moment, they will present no threat to NATO's operations in Bosnia, nor to Milosevic's ambitions in Serbia. 6. Russians are preoccupied with the situation in Chechnya, Jeltsin's health and local elections, so that chances of obstructions from their side are nil. These estimates opened the door for Richard Holbrook to Slobodan Milosevic. Here is how this American describes this meeting and the Serbian president, as well as his ties with Serbs from Republika Srpska:

"Our first meeting with the Serbian leader, on August 17th, lasted five hours and gave no indications that Milosevic had changed anything in his views. He was smart, shrewd, and evasive. We thought he was playing a game - word games devoid of substance. The meeting left me disappointed; I thought that perhaps I had not been open enough and I therefore asked for another meeting. Early in the morning, Frasure, Nelson Drew of the National Security Council, and myself were taken for the second time into a large meeting room in the Presidential Palace in Belgrade. Milosevic took an armchair a few feet from where I sat at the end of the sofa, which also seated Bob and Nelson. His Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic chose another soft chair facing us directly, and Goran Milinovic, always the loyal staff officer, sat close by, taking notes. It was a room we would come to know well in the next seven months. Milosevic had a penetrating gaze. He would fix the interlocutor with his small eyes, and nobody could deny a certain crude attractiveness of his face, which strangely resembled that of a chubby boy. His presence was strongly felt. He was smart and memorized facts easily. Because of his success in

stirring up Serbian fanaticism, he was considered by many as an extreme nationalist, but as a matter of fact he was not deeply involved in nationalism: he only made use of it in order to gain power. It stood in stark contrast to the motives of his former allies - the truly racist leaders of Bosnian Serbs, who showered Sarajevo with mortars and shells. Still, we held Milosevic responsible for the aggression. As the most powerful Serb in former Yugoslavia, he was using his power to instigate war against Croats and Muslims, hoping that he would unify Serbs in all parts of these territories under a single banner.

This morning, it was clear that nothing had changed. Thinking of difficulties we would face each time we tried to reach Sarajevo, I said: "Mister President, it is disgraceful for the United States of America that President Clinton's peace mission has to travel to Sarajevo by the most dangerous route in Europe. You claim to want peace. I ask you now to arrange for us to fly to Sarajevo directly without any interference from Bosnian Serbs."

Milosevic said in his excellent English: "You're right. I'll try," and turned to his assistant. When Milišević left the room, Milosevic said: "I'm sending a message to General Mladic." We were stunned by this piece of evidence of the direct connection between Milosevic and Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, who had recently been indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal. Twenty minutes later, Milišević returned and handed a piece of paper to his boss. "Mladic says the airport is too dangerous," Milosevic said. "He cannot guarantee that you would not be shot down by Muslims or Croats." I smiled at this transparent witticism. "Everyone knows," I said, "that the only danger at the Sarajevo airport is from Serb gunners ringing the hills around it." But Milosevic was not finished. "Mladic says you can fly to Kiseljak and go in by road from there," he added. "You will be completely safe."

Owing to Madeleine Albright's efforts in New York, and efforts by Leon Fuerth, foreign affairs advisor to Vice-President Gore, conclusions proposed by CIA and DIA became the basis of the plan for new negotiating action. According to some individuals who attended meetings about Bosnia in July and August 1995, this idea of action was strongly supported by Anthony Lake, thanks to whom this plan was soon incorporated into the general policy, which in turn puts a special emphasis on the following items:

1. Through NATO, U.N. and Contact Group, USA will continuously increase pressure on Bosnian Serbs, by extending their international isolation. Massive air strikes will significantly decrease Bosnian Serbs' capabilities of continuing the war, and in the same time make them beg for peace.
2. The U.S. will win European support for air actions against Serbs by constantly assuring them that Serbs actually want to break up the North Atlantic Treaty. The U.S. will also advocate negotiations, but NATO's military actions will eventually replace the negotiating process and thus become policy in its own right.
3. Civilian officials of the U.N. must be prevented from affecting military strikes on Serbs by their decisions.
4. Border lines will be drawn around safe areas. If Bosnian Serbs violate them, they will momentarily be subjected to massive air campaign.
5. The concept of "Great Serbia" must finally be filed away and, in the same time, it should be insisted upon Milosevic's recognition of international borders of Bosnia and Croatia. By recognizing Bosnia as a unified, but also decentralized state, Serbs will obtain a great

degree of autonomy, as well as the opportunity to create economic and cultural ties with Serbia. 6. The agreement must also include Milosevic's consent to eastern Slavonia's reintegration into the Republic of Croatia. This reintegration period has to be strictly agreed upon, and cannot be longer than two years following the signing of agreement. In the course of this period, Milosevic himself will have to grant autonomy to Kosovo. 7. All steps must be taken aimed at the soonest possible demobilization of Serbian forces in Bosnia. The same process should be applied to other parts of former Yugoslavia as well. 8. As the award for Milosevic's full cooperation in efforts to reach "honest" agreement in Bosnia, the U.S. agree to lift international sanctions against Yugoslavia, while retaining bilateral economic and financial sanctions including the veto power on any aid to Yugoslavia by international financial institutions, until Serbia offers a true proof of respecting national minorities, and of active cooperation with The Hague Tribunal for War Crimes.

Carrot-and-Stick Policy

These eight items represented the essence, as Obrad Kesic, M.A., told me, of Holbrooke's peace initiative and talks with the Serbian President. However, the affability with which Milosevic received Holbrooke, as well as Milosevic's indifference about air strikes, alleviated Clinton's fear. U.S. delegation was surprised by smiles accompanying the concessions, since its members expected heavy words during the meeting. One of the State Department officials gave the following description of the meeting between Milosevic and Holbrooke: "I must admit that I was very surprised by Milosevic's lukewarm reaction to the air strikes we made only for the form's sake." According to U.S. estimates, Slobodan Milosevic was affected by bombing of Serb positions so much that he himself suggested to Richard Holbrooke negotiations with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Here is what Holbrooke writes about his meeting with the three Serbian leaders:

"Warren Christopher and I decided that we should negotiate only with Milosevic, and hold him responsible for Bosnian Serbs' conduct. Both Karadzic and Mladic had recently been indicted for war crimes. The question was: should we meet with them? I was deeply influenced by the stories of Raoul Wallenberg and Folke Bernadotte, two legendary Swedes who had negotiated, respectively, with Adolf Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler in 1944 and 1945. As our plane descended toward the military airport in Belgrade, we all decided that we should meet Karadzic and Mladic if it could help the negotiating process. Two hours after the landing, on September 13th, 1995, we met Milosevic in a hunting lodge outside Belgrade. We were struck by the change in his tone. Clearly the bombing was making some effect. Milosevic seemed in a rush to end bombing. Not for the first time, we knew that the chances for a viable peace would increase if bombing continued, at least for a while. Milosevic liked surprising people with unexpected changes in his views or mood. On this day, September 13th, having talked for almost an hour, he unveiled his big surprise: "Karadzic and Mladic are in another villa, about two hundred meters away," he said. "Why don't we ask them to join us?" "Mister President," I said, wishing to slow down the developments, "we are ready to meet with them, but with two conditions. First, they must be part of your delegation - you must lead the discussions,

and you must control them. Second, they must not give us a lot of historical bullshit, as they have with everyone else. They must be ready for serious discussions." "They will agree," Milosevic said.

A few minutes later, a couple of Mercedes sedans pulled up in the driveway. Two men stepped out of the car. As they approached us, we saw their unmistakable silhouettes: Karadzic, tall with a wild shock of hair, in a suit; Mladic, short and burly, in combat fatigues, walking as though through a muddy field. I did not shake hands with Karadzic and Mladic, although they tried to. Some of our team did, others did not; it was their choice. We all sat down at a long table on the patio facing each other. Karadzic, speaking partly in English and partly in Serbian, described the bombing as unfair. Casting a glance at Mladic, it occurred to me that Hollywood could not find a more convincing war villain. The General did not speak. He only glowered at each of us separately. Contrary to him, Karadzic was on his best behavior. He showed no sign of the qualities that had led even a cautious observer like Warren Zimmermann to label him the 'Himmler of his generation," Holbrooke wrote.

For the first time, I spoke directly to Karadzic. "Let me tell you something," I said, my voice rising. "We work only for President Clinton. We take orders only from President Clinton. That is all there is to it."

Milosevic said something to him in low voice, and Karadzic proposed that the Americans produce the draft agreement which would end bombing and stop battles around Sarajevo. I agreed and asked Clark, Owen, Hill, and Pardew to work on a document that would end the siege of Sarajevo. For the next half an hour, while the team members were bent over their notebooks, Milosevic and I," Richard Holbrooke writes, "walked around the garden. Those guys, he said meaning the Bosnian Serbs, "are so cut off from the world they think Carter still determines American policy."

The result of these talks could soon be seen. After the Geneva agreement, Milosevic and his party stated that a significant success had been achieved. Everybody in Yugoslavia were talking about this success loud and clear, but were silent about NATO bombing, leaving it to Russians, Greeks, and Cypriots to loudly express their condemnations of the strikes on Republika Srpska. U.S. administration officials interpret such indifference by Belgrade as a clear sign of Milosevic's allegiance to peace and peace process. However, they also associate such behavior by the Serbian president with Milosevic's desperate expectations for the sanctions to finally be lifted. In private conversations and unofficial meetings, however, U.S. officials are saying that Holbrooke believes that Milosevic would like to see General Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serbs with their horns tucked in, which came true owing to the NATO ultimatum. The Belgrade silence came as a blessing for armchair-warriors in Washington, D.C. This Milosevic's silence allowed Bill Clinton and his administration to incorporate, into the negotiating process, the lift and strike military tactics!

Some diplomats believe that Holbrooke managed to convince Milosevic that he should develop and strengthen leftist forces in interior affairs and, through them, use the

inclination of a great part of electorate toward the revival of the Fourth Yugoslavia and unification of Balkan countries. Such an option, which actually was CIA and U.S. political trap, according to diplomats, was mostly accepted thanks to the assertiveness of an experienced intelligence agent and negotiator such as Holbrooke. Obrad Kesic, M.A., describes Holbrooke's opinion of Milosevic:

"Publicly, Holbrooke was adhering to the principle - U.S. does not interfere directly into internal affairs of "Yugoslav" states but will, quite certainly, support those people who signed the Dayton accord and promised to implement it. It can be seen from the change of the U.S. administration's official view on Mr. Milosevic. Only a few months ago he was accused of war crimes, as the cause of everything that happened in these regions. Now Mr. Holbrooke declares, not accidentally, that he is convinced that there will be no arrest warrant for Mr. Milosevic from The Hague. Holbrooke's statement was followed by similar ones from State Department, which make it clear and evident that the USA gave up their previous rhetorics.

Crafty but Predictable

Even so assessed, Milosevic was the most suitable contact for Americans by the end of 1995. And Serbia seemed to them the best ally for peace in the Balkans. U.S. intelligence agent Marten van Heuven also spoke publicly about it. His text was published in the respectable Washington, D.C. journal *Foreign Policy* in the fall of 1995. He showed which direction CIA's thoughts were taking and was the first reliable sign of a great turnabout in Clinton's administration and their opting for Serbia as a support in the future Balkan policy. It was in this context that even Slobodan Milosevic was at least a temporary ally America was positively counting on. Heuven writes:

"Whatever the scenario for Serbia over the next two to five years, it will be the key power in the Balkans by the virtue of its central location, newly acquired size, Serb ethnic cohesion, cultural ethos, military capacity, and strong-willed leadership. Serbia will inevitably exercise hegemonic influence. Moreover, Serbia still has friends in Moscow. It can, provided the right circumstances, also draw on historical associations with Great Britain and France. Given Serbia's strengths and the relative weakness of its neighbours, Serbian influence in and around what used to be Yugoslavia will be considerable.

In the Balkans, there are no obvious candidates to lead an effective policy of isolating Serbia. Further, none of the major European countries - Britain, France, or Germany - will be willing or able to lead a European attempt to isolate Serbia over the medium term and beyond. The alternative option is to take today's situation as a point of departure for a carrot-and-stick approach. Through a sustained combination of incentives and disincentives, the West should allow Serbia to escape the position of international pariah by patiently but persistently negotiating changes in its conduct.

Important elements of the approach would be Serbian provisional - and later permanent - agreement with Croatia and Bosnia on borders; respect for the territorial integrity and independence of the two states, Macedonia, and other neighbours; adequate guarantees

for the protection of minorities; basic human rights for the Albanian population in Kosovo; and a good faith effort by Belgrade to help deal with the consequences of displaced refugees. Serbia would, in due course, participate in the organizations from which it is now suspended; it would be eligible to receive West European regional economic assistance; and it could once again turn to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. A mixture of those elements would establish major incentives for Serbia to assume a responsible role in Balkan security and reconstruction

Serbs have changed the map of the Balkans. Except for a major military intervention from the West, nothing can make them back down. The road to peaceful and progressive Balkans must lead through Belgrade. Serbia must be offered carrot as well, since the policy of stick alone will not succeed. External factors - European union above all - will play and have to play a major role since they are re-drawing border lines in Southern Europe. The goal of stable Balkans can be achieved only through the cooperation with all political elements of former Yugoslavia, including its most significant and most influential member - Serbia.

A special committee of the Carnegie Endowment and Aspen Institute from Washington, D.C. gave their warning conclusion to so "mellow" Slobodan Milosevic. This conclusion was also used by CIA and State Department: "There is no point in denying that Milosevic has become the key political 'partner' of the West. It would, however, be very dangerous to consider Milosevic the only partner and encourage the impression that the implementation of Dayton requirements give him 'free hands' in Serbia and in Kosovo. Milosevic understood his role in Dayton as doing a 'favor' to the international community which, in return, gave him 'free hands' at home. It is the second interpretation of the post-Dayton worsening of the course on the interior level. 'Free hands' mean the comeback of his true political nature."

The head of Yugoslav Bureau in the U.S. administration, George Kinney, also organized a meeting of CIA experts about Serbs, Yugoslavia, and Slobodan Milosevic. David Bidner, the *New York Times* reporter, says:

"By the end of 1993, CIA organized a meeting of their analysts and six external experts on Yugoslavia, in their Langley headquarters, where they agreed that the sanctions against Yugoslavia could not be held for long. And that Slobodan Milosevic was the only Serb in former Yugoslavia that lends himself to cooperation. They also agreed, unanimously, that there was a possibility of the creation of both Great Serbia and Great Croatia in the Balkans. Official minutes were made of this meeting, including the names of all participants. I received a part of the minutes and publicized all these views by CIA. The agency denied/denounced my statements, since the CIA and George Kinney did not want to reveal to me the background of such an analysis."

In mid-1990s, Janusz Bugajski was the director of Bureau of Eastern Europe in Washington, D.C.-based Center of Strategic and International Studies. Reporter Duska Jovanic interviewed him about the fate of Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic as viewed from

the U.S. angle. When asked, on this occasion, what was going on between the U.S. and Milosevic, this Washington analyst said, among other things:

"What happened when the sanctions were imposed, and before that, is as follows - the opinion prevailed, particularly among members of the foreign-affairs establishment, among people who had had contacts with Milosevic, such as Eagleburger and Zimmermann, that Slobodan Milosevic was essentially a person one could cooperate with quite well. They came to trust him so much that they were convinced that Milosevic would not start a war himself and that he would not spur or support extreme nationalism. However, the disappointment with him, due to the U.S. policy's frequent focus on an individual, resulted from the official assessment that he was responsible for the outbreak of war in former SFRJ. Thus, the sanctions were not imposed because of the Serbian people. Indirectly, they targeted Milosevic, so that people would exert pressure on the Serbian president to either resign or be overthrown. Since the very beginning, thus, the sanctions were targeting Milosevic and his regime. I am free to criticize the U.S. government for not doing enough to help Serbian people get out and get rid of Slobodan Milosevic.

"What is tragic in Serbia is that there are a lot of Serbs that are normal, democratic-minded, but they are still far fewer than nationalistically-minded ones. The problem is obviously in the control over media, over people's thoughts and their bare existence...Milosevic knows it only too well and he has manipulated, outsmarted, and outplayed each opposition leader as he went. He betrayed Seselj and stealthily pulled people's support away from the Draskovic's party. It is mind-boggling. There is a huge controversy between the brutality of the Bosnian war and the sophisticated political manipulation carried out by Milosevic, both in Serbia and with international institutions. The sanctions were thus the only means the U.S. could use against him. You must devise a way to get rid of Milosevic. It is not enough for Milosevic to be only politically dead. If you ever manage to get rid of Milosevic, I believe that the chances for the sanctions against Serbia to be lifted would be huge. Serbia would basically be open to the world, and the world would then open up for Serbia!"

It was written, at the time, in CIA documents, that only three men could bring about the resolution of the Balkan situation - Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic. CIA's file on Milosevic says that he is "...crafty, but predictable by now". That he was not to be allowed an inch of maneuvering space, that he must not be allowed to create a strategic alliance with Russians, since he was aware, as a bankar and pragmatic, that financial and political power did not originate from Moscow but from the U.S. Tudjman's file says that he was stubborn and angry, but also malleable when he gets what he wants, that he likes being on the top, that he knows who is at the bottom, and that he is mellow without the European support. According to CIA's estimates, Alija Izetbegovic is "suspicious, cautious, falsely mild, does not make decisions easily, hesitates and contemplates for a long time", and therefore he wants to make ties with Islamic countries supported by the U.S. It took two years for U.S. president Bill Clinton and the U.S. government to officially recognize Slobodan Milosevic as the only Serbian negotiator in Dayton. In this U.S. base, however, both CIA and DIA had the opportunity

to check out their analyses and their characters on the spot. U.S. agents used the opportunity in Dayton to secretly tape all telephone conversations between the three leaders of the warring parties, Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, and their associates in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. Based on these CIA's recordings, U.S. TV-network ABC even publicized the contents of telephone conversations between Slobodan Milosevic and General Ratko Mladic about the fate of French pilots captured in Pale. CIA's and DIA's physicians in Dayton were even analyzing the excretions of the three Balkan negotiators in order to obtain the full picture of their health condition.

In the moments when they felt Slobodan Milosevic's wavering to accept American propositions, CIA and the U.S. always had arguments for additional talks or, more accurately, for secret and public, even media pressure on the President of Serbia. By doing so, they were clearly giving Milosevic to understand that the U.S. and Bill Clinton are very well aware of what he was doing and what was actually going on in the SRJ. To this purpose, for instance, they used strictly confidential military data about Serbian weapons exports to Lybia, the country labelled as number-two state enemy of the USA. This information was published by all world media. Further, CIA also publicized the information that the Army of Yugoslavia had not destroyed all weapons, in accordance with international commitments taken by the SRJ.

Squeezing President of Serbia

When such steps by CIA failed to produce desired results, Milosevic was squeezed with data on Serbian politicians, officers, soldiers, and volunteer-soldiers suspected of war crimes committed in Croatia and BiH. Muhamed Sacirbey, Bosnian representative in the U.N., for instance, stated for the national television in Washington, D.C. that Richard Holbrooke had awarded Slobodan Milosevic with the entire file on Serbian war criminals, with information and evidence that CIA and the USA had at their disposal, about doings of Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, and Commander Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. And that this evidence was forwarded to The Hague. Replying, by the end of 1996, to the Sacirbey's remark that the White House and Clinton did not want to arrest Karadzic, Mladic, and Raznatovic, the head of DIA, General Patrick Hewes, said that the "conditions are still not ripe for the arrest of Karadzic, Mladic, and Raznatovic". But he pointed out that it was only a matter of time when this would happen.

In the meantime, the White House issued a few statements that Pentagon and NATO were about to make a decision on the authorisation of the international police in Bosnia to arrest and extradite the indicted war criminals to The Hague Tribunal. The media that make use of CIA's and DIA's confidential information, especially the Muslim ones, almost monthly publish the names and accurate addresses of Serbs that have been labelled as war criminals. There have even been hints that the U.S. special airdrop brigade "Delta" tried to arrest Radovan Karadzic. The purpose of the arrest of Bosnian Serbs' leader is not only to make him appear at the War Court in The Hague but also to perhaps make him testify against Slobodan Milosevic, as the first man of the Serbian nation, whom the USA hold responsible for the war in former SFRJ regions. CIA has estimated that the president of Serbia is particularly sensitive to potential allegations for

provoking the war and committed war crimes in Croatia, BiH, even in Serbia, i.e. in Kosovo. Milosevic is therefore always given to understand this.

Peter Galbraith unambiguously says about the judicial persecution of the Serbian leader:

"Radovan Karadzic is a labelled man and I think he will end up in The Hague. I would not bet too much on his future fate, he is a man under arrest warrant, a man chased as the worst possible criminal. As a means of coercion to the Dayton accords, sanctions against Bosnian Serbs have been lifted but they can be re-imposed at any time if they do not fulfill they have promised to in case of the war criminals' arrest."

In 1996, the U.S. believed that their arrest of Karadzic, who topped the list of the indicted war criminals together with military commander Ratko Mladic, would gain them international prestige. For a few months, Karadzic was secretly monitored by U.S. agents, who were permanently reporting on his movements to their base, via satellite. Hardly anybody was paying attention to the intelligence protection of radio and telephone communications in SRJ and RS, and important conversations could be tapped by whoever wanted to do so. It was confirmed, to journalists, by professor Aleksandar Trofoni, former head of Decoding Office of the JNA, who said that the only limiting factor in secret recording of Milosevic's conversations with Karadzic was money. And the U.S. were the only party who could afford tapping equipment and people, even satellites, which constantly record President of Serbia. Americans would occasionally publicize these recordings. Thus, as early as in September 1991, Belgrade-based *Vreme* had the opportunity to publish a part of the shorthand of the telephone conversation between Milosevic and Karadzic wherein the "doctor" is asking for weapons and gets instructions from Milosevic to "contact (Gen. Nikola) Uzelac (Banjaluka Corps), he'll give you everything." This conversation, which also includes Milosevic's remark that "tomorrow is not a good day for air force (Kupres bombing) since European Council is in session" has never been denounced.

Americans were also very much interested in arresting Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, if he impeded the implementation of the Dayton accords. His extradition to The Hague Tribunal would also bring maximum publicity to Clinton's administration.

CIA and DIA reports, however, were saying that there are as many as four hundred mass gravesites in Bosnia. Apart from Srebrenica, the Ljubija mine is also mentioned. Immediately after such reports by secret services, U.S. officials, as well as well-informed Muslim politicians, requested the permit from the Serbian side to enter Srebrenica and Ljubija near Prijedor. One CIA report even says that "Serbs are to blame for ninety percent of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia". This report mentions Slobodan Milosevic's name, but offers no proofs, while it includes long indictments of Dr. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The texts of these CIA reports and the indictment by The Hague Tribunal are also offered to the US. public via the computer network. Since early 1990s, CIA has prepared about twenty reports about conditions in Yugoslavia. State Department's Bureau of Europe was then headed by George Kinney, who later also prepared special reports about conditions in our country. One of his analyses of the number of casualties in the

Bosnian war says that about sixty thousand people were killed in the course of four years. CIA eventually increased the figure to 150,000 and Bill Clinton himself to 250,000.

Acting like absolute world rulers, Americans, ordered by CIA, wrote instructions for IFOR members in Bosnia about how to behave in 1996. CIA experts' analysis says that Serbs and Croats will not fight any more, but that there is a serious threat of the war between Muslims and Croats. In order to preserve peace, both in Bosnia and in the Balkans, CIA wrote eight secret commandments:

"Croats, Muslims, and Serbs should be convinced that wars today can lead one far off the world scene and Western interests, that the world free market cannot bear wars, that political violence is possible only in Africa and on the rims of the world civilization, but not in Europe, that one should keep negotiating and talking with Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade, and thus pacify them with promises of aid and support, that they should be told that the life in isolation and under embargo is hard and cruel, that war as a means of diverting attention from internal problems does not pay any longer, that they should read the Dayton accords from a different standpoint, and that everybody should be offered U.S. aid in resolving interior problems, from economic crisis to fight against crime and smuggling. But they should also be repeatedly threatened with the International Hague Tribunal. CIA's information on the Internet already says that General Ratko Mladic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic are "wanted for allegations of genocide in Bosnia". And about Slobodan Milosevic, apart from the datum that he is President of Serbia - it says nothing. However, the very fact that Milosevic is included in the list implies that Milosevic is also on the list of suspects.

Anyway, it is a crucial fact that all U.S. official reports, particularly newspaper articles and electronic information start with. In his memoirs, thus, Warren Christopher labelled Milosevic as the main culprit for the bloodshed in the Balkans. And two U.S. military intelligence agents, Paul Williams and Norman Cigar wrote a book "Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic" and released it on the Internet as a media and political sensation. The rough draft of the indictment of President of Serbia was thus made up a year ago already, although it has not been done by the Tribunal. The authors are well-known as experts in international law, Paul Williams and Norman Cigar, former legal advisor to State Department, Cambridge graduate, and Oxford student, professor of national security at the Military School of Navy in the state of Virginia. The indictment was commissioned by the "Union for the Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina" from the U.S. In the introduction, the authors state that U.S. and European politicians are inclined to answer the question about Milosevic's culpability for war crimes by saying that this culpability is universally known, but is "unfortunately impossible to prove". On about fifty pages, Williams and Cigar analyze about three hundred sources and testimonies of Milosevic's involvement in the war and his incontestable control over Serbian crucial military and paramilitary formations that fought in Croatia and in Bosnia. The sources described typically originate from Serbia itself. The key "prosecution witnesses", based on statements and interviews, include Bora Jovic, Ratko Mladic, Zivota Panic, even Dr. Mira Markovic, Zoran Lilic, and Ljubisa Ristic. The authors state that Milosevic must have known of operations directed against non-Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia

since the very beginning of the war; that he exerted a high degree of power, influence, and control over the federal and republic armed formations, volunteers, and armed forces of the Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina and, finally, that regardless of all these he has not done anything to prevent crimes and call criminals to account. The authors of the private indictment claim that, based on the principle of commanding responsibility, Milosevic is: - guilty of crimes committed by Serbian forces; guilty for not having prevented the listed crimes and guilty for not having ordered investigation against the perpetrators. One American said, for *Vreme*, that "Prima Facie..." does not fit into the manner in which the Tribunal operates. "It is all very impressive, but is poor material for raising charges". Since the evidence is poor, the Tribunal needs crown witnesses such as Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and General Ratko Mladic. And in order to capture Slobodan Milosevic, Western allies and Americans in particular first have to capture Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. In May 1996, The Hague Tribunal subpoenaed Stipe Mesic, president of ex-Yugoslavia who publicly boasted of breaking the SFRJ apart. In front of the Tribunal, Mesic as a USA man testified about Slobodan Milosevic's responsibility for war in former Yugoslavia, and for war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. And it is in this way that the CIA prepares the world public for possible reckoning with Slobodan Milosevic, and sends the direct message to Serbian president that the U.S. and Bill Clinton have ways to shut the door to the world for him, or shut him up. How far Bill Clinton, White House, CIA and their new acting director George Tenet will go in this respect depends on Slobodan Milosevic's behavior, conditions in Serbia, in Kosovo, Republika Srpska, and in eastern Slavonija.

Unless events in the Balkans, i.e. in Serbian regions evolve in accordance to the needs of unified Europe and the U.S. themselves, there is a high risk - as written in the "Report on state breakdowns" study prepared by the CIA - of new wars breaking out in Serbia, in Kosovo, and Republika Srpska. The White House, CIA and DIA would only use their methods to speed up such an outcome, in order to finally turn the Balkans into their interest zone, which in turn would open another direct passage from Washington to Moscow and stubborn Russia. Besides, this is what CIA's new acting director promised to President Bill Clinton: "We must always be direct!"

Balkan Ghosts

President Clinton had a complete change of heart about grave Serbian crimes in Bosnia, and about Bosnian crisis in general, only after, urged by his wife Hillary, he had read the book by reporter Robert Kaplan *Balkan Ghosts*. Scathed by U.S. critics as utterly ignorant and dumb, the book claims that Balkan peoples have been slaughtering each other for centuries anyway! The main indictment of Serbs, and Slobodan Milosevic in particular, was being written by Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Belgrade, both in his reports and in his memoirs. He rejected any U.S. responsibility for Yugoslav catastrophe and accused all republics and their leaders, and most of all, Milosevic, whom he could never stand personally:

"As the court of history pursues its investigation of the death of Yugoslavia, I can imagine the following indictments: Slovenia for selfishness toward its fellow Yugoslavs;

Tudjman's Croatia for insensitivity toward its Serbian population and greed toward its Bosnian neighbors; the Yugoslav army for ideological rigidity and arrogance, culminating in war crimes; Radovan Karadzic for attacking the principle of tolerance in Yugoslavia's most ethnically mixed republic; and - most of all - Slobodan Milosevic for devising and pursuing a strategy that led directly to the breakup of the country and to the deaths of over a hundred thousand of its citizens. Nationalism was the arrow that killed Yugoslavia. Milosevic was the principal bowman. The Serbian leader made Yugoslavia intolerable for anybody who wasn't a Serb. He is hated among Albanians, Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, and Hungarians. And he has brought his own people into poverty and despair. Milosevic's dream of "all Serbs in one state" is a nightmare today; Serbs are now scattered among four states - "Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia. In seeking to dominate Yugoslavia, Milosevic destroyed it. In seeking to tear out the pieces where Serbs lived, he wrecked, for a generation or more, the future of all Serbs. The main problem for Americans, Bill Clinton himself, even for CIA, was that they could not find a suitable replacement for Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Vuk Draskovic seemed to them politically too tiny, although he had a million-member Serbian Movement for Renewal to back him. Dragoljub Micunovic did not suit them because he vacillated too much in his policy. Vojislav Seselj was too dangerous with his nationalistic ideas. And Zoran Djindjic has always been out of question due to his pro-European mind, and due to his adherence to Dr. Radovan Karadzic after the latter had been rejected by official Belgrade and Slobodan Milosevic. It was for this reason that, in the spring of 1995, the USA decided to come closer to President of Serbia after all, to the man they wanted as their ally least of all, to Slobodan Milosevic. Actually, as Washington, D.C. reporter David Binder claims, CIA analyses showed that sanctions against SRJ were loosening, that Milosevic would survive the international community embargo, and that he would reach the point of becoming the lifelong president of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic was thus labelled in Washington as the central figure of the negotiating process on the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. CIA justified it by following facts: "There is no good and politically viable alternative to Serbian president, who is being accused by the West of starting the international violence that followed the breakup of old Yugoslav federation. It seems logical to expect, in the foreseeable future, the creation of Great Serbia, i.e. a territory which would encompass, besides Serbia, parts of BiH and parts of Croatia, probably Baranja. We will also see Great Croatia, since it will absorb and annex Republika Srpska Krajina. An overall consensus should be reached on these issues." And it was reached indeed, since CIA analysts and State Department experts signed this report, written on seven pages. In the summer of 1996, CIA analyses reached the conclusion that Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, would face serious political unrest in the country in nine months, mostly due to troubled economic conditions. At the time, CIA said nothing about potential unrest due to the theft of electoral results and students' political rebellion which is believed, by people at SPS and JUL, to have been organized in the US.

A similar conclusion was also reached by the Balkan Committee of Carnegie Endowment and Aspen Institute, upon their visit to Serbia and Belgrade in 1996. This report says the following about Serbia and Milosevic:

"The priorities for Serbia in the forthcoming period are as follows: (1) national re-evaluation; (2) political democracy; (3) rule of law; (4) market-based economy. Most likely, Milosevic will not bring these changes. Milosevic's political skill originates from his instinctive pragmatism; the pragmatism helps him to make or reject decisions before the moment when it becomes necessary. In Serbia itself, he has been doing so since mid-1980s. Since 1994, he has very successfully managed to apply such an approach on the international level. When he realized that he was faced with defeats, he made use of them by transforming himself into a peacemaker. In this way, he obtained an aura of somebody who is absolutely necessary/urgently needed. In order to be on the safe side, Milosevic both isolated the die-hard leadership of Bosnian Serbs, and gave a significant contribution to Dayton. He used Dayton negotiations to save himself, and he seems to have made it.

After their visit to Serbia in January 1996, the Committee got the impression that Milosevic's political superiority was indestructible at the moment. He controls police and, quite certainly, the high-ranking officers of the Yugoslav Army. He also controls the greatest part of the media. His own Socialist Party of Serbia is a suitable transmission. At the meeting with the Committee, Milosevic gave the air of self-confidence, the same self-confidence he showed during the last-year's removal of the associates who used to support him but estimated the Dayton accords to be a disaster. However, Milosevic's position may not be so secure in future as it seems today. His Socialist Party of Serbia is far less powerful than he himself. It has a small majority advantage in the Assembly, and can form the government only if supported by a faction. So far, Milosevic has not had to fear democratic opposition too much and can afford to describe himself as a "lesser evil", compared to the nationalistic right - led by Vojislav Seselj and the Radical Party.

Besides, Milosevic is facing the constitutional problem, the resolving of which will test his political skill. There was some talk recently about two possible solutions of his political dilemma - Serbia or Yugoslavia. According to the first one, Milosevic will give up his office of the President of Serbia and will run for the president of Yugoslav Federation in the next elections. The second solution is far more complex. It would imply the total reorganization of the territorial administration of entire chipped Yugoslavia. The present administrative units - Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina - would be formally replaced by a certain number of federal or self-managed regions (six or eight such regions are mentioned as the number), the administration of which would be organized according to the pyramid principle. The top of the pyramid would be occupied by the president: Slobodan Milosevic. This solution seems to be less feasible than the former one. One thing is certain: Milosevic will show the full amount of his craftiness in his effort to keep the power.

Guardian's Accusations

And in order to overthrow this and such Milosevic's rule, a new step in "squeezing" the President of Serbia has been made. This time, the brunt came unexpectedly from England.

A British newspaper, which is claimed to be too close to the U.S. and CIA, published a story about Serbs early in 1997. Its very contents show that it was written by somebody who had officially analyzed the activities of paramilitary formations from Serbia in BiH and Croatian regions. The writing was accompanied by publishing of the photo of Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, commander of Serbian Volunteers' Guard, and of Radovan Stojicic - Badza, deputy minister of Serbian police; the photo was taken in the police training center in Erdut, and its publication in Belgrade press was prohibited. The goal of the article was to bring up the issue of Slobodan Milosevic's culpability for both the war and for war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia. And to extradite this text to The Hague Tribunal prosecutors, so that Serbian president could stand in front of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague due to his responsibility for the worst atrocities in Europe after the Holocaust time. In interviews for the *Guardian*, a former paramilitary commander, laid-off police chief, and a high-ranking member of Milosevic's leftist coalition described how a small group of secret policemen directly controlled by Milosevic had been coordinating a secret filthy war, arming thousands of prisoners and sending them to Croatia and Bosnia. Since April 1991 all until the end of the war in late 1995, paramilitary groups such as Serbian Chetnik Movement and Arkan's "Tigers" were going to murderous sprees of ethnic cleansing and pillaging on a great part of former Yugoslav regions. Threads were pulled, from the shadow, by a small group of people from the Department of State Security within Serbian Ministry of Interior fully loyal to Milosevic, who had brought them to these offices. In the Ministry itself, they were known as the "military line". The witnesses mention three key figures in the "military line" responsible for arming and training members of paramilitary units - Radovan Badza Stojicic, Frank Frenki Simatovic, and Mihalj Kertes. They were working for Jovica Stanisic, the chief of Milosevic's secret police. One of *Guardian's* main sources, Branislav Vakic, said that he had first met Badza in May 1991 in eastern Slavonia, Croatia. "We got arms from them. But in January 1993 we started working together in Skelani and in Srebrenica vicinity."

Vojislav Seselj told reporters that his people had been fighting together with "Red Berets"; besides Frenki, he mentioned Mihalj Kertes as their commander. Kertes was appointed the commander of "Red Berets" by another Serbian war lord, Dragoslav Bokan. While Frenki was taking the command over chetniks in eastern Bosnia, Badza got in touch with notorious "Tigers", Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic's militia. The 1991 photo sufficiently illustrates these "special relations". Arkan and Badza are standing in front of the "Tigers" training centre in Erdut, smiling, with licence plates of the Serbian Ministry of Interior, the British daily claims. Other Bosnian leaders indicted of war crimes by The Hague tribunal gave to understand that, if they were apprehended, they would testify that they had been implementing Milosevic's instructions. Even Milosevic's "supreme spy" Jovica Stanisic, *Guardian* confidently writes, hinted through his friends and colleagues that he had tried to talk Milosevic into reaching the compromise with the opposition and expressed his concern due to the growing die-hard impact of President's wife, Mirjana Markovic.

Jurists at The Hague Tribunal, *Guardian* quoted, insisted on the necessity for firmer evidence before even thinking of bringing charges against a national leader such as

Milosevic. Louise Arbour, the newly-selected Tribunal's main prosecutor, says: "We will have to show legal existence of the chain of command in a clearer way. Startin the proceedings does not make sense without firm evidence which would factually point to the chain of command. At this point, you're derailed." With this respect, *Guardian* published the chronology of suspicious events in Serbia and Yugoslavia:

- September 1987: Slobodan Milosevic takes up the control over the Communist Party of Serbia. He appoints Jovica Stanisic the chief of state security in Belgrade.
 - January 1990: Milosevic issues a decree on the centralization of the control over police forces in Serbia.
 - April 1990: Vojislav Seselj forms the Serbian Chetnik Movement. Vacic is one of the founders. Arkan's "Tigers" militia was set up.
 - December 1990: Milosevic is elected the president of Serbia.
 - March 1991: Protests against Milosevic in Belgrade were quenched with the help of tanks. Milosevic appoints Stanisic the chief of state security service in Serbia, and deputy minister of interior. Franko "Frenki" Simatovic was appointed his deputy. Milosevic announced "urgent formation of additional Serbian militia units". The release of prisoners starts, in order to deploy them for paramilitary tasks. Serbian-Croatian conflicts on the Plitvice in Croatia.
 - June 1991: War breaks out in Slovenia, Yugoslavia disintegrates.
 - Januar 1992: Radovan Badza Stojicic is appointed the chief of public security in Serbia, and deputy minister of interior.
 - May 1992: Yugoslav People's Army officially withdraws from Bosnia. Since this date, JNA and Milosevic deny any ties with events in Bosnia. But paramilitary troupes led by Badza, Frenki and Mihalj Kertes keep operating.
 - October 1992: Serbian police uses force and takes over the headquarters of the federal police and seizes files of the Federal Department of State Security.
 - April 1993: The first Serbian attack on the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. Paramilitary units, including chetniks and Arkan's "Tigers" participate in it. After the truce, Srebrenica was declared a U.N. "safe haven". Vacic's chetniks go on fighting around Srebrenica.
 - January 1994: Mihalj Kertes was appointed director of the Customs
 - November 1995: Dayton peace accords on Bosnia. The accord was signed in Paris, in December.
 - 1996-1997: Street protests are in progress due to Milosevic's refusal to accept results of local elections.
- Chain of command: Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia; Jovica Stanisic, Head of State Security of Serbia; Radovan Badza Stojicic; Franko Frenki Simatovic; Mihalj Kertes, former minister of Serbian Emigration; paramilitary, including Arkan's "Tigers", chetniks; "Red Berets" of the Ministry of Interior.

Crown Witness from Zagreb

A particularly strong pressure on Slobodan Milosevic was exerted in April 1997 when Western media published two essentially identical but seemingly different pieces of information. First, the AP agency announced to the world that Stjepan Stipe Mesic, then vice-president of the Croatian People's Party, in his testimony to the investigators of the

International Tribunal in The Hague, "described Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, as the main culprit for the war in former SFRJ and for war crimes committed in these regions". In his deposition to The Hague judges Mesic said the following:

"Tudjman and Milosevic believed that shifting population may bring about the change and division of Bosnia. Therefore Milosevic formed RS and Tudjman HZ-HB. Tudjman and Milosevic agreed in this respect. They met 48 times since the creation of the states in former Yugoslavia started. Imagine how absurd it would have been if Hitler and Churchill had met so many times during the Second World War. It was insane here as well: we were waging a defense war, and in the same time the head of the states were meeting each other. They consented to ethnic cleansing and to the expansion of their respective borders. Therefore, Milosevic did not care when Serbs fled Croatia after the "Storm" operation. All this was based on their agreement. I did not want to accept this philosophy. I met Borisav Jovic in February 1991. He told me that they were not interested in Serbs in Croatia, but in 66 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they would take it. I told Jovic: "If you have no ambitions about Croatia, let us internationalize the Bosnian problem and prevent the war by talks and negotiations." When I say "internationalization" I have in mind the involvement of international and European mechanisms. I told Jovic that Serbian policy of arming Serbs in Croatia through JNA was suicidal, since Croats were going to arm themselves as well, which would lead to conflict. Since Serbs represented only 12 percent of the population, this would mean that Serbs in Croatia would perish.

In May 1997, however, British newspaper *Observer* published the information that, at one point, Malcolm Rifkind, former minister of foreign affairs, used the power of veto to stop the investigation of the International Hague Tribunal which was to be conducted, upon U.S. request, on Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia. Rifkind reportedly stated that both the CIA and the British secret service MI5 had documents, photographic and phonographic records about Slobodan Milosevic's responsibility for war crimes committed in Bosnia. It was not said then why Stipe Mesic had testified in front of The Hague Tribunal in the first place, nor when and in what circumstances Malcolm Rifkind, then the minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain, vetoed the investigation. The only certainty was that both pieces of information travelled the world and that Slobodan Milosevic was put on the carpet in the spring of 1997. Stipe Mesic in Zagreb described such an accusation as Dr. Franjo Tudjman's attempt to "settle accounts with me and Milosevic", while Belgrade interpreted this as direct message to Serbs that Milosevic should be getting ready for a trip to The Hague.

In an interview to *Nacional* journal, the crown witness against Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian politician Stipe Mesic, once the last president of the Presidency of SFRJ, then the prime minister of Croatian government after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and later on an HDZ outcast, founder of the Party of Independent Croatian Democrats and the vice-president of the Croatian People's Party, says:

"In 1996, on the New Year's Eve, I was contacted as the last president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. After telephone-made arrangements, the two of them, Latch and Harmon,

came to Zagreb. And I received the minutes of this conversation on April 17th, 1997. I asked The Hague judges to determine individual responsibility at the topmost level, starting from Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic decided to go for a war, it is the most important issue, I said. I started from Milosevic as the main culprit who planned and provoked the war in former Yugoslavia. And who implemented it in the cruelest way in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In Croatia and in BiH, people did not start the war because they belonged to different nations and different religions. The war started because Belgrade decided to change borders and create Great Serbia. It was a plan made by Slobodan Milosevic, who initially planned to create Republika Srpska on 66% territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was persistent in his efforts to break up BiH, and he had followers in this cause both in Serbia and in Croatia. And it is exactly for this reason that I agreed to speak in front of The Hague judges. Milosevic will have to answer for his misdoings sooner or later. I am convinced he will end up at The Hague tribunal and receive the hardest term sentence.

Another interesting point is that still another U.S. man testified in The Hague, General Martin Spegelj; his story, however, did not reach the public simultaneously with Mesic's. It is obvious that the last president of the SFRJ was a stronger crown witness than the retired general of JNA and Croatian army. In the spring of 1997 newspapers were writing that Dr. Radovan Karadzic himself was also ready to travel to The Hague, but "under certain conditions". Foreign press responded to such Yugoslav news with the information that the Tribunal was willing to hear Karadzic, and that he would even have "extenuating circumstances" if he testified. The fact that public appearances of Mesic, and then Rifkind, were only the introduction to further media and political exploitation of stories of war criminal trials in former Yugoslav regions, was proved by the U.S. diplomatic routine itself. In 1996 and 1997, Dejan Mihov, head of The Hague Tribunal office in Belgrade, intensively worked, by the U.S. order, on collecting data on Serbs suspected of genociding Muslims and Croats. In Washington, however, President Bill Clinton together with Madeleine Albright appointed her long-time associate David Schaffer the ambassador for war crimes to the U.N. By appointing her deputy, who is otherwise an expert in human rights, Madeleine Albright indicated that the U.S. would not accept the fact that out of 76 indicted, only 67 ended up in the dock in The Hague. While speaking in New York, before her departure for Europe, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright publicly threatened Karadzic, Mladic, and Milosevic:

"Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic has to make sure that any person residing in Serbia, or entering Serbian territory, is arrested and extradited to the Tribunal. This principle, guaranteed in Dayton, was violated a few times in the past. Finally, people from the Bosnian Serbs' entity, Republika Srpska, must realize that we are requesting the trial to notorious and indicted individuals such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, not because they are Serbs, nor due to our political differences or because we look at history lessons in different ways. We want them to be tried, same as we do for all the other suspects, because they have been indicted of ordering mass slaughter of unarmed and helpless people. If Karadzic and Mladic truly care for the future of Republika Srpska, they should stop hiding behind their people's skirts and defend their actions in the open court.

Man Called Arkan

Referencing the CIA and DIA, as well as statements by former Milosevic's closest associates, *Washington Times* announced in their report from Belgrade of mid-April 1997, that chances daily increased for the Serbian president to find himself among those indicted of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia by The Hague Tribunal. "Formerly close allies of Slobodan Milosevic are coming up with evidence against the Serbian president," the capital-based newspaper reported and conveyed that Milosevic had used Supreme Military Council of SFRJ and Military Council of SRJ to create prerequisites for the preparations of Seselj's, Arkan's and other paramilitary units from Serbia, which were deployed on battlefields in Croatia and Bosnia. They also say that Milosevic simultaneously used the Serbian Ministry of Interior to ensure extraditees of military and other aid to the armed forces of Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. "It went on even after the summary executions and ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia had begun," *Washington Times* wrote, referring, on this occasion, to the statement by General Nedeljko Boskovic, former head of the Counterintelligence Agency of Yugoslav Army in Belgrade, about his willingness to testify in front of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. The Washington, D.C. newspaper also published the statement by Borisav Jovic, former president of the presidency of SFRJ, who confirmed the information about the range in Bubanj Potok near Belgrade as an organized center for paramilitary units training. In Belgrade, *Washington Times* reporter also discussed Milosevic's "candidacy" for The Hague with Vladan Vasiljevic, professor of international criminal law. "He formed these illegal armed groups on Serbian soil that were committing war crimes controlled by the Yugoslav People's Army and Serbian Ministry of Interior". Dr. Vasiljevic told the U.S. newspaper that, according to the international military law and The Hague Tribunal Statute, Milosevic was indictable as the "major war criminal, since he was aware, or had reason to become aware, of what was going on in Croatia and Bosnia."

During the last few days of May 1997, Slobodan Milosevic received visits from a several of Bill Clinton's political envoys. The most prominent among them was the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright herself, who spent May 31st and the first days of June 1997 on a trip to Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia in order to reprimand their leaders for not observing their obligations from the Dayton accords. In the diplomatic talks, President of Serbia committed himself to extradite to The Hague persons indicted of war crimes after the fall elections in SRJ and Serbia. SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic, however, denied it right away, saying that Yugoslav constitution does not allow the extradition of our citizens. Belgrade was not publishing the suspects' names at the time. Washington was, however, since the White House spokesman Nicholas Burns said, in the middle of Belgrade, that the U.S. was interested in the "Vukovar trio". The fourth person on his list was Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan: "Raznatovic has not been indicted of war crimes as yet, but we believe that he was involved in war events and abuses in an extremely negative way. Arkan lives in Belgrade at large," Nicholas Burns told reporters in the capital of Serbia and SRJ.

On the last day of May, during Madeleine Albright's visit to President Milosevic, the U.S. TV network CNN announced and then, on June 2nd broadcast, the documentary "Arkan". The author of the program was war reporter Christianne Amanpour. Although the peace had been made in Dayton, although the USA had recognized Slobodan Milosevic as the sovereign of both Serbia and SRJ, since they were negotiating with him about international diplomatic and economic cooperation, this CNN program treated Belgrade as the "number-two state enemy". It could even be seen in the announcement of the "Arkan" documentary, which was advertized, a few days before the broadcast, as a "dramatic testimony about an unfinished episode in the Balkan war". This testimony about Zeljko Raznatovic was a truly dramatic discovery both for Americans and for the world, since CNN can be seen in a hundred countries. Amanpour found the man from the "twelve most wanted list in the Interpol" and "from wanted circulars in 177 countries".

Besides Richard Holbrooke, Christianne Amanpour's interviewees in this program included Sheriff Basiuni, head of the U.N. expert team for investigating war crimes in former Yugoslavia, Marshall Harris, a former State Department diplomat, Aleksandar Vasovic, a reporter at B92 radio and the representative of Serbian youths who would not go to Croatian war, Milos Vasic, editor of the *Vreme* weekly, and Senad Begic, a political activist from Bijeljina. Zeljko Raznatovic had reportedly declined to be interviewed for this program, which ended with the information that Osijek court, based on the records obtained from abroad, was preparing the indictment of Arkan for war crimes committed against Vukovar population in late 1991. Washington unofficially confirmed to *Nasa Borba* reporter that Madeleine Albright asked Milosevic to bring charges against Arkan for war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia at the Belgrade court, since it had not been done thus far by the International Tribunal in The Hague. On that occasion, Albright offered to Milosevic a few pieces of evidence for this trial, supplied by the U.S. side; it is not yet known, however, how the President of Serbia replied to this offer by the U.S. Secretary of State.

Here is what Zeljko Raznatovic replied to these allegations at a press conference in the International Press Center:
"I have been indicted, and charged at the same time, by CNN, for alleged crimes over Croats, Muslims, even Serbs, without the right to defend myself. This program was made amateurishly, by order, in a short time. It showed corpses of bombing victims, not victims of arms. The U.S. intended to accuse me through CNN. On May 27th, Christian Chantiers of the U.N. replied me that name Raznatovic was not on any list of indicted war criminals. How come that CNN is accusing me, when the U.N. and The Hague claim, in writing, that I am not on their lists. If CNN have a prison of their own, why don't they jail me? But they would have to make sure not to jail Christianne Amanpour in the same cell! In 1990, I got arrested in Croatia. I spent six months in jail, I had received a twenty-month sentence. I was the first political prisoner in that new Croatia. Where were, then, those Interpol wanted circulars, when the SFRJ was a member of Interpol. There is only one Interpol's wanted circular with my name, that from Osijek court, for the alleged bank robbery in Zagreb in 1979.

About the Erdut center:

"I was given the Volunteers Collection Center in Erdut from Goran Hadzic, President of Slavonija, Baranja, and western Srem regions. When the Guard was formed, we had only twenty-four soldiers in Tenja. We were under the command of the Territorial Defense, which summoned us to defend the Yugoslav territory, according to the Constitution of SFRJ. I claim that my soldiers have not committed a single crime. We started in Tenja, with three hunting rifles, one "heckler", and a few handguns. We captured the first sniper from Croats. It was only later on that we got machine guns from TO Tenja. We were not armed by the JNA nor by Belgrade. We captured seven tanks in battles for Kerestinovo. We traded them with the JNA for ammunition and food. We were not on friendly terms with the JNA at the time. Their officers were easygoing, sloppy, unshaven, often drunk. And my guys were always shaved and neatly dressed. And alcohol was most strictly forbidden."

About General Badza:

"I used to know Radovan Stojicic Badza from Erdut. He was the Commander of Territorial Defense. He was a good man, commander and soldier. We did not fight together, because he was in the Command, and I was on the front line. I do not know the reason for the General's death. I cannot see the reason. It is disgraceful, however, what newspapers are writing about him. About a bag of a sort. There were two bananas and two kiwis in it. His brother told me so."

About Madeleine Albright's influence:

"Why did CNN broadcast this program during Madeleine Albright's visit to Belgrade - I have no comment. CNN accuses the Serbian people and the President of Serbia. This program is not directed against me. It is a pressure on the Government of Serbia and on Slobodan Milosevic. This is a pressure on us to give away Kosovo. They wasted four and a half hours for it on the CNN. They were broadcasting the reel four days. It is a campaign against the Serbian people."

About slaughter of Muslims and beating of Selim Begic:

"Selim Begic was the Muslim leader in Bijeljina. We arrested him because he was guilty of the Muslim rebellion in Bijeljina. Five Serbs were slaughtered then. We came to the city since we were invited by the Serbian Democratic Party. The battle lasted the whole day and night. Besides Muslims, there was a group of Albanians thrown in by the Croatian army. We conquered the downtown and eliminated all snipers. We arrested Begic armed. He was in my headquarters. I made him summon Muslims to surrender over the radio. I entered Janja. Fourteen thousand Muslims surrendered to me by laying down their arms. Selim Begic betrayed Muslim people, it is his problem, and he is now accusing me. He is a witness in my favor - because Selim Begic is alive. No member of the Guard cut anyone's throat. The use of knife was strictly forbidden in the Guard, in order for us to be different from ustashes."

About slapping Muslims:

"I was not beating Selim Begic two and a half hours. I did give about five million clouts during the war, but to soldiers, since the discipline was of utmost importance in the Guard. And the rod was the best medicine for sloppy and drunken Serbian volunteers."

Once, in Borovo, I lined up the entire platoon and slapped them well. Prisoners of war were not beaten. We were treating them according to Geneva Convention!"

About murdered women:

"The woman lying dead in the street was killed by Muslim snipers. They were fighting like mad dogs, shooting at everything that moved. At their own people, too. For, snipers had no choice, they had been thrown into Bijeljina and could not escape from there. We cleansed the city of these "mad dogs".

About Serif Basnioni's accusations:

"Mister Serif shows that we blinded an old woman and left her in the street to scare people. It is a sheer lie. They were broadcasting recordings from our video cassettes about the Guard, and then recordings from other cities. I denounce CNN, it is below their standard and the standard of Christianne Amanpour. We shall sue CNN for lies. Perhaps even Christianne Amanpour. We talked to our lawyers in Athens and New York. We shall sue CNN and ask for damages.

About his arrest:

"The program shows posters with my image. These were posters we had put up during our party's campaign in Republika Srpska. We were then travelling from one city to another and SFOR did not arrest me then. NATO did not react then. I was giving interviews to U.S. journalists, and Holbrooke says: "He is in Serbia, in Belgrade!" I am, but I have never been hiding. My address is well-known - Ljutice Bogdana 1. I am not guilty, and neither is my army! If Serbian authorities want to arrest me, let it be what it has, as Njegos says. I am a citizen of Serbia and I have to go to court. I do not count on going to The Hague!

About Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic:

"They are not war criminals but decent and honorable people we are all proud of. Their indictments are directed against Serbian people. It is not smart to arrest Karadzic, since Serbs will then become Palestinians, they will all rebel. We are all under suspicion since we are Serbs. I therefore give a message to The Hague not to threaten; if they want to make arrests, let them do so. But do not threaten...

About stories that, after Badza, Arkan is the first on the shooting list:

"I couldn't care less!"

About Slobodan Milosevic:

"I do not know, I have never got acquainted, nor had any contacts with Slobodan Milosevic. I was at General Radovan Stojicic's funeral standing seven meters behind Slobodan Milosevic, but whoever made the photo made it as if I was standing beside him. I have had nothing to do with Milosevic."

A Very Important Person

The photograph of Zeljko Raznatovic and Slobodan Milosevic from the funeral of Serbian Police General Radovan Stojicic-Badza, shot by Pedja Mitic of the *Daily Telegraph* at the moment when Serb officials were waiting for cars to take them from the cemetery, was used to illustrate the fundamental thesis of this CNN program, that war crimes committed by Arkan's paramilitary units against Croatian population in Vukovar, and Muslims in Bijeljina were, actually, a part of the planned "Great Serbian" state policy devised by Slobodan Milosevic. There were rumours in Belgrade, in May 1997, that Milosevic promised Arkan to Americans and that he allowed him to give interviews in order to make him feel safe. This was confirmed, first, in some newspaper writings in Serbia, about Zeljko Raznatovic's criminal activities, and then in the published information by Interpol's Lion headquarters, in mid-July 1997, that Arkan was on the list of indicted war criminals and that international arrest warrant has been issued for him.

The elements for indicting Slobodan Milosevic at the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague have, it is completely clear, been prepared a long time ago - it is only a matter of political will whether they will be implemented. Besides, were it not so, Christianne Amanpour, CNN's reporting star, would not have dared to ask Milosevic in the middle of Belgrade, after his talks with Madeleine Albright: "Are you guilty of war crimes on the soil of former Yugoslavia?" To this question, Milosevic angrily replied that he was not at the press conference, meaning that he would only give statements related to the visit by the U.S. Secretary of State for foreign affairs. Madeleine Albright herself stated that the extradition of Serbs indicted of genocide was the "U.S. priority". She said it although some political analysts in Belgrade, and even some in Zagreb, openly admitted that by the spring of 1997 Washington did not find the suitable replacement for Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman in Serbia and Croatia respectively, and that therefore she was respecting them as both her political collaborators and fellows. However, in the course of 1997, announcements were coming from Washington and The Hague that the preparations for capturing and detaining of the indicted, Karadzic and Mladic above all, were far under way, that units that were to do it had already been formed and that operational plans had been developed. The "green light" for the first action of the kind was about to be given as early as in April 1997, but SFOR's consent was recalled in the eleventh hour, which irritated the people in The Hague even more. Even the Montenegrin prosecutor general Vladimir Susovic was subpoenaed to The Hague, to give affidavit/??? about the Strpci case, and about many other Serbian names that found their way to The Hague Tribunal list. If Washington finds the replacement for Slobodan Milosevic during 1997, or if the President of Serbia, who was appointed the third President of the SRJ in the National Assembly in mid-July 1996, does not fulfill U.S. wishes, Bill Clinton himself would not need long to give his consent to the apprehension of Slobodan Milosevic himself. Besides, on July 19th, 1997, the White House commented on Milosevic's appointment as the president of the third Yugoslavia through words of their spokesman, Nicholas Burns: "The USA will not have diplomatic relations with SRJ, because they do not recognize it, but will maintain contacts with Slobodan Milosevic, since he is a very important person for us!"